ANGOLA: SHORT-TERM PROSPECTS FOR UNITA

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP97S00289R000200250004-7
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 26
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: June 27, 2011
• Sequence Number: 4
• Publication Date: February 1, 1986
• Content Type: SNIE

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Director of Top Secret
Central
Intelligence
100
Angola: Short-Term
Prospects for UNITA
Special National Intelligence Estimate
L :~GGE0
SNIE 71-86
February
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THIS ESTIMATE IS ISSUED BY THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL
INTELLIGENCE.
THE NATIONAL FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE BOARD CONCURS.
The following intelligence organizations participated in the preparation of the
Estimate:
The Central Intelligence Agency, the Defense Intelligence Agency, the National Security
Agency, and the intelligence organization of the Department of State.
Also Participating:
The Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of the Army
The Director of Naval Intelligence, Department of the Navy
The Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, Department of the Air Force
The Director of Intelligence, Headquarters, Marine Corps
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SNIE 71-86
ANGOLA: SHORT-TERM
PROSPECTS FOR UNITA
Information available as of 14 February 1986 was
used in the preparation of this Estimate, which was
approved by the National Foreign Intelligence Board
on 20 February 1986.
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CONTENTS
Page
SCOPE NOTE .................................................................................. 1
KEY JUDGMENTS .......................................................................... 3
DISCUSSION .................................................................................... 7
Prospective MPLA Military Initiatives ....................................... 7
Soviet and Cuban Support ........................................................... 7
South African Involvement .......................................................... 9
Other Foreign Support to UNITA ............................................... 10
UNITA's Military Prospects ......................................................... 10
Key Variables ................................................................................ 11
Scenarios ........................................................................................ 12
The Most Likely ........................................................................ 12
Alternative Scenarios ................................................................ 12
Prospects for Meaningful Negotiations ....................................... 13
Implications for the United States ............................................... 13
B. Overall Force Picture ..............................................................
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SCOPE NOTE
We have addressed the significant augmentation of Soviet and
Cuban support to Angola and prospects for the future Soviet and Cuban
roles in Angola in two recent publications.' Neither specifically ana-
lyzed the prospects for UNITA (National Union for the Total Indepen-
dence of Angola) in depth. Given the considerable Community and
customer interest in this subject, this Estimate looks at the remainder of
1986 from the perspective of UNITA's prospects. It updates the
judgments contained in these two previous publications, with which it is
essentially consistent.
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KEY JUDGMENTS
The military campaign for the remainder of 1986 is unlikely to
alter the military picture profoundly in favor of either UNITA or the
MPLA (Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola).
The Angolan armed forces (FAPLA) are preparing another major
offensive, expected to begin after the rainy season ends in April, which
will be the dominant factor in the military situation for most of 1986.
We expect FAPLA to advance along two axes with the UNITA-held
town of Mavinga as a major objective. Because of logistic, terrain, and
weather constraints, the offensive may well be slow in developing.
UNITA has been making extensive defensive preparations, bringing in
additional troops, and ambushing the government's supply convoys.
Although the full extent of the FAPLA attack has not yet been
discerned, it will be at least comparable to the 1985 effort (about 10,000
men
Key Variables
We see four key variables setting the parameters of military action:
- UNITA tactics and strategy.
- FAPLA weaponry and performance.
- The South African role in combat.
- The level of Soviet/Cuban support to FAPLA
Most Likely Outcome
Although these factors are volatile and interrelated, it is our
judgment that the most likely outcome will be a relative standoff, with
tactical gains and losses on both sides throughout the year.
UNITA claims to be prepared for the forthcoming FAPLA offen-
sive, and Savimbi has declared that UNITA will utilize a mobile, fluid
defense to blunt it. UNITA is also undertaking harassment attacks
around the area of FAPLA buildup to try to delay the offensive from
forming and is planning new endeavors in northern Angola. We believe
that FAPLA's 1985 gains resulted from, the fielding of improved
weaponry and improved performance because of Soviet training and
increased Soviet direction as well as from UNITA's underestimation of
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its opponents. FAPLA's close air support and greater use of armored ve-
hicles will continue to give UNITA problems in 1986 but will probably
not prove a decisive advantage in the overall campaign. It remains to be
seen whether UNITA, with better preparation and reversion to a more
mobile defense strategy to which UNITA is more accustomed, can
reestablish its overall superiority in terms of basic troop combat
capability and offset the improved FAPLA performance.
We expect the Soviet involvement in military support to FAPLA to
approximate 1985 levels, albeit with possible new surges in military
equipment deliveries once the major campaign begins.
The Cuban role also will probably remain similar to 1985, although
we envision more Cuban-piloted air sorties in support of the offensive,
and we anticipate that Cuban-piloted MIGs would attempt to react
more aggressively to any South African air intervention, raising the
potential for direct air combat
We cannot judge how the tactical gains and losses will play out in
the major campaign in the southeast. Although Mavinga could fall, we
believe the major FAPLA offensive in the southeast will probably be
contained short of Jamba. UNITA will also continue, if not step up, its
activity in northern Angola. We believe, however, that there is a
heightened risk that the Cubans and South Africans could be drawn into
direct conflict.
We see two tactical possibilities that would have some impact on
UNITA's overall prospects:
- Should FAPLA garner even limited battlefield successes, such as
the temporary capture of Mavinga or other towns in the
southeast, it will reinforce the MPLA policy of seeking a
military solution to the UNITA insurgency, much as the capture
of Cazombo by FAPLA did in 1985. Such successes would be
flaunted by the MPLA as "major victories," not only bolstering
FAPLA-MPLA morale but also damaging UNITA's prospects in
the eyes of many international observers. Moreover, it would be
tactically significant if FAPLA could not only take but hold
Mavinga, and to a lesser degree Lumbala N'guimbo or Can-
gamba, where there are airstrips. This could enable FAPLA to
interdict UNITA supply lines to the north and provide sites for
supporting air attacks deep into UNITA's heartland.
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- On the other hand, should UNITA stop the FAPLA offensive
short of Mavinga, avoid the loss of other major towns, and inflict
new losses on FAPLA elsewhere, this could revive doubts among
some MPLA leaders as to the efficacy of a military solution, as
happened in 1983-84. We do not believe that such doubts would
have a payoff this year in terms of changing MPLA policy
regarding talks with UNITA or the MPLA's making meaningful
concessions on Cuban troop withdrawal. We see the prospects
for UNITA-MPLA talks in 1986 as virtually nil and the
likelihood of meaningful MPLA concessions on Cuban troop
withdrawal, a requisite to advance the negotiations, as remote.
Should UNITA blunt the offensive without losing major towns
and make gains elsewhere, this would heighten UNITA morale
and raise the estimation of UNITA's prospects in the eyes of
many international observers. UNITA's prospects in 1986 for
gaining additional external support appear quite modest, how-
ever
The volatility of the key variables leads us to envision two
alternative outcomes, which we consider less likely but possible:
- Greater FAPLA threat scenario. If FAPLA produces unex-
pected successes in its campaign and also provokes extensive
South African air or ground interventions in combat, Washing-
ton would share the effects of widespread condemnation of the
South African intervention, which the Soviets would quite likely
succeed in associating with the United States. Although we
envision any such South African intervention as immediately
successful in blocking a FAPLA advance, the intervention-
especially using air assets-would increase the risk of air combat
The intervention might also compel
the Soviets and Cubans to increase support to FAPLA, including
increasing equipment deliveries and taking more measures to
negate the effects of South African intervention. This scenario
would create the framework for heightened prospects of subse-
quent Cuban-South African military clashes-both within and
beyond the time frame of this Estimate. The Soviets might well
deliver nonspecific private or public warnings to Pretoria or
Washington should South African intervention seriously threat-
en FAPLA's prospects.
- Greater UNITA success scenario. Should UNITA do better
than expected in blunting the impending FAPLA offensive and
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gaining successes elsewhere, including recapturing ground lost
in 1985, the Soviets and Cubans would face tough choices as to
how to retrieve the fortunes of FAPLA. We believe in this
circumstance a new surge of Soviet military deliveries would
occur- an e Cubans might well be forced to utilize the
uban ground force in Angola to bear at liact
se ec ive y some of the brunt of fighting UNITA.
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DISCUSSION
1. This paper assesses the prospects for the National
Union for the Total Independence of Angola (UNITA)
for the remainder of 1986. We expect the government
to launch another major offensive against UNITA's
stronghold in southeastern Angola, probably beginning
after the rainy season ends in April. We believe that
the main target of the coming offensive is likely to be
the town of Mavinga, where a key battle took place
last fall. The insurgents have made defensive prepara-
tions in the path of the anticipated government ad-
vance.
Prospective MPLA Military Initiatives
2. We regard as plausible UNITA's conviction that
the attack on Mavinga will be along two axes of
advance-south from Cazombo/Lucusse, and south-
east from Menongue and Cuito Cuanavale. The lack of
roads/tracks in southeastern Angola works to UNITA's
advantage because it severely limits possible axes of
advance. We believe that this overall effort will take
several months to play out, probably not beginning
until after drier weather arrives in May. The advances
may not be simultaneous and may well involve several
actions as an advance is stopped, regrouping takes
place, and then the advance is resumed. Such a
scenario would be consistent with previous FAPLA
(Angolan armed forces) actions, particularly the 1985
the 1985 offensive were reportedly caused by UNITA
mortar fire hitting helicopters on the ground as they
offloaded supplies.
4. Other FAPLA initiatives are likely to be reactive
to UNITA's military operations. We anticipate some
FAPLA effort to consolidate its position in the Ca-
zombo salient. We also anticipate FAPLA sweep
operations in the Central Highlands around the cities
of Huambo and Kuito and reactive moves in the
northwest to counter expected heightened UNITA
activity. We do not expect UNITA's actions elsewhere
in Angola to deter the main thrust of FAPLA activity
into UNITA-held southeastern Angola, although
UNITA operations near the capital, Luanda, or the oil
production support facilities in the northwest could
draw some FAPLA support away to reinforce these
fall offensive.
3. The speed of advance and timing of the offensive
will be subject to two significant constraints: weather
and logistics. The rainy season floods streams, makes
the unimproved roads in the area difficult to pass,
especially for FAPLA vehicles, and usually requires
several weeks for drying out. In previous offensives,
the government's forces have also suffered from lack
of logistic support occasioned by difficult terrain,
organizational weaknesses, and particularly UNITA's
tactics of ambushing and interdicting the forces sup-
porting advancing units. As a result, FAPLA required
significant deliveries of water, POL (petroleum, oil,
and lubricants), and ammunition from air assets, pri-
marily helicopters, during the 1985 offensive as well as
earlier offensives. This put great strain on the Air
Force, making the government's air assets vulnerable
to UNITA fire; many of FAPLA's helicopter losses in
sensitive areas.
Soviet and Cuban Support
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organ." South Africa probably also serves as a conduit
for modest numbers of weapons either purchased or
otherwise obtained by UNITA from foreign sources
machineguns, RPGs, and mortars along with ammuni-
tion. We detected a surge in South African deliveries,
probably ammunition, during FAPLA's July-October
1985 offensive. South Africa is the primary source of
POL and spares for UNITA trucks and also provides
food, medicines, and some hospital treatment for
UNITA casualties. The annual dollar amount of South
African materiel support is modest compared with the
amounts provided to the MPLA by its allies, albeit
increasing. In mid-1985 the MPLA claimed that the
dollar value of South African aid to UNITA since 1975
was $60 million. We are unable to put a dollar figure
on South African assistance. Much of the equipment
probably comes from captured South-West Africa
People's Organization (SWAPO) stocks.
NITA pays for at least some
equipment by bartering diamonds, ivory, and skins.
South Africa also provides a very small number of
more sophisticated weapons such as SA-7 hand-held
antiaircraft missiles and perhaps reloads for captured
multiple rocket launchers such as the BM-21 "Stalin
and markets.
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9. South Africa has also maintained a periodic
presence in south-central Angola since 1978 to obtain
intelligence on SWAPO and to make periodic preemp-
tive strikes on SWAPO guerrilla camps and units.
South African military "special forces" are almost
certainly attached to UNITA units near areas of
SWAPO operations and probably elsewhere as well.
The abortive South African commando strike on oil
facilities in Cabinda in 1985 revealed that South
African commandos operate clandestinely at least
occasionally to strike Angolan targets in support of
UNITA objectives.
South African Involvement
8. The principal South African involvement in re-
cent years has been to supply UNITA with training,
light weapons, ammunition, and POL. Much of
UNITA's military materiel-possibly as much as two-
thirds of it, according to estimates by DIA-is cap-
tured from the FAPLA. South Africa since 1980 has
supplied UNITA with weapons to supplement cap-
tured equipment-primarily basic infantry weapons,
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11. The South African supply of military equip-
ment to UNITA is relatively low cost and provides
some concrete returns in the form of intelligence
cooperation on targets of vital interest to South Africa,
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such as SWAPO and the African National Congress
(ANC). SWAPO has been required to commit roughly
half of its 7,000 combatants in Angola against UNITA
in response to MPLA pressure. We anticipate that
South African support to UNITA will continue and
even increase should the pace of combat require a
surge in UNITA's need for ammunition. South Africa
is much more chary of direct involvement in combat,
however, particularly with regard to its scarce air
assets. Nonetheless, we believe-as does UNITA-that
South Africa will commit air and even ground assets
protect what it sees as its vital interests.
12. South African actions in 1985 lead us to believe
that Pretoria defines its vital interests in the situation
in terms of providing whatever support is necessary to
save major concentrations of UNITA from defeat and
prevent FAPLA capture of the UNITA "capital" of
Jamba. We do not believe that South Africa will
necessarily commit air or ground units to assist UNITA
to defend Mavinga. Should a FAPLA advance proceed
much beyond Mavinga, we would anticipate direct
South African support to UNITA, including airstrikes.
South African air units have adjusted mission profiles
out of concern for the growing number of air defense
units in order to reduce the likelihood of confrontation
with Cuban-piloted MIGs and surface-to-air missiles.
We believe, however, that South African forces are
prepared to deal with either threat should the need
arise.
Other Foreign Support to UNITA
13. We do not see any major "bandwagon effect"
on foreign support for UNITA resulting from Savim-
bi's highly publicized visit to the United States in
January or from allegations of US support to UNITA.
Although we believe South Africa will remain Savim-
bi's key source of foreign assistance for the near term,
UNITA may acquire limited new external support
from African or Western states.
We believe
these reports are accurate and expect that such support
will continue-in the form of funds, propaganda,
diplomatic assistance, training of UNITA specialists,
and a very modest amount of weaponry. A few
conservative African nations-Gabon and Ivory Coast,
for example-have quietly expressed sympathy for
Savimbi, but we expect no more than a handful will
join Zaire in providing behind-the-scenes assistance.
Several conservative Arab states have aided UNITA in
the past, but we do not know whether such aid is
continuing or, if so, at what level. Most black African
states would be unlikely to break ranks publicly with
the OAU's position of support for the MPLA govern-
ment in Luanda.
14. We envision some incremental benefits to
UNITA, however, in terms of increased private sup-
port, more favorable press treatment, and a warmer-
albeit "unofficial"-reception of UNITA emissaries in
some capitals.
UNITA's Military Prospects
15. We expect the remainder of 1986 to be a period
of sustained and periodically intensive combat in
Angola, particularly in the southeast. The most likely
course of events will occasion no substantial gains or
losses for either the MPLA or UNITA, but rather some
tactical gains and losses for both sides. During the
fighting, the possibility of South African air attacks
could arise, heightening the risk of direct clashes with
Cuban-piloted MIGs.
16. For UNITA, the 1985 offensive was a sobering
experience because the insurgents underestimated
their opponents. Although we anticipate UNITA to
mount a spirited defense, we do not expect the
insurgents to expose themselves to the government's
strengths. So far, UNITA has concentrated on attack-
ing FAPLA supply lines and rear bases in the south-
east. We expect the insurgents will continue this effort
during the offensive
17. We anticipate UNITA's defense against the
main FAPLA offensive in the southeast to be more
mobile and fluid than in 1985, reverting to more
traditional UNITA tactics. This may well entail the
loss of additional UNITA-held towns in Moxico and
Cuando Cubango Provinces, specifically Mavinga,
Cangamba, and Lumbala N'guimbo. Each of these
towns is an important objective for FAPLA in that
each has an adjacent airstrip that would enable
FAPLA to receive supplies. The tactical and even
strategic question posed by the fall of these towns
would be whether FAPLA could retain such gains,
consolidate its hold, and convert the airstrips into
fields that could be used to launch airstrikes deeper
into UNITA-held territory. This question is unlikely to
be answered in 1986; should the towns be captured by
FAPLA, UNITA would almost certainly utilize the
rainy season from November 1986 to April 1987 to try
to dislodge FAPLA (FAPLA has had great difficulty in
holding towns in UNITA-controlled areas during the
rainy season when resupply by road becomes impossi-
ble because of weather and UNITA activity and when
air supply becomes chancy for the same reasons).
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18. Even a temporary FAPLA capture of one or
more UNITA-held towns in the southeast will have
some damaging effects on UNITA:
- At least temporarily disrupting logistic lines that
support UNITA formations in nothern Angola.
- Providing the MPLA with a public "victory" to
flaunt both internally and to the world.
- Probably affecting international perceptions of
UNITA's prospects.
- Perhaps most important, reinforcing the belief
within the MPLA leadership that a military
solution to the UNITA insurgency is the "cor-
rect" policy and enhancing FAPLA's morale.
19. On the other hand, UNITA could regain some
territory lost in 1985 and increase military pressure on
the sensitive capital and oil production areas in north-
western Angola. UNITA will almost certainly attempt
several military and sabotage "spectaculars," such as
the overrunning of a major town, the sabotage of key
economic facilities such as power or water utilities
near major MPLA-controlled cities, or raids on air-
fields or the oil support and storage facilities near Soyo
or Cabinda.
20. Although the 1986 military campaign will prob-
ably not produce decisive results for either side,
UNITA will try to blunt FAPLA's main effort in the
southeast, make new gains elsewhere in Angola, re-
pulse the main FAPLA effort, and, as in 1983-84,
heighten concerns in Luanda as to the validity of its
commitment to a "military solution." FAPLA in turn
will try to recapture some additional territory, gain
psychological and propaganda advantages by recap-
turing a few towns, interdict UNITA supply lines, and
possibly gain new tactical and strategic steppingstones
into UNITA territory in the form of airfields and
radar sites at Mavinga, Cangamba, or Lumbala
N'guimbo
UNITA wants advanced antitank and antiaircraft
weapons. We doubt that UNITA will obtain sufficient
weapons to negate the government's armor and air
superiority in the period of this Estimate, although its
defensive capabilities may be improved. Even with
relatively unsophisticated weapons, however, the in-
surgents were able to destroy 20 to 30 aircraft during
the last offensive, enough to cause the government
concern
Key Variables
22. We believe the key variables in determining
UNITA's military prospects for the short term will be:
- UNITA's own strategy and tactics.
- FAPLA's weaponry and performance.
- The South African role in combat.
- The level of Cuban/Soviet support to FAPLA.
23. We believe the most likely course for each of
these variables this year to be the following:
- UNITA will revert to a more classic insurgent
posture in defending against big FAPLA offen-
sives, relying on mobile defense and the interdic-
tion of supply columns, trading some territory for
FAPLA losses.
- Although UNITA will continue to have difficulty
with FAPLA close air support and with FAPLA's
increasing use of armored vehicles, the insurgents
will probably be able to exact sufficiently heavy
losses to preclude FAPLA's enhanced capabilities
from playing a decisive role overall. We believe
that FAPLA's 1985 gains resulted fro__ 'in roved
as
well as from UNITA s un erestimationo its
opponents.
- The South Africans will continue to supply
UNITA with materiel and light weaponry but
cannot meet UNITA's needs for advanced anti-
aircraft and antitank weapons. South Africa will
be reluctant to use its military assets directly in
combat but will do so if it sees its vital interests
being damaged, such as a major threat to concen-
trations of UNITA forces or a direct threat to
Jamba.
- We expect that the Cubans and Soviets will
continue to provide levels of support approximat-
ing the 1985 level without significant new escala-
tions of involvement. The exceptions to this
would be triggered by direct South African
involvement that threatened the viability of ma-
jor FAPLA formations, in which case we would
anticipat air
cover for FAPLA forces, or significant new
UNITA victories that might occasion higher lev-
els of support and Cuban reinforcements.
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Scenarios
The Most Likely
24. FAPLA has apparently "telegraphed its punch"
in terms of its most likely axes of advance, giving
UNITA an opportunity to prepare defenses in depth as
well as to conduct active harassment of areas where
the government is building up its forces. Although we
cannot determine where FAPLA's advances will be
stopped, we believe they are unlikely to pose a serious
threat to Jamba. It is possible, however, that a series of
determined FAPLA pushes, which would incur heavy
losses, could reach Mavinga, Lumbala N'guimbo, or
Cangamba. FAPLA aircraft might raid Jamba for
psychological and propaganda reasons, but such an
attack would probably be ineffectual because of the
dispersed layout of the facilities at Jamba.
25. In other areas, UNITA is likely to intensify
operations, particularly in the northwestern part of the
country. UNITA operations will continue to devastate
the economic infrastructure in MPLA-controlled ar-
eas. UNITA will continue harassing already disrupted
coffee-producing areas and will continue essentially to
shut down the MPLA's diamond production. A
UNITA raid on oil production support facilities at
Soyo or even the onshore production and storage
facilities in Cabinda is possible because UNITA has
publicly targeted these facilities, but we believe such
attacks would not seriously disrupt oil production.
UNITA is also likely to stage more sabotage operations,
including bombings in urban areas.
26. The South Africans will probably not see a need
to intervene directly in combat unless UNITA's forces
are seriously threatened. Should FAPLA present a
particularly inviting target, however, South Africa's
leaders would be tempted to authorize airstrikes or
commando attacks in circumstances that would pro-
vide plausible denial of involvement. Similarly, we
expect the Cuban and Soviet support to FAPLA
combat operations to continue at levels roughly similar
to those in 1985]
Alternative Scenarios
27. The volatility of the key variables leads us to
envision two alternative outcomes, which we consider
less likely but possible)
28. Greater FAPLA Threat Scenario. A change in
the variables regarding UNITA strategy and tactics
and FAPLA weaponry and performance could bring
about a much more threatening scenario.
29. This scenario would arise from FAPLA's mass-
ing a larger force for its offensive than in previous
years, with greater concentrations of armor and more
extensive close air support. Should UNITA underesti-
mate FAPLA capabilities or commit tactical blunders,
the FAPLA offensive could not only capture Mavinga
but continue to advance. This would almost certainly
bring in South African air attacks and possibly some
ground units in an attempt to stiffen UNITA's morale.
Although active South African involvement would stop
the offensive,
would greatly
numerous South African air sorties
increase the risk of air clashes with
A South African intervention
that threatens large FAPLA formations might well
prompt the Soviets and Cubans to escalate their own
level of involvement in subsequent military opera-
tions, setting the scene for heightened prospects of
Cuban-South African direct military clashes, UNITA's
activity elsewhere would probably be curtailed as
Savimbi would be forced to pull back additional units
to defend Jamba. Despite the probable ultimate fail-
ure of such an offensive to capture Jamba, the military
initiative would clearly belong to the FAPLA and its
Soviet and Cuban allies
30. In addition to increasing deliveries and possibly
becoming even more involved in combat operations,
the Soviets would probably mount a major political/
propaganda campaign against a direct South African
involvement. The Soviets would attempt diplomatical-
ly to encourage regional and international organiza-
tions to condemn South African actions, and the
Soviets would also make major efforts to associate the
United States with South Africa's support for UNITA.
The Soviets might also warn South Africa against
further actions, as they did privately in 1984
31. Greater UNITA Success Scenario. This sce-
nario would arise from UNITA's successfully disrupt-
ing FAPLA's offensive preparations or inflicting such
high losses that the offensive does not advance very far
but rather quickly turns into an ignominious retreat.
Should UNITA acquire new weaponry, it could signif-
icantly increase FAPLA's losses of armor and helicop-
ters. This might also enable UNITA's forces to retake
areas gained by the MPLA in 1985, such as the three
towns in the Cazombo salient, and to make new gains
in the north. Such UNITA successes could devastate
FAPLA's morale and force the Cubans and Soviets to
make tough choices regarding greater Cuban involve-
ment in combat. We believe in this circumstance a
new surge of Soviet military deliveries would occur
and that the Cuban forces would probably feel com-
pelled at least selectively to engage in combat. Al-
though UNITA still could not capture major towns and
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cities garrisoned by Cubans, UNITA would clearly
have captured the military initiative. This scenario
would also prompt the Soviets into heightened diplo-
matic and propaganda activity, again seeking condem-
nations of the United States and South Africa. The
Soviets might make representations to the United
States and possibly some nonspecific threats regarding
possible effects of US aid to UNITA on other areas of
US-Soviet relations.
Prospects for Meaningful Negotiations
32. No interested party has written off further
participation in US-brokered regional settlement talks.
But the reaffirmation of the MPLA's commitment to a
military solution at its December 1985 party congress,
Luanda's recent reiteration of its longstanding refusal
to talk with Savimbi, and the government's prepara-
tions for another prolonged military offensive against
UNITA this year all suggest that Luanda is not likely
to make adequate concessions in negotiations in the
near term. Moreover, Angola's dependence on the
Cubans for military support and guidance will contin-
ue so long as the MPLA views both UNITA and South
Africa as military threats. We expect fitful negotia-
tions to continue, but we do not believe a withdrawal
of Cuban troops or a reconciliation between the
MPLA and UNITA is likely over the next 12 months.
Implications for the United States
33. Although we believe the prospects for MPLA-
UNITA reconciliation or for substantive progress in
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negotiations on a withdrawal of Cuban troops from
Angola are virtually nil for the period of this Estimate,
we expect that all parties will maintain lines of
communication with the United States. Should UNITA
succeed in repelling the major FAPLA offensive with-
out sustaining serious losses or losing major towns, this
could well generate afresh questions among the MPLA
leadership as to the validity of an exclusively military
policy toward UNITA. In that contingency, should
UNITA make and sustain dramatic new gains-less
likely in our judgment-this might eventually lead
Luanda to show more active interest in the US-
sponsored regional negotiating process if only to gain
some diplomatic insurance against increased outside
aid to UNITA.
34. Should FAPLA succeed in prosecuting its offen-
sive to the point of triggering direct South African
combat involvement beyond an isolated response, this
could not only risk Cuban-South African air clashes
but also stimulate the Soviets and Cubans into increas-
ing their involvement to offset the South African
intervention. Although the full effects of this would
probably not be seen during 1986, an atmosphere of
crisis could be generated by the Soviets, which would
be compounded by Soviet diplomatic and propaganda
activities.
35. In either contingency-substantial gains by
UNITA or direct South African involvement in com-
bat-the United States would be the target of not only
Soviet, but also widespread African and other Third
World criticism and condemnation. Soviet posturing
could include warnings not only to South Africa, but
also to the United States.
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ANNEX B
OVERALL FORCE PICTURE
1. Luanda and its Cuban allies hold a better than 2-
to-1 advantage in manpower over UNITA and an even
more pronounced advantage in firepower. In our
view, UNITA holds the edge in the quality of its
troops, although this advantage may be eroding be-
cause of eradual improvements in the government's
forces.
2. Angolan Armed Forces. Luanda has at least
100,000 men under arms in the regular army and
other security forces and militia. The Angolan Army is
organized in brigades that average about 1,000 men;
we believe there are more than 60 brigades. Many of
these troops are conscripts. With the exception of a
few mechanized brigades that have heavy weapons
Table B-1
Angola: Balance of Forces
losses.
4. Angola's air strength is backed by a substantial
number of air defense missiles and radars. Moreover,
Angola, unlike Pretoria, can easily replace its aircraft
MI-24/25 and MI-8/17 helicopters.
3. The Angolan Air Force is expanding its capabili-
ties aided by substantial deliveries of Soviet aircraft
and helicopters and a training program for Angolan
pilots in the Soviet Union. Angolan and Cuban pilots
fly MIG-21, MIG-23, and SU-22 fighters and
only limited artillery support.
such as tanks and conventional artillery, most are
primarily infantry units with little or no armor and
70,000
30,000
21,000
7,000
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5. Cuban Military Contingent. The Angolan
Army is backed by a 36,000-man Cuban military
contingent-including some 28,000 combat troops-
which guards rear bases, provides security detach-
ments to guard Soviet military advisers, performs
essential support services, and frees an equivalent
number of Angolan troops for field operations. We
believe that Cuban combat activity is limited to small
groups that supplement the Angolan armed forces by
piloting aircraft and helicopters, manning much of the
air defense system, driving armored vehicles, and
filling other support roles. Over the years, we have not
seen evidence of significant Cuban troop deployments
8. South Africa. Pretoria has about 20,000 troops in
northern Namibia, including Namibian territorial
forces and a smaller number of South African regulars
sabotage groups.
7. UNITA. The insurgents probably have some
50,000 to 60,000 armed combatants of which about
20,000 to 25,000 are lightly armed but well-trained
regulars organized in battalions, most of which are
deployed in UNITA-held territory in southeastern
Angola. In addition, about 30,000 to 35,000 guerrillas
operate in smaller units throughout the country. We
believe that UNITA's troops have generally higher
morale than the Angolan soldiers. UNITA may have as
many as 60 battalions, each averaging between 350 to
450 men. The guerrillas are organized in company-size
columns of about 150 to 200 men or in smaller local
militias. UNITA also fields small, specially trained
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and conscripts in a small strike force. South Africa also forward in Namibia for operations in Angola. If
uses its "foreign legion"-the 32nd battalion, with a Pretoria's total air strength is counted, Angola-from a
nominal strength of 1,100 men-and "special forces" purely numerical perspective-has an edge, with more
teams of five or 10 to 50 or more men for operations in modern supersonic fighters than South Africa. Pretoria
Angola. Pretoria deploys a portion of its Air Force has the edge, however, in pilot skills and tactics.
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