ANGOLA: NEAR-TERM PROSPECTS

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP97S00289R000200230004-9
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 26
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: June 9, 2011
• Sequence Number: 4
• Publication Date: January 24, 1984
• Content Type: SNIE

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Director of
Central
Intelligence
Angola:
Near-Term Prospects
Special National Intelligence Estimate
Copy 3 3 7
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SNIE 71-84
ANGOLA:
NEAR-TERM PROSPECTS
Information available as of 19 January 1984 was
used in the preparation of this Estimate.
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THIS ESTIMATE IS ISSUED BY THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL
INTELLIGENCE.
THE NATIONAL FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE BOARD CONCURS,
EXCEPT AS NOTED IN THE TEXT.
The following intelligence organizations participated in the preparation of the
Estimate:
The Central Intelligence Agency, the Defense Intelligence Agency, the National Security
Agency, and the intelligence organization of the Department of State.
Also Participating:
The Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of the Army
The Director of Naval Intelligence, Department of the Navy
The Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, Department of the Air Force
The Director of Intelligence, Headquarters, Marine Corps
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CONTENTS
SCOPE NOTE ............................................................................................................ v
KEY JUDGMENTS .................................................................................................... 1
DISCUSSION .............................................................................................................. 5
The Security Situation .................................................................................. 5
The Internal Situation .................................................................................. 8
The MPLA ............................................................................................ 8
The Oil Question .................................................................................. 10
UNITA ................................................................................................... 11
The Soviet Union .................................................................................. 12
Cuba ....................................................................................................... 13
South Africa .......................................................................................... 13
The Frontline States ............................................................................. 14
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SCOPE NOTE
This Estimate assesses the probable course of events in Angola over
the next year, focusing on the security situation, the political state of
play in Luanda, Angola's economic prospects, and the UNITA insur-
gents' political and military capabilities. Although the Estimate deals
primarily with specifically Angolan issues, it gives considerable atten-
tion to the prospective actions of those external actors-the Soviet
Union and Cuba, the Frontline States, and South Africa-that heavily
influence developments within Angola. In addition to estimating the
outlook over the next year according to current trends, the Estimate also
examines the likelihood and implications of greater Soviet and Cuban or
South African involvement.
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KEY JUDGMENTS
The Angolan Government will continue to lose ground to the
UNITA insurgents over the next year, particularly in the rural areas,
although we do not expect dramatic net changes in the overall
military situation. UNITA-which has 35,000 men under arms and
conducts sustained guerrilla activities in 12 of Angola's 16 provinces-
will continue to make advances, particularly in the northeast where
the economically important diamond mines and coffee plantations
are located, but UNITA will remain unable to defeat the Angolan and
Cuban forces that hold the major cities and key garrisons. (Luanda has
a 35,000-man Army and 65,000-man People's Militia, and Havana's
military contingent numbers about 30,000, of which an estimated
23,000 are combat troops.)
Spreading insurgent activity will cause Soviet and Cuban backers
to increase their already high level of support to the besieged regime.
Cuban forces may be further augmented, and they are likely to
become more actively involved in the fighting. The Soviets, who have
warned the South Africans they will give Luanda all the support
necessary to protect Angola's territorial integrity, will increase their
commitment to the MPLA regime by sending more arms, supporting a
more active Cuban role, and even increasing their advisory presence as
conditions dictate. We believe that the Soviets have not yet decided
how far they will go to preserve the MPLA regime. While we think
Moscow will stop short of sending its own ground combat troops to
Angola during the next year, there is a growing possibility it will send
pilots, air defense crews, and additional advisers. The chances of
intervention would increase if, in the long run, Cuban forces are unable
to stabilize the military situation.
Despite the probable increase in Soviet and Cuban involvement in
the Angolan conflict, we do not expect the insurgents to suffer major
reverses. The additional Communist assistance, however, will probably
slow the UNITA offensive and will improve the MPLA's capability to
hold on to major urban centers.
Moscow's growing military commitment to Angola reflects Luan-
da's importance to broader Soviet objectives: namely, undermining
Western influence throughout the Third World, competing with the
Chinese, promoting pro-Soviet change, and obtaining greater air and
naval access in the region. Angola serves Soviet objectives in southern
Africa by affording the USSR entree to the SWAPO and ANC insurgent
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groups, which supports Moscow's long-term objective of undermining
the white minority regime in South Africa.
In our view, Moscow could maintain its current level of support,
and even increase it significantly, without feeling pressured to reexam-
ine its position in Angola. Havana, in addition to being ideologically
committed to the MPLA regime, will follow Soviet preferences as long
as the costs of its involvement in Angola do not rise precipitously, such
as by a sharp rise in casualties.
Angola faces an acute financial crisis as burgeoning investment
costs in the petroleum and diamond sectors and a heavy debt service
obligation for foreign military supplies and technicians consume
almost all of the country's hard currency earnings. Overall, GDP
probably will drop at least another 5 to 10 percent over the next year as
a result of Luanda's inability to increase imports of essential goods and
the steady drop in economic activities as UNITA sabotage teams move
farther north. Luanda's efforts to obtain financial relief, particularly
from Western sources, are not likely to be very successful. The
continuing economic decline in Angola probably will prompt Luanda to
ask Moscow for further concessions in their bilateral economic relation-
ship-such as delaying repayments for military assistance-which the
Soviets are likely to grant.
The political balance within the MPLA will remain delicate over
the next year. Ideological factionalism and related racial tensions
between mulattoes and blacks are major sources of friction within the
regime that will continue to impede significant decisionmaking. The
military successes of Jonas Savimbi's UNITA over the past year,
however, appear to have narrowed differences between principal
MPLA factions-the mulatto-led, pro-Soviet, more ideological hard-
liners and the more moderate, pragmatic black nationalists-on the
necessity for an increased military effort against Savimbi's insurgents. 1
Although President dos Santos has reduced somewhat the power of
the hardliners in the MPLA over the past two years-while undercut-
ting the black nationalists even more-we still believe that no major
decision can be made without the hardliners' agreement. Moreover, we
believe that dos Santos cannot overly antagonize the hardliners even on
lesser matters without running the risk of a move against him by this
faction, particularly since we believe that the hardliners retain strong
influence in the military and intelligence services.
' The Bureau of Intelligence and Research, Department of State, prefers the term "Lara faction" to
"hardliners" and accepts the use of the term "hardliners" in the context of this paper only as indicating that
this group in the Angolan Government has consistently advocated close ties with the Soviet Union and its
Communist allies, that many within it appear committed to Marxist-Leninist ideology, and that the group as
a whole opposes any form of political accommodation with UNITA. State/INR believes that, regardless of
these labels, there are few in the government who would take exception to Angola's "hardline" position
against South Africa and UNITA.
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UNITA's strategy is to force the MPLA into a negotiated settle-
ment. UNITA's leaders apparently recognize that they cannot militarily
defeat the MPLA regime as long as the Cubans and Soviets remain in
Angola. However, by crippling the Angolan economy and raising the
cost of the conflict to unacceptable levels, the UNITA leadership
believes it ultimately can force the MPLA to a negotiated settlement.
The South Africans, for their part, probably are satisfied with the
results over the past year of their policy toward Angola. At a minimum,
Pretoria probably calculates that the inability of Luanda to part with
Cuban troops has eased pressure on South Africa to agree to a Namibian
settlement. Furthermore, South Africa also probably believes that time
is on the side of the UNITA insurgents, despite increased Soviet and Cu-
ban assistance. Consequently, we expect South Africa to continue its
current policy directions, to talk about negotiating with Luanda while
keeping up the military pressure on the MPLA regime, with the long-
term intention of driving its Soviet and Cuban backers out of Angola.
Some South African policymakers, including senior military offi-
cers, wish to pursue an international settlement on Namibia that
provides for a Cuban withdrawal from Angola. Some individuals may
believe that UNITA can win a military victory over the MPLA. Pretoria
would prefer a solution that included a Cuban removal, an MPLA-
UNITA reconciliation, and the establishment of a non-SWAPO-domi-
nated government in Namibia, but most of the leadership realizes that it
is unlikely to attain all these goals.
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DISCUSSION
The Security Situation
1. UNITA's Military Capabilities. The insurgent
National Union for the Total Independence of Angola
(UNITA) significantly expanded its area of operations
during the past year, and now conducts guerrilla
activities in 12 of Angola's 16 provinces. UNITA also
has established control over Angola's border with
Zambia and more than half of the Namibian border,
where its personnel act as customs agents and issue
UNITA visas and travel documents. (See appended
map.)
2. UNITA's forces have grown substantially since
1981 when it claimed to have 20,000 to 25,000 men
under arms. UNITA's assertions that it now has some
35,000 active members probably are true. Slightly less
than half of this force, approximately 15,000 men, is
organized in conventional battalion-size units while
the remaining 20,000 conduct hit-and-run, guerrilla-
style operations. UNITA's troops are well trained, well
organized, and well disciplined, and morale is high.
Ovimbundus still predominate, but Western reporters
who have traveled with the insurgents say that UNITA
has been able to recruit a noticeable number of
adherents from other tribal groups.
3. Although not self-sufficient, UNITA appears to
be capturing substantial quantities of supplies-per-
haps as much as half of its weapons-from Angolan
Government forces. The insurgents' arsenal may now
include more small-caliber artillery pieces and antiair-
craft weapons. UNITA reportedly operates a large
fleet of trucks and maintains a large-scale communica-
tions network throughout its area of operations.
4. In addition to its territorial expansion and nu-
merical growth, UNITA in recent years has demon-
strated a growing capability to deploy battalion-size
units in large-scale assaults on isolated government
outposts. The largest single instance of such an attack
occurred at the town of Cangamba in early August
1983, when an estimated 3,000-man UNITA force
overran a 1,500-man Angolan garrison after a two-
week siege. But another battle like Cangamba, where
UNITA took heavy casualties, would be costly to the
insurgents.
5. Nevertheless, UNITA still suffers from several
significant limitations that are likely to keep the
insurgents from rapidly escalating the scale or tempo
of activity. Although the insurgents have shot down
some helicopters and fixed-wing aircraft, UNITA still
is vulnerable to airstrikes by ground attack fighters
and helicopter gunships. UNITA also has been unable
to acquire sophisticated antitank weapons, which its
forces would need if they are to attack more heavily
defended garrisons or convoys. As UNITA attempts to
expand its operations into northern Angola, it will
strain logistic resources and possibly encounter opposi-
tion from tribes not normally associated with the
Ovimbundu-dominated insurgents. While these latter
obstacles are not insurmountable, UNITA's advances
into the northern areas are likely to be deliberate and
measured.
6. Insurgent Strategy and Tactics. During the
past year, UNITA effectively has disrupted Angola's
three major rail lines and seriously hindered civilian
and military traffic on the country's most vital high-
ways and roads. Using hit-and-run as well as sabotage
techniques, the guerrillas also have seriously damaged
facilities supplying water and electricity to several of
the country's largest cities and towns. UNITA initiates
the vast majority of engagements with government
forces, selecting favorable terrain and force ratios.
7. Although UNITA has surrounded some large
provincial capitals, it has not yet launched concerted
attacks against any of them. Nevertheless, Luanda is
concerned about the security of Angola's more vulner-
able cities and has committed additional air and
ground forces for their defense. Although the threat
posed by UNITA to the major cities ties down govern-
ment forces, the insurgents' immediate objectives
probably are to attack those economic targets not yet
seriously affected by the war-coffee, diamonds, and
petroleum. UNITA's near-term target probably will be
the diamond mines in the northeast, followed by
attempts to reach coffee plantations in the northwest,
and finally oil facilities in the enclave of Cabinda.
8. UNITA's strategy is to bring the ruling Popular
Movement for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA) to the
negotiating table by means of combined military and
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economic pressure. Its leaders apparently do not be-
lieve they can inflict an outright military defeat on
Cuban-Angolan forces because UNITA is not yet
capable of challenging MPLA control over major
urban areas. However, by gradually crippling the
Angolan economy and raising the cost of the conflict
to unacceptable levels, the UNITA leadership believes
it ultimately can force the MPLA to a negotiated
settlement.
9. Government Forces. The response to the insur-
gent threat by the Angolan Armed Forces-called the
Popular Armed Forces for the Liberation of Angola
(FAPLA)-has been largely ineffective in recent years,
particularly since UNITA began its northern push.
The 35,000-man FAPLA is basically an infantry force,
with most of its relatively sophisticated equipment,
including armor, operated by Cubans. The poor health
and low educational levels of most of its recruits
significantly hamper FAPLA's development as a mili-
tarily capable force, a situation unlikely to change
soon in view of the inefficiency and weak infrastruc-
ture of the Angolan Government.
10. Angolan troops are spread widely through the
large country to meet the diverse threats of UNITA,
South Africa, and latent ethnic nationalism in the
northwest and Cabinda. Unlike the Cuban forces,
which occupy fairly large garrisons, Angolan forces
generally are deployed in smaller units within villages
and towns, at critical economic installations, and along
strategic lines of communication.
11. Government efforts to deny UNITA a popular
base of support by grouping the populace of some
areas in protected villages and establishing regional
military councils apparently have had little effect.
Similarly, the government has reconstituted Popular
Vigilante Brigades to free the estimated 65,000-man
People's Militia from some local security functions, but
neither force appears to have improved the govern-
ment's efforts significantly.
12. FAPLA also appears to be increasing its use of
foreign insurgent forces based in Angola. Reportedly
operating alongside FAPLA are personnel of the South
West Africa People's Organization (SWAPO)-and
perhaps of the African National Congress (ANC).
Likewise, opponents of the Mobutu regime in Zaire,
organized in the Front for the National Liberation of
the Congo (FLNC), reportedly are fighting in eastern
Angola, albeit to little effect.
13. Despite significant foreign military assistance,
the Angolan Army-which only recently started re-
ceiving concentrated training in counterinsurgency
techniques-has little chance of mounting an effective
campaign against the insurgents. The government
offensive launched last October-augmented by re-
cently delivered Soviet equipment, backed by Cuban-
piloted helicopter gunships, and possibly involving
Cuban ground units-appears to have hampered
UNITA advances in the Malange area. The insurgents
have continued to advance in the northeast. A far
greater direct Cuban combat participation in counter-
insurgency operations is required if the government is
to make much headway.
14. Cuban Presence. The Cuban military presence
currently numbers about 30,000 personnel, of which
an estimated 23,000 are combat troops. A large num-
ber of these Cubans are located in brigade-size groups
in the southern part of Angola; others serve as advisers
and instructors, occupy positions on military staffs,
man FAPLA's logistic system, and operate naval, air,
air defense, and armored equipment. Although we
believe the Cubans are involved in planning combat
operations, the extent of their involvement is un-
known. About 2,000 of these Cuban troops, including
paratroopers, air defense personnel, and tank drivers,
probably were sent to Angola within the past six
months as security conditions deteriorated. Moreover,
some of the several thousand Cuban military person-
nel reportedly withdrawing from Ethiopia may be
redeployed to Angola, but so far we have no evidence
of their arrival. We believe both the Cuban combat
role and the levels of Cuban assistance could increase
in the coming year without posing significant internal
political or economic problems for Fidel Castro.
15. Soviet Presence. Soviet arms deliveries over
the past several months have reached the highest level
since the mid-1970s. There were seven Soviet seaborne
military deliveries to Angola in November 1983 (as
compared with the normal monthly level of two), and
at least eight Soviet military heavy transport aircraft
have flown to Luanda since August with unknown
types and quantities of equipment on board. Included
in recent deliveries have been air defense equipment,
MI-24 Hind helicopter gunships, MI-8 Hip helicopters,
additional AN-26 Curl transports and MIG-21 Fishbed
fighters, and-introduced in January-MIG-23 Flog-
ger fighters and numerous light-armored vehicles.
Furthermore, the Soviets recently increased from two
to 12 the number of aircraft in their AN-12 Cub
medium transport detachment (the largest such de-
tachment outside the USSR).
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16. Much of the sophisticated equipment-with the
exception of the MI-24 gunships-will be of little
direct use to counterinsurgency operations and seem
designed primarily to meet the South African threat.
Still, the USSR's delivery of helicopters and its trans-
port detachment evidences a willingness to support
increased combat operations against UNITA. The
Soviet military presence is chiefly advisory and num-
bers an estimated 600 to 1,200 personnel. Soviets also
serve on military staffs and as instructors and may
assist in operating some Angolan air defense
equipment.
17. The South African Military Presence. South
African Defense Force (SADF) troops have been de-
ployed inside southern Angola since the conclusion of
Operation Protea in September 1981 and now operate
in a salient stretching about 160 kilometers (100 miles)
north of the border and over 320 km (200 miles) wide.
In the intervening two years, the South Africans have
hardened their defenses and improved the airstrips at
their forward bases at Ngiva and Xangongo.
18. In early December 1983, South African forces
(and possibly some units from the territorial forces of
Namibia), perhaps totaling as many as 2,500, began
widespread air and ground operations, some of which
involved penetration of Angolan territory as far as 240
km (150 miles) north of the Namibian border. This
operation was unprecedented in its heavy use of field
artillery and air strikes against Angola's forward posi-
tions, as well as sweep operations against SWAPO. C
in early January they
engaged a large integrated Angolan, Cuban, and
SWAPO force in the Cuvelai area, and claimed to
have killed 324 men and destroyed 11 tanks while
admitting to a loss of seven soldiers.
19. Pretoria's tactical goals appear to include not
only the preemption of SWAPO's annual offensive-
the announced objective of the South African offen-
sive-but also the neutralization of some Angolan air
defenses in the south. South African ground and air
units have launched attacks on Mulondo, Cuvelai,
Kassinga, and Cahama-all locations equipped with
advanced Soviet-supplied radars, antiaircraft artillery,
and missile systems. The South Africans also conduct-
ed a small bombing raid against the SWAPO base near
Lubango, an implicit challenge to Soviet efforts to
improve air defenses there over the past year.
20. If South Africa were to withdraw its forces from
southern Angola, as it offered in December to do
temporarily if Angola, Cuba, or SWAPO does not
exploit the situation, it still would retain enough units
in a state of readiness at its Namibian staging bases to
be able to reenter if it deemed this necessary. Pretoria
also may anticipate UNITA's occupying large areas of
its salient, so that the insurgents can serve as a tripwire
in the event the Angolans or SWAPO attempt to
reenter in force.
21. Military Outlook. Military activity probably
will continue at high levels with neither insurgent nor
government forces likely to achieve victory in the near
term. UNITA will continue to exert strong military
pressure on Angola's thinly stretched Army through
attacks on poorly defended sites and economic targets.
UNITA, however, will remain unable to challenge
Angolan and Cuban forces holding major cities and
key garrisons and, lacking adequate air defense capa-
bility, will also be unable to occupy strategic fixed
positions without making its own concentrated forces
vulnerable to attack by FAPLA airpower. The insur-
gents probably will make new territorial advances but
will find it difficult to make major gains, particularly
in the central regions where westward expansion
would bring them up against major Angolan and
Cuban garrisons. Scattered attacks on diamond, coffee,
and possibly petroleum facilities can be anticipated
during the next 12 months, and these will increase
significantly the cost of the conflict to the MPLA.
Increasing frustration with the conflict and concern
over the suffering of the populace on the part of
FAPLA members will cause individual desertions and
defections to UNITA forces to continue. Further, the
worsening situation could lead to some FAPLA unit
revolts.
22. Since we believe that Moscow will remain
strongly, though possibly not irrevocably, committed
to maintaining the MPLA regime in power, a contin-
ued heavy Soviet arms flow to Luanda is expected. We
also believe that the Cubans, perhaps augmented by
new arrivals, will become more directly involved in
Angolan operations-although not on a sufficient scale
to roll back the insurgent forces.
23. We believe that the Soviets have not yet decid-
ed how far they will go to preserve the MPLA regime.
While we think Moscow will stop short of sending its
own ground combat troops to Angola during the next
year, there is a growing possibility it will send pilots,
air defense crews, and additional advisers. The
chances of intervention would increase if, in the long
run, Cuban forces are unable to stabilize the military
situation.
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24. Increased military aid from Moscow will
strengthen the government's defensive positions, but
will not immediately improve FAPLA's counterinsur-
gency capabilities. Angola's armed forces already pos-
sess more sophisticated arms than can be effectively
absorbed or operated, and more equipment would not
rectify the Army's overriding problems of poor leader-
ship, performance, and morale. If coupled with great-
er Soviet assistance, however, a more active Cuban
combat role could help check major UNITA moves
and contribute to the achievement of a new military
equilibrium.
The Internal Situation
25. The Political State-of-Play in Luanda. The
political balance within Angola's ruling, Marxist-ori-
ented Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola
remains delicate. Ideological and ethnic factionalism
continues to be a major source of friction within the
MPLA regime that has significantly impeded decision-
making. UNITA's military successes over the past
year, however, appear to have narrowed differences
between the two principal party factions-the mulat-
to-led, pro-Soviet, more ideological hardliners and the
more moderate, pragmatic black nationalists-on the
necessity for an increased military effort, buttressed
by expanded Soviet and Cuban assistance, against
Jonas Savimbi's UNITA insurgents.
26. President Jose Eduardo dos Santos, a black who
had been a compromise choice after Angola's first
President died in 1979, has been attempting to
strengthen his position vis-a-vis the major party fac-
tions by undercutting the competing factions. He has
succeeded in removing some pro-Soviet mulatto hard-
liners from the government and replacing them with
moderate blacks and pragmatists more sympathetic to
his policy preferences. Similarly, the President has
taken steps to weaken the black nationalists by remov-
ing their most strident leaders from positions of power
within the government and party. The MPLA Central
Committee's decision in December 1982 to grant dos
Santos "special powers" to deal with the "national
emergency" seems to be part of his design to increase
his influence at the expense of the factions.
27. Dos Santos has assembled an "inner circle" of
confidants who are not closely aligned with either
major faction. This group probably includes Minister
of Interior Manuel "Kito" Rodrigues, Deputy Foreign
Minister Venancio da Moura, Minister of Defense
Pedro Maria "Pedale" Tonha, and Minister of State
Security Juliao Mateus Paulo "Dino Matross." Other
members may include from time to time Vice Minister
of Defense Antonio dos Santos "Ndalu" and Political
Bureau member Roberto de Almeida, an influential
moderate black.
28. But dos Santos cannot make major policy deci-
sions without the approval of a larger and more
diverse "ruling group" of perhaps 10 or 12 key party
leaders drawn from the party's Central Committee
and Political Bureau as well as from the cabinet. This
larger collection of key personalities is, we believe,
Angola's top policymaking body. It includes members
of dos Santos's inner circle, other moderates and
pragmatists-such as Minister of Planning Lopo do
Nascimento, a black-as well as some of dos Santos's
ideological and ethnic opponents. Reporting from
various sources suggests that hardline leader Lucio
Lara, also party secretary, and former Defense Minis-
ter Iko Carreira, both mulattoes, are currently the
most important hardline members of the decisionmak-
ing group. Carreira, however, is a known opportunist
and his position is subject to change.
29. The Soviet- and Cuban-backed, mulatto-led
hardliners are more cohesive and better disciplined
and organized than their black nationalist rivals. Be-
cause of their favored status under Portuguese colonial
rule, mulattoes as a group are better educated and
more politically experienced and sophisticated; the
key hardline leaders are seasoned political manipula-
tors and infighters. Moreover, Moscow and Havana
can be expected to use on behalf of the hardline
faction the leverage they have as the military under-
writers of the regime. During dos Santos's visit to the
Soviet Union last May, for example, he was told that
Lucio Lara should not be harassed.
30. The party's other major faction is a loose collec-
tion of black nationalists, some of whom are often
referred to as the Catete Group. We have not been
able to identify the current leaders of the Catete
Group and, in view of recent trends in Luanda, the
radical black nationalists may have to lay low tempo-
rarily and regroup. Some of the faction's former
adherents, such as Political Bureau member Evaristo
Domingos Kimba, apparently have been co-opted by
the President. Others, like Vice Minister of Defense
Joao Luis Neto, dos Santos has sent abroad for "train-
ing," or assigned to provincial posts in the interior.
One potential bright spot for the black nationalists has
been the dramatic rise to a position of major influence
over the past 18 months of Minister of Planning Lopo
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do Nascimento, a prominent black who is believed not
to be a member of the Catete Group.
31. Despite the tensions that probably have resulted
from the nationalists' losses of government and party
positions, we believe dos Santos's policy preferences
generally accord with those of the nationalists and he
probably recognizes that they are potentially support-
ed by the majority of the numerically superior blacks
within the MPLA, as well as by the urban and rural
blacks and the black rank and file in the armed forces
and in the People's Militia. So far, however, black
leaders have been unable to mobilize this latent
support.
32. Although dos Santos has somewhat reduced the
hardliners' power over the past two years, we believe
that, still, no major decision can be made without their
agreement. We believe that dos Santos's inner circle is
currently in the ascendancy, but the President proba-
bly cannot overly antagonize the hardliners even on
lesser matters without running the risk of a move
against him by this faction, particularly since we
believe they retain important influence in the military
and intelligence services. Although direct evidence of
the relationship between Moscow and hardline leader
Lucio Lara is not available, we believe that Soviet and
Cuban desires probably are filtered into the ruling
group through the hardliners led by Lara-as well as
through Moscow's and Havana's direct dealings with
dos Santos.
33. The MPLA's Agenda. The hardliners, who
realize that a departure of Cuban troops would mean
the end of mulatto influence in the Angolan Govern-
ment, categorically reject a Cuban withdrawal as the
price for a Namibian settlement and favor a military
solution to the UNITA insurgency. We believe that the
mulatto-led hardliners oppose reconciling with Sa-
vimbi because they are afraid that, if Savimbi were
brought into the government, he would enter into an
alliance with the black nationalists in the MPLA or,
with his charisma and political skills, gain a dominant
position in his own right-moves which in either case
would spell the end of mulatto influence in Luanda.
34. The black nationalists, until recently at least,
were prepared to consider a substantial reduction in
the Cuban presence as the price for a Namibian
settlement. The nationalists have been willing to force
SWAPO to be more flexible in negotiations over
Namibia and have favored using the threat of a
reduction in Angolan support to accomplish this. Some
members of the black nationalist faction also have
expressed a willingness to seek a political accommoda-
tion with Savimbi. We believe, however, that the
military momentum UNITA has generated in recent
months, probably has triggered concern among the
black nationalists, who may now believe that a with-
drawal of Cuban forces at this juncture would give
Savimbi's forces a decisive advantage on the battle-
field. For this reason and because the nationalists
probably do not want Luanda to appear to be knuck-
ling under to external pressure, we believe they would
favor a very gradual drawdown of Cuban troops but
only if they thought that Savimbi could be contained
militarily and dealt with politically.
35. The MPLA as a whole is probably dissatisfied
with Soviet Bloc economic aid. 7riX1
uggests that both the pro- 25X1
Soviet hardliners and the black nationalists agree on
the desirability of gaining US diplomatic recognition
for Angola; both recognize that greater Western eco-
nomic and technical assistance and investment are
needed if Angola is to reverse its steep economic
decline. The hardliners insist, however, that, despite
the worsening economic situation, the withdrawal of
Cuban troops-is too heavy a price to pay for such
assistance. Both factions favor supporting anti-South
African and anti-Mobutu insurgents, but the black
nationalists apparently believe that Angola's national
interests have been too readily sacrificed in the past
and now favor a more moderate foreign policy.
36. Economic Pressures. Growing security and
financial problems in recent years have deepened the
economic decline that began with the abrupt depar-
ture of the Portuguese in 1975 and the onset of civil
war. Agriculture has reverted largely to a subsistence
level, as the fighting has cut off major producing areas
in southern Angola from key urban centers. World
prices for petroleum, the country's major export, have
dropped in recent years, depressing foreign exchange
earnings. As a result, imported spare parts and other
inputs are in short supply, cutting industrial output to
around 20 percent of capacity and forcing many
plants to shut down altogether.
37. These pressures also are presenting the govern-
ment with an acute financial crisis. The problem
recently has come to a head as burgeoning investment
costs in the petroleum and diamond sectors and a
heavy debt service obligation for foreign military
supplies and technicians consume almost all of the
country's hard currency earnings. Even though Mos-
cow reportedly has agreed to a three-year moratorium
on repayment of about $750 million in loans for
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military hardware supplied between 1976 and 1982,
Luanda has not been able to meet its remaining
obligations to the Soviet Union and its allies or to
Western creditors. Luanda is bartering oil for vital
food imports, and reportedly wants to pay part of the
debt owed to Cuba for military and economic assist-
ance in oil rather than hard currency.
38. Overall GDP probably will drop at least another
5 to 10 percent over the next year as a result of
Luanda's inability to increase imports of goods-
restoring depleted stocks of industrial raw materials,
intermediate goods, fertilizers, machinery, and spare
parts probably would require at least a 40-percent
increase in imports-and the steady drop in economic
activity as UNITA's sabotage teams move farther
north. Food production is likely to continue declining,
as farmers flock to the cities or resort to subsistence
agriculture. This will make the dos Santos regime even
more dependent on food imports and further strain an
already overtaxed transportation system.
39. The rising demand for imports comes at a time
when a big chunk of Luanda's export receipts is being
used to pay off various service costs. Although new oil
production will boost oil sales this year to around $1.6
billion, Luanda reportedly agreed to turn over about
one-fourth of this amount to the USSR and Eastern
Europe to pay for Communist military and economic
assistance. Most of the remaining oil revenues already
have been mortgaged to cover petroleum investment
costs for a gas injection project in Cabinda. Luanda
also probably will have to make some gesture to stem
the burgeoning backlog on short-term debt to keep
open the credit lines that finance most of its nonmili-
tary imports. Finally, we will be watching for further
indications of accelerated capital flight as members of
the Angolan elite become more anxious about their
own future.
40. Luanda's efforts to obtain financial relief, par-
ticularly from Western sources, are not likely to be
very successful. Private creditors have become increas-
ingly reluctant to extend loans because of the uncer-
tain situation, lags in repayment of trade credits, and
the failure of Angolan officials to provide accurate
financial data. A more recent cause of concern has
been the large, unexplained Angolan cash withdrawals
from several Western banks. Western donors-includ-
ing France, Brazil, Portugal, Italy, and Spain-have
indicated that they will limit their support to govern-
ment-guaranteed trade credits, a few investment
loans, and some food aid.
41. In the absence of any substantial aid, we expect
Luanda to ask Moscow for greater concessions in their
bilateral military and economic relationships. The
USSR is likely to modify the moratorium on repay-
ments for military equipment to include some deliver-
ies in 1983 and 1984. Moscow, however, will press
Luanda to continue cash payments for Soviet and
Cuban personnel in Angola and for spare parts and
repairs. Moscow, moreover, probably will insist on
repayment of Angola's overdue commercial debt, al-
though the Soviets also will be sensitive to indications
that Luanda is running into problems paying for food
and other essential goods and services needed to keep
the government in power.
42. A critical element in Luanda's staying power is
the uninterrupted flow of oil exports. Oil revenues
currently account for over 85 percent of Luanda's
foreign exchange, a share that is certain to rise as
output from newly developed oilfields off the coast of
Cabinda comes onstream. Angola's expected sales of
about $1.6 billion in 1984 and the prospect of more in
future years will ensure Luanda's ability to pay over
the long term for Cuban troops and Soviet hardware.
The importance of the oil industry operated and
financed by US and other Western companies makes it
an inviting target for some type of military action by
UNITA. We doubt that UNITA can carry out a
coordinated attack against Angola's various production
facilities without South African or other highly skilled
foreign assistance, but a small number of trained
commandos probably could destroy a number of
offshore production platforms. Also vulnerable to sab-
otage is the system of pipelines that carry crude from
the platforms to an onshore facility where water, sand,
and other impurities are separated out before the oil is
pumped out to a loading buoy. Hitting the pipelines
would shut down production for about a week. Repair-
ing damaged production platforms would take consid-
erably longer, and the facilities would be very costly to
rebuild.
43. Sabotage of the petroleum facilities could
prompt a decision by the Western companies to pull
out temporarily. Such a move, however, almost cer-
tainly would result in Soviet pressure to take over the
fields. While the Soviets can repair damage to pipe-
lines or the loading buoy, we do not believe they have
the technical expertise and operating equipment to
rebuild or replace offshore production platforms.
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44. Organization and Leadership. Jonas Malheiro
Savimbi remains UNITA's unchallenged leader as
party president and commander in chief of the Armed
Forces for the Liberation of Angola (FALA), UNITA's
military wing. In addition to its estimated forces of
35,000, UNITA may have another 30,000 unarmed
and untrained supporters or adherents, a number that
probably includes the families of the fighters as well as
other civilians living within UNITA-controlled areas.
45. A 17-member Politburo is the top party organ.
The leading officials after Savimbi are party Secretary
General Miguel N'Zau Puna, a long-time Savimbi
associate, and the military chief of staff, Demostenes
Chilingutila. Puna is a Cabindan, and the UNITA
leadership includes a few other non-Ovimbundus as
well.
46. UNITA in affect governs southeastern Angola
and has established rudimentary, but well-run, health
and educational services and agricultural enterprises,
as well as a police force. UNITA's priorities at present,
however, are on its military effort.
48. UNITA appears to lack other figures with Sa-
vimbi's broad personal appeal, international recogni-
tion, and exceptional leadership abilities. His removal
through death or incapacitation would be a severe
setback. We do not believe UNITA would wither
away, however, but it would be considerably weak-
ened and disorganized at least in the short term.
Ultimately, it could emerge as a more inflexible
movement seeking an all-out military victory rather
than a negotiated solution. UNITA might also become
more heavily influenced by South Africa without a
leader of Savimbi's stature to maintain a degree of
independence. This view of Savimbi's importance to
UNITA is shared by leaders in Luanda, and MPLA-,
Cuban-, or Soviet-backed assassination attempts are a
real possibility, especially during Savimbi's travels
abroad.
49. Political Objectives. UNITA's stated goal is to
end the MPLA's monopoly on political power in
Luanda and, through sustained military pressure, to
ensure that no government that does not include
UNITA can rule effectively. Eventually, in UNITA's
view, the MPLA will be forced to negotiate an end to
the conflict and share power with the insurgents.
UNITA, however, probably is uncertain about the
final form of a negotiated settlement. Savimbi foresees
a coalition central government with power shared
among tribal and regional groups. Savimbi also has
said that, with the ethnic orientation of Angolan
politics, the formation of a single party would not be
possible at present.
50. UNITA currently rejects the concept of a feder-
al system that would limit UNITA to the territory it
now controls in southern and southeastern Angola, in
effect creating a buffer state between South Africa
and a truncated Angola. We also believe UNITA
would reject any MPLA proposal to grant UNITA a
role in any government that excluded Savimbi.
UNITA's attitude, however, may be hardening in view
of the MPLA's continued refusal to negotiate and
UNITA's own sustained military successes. We be-
lieve, for example, that UNITA at one time might
have been willing to accept a share in the government
proportional to its ethnic representation in the country
but now probably wants more.
51. The South African Connection. We believe
South African assistance to UNITA probably fueled
UNITA's recent advances. Although we lack detailed
evidence, we believe that South Africa's direct support
to the guerrillas has been substantial and has increased
in recent years. In addition, Pretoria's periodic mili-
tary incursions into southern Angola and its creation of
a "buffer zone" there indirectly have benefited
UNITA by tying down substantial numbers of Cuban
and Angolan forces in defensive positions near the
South African-controlled zone.
52. South African aid has included arms and am-
munition, military training, fuel, spare parts, food,
medicines and medical treatment, and exchange of
intelligence. Senior South African officials meet peri-
odically with Savimbi, and we believe there is a
continuing close liaison. Savimbi has openly acknowl-
edged that UNITA accepts aid from South Africa,
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although he has not been candid about the extent of its
assistance.
53. South African material assistance has been criti-
cally important to UNITA because of its magnitude,
regularity, and reliability. We believe that UNITA's
military advances over the past year were materially
aided by increases in South African support. If South
African aid to UNITA were to cease or be reduced
sharply
the insurgents probab y wou e
required to scale back the level of their military
operations. However, UNITA would remain a viable
insurgency, controlling at least the southeastern por-
tions of Angola, as well as continuing to operate in
central and eastern Angola, since UNITA continues to
capture a substantial amount-perhaps as much as
half-of its arms and ammunition from the Angolan
Army. Moreover, UNITA earns a small amount of
foreign exchange through diamond and ivory smug-
gling which it uses to purchase supplies on the interna-
tional arms market.
54. Although Savimbi works closely with Pretoria,
we believe that both Savimbi and South Africa recog-
nize that theirs is a marriage of convenience only.
Savimbi is not now Pretoria's puppet, but his
independence from South Africa is clearly limited by
UNITA's dependence on South African support.
55. Other Foreign Contacts. UNITA has received
aid in the past from a variety of diverse sources, but
such assistance has fallen off in recent years as more
governments have recognized Luanda. France provid-
ed arms, supplies, and training, but apparently cut off
its aid after the Socialists came to power in 1981.
Morocco provided training and small arms, helped
funnel assistance from other donors to UNITA, and
facilitated contacts between UNITA and Arab coun-
tries, but reportedly followed France's lead in cutting
off assistance. Saudi Arabia provided considerable
financial aid, but has not done so since the late 1970s.
China provided training to UNITA leaders in the
1960s and furnished substantial quantities of small
arms and other supplies in the late 1970s, but Beijing
has established diplomatic relations with Luanda and
probably no longer assists UNITA.
56. Western-oriented black African nations evi-
dently have cut back support that had included facili-
tating shipments of foreign supplies to UNITA-con-
trolled areas, furnishing UNITA with travel
documents, and allowing UNITA open representation
in their capitals. There is some evidence that Zaire still
permits UNITA to operate on its territory, or at least
turns a blind eye to a small UNITA presence.
57. There have been recent signs that some coun-
tries may be moving to establish unofficial or informal
contacts with UNITA. Zambia is said to be initiating
contacts with UNITA representatives in Europe, and
Congo is reported to be extending feelers. The Congo-
lese have also been urging the MPLA to reach an
accommodation with UNITA. Although Savimbi is
unlikely to receive any immediate public support or
materiel assistance from these renewed contacts, the
insurgents will be encouraged by the new signs of
acceptability. UNITA representatives abroad report a
greater openness on the part of certain European and
African nations toward UNITA.
58. Moscow's growing military commitment to An-
gola reflects Luanda's importance to broader Soviet
objectives-namely, undermining Western influence
throughout the Third World, competing with the
Chinese, promoting pro-Soviet change, and obtaining
greater air and naval access in the region. Angola
serves Soviet objectives in southern Africa by affording
the USSR entree to SWAPO and the ANC, which
supports Moscow's long-term objective of undermining
the white minority regime in South Africa. Angola also
provides the Soviets with the capability to monitor and
exploit any unrest in neighboring Zaire.
59. The USSR traditionally has displayed its com-
mitment to the MPLA through the provision of mili-
tary assistance. Since 1975, when Soviet arms, logistic
support, and Cuban troops helped bring the MPLA to
power, Moscow has signed military accords worth
some $2 billion, of which $1.3 billion has been deliv-
ered; this support has been essential to the regime's
efforts to consolidate its power. As the security threat
has increased during the past two years, from both
UNITA and the South Africans, the USSR has provid-
ed more and better military equipment. Soviet advis-
ers may also be assuming a more active role, possibly
including some command and control functions.
60. Soviet calculations about Angola may be further
affected by Moscow's perceptions that it faces a
renewed US challenge to its influence around the
globe. In an authoritative statement on 5 January,
TASS charged that recent South African incursions
were "directly linked to the stepped-up aggressiveness
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... of US imperialism and to acts of lawlessness perpe-
trated by it against ... Grenada, Lebanon, and Nicara-
gua." A related consideration for Moscow is the "pres-
tige factor." Angola remains a symbol of the USSR's
superpower status, of Soviet willingness and capability
to project power to distant areas. A failure to support
Angola-which in 1976 signed a Soviet Friendship and
Cooperation Treaty-would damage Moscow's credi-
bility among other Third World clients and belie
Moscow's claims of a growing pro-Soviet tilt in "the
world correlation of forces."
61. We believe these various considerations will
lead Moscow to escalate its military commitment to
the MPLA regime as conditions in Angola dictate.
Soviet officials already have told the South Africans
they will give Luanda all the support necessary to
protect Angola's territorial integrity. Future steps
could include the provision of more military hard-
ware, new augmentations of Cuban troops, a more
offensive-minded Cuban troop posture against the
UNITA forces, and/or increased Soviet advisory sup-
port and involvement in planning and directing Ango-
lan military operations. We believe that the Soviets
have not yet decided how far they will go to preserve
the MPLA regime. While we think Moscow will stop
short of sending its own ground combat troops to
Angola during the next year, there is a growing
possibility it will send pilots, air defense crews, and
additional advisers. The chances of intervention would
increase if, in the long run, Cuban forces are unable to
stabilize the military situation.
62. Havana's involvement in Luanda has won re-
spect and prestige for Fidel Castro in the Third World,
burnished his image as a major revolutionary figure,
and enabled him to play a far greater international
role than Cuba's size and importance would normally
allow. Moreover, the financially strapped Cubans earn
hard currency by charging Angola for the services of
Cuban troops and civilian personnel. Angola is also an
important outlet for Cuba's surplus labor, and a return
to Cuba of the approximate 36,000 military and
civilian personnel now stationed in Angola would
aggravate Havana's already serious unemployment
problem. Perhaps the most important factor, however,
is Castro's need to provide a return to Moscow for the
$4-5 billion in economic assistance it renders to Cuba
annually. By serving Soviet policy goals in Angola,
Havana helps justify the USSR's massive assistance
program for Cuba.
63. Havana, in addition to being ideologically com-
mitted to the MPLA regime will follow Soviet prefer-
ences as long as the costs of its involvement in Angola
do not rise precipitously. Nonetheless, the Soviets
probably could veto a Cuban pullout from Angola-
motivated by a dramatic rise in Cuban casualties-
unless Castro was convinced that failure to do so
would seriously threaten his own regime. At this point,
even Moscow would reassess its position-that is,
whether a continued Cuban presence in Angola was
worth risking instability in a far more important
client, Cuba. Given current trends, however, Havana's
troops could remain in Angola for years. Without a
total collapse of the MPLA, the Cubans probably see
little prospect for a change in their current role. They
could even increase the Cuban military presence
substantially if Moscow and Luanda provided the right
incentives.
64. Pretoria's military involvement in Angola dates
from the 1975-76 Angolan civil war, when its pre-
ferred contenders for power, UNITA and the Front
for the National Liberation of Angola (FNLA), were
forced back into the bush by Soviet- and Cuban-
backed MPLA forces. Pretoria's worst fears were
realized when Angola became a safehaven for SWAPO
and ANC guerrillas, formed close links to the USSR
and Cuba, and declared its intentions to become a
Communist state. South Africa now sees an opportuni-
ty to reverse this development and appears deter-
mined to help secure for Jonas Savimbi a share of
political power. This objective, which Pretoria appar-
ently sees as obtainable in the long term, may be one
of South Africa's prerequisites to a settlement in
Namibia.
65. Some South African policymakers, including
senior military officers, wish to pursue an international
settlement on Namibia that provides for a Cuban
withdrawal from Angola. Some individuals may be-
lieve that UNITA can win a military victory over the
MPLA. Pretoria would prefer a solution which includ-
ed a Cuban removal, an MPLA-UNITA reconciliation,
and the establishment of a non-SWAPO-dominated
government in Namibia, but most of the leadership
realizes that it is unlikely to attain all these goals.
66. While Pretoria realizes that it could not control
an Angola led by Jonas Savimbi, it probably is con-
vinced that a government in which he participated
would be useful in attaining other strategic objectives:
namely, the neutralization of SWAPO as a military
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force, the end of the ANC's military presence in
Angola, and the reduction or end of the largest Soviet
and Cuban presence in southern Africa. Helping
Savimbi take power also would serve as a serious
warning to other states in the region that South Africa
was prepared to commit major military assets in order
to impose acceptable political and economic arrange-
ments throughout southern Africa.
67. South Africa has been stressing military action
as the leading instrument of its Angolan policy. But it
has not totally abandoned its diplomatic track, having
engaged in abortive bilateral talks with Angolan lead-
ers at Cape Verde in late December 1982 and Febru-
ary 1983, and offering recently to withdraw its forces
temporarily from Angola if Luanda, SWAPO, or Cuba
does not exploit the situation. At this juncture, howev-
er, these initiatives appear to be a sideshow. Pretoria is
sufficiently confident of UNITA's military capabili-
ties, buttressed by South Africa, to believe the MPLA
will be forced sooner rather than later to negotiate.
The Frontline States
68. Angola's fellow Frontline States (FLS)-Tanza-
nia, Mozambique, Zimbabwe, Zambia, and Botswa-
na-have become virtual bystanders in the Namibia-
Angola equation. The Contact Group initiative and the
deteriorating economic and security situation in the
region have tended to shunt aside the FLS. FLS
ineffectiveness in dealing with the complexities of the
Angolan situation also reflects the weaknesses of the
individual member states-particularly the preoccu-
pation with the grave economic difficulties each
faces-and serious differences among them over the
appropriate course of action for Luanda.
69. As a group, the Frontline States continue to
support the MPLA position that the Cuban troop
withdrawal question should not be linked to Namibian
independ- ence. Nonetheless, Mozambique and Zam-
bia have advised the MPLA leadership to be more
flexible on the Cuban issue, and have even suggested
talking directly to South Africa about a possible
deescalation of the fighting. Only President Nyerere of
Tanzania, the FLS chairman, remains adamantly op-
posed to contacts between any Frontline State and
Pretoria. The States also are divided in their positions
regarding UNITA. Although the group remains for-
mally united in its support of the MPLA as the
legitimate government of Angola, Zambia and, to a
lesser extent, Botswana believe that, in view of the
obvious inability of the MPLA and its Communist
allies to defeat Savimbi's forces on the battlefield, an
eventual political accommodation will be necessary.
70. Finally, even the one proposal introduced by an
African state to find a way out of the Angolan
impasse-the suggestion by former Nigerian head of
state Shagari that the Cuban troops be replaced by an
African peacekeeping force-did not emerge from the
Frontline group. The Nigerian proposal was a non-
starter; but the continuing inability of the FLS either
to produce new initiatives or to exert much influence
on any of the major actors suggests that the States will
continue to play a minor role, particularly so relative
to the central importance of their role in the Zimbab-
wean independence negotiations.
71. On balance, we do not expect the situation in
Angola to change very much over the next year,
although security and economic conditions will contin-
ue to deteriorate. UNITA will continue to make
advances, particularly in the northeast, but probably
will remain unable to challenge Angolan and Cuban
forces holding major cities and key garrisons. Spread-
ing insurgent activity, however, will deepen the
MPLA's sense of peril and cause its Soviet and Cuban
backers to continue their high level of military assist-
ance to the besieged regime. Consequently, despite the
ebb and flow of the insurgency and of Communist
involvement, we believe the overall military situation
will continue over the next year.
72. We think it is likely that the Cuban forces will
be increased and that the Cubans will become more
actively involved in counterinsurgency operations,
preferring to at least challenge UNITA in vital parts of
the countryside rather than adopt a nationwide "en-
clave" strategy. We do not expect the Cubans to
become sufficiently involved in the fighting to inflict
major reverses on the insurgents, anticipating rather
that they will do only enough to help prevent the
MPLA regime from losing significant new ground to
Savimbi's insurgents.
73. Because we expect the overall military situation
to persist over the next year, we do not anticipate that
Moscow will face crucial decisions on its commitment
to the MPLA regime. The Soviet Union can maintain
its current level of support, and even increase it
significantly, without feeling pressured to reexamine
its position in Angola. Moscow will increase its military
commitment as security conditions dictate, including
sending more arms, extending more credit, encourag-
ing Cuba to send more troops and adopt a more active
combat role, and increasing its advisory role.
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74. As long as President dos Santos moves cautious-
ly, he probably can survive. Divisions within the
MPLA will not prevent him from continuing negotia-
tions with the United States and with South Africa.
Nonetheless, it is unlikely that dos Santos can move
decisively away from current policy directions in the
near term because of serious divisions within the
ruling party, the unstable security situation, and the
pressures being exerted on him by the USSR.
75. Despite the probability that the standoff be-
tween dos Santos and his party opponents will persist
over the near term, the power equation in Luanda
could change dramatically and with little warning.
The continued deterioration in security and economic
conditions in Angola could prompt disgruntled pro-
Soviet hardliners to engineer a palace coup. Dos
Santos's apprehensions about such an eventuality may
have contributed to the hardening of his position on
UNITA and on a Cuban withdrawal. As long as dos
Santos moves cautiously, he probably will remain in
power. His chances of being deposed increase signifi-
cantly if he moves in policy directions that threaten
the influence in Luanda of mulatto-led, Soviet-backed
hardliners. The possibility that the black nationalists,
perhaps in league with disaffected elements of the
Angolan Army, would take over the government seems
remote, partly because we believe that the hardliners
have increased their influence in the government's
security forces as Soviet and Cuban military assistance
has increased over the past year.
76. UNITA has little alternative but to keep on
fighting. Savimbi undoubtedly knows that, as long as
the hardliners maintain their strong position in the
MPLA, the only negotiations over power sharing in
Angola that could occur would be over his dead body.
Moreover, continued military pressure from the insur-
gents probably will cause black moderates in the
MPLA to be almost as wary of negotiations as the
mulattoes.
77. The South Africans, for their part, probably are
satisfied with the results over the past year of their
policy toward Angola. At a minimum, Pretoria proba-
bly calculates that the inability of Luanda to part with
Cuban troops has eased pressure on South Africa to
agree to a Namibian settlement. Furthermore, South
Africa also believes that time is on the side of the
UNITA insurgents, despite increased Soviet and Cu-
ban assistance. A recent South African military intelli-
gence estimate concluded that UNITA is now the
dominant armed force in Angola and that more Soviet
and Cuban involvement would only turn Angola into
the Soviets' "Vietnam in Africa." Consequently, we
expect South Africa to continue its current policy
direction, to talk about negotiating with Luanda while
keeping up the military pressure on the MPLA regime
with the long-term intention of driving their Commu-
nist backers out of Angola.
78. The possibility exists, of course, that the vio-
lence might escalate in Angola to the point of large-
scale, open warfare between South Africa and Ango-
lan-Cuban forces, an eventuality that could greatly
deepen Soviet involvement in Angola. From this per-
spective, the year opened ominously with reports of
Soviet threats warning Pretoria and UNITA to back
down and the first significant engagement since Sep-
tember 1981 between South African forces and Cu-
ban- and Soviet-assisted Angolan soldiers. Neverthe-
less, we believe that both Pretoria and Moscow want to
avoid such a conflict, and that their struggle for
influence in Luanda will continue much as it has since
the Angolan conflict began in 1975-76.
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 Mbanza-
Ngungu
nda }
Boma Mat
Maquela
M'banza/Congo? ) do Zombo
/ZAIRE Ouimbelej
-UIGE
'
.' , jN'I.age
-Caxito
~- t7
CUANZA
.' NORTE
ao
7? 1 h1aa e
rorto Aleaanare Ca am
1 Cacula
Metals
11
Cuima
BENGUELA A. /'
-~
CacdnBa /
Menongue
Cuito-
Coanavale
Moxico
Cangamba
Major Tribal Groups
Bakongo
Ganguela
Haneca-Humbe
Herero
Kimbundu
^ Ovambo
^ Ovimbundu
Xindonga
Figures shown are
percentages of the
total population.
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Population Distribution
ZAIRE
UIGE
{ Uig
Ste.` ---
CUANZA
MALA -
I
SS' NORTE
~ t, .. Ndalatanda
aladge
BENGO~'-L-~?
0"NZA
"to ito
SUL?'.
?~? HUAMBO .ito
lamb s ' BIE
BENGUELA li~
HUILA
lean9o
OCAMEDES '-
;CUNF,NNE_J
r ---*I'.
Neoangue
LUNDA
NORTH
SaUri md,
LUNDA
,,SUL
CUANDO
CUBANGO
Luena'
Population density
based on 1970 census
Persons per square kilometer
0 2 10 20 35
0 5 20 52 91
Persons per square mile
--- Province boundary
Military Situation in Angola
SOUth Ngunza
Atlantic
Ocean
Lobito
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UNITA claims
^ Control ^ Influence
^ Most intense guerrilla acitivity
South African buffer zone
e Angolan/Cuban garrison
zi-a-a. Angola's forward defense line
Province boundary
Road
^-~ Railroad
150 Kilometers
150 Miles
j~amutani
Etosha ~/
P. '' ? sumeb
Grootfontein
NAMIBIA
Outjo /
Ofiwaron a Boundary repmaenlation is
1 9 nm naceasadb aamoraaave.
17
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?Maun
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