KENYA: PROSPECTS FOR STABILITY

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP97S00289R000200210004-1
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 39
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: November 17, 2011
• Sequence Number: 4
• Publication Date: November 1, 1982
• Content Type: REPORT

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Director of
Central
Intelligence
Kenya: Prospects for Stability
Interagency Intelligence Memorandum
et
NI 11M 82-10011
November 1982
241
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KENYA: PROSPECTS FOR STABILITY
Information available as of 1 November 1982 was
used in the preparation of this Memorandum.
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CONTENTS
FOREWORD ..............................................................................................................
KEY JUDGMENTS .................................................................................................... 1
DISCUSSION .............................................................................................................. 5
Introduction: Coup Attempt Exacerbates Kenya's Problems .............................. 5
US Interests in Kenya ............................................................................................. 66
Military Interests .................................................................................................
Economic and Political Ties .............................................................................. 66
US-Kenyan Trade ...............................................................................................
Economic and Social Trends .................................................................................. 88
The Economic Decline .......................................................................................
Government Attempts at Reform ...................................................................... 9
The Corruption Issue .......................................................................................... 1.0
Public Reaction to the Economic Decline ........................................................ 113
3
Population Pressure ............................................................................................
The Political Situation ............................................................................................ 13
Effects of the Coup Attempt ............................................................................. 113
5
Military Attitudes ................................................................................................ 15
Rivalry for Succession .........................................................................................
Tribal Dissension ................................................................................................. 17
Students and Labor ............................................................................................. 221
1
Moi's Strategy ......................................................................................................
Foreign Relations .................................................................................................... 22
Moi's Active International Role ......................................................................... 222
2
Relations With Neighboring States ....................................................................
Relations With the USSR, the West, and Other Countries ............................. 24
Prospects and Implications for the United States ................................................. 25
Moi's Short-Term Prospects ............................................................................... 225
5
If Moi Is Replaced ..............................................................................................
Longer Term Outlook ........................................................................................ 26
Implications for the United States ..................................................................... 27
ANNEX A. Military and Security Forces .............................................................. A-1
ANNEX B. The Kenyan Press and the United States ........................................... B-1
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FOREWORD
This Interagency Intelligence Memorandum assesses prospects for
stability in Kenya over the next five years. It also addresses implications
for the United States, including contingencies that could affect US
interests.
The Memorandum was prepared under the auspices of the Nation-
al Intelligence Officer for Africa, with the participation of the Central
Intelligence Agency, the Defense Intelligence Agency, and the Bureau
of Intelligence and Research, Department of State. It was coordinated
with the intelligence organizations of the Departments of the Army and
the Air Force, with that of the Marine Corps, and with the Departments
of the Treasury and Commerce.
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KEY JUDGMENTS
Traditionally Pro-Western Kenya, one of two East African states
that permit US access to their military facilities, is experiencing
unprecedented political stress brought on largely by an economic
decline. The country's mounting problems have aggravated tribal and
communal tensions and highlighted other basic problems such as
overpopulation, corruption, and the uninspiring and ineffective leader-
ship of President Moi and his administration. A recent coup attempt by
Air Force personnel has further weakened the government. The
heretofore apolitical Army, which put down the uprising, now has a
greater voice in government decisions.
Thus far Moi has made harsh threats in response to the revolt but,
outside the Air Force, has not resorted to massive arrests of potential en-
emies. We believe, however, that he will turn increasingly to repression
to maintain his hold on power, in part because of pressure from
influential hardliners in the regime. He may buy time by intimidating
his opponents, but he risks making new enemies and driving diverse
groups to cooperate with one another and to consider extralegal tactics
against the government.
Despite Moi's problems, we believe that he has about an even
chance to serve out the remaining two years of his term. His prospects
are helped by his ability to outmaneuver potential opponents and by the
lack of a well-organized dissident movement. Divisions among his
opponents-particularly the moderate leaders of the powerful Kikuyu
tribe-will give Moi a fairly good chance to win reelection in 1984 if he
can prevent a more dramatic economic decline or widespread political
unrest. A coup or an assassination would be the most likely cause of his
ouster before the election. Under these conditions, we believe the
conservative senior military leadership probably would intervene to
ensure the succession of a moderate regime.
Over the next five years, we believe, Kenya will encounter
increasing instability and a weaker central government no matter who is
president. Tensions over food, land, and other scarce resources are
certain to intensify because the government cannot reduce significantly
the country's annual population growth rate of 4 percent-one of the
highest in the world. Economic woes, including a large current account
deficit, and record levels of inflation and unemployment will continue
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to plague the country. Furthermore, Kenya's hope of substantial
external aid may be damaged by foreign donors' dismay over its lack of
financial discipline and increasing instability. International investors
may hold back because of growing concern about instability in Kenya
following the coup attempt, thereby damaging the country's foreign
exchange position.
A budding radical movement may well pose a challenge to Moi or
a moderate successor within the next five years. A coup by radicals in
the Army similar to the uprisings in Liberia and Ghana is possible,
although the opposition of the senior military leaders would continue to
weigh against the chances of a radical takeover. Radicals are likely to
need considerable time to organize a strong challenge to the present
system. Moreover, the leadership and large portions of the general
population will still benefit from Kenya's market-oriented system. On
balance, therefore, we believe the moderate leadership has a good
prospect of remaining in power at least through the period of this
assessment.
In the event that Moi or another moderate politician continues to
rule Kenya with the backing of conservative military leaders, US
interests are likely to be affected in the following respects:
- Nairobi will remain suspicious of the Libyans and Soviets and
keep them at arm's length. Kenya will maintain its generally
pro-Western stance, but will continue to temper these senti-
ments to preserve its position as a nonaligned nation. As a result,
it will adopt foreign policy positions that occasionally vary from
those of the United States.
- Kenya will remain fearful that Somalia-which also permits US
access to its facilities-retains irredentist designs on Somali-
inhabited northeastern Kenya. Kenyan leaders are overly con-
cerned that the provision of offensive arms to Somalia by the
United States could again make the Mogadishu government a
threat to Kenya's security. Such a development could prompt
Nairobi to reconsider its military relationship with the United
States.
- Kenya will continue to seek greater US aid throughout the
period of this assessment. On the economic side, Kenyan
officials will argue that Washington is not responding adequate-
ly to Nairobi's economic needs, and will ask for more assistance.
The coup attempt has increased the urgency of Kenya's pleas
for greater help. On the military side, the Kenyans will continue
to seek assistance and cooperation, but they also will be sensitive
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to the likely negative domestic political costs of too close an
identification with the United States, and this will introduce
strains into the bilateral relationship.
- Moi's increasing loss of popular support may lead his opponents
to intensify their attacks on the bilateral military relationship
with the United States. A weakened Kenyan government may
react by reducing the level of military cooperation, applying
restrictive interpretations to the implementation of the access
agreement, or-in the unlikely extreme case-canceling the
accord altogether. Kenya also may seek to diversify further its
sources of military equipment.
In the less likely event that radical leaders should gain power in
Kenya, they probably would adopt a nonaligned policy and seek
assistance from both East and West. A radical government almost
certainly would move quickly to distance itself from the United States,
particularly by canceling the military access agreement. Because there
is strong anti-Communist sentiment in Kenya, however, the regime
would be unlikely to become a Soviet client state.
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DISCUSSION
Introduction: Coup Attempt Exacerbates Kenya's
Problems
1. The unsuccessful coup attempt on 1 August 1982
by Kenyan Air Force personnel reflected disaffection
over the weak leadership of President Daniel arap Moi
(see figure 1) and his inability to come to grips
effectively with Kenya's increasing economic and
political problems. The revolt originated in the Air
Force because the rapidly expanding force was less
disciplined than Kenya's other security services and its
better educated personnel were more attuned to radi-
cal ideas. Moi is moving to silence dissent and prevent
further challenges to his rule, but the coup attempt has
led to even higher tensions. These will probably
contribute to a further deterioration in Kenya's stabil-
ity over time.
Figure 1
Daniel arap Moi,
President of Kenya
A capable grassroots politician, Daniel arap Moi compensates for
his lack of substantive knowledge and higher education with innate
political instinct. Because he has learned to survive in the cutthroat
atmosphere of tribal politics, he has been near or at the top of the
party and government for many years. A member of the minority
Kalenjin ethnic group, Moi draws his support primarily from the
country's non-Kikuyu ethnic groups and from government workers,
the military, and the business community. Moi is strongly pro-West
and anti-Communist.
After an education at American mission schools, Moi taught
secondary school. During 1960-61 he was chairman of the Kenya
African Democratic Union, a minority political party that dissolved
in 1964. He was Minister of Education (1961-62), Local Government
(1962-64), and Home Affairs (1964-78) before serving as Vice
President (1967-78).
Moi has business interests throughout Kenya; he is in silent
partnership with many white and Asian businessmen. Widely
traveled, Moi has visited the United States several times. He is
divorced and has seven children. He was born in 1924 in the Rift
Valley province.
2. Moi's support had been gradually eroding since
he first succeeded the late Jomo Kenyatta in August
1978. Moi inherited the leadership of one of the most
prosperous and stable countries in Africa. But his
narrow ethnic base and his lack of Kenyatta's charisma
and unquestioned authority have hampered his efforts
to control escalating political tensions induced largely
by overpopulation and basic economic problems, ag-
gravated by adverse external market trends. Moi has
contributed to the problems by delaying difficult
economic decisions, ignoring domestic problems to
concentrate on foreign affairs, and then repressing his
critics.
3. Kenya's economic downturn-including food
shortages, a high rate of inflation (see table 1), and
abnormally low foreign exchange reserves-has result-
ed in part from external factors such as the high cost of
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Table 1
Kenya: Economic and Social Indicators
1975
1976
1977
1978
1979
Growth of real gross domestic
product (percent)
0.6
5.5
9.5
7.4
4.0
4.0
3.8
5.0
Inflation rate (percent)
19.0
11.4
15.0
17.0
8.0
13.8
15.0
20.0
Population growth rate (percent)
3.4
3.5
3.5
3.5
3.6
4.1
4.1
4.2
Per capita income (current US dol-
lars)
$237
$244
$306
$348
$383
$440
$395
$318
a Estimated.
b Projected.
oil imports and the recession in the West. The princi-
pal domestic causes, in addition to expansionary fiscal
and monetary policies, include government policies
that have stressed high-cost, inefficient import substi-
tution and have discouraged production of food and
export crops. Moreover, the prolonged high rate of
population growth-now 4 percent-is leading to
shortages of arable land and is triggering increasingly
frequent disputes among Kenya's tribes. It will be
difficult for Moi or any other leader to reverse the
economic decline.
US Interests in Kenya
Military Interests
4. Much of Kenya's significance for the United
States derives from its strategic location near the
Middle East oil-producing countries and the sea lanes
through the Indian Ocean and the Red Sea (see figure
2). Kenyan air and naval facilities support normal US
peacetime military requirements, providing for main-
tenance and logistic support for US forces operating in
the region. Kenya is, in fact, one of five countries in
the Indian Ocean region that allow visits by US
nuclear-powered warships.
5. The importance of Kenyan facilities has grown
significantly with the increased US presence in the
Indian Ocean and the emphasis on contingency plan-
ning for the Persian Gulf area. Kenya's existing infra-
structure, its previous relative political stability, and its
pro-Western foreign policy orientation have made it
the most attractive of the alternative locations for the
deployment of US forces. US port visits to Mombasa,
which numbered six in 1978, rose to a high of 39 in
1980, but dropped to 15 in 1981. The number of US
military flights transiting Kenya reached a high of
more than 30 per month in 1981.
6. The military access agreement signed in 1980,
formalizing Kenyan-US military cooperation, autho-
rizes US access to Kenyan air and naval facilities. In
addition, it provides for the rapid staging of US forces
into the area, sanctions joint military exercises, and
permits the United States to improve both air and
naval facilities to meet anticipated needs. When im-
provements are completed, the port of Mombasa will
be able to accommodate all types of US naval ships,
including aircraft carriers. The airfield at Mombasa
will be capable of supporting US air operations involv-
ing large US transport aircraft, up to and including the
C-141.
Economic and Political Ties
7. Kenya is important to the United States also
because it has maintained moderate policies, a market-
oriented economy, and, by African standards, a rela-
tively competitive political system, while playing a
stabilizing role in the unsettled East African region.
Thus far, however, Nairobi has often appeared out of
step with the mainstream of African opinion, and
Kenya's example has not been widely emulated. Its
ability to serve as a model of success for other African
countries, moreover, is being undermined by increas-
ing economic difficulties and political problems under
Moi's administration.
8. These problems cause Moi to look to the United
States for substantial economic and security aid. The
recent coup attempt has made him particularly anx-
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Figure 2
Kenya and Its Regional Neighbors
British Indian
Ocean Territory
(U.K.) D,ego cn,cin
Boundary representation is
not necessarily authoritative.
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0 500 Kilometers
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ious to gain new aid commitments as he tries to
strengthen his domestic position. He believes that
Kenya has been Washington's most stalwart ally in
Africa. Kenyan officials have emphasized to the US
Embassy that they have been subjected to considerable
criticism from other African countries for supporting
US policies, and have maintained that Kenya is not
receiving its share of US aid. Kenya wants greater US
aid in part to avoid making further hard decisions
about restructuring the economy and belt tightening
within the government.
9. Moi views the United States as Kenya's principal
protector against possible Libyan or Soviet subversion
and regional instability. He believes his acceptance of
the US military access agreement has given Washing-
ton a special obligation to help Kenya. For the most
part, the access agreement has stirred little controversy
among the generally pro-US Kenyan population. To
avoid damaging his relations with African and other
nonaligned countries, however, Moi wants to minimize
publicity about the arrangement. He is prepared to
consider proposals for further use of Kenyan facilities
by US forces under the agreement so long as they do
not gain much international attention.
US-Kenyan Trade
10. Since the early 1970s the United States has
experienced substantial growth in its trade with Ke-
nya, with total volume increasing from $51 million in
1972 to approximately $203 million in 1981. In 1980
the United States was Kenya's fifth-largest supplier,
after the United Kingdom, Saudi Arabia, Japan, and
West Germany. US exports to Kenya consist mainly of
cereals, agricultural products, construction machinery,
and transport equipment. Primary US imports from
Kenya are coffee and tea-which account for approxi-
mately 71 percent of total US imports from Kenya-
pyrethrum (used in insecticide), and other tropical
products. Current US private direct investment in
Kenya is estimated at $315 million, primarily in
manufacturing, sales, and service facilities. There are
more than 200 US firms with resident representation
in Kenya.
11. While Kenya has offered one of the more
attractive investment climates in Africa and continues
to welcome foreign business, there are a variety of
impediments to the operations of established investors.
All imports are licensed, and approval procedures are
cumbersome and often protracted. Investors therefore
must stock large inventories of goods, materials, and
spare parts. The added costs of such inventories are
often unrecoverable because of rigid price controls,
making some operations unprofitable.
Economic and Social Trends
The Economic Decline
12. Kenya's economic decline during Moi's presi-
dency contrasts sharply with the average annual
growth of 6.5 percent under Kenyatta, a record in
black Africa exceeded only by Ivory Coast. The once-
thriving agricultural sector has been hard hit by
reduced earnings for export crops and a combination
of bad weather and inappropriate government policies
that have lowered per capita food production. Re-
duced world prices for coffee-Kenya's largest agri-
cultural export-and other cash crops have kept for-
eign exchange earnings too low to pay for food and
other imports needed for economic growth. Drought
has contributed to periodic food shortages in recent
years. The government in effect has encouraged in-
creased food imports by paying low prices to food
producers (see table 2) in an effort to appease consum-
ers, and by insisting that all agricultural goods be
marketed through inefficient public corporations.
13. Kenya's reduced agricultural export revenues
have been accompanied by record import bills that
have cut foreign exchange reserves to less than a
month's worth of imports. The surge in world oil
prices during the late 1970s and the rising imports
have sharply increased foreign exchange outlays.
Moreover, the important tourist industry has been hurt
by the recession in the West and increased transporta-
tion costs, as well as government red tape. As a result,
Nairobi's current account deficit reached nearly $1
billion in 1980.
14. The high current account deficit (see table 3)
forced Moi to restrict imports, but this contributed to a
sharp slowdown in business activity. The lack of
timely deliveries of spare parts has forced a number of
firms to close or substantially reduce production.
15. The industrial recession and large government
budget deficits have led to a record rate of inflation.
Inflation is now officially more than 20 percent, and,
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Kenya: Average Gross On-Farm Prices for Selected Crops, 1976-80
(US dollars per 100 kilograms except as indicated)
Commodity
1975
Coffee
146
302
480
365 3
80
355
Tea
110
126
260
205 1
83
214
Sisal
48
28
36
35
48
55
Pyrethrum extract equivalent b
61
59
68
93 1
35
161
Seed cotton
26
25
35
42
43
46
Maize
10
9
11
11
9
13
Sugarcanes
12
13
15
17
18
18
Rice paddy
14
16
16
19
20
20
Wheat
14
14
16
17
19
22
payouts (source: official Kenyan statistics).
b Price per kilogram.
Price per ton.
Kenya: Trade and Financial Indicators
(million US dollars)
Trade balance
-221
-59
-6
-697
-544
-1,154
-903
Exports, f.o.b.
634
746
1,123
957
1,018
1,243
1,023
Imports, f.o.b.
-855
-805
-1,129
-1,654
-1,562
-2,397
-1,926
Net services and transfers
-10
-62
46
35
67
169
165
Current account
-231
-121
40
-662
-477
-985
-738
Foreign exchange reserves
169
272
504
338
520
466
216
External debt
570
700
920
1,085
1,435
1,745
2,095
Debt service ratio (percent)
3.6
4.4
3.7
7.0
6.6
8.9
14.0
according to the US Embassy in Nairobi, it could jump
to more than 30 percent this year. The rapid rate of
population growth and a decline in employment op-
portunities have led to a high level of unemployment.
The Embassy estimates that urban unemployment
may exceed 30 percent this year. These factors have
contributed to a dramatic upsurge in crime over the
last few years.
16. The recent coup attempt may exacerbate these
problems. Although normal economic activity re-
sumed within a few days, many businesses in Nairobi
were hit by extensive looting. Government officials
estimate replacement costs at nearly $40 million. The
incident has made businessmen more cautious about
investing their money in plant expansion or other long-
term options. Particularly wary will be the important
Asian business community, which suffered the most in
material losses during the coup attempt. The incident
also will damage the country's foreign exchange posi-
tion if tourism declines further and international
investors hold back to see how the internal situation
unfolds.
Government Attempts at Reform
17. The deteriorating economic situation has made
Moi more receptive to a number of important reforms.
To stimulate food production, his government finally
instituted a substantial increase in producer prices to
farmers earlier this year and is studying changes in
marketing. Higher prices should benefit the 80 per-
cent of the country's population involved in the
agricultural sector, but will also translate into in-
creased food bills for the rapidly increasing poor urban
population.
18. Although increased production may reduce the
level of food imports in the short term, the outlook
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over the longer term is less favorable without signifi-
cant changes in government policy. Because less than
20 percent of Kenya's land is arable (see figure 3) and
little undeveloped high-quality land remains, agricul-
tural production during the coming years will be
increasingly based on the use of marginal lands that
are highly susceptible to drought. Efforts to develop an
irrigation system are hampered by the lack of nearby
sources of surface water and the prohibitive cost of
bringing water over long distances. Nairobi must make
substantial improvements in land use, in the rural road
network, and in support services such as agricultural
credits for purchasing modern machinery, fertilizers,
and other essentials. To be truly effective these meas-
ures will require realistic pricing and marketing
policies.
19. To improve its balance-of-payments situation,
the government has restricted imports by delaying the
processing of import licenses and rationing foreign
exchange allocations. These actions have had a nega-
tive effect on industrial production and employment,
however, leading to public pressure that has made the
government reluctant to implement more far-reaching
measures. Moreover, a currency devaluation last year
boosted import prices in domestic terms by nearly 20
percent.
20. The rise in import costs has not been offset by a
similar boost in exports as anticipated by Nairobi.
Exports of coffee and tea-Kenya's principal agricul-
tural foreign exchange earners-are not likely to im-
prove as long as international prices remain depressed.
Export receipts also will be affected by the govern-
ment's recent decision to reduce crude oil imports.
During the past several years, Kenya has earned
substantial revenue by providing about 60,000 barrels
per day of refined oil products from its refinery at
Mombasa to neighboring African countries.
21. Moi's most critical economic problem is how to
restrain the high level of government expenditures.
Last year's budget deficit reached nearly $600 million,
reflecting continued heavy spending on defense, edu-
cation, health, and consumer subsidies. His attempt to
impose budgetary controls, particularly on inefficient
"parastatal" corporations, has not worked well. Moi
probably will continue to tolerate financial abuses by
the "parastatals" because he cannot afford to alienate
powerful political interests associated with the Kenyat-
ta family that still control many of the corporations.
22. An average annual increase of 30 percent in real
terms in defense expenditures since the mid-1970s also
has placed an increasingly heavy burden on the
budget. Outlays have leveled off during the past two
years as the government tries to curtail expenditures.
But Nairobi's concern about regional tensions and the
increased threat of domestic unrest following the coup
attempt make any substantial reduction in defense
spending unlikely.
23. As part of an agreement signed with the Inter-
national Monetary Fund late last year, Moi agreed to
cut this year's budget deficit by nearly 40 percent. He
hopes to do this primarily by limiting spending on
government salaries, education, foreign travel, and
defense. The government also is bringing the entire
budgetary process under closer scrutiny by requiring
ministries to submit monthly reports of their revenues
and expenditures.
24. Despite attempts at financial discipline, Kenya
has been unable to meet the IMF guidelines on
government expenditures for 1982. Nairobi's ability to
restrain government salaries further is doubtful follow-
ing a general wage increase announced shortly after
the coup attempt. The accompanying boost in food
prices will almost certainly generate pressure for even
higher salaries. Moi also will come under pressure to
boost government hirings to reduce the record high
unemployment rate.
25. Moi is counting on assistance from the United
States and other Western countries, as well as a new
arrangement with the IMF, to bail Kenya out of its
economic difficulties and lay the groundwork for
financial stability (see tables 4 and 5). He has asked for
more than $300 million from Western donors-includ-
ing $100 million from the US-in emergency balance-
of-payments aid to recover from the effects of the
coup attempt. The US Embassy estimates that Nairobi
will need about $2 billion in foreign assistance over the
next three years. Prospects for securing funds of this
magnitude are not promising. Even if large amounts of
foreign aid materialize, we believe that Nairobi will
come under growing pressure from urban consumers
to direct money slated for development programs into
purchasing foreign goods.
The Corruption Issue
26. Illegal financial dealings by government offi-
cials have long been a feature of the Kenyan system,
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Figure 3
Agricultural Potential in Kenya
High
Marginal
Severely limited
Negligible
Unusable (high elevation)
Excellent
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Table 4
Kenya: US Military and Economic Aid
(million US dollars)
1983 a
Military
11.55
33.05
66.50
FMS b
6.00
22.00
35.00
ESF c
5.50
10.00
30.00
IMET d
0.05
1.05
1.50
Projected Aid
14.80
24.30
28.00
PL480 Food
26.40
19.30
18.00
Peace Corps
Total
a Programed
b Foreign Military Sales
Economic Support Fund (security assistance)
d Military Training
but corruption increasingly has gained public attention
under Moi's government. When the economy was
healthy during the Kenyatta era such practices were
more easily tolerated. Although it is unclear whether
corruption has become more widespread during Moi's
administration, he is getting more heat from critics,
who charge the illegal transactions demonstrate his
failure to deal with the deteriorating economic
situation.
27. Moi has spoken out publicly against corruption,
but he can do little else without exposing important
officials whose political support he needs. Instead of
replacing two cabinet ministers implicated in a widely
publicized bank scandal, for example, Moi warned the
press and dissident politicians to stop discussing the
case.
28. The continuing economic difficulties will add to
Moi's problems in dealing with the corruption issue.
Table 5
Kenya: Bilateral and Multilateral Aid, 1975-80 a
(million US dollars)
1975
1976
1977
1978 1
979
1980
Total ODA bilateral assistance
Of which, major donors:
Denmark
9
10
12
15
17
18
West Germany
19
13
19
41
70
36
The Netherlands
11
15
14
24
28
48
Japan
7
13
5
12
36
28
Norway
9
9
13
13
19
21
Sweden
19
22
18
44
24
28
United Kingdom
5
29
23
49
56
49
United States
7
13
13
12
17
40
Total ODA multilateral assistance
23
25
42
61
67
120
European Economic Community
-
8
6
17
11
14
International Development Agency
7
13
17
16
21
71
IMF Trust Fund
-
-
6
19
19
16
Other
16
4
13
9
16
19
Total OOF assistance
74
97
89
94
92
98
Total official assistance
214
272
269
433 4
61
510
Less repayments
9
25
51
55
46
46
Net disbursement
205
247
218
378 4
15
464
a Includes official development assistance (ODA) and other official flows (OOF). ODA refers to funds
provided by government institutions on concessional terms for project development; at least 25 percent of
the aid must be grants. OOF are official transactions for development purposes with less than 25 percent of
the total in grants.
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While he works on budget cuts, his opponents will
focus on kickbacks as a major reason for excessive
government spending. At the same time, civil serv-
ants-faced with shrinking real incomes-will be in-
creasingly tempted to engage in illegal financial deals.
29. Despite the economic pinch, many Kenyans
realize their living standards are still considerably
better than those of their neighbors. Kenya's per capita
income of slightly more than $300 is the highest in
East Africa. Although criticism of the government's
performance is increasing, few Kenyans are question-
ing the country's basic free enterprise system thus far.
No popular spokesman for the "have nots" has
emerged to pose a serious challenge to Moi's policies.
30. Moi's fear of public reaction, however, is threat-
ening more comprehensive reforms. Rising criticism
over high inflation and unemployment and restrictions
on the availability of imported goods to the public will
make it difficult for him to stick with even those
measures already adopted. Influential businessmen are
particularly upset over irregularities in import licens-
ing procedures.
31. Popular discontent will soon become even more
widespread, if the economic situation continues to
deteriorate. A repeat of the government's late distribu-
tion of paychecks early this year could seriously
damage Moi's position with civil servants-an impor-
tant interest group. Neither can Moi give in to what
we expect will be heavy pressure from urban workers
to grant additional pay hikes.
Population Pressure
32. Over the long term, the government stands little
chance of promoting a sustained economic recovery
unless it can slow down the rapid rate of population
growth-one of the fastest growth rates in the world.
According to a study by the University of Nairobi, the
rate will rise to more than 4.3 percent in the mid-
1980s. The impact of this increase will be felt most
heavily in the countryside. Kenya needs to double
food production within the next 20 years just to regain
self-sufficiency. This will be difficult to achieve unless
increasing amounts of marginal land are brought into
production.
33. Population pressures already are triggering in-
creasingly frequent disputes over scarce resources-
especially land-that could in time lead to widespread
unrest and cause difficult problems for the govern-
ment. Ethnic tensions are growing as neighboring
tribal groups encroach on each other's territory. With-
in the last year, land disputes between important tribes
have resulted in violent clashes and a number of
deaths.
34. The increasing scarcity of land in rural areas is
one of the causes of rapid urbanization and a high rate
of urban unemployment. The population of Kenya's
cities is increasing at about twice the rate for the
country as a whole (see figure 4), and the rate may be
accelerating. In several recent cases, officials in urban
areas have caused greater tension by forcefully remov-
ing squatters.
35. Efforts to reduce population growth have had
little impact because most Kenyans value large fam-
ilies. Rural women, who are responsible for cultivation
as well as household chores, need children to help with
heavy workloads. Many Kenyans believe that having a
large number of children increases chances that one
will succeed and bring economic benefits to the entire
group. Moreover, tribal power is viewed as a function
of population size, and any program to control fertility
is likely to be perceived by Kenyans as an effort to
weaken their particular group.
36. Kenyan officials are beginning to devote in-
creased attention to developing a family planning
program, but it will take many years before popula-
tion growth can be reduced significantly. Moi publicly
has emphasized the need for reduced population
growth, but he recognizes that he cannot act forcefully
on this sensitive issue without political risk. Official
government efforts are limited largely to operating a
small number of understaffed and underequipped
family planning clinics that stress birth spacing.
Effects of the Coup Attempt
37. The Air Force junior officers and enlisted men
who tried to oust Moi apparently were not part of any
broad plot against the government. Available evidence
indicates that a small group of Army personnel also
participated. Most of the Army remained loyal and,
together with the paramilitary General Service Unit
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Figure 4
Population Density in Kenya
0 26 103 259 518
Persons per square mile
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(GSU), put down the coup. At least a few security force
commanders appear to have delayed committing their
units to the government's defense until they deter-
mined the extent of support for the coup. Outside the
military, some students at the University of Nairobi
joined the Air Force dissidents. The urban poor took
advantage of the breakdown in law and order in
Nairobi to engage in looting, but the general popula-
tion did not actively support the coup attempt.
38. Moi's actions in dealing with the uprising have
focused almost entirely on preventing a recurrence,
rather than on seeking solutions to the underlying
problems that led to the revolt. By closing the universi-
ty indefinitely and continuing his recent policy of
jailing domestic critics, he may have intimidated
opponents and bought himself some time. Moi also
hopes he has headed off trouble from within the
regime by replacing several senior security officials
whose loyalty was suspect. Moi has purged the Air
Force and ordered its reorganization, a slow process
that will severely reduce Air Force capabilities. He has
been unable, however, to prevent the coup attempt
from heightening tensions and increasing competition
for influence among important interest groups.
Military Attitudes
39. Kenya's military leadership emerged from the
coup attempt as a major force in Moi's government,
ending the traditional apolitical posture of the mili-
tary.' The country's senior military leader (General
Mulinge) and Army commanders reportedly have
urged that Moi replace a number of political and
security officials. They appear more interested, how-
ever, in settling old scores by removing their enemies
from power than in trying to improve the efficiency of
the government.
40. The coup attempt and resultant growth in
military influence increases the possibility that the
Army might take control of the government, but
Kenya's senior commanders probably would be reluc-
tant to do so. They would be unlikely to act unless Moi
and his civilian advisers appeared to have lost control
of the situation. Because of their lack of political
experience and necessary dependence on the civil
service, military leaders probably would want to bring
'Annex A discusses the military and security forces.
civilian politicians back into the government at an
early stage. Senior military officers might well turn the
administration back to civilians quickly if they
thought stability could be maintained.
41. Middle-level and junior officers and enlisted
men, who are suffering more than their superiors from
the economic decline, may be more prone to consider
moving against the government. The low-ranking Air
Force personnel who staged the recent uprising appar-
ently were dissatisfied with their living conditions
and-among other grievances-were jealous of the
advantages enjoyed by their superiors. There also have
been some indications of economic discontent within
the generally more conservative Army. Moreover,
some junior officers have complained that Moi has
unfairly promoted members of his Kalenjin ethnic
group over officers from other tribes. The Army has
long been dominated by Kamba and Kikuyu tribes-
men, but Moi in fact has put several Kalenjin into
senior positions.
42. Moi is well aware of his increased need to keep
the military happy. He already has made some of the
personnel changes recommended by the military lead-
ership and continues to maintain close contact with
General Mulinge and the Army high command.
43. Moi probably will make further changes in the
security services in an effort to ensure greater loyalty.
Moi probably at least will try to eliminate members of
the Luo and Kikuyu tribes-who he believes were
responsible for the coup attempt-from sensitive posi-
tions in the military. The first armed forces promotion
list since the coup attempt, however, did not systemat-
ically discriminate against Kikuyu or Luo officers.
Another of his targets is the GSU. Moi has replaced the
GSU commander, but he probably still distrusts the
2,000-man internal security force because it has been
dominated by the Kikuyu.
44. Moi may try to appease the Army rank and file
by granting them greater economic benefits. At a
minimum, he probably will ensure that troops are paid
on time as he did during a financial squeeze earlier
this year, while some civilian civil servants had their
paychecks delayed.
Rivalry for Succession
45. The coup attempt and erosion of Moi's support
since he assumed office have contributed to intensified
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rivalry among other members of the leadership. The
rivalry has centered mainly on Vice President Kibaki
and Constitutional Affairs Minister Nionio, who have
been two of the most owerf embers of his
administration Both men have
important weaknesses, and their positions may have
been hurt by their failure to be on the scene and to act
decisively at the time of the coup attempt. This may
open up opportunities for other members of Moi's
administration, but none currently has the national
stature of Kibaki or Nionjo, who over the short term
remain the leading contenders within the civilian
leadership to succeed Moi.
46. Neither Kibaki nor Nionio is challenging Moi
directly, but each apparently hopes to be in position to
become president if Moi is further weakened by the
time of the next national election-scheduled for
1984. Kibaki and Nionio belong to different factions of
Kenya's largest tribe, the Kikuyu. Their rivalry is
based mainly on personal rather than substantive
policy differences-Kibaki, Nionio, and almost all of
the Kenya leadership support the present economic
system and pro-Western foreign policy. But the dis-
pute is damaging government efficiency by diverting
the leadership from other pressing problems.
47. The split between Kibaki and Njonjo intensified
last year over Njonjo's efforts to grab more power.
Nionio sought to arrange his election to replace Kibaki
as vice president of the ruling Kenya African National
Union (KANU) party. This would enable Nionio to
move ahead of Kibaki as the heir apparent to Moi.
Nionio, who has long been one of Moi's closest advis-
ers, is a shrewd politician, but he has made many
enemies with his aggressive attempts to strengthen his
position. Nionio draws considerable strength from his
years of service in the Cabinet since independence. He
has placed and developed allies -
reaucracy
(Although
a member ot the Powerful Kiambu (southern) branch
of the Kikuyu tribe, Nionio has never had much tribal
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support, and his recent efforts to curry favor among
the Kikuyu apparently have not borne fruit.
48. Njonjo currently is trying to succeed a recently
deceased Kiambu political figure as the leader of an
important local KANU branch, but he faces strong
opposition from traditional leaders of the faction. A
failure to win the post would be a serious blow to
Njonjo's aspirations for power.
49. Kibaki is not close to Moi, but he enjoys signifi-
cant support from his Nyeri (northern) branch of the
Kikuyu tribe, and enjoys a popular national following
that crosses tribal lines. Although he sometimes ap-
pears reluctant to engage in political infighting, Kibaki
responded forcefully to Njonjo's bid for more power
last year, and gained some new support from leaders
of the Kiambu Kikuyu faction. Kibaki also has made
preliminary contacts about a possible alliance with the
Luo-politically the country's second most important
tribe.
50. Moi still needs cooperation from both Kibaki
and Njonjo. He cannot afford to alienate Kibaki's
important northern Kikuyu backers and values Njon-
jo's astute political advice and aggressiveness, which
have served Moi well in the past. Moi has tried to use
the split to keep the Kikuyu from uniting against him.
(Table 6 shows the tribal origins of Cabinet members.)
Kibaki and Njonjo are continuing to maneuver against
one another. Their rivalry is likely to intensify even
further if Moi's position continues to decline as the
1984 election approaches.
51. The Kibaki-Njonjo rivalry has fanned Kikuyu
aspirations for the presidency, a position many Kikuyu
believe should be held by a member of their tradition-
ally preeminent tribe. Moi's weakened position in the
wake of the coup attempt probably has further whet-
ted the Kikuyu's appetite for power. The Kikuyu, who
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Table 6
Kenya: Members of the Cabinet
Name and Portfolio
Tribe
Date
of Birth
Highest Level of Education
BIWOTT, Kiprono Nicholas
Kalenjin
About 1941
Degree in Economics, Melbourne University,
Regional Development, Science and Technology
Australia
KAMERE, Joseph
Kikuyu (Kiambu)
1926
Attended Lincoln's Inn, London
and was
Attorney General
,
called to the bar in 1965
KAMOTHO, John Joseph
Kikuyu (Muranga)
1942
M.A., Public Administration and Local Gov-
Higher Education
ernment Affairs, Birmingham University
KARIUKI, Godfrey Githa
Kikuyu (Nyeri)
1937
Diploma from the British Tutorial College
Lands, Settlements, and Physical Planning
KIBAKI, Mwai
Kikuyu (Nyeri)
1931
B.A. (Honors), Economics, Political Science
Vice President and Minister for Home Affairs
and History, Makerere University; B.S., Public
KOSGEY, Henry K.
Transportation and Communications
MAGUGU, Arthur Kinyanyui
Kalenjin
Kikuyu (Kiambu)
1935
Finance, London School of Economics
B.A., La Verne College, California; studied
Finance
international law in Sweden
MANGO, Appolling Mukasa (Dr.)
Luhya
1936
B.S., St. Benedict's College, Kansas; M.S.
Pub-
Health
,
lic Health, Ph.D., Environmental Health Sci-
MATANO, Robert Stanley
1925
ence (Parasitology), Michigan State
Diploma in Education, from Makerere Uni-
Cooperative Development
versity
MBATHI, Titus
1929
B.A. (Honors) and an M.A., Madras University;
Labor
Fulbright scholarship to study in the United
M'MBIJIWE, Gilbert Kabere
Meru
1929
States; attended New York University and
received a Master's degree in Economics
B.S., Agriculture, Reading University
Energy
MUDAVADI, Moses B.
Luhya
1923
Diploma in Education from Leeds University
Culture and Social Services
in Britain; attended Harvard University
MWAMUNGA, Eliud Timothy
Taita
1935
Diploma in Education from Dar es Salaam
Information and Broadcasting
University, Tanzania; received an LL.B.
MWANGALE, W. Elijah
Luhya
1939
Received a Master's degree in Agricultural
Tourism
Science from a US university
NGEI, Paul
Kamba
1923
Makerere University
Livestock Development
NG'ENO, Jonathan
Kalenjin
1929
Attended Greenvale College in the United
Basic Education
States; M.A. and Ph.D. in Political Science,
NJONJO, Charles
1920
Southern Illinois University
Attended King's College, Budo, Uganda; Fort
Constitutional Affairs
Hare University, South Africa; Exeter Univer-
NYAGAH, Jeremiah Joseph
Embu
1923
sity, England; London School of Economics;
called to the bar, Gray's Inn, London
Makerere University; Oxford University; di-
Water Development
ploma in Education
OKWANYO, John Henry
Luo
1928
Medical Training School at the King George
Commerce
VI Hospital (now Kenyatta Hospital)
OLOITIPITIP, Stanley S.O.
Masai
1924
High school
Local Government
OMAMO, William Odongo
1929
B.S., Agricultural College, Madras, India; M.S.
Environment and Natural Resources
,
Agricultural College, Lahore, Pakistan; attend-
OMANGA, John Andrew
1932
ed Oregon University
Holy Ghost College, Uganda; Makerere Uni-
Industry
versity, B.A. in Economics; attended Tata
ONYONKA, Zacharia Teodore
1941
Institute of Social Science, Bombay, received
B.A., M.A., and a diploma in Social Service
Administration
Inter-American University, Puerto Rico; Syra-
Economic Planning and Development
cuse University, where he earned an M.A. and
OUKO, Robert John
1932
a Ph.D. in Economics
B.A. in Public Administration and Political
Foreign Affairs
Science from Addis Ababa University
RUBIA, Charles
1923
Two-year postmaster's course in Dar es Sa-
Works and Housing
laam; attended courses in parliamentary pro-
WAIYAKI, Frederick L. (Dr.)
1923
cedures and local and central government at
Exeter University, England
Medical education at St. Andrew's University
Agriculture
(Scotland) and in Sweden
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Ethnic Representation in Kenya
(percent)
Population
Assistant
Permanent
Secretaries
and Provincial
Tribe
(1979 Census)
Cabinet
Ministers
Parliament
Commissioners
Kikuyu
21
23
18
20
41
Luhya
14
10
9
10
10
Luo
13
6
4
10
7
Kamba
11
8
7
9
12
Kalenjin
11
13
11
11
14
Kisii
6
4
2
5
5
Meni
6
4
4
4
5
Mijikenda
5
5
5
5
0
Masai
2
6
5
4
0
All others
11
21
35
22
6
make tip about 20 percent of the population (see table
7 and figure 7), had a dominant political and economic
position during Kenyatta's presidency and have main-
tained their economic power since Moi assumed office.
The Kikuyu are also strong because of their prepon-
derant position in the bureaucracy.
52. Moi's cautious attempts to curtail Kikuyu influ-
ence have not been very successful and have increased
the tribe's resentment of him. He also has made some
efforts to advance the fortunes of his own ethnic group
by appointing more Kalenjin to high-level civilian and
military positions. He ordered the abolition of the
country's tribal associations, a move directed primarily
at the influential Kikuyu association. Although this
action was popular with some smaller tribes, Kikuyu
leaders continue to exercise political and economic
power through other organizations. There are indica-
tions that Moi believes Kikuyu leaders were involved
in the coup plot, but his position would be seriously
threatened if he moved forcefully against the tribe.
53. The role of Luo Air Force personnel in the coup
attempt probably has ended any chance that Moi will
seek renewed cooperation with that tribe's leadership.
He suspects that Luo political figures were involved in
planning the uprising and has replaced a few Luo
officials of questionable loyalty with other Luo who
have little support in their home region. Luo critics of
the government have been a particular target of
security officials since the coup attempt.
54. Until last year, Moi tried to court the Luo in an
effort to use them as a counter to the Kikuyu. Moi
attempted to exploit traditional Luo resentment of
Kikuyu dominance, which was reinforced in 1969
when Kenyatta banned an embryonic opposition party
led by his former Vice President, Oginga Odinga, and
other Luo politicians. Odinga and his colleagues were
jailed briefly and remained inactive politically until
Moi gave several of them government sinecures.
55. Last year, however, Moi angered many Luo by
denying Odinga-still the preeminent Luo political
leader-official permission to contest a byelection for
the National Assembly, apparently because he did not
trust the outspoken Odinga. Moi this year had Odinga
expelled from the ruling party after the Luo leader
began a public campaign attacking Moi's economic
performance and the US military access agreement
with Kenya. Although Odinga has had a history of
contacts with Communist powers, it is not clear
whether he had foreign support or encouragement for
his campaign.
56. Odinga and his Luo colleagues do not represent
a serious threat to Moi by themselves. But they could
add to his problems if they join with other disaffected
groups-a move that could be prompted by a harsh
government crackdown on the tribe in the wake of the
coup attempt. Despite their contacts with Kibaki, the
Luo leaders probably would be reluctant to ally with
him because of their concern over a resurgence of
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Figure 7
Ethnolinguistic Groups in Kenya
LAKE
RUDOLPH
LAKE
VICTORIA
Rendille
Hawiyah
Boni
(1YESo 37,Et loret
LUHYAI ~? ~'y
M \91M .Kitui
7
JEMBU
.lS~ Embu ~ . ~ ~ ~
BANTU 67.1
Kikuyu 20.9
Luhya 13.8
Kamba 11.3
Kisii 6.1
Meru 5.5
Mijikenda 4.8
Embu 1.1
Toita 1.0
Kuria 0.6
Tharaka 0.8
Mbere 0.6
Pokomo 0.4
Bajun 0.2
Swahili 0.1
Taveta 0.1
Percent of Total Population
(Preliminary Report, Census of 1979)
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RU
/MERU\, 9
Bantu
Cushitic
Nilotic
Complex mixture
MERU Tribal name
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Kikuyu political influence. They would prefer Kibaki
to Njonjo, however, because of the latter's involvement
as Attorney General in the jailing of Odinga and other
Luo leaders in the late 1960s. A Luo-Kikuyu alliance,
although unlikely, would be a major threat to Moi's
position.
Students and Labor
57. Despite the participation of some University of
Nairobi students in the coup attempt, students in
general, as well as labor unions, have caused little
trouble for the government. Prior to the revolt, a
group of radical students and lecturers with Marxist
leanings at the university periodically organized small,
relatively peaceful protest demonstrations that includ-
ed criticism of Moi's performance. Moi's indefinite
closure of the university after the coup is a continua-
tion of the firm policies he has used in the past to head
off any widespread agitation. Student agitation, how-
ever, probably will increase as economic conditions
deteriorate further, especially if the goverment be-
comes less responsive and more repressive.
58. The government also closely supervises the la-
bor movement, including the election of union leaders.
Deteriorating economic conditions have hit union
members hard, however, leading to increasingly fre-
quent wildcat strikes and other disputes. Unions cur-
rently are unhappy with the government's refusal to
grant a large increase in the minimum wage despite
the high rate of inflation. Thus far, labor- grievances
have been settled peacefully, but union members
could combine with other groups that have complaints
against the government. Luo tribesmen-the largest
ethnic group in the union movement-might be espe-
cially prone to such a move.
Moi's Strategy
59. The coup attempt has forced Moi increasingly
to walk a tightrope to maintain his hold on power. If
he cracks down hard on real and suspected enemies,
he risks alienating increasing numbers of Kenyans who
may conclude that there is no hope of gaining redress
of their grievances within the system and consider
turning to violent opposition. He also realizes that
undemocractic actions could jeopardize badly needed
Western aid.
60. But Moi also fears that a return to conciliatory
policies, such as he followed earlier in his administra-
tion when he gave the country's smaller tribes a more
equitable share of patronage, would make him appear
weak and indecisive again. This would risk a loss of
support among powerful hardliners in the regime. Moi
has had to share power with these figures because he
lacks a substantial base of popular support and does
not have Kenyatta's authority.
61. Although Moi has threatened harsh reprisals, he
has not resorted to massive arrests outside the Air
Force. He realizes that jailin for 25X6
example, would trigger serious unrest among the Luo.
At the same time he has failed to begin dealing more
forcefully with the country's underlying economic
problems. In particular, he shows no signs of acting
against corruption-one of the major grievances of the
coup plotters-by sacking prominent officials widely
regarded to be lining their pockets.
62. Because Moi appears unable to prevent his
political fortunes from declining still further, he is
likely to adopt increasingly harsh measures against his
opponents. For more than a year before the coup
attempt, Moi already had been turning to repressive
policies more frequently to deal with dissent. The
government used or threatened harsh measures against
opponents in several institutions such as the National
Assembly where some dissidents were arrested and
brought to trial. Moi also warned that he might
suspend parliamentary immunity and jail those who
made intemperate remarks in the legislature. The
Assembly, which is dominated by Moi's supporters,
does not have much influence on government policy,
but the backbenchers have used it as a forum to vent
their complaints.
63. This spring Moi stepped up his effort to quiet
dissent by arresting several university lecturers and
government critics-the country's first political de-
tainees since the Kenyatta era. He also secured passage
of a constitutional amendment legalizing Kenya's de
facto status as a one-party state, thereby forestalling
dissidents' plans for a second party.
64. Moi also is becoming less tolerant of criticism in
the press. Kenyan papers generally have been allowed
to express mild complaints about government policy,
but within the last year a number of authors of articles
considered unflattering by Moi have been detained by
security officials for questioning. The government
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recently initiated a libel suit against one of Nairobi's
leading papers that published stories about official
corruption, reportedly as a warning to the press not to
embarrass the regime. The government also forced the
firing of a journalist who editorialized against the
detentions and other repressive measures in another
leading Nairobi daily.
65. Denunciations of Kenya's small but economical-
ly important Asian community by Moi and other
senior officials earlier this year suggest that the gov-
ernment views the Asians as a potential scapegoat for
the country's economic ills. Moi publicly castigated
Asians for smuggling, hoarding, and illegal currency
transactions. Soon afterward, an Asian businessman
received a stiff sentence for trying to send currency
out of the country without official clearance. Although
Moi subsequently backed off from his harshest criti-
cisms and denied any intent to deport Asians, they are
a convenient target because they are widely resented
by Kenya's black population.
66. The Asians-most of whose ancestors come
from the Indian subcontinent-make up only 0.5
percent of the population, but their expulsion or
departure as a result of government harassment would
be another serious blow to the economy. Asians pro-
duce about a quarter of Kenya's gross domestic prod-
uct, and have a majority share of the manufacturing
sector and a 75-percent share of trade. They also play
an important role in construction, transportation, and
import-export sectors, and account for a large number
of the country's lawyers and doctors.
67. Despite Moi's assurances, Asians have become
more insecure since his attacks. The looting of their
shops during the coup attempt appears to have moti-
vated growing numbers of Asians to send their money
out of the country and to consider leaving Kenya. If
large numbers of Asians depart, Kenya does not have a
sufficient body of skilled and experienced blacks to
replace them.
Foreign Relations
Moi's Active International Role
68. Kenyan foreign policy follows the same general-
ly moderate, pro-Western orientation under Moi as it
did in the Kenyatta period. Under both Presidents,
Nairobi has tried to avoid trouble with more left-
leaning neighbors by tempering pro-Western senti-
ments with public professions of support for non-
aligned positions. Foreign policy received relatively
little attention during the Kenyatta era, but several
factors have given international affairs a more promi-
nent place in Moi's government:
- Moi's chairmanship of the Organization of Afri-
can Unity.
- Kenya's increased need for economic aid.
- The growing regional security concerns that led
in part to Moi's acceptance of the military access
agreement with the United States.
69. Moi has regarded his position as OAU Chair-
man as a growing burden, particularly since his term
was extended by the failure of the Tripoli summit
meeting in August to choose a successor. When he
assumed the position, in mid-1981, Moi's role in efforts
to resolve the Chad and Western Sahara disputes made
him the most active OAU Chairman since the organi-
zation was founded. His attempt to appear an impar-
tial arbiter of OAU disputes antagonized some of
Kenya's usual moderate African allies. Moi's heavy
travel schedule and involvement in OAU affairs also
have led to charges by domestic critics that he has
neglected economic and internal political problems.
70. Because of the pressing domestic concerns
caused by the coup attempt, Moi wants to relinquish
his OAU responsibilities. The current split in the OAU,
however, may oblige him to remain as Chairman until
the next regular summit meeting, scheduled to be held
in mid-1983.
Relations With Neighboring States
71. Political differences, economic conflicts, and
personal disputes between regional leaders have peri-
odically marked relations between Kenya and its
immediate neighbors. Resulting tensions have gradual-
ly increased Nairobi's sense of isolation and vulnerabil-
ity to regional pressures and caused Kenya to imple-
ment an expansion and modernization of its military
despite the added drain on its declining economy. At
the same time, Moi has tried to improve relations with
his neighbors to gain trade benefits as well as to ease
security concerns.
72. Kenyan officials continue to view Somalia as the
greatest potential threat to their security despite the
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current weakened condition of the Somali military
and intermittent efforts on both sides to improve
relations. Kenya still believes that Somali President
Siad harbors irredentist ambitions for Somali-inhabit-
ed northeastern Kenya and that if Somalia becomes
stronger militarily Siad would again consider aggres-
sive moves against Kenya. The Kenyan Government
believes-probably correctly-that Siad is trying to
improve relations with Moi as a tactic to reduce the
threat of military cooperation between Kenya and
Ethiopia-partners in a longstanding military pact-
and to gain more Western aid. Kenyan leaders have
exaggerated fears that Somalia's military access agree-
ment with the United States may lead to US arms
deliveries that will improve Mogadishu's offensive
capabilities.
73. Moi has tried to improve relations with Siad
mainly because he too wants greater aid from the
United States, other Western nations, and Saudi Ara-
bia, which have encouraged the reconciliation. Meet-
ings over the past year between Moi and Siad and
other senior officials from the two countries have been
followed by some instances of cooperation between
local officials along the Kenyan-Somali border.
74. But further progress on mending Kenyan-Soma-
li relations is likely to be slow at best, given the
lingering mutual suspicions on both sides. Tensions in
northeastern Kenya increased this spring following the
killing of several local Kenyan officials by "shiftas"
(ethnic Somali bandits), who the Kenyans believe
receive support from Somalia. For his part, Siad
remains concerned that Kenya is mistreating its ethnic
Somali population.
75. The course of the Somali-Ethiopian conflict in,
the Ogaden will have an important impact on relations
between Nairobi and Mogadishu. A revitalized Somali
military would make Nairobi resistant to improving
ties with Mogadishu. As long as Somalia remains
militarily weak and fully preoccupied by the threat
from Ethiopia, however, Kenyan officials probably
will move ahead cautiously with the reconciliation.
76. If relations with Somalia continue to improve,
Kenya may see less need to maintain military coopera-
tion with Ethiopia
recent such operation was in March 1981. More
Kenyans, however, are beginning to see Ethiopia as a
long-term security threat because of the Soviet influ-
ence in Addis Ababa and the Mengistu government's
alliance with Libya. Kenya nevertheless wants to avoid
antagonizing the Ethiopians and will act cautiously in
implementing any decision to move away from them.
A Kenyan official recently indicated to the US Embas-
sy that Ethiopian pressure was causing Kenya to go
slow on the rapprochement with Somalia.
77. Moi's suspicions that Uganda and Tanzania
supported the coup attempt in Nairobi have dimmed
prospects for improved relations between Kenya and
its former partners in the East African Community.
The three countries have been haggling over the assets
of the Community, a trade and economic grouping,
since it dissolved in 1977, chiefly because Tanzania
and Uganda believed that Kenya, with its more pros-
perous economy, dominated it. The Tanzanians subse-
quently closed the border with Kenya because of the
dispute over Community assets.
78. Prospects for a settlement of the dispute will
depend on whether the practical needs of all three
countries to ease serious economic difficulties will
outweigh the hostility and distrust among them. Al-
though the three countries have agreed in principle on
general financial terms, further progress has been
blocked because of Moi's refusal to meet with Tanza-
nian President Nyerere and Ugandan President Obote.
79. Although the Kenyans might owe as much as
$100 million-primarily to Uganda-as part of any
settlement, they probably reason they would gain
more than that over time from new trade, particularly
if Nyerere agrees to reopen Tanzania's border with
Kenya. In the short term, however, a restoration of
normal trade relations among the three countries will
not significantly reduce Kenya's current account defi-
cit. Kenyan industry would benefit somewhat through
increased exports, but the Tanzanian and Ugandan
economies are so depressed that the two countries
probably will adopt measures to prevent substantial
imports of Kenyan goods for some time.
80. Moi's belief that Ugandan officials were in
contact with the coup plotters may cause him to give
freer rein to Ugandan dissidents living in Kenya.
Kenya is unlikely, however, to sanction dissident mili-
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tary activities from Kenyan territory that might in-
crease security problems along the border. If Obote's
government were overthrown and conditions in Ugan-
da deteriorated, the Moi regime probably would ask
for additional military aid from the United States. Moi
also might give greater assistance to Ugandan
dissidents.
81. Kenya probably would also look for increased
military aid if any other threatened government in the
region-such as Tanzania, Somalia, or Sudan-were
overthrown. Moi would be concerned that new re-
gimes in Tanzania or Somalia would be unable to
impose stability and that tensions could rise along their
borders with Kenya. Moi regards Sudanese President
Nimeiri as his only moderate ally in the region, and he
would be particularly concerned if Libya appeared to
be involved in Nimeiri's ouster.
Relations With the USSR, the West, and
Other Countries
82. The Kenyan leadership is strongly anti-Commu-
nist and deeply suspicious of Soviet activities in Africa.
In keeping with his nonaligned posture, Moi had
planned a visit to Moscow last year, but he canceled
the trip in part because of irritation over a Soviet
attempt to persuade him to accept military aid. The
Soviets have some 54 personnel in Kenya, including
Embassy officials, UN Environmental Program repre-
sentatives, and a trade mission. Nairobi accepts limited
Soviet aid, including the stationing of several Soviet
doctors in Kenyan hospitals and scholarships for Ke-
nyan students to study in the USSR. It would take a
major upheaval, however, including a collapse of the
economy and the ouster of virtually the entire leader-
ship before a new Kenyan government would consider
establishing close ties with Moscow and seeking sub-
stantial Soviet aid. Cuba has no diplomatic representa-
tives in Kenya and the Kenyans have turned aside
Cuban requests to establish an embassy in Nairobi.
83. In contrast, Kenya maintains close relations
with Western countries and the West provides nearly
all of Kenya's economic and military aid. Kenya's
British colonial heritage, including the civil service,
educational system, and military training and organi-
zation, gives London significant residual influence in
Kenya. The United Kingdom has been the largest
donor of economic and military aid to Nairobi, and
British forces periodically hold military training exer-
cises in Kenya. London seldom needs to use direct
pressure to affect Kenyan policies.
85. Kenya generally maintains good relations with
both the Arab world and-unofficially-with Israel.
Kenya's dependence on oil imports from the Middle
East requires the government to take public positions
in support of the Arabs. The Kenyans also have made
gestures such as permitting the Palestine Liberation
Organization to open an office in Nairobi. Although
they have had only limited success in gaining econom-
ic help from Saudi Arabia and other conservative Arab
countries, the Kenyans remain vulnerable to pressure
from these countries to support Arab positions because
of Nairobi's concern about the possibility of another
world oil shortage.
86. Moi has been publicly cordial toward Libyan
leader Qadhafi, but the Kenyans worry about possible
Libyan subversion in Kenya. Libya gives money to
Kenyan politicians with pro-Arab views, and recently
renewed efforts to expand its influence by purchasing
Kenyan newspapers. The Libyans, however, are un-
likely to have much success. Moi's government already
keeps a tight lid on Libyan diplomatic activities in
Kenya and may be more forceful in countering Liby-
an schemes once Moi's tenure as OAU Chairman is
over.
87. Libya also attempts to use Kenya as a channel
for subversion against third countries. The Libyans
tried unsuccessfully in 1981 to stage through Nairobi a
terrorist attack against US personnel in Sudan. They
have been more successful in moving Ugandan dissi-
dents through Nairobi for training in Libya.
88. Israel, which maintains an interests office in
Nairobi, has provided military and technical aid to
Kenya, including arms and ammunition.
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Moi, however, is unlikely to follow Zaire's lead
and reestablish formal relations with Israel. Nairobi is
satisfied with the current low-key relationship and
does not want to risk its supply of Arab oil. Kenya
might be responsive to pressure from Israel for recog-
nition, however, if several other African countries
were to reestablish diplomatic ties with the Israelis at
the same time.
Prospects and Implications for the United States
Moi's Short-Term Prospects
89. Moi has about an even chance of serving out the
remaining two years of his present term. Despite his
problems, he has shown a talent for outmaneuvering
potential opponents and for playing off the country's
ethnic and political groups against one another. He
may decide to seek a new mandate by calling for early
elections, but only if he believes he can win. None of
Moi's potential opponents, with the exception of Ki-
baki, has strong popular support. His current tactics
are likely to keep them off balance and force them to
lie low for at least the next several months. Food
shortages have in the past triggered the most serious
discontent among the population but-barring another
major drought-increased production diminishes the
chances of widespread shortages during the next year
or two.
90. Moi's position, however, will remain in serious
danger because he is unlikely to make the major
changes in government policy necessary to turn the
declining economy around or substantially reduce the
political tensions that have resulted from the coup
attempt. Further unrest is likely before the end of his
term. If he appears incapable of controlling it, the
military leadership probably will feel compelled to
take over the government or, as seems more likely, to
lend its support to a civilian successor regime. Moi also
might be forced to relinquish his position if the still-
powerful, but factionalized, Kikuyu unite against him.
Such a development could result from a decision by
Moi to arrest Kikuyu leaders implicated in the coup
plot or a move by Njonjo-with Moi's support-to oust
Kibaki from the vice presidency. A united Kikuyu
leadership could gain control of KANU-which deter-
mines who is president-and force an early election to
choose Moi's successor.
91. Moi's ouster before his term ends is more likely
to come through an assassination or a coup led by
middle-level and junior officers or enlisted men. Ke-
nyan politics has periodically been marked by political
violence and Moi has made many enemies since he
assumed office. Even since the coup attempt he has
insisted on risking his personal safety by appearing in
public and mingling with the people.
92. If the election is held as scheduled in 1984, it
will be preceded by even more intense jockeying for
position within the leadership. Moi's political skills and
the divisions among his opponents will give him a
fairly good chance to win another term if the economy
has not declined -more dramatically and political
unrest has not become widespread. Moi's main chal-
lengers will be from the Kikuyu. Both Kibaki and
Njonjo, however, face uphill struggles in trying to
overcome their weaknesses. If they appear likely to
lose, Moi might be able to persuade both to back off
from challenging him and resign themselves to re-
maining in subordinate roles in his administration. It is
unclear whether another Kikuyu politician has suffi-
cient time and ability to organize a successful bid for
the presidency against Moi, but there are almost
certainly other Kikuyu who covet the presidency.
If Moi Is Replaced
93. Over the short term any successor to Moi from
within the country's present leadership probably
would make few changes in basic orientation. The
leadership is largely united in support of the present
economic system, from which it benefits handsomely,
and the regime's pro-Western foreign policy orienta-
tion, which it has helped to shape. The differences
between Kibaki and Njonjo are almost entirely con-
fined to personal rivalries, and any other Kikuyu
successor to Moi would also be likely to support the
system that has enabled his tribe to exercise substantial
economic and political power. If a Kikuyu leader
succeeded Moi, his chances for maintaining stability
would depend largely on the state of the economy but
also on the means by which he came to power. He
might face greater ethnic tensions, however, because
of hostility among Kenya's lesser tribes. Non-Kikuyu
tribes fear that a regime led by Kikuyu would treat
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them as second-class citizens, as they believe Kenyat-
ta's government did.
94. Significant changes would be more likely if Moi
were ousted because an economic collapse was trigger-
ing widespread political unrest and he appeared to
have lost control of the situation. Such a development
probably would prompt conservative military leaders
to take power. Disaffected radicals probably would
not have sufficient time to organize or build sufficient
popular support to challenge a military takeover with-
in the next few years. A military regime would be
most likely to adopt more authoritarian policies, but
most other changes probably would not be considered
until after stability was restored. The military proba-
bly would look to established political figures to
participate in a new government rather than turn
power over to radicals who would make sweeping
changes in the Kenyan system.
95. A successful coup by low-ranking Army person-
nel, however, would be more likely to lead to a break
with the past. If economic grievances brought on the
coup, such military leaders probably would sweep out
the old leadership completely, call for an end to
corruption, and-at least initially-impose more radi-
cal economic policies.
96. If radicals did succeed in gaining power, they
probably would initially adopt a nonaligned policy
and seek assistance from both East and West. Wide-
spread anti-Communist sentiment in Kenya reduces
the prospect that the regime would become a Soviet
client state. It would be preoccupied with domestic
problems and would give highest priority to consoli-
dating its power. A radical government in Nairobi,
however, probably would seek closer ties with neigh-
bors with similar ideologies, particularly Ethiopia.
Refurbished ties with the government in Addis Ababa
would inevitably lead to new strains in relations with
Somalia, particularly if the present government in
Mogadishu were still in power.
Longer Term Outlook
97. Increasing instability appears likely in Kenya
over the next five years or so no matter who is
president. The pressures caused by rapid population
growth almost certainly will lead to more serious
economic and political problems for Moi or his succes-
sor. Growing friction over scarce resources is likely,
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including more frequent tribal disputes over land in
rural areas and urban unrest caused by food shortages
and other economic difficulties. The government is
beginning to understand the severe consequences of
the population explosion, and Nairobi almost certainly
will feel compelled to intensify its efforts to promote
family planning. Even so, it would be many years
before such efforts achieved results that would slow
the population growth rate significantly.
98. Moi's repressive measures against his critics
probably have led many of them to conclude that
dissent within the system is useless. Even if he or a
successor were to relax such measures, some opponents
of the government will probably have become radical-
ized and not return to legal opposition activities.
Should economic conditions continue to decline, radi-
calized opponents could, in time, exploit discontent
among students, workers, "have nots," and other
disaffected groups. Their ability to promote wide-
spread agitation against the regime would be en-
hanced if they gained support from the USSR, Libya,
or other sympathetic countries. Any significant in-
crease in unrest also could lead to further economic
difficulties by discouraging foreign investment in
Kenya and possibly by influencing foreign govern-
ments to reconsider the wisdom of granting large
amounts of economic aid to Nairobi.
99. There are several factors that give the moderate
leadership a good chance of remaining in power at
least through the period of this assessment:
- The leadership supports the present system and
has a political and economic stake in seeing it
survive.
- The lack of a tradition of popular dissent will
make it more difficult for radicals to organize the
masses.
- The general population still derives some benefits
from Kenya's market-oriented system and recog-
nizes that radical governments in neighboring
countries have failed to cope with problems as
well as the Kenyan Government has.
- The country's conservative military commanders
probably would intervene first to prevent a
radical takeover.
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Implications for the United States
100. Kenya is likely to retain its basically pro-US
policy perspective over the term of this assessment,
and will look to the United States for still greater
economic and military aid.' But because the increas-
ingly burdened Nairobi government is coming under
growing pressure, several developments could lead to
greater friction in Kenyan-US relations, and possibly
cause a reduction in military cooperation.
101. Nairobi would be unhappy with Washington if
Kenyan leaders believed the United States had failed
to respond adequately to their economic needs. The
Moi government already is restless over what it regards
as insufficient US recompense for expanded US mili-
tary access to Kenyan facilities. The coup attempt has
increased the urgency of Moi's calls for greater US
help.
102. Kenya would similarly complain if govern-
ment leaders felt Washington was not responsive to
their security concerns. A deterioration in the Ugan-
dan situation that led to new tensions along the
Kenyan-Ugandan border, greater strains in relations
with Tanzania, or, more important, renewed fears of
Somali irredentism would lead Kenya to ask Washing-
ton for more military aid.
103. Nairobi is concerned about what it sees as US
failure to comprehend that Mogadishu may again
intervene in northeastern Kenya when its military is
stronger. Moi has reluctantly accepted US transfers of
defensive arms to Mogadishu to put his own relation-
ship with the United States on a better footing. US-
Somali arms deals at concessional terms, however, are
viewed in Nairobi as largely neutralizing the effect of
improvements to Kenya's capabilities realized by Ke-
nyan arms procurement on commercial terms. Moi
would object strongly to any transfers of offensive
arms to Somalia. He would try to increase pressure on
Washington to end such arms aid.
104. Kenya would be concerned by excessive US
pressure for Kenyan support on international issues.
Nairobi does not want to be isolated within the
Nonaligned Movement and exposed to the danger of
Libyan or Communist subversion. Kenyan officials
E Kenyan press treatment of the United States is discussed in
annex B.
will continue to resist US pressure for support on
certain issues within the OAU and other international
forums, preferring to stay with the African and non-
aligned consensus to the extent possible.
105. Kenya could signal its displeasure with the
United States by refusing to agree to Washington's
proposals for further cooperation under the military
access agreement. Nairobi would consider canceling
the agreement only as a last resort, however, if it
believed the United States was acting against Kenya's
vital interests-particularly in giving offensive arms to
Somalia-and there appeared to be no hope of gaining
redress of its grievances. Moi might threaten to cancel
the agreement and adopt a more nonaligned posture if
he believed Washington had failed to respond to his
pleas for aid after the coup attempt and he saw such a
course as the only way to save his faltering position. In
such a case, Kenyan leaders would look for greater aid
from other Western countries or conservative Arab
states. Kenya might also ask Communist countries for
assistance as a tactic to press the West into granting
more aid.
106. The continued weakening of Moi's political
position could make the Kenyan-US military relation-
ship a more frequent target of opposition criticism due
to a close US identification with an increasingly
unpopular, repressive Kenyan regime. In particular, a
more visible US military presence in Kenya would
increase the possibility of anti-US protests or even
attacks on US facilities. Increasing economic problems
and political instability in Kenya, in fact, are likely to
place new strains on Nairobi's relations with Washing-
ton whether or not Moi remains in power.
107. If a radical government came to power in
Nairobi, US interests would suffer. Such a regime
almost certainly would cancel the military access
agreement with Washington to demonstrate its move
to the left on foreign policy issues. It probably would
criticize the US-Somali military access agreement and
would permit port calls by Soviet naval ships. If the
new leaders were concerned with the practical prob-
lems of trying to halt the economic decline, however,
they probably would want to avoid a rupture in
relations with the United States. Kenya's need for
substantial economic aid would cause it to seek contin-
ued help from Western countries, including the Unit-
ed States.
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ANNEX A
MILITARY AND SECURITY FORCES
Kenyan military and security forces include three
military services (Army, Navy, and Air Force), police
forces, and the Directorate of Intelligence and Securi-
ty-commonly called the Special Branch. The armed
forces and the Special Branch are under the Presi-
dent's direct control through the Office of the Presi-
dent. In a recent move President Moi also brought
most of the police forces under his direct control. He
also has made the Air Force subordinate to the Army
because of the leading role of Air Force personnel in
the attempted coup.
We believe there is currently no significant external
military threat to Kenya, although most Kenyan de-
fense planners consider Somalia, with its history of
irredentist claims on northeastern Kenya, to be the
primary threat. As the armed forces continue to
expand and become more proficient in using their
newly acquired weapons, they probably will be able to
mount at least an initial defense against violations of
Kenyan territory by any neighboring country except
Ethiopia. Kenyan forces are acquiring a variety of new
weapons, but it will be some time before improved
equipment, training, and leadership under the mod-
ernization program can produce a significantly more
capable defense force. The current investigation and
reorganization of the Air Force will drastically impede
efforts to improve its combat capabilities.
Kenyatta had kept the Kenyan military small and
underequipped because he feared coup attempts. In
the mid-1970s, however, the threat of attack by
Uganda's President Idi Amin, who claimed part of
western Kenya, and by Somalia, as well as border
tensions with Tanzania, caused Kenyatta to modernize
and expand the Kenyan armed forces.
Since his election Moi has continued to support the
modernization and expansion program, and the influ-
ence of the military in Kenya is increasing. Having
long felt neglected, the armed forces have been en-
couraged by the government's willingness to expand
and equip them, and they are now more aware of
their potential and importance to the nation. The coup
attempt has led to a further increase in military
influence within Moi's government. The Army, which
put down the uprising, has abandoned its traditional
disinterest in politics and is playing an important
advisory role. For example, top Army officers per-
suaded Moi to replace the heads of the police and the
General Service Unit following the attempted coup.
They also reportedly have urged him to purge his
Cabinet of ministers whose loyalty they suspect.
While the increase in the size of the armed forces
and the acquisition of new weapon systems will
improve military capabilities, the modernization and
expansion program has not been without significant
difficulties:
- It is heavily dependent on foreign military
assistance.
- It is a strain on the economy.
- Lack of effective management at the Depart-
ment of Defense and service headquarters causes
significant delays in program development.
- Logistic support and technical training in the
services are not sufficient to fully support the
newly acquired weapon systems.
Department of Defense
The Kenyan Department of Defense is subordinate
to the Office of the President. The operational chain
of command proceeds directly from the president
through the chief of the General Staff in the Depart-
ment of Defense down to the three service command-
ers. Administrative authority flows from the president
through a minister of state to the chief secretary in the
Office of the President down to the permanent secre-
tary (for defense) and the military chief of the General
Staff in the Department of Defense. A Defense Coun-
cil, consisting of the minister of state, the chief of the
General Staff, the service commanders, and the per-
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manent secretary, advises the president on matters
pertaining to the armed forces.
Army
The Kenyan Army remained loyal-for the most
part-and played the main role in putting down the
attempted coup. It had grown in the past few years to
an estimated 14,000 men, but its strength has been
reduced since the coup to about 12,000 because of
transfers to the Air Force. The Army remains a small
force when compared with most other East African
armies.
The acquisition of new weapons is compounding
existing maintenance deficiencies, logistic problems,
and management shortcomings in all the military
services. There is a shortage of technically qualified
personnel, and the middle-level officer and NCO
ranks have limited supervisory training and experi-
ence. The dispersion of qualified personnel from
established operational units to newly formed units has
somewhat degraded the capabilities of the older units.
The Army is capable of containing the small
"shifta" groups in northeastern Kenya. If relations
between Kenya and Somalia were to deteriorate and
Mogadishu were to renew support to the "shiftas,"
however, the Army would be taxed to counter it.
Occasional joint military exercises between Kenyan
and Ethiopian ground forces against Somali guerrilla
groups operating through Kenya into Ethiopia have
met with marginal success. The five infantry battalions
are the primary tactical units in the Kenyan Army,
and will remain so until newly formed armor, artil-
lery, and air cavalry units become fully combat ready.
In the context of black Africa, the infantry is relatively
well trained and disciplined.
The addition of new weapon systems (Vickers tanks,
105-mm artillery, and Hughes 500 MD helicopters)
will ultimately enhance the combat capabilities of the
Army. The first phase of the tank acquisition program
has been completed with the delivery of 38 tanks. The
second phase will be completed by the end of 1982
with the total delivery of some 80 tanks. The lack of
properly equipped workshop facilities, which mini-
mizes tank repair capability, is a major deficiency.
The Army also is having difficulty finding reliable
transporters for its tanks.
Air Force
The Kenyan Air Force, which had at least 3,000
personnel before the coup attempt, is undergoing an
extensive reorganization. Many former personnel have
been jailed. The Air Force is now commanded by an
Army general and heavily staffed by Army personnel.
Thus, Air Force capabilities will be severely limited
until the Army transfers and other replacements can
be trained.
Even before the coup attempt, the Air Force was
not able to perform its air defense mission adequately.
Air defense elements include an air defense artillery
unit, four early warning and ground-controlled inter-
cept radar systems, and 12 British Tigercat air defense
missile launchers. The missile systems were delivered
last year and remain in storage. The American-built
F5E aircraft will eventually improve the air defense
capability once the operational ready rating of the
aircraft is improved and armament problems are
solved. The recent addition of the British-manufac-
tured Hawk aircraft will add to Kenya's ground attack
capability when this squadron becomes fully
operational.
The Air Force has three bases-two in the Nairobi
area and the third about 150 kilometers to the north.
Before the uprising, the Air Force contained transpor-
tation, air support, and helicopter squadrons, a basic
flying school, and a newly formed technical training
center.
Navy
The Kenyan Navy, with an estimated 650 person-
nel, is capable of performing only limited coastal
patrols but is reasonably efficient for its size. There are
only seven patrol craft. Three are being refitted with
the Israeli Gabriel missile system, for use against
surface ships.
The Navy is based entirely at Mombasa, Kenya's
only deepwater port, with one patrol craft squadron.
Additionally, the naval organization consists of a head-
quarters, the Mombasa Naval Base, a communications
center, a training facility, and a maintenance support
base.
Foreign Military Assistance
For the foreseeable future, the Kenyan armed forces
will require foreign financial aid, technical assistance,
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spare parts, and training support, in addition to sources
for major items of equipment. Kenya has no indige-
nous materiel production capability. In the present
modernization program, weapon systems have been
acquired from the United States, the United Kingdom,
West Germany, France, Canada, and Israel. The first
two are the most important suppliers. The United
States has provided jet fighters and helicopters, while
the British also have supplied jet trainer/attack air-
craft, as well as tanks and artillery.
The Kenyan armed forces are not capable of easily
absorbing the sophisticated weapon systems recently
acquired and planned in present programs. All mili-
tary elements are plagued by deficiencies in support
facilities and trained technical personnel.
They are stationed at sites throughout Kenya from
where they can easily reach any remote location. In
many cases the deployment of GSU personnel to
troubled rural areas has been sufficient to forestall
disorders.
General Service Unit
The paramilitary GSU-an autonomous element of
the National Police-is made up of about 2,000 men.
Traditionally, GSU personnel have been drawn mostly
from the Kikuyu tribe. It is charged with presidential
protection, border patrol, and counterinsurgency du-
ties, and serves as a reserve to reinforce the regular
police and the armed forces.
GSU rifle companies of about 120 men each are
capable of operating independently as light infantry.
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ANNEX B
THE KENYAN PRESS AND THE UNITED STATES
Public opinion of the United States as reflected in
the press of Kenya generally is favorable. The three
major Nairobi dailies and a weekly news magazine
seldom voice strident anti-American sentiment. Factu-
al reporting on US foreign and domestic issues is
usually balanced and fair, although editorials and
commentaries do occasionally criticize the United
States and letters to the editor often reflect distrust,
suspicion, and negative attitudes about it.
In principle, the press in Kenya is unfettered and
free to report and editorialize at will. In reality,
publishers and editors tacitly practice a form of self-
imposed censorship. Moi has put the press on notice
more than once that, unless it restrains itself, the
government may step in to enforce restraint. In July
1982 he forced the firing of the editor of the country's
second-largest newspaper following the editor's criti-
cism of the government. Moi's well-known sensitivity
about publicity concerning the Kenyan-US military
relationship means that the press rarely mentions that
subject.
Positive as well as negative news items about the
United States are given play. Press service cables and
dispatches are reprinted without adding extraneous
material or omitting relevant data to produce a slanted
impression.
Foreign and domestic policies of the United States
are fair game for editors and columnists. Kenyan press
editorials and commentaries, however, contain com-
paratively few bitter denunciations of the United
States. Subjects that have elicited criticism include:
- The US role in brokering a Namibia settlement.
- The marketing by US pharmaceutical companies
of insufficiently tested drugs outside the United
States, particularly in Africa.
- US relations with South Africa.
- The US "veto" of Tanzania's candidate for UN
Secretary General.
- The Reagan administration's endeavor to kill the
Clark Amendment.
- The proposed sale of US arms to Somalia.
Although editors and commentators take firm posi-
tions against the United States on some topics, they do
not criticize or impugn the American political system
as such. Instead they tend to view some US Govern-
ment policies as the aberrations of a particular admin-
istration or secretary of state. The underlying assump-
tion appears to be that, in time and given advice by
friendly nations (such as Kenya), US citizens will exert
pressure to change policy mistakes by their govern-
ment. In contrast, Kenyan papers regularly carry
negative commentaries about the USSR that point out
deficiencies in the Soviet system.
Letters to the editor offer the best view of the grass-
roots level of Kenyan public opinion and contain the
most negative views-frequently expressed in harsh,
derogatory terms-about the United States. Long after
critical incidents disappear from factual reporting and
have been treated in editorials and commentaries,
they continue to appear in letters. One notable exam-
ple involved the slaying of a Kenyan bargirl by a
young white US serviceman in Mombasa last year. The
incident remained front page news for some time and
provoked blistering criticism of the justice system for
allegedly letting the serviceman off because of influ-
ence exerted by the United States. After the story
disappeared from news and editorial pages, angry
letters continued to appear for months denouncing
what was perceived as a miscarriage of justice. The
letterwriters indicated their disbelief that the service-
man would undergo trial and sentencing back in the
United States.
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