CONFLICT IN SOUTHERN AFRICA: REGIONAL AND INTERNATIONAL DIMENSIONS

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP97S00289R000200200018-7
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 25
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: July 8, 2011
• Sequence Number: 18
• Publication Date: December 10, 1981
• Content Type: SNIE

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Director of
Central
Intelligence
Conflict in Southern Africa:
Regional and International
Dimensions
Special National Intelligence Estimate
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CONFLICT IN SOUTHERN AFRICA:
REGIONAL AND INTERNATIONAL
DIMENSIONS
Information as of 10 December 1981 was
used in the preparation of this Estimate.
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THIS ESTIMATE IS ISSUED BY THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL
INTELLIGENCE.
THE NATIONAL FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE BOARD CONCURS.
The following intelligence organizations participated in the preparation of the
Estimate:
The Central Intelligence Agency, the intelligence organizations of the Departments of
State and Defense, and the National Security Agency.
Also Participating:
The Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of the Army
The Director of Naval Intelligence, Department of the Navy
The Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, Department of the Air Force
The Director of Intelligence, Headquarters, Marine Corps
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CONTENTS
Page
KEY JUDGMENTS .................................................................................................... 1
DISCUSSION ..............................................................................................................
Introduction ................................................................................................... 5
Black African Concerns and Soviet Exploitation ....................................... 5
Perceptions of the Soviet Role ............................................................. 5
White Rule and Black Nationalism ..................................................... 7
The Black States: Security Issues ......................................................... 8
Expanding Soviet Influence: Problems and Opportunities ........................ 12
Outlook and Implications ............................................................................. 14
Implications for the United States ....................................................... 14
ANNEX: CUBAN MILITARY PRESENCE IN ANGOLA .................................... 17
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KEY JUDGMENTS
Southern Africa is becoming increasingly polarized and unstable.
Over the past year there has been an escalation of military activity by
anti-South African insurgents based in black states, by the South
African armed forces trying to neutralize these groups, and by guerrillas
fighting the Governments of Angola and Mozambique.
The fundamental conflict in the region stems from black opposi-
tion to white minority rule in Namibia and South Africa. Soviet and Cu-
ban involvement has increased the complexity of the problem and
raised the stakes.
The black states and the anti-South African insurgents feel increas-
ingly threatened by Pretoria's growing willingness to use its military
power beyond its borders. Although the results of Soviet efforts in
southern Africa have been mixed, the deepening conflict is enhancing
the USSR's and Cuba's opportunities to build their influence and
undermine that of the West, primarily through military assistance.
The more the black states look to the USSR and Cuba for military
aid, the more Pretoria will fear an imminent Marxist onslaught. And the
more South Africa strikes back, the more Moscow and Havana will be
able to strengthen their military links with black states and anti-South
African nationalist movements. Thus the scene is set for further Soviet
exploitation and escalating conflict.
Ironically, these trends serve Pretoria as well as Moscow. Both
governments benefit from growing tension in the region because it
contributes to a closer identification of black southern Africa with the
USSR and of South Africa with the United States.
The Namibian struggle is to a great degree an extension of the
larger issue of white rule in South Africa itself. The Soviets-unlike the
West-have no conflicting interests preventing them from wholeheart-
edly endorsing black African efforts to bring majority rule to Namibia
and South Africa. Thus they can freely grant military assistance to the
South-West Africa People's Organization (SWAPO)-the Namibian
insurgent group-and the African National Congress (ANC)-the lead-
ing South African insurgent group.
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The spiral of insurgent activity, South African aggressive reaction,
and Soviet exploitation of black African security concerns manifests
itself in various ways in the black states of the region. In Marxist-ruled
Angola and Mozambique, South African intervention-military incur-
sions and aid to insurgents-and black dependence on Soviet and East
European military assistance mutually reinforce each other:
- Even a settlement of the Namibia problem probably would not
be sufficient by itself to bring about a major withdrawal of
Cuban troops from Angola, given the political and security
problems plaguing the Angolan regime.
Fear of Pretoria's intentions has also been a factor in decisions by
some of the more moderate southern African countries such as Zambia
and Botswana to turn to the Soviets for arms and training-develop-
ments that have exacerbated South Africa's own anxiety and aggres-
siveness.
But the more moderate governments remain distrustful of Moscow
and have sought to keep it from expanding its influence into their
domestic politics. Even elements within the Angolan and Mozambican
regimes show signs of wanting to limit their dependence on the USSR.
African distrust of Moscow reflects differences between Soviet and
African interests and perspectives. Moscow tends to antagonize southern
African black leaders by dealing with their countries mainly in the
context of East-West and Sino-Soviet competition.
The Soviets have an interest in continued tension in the region
because their influence there is largely founded on military assistance.
African governments by and large want a negotiated settlement in
Namibia-just as they did in Rhodesia-to hasten the end of minority
rule and to ease the economic and military burdens such issues create
for them.
A further constraint on expansion of Soviet influence in the region
is Moscow's unwillingness to meet pressing African economic needs.
This is readily apparent even in Marxist-controlled Angola and Mozam-
bique. Also, the continuing dependence of most southern African
countries on economic links with South Africa limits their willingness to
antagonize Pretoria by deepening their ties with Moscow.
The Africans know that only the West is in a position to help them
ease their economic troubles and resolve the region's political problems
through negotiations with South Africa. This gives the United States and
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the West important leverage. Most African governments are unlikely to
allow their actions to be dictated by the USSR as long as the United
States and the West remain engaged.
Yet such US involvement entails risks. In trying to play the part of
an honest broker between South Africa and black Africa, the United
States increases its susceptibility to black African charges of US-South
African collusion. Moscow will continue to exploit these suspicions.
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DISCUSSION
INTRODUCTION
1. The situation in southern Africa is becoming
increasingly polarized and unstable, marked by rising
mutual suspicion and tension between white-ruled
South Africa and its black neighbors. Over the past
year, there has been an escalation of military activity
by anti-South African insurgents based in black states,
by the South African armed forces trying to neutralize
these groups, and by guerrillas fighting the Marxist
Governments of Angola and Mozambique.
2. The black states and the anti-South African
insurgent groups feel increasingly threatened by Pre-
toria's growing willingness to use its military power
beyond its borders, illustrated recently by its large-
scale incursion into southern Angola in late August and
early September. The deepening regional tensions
have enhanced the USSR's and Cuba's opportunities to
build their influence and undermine that of the West
in the region, primarily through military and security
assistance programs.
3. Moscow's growing involvement with black states
and nationalist movements is in turn aggravating
South African fears and accelerating the trend toward
more aggressive policies in Pretoria. The result is an
ever-deepening cycle of mistrust and hostility in which
each side has tangible evidence to support its worst
case analysis of the other's intentions.
4. Thus the scene is set in southern Africa for
escalating conflict that seriously threatens Western
interests. The more the black states depend on the
USSR for military assistance, the more Pretoria will
fear an imminent Marxist onslaught. And the more
military actions the South Africans take, the more
Moscow will be able to strengthen its military links
with black states and nationalist movements.
BLACK AFRICAN CONCERNS AND SOVIET
EXPLOITATION
Perceptions of the Soviet Role
5. The conflict in southern Africa stems fundamen-
tally from longstanding black opposition to white
minority rule. Soviet involvement adds a dimension
that makes the problem more complex.
6. Black African leaders seek both Soviet and West-
ern support against the South Africans; indeed, they
have viewed the two as complementary rather than
competitive. Whatever misgivings they have about
Soviet involvement in the region are offset by their
greater antipathy toward the white regime in Pretoria.
7. The USSR's unqualified endorsement of black
African self-determination has made it an acceptable
collaborator in African eyes, even for those govern-
ments that do not embrace Marxism. Unlike the West,
Moscow has no major economic ties with South Africa
and is not otherwise constrained by vested interests
vis-a-vis the white minority regime.
8. The interlocking nature of the struggle in south-
ern Africa has helped the Soviets expand their military
assistance role. Moscow's early support for the Popular
Movement for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA)
helped pave the way for expanded Soviet military aid
to the Angola-based South-West Africa People's Orga-
nization (SWAPO) after the MPLA came to power at
independence in 1975. Similarly, the USSR's ties with
the regimes in Angola and Mozambique have facilitat-
ed its assistance to the main South African black
nationalist insurgent group, the African National Con-
gress (ANC).
9. Most African leaders believe that Moscow's and
Havana's military roles in the region-and the poten-
tial for their expansion-acted as a strong inducement
on the West to pressure the white Rhodesian regime
into agreeing to independence and black majority rule.
They believe that a similar incentive is at work in the
case of Namibia.
10. These leaders have few illusions about the
USSR's long-term aim of expanding its influence in the
region, but they appreciate Moscow's unequivocal
support for black rule and the military support that
the Soviets and Cubans have provided to black African
countries. The Africans believe that the economic and
political interests of some Western nations in South
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Southern Africa
f?abo Congo
B AZZAVILLE
Cabinda
Ang.
Zaire
, LUANDA
250 500
Kilometers
1 Malawi
LILONGWE. .
Beira
Mozambique
n OAR ES
SALAAM
Africa and Namibia constrain Western policy options. Thus, while they are critical of superpower rivalry in
They think that the West, if presented with a choice the region, they believe that Soviet involvement helps
between relative stability under white rule and uncer- keep pressure on Western countries to remain
tainty under black rule, would support the former. engaged.
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Angola
a
ec
Za bia
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11. Pretoria views the conflict in southern Africa
partly as a struggle against Communism, and empha-
sizes this point to gain US and other Western support.
South Africa's August-September incursion into south-
ern Angola, in which its forces killed four Soviets and
captured one, highlighted Moscow's involvement in
the region and reinforced Pretoria's conviction that
the struggle over Namibia is not inspired solely by
African aspirations for self-determination. Ironically,
both Pretoria and Moscow benefit from continuing
tension in the region because it contributes to a closer
identification of black southern Africa with the USSR
and of South Africa with the United States.
White Rule and Black Nationalism
12. Namibia. The conflict in southern Africa is
being fought intensely over the future of Namibia.
The Namibian independence struggle is to a great
degree an extension of the larger issue of white
minority rule in South Africa. A common perception
among black Africans and white South Africans is that
events in Namibia could set the stage for a final racial
showdown in South Africa.
13. The Soviets see clear advantages in the Nami-
bian situation because of the strains it causes between
Western and African nations and among members of
the Western alliance, and because of the opportunities
it provides for the USSR to expand its ties with the
black Africans.
14. The USSR, with Angola's cooperation, has been
the main supplier of military assistance to SWAPO
since the mid-1970s. Soviet aid has included small
arms and ammunition, mines, mortars, rocket launch-
ers, antiaircraft guns, man-portable SA-7 surface-to-air
missiles, communications equipment, trucks, and ar-
mored vehicles.
15. Most SWAPO guerrillas receive their basic
training in camps in Angola. The instructors are
primarily Cubans but include Soviets and East Ger-
mans.
Z
16. SWAPO's heavy reliance on assistance from
Moscow has resulted in close ties between Soviet
officials and some SWAPO leaders, particularly guer-
rilla commanders. SWAPO president Sam Nujoma
over the years has been a frequent visitor to Moscow.
Nujoma's loosely Marxist stance-his rhetoric has be-
come increasingly leftist in recent years-probably
reflects a desire to please SWAPO's Soviet, Cuban, and
Angolan supporters rather than any deep-seated per-
sonal commitment.
17. A faction within the SWAPO leadership ap-
pears to be particularly pro-Soviet and advocates a
military rather than a negotiated solution for Namibia.
The influence of this faction has been growing, but it
is not dominant.
18. The South African Domestic Question. Even
if the Namibian problem is resolved, the lack of
meaningful racial and political reform in South Africa
will cause continued regional tension and opportuni-
ties for Soviet exploitation.
19. Prime Minister Botha entered office three years
ago insisting that South Africa had to "adapt or die,"
but his government has implemented only limited
measures. Botha's interest in reform was dampened by
the loss of some of his conservative Afrikaner support
during the 1981 national elections. Black frustra-
tions-and the level of domestic violence and cross-
border guerrilla operations-consequently continue to
rise, although white rule is unlikely to be threatened
during the next few years.
20. As with the Namibian question, nothing pre-
vents the Soviets from wholeheartedly endorsing black
African efforts to bring majority rule to South Africa
and granting military assistance to the African Nation-
al Congress. The ANC is the leading South African
insurgent group and is responsible for the recent wave
of terrorist attacks inside the country.
21. The Soviets provide the ANC with financial
support and almost all of its weapons. Most of the
ANC's several thousand guerrillas have received mili-
tary training at camps in Angola' from Cuban and
probably some Soviet instructors. In addition, promis-
ing ANC members are sent to Cuba, the USSR, and
East Germany for further military and political
training.
' Angola, Tanzania (to a much lesser extent), and perhaps Mozam-
bique allow training of ANC guerrillas on their territory. Most of the
ANC's operations are launched from Mozambique, in many cases
through Swaziland; neither country officially permits the group to
stage attacks into South Africa from its soil, but they are unable-
and at times unwilling-to control the organization completely.
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22. The ANC has been allied since the early 1950s
with the South African Communist Party (SACK The
SACP has maintained close ties with the USSR and
Eastern Europe since it was forced into exile over two
decades ago. SACP members sit on the ANC's ruling
Executive Committee, and a white SACP member
based in Mozambique, Joe Slovo, apparently coordi-
nates much of the group's sporadic cross-border guer-
rilla activity against South Africa. Younger ANC
members, particularly those who came out of the
black consciousness movement of the 1970s, are se-
verely critical of the role white Communist activists
play in the ANC.
The Black States: Security Issues
23. The spiral of South African aggressive reaction
to guerrilla activities and Soviet exploitation of black
African security concerns has manifested itself in
various ways. In Angola and Mozambique, a substan-
tial Soviet and Cuban military assistance role has
heightened Pretoria's apprehension and intransigence,
resulting in South African military incursions as well as
growing support for antigovernment insurgents. In
other countries-particularly Zambia and Botswana-
fear of Pretoria has been a factor in recent decisions to
turn to the Soviets for arms and training. But these two
governments and others in the region remain distrust-
ful of Moscow and have sought to keep it from
expanding its influence into the internal politics of
their countries.
24. Angola. Although Soviet and Cuban interven-
tion was crucial to the MPLA's rise to power, impor-
tant elements of the regime would like to reduce the
country's dependence on Moscow and Havana. The
Soviets and Cubans have not provided the assistance
necessary to revive Angola's severely troubled econo-
my or stem South African military incursions, and
their massive presence is resented by much of the
Angolan populace. (See tables).
25. Nonetheless, several factors have prevented
Luanda from lessening its dependence on the Soviets
and Cubans:
- South African military operations against
SWAPO and Angolan military facilities in south-
ern Angola have been growing in frequency and
scope.
- Angolan forces remain unable to defeat Jonas
Savimbi's National Union for the Total Inde-
pendence of Angola (UNITA).z Savimbi's forces
dominate large portions of the sparsely populated
southern half of the country and occasionally
operate farther north.
- A mulatto-led pro-Soviet faction dominates the
Luanda regime. The mulattoes know their politi-
cal survival would be jeopardized by a sharp
reduction in the Cuban and Soviet presence.
- As a result of the large-scale exodus of educated
people when the country became independent
from Portugal, Angola lacks alternatives to the
Soviet and Cuban advisers and technicians who
play key roles in running the country as well as in
directing and supporting the Angolan armed
forces.
26. The threat that the Angolans perceive from
UNITA and from South Africa's cross-border military
actions is thus a major factor behind Luanda's continu-
ing heavy dependence on the Soviets and Cubans. A
resolution of the Namibian problem presumably
would end the South African military incursions, but
Pretoria probably would continue to assist UNITA as a
way of keeping pressure on Luanda. Savimbi, more-
over, enjoys considerable popular support in southern
Angola and would probably be able to continue his
insurgency even if his outside backing dried up.
27. A continuing challenge from UNITA would be
seen by Luanda as South African-backed regardless of
whether this were the case. Such a situation, combined
with the other factors behind Luanda's dependence on
the Soviets and Cubans, would work against any major
cutback in their presence.
28. Mozambique. The regime in Mozambique has
also received substantial Soviet and Cuban military
assistance. During the first few years after the country
became independent in 1975, President Machel's gov-
ernment was relatively secure, and Soviet and Cuban
aid-although it increased somewhat because of Rho-
desian military incursions into Mozambique-re-
mained on a far smaller scale than in Angola. During
'South African support for UNITA, which dates back to the
beginning of the Angolan civil war, has included small arms, other
equipment, and supplies. UNITA has also obtained aid from several
other countries and captures substantial quantities of equipment
from Angolan Government forces. Its dependence on South Africa is
likely to increase, however, as a result of President Mitterrand's
decision to end France's support for Savimbi and a decline in aid
from other sources.
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the past two years, however, the National Resistance
Movement of Mozambique (NRM) has received in-
creased South African support and has steadily ex-
panded its insurgent campaign, launched in 1977 in
central Mozambique. The NRM now operates widely
in rural areas of the country and occasionally attacks
urban targets.
29. South Africa has replaced the former white
regime in Rhodesia as the NRM's main source of arms,
other equipment, supplies, and training. Pretoria at
first viewed the insurgency as a means of intimidating
Machel's government into restricting African National
Congress operations from Mozambique into South
Africa. Now it may regard the NRM as an eventual
alternative to Machel.
30. The Mozambican President views the insurgents
as a growing threat to his power. As a result, his
dependence on Soviet and Cuban military support is
increasing; the number of Cuban military advisers in
Mozambique has risen in recent months to at least 800.
Tanzania has also agreed to help train Mozambican
soldiers, but Machel has been largely unsuccessful in
obtaining aid from Zimbabwe. He probably will feel
compelled to seek higher levels of Soviet military aid
and perhaps Cuban combat troops.
31. Moscow may be able to benefit from Machel's
predicament. Up to now he has not granted the Soviets
naval access rights to Mozambican ports.' If the South
African-backed insurgency continues to gain ground,
the Soviets may find him more responsive to their
interests, and they probably will succeed in strength-
ening the position of pro-Soviet hardliners within the
regime. While Pretoria has recently expressed concern
about the possibility of a Namibia-like "second front"
along its northeastern border, neither the Soviets nor
the Mozambicans want a major military confrontation
with the South Africans.
32. Zambia. President Kaunda-convinced that
southern Africa was heading for protracted turmoil,
anxious to offset Zambia's military weakness and
growing discontent in the armed forces, and disap-
pointed over repeated failures to obtain a modern air
9In late October 1981, however, the Soviets sent a 4,500-ton
floating drydock to the port of Maputo. Ostensibly this drydock will
be used to repair local and Soviet fishing boats, but it could also take
Soviet surface warships, enabling the USSR to maintain an increased
naval presence in the region.
defense package from the West-signed a major arms
purchase agreement with the USSR in late 1979.
During the past two years, Zambia has also accepted
military assistance
from East Germany, and it has expanded its ties with
several East European countries in nonmilitary fields.
33. The expansion of relations with the Soviets and
East Europeans followed a series of Rhodesian military
raids against Zimbabwe African People's Union facili-
ties in Zambia. Although the Rhodesian threat dissi-
pated when Zimbabwe came into being under black
rule in April 1980, Kaunda implemented the Soviet
arms pact, in part because of the military threat he
perceived from South Africa. The South Africans had
begun in mid-1979 to conduct cross-border raids
against SWAPO bases located in southwestern Zambia
near the Namibian and Angolan borders. The Zam-
bians have also been concerned that Pretoria might
launch raids on the ANC's offices in Lusaka.
34. The more than $200 million worth of military
equipment Zambia has acquired from the Soviets-
MIG-21 aircraft, MI-8 helicopters, SA-3 and SA-7
missiles, ZSU-23/4 self-propelled antiaircraft weapons,
and ammunition-has provided the Soviets with ac-
cess to the Zambian armed forces. The Soviet equip-
ment, however, is incompatible with much of the
country's other military hardware and has not signifi-
cantly improved the capabilities of the armed forces.
Nor has it done much to shore up Kaunda's standing
within the military, where discontent has been grow-
ing among junior officers and enlisted men U over
corruption and worsening economic conditions in the
armed forces and in the country as a whole. Some
senior officers, moreover, have been resentful that
their opposition to the Soviet deal was ignored by
Kaunda and his influential defense chief, Grey Zulu,
who favors the Soviet connection.
35. Kaunda himself has long been suspicious of the
Soviets and has sought to keep them from expanding
their influence in Zambia. Pretoria, however, views
Zambia's acquisition of Soviet and East German mili-
tary assistance-including around 50 Soviet military
advisers-as further evidence that South Africa is
increasingly being surrounded by Communist-backed
states and groups with aggressive intentions. Kaunda
could provoke South African military retaliation if he
deployed his Soviet weapon systems to the region
bordering Namibia. Even in the absence of such a
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development, he may seek further Soviet weaponry if
arms are not readily available from other sources.
36. Botswana. The pro-Western Government of
Botswana is acutely aware of its vulnerability to South
African economic and military power and conse-
quently tempers its support for SWAPO and the ANC.
The two groups are not permitted to stage attacks into
South Africa or Namibia from Botswanan territory,
although the ANC has offices in Gaborone and recruits
members from among South African refugees in the
country.
37. The Botswanan Government has sought to
achieve a level of military strength that would enable
it to continue restricting anti-South African insurgent
activities and thus dissuade Pretoria from attacking
Botswana. At the same time, the government probably
also hopes that bolstering its military strength might
enable it to cope with any low-level military harass-
ment campaign Pretoria might launch along the Bot-
swana-South Africa border.
38. Botswana in recent years has had difficulty
obtaining Western arms. Moscow, meanwhile, has
been working to persuade the Botswanan
to acquire Soviet weapons.
39. In December 1980, with SWAPO and the ANC
stepping up their demands for permission to use
Botswanan territory for anti-South African
President Ouett Masire acceded to
and agreed to purchase from the USSR arms reported-
ly costing $3.2 million. The arms, which began arriv-
ing in Botswana in August 1981, reportedly include
armored personnel carriers and SA-7 air defense mis-
siles. A small number of Soviet advisers were in the
country briefly to provide some training, and Bot-
swana reportedly is sending some 25 officers to the
USSR for military training during the next several
months.
40. The arms deal does not yet appear to be paving
the way for a significant warming of Soviet relations
with Botswana in other fields. The government has
rejected other Soviet aid offers, is wary of Soviet
intentions, and seems particularly concerned about
limiting the impact of the arms deal on ties with the
West and South Africa.
41. Pretoria nonetheless is concerned over the ap-
pearance of Soviet arms and advisers in yet another
country on its borders. The South Africans apparently
tried to intimidate Botswana after the accord was
signed by blocking an oil shipment in January, causing
spot fuel shortages.
42. Lesotho. Prime Minister Jonathan's relations
with South Africa, long relatively harmonious, have
worsened in recent years. Jonathan has suspected the
South Africans of assisting exiled opponents of his
government, even though these dissidents are left-
leaning and some have probably been trained in
Libya. South Africa has in fact been turning a blind
eye since 1979 to infiltration into Lesotho by opposi-
tion members exiled in Botswana who must pass
through South African territory to reach their land-
locked country.
43. Pretoria has become increasingly irritated over
Jonathan's sharp criticisms of South Africa, a tack he
has been taking since the late 1970s. In the past few
months, moreover, several members of the ANC have
escaped to Lesotho after conducting terrorist oper-
ations in South Africa, and the Lesotho authorities
have dealt lightly with them. Pretoria may be starting
to retaliate by providing direct assistance to Jonathan's
exiled opponents.
44. The increasing tension with South Africa and
the growing activism of dissidents have been key
factors in Jonathan's moves to strengthen ties with
Havana in recent years. The Cubans apparently are
providing military training in Mozambique-and pos-
sibly in Cuba-for members of Lesotho's defense
force.
45. Jonathan's relations with the Soviets, however,
have remained distant. Lesotho has established diplo-
matic relations with the USSR and several of its allies
in recent years, but the Soviets have not been permit-
ted to open an embassy. The conservative Jonathan
and his supporters are cool toward Moscow and gener-
ally lean toward the United States. They are also
reluctant to antagonize the South Africans any further;
they recognize that Pretoria can retaliate by aiding
Jonathan's opponents, by curtailing the employment
of workers from Lesotho in South African mines, or by
blocking food shipments from South Africa on which
Lesotho heavily depends.
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55. The Soviets are reported to have recently prom-
ised military assistance-possibly including Soviet and
Cuban advisers as well as large quantities of equip-
ment-through Angola to the Front for the National
Liberation of the Congo (FLNC), the Angola- and
Zambia-based Shahan dissident group that invaded the
territory in 1977 and again in 1978. Some Soviet
equipment earmarked for the Zairian rebels has re-
portedly reached Angola.
56. Moscow's intentions regarding the FLNC are
intertwined with other aspects of the situation in
southern Africa. The Soviets-and their Angolan al-
lies-regard President Mobutu as an agent of the
United States. They may view substantial aid to
Mobutu's opponents as a counter to US policies in the
region.
57. Although the FLNC is Zaire's most formidable
opposition group, it suffers from low morale among its
several thousand members, factionalism, and shortages
of supplies. But if the Soviets come through with
substantial assistance
the FLNC's ability to launch
new military or guerrilla operations in Shaba would be
greatly enhanced. The generally undisciplined and ill-
equipped Zairian armed forces probably could not
cope effectively with such a situation.
58. Now that former French President Giscard has
been replaced by Socialist leader Mitterrand, Mobutu
can no longer count on French forces to turn back an
invasion of Shaba as they did in 1978. Major turmoil in
Shaba would probably halt mining there, crippling the
Zairian economy. Moreover, trouble in Shaba could
spark unrest in Kinshasa and other areas, particularly
given the growing links between the FLNC and other
Zairian dissidents including Mobutu's former Prime
Minister, Nguza Karl-i-Bond, who is from Shaba.
Although Mobutu has repeatedly proved adroit during
his 16 years in power at overcoming or preempting
challenges to his rule, an outbreak of disorders in
Shaba that spread elsewhere could undermine his
government and even bring it down.
EXPANDING SOVIET INFLUENCE: PROBLEMS
AND OPPORTUNITIES
59. Over the past five years, the Soviets, along with
the East Europeans and Cubans, have considerably
expanded their military deliveries to the region. Since
1975 Moscow has supplied almost $1.3 billion worth of
arms. But the Soviets' and their allies' political influ-
ence is restricted to the states confronting South
Africa-Angola and Mozambique. Several factors con-
strain their influence in the other countries of the
region.
60. Diverging Interests. The suspicions of Soviet
intentions harbored by Nyerere, Mugabe, and others
are to a considerable extent the result of fundamental
differences between Soviet and African interests and
perspectives. Moscow tends to antagonize southern
African leaders by dealing with their countries in the
larger context of East-West and Sino-Soviet competi-
tion. Moscow's basic aims in the region are to under-
mine Western and Chinese influence, to promote pro-
Soviet regimes, and to increase Soviet access to air and
naval facilities.
61. Soviet objectives in southern Africa may also
include the denial or complication of Western access
to the strategic mineral resources of the region. Under
current political and economic conditions, this Soviet
objective is unlikely to be realized. Even if white rule
ended in South Africa, a Soviet "denial strategy"
would encounter serious obstacles-particularly West-
ern reaction and resistance from the African leaders
who depend on the hard currency generated by the
sale of mineral resources.
62. The Soviets have an interest in continued ten-
sion and even military confrontation in the region
because their influence and position are founded
largely on military assistance. African governments by
and large want a negotiated settlement in Namibia, as
they did in Rhodesia, to hasten the end of minority
rule and to ease the economic and military burdens
such issues create for them. And they know that only
the West is in a position to help them attain such a
settlement with the South Africans.
63. Soviet-African differences along these lines sur-
faced during the Rhodesian peace talks when the
Soviets lobbied against African participation in the
negotiations. Similarly, the Soviets now are frustrated
over their inability to keep southern black African
governments from taking part in Western-sponsored
negotiations on Namibia.
64. African Economic Needs. In theory, the eco-
nomic troubles that prevail in most of black southern
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46. Zimbabwe. Prime Minister Mugabe is convinced
that South Africa is trying to destabilize or at least in-
timidate his regime. When Mugabe took power at inde-
pendence in April 1980, he agreed to continue bilateral
economic relations but downgraded political ties.
47. This year Pretoria, reacting in part to hostile
rhetoric from Salisbury, has canceled a number of
trade, labor, and transportation agreements it had
originally established with the white Rhodesian re-
gime. In addition, the South African-backed NRM has
begun attacking road, rail, and pipeline links in Mo-
zambique that are also vital to Zimbabwe's efforts to
reduce its economic dependence on South Africa.
Mugabe, moreover, has charged that the South Afri-
cans are training Zimbabweans who had been loyal to
one of his opponents, Bishop Muzorewa, for possible
insurgent or military action against his government.
Mugabe also believes that South Africa was behind the
recent assassination of the ANC's top official in Salis-
bury, Joe Ggabi.
48. South Africa's policy toward Mugabe is partly a
function of its toughening stance toward most of its
black neighbors. Pretoria is probably warning him to
maintain his restrictive policies toward the ANC.
Some ANC personnel reside in Zimbabwe and the
group maintains several offices there, but Mugabe
does not allow ANC cadre to receive guerrilla training
or to stage operations from Zimbabwean territory.
49. Despite his concerns about the South Africans,
Mugabe has not turned to the Soviets or Cubans for
military assistance. He recognizes that such aid would
simply anger Pretoria without giving Zimbabwe the
ability to stand up to South African military might.
Even more importantly, he distrusts Moscow because
of its extensive military assistance to his main black
nationalist rival, Joshua Nkomo, during the Zimbab-
wean independence struggle. Mugabe belatedly
agreed to establish diplomatic relations with the USSR
in February 1981, but bilateral ties have remained
cool. Even so, he could feel compelled to accept Soviet
military assistance if he concluded that Pretoria were
about to step up its actions against Zimbabwe.
50. Mugabe recently turned to an alternative Com-
munist source of military aid, accepting an offer by
North Korea to provide training and equipment for a
new army brigade. Over 100 North Korean advisers
have arrived in Zimbabwe with the equipment; they
are scheduled to remain for eight to 12 months.
51. Mugabe's primary purpose in accepting the
North Korean assistance is to strengthen his hand
against potential dissidence at home. He still views
Nkomo's Zimbabwe African People's Union as a threat
even though its military arm has been integrated into
the country's new national army. The North Korean-
trained unit will be comprised almost entirely of
troops from Mugabe's Zimbabwe African National
Union. But regardless of Mugabe's reasons for accept-
ing Pyongyang's aid, Pretoria will view the North
Korean presence as further evidence of the Commu-
nist threat to South Africa.
52. Tanzania. President Nyerere also expects grow-
ing strife between Pretoria and black southern Africa
in the years ahead. Nyerere, moreover, wants to keep
his armed forces mollified in the face of Tanzania's
mounting economic troubles and popular discontent.
These concerns, together with the situation in Uganda
and Nyerere's African leadership ambitions, have led
him to accept sizable quantities of advanced Soviet
military equipment in recent years. Deliveries have
included MIG-21 fighters, SA-3 and SA-6 missiles,
medium tanks, and large artillery pieces. The Soviets
have about 130 military advisers stationed in
Tanzania.
53. Nyerere, however, strongly distrusts the USSR
and has minimized its influence on his government.
China is still his closest Communist ally. His relations
with Moscow over the years have been generally cool
and at times tense, and he has disagreed with the
Soviets on a variety of African and international
questions. His leading role in pushing for political
settlements of the Rhodesian and Namibian problems
has been aimed in part at forestalling further Soviet
involvement in these issues and great-power conflict in
the region.
54. Zaire. Soviet exploitation of African turmoil
takes a different form in Zaire than in countries
further south. In Zaire, the Soviets are trying to
capitalize not on black sentiment against South Africa
but rather on discontent within a regional/ethnic
group-the people of mineral-rich Shaba Region. Sha-
bans, like many other Zairians, are increasingly restive
over the country's economic malaise and what they
regard as an exploitative and corrupt central
government.
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Africa-food shortages, inflation, unemployment,
stagnant growth, low export earnings, and massive
debt obligations-should enhance Moscow's prospects
in the region through aid to hard-pressed governments
as well as dissident groups. In practice, however, the
Soviets have done little to meet African aid and capital
needs.' Only Western governments and private institu-
tions-and Western-sponsored multinational organiza-
tions such as the World Bank and the International
Monetary Fund-are in a position to address southern
African requirements. Even the Marxist regimes in
Angola and Mozambique have recognized the need to
establish economic relations with the West and, in the
case of Mozambique, to maintain with South Africa
economic ties that were established during the Portu-
guese colonial period.
65. In all probability, Moscow's refusal to compete
with the West in addressing the economic needs of
various countries in the region is largely due to the
USSR's own economic constraints and its recognition
of African economic dependence on the West. Rather
than compete on Western terms, the Soviets have tried
to turn the situation to their advantage. This is readily
apparent in Angola. Despite the extensive Soviet role
there, only about 8 percent of Angola's trade is with
Communist countries. The only successful sector of the
economy, oil production, is operated by US and other
Western firms, and the oil industry's capital needs are
met in Western financial markets. Indeed, it is the
hard currency earned by its Western-run oil industry
that enables Angola to pay for Soviet arms and Cuban
troops.
66. In Mozambique, Western economic assistance
dwarfs Communist aid despite the country's close
ideological and military ties with Moscow. In the rest
of the region as well, Western economic aid far
outstrips that of the Soviets and their allies. The West
is also a much more important trading partner. This is
vividly illustrated in the key area of minerals market-
ing: in addition to Angola's dependence on oil sales in
the West, Zambia, Zaire, and Zimbabwe rely heavily
' For instance, donors' conferences for Zimbabwe and for the
Southern African Development Coordination Conference, a regional
body, have taken place without Soviet participation. The East
Europeans, moreover, have effectively blocked Mozambique from
becoming a member of the Soviet-sponsored Council for Mutual
Economic Assistance because they realize that Maputo would be a
drain on the organization's resources.
on Western purchases of copper, cobalt, and chrome
to generate foreign exchange.
67. The economic assistance that the Soviets do
provide has significant drawbacks. Soviets goods, ma-
chinery, and technical support are widely regarded as
inadequate both in quantity and quality, and in many
instances Soviet machinery is not compatible with
Western equipment already in place. Soviet advisers
and technicians frequently are regarded by Africans as
heavyhanded and even racist. In the area of military
aid, the Soviets are often criticized for trying to use
supplies of spare parts to gain political leverage and
for failing to provide adequate training for Africans.
68. South African Leverage. The extent to which
black southern African governments are willing to
antagonize South Africa by radicalizing their policies
and by deepening their ties with the Soviets is also
limited by their economic dependence on Pretoria. At
the same time, however, black Africa's overriding
hostility to white rule in Namibia and South Africa has
blocked further expansion of ties with Pretoria.
69. The countries of the region depend on South
Africa in a variety of ways. Zaire, Zambia, and
Zimbabwe use South African ports for most of their
foreign trade because of the unreliability of the insur-
gency-plagued Benguela rail link through Angola and
the limited port facilities in Zaire, Mozambique, and
Tanzania. Zambia, Zaire, and Mozambique, moreover,
have all relied on Pretoria to varying degrees for food
and other imports. Mozambique depends on the South
Africans for 70 percent of its foreign exchange earn-
ings: it exports electricity to South Africa from the
Cabora Bassa Dam, obtains port and storage fees for
South African exports passing through its ports, and
receives remittances from the 35,000 Mozambican
migrant workers in South Africa.
70. Botswana, Lesotho, and Swaziland are even
more dependent on South Africa. These landlocked
states rely on Pretoria to move virtually all of their
exports as well as to supply many imports, including
petroleum. They also count heavily on the employ-
ment opportunities for and earnings of their 250,000
migrant workers in South Africa, on South African
investment, and on receipts from South African tour-
ists. The three countries are members of the South
African Customs Union, and earnings from this institu-
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tion play a key role in the finances of their
governments.
71. South African military action has caused com-
plications and embarrassment for .the Soviets and
Cubans. Angolan Government and military personnel,
for example, complain that Cuban ground forces
engage in little actual combat. Most Cuban ground
units have been deployed in areas that minimize the
likelihood of combat with the South Africans, and
Angolan forces have done the bulk of the fighting in
recent years against the UNITA guerrillas. The Cu-
bans do continue to provide air support against
UNITA and operate antiaircraft weaponry.
72. In the wake of South Africa's August-September
incursions, the Soviets and Cubans have probably
come under pressure from the Angolans to pl~
larger role against future South Africa., offor1
OUTLOOK AND IMPLICATIONS
73. Southern Africa will remain an area of conflict
over the next several years. Collapse of the Namibia
settlement effort would be certain to sharpen tensions
between Pretoria and its neighbors. An internationally
accepted settlement in Namibia would reduce tensions
but would not end the hostility between black Africa
and South Africa. The black Africans, prompted by
opposition to apartheid, will continue their support of
anti-South African insurgents, although they will try
to avoid direct armed conflict with Pretoria.
74. South Africa has the resources and the will to
punish neighbors who appear to threaten it. Its weap-
ons include economic pressures, sponsorship of insur-
gencies, and military operations. Whatever the out-
come in Namibia, Pretoria will not relinquish its
option to use these weapons. Indeed, with terrorist
incidents and domestic unrest likely to increase inside
South Africa, the government will probably step up its
actions against neighboring countries harboring South
African insurgents.
75. The South Africans will probably continue to
support UNITA even if the Namibia problem is
settled. UNITA is likely to continue to plague the
Angolan Government, although it might have to adjust
its tactics and the scale of its activity after a settle-
ment. In any event, UNITA probably will not be able
to expand its area of operations beyond central Angola
as long as the Cubans maintain a massive troop
presence in the country. The South Africans will also
intensify their pressure on Mozambique through the
NRM. Pretoria would clearly like to see the regimes
toppled in both Angola and Mozambique.
76. South Africa will probably rely on economic
pressures-and perhaps occasional covert operations
or small-scale military action-against Zimbabwe,
'Zambia, and Botswana to warn them against support-
ing ANC operations. Pretoria is prepared to launch
armed assaults on these comparatively moderate
neighbors should it conclude that their behavior was
threatening its own security.
77. Given these conditions, the Soviets will find
ample opportunity to increase further their influence
and presence. They will continue to rely on the means
of entry that they have found most effective in
Africa-weapons sales, military training, and associ-
ated technical expertise. The level and character of
Soviet military aid programs will vary from country to
country, but on the whole we expect to see the USSR
increase its efforts in the region.
78. Moscow has several further options. It could
facilitate a sizable increase in Cuban combat forces in
Angola and Mozambique, deploy additional Soviet
naval units to southern African waters, or provide
advanced air defense equipment requiring Soviet
manning.
Implications for the United States
79. In this environment of South African aggres-
siveness and Soviet and Cuban exploitation, Washing-
ton's room for maneuver depends to a great extent on
the willingness of the principal parties to seek peaceful
solutions to the region's problems. The Soviets have
little influence on peaceful diplomacy; the main role
they have played is to help the Africans prepare for
war. Because most of the key actors want a peaceful
settlement, the West-especially the United States-
retains important leverage in the region.
80. Final military victory in southern Africa will
elude both sides for the near future. South Africa can
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hold off SWAPO, the ANC, and other domestic black
dissident groups. But it cannot crush all of them. An
all-out effort to do so would precipitate enormous
domestic and international pressures.
81. Similarly, while the black insurgents and the
black southern African countries seem committed to
fight as long as necessary to bring about a settlement in
Namibia and an end to apartheid, they cannot defeat
South Africa militarily without large-scale outside
assistance including troops. There is no evidence at
present that the USSR, Cuba, or any other power is
prepared to provide the necessary forces.
82. So long as the United States and the West offer
the black Africans a chance for a peaceful resolution
of their problems-and appear to do so evenhanded-
ly-most African leaders will not allow their actions to
be dictated by the USSR or any other foreign power.
At the same time, such US involvement entails risks. In
trying to play the part of an honest broker between
South Africa and black Africa, Washington increases
its susceptibility to black African charges of US-South
African collusion. US attempts to play a constructive
role, either alone or with others, stimulate traditional
African suspicions that Washington's efforts are de-
signed to protect US interests in South Africa.
Selected Southern African Countries: Soviet, East European,
and Cuban Military Assistance, 1975 - 30 June 1981
Cuba
USSR Eastern Europe
Agreements
Deliveries
Agreements
Total ....................................
1,348
1,273
390
Angola ...................................
500 a
490
155,
Botswana ...............................
3
3
-
Mozambique .........................
315
215
115
Tanzania ...............................
265
315 b
80
Zaire .....................................
-
-
-
Zambia ..................................
265
250
40
Zimbabwe .............................
-
-
-
Deliveries
Agreements Deliveries
240
15 130
115
15 130 b
-
- -
80
- -
35
- -
-
10
- -
-
-
Agreements
Deliveries
1,753
1,643
670
735
3
3
430
295
345
350
305
260
a Excludes $151 million of Soviet aid and $1 million of Romanian aid committed in 1975 before independence. Of the 1975 Soviet agree-
ments, $59 million was recommitted in 1976.
b Includes deliveries made under agreements concluded before 1975.
Selected Southern African Countries: Soviet, East European,
and Cuban Military Personnel
Total ....................................
Angola ...................................
Botswana ...............................
Mozambique .........................
Tanzania ...............................
Zaire ......................................
Zambia ..................................
Zimbabwe .............................
1,880 450 20,800-25,800
1,200 400 20,000-25,000 a
- b
500
130
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Selected Southern African Countries: Soviet, East European,
and Cuban Economic Assistance, 1975-80
USSR Eastern Europe Cuba a
Agreements Deliveries Agreements Deliveries Agreements Deliveries
Total .................................... 185 30 325 50 50
Angola ................................... 15 10 100 15 25
Mozambique ......................... 150 10 65 35
Tanzania ............................... 20 - 50 25
Zambia .................................. - 10 b 110 _-
a Delivery data not available.
b From earlier commitments.
Selected Southern African Countries: Soviet, East European,
and Cuban Economic Personnel
Total .................................... 1,205
Angola ................................... 500
Mozambique ......................... 350
Tanzania ............................... 75
Zaire ...................................... 10
Zambia .................................. 270
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3,245
2,000
1,000
25
200
20
Cuba
7,575
6,500
1,000
75
Agreements Deliveries
560 80
140 25
215 45
95 -
110 10
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ANNEX: CUBAN MILITARY PRESENCE IN ANGOLA
1. We estimate that as of 10 December there were
20,000 to 25,000 Cuban military personnel in Angola.
3. The range in the numbers is due mostly to
uncertainty about the extent of troop rotations during
this period. Fragmentary information suggests that the
actual augmentation falls closer to the lower end of the
range. These figures are subject to change pending
analysis
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