THE LIBYAN-ETHIOPIAN-SOUTH YEMENI PACT: SHORT-TERM PROSPECTS

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP97S00289R000200200010-5
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 20
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: July 8, 2011
• Sequence Number: 10
• Publication Date: November 4, 1981
• Content Type: SNIE

Director of
Central
Intelligence
The Libyan-Ethiopian-
South Yemeni Pact:
Short-Term Prospects
Special National Intelligence Estimate
Copy 222
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SNIE 36/76.1-81
THE LIBYAN-ETHIOPIAN-
SOUTH YEMENI PACT:
SHORT-TERM PROSPECTS
Information available as of 4 November 1981 was
used in the preparation of this Estimate.
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THIS ESTIMATE IS ISSUED BY THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL
INTELLIGENCE.
THE NATIONAL FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE BOARD CONCURS.
The following intelligence organizations participated in the preparation of the
Estimate:
The Central Intelligence Agency, the Defense Intelligence Agency, the National Security
Agency, and the intelligence organization of the Department of State.
Also Participating:
The Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of the Army
The Director of Naval Intelligence, Department of the Navy
The Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, Department of the Air Force
The Director of Intelligence, Headquarters, Marine Corps
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CONTENTS
Page
KEY JUDGMENTS .................................................................................................... v
DISCUSSION .............................................................................................................. 1
The Alliance ................................................................................................... 1
Genesis of the Pact-Convergence of Interests ......................................... 1
Ethiopian Interests ................................................................................ 1
Libyan Interests ..................................................................................... 2
South Yemeni Interests ......................................................................... 3
Soviet Interest in the Pact ............................................................................ 3
Weaknesses of the Pact-Divergence
of Interests Within the Alliance .............................................................. 5
Regional Reactions to the Pact .................................................................... 5
Somalia ................................................................................................... 5
Gulf Cooperation Council .................................................................... 6
North Yemen ......................................................................................... 6
Kenya ...................................................................................................... 6
Sudan ...................................................................................................... 7
Egypt ...................................................................................................... 7
An Immediate US Target: Bright Star 82 .................................................. 7
Prospects for the Alliance ............................................................................ 8
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KEY JUDGMENTS
The Cooperation Treaty signed on 19 August 1981 by Ethiopia,
Libya, and South Yemen emerged from complex and disparate motives:
- The participants want to defeat US policy in the region.
- They seek to provide mutual defense against perceived threats
from the West.
- Ethiopia wants Libyan aid.
- South Yemen seeks Libyan aid as well as control over Libyan
assistance to North Yemeni dissidents. President al-Hasani also
may hope that membership in the alliance will enhance his
domestic standing.
- Libya seeks to reduce its isolation and gain accomplices for its
schemes against Sudan, Somalia, and Egypt.
The Soviets long encouraged the formation of a broad, anti-US
regional grouping, and they played an indirect and behind-the-scenes
role in the formation of the pact. The pact serves important Soviet
regional objectives and reflects a convergence of interest between
Moscow and the signatories. Given Libyan leader Qadhafi's past record
of not fulfilling his aid promises, the Soviets may have doubts about the
effectiveness of the pact, but will seek to gain maximum advantage
from it and will work to strengthen the alliance. The three pact
members, however, cannot necessarily be counted on to follow Soviet
direction.
The most likely threat from the alliance is increased cooperation
among the three for subversive operations against Sudan, Somalia,
Oman, Egypt, and North Yemen, and possibly for terrorist actions
against US personnel and facilities in those countries.
Despite cooperation among the leaders of the pact states, they will
not be able substantially to increase their capability to project military
power in the near term. Qadhafi may push for the use of military
facilities in Ethiopia and South Yemen to extend his activities through-
out the Arabian Peninsula region, but Aden and Addis Ababa are
unlikely to allow him use of their territories for his own military aims.
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There are other weaknesses in the alliance that limit its
effectiveness:
- The degree of Ethiopia's participation depends in part on
extensive Libyan aid.
- Although Qadhafi has made the first $150 million transfer to
Ethiopia of the promised $855.1 million, he may proscrastinate
on further payments.
- Ethiopia's Mengistu will probably move cautiously in cooperat-
ing with Libya against Sudanese President Nimeiri.
- Ethiopia and South Yemen will try to avoid involvement in
Qadhafi's more ambitious ventures where they might damage
their own national interests.
- A lessening of the perceived threat from the United States by
any of the three allies would decrease the cohesiveness of the
pact.
Despite the pact's weaknesses, pro-Western governments in the
region are alarmed and their alarm could lead to positive effects for the
United States:
- The Gulf Cooperation Council is beginning to conduct serious
discussions on security cooperation.
- Egypt has announced its intentions to react strongly to Libyan
meddling in Sudan.
- Somalia and Kenya are giving new attention to rapprochement.
- These pro-Western governments will seek more US aid, thereby
offering the United States new opportunities to cooperate with
them.
- Qadhafi's credibility could be further weakened if he fails to
perform for his new allies.
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The Alliance
1. The series of agreements recently concluded by
Ethiopia, Libya, and South Yemen call for close
political, economic, and military cooperation among
the signatories. The centerpiece of the alliance is the
Cooperation Treaty, signed on 19 August 1981, which
contains mutual defense clauses and several secret
military annexes.
2. The three allies agreed to coordinate increased
aid to the insurgent Somali Salvation Front (SSF),
which is attempting to overthrow the government of
Somali President Siad. They also discussed possible
future subversive activity against other regional states.
Previously, Libya had promised Ethiopia $855.1 mil-
lion in aid over an extended period.
3. The various neighboring regimes that each
member of the alliance hopes for its own reasons to
undermine are important to US and Western interests.
(See map on next page.) In the long run, some
members at least hope to form the nucleus of an
expanding bloc of radical and anti-Western states in
the Middle East and Africa.
Genesis of the Pact-Convergence of Interests
4. The three allies share a deep concern over the
increasing US presence around the Horn of Africa and
the Arabian Peninsula, including the military access
agreements signed with Somalia, Kenya, and Oman in
1980. Two of the three allies-Ethiopia and South
Yemen-have a common interest in tapping the Lib-
yan treasury.
Ethiopian Interests
5. Ethiopia sees a direct threat in any US move to
strengthen its traditional enemy Somalia, which
mounted a major invasion of eastern Ethiopia in 1977
and continues to support separatist guerrillas there in
pursuit of claims to a substantial part of Ethiopia's
territory. Ethiopia has reacted by strengthening its
military position in the disputed Ogaden territory and
by establishing, training, arming, and directing the
SSF. At the least, Ethiopia's Chairman Mengistu be-
lieves the Salvation Front can stir up enough trouble in
Somalia to keep Mogadishu from pursuing its anti-
Ethiopian designs, and probably believes that the Siad
regime there is unstable enough to be overthrown.
6. Probably as a result of Mengistu's optimistic
view of the SSF, he has permitted Libyan and, to a
lesser extent, Soviet and South Yemeni aid to be passed
to the insurgents. Instinctively suspicious of the long-
range intentions of any group of armed Somalis-
including present allies-Mengistu originally prevent-
ed any contact between the Salvation Front and
outside powers, including his Soviet sponsors. But he
also wished to shift some of the financial burden of
supporting the SSF and is eager to give the appearance
of international support for a Somali insurgency. Even
so, the Ethiopians continue efforts to limit foreign
involvement with their guerrilla clients. The increase
in the level of Libyan assistance to the insurgents
during the past year has come largely at Libyan leader
Qadhafi's urging and despite Mengistu's earlier foot-
dragging.
7. The prospect of sizable amounts of Libyan aid
almost certainly encouraged the financially strapped
Ethiopians to sign the pact. Nevertheless, the assist-
ance, if forthcoming, will not solve Ethiopia's immedi-
ate economic problems. Ethiopia's export revenues are
expected to stagnate, and it is conscious of its contract-
ed arms debt of approximately $4 billion with the
Soviet Union. In addition, Ethiopia's limited foreign
exchange reserves are being eaten up by its escalating
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 NIS itP
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DAR ES SALAAM Names and boundary representation
are not necessarily authoritative.
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oil bill to the Soviets. Moscow's failure to provide
Ethiopia with significant economic aid, to discuss
more lenient terms for repayment on the arms debt, or
to provide regular, long-term oil supplies has been a
continuing irritant in relations between the two na-
tions. Ethiopia's attempts to get oil and economic aid
from Western and Arab sources have had limited
success.
8. Mengistu has reportedly said that he would not
allow his relationship with Sudan to stand in the way
of Libyan economic aid. He is aware of past Sudanese
support for the Eritrean rebellion, and may not be
confident that his current rapprochement with Khar-
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toum will be long lived. As Sudan and the United
States draw closer together, the Ethiopians may be-
come increasingly concerned that Washington could
encourage Khartoum to renew its support for the
Eritreans and allow Sudanese territory to be used to
stage other dissident attacks inside Ethiopia. Neverthe-
less, Mengistu is not eager to be seen elsewhere in
Africa as being in Qadhafi's league as a supporter of
subversion and terrorism in neighboring states.
Libya Interests
9. Libya's involvement in the alliance stems from a
desire to achieve several overlapping goals. First and
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most importantly, Qadhafi wants to undermine
American influence and interests in the region. He has
long opposed Washington's initiatives in the area,
particularly the Camp David accords and US facilities
agreements with northeast African and Persian Gulf
states. In March, for example, he publicly admitted
that his government was providing aid to guerrillas in
Oman and Somalia in what was to be a "strategic
counteroffensive against American imperialism repre-
sented by US military bases in Egypt, Oman, Somalia,
and Palestine."
10. Since then, perceptions of increased Israeli
belligerence-manifested by the airstrikes on Iraq's
nuclear reactor and on PLO targets in Lebanon-have
increased Qadhafi's hostility to what he terms a "US-
Egyptian-Israeli" plot. The recent deterioration in US-
Libyan relations, however, has added a new dimension
to the Libyan leader's antagonism toward the United
States. A variety of factors-allegations in the press
about a CIA plot against Qadhafi, the expulsion of the
Libyan People's Bureau from Washington, the US
rejection of Libyan overtures for better relations-
have apparently convinced the Libyan leader that
Washington is plotting his overthrow. His fears were
reinforced following the Gulf of Sidra incident of
August 1981. These factors have prompted him to
undertake more dynamic initiatives in hopes of
thwarting US plans not only regarding Libya, but
throughout North Africa and the Middle East as well.
11. Tripoli's second goal-to subvert the govern-
ments of Somalia, Sudan, and Egypt-complements its
first objective. By promoting instability in these three
nations, Qadhafi not only strikes at three anti-Libyan
regimes, but acts against American interests as well.
12. A final reason probably stems from Qadhafi's
desire to enhance his political image. He has demon-
strated sensitivity to charges that he is an international
outcast, and he probably views such multinational
alliances as increasing his international respectability.
In addition, such pacts give him a convenient forum
from which to preach his unique brand of radicalism.
South Yemeni Interests
13. The Aden government regards the deepening
US military involvement in the area, especially the
creation of the Rapid Deployment Joint Task Force, as
a direct threat to its security and an obstacle to its
efforts to subvert neighboring regimes and break out
of its present isolation. South Yemen in fact sought to
foster a much broader coalition of anti-Western states
earlier this year in a bid to strengthen its ties with
other Arab radical states and to counter the Gulf
Cooperation Council, a coalition of conservative Per-
sian Gulf states.
14. By accepting a more narrowly based pact,
South Yemeni President al-Hasani still hopes at a
minimum to bolster his prestige and somewhat shaky
domestic position, to enhance his standing with Mos-
cow, and to profit from Libyan aid. South Yemen
probably also hopes to gain greater control over the
assistance Libya now gives the North Yemeni National
Democratic Front (NDF) insurgent movement. South
Yemeni leaders do not trust Qadhafi completely and
fear he may try to use the NDF to promote his
interests at Aden's expense. In exchange, Aden is
clearly prepared to continue providing safehaven and
training for Somali dissidents and other radical groups
that could be used against US interests in the region.
15. The Soviets have been trying to promote the
formation of a broad anti-US regional grouping, and
they played an indirect and behind-the-scenes role in
the formation of the pact. The pact serves several
important Soviet objectives and reflects a convergence
of Moscow's and the signatories' interests. The three
leaders, however, cannot necessarily be counted on to
follow Soviet direction.
16. As early as 1977, the Soviets expressed concern
that the Red Sea would be dominated by pro-US
Egypt and Saudi Arabia. This was one of the reasons
Moscow responded as quickly as it did to the changing
situation in the Horn in 1977. Since then, the Soviets
have successfully urged closer South Yemeni-Ethiopi-
an and, more recently, Libyan-Ethiopian ties.
17. Throughout the spring and summer of 1981,
the Soviets reportedly were encouraging the formation
of a "common front" of Arab states both to offset the
Gulf Cooperation Council and to combat Washing-
ton's efforts to bolster US forces in the Arabian
Peninsula region. The objective apparently was to
draw Algeria, Syria, and the PLO, as well as South
Yemen, Libya, and Ethiopia, into a grouping with a
broader orientation and impact than those of the
narrowly focused Steadfastness Front of Arab states
rejecting the Camp David peace process.
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18. In the months before the signing of the treaty,
the Soviets sought to facilitate closer relations among
the states of the region. Several delegations of Leba-
nese Communists and Palestinians visited Addis Ababa
during this period, reportedly to persuade Mengistu
that it was safe to deal wih Qadhafi. Palestinian
representatives and President al-Hasani reportedly
also tried to persuade Syria to join an anti-US regional
grouping. Both the Ethiopians and the Syrians be-
lieved these representations were backed by the
Soviets.
19. Although the alliance falls well short of Mos-
cow's initial goal, it seems to serve a number of Soviet
interests:
It may facilitate better coordination of subver-
sive and political efforts aimed at undercutting
the growth of US influence in the area.
It may tie Ethiopia more closely to the radical
community and could undercut any potential
drift back toward the West.
Through Libyan aid, Ethiopia and South Yem-
en may eventually get hard currency with
which to pay for Soviet weaponry. Ethiopian
inability to meet debt payments for arms could
be a major irritant in relations between Addis
Ababa and Moscow. Furthermore, if Ethiopia is
able to purchase oil from Libya at a discount, it
will help alleviate Addis Ababa's near-total
dependence on Soviet supplies, already a source
of strain in Soviet-Ethiopian relations.
The treaty gives Qadhafi some degree of the
political and psychological support he has been
seeking from Moscow to ease his increasing
international isolation. The Soviets have been
reluctant to respond directly to Qadhafi's calls
for more visible support lest they become more
closely identified with the Libyan leader and
share his isolation among the Arabs.
- Moscow may hope that formation of the new
bloc will press conservative Persian Gulf states
such as Saudi Arabia to adopt a more accommo-
dating posture.
20. The Soviets may be skeptical about Qadhafi's
willingness to fulfill his promises and thus about the
pact's longevity and effectiveness. They are tradition-
ally uneasy with radical blocs not under their direct
control. Some negative consequences for Moscow
could occur in the region from the formation of the
pact:
- The alliance could push the Gulf Cooperation
Council toward serious security cooperation
and/or closer ties with the United States.
- It could identify the Soviets more closely with
the most extreme states in the region, putting
the USSR in an isolated position it has long
sought to avoid.
The pact could create new differences rather
than increased cohesion among Moscow's. Arab
allies in view of Syrian, Algerian, and PLO lack
of interest in the alliance. This might weaken
the anti-US concentration of the Steadfastness
Front without strengthening Arab opposition to
US moves around the Persian Gulf.
- Libyan influence might dilute the Soviets' own
in Ethiopia and South Yemen.
21. The Soviets, however, do not seem to be con-
cerned that these consequences are likely to occur. In
fact, their behind-the-scenes role in the formation of
the alliance demonstrates that they view the pact as
beneficial to their objectives. Moscow has demonstrat-
ed its interest and support in a low-key manner. Its
support was probably affirmed during the visit of
Czechoslovakia's President Husak to Libya, Ethiopia,
and South Yemen in early September, during which
aspects of the alliance were apparently discussed. On
the other hand, Moscow has played down its public
reaction to the pact. The Soviets apparently intend to
continue their support of greater cooperation among
the three allies, reserve judgment on the durability of
the alliance, yet seek the maximum advantage possible
from it.
22. The Soviets are probably keeping their Cuban
allies informed of developments in the alliance, al-
though there are no indications that Havana was
involved in the formation of the pact. Cuba maintains
11,000 to 13,000 military personnel in Ethiopia, most-
ly on garrison duty in the Ogaden and near Addis
Ababa, and approximately 500 advisers in South Yem-
en. These serve as strategic reserves for the Ethiopian
and South Yemeni Governments and are not actively
engaged in hostilities at this time. It is highly unlikely
that the pact members envisage their use in joint
offensive operations in the foreseeable future, includ-
ing any against Oman or Sudan.
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Weaknesses of the Pact-Divergence of Interests
Within the Alliance
23. Despite their common interests, significant dif-
ferences remain among the three new allies. One
stumblingblock is Ethiopia's antipathy toward Arabs,
the country's traditional enemies. Mengistu has never
trusted Qadhafi and considers him unstable at best.
Qadhafi's transfer in mid-October of $150 million to
Ethiopia-the first installment of his $855.1 million
aid commitment-ensures close military cooperation,
and continued transfers may lead to the deployment
of some Ethiopian troops to Libya. But Libyan foot-
dragging on additional aid would limit Ethiopian
cooperation on other aspects of the pact.
24. Policy toward Sudan may represent another
major difference between Ethiopia and Libya. Qadha-
fi wants to overthrow the Nimeiri regime and, at the
very least, would like to use Ethiopia to pressure
Nimeiri to withdraw support for anti-Libyan forces in
Chad. The Libyan leader also wants Mengistu to allow
Ethiopian territory to be used by anti-Nimeiri
insurgents.
25. Qadhafi's interest in overthrowing President
Nimeiri appears unaffected by the assassination of
Egyptian President Sadat. Libya's strategy is to work
against Khartoum through support of insurgent ele-
ments rather than direct military intervention, par-
ticularly now that the latter strategy carries with it
greater risks of an Egyptian and US military response.
26. In the past two years, Ethiopia and Sudan have
worked out a mutually beneficial modus vivendi.
Addis Ababa now has established a dialogue with
Khartoum, which historically has provided sanctuary
to Eritrea's various secessionist groups. While Mengistu
has no present intention of seriously negotiating with
the Eritrean insurgents, he has been able to play upon
Sudanese hopes of mediating-which has led, in part,
to Khartoum's decision to crack down on some of the
Sudanese-based Eritrean guerrillas. Khartoum, in re-
turn, feels less threatened by the possibility of cross-
border raids by Ethiopian-based Sudanese rebels.
27. Mengistu is unlikely to jeopardize the benefits
of his detente with Sudan by openly cooperating with
Qadhafi against Nimeiri unless the Libyans continue
to meet their aid commitments. In any event, we
believe that Mengistu will move cautiously at first in
cooperating with Libya in assisting Sudanese dissi-
dents. The Ethiopians have already begun low-level
assistance to Libya's anti-Nimeiri schemes, however.
This has raised Sudanese suspicions concerning Ethio-
pian intentions and is leading Khartoum to reconsider
its restrictions on anti-Ethiopian organizations. Should
these restrictions be lifted, a rapid deterioration of
Ethiopian-Sudanese ties would ensue.
28. From the South Yemeni perspective, President
al-Hasani is uncomfortable with Qadhafi's self-ap-
pointed role in promoting unity between North and
South Yemen. Aden fears that Libyan meddling could
lead to a serious deterioration in the facade of cordial
relations with Sanaa that Aden has sought to sustain.
Moreover, South Yemen probably doubts Qadhafi's
commitment to begin channeling Libyan aid to the
National Democratic Front through Aden. South Yem-
en and Libya support different factions within the
NDF and Aden wishes to continue controlling the
level and tactics of NDF subversion in North Yemen.
29. Finally, both Ethiopia and South Yemen recog-
nize Qadhafi's extremist and quixotic character. In
general, both Aden and Addis Ababa will be reluctant
to take dramatic turns of policy or reckless actions
without carefully considering the ramifications for
their own narrow national interests.
Regional Reactions to the Pact
30. Despite the pact's fragile nature, Western-ori-
ented states of the region are concerned. This concern
has been amplified by the assassination of Sadat and
suspicions that Libya was somehow involved. Con-
cerns about the pact have been actively vented to US
representatives.
31. The ability of regional states to act collectively
to counter hostile activity undertaken as the result of
the pact is limited at present. Much depends on the
activities of more influential regional players-Saudi
Arabia and Egypt-either to motivate a joint response
or assist the threatened states individually.
Somalia
32. The Somali Government recognizes that it is a
prime target of the new alliance and is predictably
alarmed. Somalia's fears of an imminent invasion by
regular forces from Ethiopia or South Yemen, or both,
are unrealistic. But Somalia can anticipate increased
Ethiopian-backed military activity and terrorist inci-
dents staged by the Somali Salvation Front. Its security
forces, lacking experience and proper training to deal
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with terrorism,
effectively.
will have difficulty responding
33. The pact will bring increased aid to the SSF,
but its small size (about 2,500), narrow tribal base, and
close association with the Ethiopians severely undercut
its appeal in Somalia. As a result, it is not capable of
overthrowing the Siad regime on its own.
34. Nevertheless, Siad has already been subjected
to high-level government criticism-and suggestions
that he step aside-prompted by his inability to deal
with severe economic and internal and external securi-
ty problems. An increase in SSF activity in Somalia,
however, especially if accompanied by more humiliat-
ing Ethiopian ground incursions and airstrikes along
the border, could prompt moves by Somali officers to
replace Siad.
35. Siad so far has attempted to deal with growing
discontent, particularly within the military, by making
token moves to decentralize the Somali economy and
by promising strong US support resulting from the
access agreement. His Army realizes the limited na-
ture of the US military aid commitment, however, and
pressure on Siad has increased. Siad already has
responded by pressing Washington for more aid and,
citing new dangers posed by the pact, for a rapid
acceleration in the delivery of arms aid already
promised. -
36. The Siad regime is making a greater effort to
improve relations with Kenya, which have long been
strained by Mogadishu's claim to Kenya's ethnic So-
mali-inhabited Northeastern Province. For the past
few months, at the urging of the United States, Saudi
Arabia, and several West European powers, Nairobi
and Mogadishu have made some progress in trying to
submerge their differences, although suspicions linger.
Gulf Cooperation Council
37. Oman also sees itself threatened by the new
alliance. The Omani Government raised its fears at the
most recent meeting of the Gulf Cooperation Council.
The formation of the pact reportedly spurred council
members-including Saudi Arabia-to discuss serious-
ly future defense coordination, and this trend may
gain added momentum from the situation in Egypt.
One important convert was Kuwait, which had pre-
viously opposed such discussions. The council mem-
bers agreed to hold up further aid commitments to
South Yemen and to launch a diplomatic campaign to
persuade other East African states to pressure Ethiopia
to stay out of Arabian Peninsula affairs.
38. Despite the initial concern of conservative Arab
governments around the Persian Gulf, enthusiasm for
concrete cooperation may wane if military collabora-
tion among the pact members falters. Oman, however,
almost certainly will keep prodding its partners to
action. Saudi Arabia probably perceives the pact as
evidence of the hostile objectives of radical regional
states that are being directed by Qadhafi. The Saudis
are pleased that their oil policies have had the byprod-
uct of placing Qadhafi in financial straits, and they
hope that continued pressure may limit his disruptive
activities. Riyadh probably is concerned most with the
effects the pact may have on attempts to subvert
North Yemen.
39. Sanaa sees the pact as an attempt by Aden to
widen support for the South Yemeni-sponsored Na-
tional Democratic Front insurgents. Particularly dis-
tressed by Qadhafi's involvement, President Salih has
embarked on a so far unsuccessful campaign to secure
substantive political and military assistance from a
variety of Arab states and the Gulf Cooperation
Council. Increased Libyan assistance to the NDF-if it
occurs-is likely to contribute to a further erosion of
Salih's already diminished authority.
Kenya
40. The radical alliance has caused Kenyan Presi-
dent Moi and his advisers to have doubts about their
relationship with Ethiopia. Common fear of Somali
irredentism led Kenya and Ethiopia to conclude a
loose military alliance in 1963. Nairobi and Addis
Ababa have retained friendly ties and continued mili-
tary cooperation despite the sharp shift in Ethiopia's
ideological orientation since its 1974 revolution. How-
ever, several Kenyan leaders have recently expressed
concern that the present Marxist-Leninist government
in Ethiopia may pose a serious long-term threat to
capitalist and pro-Western Kenya. In the wake of the
Aden summit, Moi ordered a Foreign Ministry reeval-
uation of Kenya's ties with Ethiopia.
41. The pact may succeed in spurring Kenya's
leaders toward a more serious rapprochement with
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Somalia despite lingering doubts about Siad's willing-
ness to abandon Somalia's claim on Kenyan territory.
The two governments remain far apart, however.
Regardless of the prospects for detente with Somalia,
Kenya probably will try to avoid antagonizing the
Ethiopians. At the same time, Kenya is certain to
request an increase in US military assistance and will
move toward closer security cooperation with the
United States.
Egypt
44. The pact poses only an indirect threat to Egypt,
primarily through Libya and possible future Ethiopian
subversion against Sudan. The late President Sadat had
reacted sharply to the pact by sending a stinging
message to Qadhafi threatening to attack Libya if the
Libyans took any action to undermine the Nimeiri
regime. Then Vice President Hosni Moubarek fol-
lowed up by traveling to Washington to persuade US
officials to rush more aid to Sudan to meet the
increased threat.
42. Despite improved Sudanese-Ethiopian rela-
tions, Khartoum recognizes that Libya will try to use
the new alliance against it. The Sudanese have ex-
pressed fear that Libyan forces in Chad and Libya
intend to cross the border to support Sudanese dissi-
dents. In the aftermath of the Sadat assassination,
NimeirLfeel articularly vulnerable.
While internal
security considerations also played a major role in
Nimeiri's crackdown on the Eritrean groups, the Su-
danese leader probably will be looking for other ways
to remain on good terms with Mengistu in the months
to come.
43. Qadhafi's forces in Chad are currently tied up
in their dual role as occupiers and counterinsurgents,
and probably will confine their military actions in
Sudan to airstrikes against Chadian rebel enclaves just
over the border. Furthermore, Tripoli is aware of the
Egyptian defense commitments to Sudan and is un-
likely to conduct attacks that would prompt Cairo to
initiate retaliatory action on the Libyan-Egyptian
border. Finally, Qadhafi probably would also fear that
Chadian rebel forces would use such an occasion to
intensify the insurgency in Chad. He is likely, how-
ever, to continue support for anti-Nimeiri subversive
forces, which increases his interest in using Ethiopia as
a base for insurgent attacks into Sudan.
45. The mutual defense treaty signed by Egypt and
Sudan in 1976 remains in force and Egyptian officials
continue to view Sudan as vital to Egypt's defense.
President Moubarek is almost certainly as committed
to maintaining a moderate regime in Khartoum as was
Sadat, even to the point of sending troops there. It is
unlikely that Cairo would commit substantial military
assets to Somalia or Oman despite its recent declara-
tion that any threat to these countries will be "con-
fronted firmly."
An Immediate US Target: Bright Star 82
46. The members of the pact can be expected to
react strongly to the RDJTF Bright Star 82 exercise
currently scheduled for 9 November to 15 December
1981. The exercise, which will involve 5,000 to 6,000
US troops,' will include joint training operations with
Egyptian, Sudanese, and Omani forces and a smaller
operation in Somalia in which the Somali military will
not directly participate. Members of the pact, along
with other nations and groups in the region hostile to
the United States, probably will sharply condemn the
exercise. Qadhafi in particular will view the exercise
as a real military threat, and may press his new
partners to join in an effort to disrupt it.
47. The Egyptian, Sudanese, and Omani forces
participating in the exercise can be expected to pro-
vide protection for US troops. The majority of the
American forces in the exercise will pass through the
Cairo West airbase in Egypt, where a smaller but
similar operation took place without incident last year.
The pact members will try to encourage anti-Ameri-
can demonstrations throughout the region to protest
Bright Star 82, but such protests will probably have
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little impact on the actual conduct of the exercise.
Libya and South Yemen will also try to use the issue at
the Arab League summit this month to isolate conser-
vative Arab states supportive of US interests.
48. Somalia is the most vulnerable point of the
exercise in terms of potential terrorist disruption.
Current Bright Star 82 plans call for approximately
250 military engineers and medical personnel, with
their equipment, to be landed at Berbera.
lems resulting from falling oil exports may cause
occasional difficulties in meeting some payments. Lib-
yan officials, however, probably will dole out the
promised aid parsimoniously, and this may in itself
become a source of friction within the pact.
52. It is somewhat questionable whether Libya's
partners will fulfill all of the military aspects of the
pact.
49. The Libyans and the Somali Salvation Front,
however, have publicly threatened to attack any
Americans sent to Berbera, and several hundred Soma-
li insurgents are currently undergoing guerrilla and
terrorist training in Libya. In the past, the SSF's
limited capabilities have restricted its terrorist activity
to setting off explosives in Mogadishu, Berbera, . Har-
geisa, and Galcaio, and even now it may not be able to
mark Bright Star 82 with more than another small
terrorist attack to gain publicity.
Prospects for the Alliance
50. The near-term effectiveness of the alliance
depends on continued concern about US activities in
the area and the willingness and ability of the Libyans
to fulfill their economic commitments. Should Qadha-
fi not generally fulfill his commitments, Mengistu is
likely to back away. Qadhafi has a long record of
failing to follow up his pledges, although he has done
much better in fulfilling promises of military aid than
he has in keeping economic aid pledges.,
51. The military provisions of the new alliance, the
importance that Qadhafi places on the possible de-
ployment of Ethiopian troops in Libya, and his appar-
ent high hopes for the pact caused Qadhafi in mid-
October to begin to fulfill his economic and military
pledges to Ethiopia. With $16 billion in foreign assets,
Libya has the capability to fulfill all of Qadhafi's
promises, although present short-term cash-flow prob-
4 From 1975 to 1980 Tripoli disbursed only $1.4 billion in
foreign military and economic aid, although it had promised $3.3
billion. During that period it paid 70 percent of its military aid
commitments but only 30 percent of its promised development
assistance.
_Ft he poor
overall condition of the South Yemeni military makes
it difficult for Aden to fulfill its commitments.
53. Libya's capabilities to deploy sizable forces to
its partners are constrained by the perceived threat
posed by Egypt as well as by logistic considerations.
Although Tripoli spent several months preparing for
the intervention in Chad, logistic support for the forces
there has been a strain on the military. Major armed
actions in areas that cannot be reached overland from
Libya would severely tax Libya's already overworked
airlift capabilities. Moreover, should Libya want to use
Ethiopian or South Yemeni facilities for air or sea
strikes in neighboring waters or against Saudi Arabia,
Addis Ababa and Aden are unlikely to allow this use of
their territory.
54. Should the pact leaders continue to cooperate,
coordinated subversive activities within the next year
will probably be directed against the Somali Govern-
ment, with some aid being provided to dissident
groups in North Yemen, Oman, Sudan, and possibly
Egypt. The alliance will try to expand its influence in
the Middle East and Africa as a counterbalance to
Western influences, and will condemn US diplomatic
or military efforts in the region.
55. The Soviets certainly are pleased with the
currently strong anti-Western and anti-American di-
rection of their three clients, and for the moment
welcome the Bloc's intention to undermine US defense
strategy in the Middle East and East Africa. The
Soviets recognize that the independent-minded gov-
ernments in Addis Ababa and Tripoli almost certainly
will antagonize each other as well as their patron in
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Moscow. Nonetheless, the Soviets will work behind the
scenes to strengthen the alliance.
56. The threat to regional states in the near term
has been increased somewhat. The immediate threat is
to such states as Somalia and Sudan. Any threat to
others-Oman, North Yemen, Kenya, or Djibouti-is
unlikely to develop for some time. In the long run,
however, if continued significant financial assistance
from Libya to its partners is forthcoming, if the three
allies continue to perceive a serious US threat to their
interests, and if the pact goes unopposed by other
states in the region, it could endanger pro-Western
states there and US policy for the area.
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