CONFLICTS IN THE HORN OF AFRICA: PROSPECTS FOR THE NEXT YEAR

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP97S00289R000200200008-8
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 31
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: July 8, 2011
• Sequence Number: 8
• Publication Date: June 23, 1981
• Content Type: SNIE

Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/07/08: CIA-RDP97SO0289R000200200008-8
Director of ret
Central
Intelligence
Conflicts in the Horn of Africa:
Prospects for the Next Year
Special National Intelligence Estimate
SNIE 76-81
23 June 1981
Copy 2 2 9
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/07/08: CIA-RDP97SO0289R000200200008-8
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/07/08: CIA-RDP97SO0289R000200200008-8
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/07/08: CIA-RDP97SO0289R000200200008-8
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/07/08: CIA-RDP97S00289R000200200008-8
SNIE 76-81
CONFLICTS IN THE HORN OF AFRICA:
PROSPECTS FOR THE NEXT YEAR
Information available as of 15 June 1981 was
used in the preparation of this Estimate.
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/07/08: CIA-RDP97S00289R000200200008-8
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/07/08: CIA-RDP97SO0289R000200200008-8
THIS ESTIMATE IS ISSUED BY THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL
INTELLIGENCE.
THE NATIONAL FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE BOARD CONCURS,
EXCEPT AS NOTED IN THE TEXT.
The following intelligence organizations participated in the preparation of the
Estimate:
The Central Intelligence Agency, the Defense Intelligence Agency, the National Security
Agency, and the intelligence organization of the Department of State.
Also Participating:
The Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of the Army
The Director of Naval Intelligence, Department of the Navy
The Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, Department of the Air Force
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/07/08: CIA-RDP97SO0289R000200200008-8
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/07/08: CIA-RDP97SO0289R000200200008-8
CONTENTS
II. Political and Economic Situations of Regional States ................................ 8
A. Ethiopia ................................................................................................... 8
Ethiopia's Principal Backers: USSR, Eastern Europe, and Cuba........ 9
B. Somalia ..................................................................................................... 10
C. Djibouti .................................................................................................... 11
D. Kenya ....................................................................................................... 11
E. Sudan ........................................................................................................ 13
III. Regional Conflicts ......................................................................................... 14
A. The Somali Irredenta .............................................................................. 14
The Ogaden ............................................................................................. 14
Kenya ....................................................................................................... 15
Djibouti .................................................................................................... 16
B. Northern Ethiopia (Eritrea and Tigray) ................................................ 16
IV. Non-Communist External Involvement in the Horn ................................. 18
A. West Europeans ...................................................................................... 18
B. Arabs ........................................................................................................ 18
C. Africans .................................................................................................... 19
iii
SECRET
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/07/08: CIA-RDP97SO0289R000200200008-8
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/07/08: CIA-RDP97SO0289R000200200008-8
KEY JUDGMENTS
Ethiopia, Sudan, Kenya, Somalia, and Djibouti have been involved
in regional struggles which stem largely from the expansion and
contraction of the traditional Ethiopian Empire over the past 1,000
years. Separatism in northern Ethiopia as well as Somali irredentist
claims upon territory in Ethiopia, Kenya, and Djibouti have deep
historical roots, and the local conflicts arising from them will not be
settled within the next year. Resolution of these conflicts is further com-
plicated by the growing involvement of outside powers, particularly the
USSR and the United States.
While Ethiopia seems to have contained the guerrillas in both the
Eritrean and Ogaden conflicts, these insurgencies cannot readily be re-
solved either politically or militarily, and Ethiopia will require contin-
ued military support from the Soviet Union. This dependence on the
Soviets severely limits Ethiopia's maneuverability on the international
scene beyond the Horn. However, Ethiopian leader Mengistu and his
close associates are highly nationalistic and have largely retained auton-
omy in internal matters. Nevertheless, his need for massive military
assistance (about $2.5 billion of Soviet supplies have already been deliv-
ered) to combat the insurgencies has enabled the Soviets to gain a foot-
hold in Ethiopia that complements their close military and political
relationships with South Yemen. Mengistu could survive against internal
political opponents without the 1,400 Soviet military advisers and the
12,000 or so Cuban military personnel in Ethiopia, but he will continue
to depend on their presence to help cope with internal insurgencies and
with related external military threats. Ethiopia's dependence on the
Soviets and the Cubans would increase further should the guerrillas in
either Eritrea or the Ogaden receive significant additional support. '
Somali President Siad has gambled that the military access agree-
ment and association with the United States will help reverse Somalia's
deteriorating economic and military situation and thus improve his
weakening political position. As long as Siad is able to show benefits
from his relations with the United States and can cope with Somalia's
myriad economic problems and military pressure from Ethiopia, we
believe he will survive the coming year.
' The Director, Defense Intelligence Agency, believes that Ethiopian dependence on the Soviets and
Cubans would remain strong as long as anti-Ethiopian insurgency persists in Eritrea and the Ogaden,
irrespective of additional support.
1
SECRET
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/07/08: CIA-RDP97SO0289R000200200008-8
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/07/08: CIA-RDP97S00289R000200200008-8
Djibouti is the most politically fragile state in the region. While we
believe that President Gouled will remain in office for at least the next
year, his departure would probably lead to instability caused by height-
ened ethnic rivalry. This would undermine the French position in the
country and endanger the important US military access there. Instabil-
ity might also provoke military intervention by Ethiopia or Somalia.
Djibouti is almost totally dependent on French aid, which amounts
to one-third of all bilateral French aid to Africa. A force of about 4,600
French military personnel is stationed there and France pays for most
of Djibouti's own somewhat smaller forces. With the exception of the
foreign ministry, most government functions are carried out with the
assistance of French civilian advisers. No equivalent facilities are avail-
able elsewhere in the area for support of France's Indian Ocean naval
force and the Giscard government was firmly committed to maintain-
ing a strong French presence in Djibouti. While the attitude of the new
Mitterrand government toward Djibouti is not clear, we believe that the
French military involvement will continue for at least the next year.
Despite economic problems, Kenya and Sudan-both of which
have close relations with the United States-are relatively stable. Al-
though we expect no serious challenge to Kenyan President Moi in the
near future, Sudanese President Nimeiri is somewhat vulnerable,
particularly to subversion from Libya. As in the past, these countries
will be affected by regional conflicts. Kenya will continue to regard
Somali irredentism as its most serious threat. Persisting hostilities in
Eritrea will frustrate Sudan's efforts to alleviate the refugee and secu-
rity problems along its eastern border and to reduce the number of
Soviet and Cuban military personnel in Ethiopia.
These local conflicts have become enmeshed with heightened
superpower competition fueled by:
- Soviet exploitation of new opportunities in Sub-Saharan Africa
beginning around 1974 when the Portuguese African Empire
collapsed.
- The proximity of the Horn to the Persian Gulf and the critical
dependence of the West on oil from this region evident since the
1973 embargo.
- The overthrow of the Shah and vulnerability of other regional
regimes to radical change.
- The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan and Moscow's warnings to
Pakistan.
2
SECRET
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/07/08: CIA-RDP97S00289R000200200008-8
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/07/08: CIA-RDP97S00289R000200200008-8
Since the mid-1970s, Moscow has seized the opportunities afforded
by the Ethiopian revolution, the cooling of US relations with the succes-
sors of Haile Selassie, and the Somali invasion of the Ogaden, to fashion
a greater political-strategic presence in the Horn of Africa. Moscow no
doubt also viewed Ethiopia as an asset that partially offset the losses
from its earlier setbacks in Egypt and Sudan.
The Soviets apparently hope to employ their presence as a means
- Maintain at least one pro-Soviet regime in the Horn.
- Weaken Western political influence in the broad Indian Ocean-
Persian Gulf-Red Sea-East African region and encourage a
more pro-Soviet or at least neutralist orientation in local
regimes.
- Reinforce the USSR's claim to play a major role in any future
Indian Ocean-Persian Gulf security arrangements.
- Promote pro-Soviet antiregime movements over the longer term
in African countries adjoining the Horn and in the Arabian
Peninsula.
- Monitor and counter Western military activities in the region
and undermine local support for expansion of these activities.
- Improve and expand Soviet naval and naval aviation capabili-
ties in the region.
- Work over the long term toward a credible capability to
threaten Western access to Persian Gulf oil supplies.
Judgments regarding the prospect that the Soviets will achieve these
broader objectives are treated in other Estimates. 2
Ethiopia is now Moscow's most important client in Sub-Saharan
Africa and is the focus of Soviet policy in the Horn. In late 1976, the
Soviets chose to risk their longstanding position in Somalia-they were
eventually expelled from their base in Berbera by President Siad-by
assisting Ethiopia in order to:
- Establish a position of influence in the country that historically
had been the dominant regional power in the Horn and a major
African power.
3
SECRET
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/07/08: CIA-RDP97S00289R000200200008-8
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/07/08: CIA-RDP97S00289R000200200008-8
- Acquire a better position from which to extend Soviet influence
in Africa and the Northwest Indian Ocean region.
- Accelerate the reduction of the US presence in Ethiopia.
Moscow's access to Aden and its nearly unrestricted use of Ethi-
opia's Dahlak Island and use of the Asmara airfield helps the Soviets to
support their presence in the Indian Ocean. It also assists the Soviets to
pursue interests in the Red Sea region including protection of their own
lines of communication through the Suez Canal between the eastern
and western USSR and to exert leverage against Red Sea littoral coun-
tries including Saudi Arabia, North Yemen, Sudan, Egypt, and Jordan.
We believe that present US plans to provide defensive weapons to
Somalia will only marginally increase the prospects for a higher level of
fighting between Ethiopia and Somalia or for a serious negative reaction
by moderate governments in the area. But US military access and assist-
ance to Somalia substantially above currently announced levels would:
- Allow the Soviets to improve their position in Ethiopia by play-
ing more heavily upon Addis Ababa's fears of Somalia.
- Probably lead Moscow to ease restraints upon Ethiopian efforts
to put military pressure on Somalia.
- Increase chances of terrorist attacks upon US personnel in Soma-
lia, particularly in Berbera.
- Bring into question the US use of military facilities in Kenya.
Kenyans fear Somali irredentism and might react to increased
US military support to Mogadishu by threatening to reconsider
our access agreement.
- Cause Djibouti to reevaluate US military access there, if intensi-
fied conflict in the Ogaden posed a threat to the Djibouti
regime.
- Provoke negative reactions from some Arab states, both from
radicals such as the Libyans who oppose the US generally, and
from conservative Arabs such as the Saudis who fear intensified
superpower competition close to home. 3
Moscow has threatened Siad and is seeking openings to pressure
him; it sees value in the antiregime activities of the Ethiopian-based
Somali Salvation Front which receives support from Libya, South Ye-
' The Director, Defense Intelligence Agency, believes that it is not feasible to generalize, as in the tics
above, regarding the effects of possible US policies which are not clearly described.
4
SECRET
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/07/08: CIA-RDP97S00289R000200200008-8
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/07/08: CIA-RDP97S00289R000200200008-8
men, and Syria, and there are indications that Moscow is directly in-
volved with the group.
The Soviets have not been able to exploit their presence in Ethiopia
as a means to improve their position significantly in adjoining Sudan
and Kenya. Relations between Sudan and the Soviet Union have long
been poor and President Nimeiri has rejected periodic Soviet attempts
to improve ties. He is convinced Soviet policy aims at the removal of
Egyptian President Sadat and himself as steps toward dominating the
Arabian Peninsula and the Persian Gulf. For their part, the Soviets
would like to see a realignment of Sudan's policies, and no doubt ap-
prove of Qadhafi's efforts to destabilize Sudan. In Kenya the Soviets
have sought, so far unsuccessfully, to gain influence, and have invited
President Moi to visit Moscow later this year. President Moi may be
somewhat more susceptible to pressures toward nonalignment as he
serves as OAU chairman during the coming year.
The Soviet attitude toward continued local conflict in the Horn is
ambivalent. Overall, the Soviets probably prefer:
- A political settlement of the Eritrean and Ogaden problems if
the Soviets' position in Ethiopia were not jeopardized and they
could successfully portray themselves as peacemakers.
- Failing this, a manageable level of political tension and guerrilla
fighting that would perpetuate Ethiopian dependence on Soviet
military assistance but avoid a confrontation with the United
States.
- Continued diplomatic tensions between Somalia and Kenya
which would complicate US relations with both.
We believe, however, that the USSR's political position in the Horn is
unlikely to improve significantly in the coming year. Ethiopia will con-
tinue to be a difficult client, and the pro-Western states in the Horn will
attempt to resist developments that might advance Soviet goals.
5
SECRET
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/07/08: CIA-RDP97S00289R000200200008-8
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/07/08: CIA-RDP97SO0289R000200200008-8
Horn of Africa
L."A ~
A!r~ t
Zaire akc
", Kvnqu
Uganda
KAMPALAy
Burundi
kBUJUMBURA
N"JO
, 77 Tan ani a A
L, kr 1
pAR ES SALAAM
6
SECRET
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/07/08: CIA-RDP97SO0289R000200200008-8
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/07/08: CIA-RDP97SO0289R000200200008-8
DISCUSSION
1. INTRODUCTION
1. In the Horn of Africa four states-Sudan, Kenya,
Somalia, and Djibouti-have become independent
only since World War II, while Ethiopia is the oldest
independent state in Africa. These countries have been
involved in regional conflicts which stem largely from
the expansion and contraction of the traditional Ethi-
opian Empire over the past 1,000 years. Separatism in
northern Ethiopia as well as Somali irredentist claims
upon territory in Ethiopia, Kenya, and Djibouti have
deep historical roots.
2. The intensification of conflict in the Horn from
1975 through 1981 resulted from breakdown of the
preponderance of power established by an Ethiopia
closely tied with the United States in the immediate
post-World War II period. Three factors combined to
bring about the breakdown in Ethiopian power:
- Waning US interest in Ethiopia beginning in the
early 1970s, particularly as the Kagnew commu-
nications facility (the quid pro quo for US mili-
tary aid to Ethiopia for 20 years) became tech-
nologically obsolescent.
- The Ethiopian revolution, which began in 1974
with the overthrow of Haile Selassie by a leftist
military junta.
Any resolution of conflict will be complicated by
superpower competition, which has been fanned by:
- Soviet exploitation of new opportunities in Sub-
Saharan Africa beginning around 1974 when the
Portuguese African Empire collapsed.
- The proximity of the Horn to the Persian Gulf
and the critical dependence of the West on oil
from this region evident since the 1973 oil
embargo.
- The overthrow of the Shah, and vulnerability of
other regional regimes to radical change.
- The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan and Moscow's
warnings to Pakistan.
3. The Reversal of Alliances. The Soviet Union
established a military-assistance relationship with
Mogadishu shortly after Somalia's independence in
1960. By the early 1970s-following the seizure of
power by a radical military junta headed by General
Mohamed Siad Barre-Moscow's arms and advisory
assistance had reached relatively high levels, and in
partial return Somalia allowed Soviet naval ships and
aircraft use of local facilities. This access, which
helped support the Soviet Union's growing presence in
the Indian Ocean, worried the United States, while
Somalia's military buildup alarmed Ethiopia.
4. Ethiopian concern became acute after the 1974
revolution because the new leftist leaders in Addis
Ababa were suspicious of the United States-due to
our past ties with the Emperor-and apprehensive
about continued assistance from Washington. After the
military seized power, the debate in Washington over
aid to Ethiopia intensified. The outcome was a
continuation of aid at somewhat higher levels that,
nonetheless, failed to satisfy the regime. (Total US
military commitments from 1974 to 1977 were $160
million.) By late 1976 the regime was in desperate
straits. The revolution had weakened central author-
ity, thus encouraging separatist movements through-
out the country. The most serious were those in
Eritrea-where the longstanding insurgency had es-
calated since early 1975-and in the Ogaden-where
Mogadishu had renewed the insurgency in late 1975.
5. From 1974 on, Addis Ababa had sounded out
Moscow for arms aid. Some junta members, especially
Mengistu Haile-Mariam, regarded the USSR as a
potentially more generous arms supplier than the
United States and as more ideologically compatible
with the Ethiopian revolution.
6. Initially, the Soviets were deterred from moving
closer to Ethiopia by their doubts about the junta's
staying power and their fears of losing military access
in Somalia. The Soviets, however, then attempted to
play both sides in the Horn. The first major Soviet
arms deal with Ethiopia was signed in December
1976. US concern over Ethiopia's human rights viola-
7
SECRET
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/07/08: CIA-RDP97SO0289R000200200008-8
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/07/08: CIA-RDP97SO0289R000200200008-8
tions led to a cutoff in February 1977 of military grant
aid. Following Ethiopia's closure of Kagnew and
expulsion of US military personnel in April, another
more generous agreement was signed with the Soviets
in May.
7. By this time a resentful Somalia was trying to
counter the budding Soviet-Ethiopian relationship by
improving relations with the United States and explor-
ing our willingness to supply arms. In July 1977 Soma-
lia invaded Ethiopia. Siad's decision to use his army to
seize the Ogaden (after the insurgents had failed) was
based on a calculation that Ethiopia-torn by revolu-
tion and in the midst of switching from US to Soviet
weaponry-was at its most vulnerable.
8. In late 1976, the Soviets chose to risk their
longstanding position in Somalia-they were even-
tually expelled from their base in Berbera-by assist-
ing Ethiopia in order to:
- Establish a position of influence in the country
that historically had been the dominant re-
gional power in the Horn and a major African
power.
11. Military-Political Situation Today. Ethiopia is
stronger than it was in late 1977. The Ogaden has been
reconquered. In Eritrea, most of the insurgent-held
towns have been retaken, and the level of fighting has
declined over the past year. Most of the earlier Soviet
military aid commitment of over $2.5 billion has been
delivered and absorbed, and significant assistance
continues. The Ethiopian armed forces are now the
largest (245,000 men) and best-equipped in black Af-
rica. In addition, the Cuban troops (11,000-13,000
men, most of whom are organized in four combat bri-
gades) provide a strategic reserve. The Soviets provide
1,400 advisers.
12. Mengistu has improved relations with all of his
neighbors except Somalia. He is trying to put together
a loose grouping of Horn states based on mutual en-
dorsement of the principle of noninterference in in-
ternal affairs and respect for national boundaries. He
has had some success because Sudan, Kenya, and Dji-
bouti want peace and economic development, and are
prepared to work with Ethiopia even though they
have no affinity for Mengistu's political ideas or style
of rule.
- Accelerate the reduction of the US presence in
Ethiopia.
- Acquire a better position from which to extend
Soviet influence in Africa and the northwest In-
dian Ocean region.
9. The Somali invasion caused the United States to
withdraw an earlier offer of defensive arms. The So-
viet tilt toward Ethiopia led Siad in November 1977 to
expel his Soviet and Cuban advisers, to cancel the
friendship treaty with the Soviets, and to sever all mili-
tary ties. Moscow then staged a massive military res-
cue on Ethiopia's behalf, including the use of Cuban
troops, which succeeded in driving the Somali Army
out of the Ogaden by March 1978.
10. Following the Somali defeat, the United States
renewed its arms offer, but again shelved it as Siad's
support for the Ogaden insurgency continued. In
December 1979 the United States made another offer
of arms in return for access to Somali military facili-
ties. A US-Somali military access agreement was con-
cluded in August 1980, but military aid-the quid pro
quo-vas delayed by Congress until the Intelligence
Community could certify that Somali regular army
units were out of the Ogaden. This assurance was
given in December.
13. Nevertheless, Ethiopia does not have the mili-
tary capability to resolve its insurgencies, and the par-
ties have not yet been willing to negotiate political
solutions. Resolution of the regional conflicts has been
further complicated by the growing involvement of
outside powers-the Communist states, the United
States, Western Europe, and almost all Arab states.
II. POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC SITUATIONS
OF REGIONAL STATES
A. Ethiopia
14. Seven years after the beginning of the revolu-
tion that overthrew Emperor Haile Selassie, Ethiopia
is still governed by military-dominated political struc-
tures which are ostensibly temporary. In early 1977,
after extensive factional fighting, Mengistu emerged as
the undisputed leader of the government, and since
then has further consolidated his personal leadership.
Despite Mengistu's personal preeminence, however,
we believe that he is ultimately dependent on the mili-
tary and that he must take its views into account in
setting major policies. Mengistu stays in power by
shrewd maneuvering among elements within the mili-
tary and ruthlessly uses force when necessary. A sus-
8
SECRET
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/07/08: CIA-RDP97SO0289R000200200008-8
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/07/08: CIA-RDP97SO0289R000200200008-8
tained challenge to Mengistu's rule from within the
military seems unlikely over the next 12 months.
15. Apart from separatist challenges in Eritrea,
Tigray, and the Ogaden, the regime faces widespread
discontent within many sectors of Ethiopian society
due to erosion of the economy, including growing food
shortages, foreign exchange losses, and breakdowns in
the distribution system. Military spending-estimated
at 45 percent of the government budget-diverts re-
sources from economic development. But over the
next year, it seems unlikely that this discontent on its
own will threaten the regime.
16. Despite the Soviet Union's continuing efforts to
influence the character of the Ethiopian regime,
Mengistu and his close associates are highly nationalis-
tic and have largely retained autonomy in internal
matters. We believe that the Mengistu regime could
survive against internal opponents in the absence of
Soviet and Cuban military personnel but the regime
depends on Soviet and Cuban military assistance to
help cope with external and separatist military threats.
This dependence on the Soviets limits Ethiopia's
maneuverability on the international scene, particu-
larly vis-a-vis the United States. Nevertheless, dis-
appointment with Soviet economic aid has led Ethi-
opia to search for economic help from the West.
(Despite Communist commitments of $750 million in
economic aid since 1959, less than $10 million has
been disbursed annually.)
Ethiopia's Principal Backers: USSR,
Eastern Europe, and Cuba
17. Ethiopia is Moscow's most important client in
Sub-Saharan Africa and remains the focus of Soviet
policy in the Horn.
18. The Soviets apparently hope their presence will
help to:
- Maintain at least one pro-Soviet regime in the
Horn.
- Weaken Western political influence in the
broader northwest Indian Ocean-Persian Gulf-
Red Sea-East African region and encourage a
more pro-Soviet or at least neutralist orientation
in local regimes.
- Reinforce the USSR's claim to play a major role
in any future Indian Ocean-Persian Gulf secu-
rity arrangements.
- Promote pro-Soviet antiregime movements over
the longer term in African countries adjoining
Ethiopia and in the Arabian Peninsula.
- Monitor and counter Western military activities
in the region.
- Improve and expand Soviet naval and naval avi-
ation capabilities in the region.
- Work over the long term toward a credible ca-
pability to threaten Western access to Persian
Gulf oil supplies.
- Protect lines of communication through the Suez
Canal between the eastern and western USSR.
19. Having been expelled from naval facilities in
Egypt and Somalia, the Soviets may be wary of mak-
ing a substantial economic commitment to develop-
ment of installations in an unstable area. Rather than
one or two large facilities, the Soviets probably would
prefer access to facilities in several more countries in
the Indian Ocean region-especially at critical loca-
tions from which they could monitor the activities of
US naval forces. They, of course, would like to estab-
lish a presence as close as possible to the US naval base
at Diego Garcia.
20. The ships of the Soviet Indian Ocean squadron
make occasional calls at Mozambique, the Seychelles,
and Mauritius. Moscow also has been providing
considerable assistance in the expansion of an airfield
in Madagascar. The USSR has made overtures to all of
these countries for increased naval access. The re-
quests so far have been rebuffed. If the Soviets were
able to establish a closer relationship with any of these
countries, but in particular the right to fly military
aircraft from them, they would gain greatly increased
reconnaissance coverage of the south central Indian
Ocean. From the Seychelles, Mauritius, and Madagas-
car, most Soviet maritime reconnaissance aircraft
would be well within range of Diego Garcia.
21. The Mengistu regime has granted the Soviets
access to certain air and naval facilities in return for
military backing. The naval installation on Dahlak
Island-which provides the Soviet Indian Ocean
squadron with logistic support, light repair, and
replenishment services-is the most important of
these. (See annex.) Together with Moscow's access to
Aden, its nearly unrestricted use of Dahlak Island and
use of the Ethiopian airfield in Asmara provide key
support for Soviet naval operations in the Indian
9
SECRET
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/07/08: CIA-RDP97SO0289R000200200008-8
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/07/08: CIA-RDP97SO0289R000200200008-8
Ocean. The Soviets also deploy two IL-38 maritime
reconnaissance aircraft to Asmara to supplement four
IL-38s they deploy to Aden. Access to these Ethiopian
facilities is not absolutely vital for Soviet naval com-
batants. The Indian Ocean squadron can, if necessary,
operate without access to shore facilities, although at
reduced levels of flexibility and effectiveness. Never-
theless, access to Ethiopia enhances Moscow's capabil-
ity to maintain augmented naval and air deployments
in the Indian Ocean area, particularly during a crisis.
22. Despite his dependence on Moscow, Mengistu
has been a less than pliable client. He has repeatedly
refused Moscow the major coastal naval base it seeks.
However, if events in the Horn should greatly increase
Mengistu's dependence on the Soviets, he would be
less able to resist Soviet blandishments and might agree
to greater Soviet access to facilities.
23. In the symbiotic relationship between Mengistu
and Moscow, the Soviets have supported Mengistu per-
sonally to maintain their influence while they attempt
to develop a broader base by encouraging the forma-
tion of a Marxist-Leninist party. After protracted
footdragging, in late 1979, Mengistu established a
committee to organize a party but staffed it largely
with his military supporters rather than civilian ele-
ments favored by Moscow. Nevertheless, we do not
expect either Mengistu or Moscow to abandon the
other during the period of this Estimate.
24. The Soviets-in coordination with their East
European and Cuban allies-pursue other activities
designed to strengthen ties with Ethiopia. Ethiopia's
friendship treaties with the USSR, East Germany,
Hungary, and Bulgaria reflect this effort as do the host
of economic, scientific, and cultural accords concluded
with Moscow and the East European states. In addi-
tion, East Germany plays a key role in advising the
Ethiopians on security and intelligence and, along with
Moscow, exercises influence over the Ethiopian media.
25. Cuban and Ethiopian foreign policy goals gen-
erally coincide, as evidenced by the overtures the two
countries-with likely Soviet encouragement-made
to the new regime in Liberia after the 1980 coup and
Ethiopia's offer of aid-via Cuba-to guerrilla forces
in El Salvador. Havana, however, remains sensitive to
the conflicting interests of its radical Arab friends, thus
contributing to Cuba's minimizing its support for
Mengistu's counterinsurgency campaigns. Iraq, for
example, which has the largest Cuban presence in the
Middle East, and provides significant hard currency
earnings to Havana, is a backer of the Eritrean insur-
gents and the Somalis.
26. Cuban troops in Ethiopia protect Soviet in-
terests, provide a strategic reserve in case of renewed
hostilities in the Ogaden, and serve as a psychological
deterrent to potential enemies of the regime. More-
over, Havana's commitment demonstrates solidarity
with a "fraternal" regime. Given the current passive
role of the Cuban troops in Ethiopia, as well as Ha-
vana's need for technically skilled military personnel
at home, a lowering of tensions in the Ogaden could
lead to a reduction of the size of the Cuban military
presence. But even in these circumstances, the basic
Ethiopian relationship with Havana would probably
remain intact.
27. Since coming to power in a coup in 1969, Presi-
dent Siad has ruled Somalia by placating the Army
and by keeping the many Somali clans and subclans
balanced. Basically, Siad's political strategy has
worked well: except for one narrowly based coup at-
tempt in 1978 following the withdrawal of the Somali
Army from the Ogaden, there have been no serious
challenges to his rule. Part of Siad's political strength is
a general Somali perception that, given persistent
interclan tensions, he is the only figure who can keep
the country together at present.
28. Serious internal problems and the deteriorating
military situation vis-a-vis Ethiopia led Siad to declare
a state of emergency in October 1980. At that time,
he downgraded the role of his ruling party and
reconstituted the junta of military officers that had
taken power with him in 1969. Siad's revival of the
junta-the Supreme Revolutionary Council (SRC)-
was an effort by him to dilute personal responsibility
for Somalia's growing problems.
29. The SRC is the only institution capable of limit-
ing Siad's authority. But the members of the SRC are
beholden to Siad and probably would try to overthrow
him only under critical circumstances, such as sharply
stepped up Ethiopian military pressure or his failure to
come to terms with economic deterioration.
30. Siad faces growing criticism of his policies and
growing pressure to introduce economic and political
reforms. Somalia is experiencing its worst economic
10
SECRET
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/07/08: CIA-RDP97SO0289R000200200008-8
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/07/08: CIA-RDP97SO0289R000200200008-8
crisis (including a severe food shortage) since 1969
-caused by the conflict with Ethiopia, government
mismanagement, the refugees from the Ogaden, and
drought followed by heavy flooding.
31. Siad has gambled that the access agreement and
association with the United States will provide him
with the support that he believes would help rebuild
the country's economic and military structures and
thus bolster his position. Some individuals in the mili-
tary are increasingly frustrated over the lack of visible
US support in the face of Somalia's problems. While
the possibility of plotting against Siad cannot be dis-
missed, there is no evidence that discontent has
reached this point. As long as Siad is able to show
benefits from his relations with the United States and
can cope with Somalia's myriad economic problems
and military pressure from Ethiopia, we believe he
will survive the coming year.
32. Moscow has threatened Siad and is seeking
openings to pressure him. Since Somalia abrogated its
Friendship Treaty with Moscow and expelled Soviet
advisers in 1977, Mogadishu has severely limited the
number of Soviet and East European diplomats in the
country. The Soviets, for example, are permitted only
four diplomatic representatives along with support
staff, all of whom are closely watched.
33. Leftist military and party members trained or
indoctrinated by the Soviets during the 1970s are re-
garded with suspicion by the Siad government and are
being phased out of positions of responsibility. While
some disaffected leftists may be plotting the overthrow
of the Siad regime, we doubt they would succeed
without the support of the Army, which remains un-
der Siad's control.
C. Djibouti
34. The Republic of Djibouti became independent
from France in 1977. The basic political dynamics of
the new nation are the strong tribal hostility between
the dominant Issas (ethnic Somalis) and the minority
Afars (linked to the Afar ethnic group of Ethiopia); the
inevitable interrelationship between Ethiopian-Somali
rivalry and the internal political balance; and the
heavy dependence on the French presence to keep
both neighbors at bay (see map). At present, internal
tribal hostilities are muted by the attention given to
economic development in Afar territory by President
Hassan Gouled Aptidon, who is an Issa. Gouled's
departure from the scene would precipitate instability,
since there is no constitutional mechanism for succes-
sion and there is no clear candidate to succeed him.
We believe, however, that he will remain in office
over the next year.
35. Gouled is anxious to see an end to tensions over
the Ogaden. The growing influx of refugees from
Ethiopia and Somalia is adding new strains to
Djibouti's narrowly based economy. Their numbers
have increased the population of Djibouti by some
40,000 and pushed the unemployment rate in the cap-
ital beyond 50 percent. In coming months Gouled
probably will try to mediate the Ethiopian-Somali
conflict, but apart from being considered an honest
broker, he has little influence with either Siad or
Mengistu.
36. France has a wide-ranging relationship with
Djibouti. The country is highly dependent on French
aid, which amounts to one-third of all French bilateral
aid to Africa. A force of about 4,600 French military
personnel will probably remain in Djibouti for the im-
mediate future, and France pays for most of Djibouti's
own somewhat smaller forces. French advisers are
prominent in the local armed forces and civilian advis-
ers work in most sectors of the government bureauc-
racy except the foreign ministry.
37. French policy is motivated primarily by the de-
sire to preserve a base of operation there for France's
naval forces in the Indian Ocean since no equivalent
facilities are available in the area. The Giscard govern-
ment was firmly committed to Djibouti and agreed to
continue its military presence through 1985. While the
attitude of the Mitterrand government toward Dji-
bouti is not fully clear, we believe that the French
military presence will continue for at least the next
year.
The Soviets would almost certainly prefer to see
the French leave Djibouti and may attempt indirectly
to exacerbate tensions within the country to encourage
the new French Government to withdraw-although
they are unlikely to challenge France openly.
D. Kenya
38. Since becoming independent in 1963, Kenya
has experienced political stability and economic
growth. President Daniel arap Moi peacefully suc-
ceeded Jomo Kenyatta in 1978 and, despite some ero-
11
SECRET
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/07/08: CIA-RDP97SO0289R000200200008-8
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/07/08: CIA-RDP97SO0289R000200200008-8
Tribes and Major Clans of the Somali Nation
i.,k
Zaire
Kenya
*NAIROBI
Ishaak Digil
Darod L Rahanwein
area
Somali Clans
Abgal Clan
Non-Somali Groups
Afar Other
0 400
Boundary representation is
not necessarily authoritative.
12
SECRET
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/07/08: CIA-RDP97SO0289R000200200008-8
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/07/08: CIA-RDP97SO0289R000200200008-8
sion of his position, will almost certainly remain in
power for at least the period of this Estimate. Never-
theless, Kenya now faces tougher economic conditions
caused primarily by high population growth, deterio-
rating terms of trade, rising food imports, and in-
creased military expenditures. But the economic situ-
ation is unlikely to affect decisively either Kenya's
internal or international orientation over the next year.
39. Kenya has had a defensive alliance with Ethi-
opia against Somalia since 1963. Despite the
radicalization of Addis Ababa's policies after 1974, the
joint Ethiopian-Kenyan opposition to Somali irreden-
tism has survived and has recently been reconfirmed.
We believe that the prospects for any meaningful rap-
prochement between Kenya and Somalia are not
bright because Siad is unlikely to renounce formally
Somalia's irredentist claims to northeastern Kenya.
Without continuing efforts by the United States and its
allies to ameliorate tensions, relations between the two
countries would deteriorate further.
40. Moi's intentions regarding the conflicts in the
Horn are ambiguous, although he is probably more
moderate than most of his advisers on the problem of
relations with Somalia. It seems unlikely that Moi
would take any major diplomatic initiative on regional
issues, but he would probably participate in any multi-
lateral effort to seek a reduction of tensions.
41. The Western-oriented government of President
Moi, like the Kenyatta regime that preceded it, has
maintained cool but correct relations with Moscow.
Kenyan leaders, traditionally moderate in outlook and
heavily invested in Kenya's capitalist-oriented econ-
omy, have resisted Soviet efforts to cultivate influence
in Kenya. Kenyan authorities, for example, carefully
monitor and limit Soviet presence in the country and
circumscribe Soviet contacts with students and labor
officials.
42. Over the years, Kenyan suspicions of the Soviets
have been fueled by Moscow's military ties to antago-
nistic regimes in neighboring Somalia, Uganda, and
Tanzania, by Soviet contacts with opposition figures in
the early years of independence, and by Soviet moves
in the international area. Moi and the Kenyan press,
for example, were outspoken in their criticism of the
Soviet invasion of Afghanistan and Moi was the first
African head of state to announce a boycott of the
Moscow Olympics.
43. The Soviets have sought, so far unsuccessfully,
to gain influence in Kenya, including an invitation to
Moi to visit Moscow this year. Moi may become
somewhat more susceptible to pressures toward
nonalignment as he assumes the OAU chairmanship in
June. From time to time, the Soviets probably have
encouraged the Ethiopians to intercede with Nairobi
on their behalf, but such efforts have not allayed
Kenyan suspicions of Soviet intentions in the region.
E. Sudan
44. President and Prime Minister Gaafar Mohamed
Nimeiri came to power by a military coup in 1969. He
has succeeded in building relatively effective political
institutions and in reconciling most of the former
politically active groups to the present regime. The
Sudan Communist Party remains in open opposition to
the government, but by itself does not constitute a ma-
jor threat. Nimeiri succeeded in 1972 in dealing with
Sudan's major separatist problem by negotiating the
end of the 17-year rebellion in the non-Muslim south,
although north-south tensions have recently increased
somewhat.
45. Sudan's short-term economic prospects are
bleak, and discontent over economic conditions is
widespread. Nevertheless, there appears to be no
coherent internal threat to the Nimeiri government.
Nimeiri's health has improved and he should remain
in power at least through the next year.
46. Overt aggression against Sudan is discouraged
by a 1976 defense pact with Egypt that would bring
Egyptian combat assistance should Sudanese security
be threatened. External meddling does, however, rep-
resent a threat to the Nimeiri regime. The government
is vulnerable to subversion by Libya, particularly
through involvement with unreconciled or opportunis-
tic tribal, political, and perhaps military leaders. Re-
cently, Qadhafi has actively tried to stimulate the op-
position to Nimeiri. Although Ethiopia in 1976 played
a limited role in a Libyan-sponsored coup attempt
against Nimeiri, Addis Ababa's relations with Sudan
are now good. We do not believe that there is much
chance of Ethiopian moves-alone or in concert with
Libya-against the Sudanese Government in the com-
ing year.
47. Relations between Sudan and the Soviet Union
have been poor since an abortive Communist-led coup
attempt in 1971, and have deteriorated further since
13
SECRET
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/07/08: CIA-RDP97SO0289R000200200008-8
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/07/08: CIA-RDP97S00289R000200200008-8
1977 when Nimeiri reduced the Soviets' diplomatic
presence and expelled their military assistance mis-
sion. Nimeiri is convinced Soviet policy aims at the
removal of Sadat and himself as steps toward dominat-
ing the region. Although the Soviets continue to try to
improve bilateral relations with Sudan in order to off-
set Nimieri's Western orientation, they will use their
links with the Sudanese Communist Party-and per-
haps ties with other Sudanese dissidents-to exploit
opportunities to undermine the Nimieri regime. The
Soviets, however, are skeptical of the current ability of
the Sudanese Communist Party to effect a change and
remember the damage done to bilateral ties by the
abortive Communist coup. No doubt they approve
Qadhafi's efforts to destabilize Sudan. Over the next
year Nimeiri will continue to rebuff Soviet efforts to
improve relations although he will seek to avoid a
complete rupture of diplomatic ties.
48. Of all the regional actors, Nimeiri's intentions
toward the various conflicts in the Horn are the clear-
est. He is committed to searching for peaceful settle-
ments to these conflicts, particularly the war in Eri-
trea. His objectives are: to neutralize the potential
military and subversive threat from Ethiopia; to re-
lieve instability along the Ethiopian border in order to
focus on the Libyan threat from Chad; to enable the
large number of Ethiopian refugees in Sudan to return
home; and, in the longer run, to facilitate the removal
of Soviet advisers and Cuban soldiers from Ethiopia.
Nimeiri has invested considerable political capital in
this campaign, and we believe he is likely to pursue
these efforts at least over the period of this Estimate.
chose independence, thwarting Siad's plans for union
of the young republic with Mogadishu.
The Ogaden
50. The origins of the Ogaden problem go back to
the last century:
- In the late 19th century, Ethiopia expanded into
the Somali-inhabited lowlands of the Ogaden,
which had rarely experienced Ethiopian
overlordship before that time.
- In 1897, the European powers principally in-
volved in the region-France, the UK, and
Italy-signed treaties accepting boundaries for
Ethiopia that approximate its present boundaries.
- Fascist Italy occupied the Ogaden from 1936 to
1941. The Allies returned it to Ethiopia after
World War II.
- Emperor Haile Selassie used his African prestige
to win OAU (Organization of African Unity) en-
dorsement of existing colonial boundaries in 1963
and to relegate Somalia to an odd-man-out
position in inter-African affairs.
51. The result is an Ethiopian-Somali boundary that
Somalia does not recognize. Mogadishu claims that the
1897 treaties violated treaties between the Europeans
and various Somali clans signed in the 1880s. In addi-
tion, the 1897 treaties' definitions of borders were
vague and contradictory and have never been
resolved.
A. The Somali Irredenta
49. Mogadishu seeks to unite all Somali-speaking
peoples under a single flag. Only about two-thirds of
these live in Somalia. The others are in the Ogaden
region of Ethiopia, in northeastern Kenya, and in Dji-
bouti. The Somalis fared poorly at the end of the 19th
century when European powers and Ethiopia negoti-
ated the approximate present-day national boundaries.
The Somalis continued to do poorly-losing out in the
post-World War II territorial settlements by the Allies;
again in 1963 when the UK, in the face of opposition
from the Kenyans and other Africans, abandoned a
plan to unite northeastern Kenya with Somalia; and
finally in 1977 when the French territory of Djibouti
52. Beginning in 1960, Somalia set out to wrest the
Ogaden from Ethiopian control. Over a period of two
decades, Mogadishu:
- Sponsored an insurgency in the Ogaden (1960-
64).
- Renewed the Ogaden insurgency from late 1975
until mid-1977.
- Invaded and occupied most of the Ogaden with
its regular army from July 1977 until March
1978, when it was defeated militarily and forced
to withdraw.
- Continued the insurgency after the 1978 with-
drawal of the regular army and reintroduced
regular army units in late 1979 which remained
until the end of 1980.
14
SECRET
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/07/08: CIA-RDP97S00289R000200200008-8
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/07/08: CIA-RDP97S00289R000200200008-8
53. The insurgent struggle for control of the
Ogaden is conducted primarily by the Western Somali
Liberation Front (WSLF). The Somali regime created
the WSLF in 1975 and exerts considerable control
over it by providing sanctuary, funds, equipment,
training, cadres, and, until recently, combat support
from regular army units.
54. Regular Somali army cadres remain with the
WSLF forces in the Ogaden. The army sends recon-
naissance elements into the area, and at least on two
occasions in February and June 1981 Somalia briefly
reintroduced small regular elements for tactical
purposes.
Estimated Personnel Strengths
in and Near the Ogaden
Ethiopia
Government Forces
100,000
SSF Guerrillas
2,000-2,500
Cuban Forces
6,000
Somalia
Government Forces
50,000
WSLF Guerrillas
20,000-30,000
55. Ethiopian military strength in the Ogaden will
continue to expand over the next year as trained man-
power increases and additional Soviet weapons systems
are integrated into the Army and Air Force. The
strength of the Ethiopian Army will increase in the
Ogaden by about 10,000 by late 1981. Ethiopia's supe-
rior ground and air assets give it the capability to con-
duct brigade-size ground incursions in any area im-
mediately inside the Somali border and large-scale air
strikes throughout Somalia.
56. The Somali armed forces are severely limited in
their ability to respond to Ethiopian attacks. The So-
mali Army has never recovered from losses sustained
during the 1977-78 Ogaden war and suffers from poor
mobility, weak air defense, and logistic shortfalls. The
Somali Air Force recently obtained MIG-19 jet fighter
aircraft from China, but inoperative radars and the
lack of trained pilots leave the balance of air power
heavily in Ethiopia's favor. Shortages of equipment
and supplies also limit Mogadishu's ability to supply
the WSLF.
57. The recent lull in Ogaden activity has made the
Somali Salvation Front (SSF)-composed of anti-Siad
dissidents-the immediate security threat. The SSF
mines roads, raids civilian or lightly defended military
targets, and undertakes minor terrorist acts in urban
areas. Somalia's security forces are capable of contain-
ing, but not preventing, SSF guerrilla raids launched
from Ethiopia. The SSF receives weapons, funding,
training, and combat support from Ethiopia and also
receives funds and materiel from Libya, South Yemen,
and Syria. The Soviets clearly approve this outside
assistance and there are indications they are directly
involved with the SSF.
58. Siad's intentions toward the Ogaden over the
coming year are uncertain. Assuming that the politi-
cally important clans continue to support the Ogadeni
cause (we have little current evidence on this point),
Siad will continue support to the guerrillas, but at a
level designed to avoid provoking serious Ethiopian
retaliation. Presumably, such support will also be dis-
creet to avoid antagonizing the United States.
59. At least until he has an assured external source
of military aid, Siad is unlikely to reintroduce
Somali regulars into the Ogaden in significant num-
bers. It is also possible that Siad would be prepared
to reduce tensions-probably based on a tacit
understanding-provided he would not be obliged to
renounce the Ogadeni cause. No matter what Siad
intends to do about the Ogaden, he will continue to
look to the United States for help in building up regu-
lar Somali military capabilities to meet the perceived
Ethiopian threat to Somalia.
60. For his part, Mengistu would probably welcome
a modus vivendi in the Ogaden, but he is not prepared
to negotiate a permanent settlement except on the ba-
sis of token autonomy. In the meantime, he will con-
centrate on consolidating Ethiopian control over the
Ogaden. To discourage Somali activity there, he
continues to apply pressure on Somalia through air at-
tacks and limited cross-border operations by Ethiopian
regulars, as well as by increasing support to the SSF.
61. Should Somali activity increase significantly,
Addis Ababa would probably resort to even stronger
action. This could involve more extensive penetrations
of the border areas, a full-scale invasion, an attempt to
oust Siad, or some combination of these options.
Kenya
62. The Somali claim to northeastern Kenya is a
continuing strain on relations between Nairobi and
Mogadishu. A number of unsuccessful efforts have
been made to ease tensions between the two countries.
15
SECRET
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/07/08: CIA-RDP97S00289R000200200008-8
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/07/08: CIA-RDP97S00289R000200200008-8
The Kenyans, recalling the 1963-67 insurgency in the
northeast that was backed by Mogadishu, fear re-
newed Somali meddling, pointing to the continued
existence of the insurgent organization's office in
Mogadishu. In turn, the Somalis charge that the
Kenyans support the Somali Salvation Front.
63. Despite occasional violence by Kenyan Somalis
against officials in the northeast, there is no active
insurgency. Siad recognizes the implications for his
relations with the United States of any significant at-
tempt to destabilize northeastern Kenya.
64. While it is unlikely that Somalia will renew the
insurgency during the period of this Estimate, were it
to do so, Kenyan security forces would be capable of
containing small-scale rebel activity. If Somali support
were extensive, however, Kenya's ability to resist
would be severely taxed.
Djibouti
65. Djibouti's vulnerability to major external and
internal threats makes it the most politically fragile of
the Horn states. Both Ethiopia and Somalia covet it:
the first because Djibouti's port and rail link to Addis
Ababa are significant for Ethiopian trade; the second
because Djibouti is one of the irredenta. But both
countries also accept Djibouti's independence-at least
for now-to keep the other out.
66. Djibouti's independence is underwritten by the
French forces stationed there, because the local armed
forces have little or no capability to stop an attack
from its neighbors. The French could hold the country
for a limited time against attack from either Ethiopia
or Somalia, but their presence is not designed to hold
out against a large-scale attacking force. If Ethiopia
should launch an offensive against Djibouti, the
French, without reinforcements, could hold out for
only a few days. French defense against a Somali at-
tack would be more successful.
67. Internal instability now is a more serious threat
to Djibouti than external dangers because Ethiopia
and Somalia are preoccupied elsewhere. A number of
actors-contending domestic elements, the Soviets and
Libyans-are maneuvering for influence. Although in-
ternal security is not the responsibility of the French,
they might well honor a request for help against
domestic unrest. But significant casualties at the hands
of terrorists or insurgents could cause the new
Mitterrand government to reevaluate its commitment
to Djibouti.
B. Northern Ethiopia (Eritrea and Tigray)
68. Over the years, Ethiopia has exercised greater
control over the area now known as Eritrea than was
ever the case with the Ogaden. This control, however,
was largely confined to the Christian highlands and
only occasionally reached the Muslim lowlands. Eri-
trea was basically a creation of the Italian colonial
administration (1889-1941). Italian-subsidized social
and economic development implanted a sense of
Eritrean superiority vis-a-vis a far less developed Ethi-
opia. Eritreans were further alienated by Ethiopia's
destruction of the Ethiopian-Eritrean Federation,
which lasted only 10 years (1952-1962), and the
incorporation of Eritrea into the Empire as a province.
69. Shortly after the demise of the Federation, an
Eritrean insurgency got under way that subse-
quently received substantial Arab aid. The major
insurgent organization in the 1960s was the Eritrean
Liberation Front (ELF), which is largely Muslim-
dominated and pro-Arab. After 1975, it lost ground
to a breakaway Christian-led and Marxist-Leninist
group-the Eritrean People's Liberation Front
(EPLF)-which is now the strongest of the Eritrean
movements. A third group-the Eritrean Liberation
Front/Popular Liberation Forces (ELF-PLF)-plays
a minor role on the political /diplomatic front. ( See
map.)
70. After the 1974 revolution the insurgency es-
calated, and by late 1977 the Eritreans had come close
to achieving independence. In 1978 the Ethiopians,
with Soviet arms and advice, regained most of the
insurgent-held towns, but another Ethiopian offensive
in 1979 failed, leaving most of the countryside in the
control of the insurgents.
71. Since 1979, there has been a lull in the fighting
while Sudanese President Nimeiri, despite his
longstanding support for the Eritreans, has explored
the possibility of a political settlement. So far,
Nimeiri's efforts to broker a unified insurgent posi-
tion for peace talks with Ethiopia have been
unsuccessful.
72. Despite Mengistu's cooperation with Nimeiri,
he seems unwilling at present to grant significant
concessions to the Eritreans and appears to be trying to
isolate them diplomatically in order to reduce their
16
SECRET
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/07/08: CIA-RDP97S00289R000200200008-8
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/07/08: CIA-RDP97SO0289R000200200008-8
Principal Insurgent Groups
Sudan
Tana
Ha yk'
p P L F Tigray
jGonder
Gojam\;N~OO n-
Welega ADDIS Shewa
ABABA
.
~. t
Ilubabor Arsi
ELF Eritrean Liberation Front
EPLF Eritrean People's Liberation
Front
TPLF Tigrean People's Liberation
Front
WSLF Western Somali Liberation
Front
* SANAA
South
\ Yemen
4
v
?N,EL F
pjibout$ `6
Kefa
"-,--~ F
'Y', I \\ Sale
_ t h Gofa I
Uganda
Welo
l
Sidar tno \
\ 1c
Kenya
17
SECRET
Somalia
Indian
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/07/08: CIA-RDP97SO0289R000200200008-8
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/07/08: CIA-RDP97SO0289R000200200008-8
Estimated Personnel Strengths in Eritrea and Tigray
Ethiopian Armed Forces
110,000
Guerrilla Forces
40,000
ELF
10,000-12,000
EPLF
20,000-24,000
TPLF
6,000-8,000
sources of supply. Prospects for a settlement are bleak,
particularly given the strong opposition of the EPLF
to any solution other than independence.
73. Another insurgency in neighboring Tigray
Province is led by a six-year-old Marxist-Leninist
movement-the Tigrean People's Liberation Front
(TPLF). The TPLF receives limited Sudanese support.
It has ethnic and ideological ties with the EPLF and
cooperates militarily with it to the extent of holding
down Ethiopian forces and threatening their supply
lines to Eritrea.
74. The military capabilities of the Ethiopian forces
deployed in the north are expected to improve. An-
other infantry division, with about 10,000 personnel,
will probably arrive in the area later this year. If the
Ethiopians were to launch another major offensive
they probably would overrun many guerrilla positions
and would try to capture the remaining town held by
the EPLF-Nakfa.
75. The military value of successes of this nature is
questionable. While they would provide a psychologi-
cal boost to the Ethiopians, the basic military situation
in the north would probably remain much the same.
The rebels would probably retain control of large parts
of the Eritrean countryside, as well as the more in-
accessible areas of Tigray.
IV. NON-COMMUNIST EXTERNAL
INVOLVEMENT IN THE HORN
A. West Europeans
76. West European interest in the Horn stems pri-
marily from the region's geographic location. The
Horn lies adjacent to Western Europe's major sources
of oil and controls access to the Suez Canal and thus to
the Mediterranean. The West Europeans also have
significant trade and aid ties with all of the Horn
countries, primarily through the European Commu-
nity's Lome Convention system of trade and economic
assistance to former colonies.
77. There are bilateral political interests such as
France's relations with Djibouti. There has also been a
recent increase in French cooperation with Sudan
against the Libyan presence in Chad. In addition, Italy
has been a major supplier of military aid to Somalia. A
final example is the West German desire to aid Soma-
lia after the 1977 rescue of the hijacked Lufthansa jet
at Mogadishu.
78. In general, however, the West Europeans have
been cautious in dealing with Somalia. They are wary
of the impact of closer ties on their relations with other
African states because of Mogadishu's violation of the
OAU principle of the inviolability of African borders.
They realize that Ethiopia is the major regional state
and look toward the day when it may become dis-
enchanted with the Soviets.
79. West Europeans seek a reduction of Soviet in-
fluence in the Horn, and most believe their main asset
is influence based on economic, cultural, and political
ties. All of the principal West European states have
over the past year sought to defuse one or the other of
the conflicts in the Horn.
80. There is a close interrelationship between
events in the Horn of Africa and the Arab world. Su-
dan, Somalia, and Djibouti are members of the Arab
League. In recent years the policies of the principal
Arab actors in the Horn of Africa-Egypt, Saudi Ara-
bia, Libya, Iraq, and South Yemen-have reflected to
a large extent the rift between the conservative Arab
states and their radical opponents.
81. Egyptian President Sadat sees the actions of the
radical states as part of a larger effort directed by the
Soviet Union to depose the Sudanese Government and
thereby isolate Egypt. The Saudis perceive the Soviet
presence in Ethiopia as part of an effort by Moscow to
encircle the Persian Gulf oilfields and fear that the
Mengistu regime will join with South Yemen against
them.
82. Although Egypt has given military aid to Soma-
lia (and in turn has received limited Somali support for
Sadat's Middle East policies), the Egyptians prefer to
avoid large-scale military involvement in the Horn. In
recent months, Cairo has tried to ease tensions with
Ethiopia, hoping to weaken Ethiopian reliance on
Moscow.
18
SECRET
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/07/08: CIA-RDP97SO0289R000200200008-8
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/07/08: CIA-RDP97SO0289R000200200008-8
83. Despite their opposition to the Mengistu regime
in Ethiopia, the Saudis are discouraged with the
Eritrean groups' lack of unity and have ended signifi-
cant aid to them. Saudi policy toward Somalia has
been ambivalent. Jidda has continued to give limited
economic aid to Mogadishu and has refused requests
for military aid because of Siad's public support for
Egypt and his refusal to stress Islamic values and
downplay his socialist ideology.
84. In general, the Egyptians and Saudis want the
United States to strengthen Somalia militarily and
politically to the point that it can withstand an Ethi-
opian invasion, but not to the point that it can cause
trouble that would result in a larger Soviet-Cuban
presence in the region.
85. Libyan activities in the region are motivated by
Qadhafi's desire to weaken the influence of the super-
powers, especially the United States, to undermine
Egypt's regional position and to gain converts to his
own politicized brand of Islam. Iraq also has long
sought the elimination of the superpower presence in
the Horn, but has been forced by the conflict with
Iran and the need for support by conservative Arab
states to moderate, at least temporarily, its criticism of
Western presence in the region. The Marxist regime in
South Yemen is committed to a policy of supporting
revolutionary forces in the region.
86. Qadhafi's ability to influence events in the
Horn has been limited. Libyan-backed efforts in 1975
and 1976 to depose the Nimeiri regime in Sudan
failed, although Qadhafi's continued support for
Sudanese dissidents remains a serious concern for
Khartoum. Despite Qadhafi's limited aid to the Ethi-
opian regime, and his cutoff of aid to the Eritreans,
Tripoli has failed to gain leverage in Addis Ababa.
Nevertheless, Libya sides with Ethiopia against Soma-
lia. Libya has given aid to Somali dissident organiza-
tions, and recently airlifted arms and supplies to the
SSF. The Libyans are apparently encouraging the SSF
to increase its activity within Somalia. Tripoli has also
attempted to weaken French influence in Djibouti by
providing the government with Soviet-made military
equipment. In addition, Libya is trying to influence
the Kenyan Government by bribing officials.
87. Iraq's need for Arab backing in the war with
Iran has led Baghdad to reduce its criticism of Somali
and Sudanese ties with the United States and support
for Egypt. Iraq probably will try to maintain some
influence in the region by providing economic assist-
ance to Somalia and Djibouti. Baghdad will also con-
tinue modest aid to the Eritrean rebels to bolster its
credentials as an advocate of Arab liberation move-
ments and to signal its displeasure with Soviet backing
of Ethiopia.
88. South Yemen regards Ethiopia as an important
socialist ally. Aden has provided Addis Ababa with
military personnel and assistance and has also pro-
vided training, funds, and political support to Somali
dissident groups.
C. Africans
89. African states outside the Horn generally have
had little interest in the region's disputes, preferring
to focus on issues they see as more pressing such as
minority rule in southern Africa. Limited African
involvement in Horn conflicts has largely been re-
stricted to OAU initiatives. In 1964, the OAU helped
arrange a cease-fire between Ethiopia and Somalia
following their first border war. In the mid-1970s the
organization appointed an eight-nation "Good Of-
fices" Committee, chaired by Nigeria, to suggest possi-
ble solutions. The Committee concluded in August
1980 that the dispute should be settled on the basis of
Ethiopian sovereignty over the Ogaden. Moreover, the
OAU has never recognized the Eritrean or Ogaden
liberation groups.
V. PROSPECTS AND IMPLICATIONS
90. Developments in the Horn will continue to be
influenced by the interaction of local conflicts and
superpower competition. Local rivalries will provide a
continuing opportunity for involvement by the USSR
and the United States and further involvement by ei-
ther one would tend to intensify fears on the part of
the other's ally and to strengthen the latter's depend-
ency on its own superpower supporter. Soviet military
assistance to Ethiopia will be an essential condition for
the Ethiopian regime to withstand internal separatism.
This assistance, by the same token, will be used by
Somalia as justification for demanding military help
from the West. But the possibility of superpower con-
frontation probably will lead the USSR to impose con-
straints on offensive Ethiopian action against Somalia.
91. The situation in the Horn will probably develop
along the following lines over the next year or so. In
the Ethiopian-Somali conflict Ethiopia will concen-
19
SECRET
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/07/08: CIA-RDP97SO0289R000200200008-8
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/07/08: CIA-RDP97SO0289R000200200008-8
trate on extending its control throughout the country-
side in the Ogaden and along the ill-defined border.
Primarily by increased support to the SSF, Mengistu
will continue to apply pressure on Siad to reduce his
involvement in the Ogaden. Siad, however, will con-
tinue at least discreet support to the WSLF.
92. Depending on developments in Sudanese medi-
ation efforts, Mengistu may again give the signal for a
military offensive in Eritrea. But such an offensive
would not be militarily decisive and would not nec-
essarily end Sudanese and other efforts to mediate. In
neighboring Tigray, the prospects are for continued
fighting with virtually no possibility of settlement.
93. Although military coup attempts are always
possible-Siad is particularly vulnerable-we do not
believe any of the five regimes in the Horn are likely
to be overthrown in the course of this Estimate.
In Somalia, Sudan, or Kenya, the removal of the
present leader by natural causes or by lone assas-
sination would probably result in the succession
of a senior colleague with much the same pro-
Western outlook, and the effects on the overall
situation in the Horn would be limited.
In Djibouti, however, Gouled's departure would
raise greater uncertainties and might cause either
Ethiopia or Somalia to intervene militarily to
preempt the other.
Most unsettling, for the region, would be the re-
moval of Mengistu. Both the Eritreans and the
Somalis would react by stepping up their military
activities. Mengistu's removal would lead to a
contest among factions in the Ethiopian military
junta which could invite Soviet and Cuban in-
volvement. In the end, however, Ethiopia would.
continue to be run by a military regime heavily
dependent on the Soviets and Cubans.
94. While present US plans for defensive weapons
to Somalia have been criticized by both Addis Ababa
and Moscow, the provision of this kind of military
aid-or additional economic aid-would only margin-
ally increase the prospects for a higher level of fighting
on the Ethiopian-Somali border or for a serious nega-
tive reaction by other states in the region. However, a
US decision to provide Somalia with additional and
more advanced weapons, which were perceived by
Ethiopia as eroding its military advantage over Soma-
lia, would evoke a sharp reaction in Addis Ababa.
Ethiopia might then decide to escalate military pres-
sure on Somalia.
95. Somalia is anxious that US support be highly
visible and has offered greatly increased access. Even
with the currently projected level of US military
presence in Somalia, terrorist action against Ameri-
cans is possible. If increased numbers of US military
personnel-particularly combat forces-were in-
troduced, especially if coincident with stepped-up
insurgent activity in the Ogaden, the likelihood of ter-
rorist actions against Americans would increase
significantly.
96. Should the United States significantly step up its
military aid to Somalia, this would bring into question
the US use of military facilities in Kenya. Nairobi
would demand additional military aid, and might
react by threatening to reconsider the US access agree-
ment. If more US military aid to Somalia leads to in-
creased fighting in the Ogaden, the spillover effects
could weaken the Djibouti regime and might cause it
to reevaluate US military access there.
97. The Ethiopian Government has accused the
United States of supporting opposition elements and
fears our support to the insurgencies. Evidence of al-
most any degree of US support to the insurgents would
have serious consequences. The Ethiopians would al-
most certainly intensify military operations, leading to
greater dependence on Moscow and Havana. In addi-
tion, Nimeiri, Moi, and Gouled would react negatively
to such a US move.
98. The Soviet attitude toward continued local con-
flict in the Horn is ambivalent. Overall, the Soviets
would probably prefer:
- A political settlement of the Eritrean and
Ogaden problems if the Soviet position in Ethi-
opia were not jeopardized and they could suc-
cessfully portray themselves as peacemakers.
- Failing this, a manageable level of political ten-
sion and guerrilla fighting that would perpetuate
Ethiopian dependence on Soviet military assist-
ance, but would avoid a confrontation with the
United States.
- Continued diplomatic tension between Somalia
and Kenya which would complicate US relations
with both.
99. Soviet policy in the Horn will continue to focus
on Ethiopia as a key point from which to support its
20
SECRET
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/07/08: CIA-RDP97SO0289R000200200008-8
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/07/08: CIA-RDP97SO0289R000200200008-8
Military Balance in the Horn of Africa
(Estimated Personnel Strengths and Major Equipment)
Ethiopia
Somalia
Kenya
Army
Personnel
240,000
50,000
12,000
3,100
54,000
Tanks
850
140
38
33
260
APCs
600
290
52
-
170
Armored Cars
195
25
22
11
270
Field Artillery
970
340
30
15
160
Air Defense Artillery
475
285
-
8
90
SAM Battalions
7
10
-
Navy
Personnel
1,500
2,800
650
600
Missile Attack Boats
4
2
-
Patrol Boats
13
13
7
Air Force
Personnel
3,500
1,000
2,600
900
3,000
jet Fighters
135
46
24
18
31
Helicopters
50
-
26
5
25
Transports
30
13
12
5
10
a All forces shown in Djibouti are French. The embryonic Djiboutian Army has about 2,400 men and is equipped with some 20 armored
vehicles.
Ethiopia Somalia Djibouti Kenya Sudan
Population in Millions (mid-1980) 29.8 4.0 .25 15.9 18.3
Gross National Product
(current prices, in million US $)
broader goals in the region. The Soviets will continue
to favor the creation of a civilian government and a
Marxist-Leninist party to help ensure their long-term
influence within Ethiopia. However, Moscow will not
bring extensive pressure to bear on this issue, recogniz-
ing Ethiopian sensitivities and realizing that more
important Soviet leverage for the future lies in other
fields, particularly military assistance. Similarly, the
Soviets will seek greater access to Ethiopian military
facilities, but will not press Addis Ababa severely as
long as they have access to Aden.
100. The Soviet presence in Ethiopia is intended to
support Moscow's broader aspirations in the Horn and
in the Indian Ocean and Persian Gulf. The Soviets
hope that at least one strongly pro-Soviet regime in the
Horn will encourage more pro-Soviet, or at least neu-
tralist, attitudes on the part of other regional states,
particularly those that have close relations with the
United States. Over the long term, Moscow intends
such a development to weaken Western influence in
the Indian Ocean, particularly if Moscow can also pro-
mote the growth of pro-Soviet antiregime movements
in the African states adjoining the Horn, and in the
Gulf and Indian Ocean island states. Greater influence
over, or relations with, the governments of the region
will enable Moscow to reinforce its claim to a major
role in Indian Ocean-Persian Gulf security arrange-
ments and over the long term work toward a credible
capability to threaten Western access to Gulf oil
supplies.
101. The Soviet position in Ethiopia also offers Mos-
cow a position from which to monitor and counter
Western military activity in the area and to improve
and expand Soviet naval and naval aviation capabili-
ties. Ethiopia and South Yemen would become more
valuable if the Soviet involvement there could be
supplemented by a greater presence in one or more of
the Indian Ocean island states Moscow seems to be
21
SECRET
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/07/08: CIA-RDP97SO0289R000200200008-8
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/07/08: CIA-RDP97SO0289R000200200008-8
aiming for and if the Soviets are successful in under-
mining local support for any expansion of Western
military facilities in the region.
102. The Soviets will also react to US moves in the
area. A primary Soviet goal is to prevent the United
States from exercising military access rights in the re-
gion and to undermine the evolving US relationships
with Somalia, Kenya, and Djibouti. Among these, the
Soviets perceive Somalia as the most vulnerable to out-
side pressures.
103. US military aid to Somalia-and for that mat-
ter Kenya-has been used by Moscow as evidence that
the United States is increasing tension in the region. At
the same time, the Soviets continue to play on Addis
Ababa's fears of a US-backed Somalia to improve their
political and strategic position in Ethiopia. The Soviets
will continue to support Ethiopian efforts to put mili-
tary pressure on the Siad regime and would probably
encourage greater efforts if the United States ex-
panded its military access and aid to Somalia. We
doubt, however, that they would encourage or ap-
prove an all-out invasion of Somalia by Ethiopia for
fear that it would lead to the stationing of US combat
forces in Somalia or even to a US-Soviet confrontation.
22
SECRET
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/07/08: CIA-RDP97SO0289R000200200008-8
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/07/08: CIA-RDP97SO0289R000200200008-8
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/07/08: CIA-RDP97SO0289R000200200008-8
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/07/08: CIA-RDP97SO0289R000200200008-8
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/07/08: CIA-RDP97SO0289R000200200008-8
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/07/08: CIA-RDP97S00289R000200200008-8
1. This document was disseminated by the National Foreign Assessment Center. This copy
is for the information and use of the recipient and of persons under his or her jurisdiction on a
need-to-know basis. Additional essential dissemination may be authorized by the following
officials within their respective departments:
a. Director of Intelligence and Research, for the Department of State
b. Director, Defense Intelligence Agency, for the Office of the Secretary of Defense
and the organization of the Joint Chiefs of Staff
c. Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, for the Department of the Army
d. Director of Naval Intelligence, for the Department of the Navy
e. Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, for the Department of the Air Force
f. Director of Intelligence, for Headquarters, Marine Corps
g. Deputy Assistant Secretary for International Intelligence Analysis, for the Depart-
ment of Energy
h. Assistant Director, FBI, for the Federal Bureau of Investigation
i. Director of NSA, for the National Security Agency
j. Special Assistant to the Secretary for National Security, for the Department of the
Treasury
k. The Deputy Director for National Foreign Assessment for any other Department or
Agency
2. This document may be retained, or destroyed by burning in accordance with applicable
security regulations, or returned to the National Foreign Assessment Center.
3. When this document is disseminated overseas, the overseas recipients may retain it for a
period not in excess of one year. At the end of this period, the document should be destroyed
or returned to the forwarding agency, or permission should be requested of the forwarding
agency to retain it in accordance with IAC-D-69/2, 22 June 1953.
4. The title of this document when used separately from the text is Unclassified.
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/07/08: CIA-RDP97S00289R000200200008-8
 Secret Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/07/08: CIA-RDP97SO0289R000200200008-8
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/07/08: CIA-RDP97SO0289R000200200008-8