ZAMBIA: KAUNDA'S POLITICAL PROSPECTS

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP97S00289R000200200003-3
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 22
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: July 8, 2011
• Sequence Number: 3
• Publication Date: February 1, 1981
• Content Type: REPORT

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Director of Seciet
Central
Intelligence
Zambia: Kaunda's
Political Prospects
Interagency Intelligence Memorandum
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ZAMBIA: KAUNDA'S
POLITICAL PROSPECTS
Information as of 10 February 1981 was
used in the preparation of this Memorandum.
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KEY JUDGMENTS
The outlook for Zambia over the next two or three years is for
continued political decay. President Kenneth Kaunda's political grip is
slipping, and he seems incapable of ameliorating the problems that have
given rise to mounting domestic dissatisfaction with his regime:
- Zambia's economy is stagnant, inflation and unemployment are
high, and the population suffers periodic shortages of even basic
commodities.
- Amid widespread corruption, wealth and power are increas-
ingly concentrated within a narrow urban elite despite socialist
policies intended to create an egalitarian society.
- Throughout Zambian society, economic distress has aggravated
tribal and regional rivalries.
- Although there is no organized political opposition, labor leaders
as well as many members of the middle class and the educated
younger generation are fed up with Kaunda's economic policies
and the mismanagement they have spawned.
- Within the armed forces, low pay and poor housing have fueled
discontent among the lower ranks, while senior officers, disgrun-
tled about Zambia's military weakness, chafe at political
interference.
Kaunda's room for maneuver is severely limited by Zambia's suscep-
tibility to outside economic forces and by the delicately balanced politi-
cal system he has developed over the years.
On balance, however, we believe there is at least an even chance
that Kaunda will remain in office for the next year, and he may even
retain sufficient strength to win the national election scheduled for
1983. His most formidable challenge would come if elements in the
military were to join with civilian opponents of the regime in a well-
organized attempt to remove him from power. The most likely can-
didates to lead such a move would be influential members of the large
Note: This Memorandum was prepared under the auspices of the National Intelligence Officer for
Africa with contributions from the Bureau of Intelligence and Research of the Department of State, the
Defense Intelligence Agency, and the Central Intelligence Agency. It has been coordinated with Intelligence
Community representatives at the working level.
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and aggressive Bemba tribe, especially middle-level military officers
and the leaders of organized labor, business, and the professions.
Kaunda continues to depend on Western economic assistance and
wants to promote peaceful solutions to southern Africa's problems, espe-
cially the Namibian situation. But as his position erodes he is likely to
respond in ways that strain these relations. He probably will not resort
to brutal repression to fend off his adversaries, but his rule is apt to
become more authoritarian and arbitrary. Although we do not believe
he will break with the West, in periods of stress he will be tempted as in
the past to make the United States and the West scapegoats for his
problems, especially those relating to the economy and the South Af-
rican threat. He will also broaden his still-tentative relations with the
Soviet Union and its allies to shore up his military, security services, and
party structure.
Although Zambia probably has not abandoned its policy of diversi-
fying the acquisition of arms and training for its armed forces, the 1979
arms agreement with the Soviets is part of an expanding military rela-
tionship with Moscow. The new Soviet weaponry and accompanying
military advisers and technicians, however, will not appreciably in-
crease Zambian capabilities. The Soviet involvement, moreover, may
aggravate the threat from South Africa, which could exert considerable
economic and military pressure on Zambia if Pretoria perceived its
interests seriously jeopardized by an abrupt shift toward the Soviets.
If within the next year or two Kaunda were unexpectedly removed
from the scene by natural causes, he would most likely be succeeded by
one of his proteges in the ruling party. In this case Zambia's domestic
and foreign policies would be unlikely to change appreciably. Political
deterioration would quicken, however, increasing the temptation for
members of the younger political generation to make a bid for power.
A successful civilian or military coup could unleash repressed
popular demands that would make the country extremely difficult to
rule. A government led by Kaunda's civilian critics would encourage
private enterprise and Western assistance, but it probably would be
unstable and crippled by infighting. It would inherit serious socio-
economic problems. A regime in which the military predominated
would encounter similar difficulties. Although it might attempt to im-
pose order through repression, military discipline would erode further
as the armed forces assumed unaccustomed political burdens. Policy
under military rule would be less predictable than under civilian rule.
Moreover, fresh coup attempts might arise from unexpected quarters,
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such as junior officers or enlisted men. Prolonged instability could
encourage the emergence of radical elements.
No matter what its political coloration, a post-Kaunda government
would continue exporting key minerals to the West, but serious internal
disorder would jeopardize mining operations and transportation routes.
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DISCUSSION
The Kaunda Regime
1. Kenneth David Kaunda has been the dominant
figure in Zambia since before independence in 1964.
The principal architect of the political system, he re-
mains the key decisionmaker, arbiter, and manipu-
lator of Zambian affairs. Despite growing economic
and political discontent, many Zambians still consider
Kaunda indispensable for continued stability and
unity. (See biographic sketch in figure 1.)
2. An emotional, moralistic man of modest educa-
tion but keen intelligence, the President governs by
balancing power and positions among competing tribal
and regional interests. Over the years, this policy has
reduced the influence of the Bemba, Zambia's largest
ethnic grouping. (See map of ethnic distribution, fig-
ure 2.) Kaunda's lack of a strong tribal indentification
Kenneth Kaunda led Zambia to independence in 1964. Since then
he has been the primary unifying factor in the country's highly
tribalized society.
The son of an African Church of Scotland missionary and teacher,
Kenneth David Kaunda was born on 28 April 1924 in Lubwa,
Zambia. His parents came from Malawi and were members of the
Tonga ethnic group, but the young Kaunda grew up among the
Bemba people of Zambia's Northern Province. (He is one of the
few Africans in Zambia who consider themselves Zambian rather
than members of an ethnic group.) After receiving the equivalent
of a seventh-grade education, and then qualifying as a teacher, he
taught for several years at the Lubwa mission school, in the
Copperbelt, and in Tanzania.
Kaunda became active in politics in 1949 when he joined various
black nationalist groups lobbying for Zambian independence. At
one point his political activities led to imprisonment for nine
months. Upon release in 1960, he was elected President of the
newly formed United National Independence Party (UNIP).
During the early 1960s he compaigned in Zambia's mining towns
by playing the guitar and singing freedom songs he composed; he
still plays and sings for his countrymen. Although long Zambia's
ruling party, the UNIP in 1973 was declared the sole political
party, creating what Kaunda described as a "one-party
participatory democracy" in Zambia.
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has always been one of his main assets, enabling him to
stand above ethnic rivalries while using them to focus
power toward himself. Moreover, he has gradually
eliminated his chief rivals-who generally represented
important tribal interests-by banning opposition par-
ties and instituting a one-party state.
3. Kaunda's durability owes much to his personal
style, which combines compromise with coercion. He
prefers to exercise his considerable persuasive powers
to achieve consensus, but he reserves for himself the
final decision on major policy questions. A wide range
of criticism in the Parliament and the press is tolerated
so long as the President himself is not directly chal-
lenged. Since Kaunda is acutely sensitive to criticism,
however, anyone suspected of disloyalty becomes sub-
ject to public verbal abuse and the threat at least of
detention.
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JCLKCI
Figure 2
Language and Population
Distribution
irbuid+?
asama
Bemba
ak
11
JLeke Bangweulu
ZambYia~
Lenje /".anal
Tonga
r-11,
Choma
Lundaii~
Chewar
Linguistic Group
Percent of
Black Population
Percent of
Linguistic Group Black Population
Bemba Speakers
33.9
Lunda/Luvale Speakers
10.4
Bemba
18.5
Lala
3.1
Luvale
2.3
Ushi
2.2
Lunda
2.3
Lamba
2.2
Mbunda
1.4
Bisa
2.0
Luchazi
0.8
Ngumbo
1.0
Chokwe
0.6
Lunda
0.8
Ndembu
9.2
Swaka
0.8
Kabende
0.7
Lozi Speakers
9.2
Tabwa
0.7
Lozi
5.5
Chishinga
0.4
Nkoya
0.7
Unga
0.4
Kwandi
0.3
Lima
0.3
Koma
0.3
Bwile
0.3
Totela
0.2
Mukulu
0.2
Simaa
0.2
Shila
0.1
Subiya
0.1
Luano
0.1
Ndoundolu
0.1
Ambo
0.1
5 minor groups
1.1
0 Nyanja Speakers
17.1
Ngoni
6.4
Mambwe Speakers
5.1
Nsenga
5.1
Mambwe
5.1
Chewa
4.9
Nyamwanga
1.6
Kunda
0.5
Lungu
1.3
Chikunda
0.2
Iwa
0.4
Tonga Speakers
15.2
Tambo
0.2
Tonga
10.6
Lenje
1.9
Tumbuka Speakers
4.7
Ila
0.9
Tumbuka
3.8
Soli
0.8
Senga
0.8
Toka
0.3
Yombe
0.1
Sala
0.3
Leya
0.2
Other languages
4.4
Gowa
0.2
Kaonde
2.9
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4. Kaunda espouses "Zambian humanism," a fuzzy
philosophy that stresses the dignity of ordinary people
and the need to subordinate tribal and class interests to
a common Zambian identity. An eclectic blend of tra-
ditional African values, Christian principles, and uto-
pian socialism, it exhorts Zambians to develop a system
that is "man centered" and "nonexploitative." Hu-
manism's ambiguity has allowed Kaunda to use the
philosophy to attack or placate critics on both the left
and the right. He also has used it to justify the govern-
ment's acquisition of a controlling interest in major
economic institutions so that, ideally, wealth and op-
portunity can be shared by all.
5. In fact, wealth and opportunity are concentrated
within a narrow stratum of urban Zambians drawn
chiefly from the top ranks of the party, government,
and military and from the business and professional
communities. The system that Kaunda has fashioned
for balancing rival interests operates largely within this
stratum, extending patronage relationships throughout
the upper reaches of Zambia's society and institutions.
6. Even the single party, which constitutionally is
supposed to be the supreme ruling body, falls within
the embrace of this patronage network. The United
National Independence Party (UNIP) is run by a 25-
member Central Committee, which in turn is con-
trolled by Kaunda and a handful of cronies who have
been close to him for 20 years or more. Among them
are Secretary of State for Defense and Security Grey
Zulu, an Ngoni from the east; Reuben Kamanga, a
Chewa, also from the east; and UNIP Secretary Gen-
eral Mainza Chona, a Tonga from the south. Preoccu-
pied by their mutual distrust and comfortable with
their long-held power, they have allowed the party to
atrophy.
7. Never the mass party that Kaunda envisioned
during the headier days of the struggle for independ-
ence, UNIP has lost considerable popular support dur-
ing recent years. Local membership seems to be
contingent upon the spoils-increasingly scarce-that
party wardheelers in a particular area can deliver.
Less than 5 percent of the population is now active in
the party. UNIP's women's brigade and youth league
are moribund, and the party has little following among
students, businessmen, and professionals.
8. Like the party, the parliament seldom functions
as conceived but rather serves largely as an instrument
for Kaunda's rule. The 125-seat National Assembly has
little power; most of its members live in Lusaka and
have only tenuous links with their constituencies. But
its members are often extremely outspoken in criticiz-
ing the government and party during normal par-
liamentary debate. Such speeches usually get heavy
play in the press and sometimes stimulate a corrective
response from the leadership. Kaunda tacitly encour-
ages the venting of frustrations in the parliamentary
arena because it provides an outlet for dissent that he
can control. Potentially divisive issues are usually dis-
cussed in informal, closed sessions. If the assembly
seems on the verge of taking a position embarrassing to
the government, as has happened with increasing fre-
quency in recent years, Kaunda ordinarily will inter-
vene, though usually at the last minute.
9. Unlike many other African leaders, Kaunda has
not relied on the military to keep himself in power.
But under the pressures of the Rhodesian war the se-
curity forces assumed greater importance on the politi-
cal scene. Although the security forces have been ba-
sically apolitical, their leaders owe their positions to
Kaunda and his cronies.
11. The 12,000-man Zambian National Police is ca-
pable of quelling minor disturbances of short duration
but probably could not contend with widespread un-
rest. Popular dissatisfaction with the performance of
the. police has been growing in the last several years,
stemming from a steadily rising crime rate, incidents
of indiscipline, and corruption by police officials.
12. The Zambian National Defense Force (ZNDF)
is an organization whose quality of training and lead-
ership are low even in the African context. Made up of
a 13,000-man Army, a 1,500-man Air Force, and a
5,000-man civic action militia, it has little prestige;
morale is low and discipline poor. Military coup plot-
ting has been inhibited by the realization that there
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are numerous informants in the ranks and by Kaunda's
manipulation of tribal membership among officers
and enlisted men.
13. The ZNDF's inability to control guerrillas op-
erating from Zambian territory against Angola and
Zaire has complicated relations with neighboring gov-
ernments. More seriously, Zambia's military weakness
has ill served Kaunda's commitment to ending white
rule in southern Africa. His support for insurgents
of the South-West Africa People's Organization
(SWAPO) fighting for control of Namibia has at-
tracted numerous South African attacks against guer-
rilla camps in southwestern Zambia, where the South
Africans operate from time to time with virtual impu-
nity. Kaunda's active involvement in the Rhodesian
struggle on the side of Joshua Nkomo's guerrillas left
Zambia open to cross-border strikes, some of which
destroyed economic targets and laid bare the country's
extreme vulnerability to disruption of its supply lines.
Challenges and Responses
14. Economic. Economic problems are at the root
of Zambia's political difficulties. During the Rhode-
sian war many Zambians complained that the eco-
nomic and social costs of Kaunda's commitment to the
guerrillas were too high, but most grudgingly accepted
the sacrifice because they expected rapid improve-
ment of their living standards once the war was over.
Now that white-run Rhodesia has become black-ruled
Zimbabwe, however, the long anticipated "peace divi-
dend" has not materialized. Instead, the settlement in
Zimbabwe has drawn into sharper focus the worsening
state of Zambia's economy while removing the main
excuse for the government's inability to improve the
situation.
15. The mining sector predominates in Zambia's
economy, overshadowing agriculture not only in
producing revenues but in shaping the general struc-
ture of the economy and society. About 40 percent of
the people live in cities and towns, almost all of them
concentrated in a narrow corridor that follows the rail
line running south from the mining centers in the
Copperbelt through Lusaka to the border at Living-
stone. (See foldout map, figure 3.) Most economic and
social development has been restricted to this "line-of-
rail" zone.
16. The economy is hostage to fluctuations in world
prices for copper and cobalt, which account for 95
percent of total exports and nearly half of government
revenue. Soft demand for these minerals, in combina-
tion with steadily rising import prices, has tended to
keep Zambia's current account chronically in deficit,
leading by the end of 1979 to accumulated debts of
nearly $1.8 billion to international organizations, for-
eign governments, and banks. (See table 1.)
17. An important element in the economic deterio-
ration has been rising energy costs. Nearly $104 mil-
lion was spent on oil in 1979, more than 13 percent of
total imports, and 1980's oil bill will be even larger, an
estimated $170 million. Lusaka hopes eventually to
convert the mines and the railroads-the main
consumers of imported oil-to hydroelectricity. But a
conversion effort will be long and costly, and these
sectors will have to continue using oil as their primary
fuel at least through the 1980s.
18. Transportation bottlenecks have also been an
economic stumblingblock. Routes through Angola and
Zaire are now generally closed, forcing most traffic to
go via Tanzania (50 percent) and via Zimbabwe to
South Africa (41 percent). Transportation problems
1975
1976
1977
1978
1979
1980a
Exports, f.o.b.
803
1,029
897
815
1,444
1,510
Imports, f.o.b.
947
668
683
610
756
1,100
Trade balance
-144
361
214
205
688
410
Net services and transfers b
-581
-493
-446
-469
-533
-810
Balance
-725
-132
-232
-264
155
-400
a Estimated.
b Mainly transportation and insurance costs.
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have contributed to shortages of essential imports-
food in particular-and to backups of copper exports.
Substantial improvement in the dependability and ca-
pability of the transportation system will require time,
heavy foreign assistance, and the cooperation of neigh-
boring states.
19. Food shortages have also been a persistent prob-
lem. Although the government has repeatedly called
for expanding agricultural output, the gap between
domestic demand and supply continues to widen. De-
mand for maize, the main staple, runs about 720,000
metric tons annually, but output fell from 693,000 tons
in 1977 to only 337,000 tons in 1979. Production in
1980 once again fell far short of demand. Zambia has
had to import maize from South Africa and elsewhere
to cover these deficits. Although poor weather periodi-
cally affects production, government policies have had
a greater impact on output. To keep urban food prices
down, the government purchasing board pays low
prices to farmers, leaving them little or no incentive to
expand production.
20. The Zambian economy at independence was
dominated by foreign-owned firms, but since 1968
Kaunda has extended state control of all sectors except
agriculture and construction. The government now
owns the large enterprises and conducts their business
through so-called "parastatals" that were formed
when private firms in such areas as mining, manufac-
turing, and commerce were nationalized. Over half
the gross domestic product (GDP) originates in the
"parastatals," which employ 37 percent of the labor
force in the modern sector. Plagued by inept manage-
ment, political interference, chronic shortages of for-
eign exchange, and poor pricing policies, their substan-
tial deficits have had to be covered by the national
budget.
21. The cumulative impact of these problems has
been devastating. Since 1975 real GDP has declined by
about 1 percent annually. Figures for 1980 are ex-
pected to show 20-percent inflation, and about one-
third of the labor force in the modern sector is un-
employed. Per capita GDP in Zambia is higher than
for Africa as a whole, but poor economic performance,
combined with a 3-percent annual population growth
rate, has left the Zambian economy worse off now
than at the time of independence. (See economic in-
dicators in figure 4.)
22. There is little hope for an early reversal of the
economic deterioration. Copper is generally expected
to be in surplus on the world market in 1981. This,
combined with the slow recovery from the current
worldwide recession, will keep copper demands low
and prices depressed. The outlook for copper beyond
1981 is somewhat brighter, but not enough to solve
Zambia's economic problems.
23. In 1980, virtually unchecked import spending
nearly exhausted foreign reserves, and foreign pay-
ment arrears soared to $600 million. Import restric-
tions imposed in 1978 as part of an International
Monetary Fund agreement were allowed to lapse. At
the same time, shortages of investment in capital
equipment have been a drag on overall growth and an
impediment to refurbishing the mines. In an effort to
keep costs down, Kaunda has directed that imports be
purchased from the cheapest and closest sources, even
if it means increasing reliance upon South Africa.
24. The government has taken limited steps to im-
prove the performance of "parastatals." Corporate
planning, new accounting procedures, and cost reduc-
tion measures have been introduced, and some price
controls have been adjusted to make them more ra-
tional. Kaunda, however, will resist drastic changes in
his approach to the public sector. Not only is he ideo-
logically wedded to state control of major enterprises,
but imposition of harsh remedies within the
"parastatals" would undermine his political support.
Jobs and contracts with them are important plums
with which the President and his inner circle reward
loyalists and co-opt potential opponents. Kaunda can
ill afford to strike deeply at the system of middle-class
welfare that sustains him politically, so he is more
likely to scold and exhort than undertake bold action.
25. Kaunda is reluctant to address the real causes of
the food problem because sharp increases in agricul-
tural prices and a significant diversion of resources to
the countryside would cut severely into his support in
the urban areas. The rural areas wield little influence,
so perennial announcements of new agricultural pro-
grams have led to little substantive action. Neverthe-
less, in response to IMF pressures, prices have been
raised 30 to 50 percent for maize, and the 1981 budget
proposes to cut food subsidies 40 percent. These meas-
ures, which involve considerable political risk, would
not solve Zambia's food problem. The President also
has been promoting Operation Food Production, a
vague plan that involves beefing up state farms and
organizing cooperatives. Greater government interven-
tion would subject agriculture to the same inefficien-
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Figure 4
Real Growth of Gross Domestic Product Inflation
Percent Percent
8
Li
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cies and mismanagement that Zambian socialism has
imposed on the industrial and commercial sectors.
26. If Zambia is to stand any chance of stabilizing
its economy, it must reach an agreement on an ex-
tended fund facility with the IMF. The financial dis-
cipline and ensuing credits provided under this three-
year agreement would somewhat strengthen Zambia's
poor credit rating and prevent cutoffs of essential im-
ports. While the 1981 budget responds in part to the
austerity measures that the IMF requires, negotiations
on this agreement will be difficult.
27. Social. Notwithstanding Kaunda's egalitarian
principles, he has failed to narrow the gap between the
rich and the poor. In fact, his policies have fostered a
privileged elite among bureaucrats and salaried work-
ers while neglecting subsistence farmers and the urban
poor.
28. In this environment, corruption pervades all
levels of the party, government, state-owned enter-
prises, and the civil service-except apparently the
presidency itself. Although corruption has been a fact
of life in Zambia for many years, it now appears to be
worse than ever.
29. Kaunda is aware of the extent of corruption but
he is loath to move against friends and trusted political
allies. He realizes that no senior official would submit
quietly to prosecution and that scrutiny of one would
reveal the involvement of others. Moreover, Kaunda
knows that a thorough housecleaning would ultimately
jeopardize his own position because he could hardly
escape responsibility for the actions of his closest asso-
ciates. Since the corruption is largely a product of the
system he has created, there is little prospect for
change while he remains in power.
30. Political. Opposition to Kaunda does not ap-
pear to be well organized, but dissatisfaction with his
regime is growing. The most articulate criticism
comes from the technocrats, bureaucrats, and West-
ern-oriented businessmen in their thirties and forties
eager for a share of power and better educated and
more sophisticated than the older generation that has
run the country since independence. Less concerned
than the older generation about liberation movements
and ideology and primarily interested in economic
development, they resent the restrictions of one-party
rule and the government's mishandling of the
economy.
31. Several members of this urban elite formerly
worked in the government or party. Recent "drop-
outs" include Kaunda's former principal foreign
policy adviser, Mark Chona, and the former Minister
of Agriculture, Alexander Chikwanda. Although nei-
ther has been critical of the President directly, both
grew upset because Kaunda no longer listened to their
advice. Their departures have isolated Kaunda more
than ever, making him even more dependent on loyal
but uncritical party stalwarts. Other highly qualified
technocrats still in the government are disillusioned
with the regime, but in a declining economy their
chances for lucrative outside employment are
shrinking.
32. Kaunda clearly recognizes the dropouts and the
rest of the nongovernmental urban elite as a potential
source of opposition. In the immediate aftermath of
the Liberian coup he lashed out at five of the ablest
members of this group, calling them "traitors" and
"enemies of the state." One of his main targets, Elias
Chipimo, then chairman of the Standard Bank and a
former Zambian High Commissioner in London, had
suggested that a multiparty political system would be
more amenable to peaceful political change than a
one-party state. For Kaunda, that was clearly beyond
the bounds of acceptable criticism. His accusations
were undoubtedly viewed as paranoid and heavy-
handed by the very professionals and former col-
leagues whose support the government needs in meet-
ing the problems ahead.
33. Chipimo and several other prominent Zambians
were arrested in October 1980 in connection with
what Kaunda described as a coup plot against his re-
gime. The plot supposedly also involved Zairian exiles
(ex-Katangan gendarmes) and a few dissident Zam-
bian military officers. The arrests and detentions made
in response to the alleged plot will deter further
antiregime activities for the time being, but restiveness
within the nongovernmental elite probably has been
heightened.
34. Another source of opposition to the Kaunda re-
gime is organized labor, which has long pressed its in-
terests with considerable success. The Zambian Con-
gress of Trade Unions (ZCTU) represents about
250,000 of the country's 400,000 wage earners and
could severely disrupt the economy. This is especially
true of the Mineworkers Union, whose members are
predominantly Bembas. Tensions between labor and
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the government reached serious proportions early in
1981 when striking mineworkers shut down operations
in the Copperbelt for several days and hardcore pick-
eters clashed with police. The mineworkers-ioined by
a few other unions-were protesting Kaunda's suspen-
sion of 17 labor leaders from the UNIP for opposing
the party's plan to assume additional authority at the
local level. Among those suspended was ZCTU Chair-
man Frederick Chiluba, an outspoken critic of the
government's policies and its corruption, inefficiency,
and mismanagement.
35. The immediate crisis has been eased by a face-
saving compromise, but future confrontations seem
inevitable. In view of Zambia's economic straits, the
government cannot afford to grant the generous wage
hikes-30 percent or more in some industries-that
union militants are demanding. Even more serious,
Chiluba and other labor leaders are expanding their
demands beyond bread-and-butter issues to the
broader political field. They not only want the right to
bargain collectively in both the private and public sec-
tors, but are now pressing for a role in setting national
economic priorities. Kaunda, who has carefully
guarded his prerogatives in the past, is unlikely to
grant such concessions.
36. Chiluba seems determined to promote far-
reaching changes and would like to see Kaunda re-
placed. He wants to temper Kaunda's socialist policies
by reducing the size of the public sector and relying
more heavily on private enterprise. Although Chiluba
has never publicly expressed political aspirations,
Kaunda and other party leaders view him as ambitious
and irresponsible. They are aware that, as a Bemba,
Chiluba is regarded by many Zambians as the heir to
dissident Bemba leader Simon Kapwepwe (formerly
Vice President), who died early in 1980.
37. Tribalism is a major potential source of unrest.
Kaunda tirelessly exhorts Zambians to put aside tribal
animosities and to think in terms of "One Zambia,
One Nation." But his system of tribal balancing has
institutionalized the very divisive forces he hopes to
overcome. Moreover, prospects are for an intensifica-
tion of ethnic competition as the economy deterio-
rates, inequalities worsen, and government spoils be-
come less available.
38. Sharpened tribal rivalries will probably take the
form of renewed Bemba assertiveness and counter-
actions by non-Bembas who fear Bemba domination.
Unhappiness among Bembas with the Kaunda regime
is longstanding. Although the death of Kapwepwe has
left them at least temporarily unable to organize effec-
tively for political action, disgruntled Bembas would
pose a serious challenge if they were to form an alli-
ance with other dissidents in the labor movement, the
urban elite, and the military.
39. Military. As in the rest of Zambian society, dis-
content within the military seems to be growing as
part of the general economic malaise. Disgruntlement
among junior officers and enlisted men is also rising
because of low pay, poor housing, and the belief that
much of the civilian and military hierarchy is corrupt
and inept. Tribal tensions may have been aggravated
by Kaunda's most recent shakeup of the military,
particularly by the arrest of the Air Force Com-
mander, a Bemba, in connection with the purported
coup plot. Finally, many officers feel deeply frus-
trated by the ZNDF's inability to defend against South
African incursions into southwestern Zambia, just as it
could not prevent humiliating cross-border strikes dur-
ing the Rhodesian war.
40. To offset Zambia's military weakness and sag-
ging morale in the armed forces, Kaunda in 1979 con-
cluded an arms deal with the Soviet Union that called
for deliveries of MIG-21 jet fighters, SA-3 antiaircraft
missile systems, radars, other equipment, and related
training. The value of this equipment, originally es-
timated at $100 million, now appears to be consider-
ably more. Much of the equipment has already ar-
rived. The Soviet Union is now the largest foreign
supplier of military materiel to Zambia. (See table 2.)
Additional advisers will be needed to meet the peak
demands of installing the new equipment and training
Zambians to use it. They will join the 50 to 100 Soviet
and perhaps some East German advisers and tech-
nicians who are already on the ground. As a result, the
military presence of the Soviets and their allies could
grow to several hundred.
41. Ironically, the Soviet arms deal has worked in
directions contrary to what Kaunda intended. Some
senior ZNDF officers, rather than being assuaged by
prospects for sophisticated new equipment, resent
what they regard as additional political interference in
military affairs. Already unhappy with Grey Zulu be-
cause of his role in pushing the arms deal, and his
access to the President, they complain that their ad-
vice to reject the Soviet offer was ignored. At lower
levels of the ZNDF, some troops grumble that acquir-
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Estimated Value of Military Assistance to Zambia
Agreements (A) and Deliveries (D)
1980
Total
(Prelimina
ry)
1954 to 1980
Total Communist
108.2
20.0 50
.4
187.0
258.8
297.8
Bulgaria
-
-
8.0
-
8.0
-
China
3.2
9.0 N
A
-
29.2
26.0
East Germany
-
- 15
.0
1.0
11.0
2.0
Romania
-
- 17
.0
2.0
15.0
2.0
USSR
105.0-
11.0 10
.4
184.0
166.8
239.0
Yugoslavia
-
NEGL
-
-
28.8
28.8
Total Non-Communist
14.7
0.3 33
.5
3.5
172.1
125.7
Belgium
-
-
-
-
0.2
0.2
Brazil
-
- 3
0.0
-
30.0
-
Canada
-
-
-
22.4
22.4
Egypt
-
-
-
0.5
0.5
Finland
0.7
0.3
-
1.0
0.6
France
-
-
-
NEGL
NEGI.
West Germany
-
-
-
9.2
7.7
India
12.0
-
-
12.0
-
Iraq
2.0
-
2.0
2.0
2.0
Israel
-
-
-
NA
NA
Italy
-
- 3
.5
1.5
47.8
45.3
Sweden
-
-
-
-
1.4
1.4
United Kingdom
-
-
45.6
45.6
NA = Not Available.
NEGL = Negligible.
ing Soviet equipment will divert resources that could
otherwise alleviate pay and housing problems.
42. Beyond this failure to combat flagging morale,
the new equipment is unlikely to raise Zambia's mili-
tary capabilities appreciably and may in fact cause
additional logistic problems by introducing novel
items to an already motley inventory. Even with
substantial Soviet Bloc assistance, a Zambian-run mis-
sile system and jet interceptor squadron are at least
two years away from implementation. Furthermore, if
Kaunda ordered these weapon systems deployed to the
region bordering Namibia, he would raise-not
lower-the threat of South African reaction.
43. Kaunda's gamble on Soviet arms has therefore
increased his liabilities without winning immediate
benefits. He may calculate, however, that, since West-
ern arms aid has been disappointing to him, Zambia
has no long-run choice but to look to the Soviets for
further military assistance. His gloomy outlook for the
region is shaped by more than the Namibian problem
and the threat from South Africa. He sees Zambia sur-
rounded by countries whose future stability is at best
uncertain and whose problems could easily spill across
the border.
44. It is far from certain that Zambia has aban-
doned its policy of diversifying its military bene-
factors-British, Chinese, Indian, and Yugoslav advis-
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ers are still in country. But the timing and scale of the
recent arms agreement suggest that Kaunda intends to
continue a substantial military relationship with Mos-
cow despite his longstanding distrust of the Soviets and
the economic strains that military modernization and
expansion will impose.
45. Foreign Relations. The Soviets evidently
hoped that the arms deal would give them substantial
leverage in Zambia, a country that seems to have be-
come more important to their quest for greater influ-
ence in southern Africa since their reverses in Zim-
babwe. But Kaunda has turned down several requests
to expand the Soviet diplomatic presence in Lusaka.
More importantly, he has not responded to Soviet arm
twisting on a number of international issues; for exam-
ple, Zambia voted against the USSR on the second UN
Afghanistan resolution in November 1980. Kaunda has
also refused a Soviet request for sole use of remote
airfields to train Zambian MIG-21 pilots.
46. Notwithstanding these disappointments, the
Soviets will seek further opportunities for increasing
their influence in Lusaka. Moscow aims to undermine
not only Western influence but also that of China. The
Soviets may seek to use Zambia for supporting anti-
South African guerrilla movements. Manipulating the
supply of southern African minerals of strategic
importance to the West may also play a part in long-
range Soviet thinking.
47. In concert with Soviet involvement, East
Germany's role in Zambia has grown in recent years.
East Germany as entered the
military assistance field and is providing training pro-
grams for UNIP party organizers. Additionally,
Kaunda is looking to East Germany for aid in develop-
ing the agricultural sector.
48. Kaunda in his relations with the Soviet Bloc will
take into account his heavy dependence upon Western
economic assistance. His refusal to abrogate the Soviet
arms deal once the Rhodesian conflict had died down
might have been in part an attempt to stimulate the
West into stepping up the flow of aid. In any case this
move has yielded few benefits, and Kaunda faces risks
that closer identification with the Soviets and East
Germans will provoke a reduction of Western aid and
investment. Zambia receives about $210 million in
economic aid annually, mostly from the West, but
from Eastern Europe, Saudi Arabia, and China as well.
US aid has been running at about $35-40 million an-
nually over the past three years. Almost all foreign
investment comes from the West.
49. Within the region, Zambian relations with Zim-
babwe have improved in recent months despite resid-
ual suspicions within Zimbabwe's ruling party stem-
ming from Kaunda's past support for Joshua Nkomo,
whose party fared second-best in the February 1980
elections there. Official relations are likely to remain
correct as long as the Zambian Government avoids the
impression of involvement in Zimbabwean internal af-
fairs. Nonetheless, over the next several years Zambia
risks slipping into Zimbabwe's economic orbit, revert-
ing to the pattern shaped during the colonial era in
which Lusaka was overshadowed by Salisbury.
50. Zambia faces unenviable choices in attempting
to gain greater control over its economic destiny. Zam-
bia is pursuing joint economic planning with the nine
black states that are banded together in the Southern
African Development Cooperation Conference. But,
apart from the possibility of ultimately developing
alternative transportation routes for those through
South Africa, the chances of solidifying regional eco-
nomic ties remain slight for the foreseeable future.
Zambia is unlikely to experience economic recovery
through closer association with its neighbors, or inside
or outside the South African orbit. It continues to rely
on South African rail and port links and will remain
vulnerable to retaliation for its support for the Namib-
ian dissidents (SWAPO) and insurgents targeted
against the Pretoria regime itself.
51. Kaunda is unlikely to accept the economic and
consequent political cost of cutting back ties with
South Africa. At the same time, he can be expected as
in the past to launch noisy propaganda campaigns that
highlight the South African threat. These help to di-
vert domestic attention from problems at home-
albeit with diminishing effectiveness-while providing
a backdrop for efforts to drum up international sup-
port. Diversionary tactics will probably be restricted to
words and symbolic gestures, however.
52. In response to both internal and external pres-
sures, Kaunda will probably be willing to continue
pursuing a peaceful Namibian settlement. His per-
sonal commitment to the liberation cause and his im-
age within African and international circles will not
permit him to abandon SWAPO altogether or to di-
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verge widely from the other Frontline States,' but in
private at least he will probably counsel patience and
accommodation with South Africa to relieve Zambia
of its Namibian burden.
53. Similarly, Kaunda will be unwilling to cut off
support to South African guerrilla groups, but to the
extent that Zambia's economy deteriorates and domes-
tic grievances accumulate he will be under increasing
pressure to restrict guerrilla activities so that trade and
transport ties with South Africa will not be
jeopardized.
Outlook: Continued Decay
54. Kaunda's grip on power is perceptibly slipping,
and how long he can survive is unclear. Much depends
on circumstances beyond his control. Rising world
copper prices, for instance, would tend to lengthen his
lease on political life, whereas falling prices would
hasten his departure. Nonetheless, despite rising criti-
cism, the 56-year-old Kaunda still seems to enjoy a
reservoir of popular support and he suffers from no
apparent health problems. On balance, therefore, we
believe that there is at least an even chance that he
will continue in office for another year, and he may
even survive to win a fifth five-year term in 1983.
55. Kaunda will remain an embattled figure-as
much a risoner as the master of the system he has
created.
Kaunda is ill preparee
to deal with Zambia's complex problems. As new prob-
lems arise or if things continue to go badly, he will
resort to more repressive measures. He will lay blame
on foreign or domestic conspirators or some combina-
tion of the two.
he wi exhort the populace with ig -
minuea rnerdric. But particularly the younger and
better educated elements of the Zambian population
expect more of their government than promises and
advice, and dissatisfaction with the Kaunda regime
will continue to mount.
56. If Kaunda within the next year or two were
unexpectedly removed from the scene by natural
causes, constitutional provisions for succession would
probably be followed. UNIP's secretary general would
become acting president for a three-month period so
' The Frontline States are Angola, Botswana, Mozambique, Tan-
zania, Zambia, and Zimbabwe.
that a party national convention could choose a nomi-
nee who would be confirmed as president in a general
election. Jockeying among top party leaders for the
nomination would be intense, but the secretary gen-
eral would have the advantage of incumbency. The
current secretary general, Mainza Chona, may come
into disfavor because of suspected plotting against
Kaunda. Grey Zulu's star is rising and his loyalty to the
President is unswerving. Indeed, Kaunda seems to
have maneuvered him into a stronger position by
creating for him the post of Secretary of State for De-
fense and Security, a position that gives Zulu consider-
able authority over military, police, and intelligence
matters.
57. Zulu has been instrumental in developing closer
relations with Communist states, but, even if he
emerged as the party's choice to replace Kaunda, Zam-
bia's domestic and foreign policies would probably re-
main essentially unchanged. Whichever of Kaunda's
proteges became president would be boxed in by the
system he inherited. Indeed, without Kaunda's per-
sonal appeal and acumen, Zambia's downward slide
would probably accelerate. Kaunda's departure would
hasten the day when a new political generation or the
military makes a bid for power.
58. In the short run, if Kaunda were to leave the
scene, or in the longer term, if he hangs on, serious
challenges to the regime are likely to arise. The most
formidable challenge to Kaunda or a UNIP successor
would come if elements in the military joined with
civilian opponents of the regime in a well-organized
attempt to remove him from power. The most likely
candidates to lead such a move would be influential
members of the large and aggressive Bemba tribe,
especially middle-level officers and leaders of or-
ganized labor, business, and the professions. Their
chances for success would grow if they were able to
ally with key members of other tribes.
59. An opposition of this sort would be extremely
difficult to organize without attracting government
countermeasures, but there are a few signs beyond the
alleged plot last October that attempts to join forces
may be in the offing. Disgruntled political critics,
particularly Bembas, have been dropping hints that
the Army should step in to clear up the nation's affairs.
They may be finding an increasingly receptive au-
dience in the officer corps. Although there is no in-
dication that leaders of the Bemba-dominated labor
movement are in direct contact with dissidents in the
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military, they would at least condone if not applaud
the removal of Kaunda or his UNIP successor.
60. A civilian government led by Kaunda's critics
would probably seek to dismantle the most onerous
aspects of Zambian socialism and encourage private
enterprise, efficiency, and Western investment. Per-
haps it would even promise more open political
participation. But overthrow of the Kaunda regime
would unleash repressed demands which, coupled
with Zambia's basic tribal and socioeconomic prob-
lems, would make the country extremely difficult to
govern.
61. If elements within the military moved against
the regime, they might call on some of the respected
dropouts to help run the country. Even with civilian
participation, however, a military government would
be narrowly based and unstable. If it were perceived
as a Bemba preserve, other groups could well coalesce
in opposition. Moreover, amid the uncertainty of
forcefully replacing one regime by another, military
discipline might collapse altogether, inviting coup at-
tempts by enlisted men or junior officers. At the very
least, the lower ranks would assert demands for better
pay and amenities.
Implications for the United States
62. While its importance to the West has declined
with the end of the conflict in neighboring Zimbabwe,
Zambia is still involved in matters that deeply concern
Washington and its allies, particularly with regard to a
Namibian settlement and limiting opportunities for
the expansion of Soviet influence in the region. Zam-
bia might also play a role in keeping Zimbabwe on a
moderate and stable course. Moreover, it is an impor-
tant supplier of copper to the West and accounts for
some 10 percent of non-Communist production of co-
balt, a strategic material with no adequate substitutes
in certain critical industrial and defense applications.
63. Under Kaunda, Zambia has been relatively
responsive to the West and a force for moderation in
the region. But, as Kaunda's position erodes, he is
likely to respond in ways that strain these relations. He
probably will not resort to brutal repression to fend off
his adversaries, but his rule is apt to become more
authoritarian and arbitrary. Although we do not be-
lieve he will break with the West, in periods of stress
he will be tempted as in the past to make the United
States and the West scapegoats for his problems, espe-
cially those relating to the economy and the South Af-
rican threat. He will also broaden his still tentative
relations with the Soviet Union and its allies to shore
up his military, security services, and party structure.
64. Nonetheless, Zambia's basic interests are bound
to a fundamentally conservative economic and social
order and to Western-oriented trading patterns. We
would not expect Kaunda to break completely with
the West even if faced with a grave challenge to his
political survival.
65. Although US-Zambian relations will be ambigu-
ous and trying as Kaunda's situation continues to
deteriorate, they could well become even more dif-
ficult if he were removed from power. Any likely
successor would seek help from the West, but a post-
Kaunda government would probably be unstable, crip-
pled by infighting and unsatisfiable demands. The
Soviets would not necessarily be able to broaden their
foothold in these circumstances, but they might win
greater influence through their access to the armed
forces. Moscow would, of course, stand to gain consid-
erably if-however unlikely-the Zambian Govern-
ment were to come under the control of radical ele-
ments that might emerge from protracted instability.
South Africa would not passively accept a shift toward
radicalism in Zambia or substantial moves favorable to
the Soviets.
66. Instability is the chief threat to Western access
to Zambia's copper and cobalt supplies. Even a radical
Zambian Government friendly to the Soviets would
feel compelled to continue mineral exports to tra-
ditional markets, which are primarily Western, but
serious disorder would jeopardize mining operations
and transportation routes.
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