POSTCOUP PROSPECTS IN LIBERIA

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP97S00289R000100190007-2
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 22
• Document Creation Date: December 27, 2016
• Document Release Date: March 9, 2012
• Sequence Number: 7
• Publication Date: December 1, 1980
• Content Type: MEMO

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Director of
Central
Pos~coup Pr~p~ects in ~ib~~r
Interagency Intelligence Memoratn~um
Nt trot 8o-roo~9
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POSTCOUP PROSPECTS IN LIBERIA
Information available as of 22 December 1980 was
used in the preparation of this Memorandum.
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CONTENTS
Page
KEY JUDGMENTS .................................................................................................... 1
DISCUSSION .............................................................................................................. 3
I. INTRODUCTION ......................................................................................... 3
II. US INTERESTS IN LIBERIA ..................................................................... 4
A. Military-Strategic Interests ...................................................................... 4
B. Economic Interests ................................................................................... 5
C. Political Interests ..................................................................................... 5
A. Political Factors ....................................................................................... 6
B. Military Factors ........................................................................................ 8
C. Economic Factors .................................................................................... 9
D. Emerging Foreign Policy Orientation .................................................. 10
IV. PROSPECTS FOR THE FUTURE AND IMPLICATIONS
FOR THE UNITED STATES ..................................................................... 12
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KEY JUDGMENTS
The United States enjoys valuable access rights and facilities in
Liberia which probably cannot be duplicated elsewhere on the con-
tinent. In the eyes of the world, Liberia is inextricably linked to the
United States, and its failures will be interpreted as American failures.
As a result, the symbolic importance of Liberia to US interest may even
transcend material considerations. If Liberia is disappointed with US
assistance, it will turn elsewhere. This could allow nations unfriendly
toward the United States to make significant inroads.
The coup last April left Liberia with a fragile political system and
profound weaknesses in its institutions, leadership, and social structure.
Realization of these conditions, and fear that the most likely alternative
to the Doe regime is unpredictable chaos, is probably the major cement
holding the system together today. The regime depends on the support
of the military, and therefore must satisfy the personal and professional
demands of the ethnically disparate rank and file. Continued relative
stability in Liberia depends on solving the near-term fiscal crisis to
permit continued importation of petroleum products and foodstuffs. In
the longer term, basic economic stability will depend on a return of
foreign investor confidence. Foreign assistance will be crucial both in
the short and in the long run.
Despite the grudging acceptance of the new regime by other Af-
rican governments, Liberian leaders remain frightened of subversion
supported from the outside. Efforts by Communist and radical African
regimes to exploit the situation have so far generally been unsuccessful
because of the Liberian Government's continued attachment to Amer-
ica and its suspicion of Communist motivation.
Civilian rule will not return to Liberia until the economic situation
improves to a point where civilians and military alike can count on
some benefits from the system. This in turn depends upon the ability of
a fragile administration to sustain progress and to resolve day-to-day
crises in the fiscal and public security areas. Liberia is bound to the
United States and its progress, or lack of it, will depend upon
cooperation with the United States or replacement of the United States
with some other outside benefactor.
Note: This memorandum was prepared under the auspices of the National Intelligence Officer for Africa
with contributions from the Bureau of Intelligence and Research of the Department of State, the Defense
Intelligence Agency, and the Central Intelligence Agency. It has been coordinated with Intelligence
Community representatives at the working level.
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Sierra Leone
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DISCUSSION
I. INTRODUCTION
1. On 12 April 1980 Master Sergeant Samuel K.
Doe and a handful of other noncommissioned officers
assassinated Liberia's President William Tolbert, end-
ing the regime that had ruled the country since it
achieved independence in 1847. The coup d'etat put
in question the "special relationship" that has long
characterized US-Liberian relations. Although the
coup itself was spontaneous and unexpected, tensions
had been building since unprecedented riots over a
proposed increase in the price of rice rocked Monro-
via, the capital, in April 1979. A deeper cause, how-
ever, was the effect of economic and social progress
and of rapidly rising expectations on the century-old
cleavage between Americo-Liberians and Liberia's
indigenous majority.'
2. The growth of dissent was facilitated by the lib-
eralized political atmosphere that Tolbert, with US
encouragement, had allowed. The increasingly free
press and rapid development of education spread the
arena of political discussion to remote parts of the
country, to reach a growing proportion of the indig-
enous majority. The Progressive Peoples Party (PPP),
an opposition group espousing social-democratic prin-
ciples, was able to register legally in December 1979,
while the Movement for Justice in Africa (MOJA),
with a more radical socialist creed, flourished in aca-
demic circles. In March 1980 the PPP called an abor-
tive general strike in Monrovia, and was held respon-
sible for subsequent public disturbances; the arrest and
threatened treason trials of its leaders raised fears that
the relative liberalism of recent years was at an end.
3. Meanwhile, Sergeant Doe-a career soldier from
the remote but increasingly ambitious Krahn tribe-
felt that his career prospects were blighted by the Tol-
bert regime and the Americo-Liberians who domi-
nated it and the upper ranks of the army officer corps.
On the night of 11-12 April 1980 a handful of soldiers
directed by Doe invaded the presidential mansion and
murdered Tolbert. As news of their success spread, the
rank and file of the army mutinied. Their officers
made no serious effort to restore authority. Doe's plans
had not gone much beyond killing the President, bait
this proved sufficient for complete victory.
4. Unexpectedly finding himself in power, Sergeant
Doe established a Peoples Redemption Council (PRC)
of his principal noncommissioned associates as Li-
beria's ultimate authority. Recognizing the ignorance
of PRC members about the functioning of the govern-
ment, Doe named a composite Cabinet made up of
politicians from the PPP and MOJA, some army of-
ficers, and a few technocrat holdovers from the de-
posed Tolbert regime. Lines of authority have re-
mained confused, both within the PRC and among it,
the Cabinet, and the renovated military hierarchy.
5. It took Doe some days to restore order in Monro-
via, where jubilant soldiers looted and harassed
Americo-Liberians and, to some extent, foreigners.
Several hundred leading officials, army officers, and
politicians associated with Tolbert or believed guilty of
major corruption were arrested and sometimes bru-
talized; on 22 April, 13 leading officials, including
Foreign Minister Cecil Dennis, were publicly executed
after a travesty of a trial. Lower levels of the govern-
ment bureaucracy were, however, retained in place.
While many detained individuals were eventually re-
leased, some 75 remain in custody. Most prominent
Americo-Liberians who were outside the country on
12 April, including Vice President Bennie Warner,
went into exile; many others escaped from Liberia or
at least sent their families to safehaven abroad.
6. Although Doe and his associates were at first very
iittery, no real attempts were made from inside the
country or from abroad to contest his victory. Never-
theless, many African leaders were horrified, less by
the fact of a coup than by the public killing of promi-
nent Liberians (including personal friends) and be-
cause the easy victory of an army sergeant in Liberia
seemed a potential threat to all African governments.
Though some radical regimes backed Doe from the
first, it was not until July that his regime was, in effect,
accepted as legitimate at the annual summit of the
Organization of African Unity.
7. At home, Doe and his government face enormous
difficulties. Despite general public support, the regime
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itself remains weak and often ineffective. The economy,
in trouble before the coup, has been made worse by
inept government management and an atmosphere of
political instability that has shattered the confidence
of the business and banking communities. The pos-
sibility of conflict between indigenous ethnic groups,
in the past muted by Americo-Liberian domination,
poses new problems, especially in the army. Under
these circumstances, the security of US interests in
Liberia-political, economic, and strategic-is signifi-
cantly endangered.
II. US INTERESTS IN LIBERIA
A. Military-Strategic Interests
8. The close relationship between the United States
and Liberia has, especially since World War II, given
the United States access rights and facilities which it
does not, in 1980, enjoy anywhere else in Africa and
which could probably not be duplicated elsewhere on
the continent. Though the future reliability of the
access rights has undoubtedly diminished as a result
of the revolution, the existing facilities-which have so
far not been threatened by Liberia's new government-
remain of considerable value.
9. Port and Airport Access Rights. The Port of
Monrovia and Roberts International Airfield were
built by the United States during and after World War
II. In the process of turning the facilities over to
Liberian control the United States negotiated special
rights of access.
10. In accordance with a confidential exchange of
notes of 13 and 14 April 1964, the United States may
establish in the Monrovia Free Port area "such mili-
tary installations as are agreed upon" by the US and
Liberian Governments, if they jointly find it "nec-
essary for the maintenance of international peace and
security." Such installations-which would be built
and maintained entirely at US expense-may not be
used "as weapons of conflict" without prior Liberian
consent.
11. An unpublished exchange of notes of 6 and 13
July 1954, allows the United States to use Roberts
International Airfield "during a national emergency"
under the "exclusive jurisdiction" terms of the other-
wise obsolete Defense Areas Agreement of 31 March
1942. What constitutes a "national emergency," and to
which nation it applies, is not specified. Plans to up-
grade the airfield, at US expense, have been in abey-
ance since the coup, in part because of US doubts
about their reception by a new government with other
priorities.
12. Neither agreement has an expiration date.
While the United States has not formally invoked
either, it has maintained annual naval port visits to
Monrovia, and operates some three military transport
flights to Roberts Airfield each month; Roberts has
been used during various international crises, includ-
ing the 1978 Shaba invasion. To the extent that they
can in fact be exercised, these access agreements
would be of considerable strategic value to the United
States, since they are not duplicated elsewhere in the
region.
13. Defense Agreements. The Cooperation Agree-
ment of 8 July 1959, which remains in effect until
terminated with one year's notice by either party, pro-
vides that: "In the event of aggression or threat of
aggression against Liberia, the Government of the
United States of America and the Government of Li-
beria will immediately determine what action may be
appropriate for the defense of Liberia." The United
States also affirms its intention to "continue to fur-
nish" aid for economic development and the preserva-
tion of Liberian national independence and integrity.
This agreement is of significance in protecting US
facilities and interests in Liberia.
14. The United States has provided military train-
ing for Liberia since 1912, currently under the Army
Mission to Liberia Agreement of 11 January 1951, as
most recently amended and extended by a series of
notes ending 10 March 1977. Article 18 of this Agree-
ment provides that "the Government of Liberia shall
not engage or accept the services of any personnel of
any government other than the United States of
America for duties of any nature connected with the
Liberian Armed Forces" except by mutual agreement
between the two parties. The United States is seeking
extension of the present agreement, which expires on
11 January 1981. At the time of its last renewal, the
Tolbert government sought unsuccessfully to amend
Article 18 to provide that if the United States refused a
training request the Liberians could look elsewhere.
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16. VOA Facilities. A major US asset in Liberia is
the Voice of America's Liberia relay station, which
occupies 1,600 acres on two sites near Monrovia. An
agreement of 13 August 1959, implemented by ex-
changes of notes in 1960 and 1961, gives the United
States the right to establish a series of 500-kW
transmitters, and to operate them without Liberian
interference, until 13 August 1999-for a payment to
Liberia of less than $2.50 per acre per year. The relay
station transmits all of the VOA's programing to
Sub-Saharan Africa, including the new relay station in
Botswana. A location in West Africa is essential for
technical reasons. To rebuild the station elsewhere
would take five years and cost at least $60 million.
Moreover, it is highly improbable that any other coun-
try in West Africa would allow it.
17. OMEGA. Pursuant to an exchange of notes of
10 and 18 April 1973, the United States Coast Guard
has constructed an OMEGA navigational station on a
700-acre site outside Monrovia, as part of a worldwide
network serving ships and aircraft of all nationalities.
While the United States will continue to maintain the
OMEGA station, it will by late 1981 be operated by
Liberians. Replacement at another site would cost
$15-25 million.
18. US economic relations with Liberia are crucial
to that country, though of marginal significance, in
purely economic terms, to the United States. Because
they are vital to Liberia's welfare, however, they are
of considerable political importance to US-Liberian
relations.
19. Investment. The value of US investment in
Liberia-less than 0.5 percent of all US investment
abroad-totaled about $340 million in 1979; most of it
was in rubber and iron ore production facilities. This
was about half the foreign investment in the country.
US investment has probably declined this year, as
depreciated assets are not being replaced. Liberia
ranks third among Sub-Saharan .lfrican countries
hosting US investments, with about 8 percent of the
total.
20. Trade and Raw Materials. Liberia's share of
US world trade is minuscule, totaling about $310 mil-
lion in 1978. Sub-Saharan African trade as a whole
represents less than 5 percent of total US trade, with
Liberia ninth in the area among US trading partners.
US exports to Liberia consist mainly of food and
manufactures; imports are primarily iron ore and rub-
ber. Liberia provides only 5 to 6 percent of US imports
of both commodities; they could easily be replaced
from other sources.
21. American-Controlled Shipping. US shipping
under Liberian registry is important to US transporta-
tion interests. Liberia's flag-of-convenience fleet is the
world's largest, at 150 million deadweight tons. About
one-third consists of US-owned tankers and bulk
carriers-some 75 percent of US-owned shipping.
Owners and users of Liberian flag vessels enjoy such
money-saving advantages as low taxes and access to
cheaper, nonunion labor. Although registrations ap-
pear to be lower in 1980, total revenue may rise
significantly next year because of a 200-percent in-
crease in registration levies, agreed to by the owners
before the coup.
22. Some shipowners are worried at the possibility
that Liberia might seek to nationalize the Liberian-
flag fleet, or-somewhat more realistically-that at-
tempts might be made to attach Liberian-flag vessels
in foreign ports if Liberia should default on its debts.
Such fears act as a stimulus to explore alternatives to
Liberian registration, as do concerns about the caliber
of men the new regime may name to top maritime
positions. While some new shipping will seek a dif-
ferent flag, most shipowners prefer to stick with
Liberia for the time being.
C. Political Interests
23. US-Liberian "Special Relationship." Liberia's
"special relationship" with the United States was born
in its settlement by American blacks in the 1820s and
has been nurtured by more than a century of close
relations, at first largely philanthropic and political,
but in more recent years economic and cultural as
well. From it, Liberia derives its American-style po-
litical institutions and the American cultural veneer so
apparent in Monrovia. Liberians-of tribal origin as
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well as Americo-Liberians-look to the United States
as a model and a patron, and believe that the United
States both can and should come to Liberia's aid in
time of need. Liberians have had extensive, and gen-
erally favorable, contact with the United States-in
Liberia through American businessmen, Peace Corps
volunteers, and missionaries and exposure to American
media; and in the United States, where many Liberi-
ans have studied.
24. The extent of the Liberians' positive feelings to-
ward the United States has been amply demonstrated
by the noncommissioned officers from the hinterland
who now make up the ruling Peoples Redemption
Council. Despite resentment at generations of per-
ceived exploitation by Americo-Liberians, their image
of America seems overwhelmingly favorable. But it is
also true that some Liberians, principally among intel-
lectuals, harbor anti-American sentiments.
25. Support in International Forums. Despite ef-
forts in recent years to improve its nonaligned creden-
tials, Liberia has given the United States significant
diplomatic support in many international forums-
both because of the special relationship with the
United States and because Liberian leaders have
shared many US perceptions of international prob-
lems. Often more important than votes has been the
corridor support for American positions given by
experienced Liberian diplomats, within the UN sys-
tem, and in forums, such as the Organization of
African Unity and the nonaligned movement, where
the United States is not directly represented. It
remains to be seen to what extent such diplomatic sup-
port will continue-both because the new Liberian re-
gime is likely to take a more "nonaligned" stance on
international issues, and because the corps of hitherto
largely Americo-Liberian diplomats is undergoing
change.
26. Liberia's Fortunes as an Element of
American Prestige. In the eyes of Africans, and of
the world generally, Liberia is inextricably linked to
the United States. Indeed, many have considered it
little better than an American colony, a reputation
that Liberian leaders have striven to overcome. Its suc-
cesses may redound in favor of the United States, but
its failures are interpreted by many as American fail-
ures. That Liberia has hitherto combined a largely
capitalist economy with apro-Western international
orientation identifies it not just with the United States,
but with the Western world and its values generally.
To detach Liberia from the United States would have
a symbolic and psychological value to the Communist
world considerably exceeding even the important ma-
terial interests involved.
A. Political Factors
27. The coup last April left Liberia a fragile po-
litical system, with profound weaknesses in its institu-
tions, leadership, and social structure. Realization of
this weakness, and fear that the most likely alternative
to the Doe regime is unpredictable chaos, may be the
maior cement holding the system together today.
28. The PRC and the Cabinet. The 28-member
Peoples Redemption Council, aself-appointed group
whose nucleus is the band of soldiers that assassinated
President Tolbert, is the supreme executive, legislative,
and at times iudicial authority in Liberia. Composed
of uneducated noncommissioned officers (all but Doe
now raised to officer rank), its membership is naive
and wholly inexperienced in either the substance or
procedure of government. Only a few PRC members-
notably Chief of State Doe and Army Commander
General Quiwonkpa-have demonstrated leadership
qualities. Many are easily distracted from the PRC's
mission by opportunities for the petty exercise of
power for themselves or on behalf of tribal associates,
or the enjoyment of the perquisites of office.
29. In the PRC, Doe is the predominant personal-
ity, but his authority is not absolute and most decisions
are made collegially. Where there is contention, Doe
can probably swing the Council in his favor in most
instances; otherwise, the issue will be resolved by com-
promise. Doe has clashed with several officials, in
particular Major General Thomas Weh Syen, the
cochairman of the PRC. Most of the incidents appear
based more on personality conflicts than on ideological
or political differences. If the Council should perceive
Doe as weak or unresponsive, other members might
unite to replace him.
30. The 17-member Cabinet, though far better edu-
cated, is also short on real governmental experience,
and is united only in its opposition to the ousted re-
gime (two of the three holdovers from the Tolbert gov-
ernment quietly left the country, and were ultimately
replaced). Personalities and the continuing rivalry be-
tween the two main civilian groups, PPP and MOJA,
prevent the Cabinet from acting with the authority
with which its comparative sophistication might other-
wise invest it. Though it carries out the day-to-day
functions of government and supervises the ministries,
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it is presided over by Chief of State Doe and has devel-
oped no clear program of its own. Relations with the
PRC are, probably inevitably, strained. The Cabinet
must constantly seek to rein in the PRC, not to men-
tion individual PRC members, while the PRC resents
the patronizing attitude sometimes shown by ministers.
31. Partially counterbalancing these deficiencies
are the will of Doe and some of his colleagues to shoul-
der the responsibility they have assumed for the bet-
terment of the Liberian masses and soldiers with
whom they identify, and the genuine efforts of many
Cabinet members to help Liberia survive its current
difficulties.
32. Political Goals and Intentions of the Mili-
tary. Sergeant Doe has proclaimed that the PRC took
power to eliminate corruption and to bring about "ius-
tice, human dignity, equal opportunity, and fair treat-
ment for all." He says the military will relinquish
power when it is satisfied that the country's problems
have been made more manageable. In addition, the
PRC undoubtedly wants to improve the military be-
fore relinquishing power. It seems improbable that the
PRC will voluntarily step down much before 1983, at
the earliest, when national elections are due.
33. Role of Civilian Parties in the Regime. With
the demise of the Americo-Liberian-dominated True
Whig Party, which had ruled Liberia for more than
100 years, only two organized political groups remain
on the scene:
The Movement for Justice in Africa (MOJA),
which has never claimed party status, was found-
ed by Liberian university students in 1973 to
support African liberation movements. Espousing
a generally Marxist future for Liberia and Africa,
its main strength is among Liberian university
students and faculty. It has tried to expand its
roots among workers and peasants, in part by
sponsoring cooperatives. MOJA's leaders, Plan-
ning Minister Togba Nah Tipoteh and Education
Minister Henry Fahnbulleh, Jr., are the most
ideologically oriented and leftist members of the
Cabinet. Fahnbulleh has approached the Soviets
for aid to his ministry.
The Progressive Peoples Party (PPP) was reg-
istered in December 1979, but is the offshoot of
an organization founded by Liberian students in
the United States in 1974. The brand of socialism
it espouses is both vaguer and milder than that of
MOJA, and perhaps closer to social democracy,
though sometimes described in provocatively
radical terms. Apart from PPP founder Foreign
Minister Gabriel Baccus Matthews, other PPP
members in the Cabinet are Presidential Affairs
Minister George Boley, Local Government Min-
ister Oscar Quiah, and theOJustice Min-
ister Chea Cheapoo. The suppression of the PPP
and the threatened treason trial of its leaders
were among the immediate catalysts for the
coup, but neither the PPP nor MOJA seems to
have known of Doe's plans in advance.
In the short run, at least, both MOJA and PPP leaders
support Liberia's present, capitalist economic struc-
ture, and its economic ties with the United States,
while they demand social reform and a much better
deal for the masses.
34. A third group, with little public following, is
made up of Liberians-many of them longtime res-
idents or students in the United States-who have re-
cently returned home and attached themselves as
"civilian advisers" to the PRC. Many were associated
with the Union of Liberian Associations in the Ameri-
cas (ULAA), of which the PPP is an offshoot. Their
principal interest is probably in preserving the present
regime, which has given them high positions. Most
prominent are Tambakai Jangabe (ex-Johnson), senior
adviser to the PRC, and Doe's special assistant, Bai
Gbala. MOJA and the PPP may despise these advisers
as opportunists, but they seem to be valued by the
PRC as educated men who are outside the civilian
movements maneuvering for power.
35. Finally, some young bureaucrats, who had
worked for reform within the old regime and its True
Whig Party, are meeting quietly behind the scenes to
organize a new moderate party to the right of the PPP
and MOJA.
36. Whatever their rivalries, all these groups fear
that any immediate breakdown of Doe's regime would
bring chaos. Therefore, while they continue to jockey
for power to the extent that circumstances-and Doe's
limited tolerance for politicking-will permit, all seem
prepared to continue the fragile status quo.
37. Changing Role of Americo-Liberians. Much
of the popular animus behind the April events was
directed specifically against President Tolbert and his
immediate relatives and associates, and the Americo-
Liberians not identified with Tolbert (including some
relatives of the still-revered President Tubman) have
escaped its full fury. After the killings, arrests, and
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harassment that followed the coup, most Americo-Li-
berians are doing their jobs but keeping as low a pro-
file as possible. Many who were able to do so have sent
their families to safety abroad; not a few have them-
selves left or, because they were outside the country in
April, stayed away. Despite the government's repeated
claims of ethnic impartiality, Americo-Liberians see
themselves as members of a marked group, even if
they escape direct injury. Although Americo-Liberian
talents and education will continue to be needed,
Liberians of tribal origin are likely to be given pref-
erence for top jobs in the society and in government.
38. Americo-Liberians as a Threat to Regime.
Some Americo-Liberians in the United States, Europe,
and neighboring African states have sought to organize
against the Doe regime. They might have the re-
sources and the will to mount a mercenary expedition
against it, but whether they have the requisite organiza-
tion, discipline, and leadership is highly questionable.
39. The reality of the threat posed by Americo-
Liberian dissidents is probably less than its psychologi-
cal effect on Liberia's new leaders. The mere existence
of an opposition Americo-Liberian community abroad
frightens them, and the PRC has been reluctant to
release political prisoners for fear they will join forces
with the exiles.
40. It is doubtful that an Americo-Liberian-inspired
coup attempt, whether internally or externally gen-
erated, could succeed in restoring an Americo-Liberian-
dominated government to power. The termination of
Americo-Liberian domination is one aspect of the
coup on 12 April 1980 that is generally popular and
probably permanent.
B. Military Factors
41. Sergeant Doe and the Armu? Sergeant Doe, or
any immediate successor, will require the support of
the military to maintain his rule. At present, Doe is
well respected and popular among army personnel,
and probably enjoys their allegiance. Part of this stems
from his image, reinforced by his unwillingness to pro-
mote himself, as a sincere soldier dedicated to improv-
ing social conditions in Liberia. But most of Doe's mili-
tary support probably depends on practical consider-
ations. The large pay increase granted immediately
after the coup, which doubled the pay of lower ranks,
is undoubtedly a major factor in Doe's popularity.
42. If Doe proves unable to deliver on other prom-
ises to the military-such as improved housing and
equipment-because of a serious downturn in the
economy or a lack of foreign assistance, there is little
doubt that his popularity would wane. In such an
event, disillusioned elements within the military
would probably support, or at least not resist, an at-
tempt to remove Doe from power, and the rank and
file would probably acquiesce in his ouster.
43. The 5,500-man Armed Forces of Liberia (AFL)
suffers from severe deficiencies, which hamper its
operational effectiveness. Enlisted men have little re-
spect or loyalty for officers, disciplinary problems are
rampant, and decisions in many units are made by
consensus. Most officers in significant command posi-
tions have been promoted from the ranks since April
and have little education or command experience.
Aside from two infantry battalions, which have re-
ceived training from US Army mobile training teams
(MTTs), units have not undergone even platoon-level
training, are equipped with old weapons, and have no
logistic support.
44. The AFL has little capability to deploy units to
crisis locations, because of problems with vehicles and
other equipment. Command and control are ex-
tremely poor, with little communications below bat-
talion level except for telephones and messengers, and
the military hierarchy lacks even the rudiments of an
intelligence network. All major decisions are made by
the PRC, with individual PRC members often taking
unilateral action and passing commands directly to
AFL units. This has an adverse effect on the ability of
the AFL to function on a day-to-day basis, let alone
during crisis situations. The AFL could probably deal
with limited cases of sporadic unrest, particularly in
the Monrovia area, but would be unable to contain
widespread urban unrest or violence in the country-
side and would crumble rapidly in the face of serious
opposition. The result might well repeat the AFL's
performance of April 1979, when many troops either
faded away or joined the rioters.
45. Tribalism Within the AFL. Although the vast
majority of AFL personnel are of indigenous (that is,
non-Americo-Liberian) origin, the ethnic structure of
the military does not parallel that of Liberian society.
Most enlisted men probably still come from the Loma
and Kpelle tribes, which represent only about one
quarter of the country's population, though the
proportion of Krahns and others in the military has
been rising rapidly. The officer corps is dominated by
Kru-speaking groups (especially the Kru, Krahn, and
Grebo), which constitute only about one-fifth of the
population.
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46. The average Liberian soldier feels more affinity
for his own ethnic group than for any other grouping
in the military. Personnel socialize primarily with in-
dividuals from their own tribe, and fraternization be-
tween officers and enlisted personnel from the same
ethnic group is common. In addition, soldiers often
feel a responsibility for their fellow tribesmen and aid
them financially.
47. Since the coup, ethnic differences within the
military have surfaced as a possible source of instabil-
ity. The removal of the Americo-Liberians from
political and military power has focused attention on
ethnic differences among the indigenous Liberians.
Each group is closely watching the others to ensure
that no tribe receives more than its proportional share
of the spoils of the revolution.
48. To date, most ethnic tension has centered on the
tribal composition of the PRC. Immediately following
the coup, about half of its 17 members were of Krahn
or Kru origin. Despite the PRC's expansion, the Kru-
speaking tribes still have a disproportionate share of
power, as well as holding most of the command posi-
tions in the army. Moreover, while some officers from
other tribes arrested since April remain in detention,
almost all of Krahn or Kru origin have been released.
Despite grumblings about ethnic imbalance and dis-
crimination, there is no evidence that other ethnic
groups are yet trying to unite against real or perceived
Kru/Krahn domination of the AFL.
C. Economic Factors
49. The most immediate threats to the stability of
the fragile regime that has governed Liberia since
April are economic. The public expects that the events
of April should lead to improvements in living stan-
dards. However, the state of the economy, already
weakened by declining international demand for iron
ore and rubber, and further shaken by the decline in
investor confidence that the coup has engendered, de-
mands increased austerity.
50. The Doe government has ushered in a period of
high and unfulfillable expectations for most of the
population. The doubling of basic pay for lower-rank-
ing military and civil service personnel boosted
planned budgetary outlays by $30 million yearly. The
government also promised free schoolbooks and re-
duced prices for rice, transport, and other necessities,
all actions requiring subsidies for which funds are not
available. The pay hikes set off demands for increased
benefits by private sector workers. The large rubber,
iron ore, and grain companies, as well as many smaller
firms, have been hit with wildcat strikes and exor-
bitant worker demands. Many companies have in-
dicated that meeting these demands could put them
out of business. The government has banned strikes,
and some officials understand the need to keep Li-
berian enterprises viable, but the regime is inevitably
under constant pressure to produce visible benefits for
the Liberian masses.
51. Fiscal Crisis. The Doe government is currently
suffering regular monthly deficits that will total at
least $35 million by the end of the year. It is under
constant financial pressure to find funds to cover its
deficits. The coup led to substantial currency hoarding
and capital flight, reducing the deposit base of the
banking system by one-fourth. The subsequent liquid-
ity squeeze reduced credit for imports, curtailing over-
all business activity. International banks reacted by
tightening credit, complicating Monrovia's difficulties
in servicing a foreign debt of more than $650 million.
Government and large private enterprises have since
found themselves hard pressed to meet their payrolls.
52. The budgetary practices of the government also
have been chaotic. In part, this reflects the confusion
of a new government faced with the steady evapora-
tion of traditional revenue sources. More than 60
percent of government revenues comes from taxes on
income, profits, and international trade. Import rev-
enues, about one-third of total revenues, are down
sharply because of asecond-quarter drop in imports of
nearly 45 percent. Business profits have dropped. Fees
and taxes from ship registrations-nearly $14 million
in 1979-have declined since the coup.
53. Western bankers have not replaced the cur-
rency drained from their Liberian subsidiaries, which
dominate the country's banking system. Instead, they
have tightened credit to Monrovia. Month by month,
the availability of untied credits diminishes. Liberia
cannot resort to printing money to meet domestic ob-
ligations, because, except for some coins, the legal
tender is US currency.
54. In spite of renewed aid flows, Monrovia shows
little sign of overcoming immediate financial difficul-
ties and will face recurring payments crises in the
short run. US aid funds and a drawing under the Inter-
national Monetary Fund standby agreement, which
added $20 million to September revenues, were rap-
idly swallowed up by debt payments. By October, the
Doe government was looking for an additional $15
million in emergency aid. Undisciplined spending has
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pushed government borrowing above IMF-imposed
limits and temporarily halted Monrovia's access to
badly needed further drawing against the $70 million
remaining under the standby agreement. Failure to
meet IMF criteria reduces both commercial bank
willingness to finance Liberia and the generosity of
foreign creditors in rescheduling foreign debt.
55. Export-Import Outlook. Exports have been
running at normal levels despite the coup. Prospects
for maintaining them at these levels, however, are not
favorable. Iron ore exports, about half of total exports,
are likely to decline. The National Iron Ore Company
(NIOC) and the Bong Mining Company are both
experiencing financial difficulty; together, the two
companies account for half of Liberia's iron ore out-
put. LAMCO, the remaining ore producer, will not be
able to compensate for reduced production if Bong or
NIOC should fail. World economic conditions, includ-
ing aweakening market for iron ore, do not favor a
long-run upward movement of Liberia's raw material
exports.
56. It is improbable that development of minerals
other than iron ore will provide serious stimulus to the
economy. Although Liberia produces some gold and
diamonds and preliminary surveys have found depos-
its of manganese, bauxite, titanium, chromite, and tin,
their development would require an infusion of expa-
triate skills and financing, which is unlikely in the cur-
rent business climate.
57. Imports for 1980 are likely to fall below the
level of last year. They were down sharply during the
second quarter of the year because of restricted credit
but appear to have stabilized since then. The major
import concerns are food and fuel. The new govern-
ment narrowly avoided a rice shortage in its first few
weeks, but has since received a credit to help build up
its rice stocks. Rice imports will probably continue to
rise both absolutely and as a share of domestic
consumption in the foreseeable future.
58. Prospects for sufficient oil imports are even
more tenuous than for rice. Monrovia has been late
with recent oil payments, endangering an oil credit
provided by a US-led consortium. Several banks have
threatened to withdraw from the consortium, and the
group has cut the credit from $75 million to $50
million-barely covering Liberia's oil needs. Should
continued late payments lead the consortium to with-
draw financing, Saudi Arabia, which provides the oil
and is paid directly by the banks, might terminate its
supply agreement..
59. Stabilizing the Economy. Economic stability
as experienced before 1979 is unlikely to return any
time soon. Without the return of foreign investor con-
fidence-a slow and difficult process at best-Liberia
will continue to experience significant economic prob-
lems. Political instability and lack of labor discipline
will also contribute to negative net private capital
flows. Major expatriate firms have begun to eliminate
marginally profitable operations and to delay expan-
sion plans. The economy will contract and employ-
ment will be reduced, leading to greater instability.
Further weakening of Liberia's balance-of-payments
position will require increased aid. Obtaining this aid
from foreign donors will be a major preoccupation of
Liberian governments for the foreseeable future. Dur-
ing the next several years Monrovia will be looking to
the outside for fiscal and management guidance.
D. Emerging Foreign Policy Orientation
60. Acceptance of Regime by Moderate ~rican
States. Sergeant Doe's coup d'etat shocked other Af-
rican nations because it was carried out by enlisted
men and because of Tolbert's assassination and the
subsequent public execution of 13 other high officials.
Both the fact and the manner of these deaths dis-
turbed African leaders, many of whom identified with
Tolbert and other victims as colleagues and personal
friends. Their shock was intensified because of their
fear that the Liberian coup might prove an example in
other African countries.
61. Initial African response was, therefore, one of
rejection, a situation that both insulted and frightened
the new leaders. Both Doe and Foreign Minister Mat-
thews were pointedly excluded from several African
gatherings. Doe was anxious to restore good relations
with his neighbors, but he did not receive complete
support from other PRC members. Liberia's immedi-
ate neighbors (Ivory Coast, Guinea, and Sierra Leone,
ioined by Togo) subsequently decided to minimize the
damage, preferring an attempt to guide Doe toward
moderation rather than risk the chaos or even further
radicalization that might follow his disappearance.
Though only very partially successful in obtaining the
release of political detainees, their efforts led to
Liberia's acceptance at the annual OAU summit in
July 1980, although Doe himself did not try to make
an appearance. Today the new Liberian regime seems
to have at least the reluctant acquiescence of all
African states, and, barring further executions, its
status should continue to improve.
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62. Relations With the United States. Over the
years, Liberia has looked to the United States as its
natural defender against outside enemies and its prin-
cipal source of aid in times of need. The United States
has reciprocated by assuming (though sometimes
neglecting) a special responsibility for Liberia because
of its historical American origins. Since World War II,
with the emergence of the Third World and nonalign-
ment, many Liberians have grown ambivalent about
this "special relationship," in part because they and
other Africans saw in it elements of neocolonialism.
Students, in particular, have picked up facile, and
fashionable, anti-American sentiments from Europe-
ans, other Africans, or even while studying in anti-
establishment environments in the United States,
though they often retain more American attitudes
than they would care to admit.
63. Many of the well-educated civilian members of
the government clearly wish to move Liberia (as it had
in fact been moving under Tolbert) toward greater
nonalignment, as a sign of Liberian independence
from foreign tutelage. Foreign Minister Matthews is
typical of this group in defining nonalignment in
terms of balanced contacts, visits, and acceptance of
aid, and the avoidance of "cold war" foreign policy
stands. More radical Liberians are also aware of how
much the country is dependent on the West, in both
the public and private sectors, and realize that there is
no practical prospect of quickly replacing these ties.
64. The members of the PRC, however, seem to
have retained much of the anti-Communist suspicion
that previous governments had sought to instill in the
Liberian people, while their image of the United
States-largely garnered from experience with US
military training teams-is distinctly favorable. Ser-
geant Doe thinks it only natural and proper that
Washington should provide substantial military and
economic aid to Liberia in its present crisis, and that
this should be an easy thing for the all-powerful
United States to do.
65. Sergeant Doe and other high-ranking PRC
members are acutely aware of the shortcomings of the
government and especially of the army, and they are
concerned about both internal and perceived external
threats. In addition to economic assistance, Liberia has
formally requested additional MTT training, vehicles,
communications equipment, infantry support weap-
ons, and ammunition. It also wants US assistance in the
construction of low-cost military housing, a major need
to maintain soldier morale. Though Sergeant Doe has
been temporarily convinced that his army does not
require tanks and jets, the PRC may be tempted to
acquire sophisticated military equipment in the belief
that it will provide a quantum leap in the AFL's
capabilities and prestige. If they cannot obtain such
assistance from the United States, they could turn to
the Soviets or radical African governments, who are
probably willing to supply such aid.
66. Soviet Activities. Moscow probably sees the
combination of the inexperience of the PRC, its ex-
pressed interest in military assistance, and the an-
nounced adoption of a nonaligned foreign policy as an
opportunity to enhance the Soviet position in West Af-
rica at little cost while at the same time decreasing US
influence. Soviet activities have not been particularly
aggressive, however, as the Soviets probably realize
that radical ideology is not well rooted in Liberia and
it has historically played only a small role in the
political life of the country.
67. In early summer the Soviets' request to increase
the size of their Embassy staff was granted. Ambas-
sador Ulanov then returned to Moscow for consulta-
tions, and a decision was made to step up Soviet activ-
ities, including an invitation to Doe to visit the USSR,
which he accepted in principle. Doe, however, is
under heavy pressure not to go, and an official
Liberian visit to the USSR, if it takes place at all, is
likely to be at a lower level and balanced by trips to
the West.
68. Reportedly, the Soviets will provide scholarships
for Liberian students to study in the USSR. They also
have indicated a willingness to respond to generalized
Liberian requests for military assistance, though no
agreements appear to have been completed. The Li-
berian regime still looks first to the United States for
military help and is well aware both of US sensitivities
about Soviet involvement and of its treaty obligation
not to bring in foreign military advisers without US
consent. But Moscow seems prepared to keep its offers
open in the hope that US aid will fail to satisfy
Liberian expectations.
69. Soviet Surrogate Activity. The Soviets may
also believe that efforts to obtain their objectives can
be facilitated by using third parties more acceptable to
the Liberians. They have encouraged the Cubans and
Ethiopians to increase their efforts to establish closer
relations with Monrovia. The three governments
apparently plan to coordinate their Liberian policies
in order to maximize mutual benefits.
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70. There is some evidence that the Ethiopians, act-
ing in concert with the Soviets, hope to use assistance
programs, and particularly offers to train a militia, to
radicalize the Liberian revolution. Doe's visit to Ethi-
opia in late August 1980, however, did not result in
any major military or economic assistance. The two
sides renewed existing cultural and educational ex-
change agreements and signed an accord for agricul-
tural cooperation. The Liberians also arranged for
training of soldiers in Ethiopia and brought back a
donation of small arms "for testing," but further
discussions on military assistance were apparently
deferred.
71. The Cuban ambassador, who is resident in
Sierra Leone, has visited Monrovia several times for
discussions with Liberian officials, and met with Soviet
and Ethiopian representatives while there. The
Cubans hope to open a resident embassy, but the
proiect has made little headway to date. Future Cuban
assistance would probably involve agricultural and
medical aid and scholarships.
72. Liberian leaders for the most part tend to be
suspicious of the Soviets and appear to understand, at
least to some extent, the role of Soviet surrogates. So
far they have been cautious in their dealings with Mos-
cow, Addis Ababa, and Havana. A few PRC members,
notably Brigadier General Quiwonkpa, have openly
expressed anti-Communist views, and an attempt to
expand relations with the East would probably lead to
disagreements within the PRC. Nonetheless, Liberia's
military leaders may find it increasingly difficult to
resist offers of military assistance.
73. At a minimum, increasing Soviet and Cuban
sponsorship of study programs for Liberian students
and an enlarged Soviet or Soviet-surrogate repre-
sentation in Monrovia will increase the potential for
them to influence Liberia's new government.
74. Libyan and Palestinian Activities. The Doe
government has established contact with both the Lib-
yan Government and the Palestine Liberation Orga-
nization since the coup. General Quiwonkpa visited
Beirut in June and accompanied a PLO delegation to
Monrovia on his return. The Palestinians provided a
small number of weapons at the time of their visit and
furnished some medical personnel. In return the PLO
probably will seek Liberian support for Palestinian
causes and permission to establish a PLO office in
Monrovia; these efforts, however, will probably not be
greeted with enthusiasm by the Doe government. In-
deed, the original PLO delegation was sent home after
being caught operating a clandestine radio transmitter.
The Liberian leadership seems aware that it stands to
lose more from the West than it would gain from the
PLO through too close an association with it.
75. The Libyan connection is perhaps more omi-
nous, if only because Libya-unlike the PLO-could
afford to "buy into" Liberia. Aseveral-million-dollar
agreement for the construction of aLibyan-financed
Liberian-Libyan holding company building in Monro-
via, aproject which had been forming for at least a
year, was the first major international transaction after
the coup last April. This was followed by a visit by
General Quiwonkpa to Tripoli and brief visits to
Monrovia by envoys of Libyan Chief of State Colonel
Qadhafi.
76. Rumors of a Libyan offer of large-scale bud-
getary support for Liberia have not been substan-
tiated. Chief of State Doe accepted an invitation in
late November to visit Tripoli to appeal for emergency
aid and to seek an alternative source of oil. He was
temporarily dissuaded from going by African and
Western arguments regarding the dangers of Libyan
involvement. A delegation headed by the Foreign
Minister went instead; however, Doe is unlikely to
have abandoned this option.
IV. PROSPECTS FOR THE FUTURE AND
IMPLICATIONS FOR THE UNITED STATES
77. Stability o,{ the Regime. In view of the prob-
lems facing Liberia, political stability depends primar-
ily on the lack of clearly visible alternatives to the
weak Doe regime. Despite his limited background,
Sergeant Doe has shown some leadership ability and a
capacity for growth, but his popularity is still based
largely on resentment against the ousted regime. Doe
envoys prestige as the man who successfully dared to
challenge Tolbert.
78. Doe's personal popularity is not matched by sig-
nificant institutional strength. The PRC has yet to
establish clear lines of authority, and Doe must domi-
nate it by his personality and by trying to forge a
consensus on specific issues among its uneducated and
sometimes venal members. The Cabinet is a conglom-
eration of politicians, soldiers, and technocrats, with
differing perspectives and interests, and exists more or
less at the whim of the PRC. The army command
structure is filled with suddenly promoted noncoms
from the Krahn tribe; despite an almost total lack of
executive experience, they must seek to control a rank
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and file in which other ethnic groups clearly
predominate.
79. The fact that Doe easily toppled a regime which
had ruled for more than a century must give ideas to
other would-be leaders of Liberia. Fear probably has
kept them from trying to displace Doe. An unsuccess-
ful coup attempt would be ruthlessly punished without
regard for judicial niceties; moreover, the most prob-
able alternative to Doe is chaos in which neither in-
dividuals nor political movements would be safe. The
looting soldiers in the days after 12 April are not
quickly forgotten by a people used to reasonable pub-
lic order. There is considerable doubt as to whether an
alleged military countercoup attempt in May, the pre-
sumed perpetrators of which are slowly being tried,
ever really took place except in the suspicious minds of
the PRC. For sophisticated Liberians there is also the
realization that the frail economy rests on Western
confidence-to provide credits and maintain invest-
ments-and that any further political shock could
bring economic disaster in which nobody would win.
80. Liberians, whatever their political views, thus
seem prepared to wait for a more propitious time to
seek new leadership. The spokesmen of both MOJA
and the PPP appear to hope that a return to civilian
government, as eventually promised by Doe, will give
them the opportunity to direct Liberian destinies.
Many Americo-Liberians would certainly like to re-
sume their former privileged position, but at least
those inside Liberia seem frightened that the Doe re-
gime will be replaced by something worse.
81. This does not make the Doe regime any
stronger, but it' suggests that real threats to political
stability are likely to be spontaneous or (like the Doe
coup d'etat itself) rapidly improvised. The United
States is unlikely to have advance warning of their
exact nature or timing of stability-threatening events
or be able to predict their course.
82. One such event would be uncontrollable urban
rioting, resulting from unemployment, shortages of ba-
sic commodities, and/or sudden price rises. If military
discipline broke down, as it did to a large extent dur-
ing the 1979 rice riots, this could lead to chaos and
destroy the Doe government. In an anarchic situation,
armed Liberians might turn against the white commu-
nity for the first time.
83. Dissatisfied soldiers (whether officers or rank
and file) might seek to displace Doe in a second palace
coup, from within the PRC or from outside. Two of
the conditions that might precipitate such an event
are: resentment that the army was not getting the im-
provements-in pay, housing, and military equipment-
to which it thinks the coup entitled it; or a perception
by the army's Mande-speaking majority that Sergeant
Doe's Krahn tribe was unfairly monopolizing power
and privilege for itself. Doe is probably better pre-
pared to resist such an attempt than was the sloppily
guarded Tolbert, but he remains vulnerable. If they
succeeded quickly, the leaders of such a coup might be
able to maintain public order among the
Liberian public, but both their internal and
external prospects would probably be worse than
Doe's. Should Doe and his Krahn-dominated en-
tourage resist, intertribal conflict could break out.
84. A general breakdown of law and order in Li-
beria might lead to intervention by Guinea and/or
Ivory Coast, though the modalities of such interven-
tion cannot now be predicted. Ivory Coast might,
though this is less likely, also intervene if the Doe gov-
ernment were to resume executions of Americo-Liberi-
ans on a significant scale.
85. None of these violent eventualities seems prob-
able. More likely, the Doe regime will limp along for
lack of any better alternative unless it is forced to the
wall by financial collapse or administrative ineptitude.
But its essential stability will remain fragile and hence
subject to the possibility of sudden rupture.
86. Transition to Civilian Rule. Although Li-
beria's new military rulers have expressed their in-
tention to return the government to civilian hands
when conditions are ripe, they have refused to be
drawn into specifics. US diplomats have repeatedly
suggested that a formal commitment or timetable for a
return to civilian rule, through democratic processes,
would enhance US ability to provide economic aid,
but they have received little response.
87. Sergeant Doe regards himself as only a tem-
porary, and not really qualified, head of state. No
other member of the PRC has endorsed indefinite
military rule.
88. The Liberian public generally still looks on mili-
tary rule as an aberration; it is accustomed to civilian
government and adherence to the letter, if not always
the spirit, of a written constitution which was in effect
for over a century until suspended by the PRC. The
year 1983, when new national elections are scheduled
under the present constitution, seems to many a logical.
date for a return of the soldiers to their barracks.
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89. Nevertheless, there are significant obstacles to a
restoration of civilian rule. The ruling soldiers of the
PRC want to see certain objectives-vague and hence
probably open-ended-accomplished before they
leave office. These are framed in terms of ending
corruption and ensuring social gains to the people, but
in practice the PRC is probably more interested in the
status of the military rank and file it represents. Above
all, however, PRC members are probably concerned
with their own personal safety, and with the specter of
vengeance taken by a renascent Americo-Liberian rul-
ing caste.
90. Civilian leaders, including the representatives
of the PPP and MOJA in the cabinet, are all theoreti-
cally in favor of civilian rule based on democratic
elections. Most appear to favor a multiparty system
based on a Western (generally an American) model,
though some may advocate an African one-party state
as more appropriate to the needs of a poor developing
country. But they have little trust in each other, and
vivid memories of the ways in which the former True
Whig Party effectively dominated a nominally demo-
cratic system for over a century. With little indication
of how free elections would really come out, and wide-
spread fear of returning chaos, most civilians seem
prepared to wait until the situation clarifies. Some,
such as the students who have attached themselves to
the PRC as advisers, have a vested interest in the status
quo.
91. An eventual attempt to restore civilian govern-
ment through national elections remains quite prob-
able, but it is not realistically possible to suggest a
timetable. Prospects for such elections will be im-
proved to the extent that Liberia surmounts its im-
mediate economic difficulties, and that the military's
perceived needs for equipment, training, and better
working conditions are met. Pressure from the United
States, or from other African countries, may also help.
But there will be a constant tendency to postpone the
transfer to civilian rule so long as the incumbent PRC
members feel insecure about their personal futures,
and in the interim they may find the pleasures and
perquisites of office increasingly enticing.
92. Leaders of both MOJA and the PPP have pri-
vately expressed confidence that their organizations
could win a free election handily, but there is little
evidence to support them. Though the PPP appears to
have some grass-roots organization, general popular
opinion is likely to support the party that-with a
modicum of credibility-promises most. The appeal of
Marxist rhetoric, however, seems limited by Liberia's
long tradition of anti-Communism.
93. Though MOJA and the PPP are the only extant
political groups, and even they are nominally inactive,
it is probable that other competitors will emerge if the
opportunity arises. Moderates who had formerly
worked for reform within the True Whig Party, for
example, are quietly trying to organize. Should the
competition get too intense, however, MOJA and the
PPP might well try, though with doubtful prospects
for success, to forma "national" coalition government
that could exclude political newcomers.
94. Changes in Liberian Foreign Relations.
Since at least 1959, Liberian foreign policy has been in
transition, as the old "special relationship" between
the United States and the Americo Liberian elite (di-
rected originally against the "uncivilized" Liberian
natives as well as against foreign colonial encroach-
ment) has gradually been replaced by a perception of
Liberia as an African country inherently tied to the
underdeveloped Third World. Especially since the
death of President Tubman in 1971, Liberia has
sought to improve its Third World credentials by dem-
onstrating greater independence from the United
States. The extent of the transformation was dem-
onstrated by President Tolbert's tenure, until his death
on 12 April, as the 1979-80 Chairman of the Organiza-
tion of African Unity.
95. Since almost any conceivable future Liberian
government will, like the present PRC, see itself as
based primarily on Liberia's indigenous majority, this
trend can only continue. Liberia's leaders in the
foreseeable future will see themselves as Africans, and
will take pains not to be perceived by others as
American surrogates.
96. This by no means rules out close relations with
the United States. Liberians of all ethnic origins tend
to be linguistically and culturally drawn to Americans.
Even when Liberians are sharply critical-as are
many intellectuals-their criticism is likely to be based
on American traditions of dissent. Some of the mem-
bers of the PRC, including Sergeant Doe, have shown
themselves particularly pro-American; their principal
perception of foreigners is based on favorable memo-
ries of US military training teams and Peace Corps
volunteers. Virtually all Liberians tacitly accept that
the United States should and could take primary
responsibility for Liberia's welfare during the present
economic crisis.
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97. The only alternative poles of attraction for most
Liberians are indigenous African radical regimes, such
as Libya, Guinea, and Ethiopia, or the Soviet Bloc.
West European countries, despite their substantial eco-
nomic activities in Liberia, are identified politically
with the United States. China, though its aid activities
in recent years were preferred to those of the Soviets,
has exerted little ideological attraction; since 12 April,
Chinese diplomats have not been active.
98. Up to now, Liberian acceptance of diplomatic
ties with the Soviet Union and its allies, and of the
very limited aid they have offered, has been intended
primarily to demonstrate Liberian nonalignment and
to encourage more aid from the West. Except for a
small, but vociferous, group of students in Monrovia,
and a few of their teachers, Liberians have remained
suspicious of Soviet blandishments.
99. What could tilt this situation in the Soviet direc-
tion? The Soviets themselves seem to be counting on
time to give them greater opportunities, while offering
Liberia scholarships in the hope of enticing a larger
nucleus of students for indoctrination. Apparently re-
buffed in their initial efforts to establish a foothold
through military assistance and political support
(though the extent of their offers is uncertain), they
may still hope that economic breakdown, or Liberian
frustration at obtaining from the United States the
level of military assistance the PRC feels it needs, will
open new doors. It is also possible, though not likely in
the immediate future, that a civilian government
dominated by self-proclaimed scientific socialists (as
MOJA's leaders purport to be) could come to power
and actively seek a new political orientation for
Liberia.
100. Efforts by Ethiopia to woo the new Liberian
regime have not proved very successful; Sergeant Doe
and the PRC seem to recognize that the Mengistu re-
gime is a surrogate for the Soviets. Among radical
African regimes, Guinea may be in the best position to
influence Liberia. President Sekou Toure has actively
sought to mediate between the Doe regime and Af-
rican governments horrified by the manner of its
accession to power. But Guinea's potential for influ-
ence is greatly diminished by its own dismal economic
performance, of which Liberians are very much
aware. Nevertheless, Guinea may in the future serve
as an example for political mobilization. Finally, given
Liberia's economic problems, Libya might be able to
make an impact by a judicious expenditure of hard
cash, or gifts of weaponry. But Qadhafi's socio-
religious message is unlikely to make much impression
in Liberia, where Islam is limited and organized Chris-
tianity remains a strong force.
101. The outlook, then, is for a Liberian foreign
policy based on pro-African nonalignment, but with a
continued slant-political, cultural, and economic-
toward the West. A Liberian perception that Western
countries are being supportive will tend to strengthen
this slant; a decline of Liberian society into chaos
could lead to its reversal.
102. Implications .for US Relations and In-
terests. The events of 12 April 1980 have altered the
"special relationship" between Liberia and the United
States, but they have not necessarily ended it. More-
over, the changes are ones that were under way in any
case; Sergeant Doe's coup has merely speeded them
up. By placing Liberia's destinies clearly in the hands
of its indigenous majority, the Coup d'etat on 12 April
put an end to whatever remained of the Americo-
Liberians' former role as surrogate Americans in a
quasi-colonial setting. But it has not ended the per-
ception, shared by indigenous .and settler-descended
Liberians, that Liberia should be able to look to the
United States as its principal patron as a result of the
historical, cultural, and economic relationships be-
tween the two nations.
103. There is a chance that this perception could
act to the disadvantage of the United States. If
Liberia's leaders become extremely disappointed in
Washington's aid, or economic conditions continue to
worsen, the United States as the dominant economic
factor in the country could quickly become identified
as the cause of all Liberian ills. If Liberian frustrations
are unleashed by making the United States a scape-
goat, arapid anti-US tilt is possible. This would not
only threaten US interests in Liberia but create an
opening that would surely be exploited by the Soviet
Union, its allies, and radical African states.
104. Even if this backlash does not occur, as Liberia
moves toward greater nonalignment, and seeks to re-
inforce its African orientation, it will prove less willing
to provide specific assistance to the United States in
international forums. In particular, it will no longer be
willing (as it has been, though decreasingly so) to take
anti-Communist postures on "cold war" issues regard-
less of prevailing Third World opinion. Instead, Li-
beria will probably try to stay with the main stream of
nonaligned views. Even so, continued and successful
close cooperation between the United States and Li-
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beria will tend to insulate Liberia from nations hostile
to US interests.
105. Similarly, the value of US treaty rights to use
the Port of Monrovia and Roberts International Air-
field, dependent as they are on Liberian Government
cooperation, has diminished. At best, the present or
any possible future Liberian government is likely to
permit their implementation only as part of military
actions sanctioned by the Organization of African
Unity, or which relate directly to Liberian security.
106. US facilities actually in place have not so far
been threatened. The new government has expressed
no dissatisfaction with
the Voice of America relay station.
However, Liberia may well seek to "raise the rent" by
asking the United States to pay some substantial
amount for their continued operation. The OMEGA
navigation facility may be less controversial, given its
international utility, and the fact that the United
States pays Liberians to operate it. But it is doubtful
whether a Liberian government will, in the future, be
willing to agree to additonal US installations
which most Af-
rican countries today would consider as compromising
their sovereignty.
107. American economic interests in Liberia seem,
for the time being, threatened more by Liberia's eco-
nomic weakness than by any deliberate governmental
policies. Even MOJA's self-proclaimed socialists agree
that Liberia cannot quickly change its capitalist-based
economic system in which foreign concessions play so
great a part. Nevertheless, the serious fiscal difficulties
that Liberia will probably continue to face over the
next few years, coupled with public expectations that
the new regime will bring economic improvement,
will force the government to maximize the economic
contributions-whether as sources of revenue or as
providers of employment-of foreign investors.
Whether it can respect their continued economic vi-
ability in practice, as it does in principle, remains to be
seen. There is even greater question as to whether Li-
beria will be able to attract significant new American
capital investment.
108. Two developments could drastically change
this outlook. The first, and perhaps most dangerous,
would be a breakdown in public order, in which mob
violence and/or military vigilantes seriously threat-
ened the physical security or property interest of
Americans. Under such circumstances, specifically
antiwhite sentiment might become a significant factor.
Needless to say, long-term economic interest, as well as
the operation of present US facilities, would be seri-
ously jeopardized.
109. A second danger to US interests would be the
establishment of an anti-American government-
through the victory of radicals at the polls, a new coup
d'etat, or conceivably the establishment of a Soviet or
radical-African military presence. This, too, could de-
stroy most US interests in Liberia, though perhaps
more gradually and without violence.
110. There is nothing to suggest that either of these
eventualities is imminent, or in any sense inevitable,
but both will remain possibilities for some time to
come.
111. Liberia, the United States, and ~{rica.
Whatever happens in Liberia will be associated, by
other Africans, with the United States. Whether the
United States wishes it or not, Liberia is an American
showcase in Africa, just as European nations, are asso-
ciated with their leading former colonies. Liberian
success will redound to US benefit. Catastrophe in Li-
beria, however caused, will be laid to some extent at
Washington's door.
112. The effect of the coup on American prestige in
Africa has been mixed. On the one hand, the sudden
overthrow of the pro-American Tolbert government
suggested American weakness. On the other, however,
the existence of the Americo-Liberian-dominated re-
gime had always seemed something of an anomaly,
with neocolonialist overtones, to other Africans. The
United States' decision to support the Doe regime has
escaped criticism, in part, perhaps, because of the
continued US concern with human rights in Liberia.
With other African nations almost completely rec-
onciled to the new Liberian regime, continued US sup-
port of Liberia will not cause difficulties for Wash-
ington, indeed such support is generally viewed as
necessary to prevent worse things from happening
there.
113. Barring further atrocities in Liberia, US failure
to support Liberia would be viewed elsewhere in Af-
rica as evidence of American unreliability. If Wash-
ington is not prepared to help Liberia, with its
longstanding US ties and large-scale American in-
terests, Africans would be uncertain of any US
commitments. Indeed, many Africans undoubtedly
agree with Liberians that the United States has a posi-
tive obligation to ensure that Liberia avoids economic
collapse.
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114. African evaluations are, of course, made in rican nations will think the better of the United States
context, and attitudes toward the United States involve if it is seen as supporting Liberia at this iuncture.
many factors other than Liberia. But virtually all Af-
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