INTERAGENCY ASSESSMENT: SOMALI MILITARY POSTURE IN THE OGADEN

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP97S00289R000100170008-3
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 17
• Document Creation Date: December 23, 2016
• Document Release Date: September 1, 2011
• Sequence Number: 8
• Publication Date: October 18, 1977
• Content Type: MEMO

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THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
National Intelligence Officers
MEMORANDUM FOR: The National Foreign Intelligence Board
SUBJECT Interagency Assessment: Somali Military Posture
in the Ogaden
The attached interagency assessment has been coordinated informally
at the working level. The paper was prepared to respond to a series of
rather specific questions, and thus its scope is a bit narrow. However,
we felt that the observations and judgments that surfaced during this
undertaking should be shared with others following developments in the
Horn of Africa.
~d,ic
William Parmenter
National Intelligence Officer
for Africa
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INTERAGENCY ASSESSMENT
SUBJECT: Somali Military Posture in the Ogaden
KEY JUDGMENTS
-- Despite Somali denials of direct involvement in the Ogaden
fighting, nearly a third of Somalia's regular units have been
in the Ogaden at one time or another since late July. These
units include commando, tank, motorized, mechanized, and a
artillery battalions. About 8,000 to 10,000 insurgents are
fighting alongside the Somali regulars.
-- Somalia's success in the Ogaden has been due to its ability
to keep the pace of the fighting within the range of its
limited resources. This includes a strategy of relying as
much as possible on insurgents to pin down Ethiopian defenders
and husbanding POL and ammunition supplies for a series of
almost evenly spaced major attacks. In addition, the Somalis
can choose the time and place of the attacks because of
Ethiopian inability to put significant pressure on SNA and
insurgent forces anywhere in the region.
-- The SNA has lost about 40 to 50 tanks since July 23, plus an
undetermined number of armored personnel carriers and trucks.
-- Despite these losses, we expect Siad to continue the offensive
until he has achieved his military objectives of capturing
Dire Dawa, Harar, and a few remaining strongholds in the
south and establishing a defensive position. We believe
that Siad has an even chance of achieving his objectives.
If he does not do so by the end of the year, then his
prospects become less favorable.
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-- Arab military and financial aid should provide Somalia with
sufficient small arms, ammunition, and spare parts, but it
appears at this time that Siad is unlikely to find an
alternative source to replace the major military equipment
the Soviets are refusing to supply. Saudi Arabian pressure
on Arab and West European countries to be forthcoming to
Somali requests is unlikely to achieve results.
-- If major items of equipment cannot be obtained and the
level of the fighting is significantly increased, the SNA
would be hard-pressed to hold on to what it has in the
Ogaden, much less continue its advance.
-- Ethiopia is determined to mount a counterattack as soon as
possible. Transitioning Ethiopian fighter pilots to Soviet
aircraft should not be difficult, but training tank crews,
mechanics, and other hard-skill specialists will be time
consuming. An effective counteroffensive will also be
delayed by morale problems, vulnerable supply lines, and
other military deficiencies. Nevertheless, some Ethiopian
units armed with new Soviet equipment could be ready within
six months.
-- In the meantime, recent deliveries of new Soviet aircraft
should allow the Ethiopians to maintain their air superiority
in the Ogaden and possibly conduct strikes into Somalia. If
the Dire Dawa airfield is lost, MIG-21s and F-5s operating
from Debre Zeit could reach the Dire Dawa - Harar area, and
MIG-23s, if received and made operational, could strike
targets deep in Somalia.
-- In the long run, Ethiopia probably will regain the military
advantage because of its superior manpower reserves and
acquisition of Soviet military equipment. The USSR and its
allies have delivered a sizable number of tanks, some artil-
lery pieces, APCs and MIG-21s, and they have promised addi-
tional MIGs, a few missile boats, and surface-to-air missiles.
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5. Equipment Losses and Casualties. We do not believe
recent reports that Somali losses have been as high as 70
percent of all tanks and 30 percent of all troops committed.
We estimate 40 to 50 Somali tanks have been lost since the 23rd
of July, plus an undetermined number of armored personnel
carriers and trucks--probably less than 30 percent of the total
inventory.- Artillery losses are probably much lower, since
this equipment is normally deployed a considerable distance
behind the front lines. Some small fraction of the SNA losses
may have been made up through the use of captured materiel
including American-made M-41 and M-47 tanks and a few Soviet
T-34 tanks.
6. Data on Somali personnel losses is too unreliable
to make a sound judgment; nonetheless, reports indicate about
440 are known dead, 480 wounded, and about 30 captured. Actual
figures are almost certain to be higher, but probably not as
high as 30 percent of all troops committed.
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7. Logistics. Prior to the beginning of war it was
generally believed that logistic and maintenance factors
would play a significant part in limiting Somalia's military
options. Assistance from friendly Arab regimes has unquestion-
ably relieved some of the anxiety, but the aid received from
Soviet and Middle Eastern donors has not entirely resolved
the problem. At various times operations canceled
or delayed because of shortages of rations and artillery
ammunition. some of the front line units were
reportedly out o mine detection equipment
were directed to gather up all captured medical supplies and
forward them to Mogadiscio.
8. Logistics have played a part in shaping the pattern
of Somalia's combat operation. Periods of heavy fighting have
typically been preceded by two to three weeks of intensive
administrative and logistic preparation. An attacking force
sufficient to overwhelm the Ethiopian garrison is assembled,
supplies and POL are ordered forward from divisional supply
points, and locals sympathetic to the Somali cause are recruited
to assist the regular forces in the attack. Several days prior
to the attack Somali forces move into their attack positions
usually within sight of the Ethiopian defenders. Following
two to four days of heavy fighting the cycle is repeated.
This pattern of lengthy preparation, followed by a short period
of intensive combat, has been feasible because the Ethiopians
are not putting any significant pressure on the SNA and
insurgent forces anywhere in the Ogaden. The SNA had had
enough time to relocate its forces, and juggle its limited
logistic resources, to meet the military demands imposed on it
by Somalia's political leadership.
9. While we do not have good information on the SNA's
logistic reserves or resupply capabilities, we would have to
assume, from their current offensive efforts, that sufficient
stores are available to maintain the current level or character
of the fighting over the short term. However, if the nature of
the fighting is significantly increased, and if the Somalis are
unable to find foreign sources for major items of equipment,
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the SNA would be hard-pressed to hold on to what they have in
the Ogaden, much less continue their advance.
11. Inventory and Deployment. Prior to the fighting
in the Ogaden, the Somali Air Force was believed to have had
42 combat aircraft in its inventory normally based at Hargeisa,
Uanle Uen, and Iscia Baidoa. During the conflict these air-
craft were-redeployed to provide improved support for ground
forces in the Ogaden.
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12. Operational Capability. Actual aircraft losses
are probably hig er than our conservative estimate, and the
overall fighting capability of the Somali Air Force is believed
to be considerably reduced. There is a shortage of fighter
pilots, and the capability of existing pilots is questionable.
Aircraft maintenance is substandard, and no replacement
aircraft appear to be forthcoming. We believe that Somalia
has 13 additional Fishbeds yet to be assembled, but the Soviet
technicians may not be continuing with this project. Ethiopia
will probably continue to enjoy air superiority over most of
the Ogaden. However, the loss of the airfield at Dire Dawa
would limit Ethiopian combat aircraft capabilities in the
Ogaden. Operating from Debre Zeit, MIG-21s and F-5s could
reach the Harrar - Dire Dawa area but could not reach targets
as far as Hargeisa. However, if Ethiopia obtains MIG-21s,
then operating from Debre Zeit they would be able to strike
targets deep inside Somalia.
A. Forces Available for Deployment
13. The overall strength of the SNA is presently
thought to be about 32,000 men. Subtracting the number of
personnel believed to be in the Ogaden (.9,000 to 13,000) does
not necessarily furnish a reliable estimate of the number of
troops still available for deployment. Some SNA personnel are
known to have been siphoned off for service with the insurgents,
others have undoubtedly been taken out of their usual assign-
ments and sent to the Ogaden as replacements. The 17th.
Motorized Group, formerly stationed at Chisimaio has functioned
primarily as a replacement depot for the various groups already
in combat. Various other measures have been taken to augment
the forces available for combat operations, including the
organization of defense squads in factories, drafting local
personnel into the police in areas captured by Somalia,
providing weapons training at the local party level, returning
to active duty all noncommissioned officers and enlisted
personnel on loan to civil agencies, recalling students
training abroad, and transferring all recent graduates of the
Halane Academy to operational units. Somali officials have
also mentioned a 100,000-man reserve, which is apparently being
called up to counter the threat posed by the Ethiopian
People's Militia, but there are indications that this force
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cannot be adequately equipped with the material available in
Somalia.
14. While it is difficult to accurately assess the
effectiveness of Somalia's recruiting and retraining programs,
no significant increase in the overall strength of the SNA is
likely to occur without major outside logistic support.
Vacancies in existing units can probably be filled but no
additional units are likely to be formed. Thus the armed and
trained troops presently in Somalia that could be committed
to the fighting probably number about 15,000.
B. Equipment Status
15. Reserves. Somalia's limited equipment reserves
are, for the most part, already in the hands of the troops.
Those units which have not yet crossed the border or engaged
in combat operations constitute the known reserves of both
trained manpower and materiel. This situation is particularly
critical in the case of combat aircraft, tanks, personnel
carriers, and cargo vehicles. Although Somalis has received
considerable amounts of military equipment from various nations,
there is no indication that any nation has made up the losses
in combat vehicles and aircraft.
16. Sources of New Equipment. Since July, the
People's Republic of China, Italy, and sympathetic Muslim
states have furnished large quantities of military and medical
supplies. Soviet deliveries of previously ordered supplies
have continued during this period. Over the past two months
medical personnel or supplies or both have been provided by
Egypt, Iraq, Iran, Sudan, Qatar, and the PRC. Military
clothing, small arms, spare parts and ammunition have been
furnished by Syria, Saudi Arabia, Italy, Pakistan, and the
Soviet Union. These recent Somali purchases appear to have
been financed with Saudi Arabian and Kuwaiti funds.
17. However, while the Arabs have been willing to
supply small arms, spare parts, ammunition, and related support
equipment, they are unwilling, so far, to provide the heavy
combat equipment needed by Somalia to replace losses in the
Ogaden. Saudi money should be sufficient to allow Siad to
continue to acquire small arms and ammunition on the open
market and from some West European countries. However, major
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military equipment is unavailable from Western sources because
of political constraints and prior commitments by potential
armorers. Saudi Arabia is applying political pressure on West
European countries to be more forthcoming, but we doubt such
pressure will achieve results. Somalia will soon face serious
shortages of planes, tanks, and armored personnel carriers
should the present rate of combat losses continue.
18. Available information seems to indicate that
Somalia has or can obtain adequate POL supplies to sustain the
current level of fighting for the foreseeable future. The
major problem for the Somalis is to transport POL from coastal
storage facilities to the areas where the fighting is taking
place some 200 to 500 miles inland. While this is a definite
limitation on the magnitude and pace of combat operations,
Somali efforts to reduce its impact have been adequate in the
past, and we believe the Somalis will be able to successfully
manage this situation in the future.
19. In recent years the Soviets have helped the
Somalis expand their POL storage capacity to more than 800,000
barrels. Some 35 percent (275,000 barrels) of this capacity
is in the north around Berbera and Hargeisa and the remainder
in the south--principally at Mogadiscio and Chisimaio.
20. Somali POL imports have more than tripled since
1971 to some 1 million barrels per year. A portion of these
increased imports went into the newly constructed storage
capacity so when the fighting began the Somalis had some
500,000 to 800,000 barrels in reserve. The Soviets have been
the principal supplier of petroleum to Somalia and have
contracted to supply 1 million barrels during 1977. Should
the Soviets cut off or slow deliveries, the Somalis would
have no trouble obtaining supplies from the Arab producing
states.
21. Estimating the amount of POL the Somalis are
consuming during the sporadic fighting in the Ogaden is
difficult. However, based on data we have developed from
comparable Soviet mechanized and armored formations we would
estimate that the Somali army is consuming some 5,000 barrels
per day (bpd) when heavy fighting is taking place and some
2,500 bpd during lulls.
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D. Political Considerations Affecting Somali Activity
22. Early Strategy. Early this year, Somali
President Siad concluded that the time was opportune to esclate
the fighting in the Ogaden. We believe the actual decision to
commit regular forces was not made until May or early June.
Siad's original intent was to have the insurgents conduct the
actual fighting, with Mogadiscio providing logistic and some
advisory support. The inability of the insurgents to achieve
significant gains led Siad to introduce regular forces to
regain the momentum of the fighting.
23. Internal Factors. Siad does not appear to face
serious opposition to his rule. Some members of the ruling
military hierarchy may be unhappy with Siad's handling of the
war, and serious Somali military setbacks would probably raise
more doubts about his recent policies. However, his political
survival would not necessarily be threatened. The decision to
try to seize the Ogaden seems to have been supported by a
consensus among the hierarchy. There is no indication that
any faction distanced itself from that policy to the extent
that it could turn the policy's failure against Siad. The
Somalis are more likely to blame the Soviets than Siad if an
Ethiopian counterattack is successful.
24. External Factors. Siad has not been able to
acquire support for Somalia from international organizations.
The OAU has refused to endorse his claims that Ethiopia is a
colonialist power and the insurgents represent a liberation
front. In fact, the OAU has endorsed Ethiopia's position
under the OAU principle of territorial integrity. In deference
to the OAU, even the Arab League refused to endorse the
insurgents' claims. The US and other Western countries have
withdrawn, at least for the present, their offer to provide
"defensive" arms. The Soviets have adopted an openly pro-
Ethiopian stance and are refusing to enter into new arms
agreements.
III. Expected Developments
A. Ethiopia's Strategy
25. Factors Affecting a Counterattack. Addis Ababa
enjoys a substantial manpower reserve, and massive quantities
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of military equipment are now arriving from the Soviet Union
and its allies. This includes some 200 tanks, 50 artillery
pieces, 60 APCs, and about 15 MIG-21s to Ethiopia; and they
have promised a total of 48 MIGs, five missile boats, and
surface-to-air missiles.
26. Ethiopia would have already achieved a numerical
edge in tanks but for the losses incurred in the fighting
at Jijiga. An unanticipated side effect of the battles at
Jijiga and Kabredehar has been the upgrading of the Ethiopian
tank fleet. Most of the vehicles lost at Jijiga were
obsolescent models built after World War II. They are being
replaced with more modern Soviet tanks, offering a greatly
increased operational radius and a more powerful main gun.
27. Ethiopia's Air Force also stands to improve its
operational capabilities in the near future. At the present
rate of delivery and assembly, one squadron of MIG-21s, about
15 aircraft, could be operational by mid-November.
28. The regime's immediate strategy is to gain time
to absorb the new Soviet equipment. Some units could be
operational within six months. However, more time will be
required to prepare adequately for a concerted counterattack.
Some problems which might inhibit a successful counterattack
include:
-- Morale. Since mid-July there have been numerous
indications of sagging morale, and there is some
question whether the regular units and militia
personnel can be relied upon to mount an effective
effort. Ethiopian troops operating in the desert
will be mostly conscripted highlanders, unused
to conditions in the Ogaden and, judging by the
performance of the militia, inadequately prepared
to fight Somali mobile infantry, tanks, and heavy
artillery.
-- Assimilation Of New Equipment Transitioning
thiopian fighter pilots to Soviet aircraft should
not prove unduly challenging, but training tank
crews, radio repairmen, mechanics, and other hard-
skill specialists will be time consuming and
frustrating. The failure of the People's Militia
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at Gode, and the ineffective performance of the
newly created T-34 and M-47 battalions at Jijiga,
should have demonstrated to the Ethiopians the
futility of sending partially trained recruits
into combat without adequate preparation. The
Soviets take 5 1/2 months to train a tank crewman
(four to six weeks of basic training, followed by
four months of advanced training in a tank unit).
If the Ethiopians follow this schedule in organizing
their T-54/55 battalions, the Ethiopian counterattack
could be delayed until early 1978. If they do not
follow a realistic training schedule they are in
clinger of losing still more of their tank force.
-- Vulnerability of Supply Lines. Interior supply
lines will be susceptible to guerrilla action,
while the vital overland route to Assab is vulnerable
to attack. The damage to the Assab refinery and
the port facilities could have a crippling effect
on Ethiopian plans for a counterattack.
-- Army Internal Weaknesses. The Ethiopian Army is
plagued with numerous operational and organizational
weaknesses which will continue to inhibit combat
effectiveness over the coming months. Included
among these are: a weak military chain of command,
its effectiveness hampered by continuous PMAC
interferences; the loss of many experienced military
leaders and trained technicians; the growing
reliance on poorly trained, inexperienced militia
personnel; an ineffective personnel management and
maintenance system; poor intra- and inter- service
cooperation; a shortage of operational air defense
radars; limited aerial reconnaissance capabilities;
and a limited ground mobility capability. While
some of these deficiencies will undoubtedly be
overcome in the future, they nevertheless remain
as obstacles to current combat effectiveness, and
are likely to remain so over the short term.
29. Siad finds himself in a situation he may not have
anticipated. While he can disregard OAU and other external
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pressure for a cease-fire or withdrawal of regular combat
forces from Ethiopia, he cannot disregard the hard fact of a
diminishing stockpile of war materiel. Nevertheless, we
believe the SNA is preparing to mount a major military offensive
in the Harar - Dire Dawa area in the north, while keeping up the
pressure in Bale and Sidamo provinces. We believe he has an
even chance of succeeding on both fronts, but the costs in
manpower and materiel will be high. Once these objectives
have been taken we would expect the SNA to halt its advance,
and assume a defensive posture.
30. Unless Somalia can rapidly repair its losses in
combat vehicles and aircraft, and adequately train and equip
the replacements needed to bring the forward battalions
and groups back to full strength, the long-term forecast is
less promising. Ethiopia's demonstrated air superiority will
further aggravate Somalia's defensive problems, as will
fighting at the outer limits of their supply line. Poor roads,
weather problems, and potential shortages of cargo vehicles,
will exacerbate the existing equipment shortages and further
weaken the units scattered along the eastern edge of the
Ethiopian massif.
31. The major insurgent organizations, the Western
Somalia Liberation and the Somali Abo Liberation Front, are
playing a crucial part in the Somali successes in Ethiopia.
During the period January to July 1977 the insurgents performed
invaluable service in gathering intelligence on Ethiopian
troop dispositions and organizing the Somali population inside
Ethiopia to assist in the more conventional aspects of the
summer campaign. Once the war began, the insurgents bore
the brunt of the early fighting at Dire Dawa, Dagahabur,
Kabredehar, Gode, El Carre, Neghelli Borana, and numerous
small outposts along the former border. Now that the war
has moved into a more orthodox phase, the insurgents will
probably be reinforced with personnel recruited from among
the Somali population in the Ogaden. It is possible that
some of the insurgents will become the armed forces of an
independent Western Somalia or perhaps, at a later date, that
it will be absorbed directly into the Somali National Army.
In either event, their importance as a fighting force is
expected to increase as the combat capabilities of regular
Somali forces in the Ogaden tend to decrease.
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32. Despite Somali denials of direct involvement in
the Ogaden fighting, nearly a third of Somalia's regular
units have been active in the Ogaden since late July.
33. The Somalis have been successful because they
have been able to keep the pace of the fighting within the
range of their limited resources. This includes a strategy
of relying as much as possible on insurgents to pin down
Ethiopian defenders and husbanding POL and ammunition supplies
for a series of almost evenly spaced major attacks.
34. Despite the prospect that Somalia will pay a high
price in both manpower and material, we expect Siad to continue
the offensive until he has achieved his military objectives
of capturing Dire Dawa, Harar, and a few remaining strongholds
in the south and establishing a defensive postion. We believe
Siad has an even chance of achieving his objectives, but that
he must do so by the end of the year.
35. Arab military and financial aid should provide
Somalia with sufficient small arms, ammunition, and spare
parts, but Siad seems unlikely to find an alternative source
to replace the major military equipment the Soviets are
refusing to supply. Saudi Arabian pressure on Arab and West
European countries to be more forthcoming to Somali requests
is unlikely to achieve results.
36. Ethiopia is determined to mount a counterattack
as soon as possible. While some Ethiopian units armed with
new Soviet equipment could be ready within six months, an
effective counteroffensive will be delayed because of morale
problems, vulnerable supply lines, lack of trained manpower,
and other military deficiencies. For the present, recent
deliveries of new Soviet aircraft should allow the Ethiopians
to maintain their air superiority in the Ogaden and possibly
conduct strikes into Somalia.
37. In the long run Ethiopia will regain the military
advantage because of its superior manpower reserves and
acquisition of Soviet military equipment.
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