COMMUNIST MILITARY ASSISTANCE TO NICARAGUA: TRENDS AND IMPLICATIONS

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP97R00694R000800340001-5
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 21
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: February 21, 2012
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: December 1, 1987
• Content Type: MISC

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Communist Military
Assistance to Nicaragua:
Trends and Implications
A Research Paper
S.R-
GI87-10084/ S
December 1987
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Communist Military Assistance to Nicaragua: Trends and
Implications
Scope Note
This research paper highlights the evolution of
Communist arms transfers to Nicaragua and analyzes the
likely direction of Communist arms deliveries in the near
term. It focuses in particular on Soviet assistance since
1983, its means of delivery, and its imp Nirararninf-g
conflict with the anti-Sandinista rebels.
is a ieve a almost a mayor
combat arms delivered to Nicaragua have been identified. It
is believed that estimates of the tonnage of military
support materiel represent the minimum quantity of military
cargo delivered. Estimates of the dollar value of Soviet
military deliveries are derived by adding the value of major
equipment delivered to the estimated value of deliveries of
support equipment, spare parts, and munitions, which are
valued in the aggregate on a per-ton basis. The value
assigned by weight to such follow-on support was recently
revised upward for Soviet deliveries to all Third World
nations, based on a comprehensive review of the composition
and value of this component of Soviet arms transfers.
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Communist Military Assistance to Nicaragua: Trends and
Implications
Summary
Information available as of 20 November 1987 was used in
this report.
Communist military assistance to Nicaragua since the
Sandinista revolution now exceeds $2.5 billion and probably
will continue at or above its current level of $400-500
million annually as long as Managua faces an active
insurgency. The value of Soviet deliveries by mid November
1987 was approaching the record high of $550 million in
1986. Continuing aid at this level should be sufficient to
supply the helicopters, infantry weapons, trucks,
ammunition, and other materiel Managua needs to carry on its
counterinsurgency without serious shortages. In the short to
medium term, the Soviet Union is unlikely to send newer or
more expensive equipment, which would be difficult for the
Sandinistas to use effectively against the insurgent threat.
Moreover, Managua can pay for little, if any, of the
materiel delivered.
The military assistance already provided has made
Nicaragua the strongest conventional military power in
Central America and has been vital in limiting the insurgent
threat. Nicaragua has more tanks, other armored vehicles,
field artillery, and air defense artillery than Honduras, El
Salvador, and Guatemala combined, and its regular armed
forces are at least 50 percent larger than those of any of
its neighbors. Recent Soviet deliveries are intended to
improve Sandinista mobility, firepower, logistic support,
and air defense capabilities. Most notably, Moscow has
delivered at least 50 helicopters since 1984.
Soviet military aid to Nicaragua undoubtedly will
fluctuate as a result of changes in the regional political
and military situation. Should the insurgency intensify,
Moscow would probably provide additional helicopters to
enhance mobility and firepower, more trucks and wheeled
armored vehicles to increase troop mobility and protection,
and improved air defense equipment to try to disrupt
insurgent resupply flights. On the other hand, if the
insurgent threat declines as a result of the Central
American peace plan, Moscow would probably replenish
depleted stocks and then reduce military deliveries below
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current levels, possibly passing the savings on to other
beleaguered Third World clients fighting insurgencies.
Even if the insurgency declined, Moscow probably would
still provide several hundred million dollars of military
assistance per year to Nicaragua over the longer term. In
this situation, Moscow would probably concentrate on
building up Nicaragua's conventional armed forces to
consolidate the regime and to allay Sandinista fears of a US
invasion. Once Managua was militarily secure, Moscow might
discreetly build a weapons stockpile for provision to
subversive groups in the region. A militarily dominant
Nicaragua would provide an effective platform for the
Sandinistas to further their revolutionary goals and
intimidate their neighbors.
It is unlikely that Moscow would deliver jet combat
aircraft as long as the United States, maintains its clearly
stated objections to such a delivery.
If the USSR decided to deliver new or politically
sensitive weapons to Nicaragua, it would probably use
deception and denial methods to reduce Washington's reaction
time and deny tactical warning to US-backed insurgents and
other Central American nations. It is believed that Soviet
vessels going to Nicaragua in the past have employed more
deceptive measures than those going to other Third World
clients. Moscow also uses Cuba as a transshipment point for
military cargo destined for Nicaragua, and it could
calculate that new weapons shipped via this channel would
not set off alarms in Washington because ships frequently
travel between Cuba and Nicaragua. The Soviets would,
moreover, retain an element of deniability in their military
relationship with the Sandinistas.
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Communist Militarv Assistance to Nicaragua: Trends and
Implications
The Arming of Nicaragua
Since the Sandinista revolution in 1979, the Soviet
Union and its Communist allies have supplied Nicaragua with
nearly all of its military needs at little cost to Managua.
In the early years after the revolution, Moscow provided
Managua with the weapons to build a conventional army. The
Kremlin did not deliver these arms directly but relied on
friends and allies to ship this materiel. Since 1984 the
Soviets have played a more direct role in shipping materiel
to the Sandinistas and have concentrated their deliveries on
bolstering the counterinsurgency effort in Nicaragua. Soviet
deliveries reached a record high of $550 million in 1986,
and the value of such shipments by mid November 1987 was
approaching that level.
Moscow Provides Materiel Indirectly: 1980-84
During the early years after the revolution, Nicaragua
received cumulative shipments of military hardware from the
Soviet Union in excess of $1 billion, much of which was
delivered on Algerian and Bulgarian vessels. Four Algerian
ships delivered almost 11,000 metric tons of materiel
between 1981 and 1982, including Nicaragua's first medium
tanks and armored personnel carriers. Bulgarian ships
delivered some 16,000 tons of equipment, including
additional armored vehicles and radars, in five trips
between 1982 and 1984. East Germany also made at least five
deliveries of support materiel totaling some $40 million
during this time; and North Korea, the only other Communist
supplier, provided four patrol boats worth $8 million.
It is believed that most, if not all, of the materiel
delivered on the Algerian and Bulgarian ships was of Soviet
origin and, at least in the case of Algeria, was provided
specifically for transshipment to Nicaragua. Some cargo
delivered to Mers-el-Kebir probably came from Nikolayev Port
Facility South, the dedicated arms exporting facility in the
Soviet Union. Once delivered to Algeria, the hardware may
have been stored separately before being loaded on an
Algerian ship. Similar equipment was reported to be in
Nicaragua after a visit by an Algerian vessel.
the Bulgarian
shipmen s also originated in the ovie nion. Soviet ships
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reportedly offloaded equipment of the types later delivered
to Nicaragua at the port of Burgas. This equipment probably
was later transported by Bulgarian vessels to Nicaragua.
Bulgaria does not have a surplus of military equipment,
making it unlikely that the large numbers of armored
vehicles, for example, that were sent to Nicaragua came from
Bulgarian stocks
Moscow also made some direct military deliveries to
Nicaragua throughout this period from ports other than
Nikolayev. Ships leaving the Soviet Union--at least one in
1981, another in 1982, and some 19 during 1983--carried
about 8,000 tons of support materiel to the Sandinistas.
These ships were part of the regular liner service that
delivers both military and nonmilitary goods from ports such
as Leningrad. The military portions of the cargo were
probably made up of 11 MI-8 transport helicopters. ks,
spare parts, and other items.F 7
The USSR may have relied to a large extent on other
countries to ship major arms to Nicaragua in the 1981-84
period because it was uncertain about the US response.
Moscow may have feared providing Washington with a pretext
for military action against the Sandinista regime; it almost
certainly sought to avoid any direct conflict with the new
US administration.
Direct Soviet Deliveries Increase: 1984-87
Moscow began direct shipments of large quantities of
combat arms to the Sandinistas in late 1984. The Soviet ship
Bakuriani arrived in Corinto from Nikolayev in November
after avoiding the Panama Canal by traveling around the tip
of South America. Since then, three more Nikolayev
deliveries have occurred--two in 1986 and one so far in
1987--with some 14,000 tons of materiel, about a quarter of
all Soviet tonnage shipped to Nicaragua from 1984 through
November 1987. Military voyages from other Soviet ports also
rose, particularly in 1986 when 33 trips were made. Eighteen
shipments had been identified by mid November 1987. Prior to
1986, the Soviets sent an average of 15 such deliveries to
Nicaragua annually.
East European nations made significant shipments in
1985 and 1986. They picked up some of the slack during an
ebb in Soviet deliveries by shipping more in 1985 than all
the previous years combined--some $55 million worth of
military assistance in 1985, compared with $46 million
during 1981-84. Most of this aid was provided by East
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Germany, although Czechoslovakia, Poland, and Romania
supplied small amounts. In 1986 East European deliveries
dropped back to $35 million and will probably continue to
remain low in 1987. The North Koreans also had 1,000 tons of
arms--possibly rifles, rocket launchers, and ammunition from
Iran--awaiting shipment to Nicaragua in 1985. These arms
probably were delivered. Four North Korean patrol boats are
also currently in Cuba awaiting delivery to Nicaragua.
The Soviets probably became more directly involved in
supplying military equipment as concern over the US reaction
lessened and political commitment to the Sandinista regime
grew. At the same time, the Sandinistas became more firmly
entrenched, developed a viable conventional army, and
therefore, in Moscow's eyes, were probably more deserving of
Soviet assistance.
The USSR has employed deception and denial measures
with each of the four shipments of weapons from Nikolayev.
Such steps presumably were taken to reduce Washington's
ability to react to the deliveries before they reached
Nicaragua and to downplay Moscow's military relationship
with the Sandinistas:
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The Soviets may be taking these steps to confuse and
complicate any short-term US response to a pending arms
delivery by introducing elements of uncertainty about where
the ship is actually destined, what it is really carrying,
and when it will actually arrive in port. Moscow may also be
trying to establish a pattern by which more sensitive
equipment could be delivered to Nicaragua by testing the
West's responses to the use of deceptive measures.
The Cuban Role
Cuba was the first nation to provide military
assistance to Nicaragua after the Sandinistas came to power,
and Havana sent a significant amount of military equipment
to Managua from 1979 through 1983. This materiel consisted
mostly of field artillery and air defense guns, the bulk of
which arrived in 1980. Beginning in 1984, direct
Cuban provision of identified military equipment dropped
off. Even so, substantial quantities of materiel--probably
mostly small arms and ammunition--are still shipped to
Nicaragua from Cuba:
--Nicaraguan, Cuban, and Cuban-controlled ships shuttle
frequently between the two countries, and
the offloading of some military
Nicaraguan ship brought a radar from Cuba to Rama in
March 1987, and another ship delivered at least 16
ZPU-4 antiaircraft guns in April 1987 to the same
port. These shuttle ships reportedly have also towed
Zhuk-class patrol boats from Cuba to Nicaragua.
--Security precautions are often put into effect at El
Bluff or Rama, indicating the imminent arrival of
military cargo on the shuttle ships from Cuba. These
security precautions include: deployment of early
warning radars to the area, movement of patrol boats
on the river between El Bluff and Rama, deployment of
underwater demolition teams to search the port and
river for mines, and deployment of troops and
helicopters to the area to protect the convoys
carrying offloaded equipment.
equipment from at least two such voyages. One
--Reportedly a crate taken off the Aracely, one of the
Nicaraguan shuttle ships, broke open, revealing RPK
light machineguns.
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--Cargo manifests accompanying Cuban deliveries to
Nicaragua sometimes include high tonnages of such
items as "dolls" and "toys" that appear too
frequently to actually be playthings. Some 10
shipments of "dolls" and "toys," totaling more
than 600 tons, have been made in 1987 alone.
most Cuban materiel for
Nicaragua is almost certainly provided by Moscow. It is
likely that this materiel either never enters the Cuban
inventor or if taken from Cuban stocks, is re laced b the
Soviets.
--The Soviets have used Cuba to transship weapons to
the Sandinistas on several occasions. A total of six
AN-26 transport aircraft delivered to Cuba between
1983 and 1986 were assembled and flown to Nicaragua,
and at least five Soviet-built Zhuk-class patrol
boats were towed from Cuba to Nicaragua between 1982
and 1987. The Soviets replenished the Cuban inventory
with at least 14 Zhuks during this time.
--In 1985 three Soviet arms carriers were in port in
Mariel, Cuba, and two Nicaraguan shuttle ships were
berthed next to them. It cannot be established
conclusively that military cargo was moved from the
Soviet ships to the Nicaraguan ships, but the
uncommon berthing practice suggests that it was.
--Cuba does not manufacture sufficient quantities of
small arms and ammunition to allow exports, so the
large quantities delivered to Nicaragua on the
shuttle ships almost certainly come from Cuba's
military benefactor, the Soviet Union.
Cuba's growing role as a transshipment point for
military goods has been accompanied by a slight decline in
other forms of Cuban assistance to Nicaragua:
--Cubans fly fewer Nicaraguan combat missions than in
1985.
--Since 1985 there is no information to suggest that
Nicaraguans are currently training on air defense
missile systems in Cuba, although some communications
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and much officer training are still provided there.
--Since completion of the Punta Huete runway in late
1985, the Cubans do not appear to have been actively
involved in militarv construction in Nicaragua.
Impact of Communist Military
Deliveries on the Sandinista Regime
Communist military assistance in the early years after
the revolution transformed the Sandinista guerrillas into
the largest conventional force in Central America. In more
recent years, the types and quantities of military equipment
delivered indicate that Moscow's and Managua's priorities
have shifted from building conventional forces to
confronting the insurgency.
Creating a Conventional Army: 1980-84
Large arms deliveries during the first years after the
revolution helped Nicaragua create the largest ground force
in Central America.
e Soviets reportedly
provided Managua with more than 0 T-54/55 medium tanks,
two dozen PT-76 light amphibious tanks, and some 130 BTR-60
and BTR-152 armored personnel carriers (APCs). The first
tanks were delivered by an Algerian ship in 1981, but much
of the armor--as well as large numbers of field artillery
and air defense weapons--was shipped on Bulgarian vessels in
1982 and 1983. The last and largest major Bulgarian
shipment, in October 1984, contained more than 180 tanks and
other armored vehicles and more than 20 early warning and
coastal surveillance radars.
Soviet, Cuban, and East German advisers provided
training on these new systems, as well as basic training for
new conscripts, while other Communist countries worked to
improve the military infrastructure. The Bulgarians began
construction of a deepwater port at El Bluff, which is still
under way but proceeding very slowly. Other Communist aid
went into facilities for the thousands of new recruits,
while still other assistance improved the road network.
Confronting the Insurgency: 1984-87
Communist military assistance since late 1984 has
focused on improving Managua's counterinsurgent efforts. The
types and quantities of weapons delivered--large numbers of
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helicopters, trucks, munitions, early warning radars, and
air defense weapons--have increased Sandinista mobility,
firepower, and air defense capabilities.
Greater Mobility. Soviet deliveries have facilitated
government movement throughout the country to meet the
insurgent threat. Moscow has provided 37 transport
helicopters--MI-8 and MI-17s--since late 1984. These
helicopters can carry up to 24 troops and are armed with
12.7-mm machineguns, 57-mm rockets, and bombs. They allow
the Sandinista troops to reach northern and eastern parts of
the country where the road network is undeveloped. The
helicopters reportedly are also used to protect the road
leading from Rama when the shuttle ships make arms
deliveries.
Nicaragua now has six AN-26 transport aircraft in its
inventory--although two are registered to the civilian
airline--that further enhance mobility. These aircraft can
carry either passengers or cargo and have been used to move
materiel from the Managua area to the east coast where
insurgent activity is greater. The AN-26s also have been
used for bombing and. reconnaissance missions.
Delivery of some 5,000 vehicles since 1985 by the
Soviet Union and Eastern Europe--primarily East Germany--
further enhances Sandinista troop movement, logistic
resupply, and rapid dispersion of military materiel
throughout the country. In late 1984, and again in 1986, the
Sandinistas received a total of 14 40-ton trailers that are
used to move tracked armored vehicles, such as tanks,
without wearing out the vehicles themselves. Other vehicles-
-mostly trucks and jeeps--also assist in the dispersion of
newly arrived materiel.
More Firepower. Moscow has also provided Managua with
assault helicopters and patrol boats that markedly increase
Sandinista firepower and threaten insurgent activities. The
Soviets delivered the first six MI-25 helicopter gunships in
late 1984, another six in 1986, and one more in mid-1987.
The aircraft are armed with machineguns,-cannons, air-to-
ground rockets, and bombs. They are ideal for attacking
insurgent bases--although they have never been used this
way--and they provide effective support for military
operations, including security for convoys that meet the
smaller arms carriers visiting the east coast of Nicaragua.
Soviet-built Zhuk-class patrol boats also support arms
deliveries by patrolling the Rio Escondido between El Bluff
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and Rama, preventing the insurgents from establishing
themselves in the area
The Soviets have, with Cuban help, sent Managua large
quantities of expendables needed to fight the intensifying
war. Consumables made up more than 55 percent of all
military tonnage delivered between 1985 and 1987, up from
some 40 percent during the 1981-84 time frame. In the first
six months of 1987 alone, it is estimated that at least
8,500 tons of small arms and ammunition were delivered to
Managua by Havana and Moscow. The two Nikolayev ships that
called in Nicaragua in 1986 may have carried as much as
8,200 tons of ammunition. From 1982 to 1984, the Algerian
and Bulgarian ships probably brought some 12,000.tons of
munitions on behalf of the Soviets.
Improved Early Warning and Air Defense Capability.
Communist early warning radars and air defense weapons,
while improving Managua's ability to track aircraft, have
only marginally enhanced the Sandinistas' ability to shoot
them down. Nicaragua received its largest delivery of radars
in late 1984, followed by a second surge in 1987. Effective
use of these radars in a nationwide network will improve
counterinsurgency efforts by allowing the Sandinistas to
identify and track rebel resupply flights better,
particularly in the eastern portion of the country. Stopping
these flights, which have been delivering supplies to the
insurgents virtually unhampered since March 1987, is a top
priority for the Sandinistas.
Support for Political Violence in Latin America
Nicaragua has received some small arms and ammunition
from other Communist nations that it almost certainly has
passed on to insurgent groups in Latin America. Managua's
involvement in arms trafficking includes the supply of most
of the US Vietnam-vintage M-16 assault rifles that have been
recovered in El Salvador from leftist insurgents between
1979 and 1984. The provision of weapons has dropped off in
the last few years, probably at least in part as a result of
Managua's heightened attention to its own counterinsurgent
effort. The Sandinistas, however, continue to provide
ammunition to the Salvadoran guerrillas.
Nicaragua has also provided weapons from its own
inventory or has sought to procure weapons on the
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international market. At least six of the weapons recovered
following the 19th of April Movement's takeover of the
Palace of Justice in Colombia in November 1985 can be linked
to Nicaragua.
Should Managua no longer need to concentrate on
fighting the insurgents, Sandinista assistance to regional
leftists would probably rise. When not faced with an active
civil war, the Sandinistas would have more materiel
available that could be provided to regional groups to help
them further both their own goals as well as Sandinista
revolutionary ideals. Such assistance, however, would have
to be very discreet so as not to elicit an international
outcry in the wake of the Central American peace plan.
Although Nicaragua has received large numbers of air
defense weapons, the Sandinistas typically have not been
able to use them effectively against insurgent resupply
flights. The largest delivery of air defense weapons
occurred in 1987, following smaller shipments in earlier
years. The optically guided 23-mm ZU-23 antiaircraft (AA)
guns delivered in 1987 provide some improvement but lack
sufficient range to be effective against the rebel flights.
The radar-directed KS-19 guns and the 57-mm S-60 guns
delivered in 1987 pose a threat to the flights because they
are the only weapons capable of engaging targets at high
altitude and at night. In 1986 and 1987 the Sandinistas
deployed some of the KS-19s to the eastern portion of the
country, but the guns had not inflicted any losses by
November 1987. The wheeled S-60--which is slightly more
mobile and has a higher rate of fire than the KS-19--may
prove more effective once deployed. The Sandinistas also
have several hundred SA-7 hand-held surface-to-air missiles
(SAMs) as well as more powerful and versatile SA-14 and SA-
16 SAMs. All of these weapons require visual target
acquisition, which reduces their effectiveness at night when
the resupply flights operate.
Communist Economic Aid Increasing
Nicaragua has received most of its economic aid from
Warsaw Pact countries and Cuba since 1984, when oil, other
imports, and project development aid from non-Communist
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sources began to dry up as a result of Managua's
increasingly radical stance. By 1986 Communist countries
accounted for about two-thirds of aid flows from non-
Communist sources, or more than $2 billion. With an
estimated 3,000 civilian technicians in country (about 85
percent of them Cubans) and some 4,000 Nicaraguans training
in Communist academic establishments, the Soviet Union and
its allies have consolidated their position as the dominant
foreign economic influence in Nicaragua.
Commodity assistance to relieve import shortfalls is
the predominant element in Warsaw Pact economic aid, with
nearly $750 million worth of oil, food, and other products
having been delivered. The Soviet agreement in 1984 to meet
Nicaragua's annual oil needs on credit has been the most
important economic assistance provided. Eastern Europe is
also providing oil, but the value of these commitments is
not clear. Another $550 million in deliveries represents
machinery, equipment, and long-term development aid.
Projects under way with Soviet and East European assistance
include:
--Gold mining at Bonanza and Siuna and oil and minerals
prospecting elsewhere.
--A satellite ground station.
--School and hospital construction.
--Fishing and port development.
--The Pacific Coast irrigation project and hydropower
development.
Project aid is expected to accelerate from its present
low level over the next few years as major projects enter an
advanced stage of implementation.
Cuba has provided some $400 million of assistance since
1980, most of which has gone into a sugar mill and into
airfield, road, and railway construction, as well as oil
storage facilities and irrigation projects. Cuban
participation in economic development has receded from the
high levels of the early 1980s, when 5.,000 Cuban technicians
were in Nicaragua and 4,000 Nicaraguans were in Cuba for
training. Cuban-trained Nicaraguans have replaced Cubans in
teaching and other administrative jobs, and Cuba has been
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reluctant to commit new resources to Nicaraguan projects
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because of competing requirements at home.
insurgents.
Outlook and Implications
Communist military deliveries to Nicaragua will
probably continue at a fairly steady pace as long as Managua
faces an active insurgency. The Soviets almost certainly are
committed to supplying whatever military assistance they
deem necessary to help the Sandinistas combat the rebels. If
the insurgent threat remains at current levels, most
Communist aid will probably consist of helicopters, trucks,
and consumables, delivered in quantities comparable with
those of 1986. Since Nicaragua pays for little, if any, of
the materiel it receives, the Soviets will probably choose
not to send newer or more expensive equipment that is in
demand by paying clients like Iraq. Moreover, more
sophisticated weaponry would require an increased Soviet or
Cuban advisory presence, something Moscow probably is trying
to avoid. The Kremlin nonetheless has several options to
improve Managua's military capabilities against the
term to avoid adverse reactions from the West.
Should hostilities intensify, Moscow would likely step
up deliveries of trucks and wheeled armored vehicles, air
defense equipment, and additional and more effective
helicopters.- Although jet combat aircraft would enhance the
Sandinistas' defenses against aerial resupply, it is
doubtful that Moscow would provide such aircraft in the near
Over the longer term, it is believed that Moscow,
unless constrained by a regional accord, would continue to
build up the Sandinistas' conventional capabilities.
would be marginal given their larger needs.
If insurgent activity were to decline, the Soviets
would probably maintain their current level of military
support for at least a year to rebuild stocks depleted by
the war. Afterward, the number and tonnage of deliveries
could fall to a level comparable with the 1982-84 period
when the Soviets delivered $300-400 million worth of
materiel each year. The $100-150 million saved each year by
Moscow could be passed on to Moscow's other beleaguered
clients fighting insurgencies, although the impact for some
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The Soviets' first priority would be the provision of
the conventional materiel necessary to help the Sandinistas
protect themselves from any remaining internal threats. As a
second priority, the Soviets would probably continue to
enhance the defenses around Managua to provide still more
protection from an external attack. Finally, the Soviets
might create a large stockpile of weapons for the
Sandinistas to distribute to regional insurgent and
terrorist groups to further their revolutionary goals.
Improved Ground Forces
Soviet efforts to improve Managua's ground forces would
probably include delivery of both armored and unarmored
vehicles. Moscow would almost certainly continue to ship
large numbers of trucks to replace those that are damaged,
worn out, or poorly maintained. If an insurgent threat
continues, delivery of wheeled APC5 would also be likely,
given the Sandinistas' need to move troops around the
country to combat the insurgents and defend convoys of
unarmed vehicles. Such vehicles would include the BTR-152
and the BTR-60, which Managua already has in its inventory.
Additional wheeled armored reconnaissance vehicles--such as
the BRDM-2--would also be useful in stepped-up
counterinsurgent operations. It is unlikely that the Soviets
would send more tanks or tracked APCs because such vehicles
are not as useful in an unconventional war as the more
mobile wheeled vehicles.
The Soviets could also provide more light artillery,
infantry support weapons, and rocket launchers to improve
Nicaragua's ground forces. The Sandinistas' 76-mm guns, ZIS-
3s, are ineffective against the insurgents; light artillery
that can be easily moved would be more useful. Truck-mounted
rocket launchers, such as the 122-mm BM-21, are also fairly
mobile and are already in the Sandinista inventory. The
Soviets could deliver more of these as well as additional
122-mm and 152-mm howitzers.
More Effective Air Defenses
At present, Nicaragua's air defenses have the double
task of targeting the insurgent resupply flights and
defending against conventional air attacks, and Moscow could
take several steps to improve both facets. Managua's top
priority is almost certainly to interrupt the insurgent
resupply flights. The Sandinistas now have a growing
nationwide air defense tracking network, but air defense
weapons currently in the inventory usually have been
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ineffective in shooting rebel supply craft. To threaten the
insurgent pipeline seriously, the Sandinistas would need a
more mobile weapon like the radar-guided ZSU-23-4 self-
propelled AA gun.
To meet a conventional threat, the Soviets could
provide the SA-2 or the SA-3 SAM system or the more mobile
SA-6 and SA-8 SAMs. Some in-country preparation would be
necessary to deploy the SA-2, and refresher training on the
use of any of these systems would be essential.
Better Air Capabilities
The Sandinistas already have some of the best aircraft
available for counterinsurgency operations with the MI-25
helicopter gunship and the MI-17 transport helicopter. If,
however, the Soviets chose to further upgrade this
capability, they would probably send the recently identified
MI-35, the export version of the MI-25 Hind E. This aircraft
has a more powerful engine, improved countermeasures, and
carries more air-to-ground rocket launchers than the MI-25.
Alternatively, the Soviets could supply additional
countermeasure packages for incorporation in the aircraft
the Sandinistas already have to defend against the SAMs in
rebel hands. In either case, the Nicaraguans would need
additional training and greater maintenance support to use
these systems effectively.
The Soviets could improve the Sandinista transport
aircraft fleet by supplying additional AN-26 transports or
upgraded AN-32 transports. Peru is currently exchanging its
AN-26s for new AN-32s in a barter arrangement with the
Soviet Union, and the AN-26s from Peru reportedly may go to
Nicaragua. Either aircraft would enhance Sandinista efforts
to supply troops fighting the insurgents in the northern and
eastern portions of the country.
Delivery of Fighter Aircraft
It is unlikely that Moscow will deliver jet combat
aircraft to Nicaragua in the near term, although Managua has
made preparations to receive them at any time. Managua
continues to request MIGs. Construction of the jet-capable
runway at Punta Huete has been finished for some time and
the nationwide radar network needed to detect an imminent
air attack is virtually complete. Moreover, such aircraft
could be easily and rapidly delivered from Cuba.
Despite Managua's preparations to receive jet combat
aircraft, Moscow probably will continue to withhold delivery
for political reasons:
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--Washington has warned the Soviets on a number of
occasions since 1980 that the United States would
take very seriously the introduction of jet fighter
aircraft into Nicaragua.
--Moscow almost certainly assumes that such planes
would be attacked if discovered. Delivery of MIGs
would be seen as provocative by other nations and
would do significant harm to US-Soviet and
Soviet-Latin American relations.
--Although it is also possible that Castro could
unilaterally provide MIGs, it is not believed he
would do so given the strong adverse reaction this
would probably cause in Moscow.
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Secret
Secret
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