CUBA: SOVIET MILITARY DELIVERIES IN 1986

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• Collection: General CIA Records
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• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
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• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: October 1, 1987
• Content Type: MISC

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Directorate of
Intelligence
Cuba:
Soviet Military
Deliveries in 1986
A Research Paper
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Top Secret
ALA 87-10046C
GI 87-10073C
October 1987 25X1
Copy 3 4 9
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Directorate of Top Secret
Intelligence
Cuba:
Soviet Military
Deliveries in 1986
This paper was prepared byl I Office
of African and Latin American Analysis, and analysts
in the International Security Issues Division, Office
of Global Issues
with the Directorate of Operations
Comments and queries are welcome and may be
directed to the Chief, Middle America-Caribbean
Division, ALA
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GI 87-10073C
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Summary
Information available as
of 1 September 1987 was
used in this report.
Cuba:
Soviet Military
Deliveries in 1986
Moscow is continuing its support for the expansion and modernization of
the Cuban armed forces. Soviet military deliveries to Cuba in 1986
returned to the higher levels prevalent in the early 1980s, after sharply
declining in 1985. The total tonnage of Soviet deliveries in 1986 increased
substantially over 1985. As a result, Havana continues its gradual
improvement in defensive military capabilities, while building a small-but
growing-potential for intervention and power projection in the region.
Key features of the Soviet deliveries made to Cuba during 1986 include:
? Shipments of military equipment and other goods reached 55,625 metric
tons. The quantity of military goods delivered from Eastern Europe and
other Soviet client states may have declined slightly from 10,000 tons in
1985 to about 9,000 metric tons.
? Modernization of Cuban Ground Forces is continuing with Havana's
receipt of 100 armored vehicles, 16 D-20 152-mm howitzers, a small
number of mobile missile and rocket launchers, and some two dozen
pieces of bridging equipment.
? Cuban command and control capabilities have improved with the
delivery of more than 90 pieces of electronics-related equipment, includ-
ing the initial acquisition of the R-410M/Twin Plate tropospheric scatter
communications system.
? Moscow's transfer of 26 SA-3 surface-to-air missile (SAM) transporters
will assist Havana in expanding its air defense umbrella, particularly into
eastern Cuba.
In addition, the Soviet Union's delivery of two inshore minesweepers
helped sustain Cuban naval and coastal defense force inventories in 1986.
Moscow's transfe two Soviet SSC-3 coastal defense 25X1
missile launchers-which, in wartime, could pose a potential threat to
Caribbean and other shipping lanes-doubled the number formerly known
to be operational in Cuba.
Cuba also continues to be an important transshipment point for Soviet
deliveries to Angola and Nicaragua. Although we are unable to confirm
the exact amount of military equipment and supplies transshipped from
Cuba to Angola, Havana occasionally transfers older weaponry and
equipment to Angola for use by Cuban forces there. Light transport
aircraft, coastal patrol boats, and antiaircraft artillery guns were among
the major items delivered to the Nicaraguan armed forces via Cuba during
1986.
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GI 87-10073C
October 1987
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The Soviets almost certainly intend to continue their support of the Cuban
military modernization program through the end of the decade, if only to
raise the cost for the United States of any prospective military action
against the Castro regime. On the basis of current Cuban needs, we
anticipate that Moscow's future deliveries will include additional equip-
ment to improve command, control, and communications capabilities of the
Cuban armed forces. The Cuban Navy probably will receive at least one
major surface combatant or submarine in the short term, while the Cuban
Air Force is likely to benefit from major equipment deliveries.
Moscow, however, probably will remain reluctant to provide Havana with
offensive weapons systems that Washington would view as posing an
increased threat to US security interests. In addition, we believe the
Soviets are unlikely to substantially exceed current levels of support to
Cuba, lest it attract US attention and jeopardize agreement on more
strategic bilateral issues such as arms control.
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Summary
Support for the Soviet Presence 6
Impact of Arms Deliveries on Cuban Military Capabilities 6
Observed Soviet Military Deliveries to Cuba: Selected Weapons 13
Systems and Equipment, 1981-86
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Scope Note This paper is the sixth in a series of annual assessments of Soviet military
deliveries to Cuba produced since 1981. It examines 25X1
arms and military-associated equipment delivered to Cuba by the 25X1
Soviet Union and its Eastern Bloc allies during 1986. It also identifies
trends in these weapons deliveries, assesses their impact on Cuba's military,
preparedness, and discusses their implications for the United States.
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Cuba:
Soviet Military
Deliveries in 1986
This paper details the available information on the
transfer of arms and other military-related equipment
to Cuba from the Soviet Union and its Eastern Bloc
allies during 1986. Trends in these weapons deliveries,
their impact on Cuba's military preparedness, and
their implications for the United States are discussed.
better definition of military tonnage.'
We have also introduced a revised methodology for
determining the contract value of Soviet arms deliver-
ies to the Third World, including Cuba (see inset).
Improvements in the methodology for assessing Soviet
arms transfers have increased our estimates of the
dollar value of Soviet deliveries by roughly two-thirds
and estimates of delivery tonnages by one-quarter.
The increases reflect an improved estimate of the
value of support equipment and ammunition, and a
Military Deliveries in 1986
General Patterns
The pace of Soviet military deliveries to Cuba quick-
ened during the final months of 1986, reversing the
slowdown in deliveries that marked the first eight
months of the year. In the first half of 1986, deliveries
totaled only about 13,900 metric tons but by year's
end had grown to 55,625 metric tons-an increase of
more than 60 percent over the 1985 total tonnage
figure? Moscow's large arms deliveries to Iraq in
February and March 1986 to help contain an Iranian
Soviet deliveries in 1986. When similar methodological guidelines
are applied to the 1985 data, for example, the percentage increase
' The roughly 60-percent increase in tonnage over 1985 largely
reflects differences in the methodological approach used to estimate
support equipment.
Recent revisions in our methodology for assessing the
value of arms transfers significantly increase the
value of annual Soviet military deliveries to Cuba.
These increases are due mainly to a broader defini-
tion of what constitutes military tonnage and an
improved estimate of the value assigned per ton of
have been delivered to military jbrces.'~
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By broadening the de inition of what is military
related, we have increased slightly the amount of
items delivered from Soviet ports other than Nikola-
yev Port Facilities South. Significant portions of 25X1
Soviet deliveries from these ports formerly were
labeled "military-associated" and were not included
in our tonnage calculations. We have eliminated this
distinction under the revised methodology. As pres- 25X1
ently de ined, military tonnage is "the weight of all
goods except for raw materials known or estimated to
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Table 1
Top Soviet Arms Export Customers
in 1986
Rank
Country
Estimated Value of Arms
Delivered (Million 1986
Constant US $)
1
Iraq
3,970
2
India
1,885
3
Vietnam
1,610
4
Cuba
1,460
5
Afghanistan
1,264
6
Angola
1,040
7
Libya
730
8
Syria
575
9
Algeria
560
10
Nicaragua
550
offensive against the port of Al-Faw may have tempo-
rarily delayed the normal Soviet delivery patterns to
Cuba, which over the past three years have averaged
one or two a month
We have calculated a $1.5 billion cost for the arms
and other military-associated equipment provided to
Cuba in 1986, based on our revised methodology for
estimating the market value of Soviet arms deliveries.
The 75 Soviet ship voyages used to carry out the
transfers were more than double the 35 voyages
conducted in 1985, and also established a new high
for total arms-related voyages during a year, surpass-
ing the previous record of 68 set in 1982.
Major Arms Deliveries
In 1986 the major items of Soviet equipment delivered
to Cuba's ground forces included 47 medium tanks-
38 T-62s and nine T-54/55s-and 53 other armored
vehicles, 16 D-20 152-mm howitzers, a small number
of mobile missile and rocket launchers, and about 24
pieces of bridging equipment.
Other Non-Soviet Shipments
As in past years, Cuba depended heavily on non-
Soviet suppliers again in 1986 for military-associated
goods and equipment such as spare parts, medical
supplies, munitions, and vehicles. Our analysis of data
available on non-Soviet supplies to Cuba suggests that
the volume of deliveries from Eastern Europe and
other Soviet client states may have declined slightly
over the past year-dropping from an estimated
10,000 metric tons in 1985 to about 9,000 metric tons
in 1986.
Nonaligned Yugoslavia's delivery in February 1986 of
some 5,000 metric tons of munitions evidently ac-
counted for more than half of all non-Soviet military
garia, which supplied at least an estimated 2,100
metric tons of military-related goods to Cuba in 1986,
apparently was a distant second to Yugoslavia in total
tonnage delivered to Havana by non-Soviet suppliers.
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Figure 1
Soviet Military Deliveries by Month,
1981-87
Jan
1981
Jan
82
Jan
83
Jan
84
Jan
85
i`_1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Jan
86
Pipeline for Transfers to Other Soviet-Cuban Allies
In 1986, as in past years, Cuba was an important
conduit for arms to other Soviet Third World client
states, principally Angola and Nicaragua. Most mili-
tary deliveries to Angola from the Soviet Union are
shipped directly, and we are unable to confirm the
exact amount of military equipment and supplies
transshipped from Cuba. Nevertheless, our analysis F
indicates
that Cuba occasionally transfers its older weapons
and equipment, such as T-34 or T-54/55 tanks, to
Cuban forces in Angola as Havana's domestic mili-
tary inventories are restocked with more modern
Soviet arms.
we 25X1
believe Cuba carried out several military transfers to
Angola in 1986:
a Cuban arms carrier
Dec
86
delivered an unspecified number of tanks and artil-
lery at the port of Luanda in April.
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? Five BTR-152 armored personnel carriers and somc25X1 K1
20 transport vehicles probably were shipped to
Angola from the Cuban arms port of Mariel in late
July, 25X1
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Improvements to the Cuban Port of Mariel. The port
of Mariel, located about 40 kilometers west of Ha-
vana, is Cuba's primary arms transshipment facility
for virtually all military deliveries to Cuba from the
USSR, as well as for Cuban arms shipments to Third
World allies such as Angola and Nicaragua. Since
the modernization program at Mariel was begun in
1981, the military and commercial importance of the
port has continued to grow. Mariel already is an
important container and roll-on/roll-off cargo-han-
dling facility, and current efforts to improve the port
are certain to enhance Cuba's ability to transship
military cargo quickly,
? Moscow also shipped seven MI-17 helicopters di-
presumably for use by Cuban forces
tion and container operations are planned.
Meanwhile, the initial phase of the development
program, which appears to have accelerated since
1985, is nearing completion. Highlighting this phase
of construction is the addition of two single-berth
quays equipped with rail-mounted portal cranes, and
a new transit shed with more than 60,000 cubic
meters of covered storage-enough to store the con-
tents of two average-sized Soviet arms carriers. Ap-
proximately 75,000 square meters of paved open
storage-sufiicient to handle some 4,000 vehicles or
3,600 double-stacked standard shipping containers-
and a large port operations area also have been
completed. The added equipment storage and mainte-
nance capacity are well beyond current requirements,
suggesting. that further increases in port mechaniza-
When the port development program is completed in
the early 1990s, we estimate that Mariel's capacity
will have increased from three ship berths and almost
no shore facilities to at least 10 berths and an
extensive support infrastructure, including at least
one-and possibly several-of the previously de-
scribed covered storage sheds. Despite these up-
grades, we have no evidence that the modernization of
Mariel portends any major increase in Soviet mili-
tary assistance to Cuba. However, the current and
projected improvements will allow more efficient
handling of arms deliveries, increase commercial use
of the port, and help alleviate congestion at Havana,
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Cuba serves as a major transshipment point for arms
and other military-related equipment supplied by the
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USSR and the Soviet Bloc to the Sandinista regime in
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Nicaragua
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Our analysis of Cuban and Nicaraguan merchant
shipping patterns indicates that as much as 200 tons
of ammunition and other supplies may be delivered
from Cuba to Nicaragua by sea each month. Of the
more than 5,900 metric tons of military cargo deliv-
ered to Nicaragua last year by Cuba-including
shipments directly from Cuba and transshipments
from other non-Soviet Warsaw Pact countries-a
single delivery by a Cuban shi account-
ed for nearly 4,300 metric tons. Aside from deliveries
made to the Sandinistas via Cuban merchant vessels,
we estimate that Cuba also has provided some 200
metric tons of military cargo, using Nicaraguan-
registered merchant ships to carry out the transfer.
Havana's ability to supply war materiel to Nicaragua
via aerial deliveries complicates our efforts to monitor
military-associated transactions. Cuba's state-run air-
line, Cubana, makes between six and 10 weekly
flights to Nicaragua, which could-under optimal
conditions-allow Havana to transfer up to 75 tons of
materiel per week in this manner
In addition to acting as a conduit and a direct
supplier, Cuba assembles some larger military items
before their delivery to, Nicaragua and provides crew
training and follow-on maintenance and repair of the
equipment.
Managua's current lack of repair facilities and exper-
tise reinforces Nicara ua's military dependence on
Havana. Our analysis ver the past
Cuba for maintenance or repair.
two years indicates that AN-2 light transport aircraft,
at least one MI-8 helicopter, and a Dabur patrol boat
are among major items of equipment returned to
Support for the Soviet Presence
The delivery of military equipment and other goods to
Cuba intended for use by Soviet forces garrisoned
there can sometimes complicate our ability to monitor
Soviet military transfers to Cuba. Since 1982 the
Soviet motorized rifle brigade-numbering some
2,600 to 2,900 combat troops-has continued to
modernize its support and training facilities and
gradually upgrade its inventory of equipment. These
developments, in our view, reflect the brigade's role as
both a symbol of Moscow's support to Havana and the
first line of defense for Soviet facilities on the island.
Impact of Arms Deliveries on Cuban Military
Capabilities
Soviet military deliveries last year appear to have
produced a modest qualitative-as well as quantita-
tive-improvement in the capabilities of the Cuban
armed forces, while sustaining current inventory lev-
els. The most notable developments, in our view, were
the continued upgrading of Cuba's Ground Forces
and significant improvement in the military's com-
mand and control capabilities with the delivery of
more than 90 pieces of electronics-related equipment.
Ground Forces
The upgrading of Cuban armor units continued to be
a high priority for Havana in 1986 with the acquisi-
tion from the Soviet Union of 38 more modern T-62s
to replace aging T-54/55 tanks
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Table 2
Soviet Deliveries of Military Goods to Cuba,
1962-86, Selected Years
Total 25X1
Metric tons
1962
125
250,000
250,
000
1965
5
10,800
10,
800
1970
8
11,300
11,
300
1975
8
13,900
13,
900
1976
13
19,500
19,
500
1977
10
21,600
21,
600
1978
12
22,200
22,
200
1979
12
17,300
17,
300
1980
14
20,900
20,
900
1981
24
45,500
21
18,200
63,
700
1982
15
24,540
47
35,470
6
3,730
63,
740
1983
20
37,690
32
12,970
2
710
51,
370
1984
23
41,870
23
8,510
6
4,220
54,
600
1985
13
23,868
15
8,448
7
1,830
34,
146
1986
12
39,846
59
15,209
4 d
570-
55,
625 f
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c Beginning in 1982, estimates of naval deliveries from all oviet
ports are listed as a separate category; includes for the first time
ships delivered under tow or their own power as well as small naval
craft such as patrol boats carried by merchant ships, which were
included in prior years' tonnages.
eThe estimated naval tonnage includes tour unidentified pa ro
boats/craft and one unidentified power boat with crated pilothouse.
f The roughly 60-percent increase in tonnage over 1985 largely
reflects differences in the methodological approach used to estimate
Soviet deliveries in 1986. When similar methodological guidelines
are applied to the 1985 data, for example, the percentage increase
in total tonnage drops to approximately 45 percent.
The mobility and firepower capabilities of Cuba's
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Ground Forces were further enhanced in 1986 as the
result of Soviet shipments.
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Figure 3. The Soviets are continuing their efforts
to gradually upgrade Cuban armor holdings. In
1986, Moscow supplied Havana with 38 T-62
medium tanks (shown here during Cuba's 30th
Anniversary parade in Havana last December) to
replace earlier Soviet-built T-54/55s (seen here
on display at Aberdeen Proving Grounds, Mary-
land). At least some of this older military equip-
ment is transferred to Angola for use by Cuban
including an interim stop at San Jose de las Lajas
Repair and Storage Depot-took seven days to com-
plete some 500 nautical miles of both road and rail
transport.
Cuba has only four Sonyas in its inventory.
Naval and Coastal Defense Forces
The Soviets delivered two Yevgenya-class inshore
minesweepers and a number of smaller patrol boats to
Cuba in 1986. The Yevgenyas continue to dominate
the Navy's inventory of craft dedicated to mine
warfare, indicating that the Cubans are likely to
remain limited primarily to inshore sweeping opera-
tions for the next several years. The Yevgenyas lack
the minelaying and antisubmarine capabilities of the
better equipped Sonya-class coastal minesweepers;
total of 25 boats.
In November 1986, the Soviets also delivered two
Zhuk-class patrol boats at the port of Mariel. As a
result, the transfer of three Zhuks to the Nicaraguan
Navy in mid-1986 resulted in a net loss of one for
Cuba's Zhuk patrol boat inventory, reducing it to a
over the past year, Cuba's total guided-
missile patrol boat inventory dropped from 21 to 18,
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Table 3
Inventory of Selected Cuban Ground Forces
Weapons and Equipment a
improving Cuban command, control, and com-
munications capabilities in the years ahead.
Figure 4. The Soviet Union's delivery of more
than 90 pieces of radio, radar, and other elec-
tronics-related equipment, including the initial
provision of the R-410M/Twin Plate tropospheric
scatter communications system shown here, sug-
gests Moscow will give increased attention to
patrol capabilities.
and its torpedo boat inventory fell by nearly one-third.
The drawdown, which comes exclusively from Cuba's
older inventory of P-4, P-6, and Komar boats that
either had fallen into disrepair or been decommis-
sioned because of recurring maintenance problems,
probably is having little effect on the Navy's overall
launcher for the system was
Cuba has bolstered its coastal defenses with the
acquisition of the Soviet SSC-3 coastal missile sys-
tem-now used in the Warsaw Pact countries and
exported by the USSR to Syria, Libya, Algeria, and
South Yemen. We confirmed the SSC-3's deployment
in January 1986, when the transporter-erector-
in an area southwest of Cienfuegos.
' The first indication that Havana possessed the improved coastal
defense system came in July 1985 when an antiship missile
fragment associated with the SSC-3 was found off the Florida
coast. US technicians established that the missile probably was
fired from a ground-based launcher rather than from a Cuban
BMP infantry combat vehicle
0
30
81
98
BTR-60 armored personnel carrier
(80)
340
453
453
BRDM reconnaissance vehicle
(40)
90
130
166
Field artillery
M-1973 SP 152-mm howitzer
0
0
6
6
M-1974 SP 122-mm howitzer
0
6
18
18
B-21 122-mm multiple rocket launcher
(0)
40
72
76
130-mm field gun
(100)
110
176
176
122-mm howitzer
(140)
160
225
225
Air defense artillery
ZSU-23/4 SP air defense artillery
0
28
45
45
wartime, Cuba's use of this highly mobile, radar-
guided missile-with a range of some 45 nautical
miles-could pose a potential threat to shipping in the
Yucatan Channel, the Straits of Florida and other sea
lanes in the Caribbean.
Air and Air Defense Forces
Soviet military deliveries to the Cuban Air Force in
1986 appear aimed at sustaining current inventory
levels and improving pilot training and performance.
Our analysis indicates, for
example, that only four MIG-23 fighters-double
their number in 1985-could be considered new addi-
tions to the Air Force's inventory; three other
MIG-23s returned to Cuba following apparent refur-
bishment in the USSR. Two new MIG-21 Mongol
trainers, plus two others returning from repairs, aug-
mented Cuba's meager MIG-21 training fleet. In
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Figure 5. Moscow's transfer in January 1986 of
two Soviet SSC-3 coastal defense missile launch-
ers to Havana doubled the number formerly
known to be operational in Cuba. In wartime,
these missile systems particularly if they are
augmented by additional deliveries-could pose
a potential threat to Caribbean and other ship-
addition, one MI-8 transport helicopter also was
Offsetting these modest gains in aircraft last year are
the losses of one MIG-23 and six MIG-21 fighters
through various crashes and accidents; only five
The increased number of aircraft crashes probably
reflects low pilot training time-of about 60 hours a
year-that is substantially less than both Soviet and
US standards.' Nagging maintenance problems and
Table 4
Inventory of Selected Cuban Navy Assets a
Foxtrot submarines
0
2
3
3
Koni frigates
0
0
2
2
Guided-missile patrol boats
Komar
(16)
6
3
0
Osa-I
5
5
5
5
OSA-II
1
7
13
13
P-4/P-6/Komar conversion
(24)
(19)
13
6
Turya hydrofoil
0
4
9
9
Patrol boats
Zhuk
(0)
12
26
25 b
Stenka
0
0
3
3
Minesweepers
a Operational inventory only.
b Three Zhuk patrol boats were transshipped to Nicaragua follow-
ing delivery and outfitting in Cuba.
growing fuel shortages reflecting a badly deteriorat-
ing economy also probably contributed to increased
aircraft downtime and reduced pilot efficiency, in our
judgment.
The Soviets delivered 26 SA-3 SAM transporters to
Mariel in late November, the first known delivery of
air defense missile equipment to the Cuban armed
forces since 1984.6 More than 100 SA-2 missiles,
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200 SA-3 missiles, and 17 SAM-associated radars
were added to the Cuban air defense arsenal at that
Table 5
Inventory of Selected Cuban Air and
Air Defense Force Weapons
and Equipment a
Modern jet fighters/trainers b
MIG-23
0
12
44
48
(95)
138
161
161
L-39 trainers
0
0
30
30
Other aircraft b
MI-24 attack helicopters d
0
0
11
11
MI-8/17 helicopters
(3)
30
58
58
AN-24/26 transports
(2)
24
30
30
Surface-to-air missile launchers
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SA-2 a
102
120
132
132
SA-3 e
6
24
42
42
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SA-6
0
20
20
20
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SA-9
0
0
20
24
SA-13
0
0
12
12
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time.
We believe the delivery of the SAM transporters
could signal the arrival of additional SA-3 systems
and herald the expansion of Havana's SA-3 coverage
into the Eastern Air Defense Zone
several SA-3 missile launchers
and other support equipment were deployed near
Holguin earlier this year.
Outlook and Implications for the United States
We continue to believe that Moscow will support
Havana's armed forces modernization efforts through
the end of the decade by relying, as it has in the past,
on the transfer of largely second- or third-generation
equipment to meet Havana's military needs. Soviet
Secretary General Gorbachev's attempt to move be-
yond the current impasse with the United States on
arms control issues, for example, suggests that over
the near term Moscow will remain reluctant to pro-
vide Havana with sophisticated weapons systems that
Washington would view as posing a threat to US
security interests. Nevertheless, Moscow almost cer-
tainly intends to support Cuba's program to modern-
ize its armed forces, if.only to raise the costs for the
United States of any prospective military action
against the island.
Efforts to improve the mobility and firepower of the
Cuban Ground Forces probably will continue to re-
ceive steady, but more limited, attention from Mos-
cow than Havana's naval and air assets. The latter
a Operational inventory only.
b Through 1980 there were also decreasing numbers of older
aircraft.
c Includes MIG-21H (reconnaissance) but excludes older MIG-21
variants whose operational status is uncertain.
d Five to six MI-24 attack helicopters were returned to the USSR in
1986 for overhaul and had not been returned to active Cuban
service by July 1987.
e Includes only launchers associated with sites assessed to be
primary occupied/operational sites (excludes dispersal sites).
forces almost certainly are assessed by the Soviets as
potentially more important to their longer term strate-
gic goals, while Cuba's ground elements are largely
defensive in nature and pose little direct threat to the
United States. We anticipate, however, that Moscow
will give increased attention in the years ahead to
improving the command, control, and communica- 25X1
tions capabilities of the Cuban armed forces to
improve their effectiveness across the board.
We continue to believe that the Cuban Navy is likely
to acquire at least one major surface combatant or
submarine in the short term.
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Figure 6. Moscow's reported
plans to introduce the MIG-29
into Cuba next year-if carried
out-are likely to significantly
improve Cuban air defenses. In-
tended by the Soviets to be
competitive with USfourth-
generationJighters like the F-
16, the MIG-29 would pose a
credible threat against US low-
altitude strike and reconnais-
sance aircraft such as the F-
111 and RF-4. Although it does
not have the capability to en-
gage high-altitude, high-speed
targets such as the SR-71,
Cuba could use the MIG-29 to
attempt to discourage US re-
connaissance missions, which
are regarded by Castro as a
personal affront and a violation
of national sovereignty.
The Cuban Air Force may also benefit from major
equipment additions in the coming months
fighter; and its planned introduction in Cuba would
significantly enhance the island's air defenses. The
aircraft's ability to fly up to 60,000 feet (18,000
meters) and fire more advanced, longer range air-to-
air missiles would pose a greater threat to US recon-
naissance overflights. Castro's strong reaction to the
SR-71 overflight of Cuba by the United States last
December may have prompted the Cuban leader to
seek the more sophisticated MIG-29 as a visible sign
of his displeasure.
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The MIG-29, which during the past two years has
already been exported by the Soviet Union to Iraq,
India, and Syria, is Moscow's latest generation
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Appendix A
Soviet Military Deliveries to Cuba:
Selected Weapons Systems and Equipment, 1981-86 a
Tank, T-54/55, medium
73
31
50
9
163
Tank, T-62, medium, 115-mm
10
107
45
25
38
225
Armored personnel carrier,
BTR-60, 60P, 660 PB
26
31
41
98
Infantry fighting vehicle, BMP
9
42
17
68
Antitank gun, 57-mm, M-1943,
ZIS-2
71
82
153
Antitank gun, 85-mm, M-45
29
40
69
Antitank gun, 100-mm, T-12
44
64
108
Air defense artillery, self-propelled,
23-mm, ZSU-23/4
0
Air defense artillery, 23-mm,
ZU-23
17
17
Air defense artillery, 57-mm, S-60
0
Rocket launcher, 122-mm, BM-21
12
4
16
Howitzer, self-propelled, 122-mm,
5
5
M-1974
Howitzer, 122-mm, D-30
12
46
58
Field gun, 130-mm, M-46
12
24
30
66
Howitzer, self-propelled, 152-mm,
M-1973
3
Fighter, MIG-21, Fishbed/Mongol
26
35
6
4
1
2
74
Fighter, MIG-23, Flogger
4
20
3
3
2
4
36
Transport, AN-26, Curl
4
2
d
6
Helicopter, MI-8, Hip
1
1
Helicopter, MI-17, Hip H
15
2
17
Helicopter, MI-14, Haze
4
4
Helicopter, MI-24, Hind
12
Missile, SAM, SA-2, Guideline
46
106
152
Missile launcher, SAM, SA-3, Goa
0
Missile, SAM, SA-3
230
14
206
450
Missile launcher, SAM, SA-6
0
Missile launcher, SAM, SA-9
3
8
15
Missile launcher, SAM, SA-13
12
12
Electronic warfare equipment
3
6
15
24
Radar, Fan Song E
3
3
6
Radar, Odd Pair
2
2
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Soviet Military Deliveries to Cuba:
Selected Weapons Systems and Equipment, 1981-86 a (continued)
SSC-3 ground-launched antiship
missile system
Missile attack boat, Osa-II-class 2 4
Hydrofoil patrol craft, Turya-class 2
Patrol boat, Stenka-class
Patrol boat, Zhuk-class
Coastal minesweeper, Sonya-class 1
Inshore minesweeper, Yevgenya- 2
class
Degaussing ship, Pelym-class
Landing ship, medium, Polnocny-
class
9 5 r 14
2 3
c Of 76 medium tanks delivered in 1984, only 24 were indentifiable
as to type (T-54/55s). As an approximation, the 1983 distribution
between T-54/55s and T-62s was applied to 1984; hence, of the 76,
31 are assumed to be T-54/55 types, and the remainder assumed to
be the more modern T-62. Of the 76 single-tube field artillery, 46
were identifiable as 122-mm, D-30 howitzers; the remainder were
assumed to be M-46s, which featured prominently in 1983 deliver-
ies.
d Two AN-26 aircraft were delivered in 1984, but were probably
f Three Zhuk patrol boats, including two craft delivered to Cuba in
1986, were subsequently transshipped to Nicaragua following
delivery and outfitting in Cuba.
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