THE SOVIET GAS NETWORK: CAPACITY AND VULNERABILITY

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP97R00694R000700100001-2
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 30
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: January 5, 2012
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: February 1, 1987
• Content Type: REPORT

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The Soviet Gas Network:
Capacity and Vulnerability
A Research Paper
Author/Production Officer
Attached for your information and
retention is a copy of your
publication
GI 87-10004/S
February 1987
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The Soviet Gas Network: Capacity and Vulnerability) 25X1
Scope Note
Natural gas exports are an increasingly important source of
revenues to the Soviet Union, and Western Europe is an
increasingly important Soviet market. This paper assesses Soviet
capabilities to supply more gas to the West and still meet rising
domestic and East European demand.. It focuses on capacity and
vulnerability issues, especially technical factors that determine
Soviet gas deliverability, and examines the implications of
Soviet gas network expansion on Moscow's options to increase
further gas exports.
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The Soviet Gas Network: Capacity and Vulnerability
Summary
Information available as of June 1986 was used in this report.
Planned and probable expansion of the Soviet natural gas
transmission network will put Moscow in strong position to
compete for gas markets in Western Europe in the 1990s and
beyond. New pipelines to be completed by 1990 will carry more gas
from West Siberia and give Moscow the capacity to more than
double hard currency gas exports. The opportunity for further
inroads will apparently be limited by the early stages of
Norway's planned development of its North Sea gasfields. Soviet
decisions to use aggressively pipeline capacity and to price gas
competitively in the early 1990s, however, could undermine the
later stages of these expensive Norwegian gas projects designed
to meet most growth in West European demand well into the next
century. Pressures on Soviet hard currency earnings are likely to
make this an attractive option.
Already the world's largest producer of natural gas, the
USSR is seeking to increase production by more than 50 percent by
the year 2000. To accomplish this, Moscow plans to expand its
extensive pipeline systems that deliver gas from giant fields in
West Siberia to major domestic and export markets west of the
Urals. The 1986-90 Five-Year Plan calls for six new 56-inch
pipelines to be added to the main West Siberian corridor. Our
analysis, using computer simulation of planned additions to the
Soviet gas network, indicates that by 1990 overall capacity will
exceed projected consumption and export levels by about 30
percent or more than 250 billion cubic meters (bcm). This excess
capacity will include more than 30 bcm at the Czechoslovak
border, where we estimate the Soviets will deliver between 80 to
85 bcm a year by 1990 to Eastern and Western Europe. Additional
excess capacity may also be available at Romania's border for
export to Turkey and Greece.
The Soviets have a highly integrated natural gas network
that has sufficient flexibility and redundancy to cope with most
ff tional problems and equipment failures.
they are continuing to improve their capabilities to move
gas from one system to another to avoid serious shortfalls. As
the network expands, however, the operation and switching
requirements become greater and more complex, and further
improvement in operational sophistication will be needed. Even
with planned capacity additions by 1990, demands on the system
could still lead to localized gas shortfalls in the USSR and
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Eastern Europe because of_ the long system-response time to
emergency diversions, wide seasonal swings in gas needs, and
limited capability in some areas to tap alternative supplies. In
particular, problems are likely to continue in the northern
regions of the USSR--except Moscow--served by a system that is
not presently scheduled for expansion.
The four major export pipelines are less likely to be
affected by problems elsewhere in the network because they are
dedicated almost entirely to export deliveries. Some connections
with other systems, moreover, could permit diversion of domestic
supplies from other pipelines to help maintain exports in an
emergency. Because of excess capacity, any two of the three
systems delivering gas to Czechoslovakia for export could
compensate for lost supply from the third, at least at 1985
export levels. Also, if additional export capacity is needed
before new pipelines are built, the Soviets could increase the
deliverability of their current network by using a number of
shorter term measures, such as lowering the gas temperature in
the pipeline, increasing the discharge pressure of compressors,
or increasing the system's fuel efficiency.
An examination of a large number of disruption possibilities
indicates that only a combination of major problems would
seriously affect exports and that impact would be relatively
short lived:
--Disruptions of the pipeline corridor transporting gas from
West Siberia would cause a major loss--affecting more than
50 percent of Soviet production by 1990.
--Loss of flow through five key compressor stations in the
Central and Volga regions would result in a devastating
loss of gas to Moscow, loss of at least half of export
capacity, and a major reduction in overall domestic
supplies.
Loss of compression equipment would cause a less severe
reduction but would take longer to repair or replace. With the
completion of scheduled expansion, even a major trade embargo on
parts for Western equipment in the Soviet gas network would
reduce projected 1990 exports to the West by only about 17
percent.
Beyond 1990 much of the excess capacity built into the
Soviet gas network will erode as scheduled deliveries to Eastern
Europe increase-and as domestic demand grows, unless Moscow
further expands the system. If the Soviets intend to export gas
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to Wes-ern 'Europe at levels significantly above current
com:mrifi.:" nts, Moscow would probably add another export pipeline to
be completed by the mid-1990s. The Soviets probably will include
designs in the next Five-Year Plan (1991-95) for additional
large-diameter domestic gas pipelines to help service growing
needs at home and to further substitute gas for oil in an effort
to bolster oil sales.
Soviet gas export strategy will not necessarily become
evident over the next few years. Soviet exports should grow
during this period, however, as a result of contracts already in
hand. A decision to use excess capacity to pursue further sales
could be delayed until around 1990. The Soviets would still have
plenty of time to invest in further capacity expansion needed to
compete aggressively and maintain a comfortable margin for
reliable deliveries. They also could still directly affect the
decision to proceed with the second phase of Norwegian
development of its giant Troll field in the North Sea. The
Soviets, with large reserves and low production costs, have an
opportunity to offer West European customers an attractive
alternative well in advance of the additional North Sea supplies.
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The Soviet Gas Network: Capacity and Vulnerability) 25X1
The Soviet Union holds a commanding position as leader in
all phases of the worldwide natural gas industry. It has the
largest gas reserves--40 percent of the world's total--and is the
largest gas producer, consumer, and exporter. Moscow exceeded its
1985 production goal of 630 billion cubic meters (bcm) by a
comfortable margin, according to the Soviet press, and now
produces the gas equivalent of nearly 11 million barrels per day
(b/d) of oil, more than the highest yearly Saudi Arabian oil
production. Natural gas development has gained a high priority in
the Soviet energy sector to compensate for the stagnation of oil
production and will become increasin 1 important as a source of
energy and hard currency. F_ -y
To deliver its enormous quantities of gas, Moscow has built
the world's most extensive gas transmission network. The Soviets
are the major gas exporter to Eastern and Western Europe, and the
ability of the network to deliver gas exports in the future will
influence energy policy and economic prospects in Eastern Europe
and energy security and planning in the West. With the growing
dependence of the Soviet economy on natural gas as the primary
source of growth in energy supplies, the network's capabilities
will affect Moscow's ability to move away from oil and still
support steady economic growth.
To assist in examining the capabilities and vulnerabilities
of the Soviet gas network, a detailed computer simulation model
was developed that enables analysis of a multitude of scenarios
representing varying operating conditions. The model simulates
the gas flow and control in all pipelines 32 inches in diameter
and larger, accounting for about 95 percent of the total
transmission capacity from the producing areas.
The Gas Network: Distribution and Capacity
Distribution Systems
Over the last 25 years, growth in natural gas production has
been concentrated in the eastern USSR, increasing Soviet
dependence on the pipeline network to deliver gas to major
consumption centers and export outlets west of the Urals:
--In the 1960s, the North Caucasus and Ukraine regions
supplied 85 percent of gas produced.
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--In the 1970s, the Volga-Urals and Central Asia regions
paced production.
--West Siberia now supplies one half the USSR's gas
production and will account for the majority of the growth
in gas production and capacity. Because most of the vast
Soviet gas reserves are located in remote areas of West
Siberia, the importance of the a system will grow
as these are developed.
Natural gas is currently produced and distributed by
pipeline from five major areas within the Soviet Union (see
figure). The Soviets, over the last five years, not only have
expanded their overall pipeline capacity but also have integrated
their newer systems into a complex network that, by design,
should help solve system shortfalls, increase dependability of
gas exports, and alleviate some domestic supply problems. With
the exception of the Northern Lights system--serving the northern
areas of the USSR--the Soviets apparently have systematically
intersected major pipeline systems to increase the flexibility of
the overall transmission network. Analysis shows that even those
pipelines dedicated primarily to exports--such as the Urengoy-
Uzhgorod export pipeline--have the capability to supply domestic
gas if required. Similarly, several systems typically used for
domestic supply can divert gas to export pipelines in case of a
disruption or demand surge.
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--Examine Soviet options to expand the network and explore
the implications for capacity and vulnerabilities.
The model of the Soviet natural gas network consists of 18
separate real-time computer simulation models. Each represents
one of the major pipeline systems in the Soviet Union and allows
analysis of systems hydraulics such as flowrates, pressures, and
power requirements, and other fluid-related properties under
various operating scenarios. Standard thermodynamic and gas-flow
equations are used to represent flow in closed conduits.
Only pipelines 32 inches in diameter and larger have been
modeled. These lines represent the vast majority of the pipelines
within the USSR's main transmission network, accounting for about
95 percent of total transmission capacity from the Qas-producing
IIn some cases where specific information was
not available, assumptions were made, based on engineering
practices in operating similar Western pipeline systems and on
general equipment characteristics. In the worst case, it was
calculated that these assumptions could distort
capacity
projections by as much as 10 percent.
For this study many of the older pipeline names within the
USSR have been dropped. Each system has been named with its most
popular name or by its source and destination.
a. The modeling effort includes the Soviet systems only.
Quantitative estimates are given as a measure of Soviet
capability to send gas to the Soviet border. Hydraulic
restrictions of pipeline systems within the Eastern Bloc or
Western Europe may reduce flows below estimates given in this
study.
West Siberian Systems. The West Siberian systems are the
most important pipeline group, carrying about 50 percent of 1985
production. A total of 12 pipelines currently leave West Siberia
through two major corridors, carrying gas from Medvezhye, Punga,
Nadym, and Vyngapur as well as the giant Urengoy gasfield. Six
pipeline systems originate at the Urengoy gasfield, including two
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of the four major export systems--the Urengoy-Uzhgorod-pipeline
and the Northern Lights--through which pass 60 percent of all
exported gas. Scheduled development of the Yamburg gasfield in
the current five-year plan will increase the importance of this
corridor and may increase the number of pipelines to 18. 25X1
The Volga-Urals Systems. The Volga-Urals systems include the
Orenburg export pipeline to Uzhgorod and the Orenburg domestic
system branching out in five directions from the Orenburg
gasfield to serve the Volga-Urals regions. Orenburg gas is also
high in hydrogen sulfide and is processed locally to remove it
before being transported. Both systems cross several other major
domestic pipeline networks and are assumed to be able to divert
gas to those networks if needed. 25X1
Central Asian Systems. Central Asia is the second-most-
productive gas region in the Soviet Union. Central Asia has two
major domestic networks: the Central Asia-Center network and the
Central Asia-Urals network. Gas is transported through these
networks from fields such as Gazli, Achak, Naip, Shatlyk, and
Okarem to Moscow and industrial regions in the western USSR and
Urals. The Central Asia-Center network is a complicated, tree-
shaped pipeline network with a major trunk section made up of
three to five 40- to 56-inch pipelines that run from Khiva to
Moscow. Some Central Asian gas is high in hydrogen sulfide
content. corroded portions of the lines. Although 25X1
the Soviets have been replacing many line
segments along this corridor, the area east of the Caspian Sea
apparently is still undergoing repairs. 25X1
Before 1970 only two pipelines extended from the southern
gasfield north to Moscow. With later additions of smaller
gasfields, the Soviets added pipelines and installed four
branches to deliver gas to various destinations other than
Moscow, such as Frolovo, Kalach, Ostrogozhsk, and Gorkiy. The
current network crosses or ties into most other major pipeline
networks and probably has the capability to divert gas to those
networks if needed. The Central Asia-Urals network also
transports gas northward from the southern gasfields but is
located just west of the Aral Sea and provides domestic gas
mainly to industrial areas near Dombarovskiy and Kartaly. 25X1
Caucasus Systems. The North Caucasus system was originally
developed to deliver gas to the Moscow-Leningrad areas and to
provide some gas for export to Finland. The function of this
network, however, has changed over the last 10 years as the
fields originally serving this system began to decline. Gas for
export and for Leningrad is now provided by the Northern Lights
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system. In addition,) ot`lrr s' rces of gas LORI
have been connected, probably to make the system a more secure
source of gas for Moscow. West Siberian gas can now be
transferred to the system at Yelets and Novopskov. Central Asia
gas can also enter the system at Ostrogozhsk. In the
Transcaucasus area, West Siberian gas is now delivered by a new
pipeline--Urengoy-Baku--through Novopskov, permitting replacement
of gas lost when Iran stopped deliveries to the USSR in 1980.
Ukraine System. The Ukraine has a high demand for natural,
gas and is served mainly by the Shebelinka pipeline system.
Fields associated with the Shebelinka system have been declining
over the last 10 years. As a result, gas from West Siberia and
Central Asia has been linked to the system to provide a stable
gas supply. Part of the Shebelinka system is an export pipeline
into Romania. This portion may become a major export link for the
Soviets in the current five-year plan if plans to export gas to
Turkey and Greece are implemented.
Capacity Estimates
Total 1985 capacity in the major pipelines from all five
major gas producing areas probably is just over 760 bcm per year.
(1) Additional-capacity in local distribution pipelines near the
producing fields probably brings the total capacity of the USSR
to deliver gas from its producing areas to over 800 bcm per year
(see table), nearly 25 percent greater than 1985 gas production
of about 645 bcm reported in the Soviet press. About half this
capacity is in the West Siberian system--by far the country's
most important. Capacity in this system is estimated at 425 bcm
per year, more than 30 percent above 1985 West Siberian
production of about 320 bcm.
Domestic Delivery Capability. Analysis shows all domestic
pipeline systems have sufficient capacity to meet normal
consumption demands and limited excess capacity to provide
flexibility in coping with system problems or seasonal swings.
Some excess capacity is available in all systems at the major
producing areas, and additional excess capacity may become
available in many of these pipelines downstream, as gas is
consumed and bottlenecks are passed (see table). In many cases,
however, this excess can only be used in certain sections of the
system because bottlenecks preclude its distribution throughout
the length of the pipeline. For example, the Central Asian-Center
system has a capacity of more than 100 bcm per year at the
gasfields, but this is quickly reduced to just over 65 bcm per
year as the gas approaches Aleksandrov Gay. Most of this
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reduction is the result of increased spacing between compressor
stations, creating additional pressure drop and loss of flow
potential. In this system, therefore, the majority of excess
capacity exists between the gasfield and Aleksandrov Gay.
The Northern Lights system has a limited amount of excess
capacity and, as a result, has the least flexibility to respond
to changing system demands. Because it has no access to gas from
other networks and is responsible for delivering gas to the
entire northern area of the USSR, additional demands made by
consumers along the Northern Lights line--such as during peak
winter periods--must be met by curtailing flow to other areas.
Some of these regions--such as Baltic, Northern, and Belorussia--
are not served by any other gas system.
Regional Gas Consumption
The capacity and flexibility of the Soviet gas network
depends heavily on regional gas demand. An analysis of the
distribution of Soviet natural gas consumption is needed,
therefore, as a precondition for study of the network's operating
characteristics. Total domestic gas consumption for the Soviet
Union is calculated at 572 bcm in 1985--reported production last
year of 643 bcm, plus 2.0 bcm per year for imports minus an
For this study regional gas consumption is estimated
by prorating the total production among 17 major economic regions
an by accounting for increased pipeline
construction over the last decade as well as differences in
regional growth rates. This consumption was then apportioned
among the various pipeline systems that traverse each economic
region (see appendix table A-1). Fuel consumption by pipeline was
estimated from the calculated horsepower used by gas turbines
during a normal system operation--approximately 8 percent of
total production--and was distributed by region for each
appropriate system (see appendix table A-2).
Exports Deliverability.l (natural gas is
delivered by four major pipeline systems to six major locations
in the Soviet Union for export to Eastern and Western Europe. The
Northern Lights, Orenburg, and Urengoy-Uzhgorod export pipeline
systems deliver gas to Uzhgorod near the Czechoslovak border,
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where gas is sent on to users in Czechoslovakia, Yugoslavia, East
Germany, West Germany, France, Italy, and Austria. The Northern
Lights system also provides exports to Poland, Finland, and
Hungary. The Shebelinka system supplies gas to Izmail on the
Romanian border for export to Romania and Bulgaria.
Of the four export pipelines delivering gas to the border,
the only system constrained by domestic consumption commitments
is the Northern Lights, according to analysis. The Urengoy-
Uzhgorod and Orenburg pipeline systems were originally planned to
be used exclusively to export gas and are unaffected by domestic
needs, except for fuel usage; at 1985 export levels, however,
both have excess capacity to provide gas for domestic consumption
if needed. In the Shebelinka system, exports are restricted by
mechanical limitations along the pipeline.
Based on an estimate of the distribution of domestic
consumption, the Soviets could deliver up to 105 bcm annually
through its four export systems and still meet domestic needs.
This means that the Soviet network could deliver annually some 30
bcm--or about 500,000 b/d of oil equivalent--more than the amount
exported in 1985 without any modifications to the system. About
28 bcm per year could be delivered to Western Europe if the
connecting pipeline infrastructure is available in Eastern
Europe.
The Soviet gas network has sufficient capacity and
flexibility to ensure that gas exports are maintained, at least
at the 1985 level. Indeed, the Soviets could deliver the entire
volume of gas exported to Western Europe in 1985 through the
Northern Lights system alone, but the operation would be costly.
The Northern Lights system has limited spare capacity under
normal operating conditions, but this study shows that in an
emergency the system could deliver gas to Uzhgorod at a rate of
83 bcm per year for a short period if gas reserves from the
underground storage area near Dolina were extracted and almost
all domestic gas consumption from the Northern Lights system were
curtailed. Although this scenario is unlikely and carries an
exorbitant cost to domestic consumers, it shows that the Northern
Lights system could completely satisfy all current export demand
at Uzhgorod for a short time if both the Orenburg and Urengoy-
Uzhgorod export pipelines were disrupted
Options To Enhance Export Deliverability. Recent hard
currency shortages reportedly are delaying construction of the
new Progress gasline to Uzhgorod, which now may not be completed
until the end of 1989. If additional export capacity is needed
before then--or if the Progress project is further delayed--the
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Soviets' best option probably would be to expand the capacity of
existing export pipelines. The model was used to estimate the
potential gains in export capacity from methods typically
employed to increase the deliverability of gas transmission
networks short of laying additional pipelines--such as lowering
the gas temperature in the pipeline, optimizing the performance
of each compressor station, and modifying the pipeline
hydraulics:
--Lowering the temperature in a gas pipeline involves the
installation of additional coolers and possibly the
improvement of existing pipe insulation to maintain a
lower gas temperature between stations. Deliverability
will increase as fluid temperature is decreased until the
gas condenses, at which point flow in the line is
obstructed and deliverability decreases. On the basis of
the model, if the Soviets lowered the gas temperature from
the base of 59F to 28F, throughput would increase by 2.5
bcm per year. Lowering the temperature to 5F would
increase the flow by 5 bcm per year, assuming no
condensation.
--Another method to improve deliverability that the Soviets
may pursue is optimizing system performance to reduce
internal use of gas to fuel turbines. Fuel requirements
for each system are 20 to 25 percent of maximum
deliverability. The Soviets may be purchasing
regenerators--an addition to the gas turbine to preheat
the combustion gas--to increase efficiency of the
compressor's gas turbine drivers. For every 10-percent
increase in efficiency the Soviets can add nearly 1 bcm
per year in exports per pipeline.
--A common practice in Western countries is to supply peak
short-term demands by increasing the discharge pressure of
the compressor stations above the design pressure of the
pipe to increase flows. Analysis of the four Soviet export
systems indicates that running at supply pressures 10
percent above normal would yield a total export capacity
about 20 percent higher than normal--or 125 bcm per year.
Although no evidence suggests the Soviets have employed
this practice, this option is especially feasible in areas
with high peak demand and low excess capacity such as
those served by the Northern Lights. This practice
increases the frequency between required equipment
maintenance overhauls, however, which might discourage its
use in the USSR, where spare parts and the technical
expertise needed to maintain Western equipment are scarce.
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Moscow also has several longer term options to expand
exports that would require some pipeline construction but fall
short of adding an entire new export pipeline with compressor
stations:
--One alternative is to loop an existing pipeline--that is,
construct additional parallel pipelines between existing
compressor stations to alleviate flow bottlenecks. This
may be feasible for the Orenburg and Urengoy-Uzhgorod
pipelines, but the only efficient way to loop either of
these two systems would be to add a parallel 56-inch-
diameter pipe the entire pipeline length that shares
existing horsepower at all stations. This would increase
deliverability of each system by 26 bcm per year.
--The capacity of poorly designed pipelines can usually be
improved by adding additional horsepower--turbine and
compressor sets--either at existing compressor stations or
at intermediate locations. Reviewing the two major export
systems--Orenburg and Urengoy-Uzhgorod--however, they had
been found to be efficiently engineered and probably would
not benefit from these additions. Of course, adding a
parallel pipeline with duplicate compressor stations--a
process that would take as long as constructing the
Progress pipeline--would double current export rates for
both systems. if the new parallel lines were built using
pipe fabricated from experimental steel that can withstand
pressures of 100 atmospheres--now being constructed by the
Soviets--each additional pipeline could deliver flows up
to 44 bcm annually, an increase of nearly 35 percent.
Potential To Substitute Gas for Oil. The need to buoy hard
currency earnings despite a decline in growth of Soviet oil
production in the 1980s has led to increased natural gas
consumption in the industrial, commercial, residential, and other
petroleum-using sectors in the Soviet Union. Natural gas is
consumed as feedstock in the manufacture of chemicals and
plastics and as fuel for commercial and residential activities.
Gas consumption has increased from 3 percent of energy
consumption in the 1950s to nearly 40 percent in 1985. Future
substitution potential probably exists in the electric power
sector where additional gas may be substituted for oil. This
potential depends on the availability of gas production and the
ability of the pipeline network to deliver it to the regions
Using the modeling capability, excess capacity is estimated
to be available in the Soviet natural gas transmission network
for each of the 10 economic regions where major thermal power
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plants--1,000 megawatts (MW) and above--are located. Analysis
shows that nine of the 10 economic regions have excess pipeline
capacity totaling 117 bcm per year. Allowing for some flexibility
in the export market and' to cope with domestic demand swings,
nearly half the total excess capacity--58 bcm per year or nearly
million b/d of oil equivalent--probably could still be available
for interfuel substitution. At a fuel consumption rate of 1.8 bcm
per 1,000 MW, the Soviets have the main trunkline capacity to
substitute gas for oil in these five regions in the generation of
over 29,000 MW--or roughly one-half of the existing power plant
Gas could also substitute for oil in the export market to
Eastern Europe or compete with oil as a hard currency earner in
Western Europe. A portion of the gas scheduled to be supplied by
the Progress pipeline for East European consumption will probably
be used to substitute for oil. If this substitution effort could
be expanded, more oil would be available for export to the West.
Several countries in Western Europe reportedly have indicated a
willingness to convert more industry to gas if a reliable supply
is available at an attractive price. By 1990 over 30 bcm per year
of additional capacity probably could be available at Uzhgorod.
We estimate that 20 bcm of this--over 300,000 b/d of oil
equivalent--could be used for export if needed and customers were
available, still leaving excess capacity of 10 bcm per year to
The Soviets probably will continue their domestic
substitution of gas for oil, but at a slow pace. Excessive
interfuel substitution using the existing trunkline network would
reduce the flexibility of the network to cope with disruptions
and seasonal demand swings. In addition, smaller local
distribution lines reportedly must also be built before serious
progress can be made in this area. Many of these lines must be
tunneled to prevent disruption of traffic and other activity.
Although this is a common procedure, it is time consuming and
will cause delays in Moscow's conversion plans.
The Soviets could also use a portion of the excess capacity
at Uzhgorod to increase gas sales to Eastern Europe above those
already expected through 2000--thereby freeing additional oil for
sale to the West. Moscow now ships over 45 percent of its oil
exports to Eastern Europe, which with the exception of Romania is
heavily dependent on imported Soviet oil. Most of the Soviet oil
sent to Eastern Europe is consumed in the transportation sector,
although large amounts are also used in power generation and as
feedstock in petrochemical processes. If a combination of
investment and adjustments permitted the Soviets to meet East
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European energy needs with more gas and to cut back oil exports
by just 10 percent, they might save enough oil to meet a couple
of years' growth in their own oil consumption. Alternatively,
this additional oil, if exported to the West, would raise hard
currency oil exports by more than 10 percent above present levels
and much more above lower levels likely to prevail in the 1990s.
Future Network Capacity
Soviet gas development, according to press reports, will be
focused in the northern part of the Tyumen Oblast in West
Siberia, where six supergiant gasfields--Bovanenko, Kharasavey,
Medvezhye, Urengoy, Yamburg, and Zapolyarnoye--contain more than
75 percent of West Siberian reserves. Only two have been
developed thus far--Medvezhye was brought on line in 1972 and
Urengoy in 1978. Production activities are also under way at
Yamburg, which will be the next field developed. Elsewhere in the
Soviet Union older gasfields are continuing to decline. New
supplies are expected from development of the Astrakhan and
Karachaganak gasfields southwest of Orenburg, but the gas from
these fields will help compensate for declining production in
other areas rather than increase overall output.
Longer term future expansion will probably depend on finding
new gas reserves in East Siberia, the Soviet Far East, and
offshore areas in the Barents and Kara Seas. To handle the
development of West Siberian fields, the 12th Five-Year Plan
(1986-90) calls for six additional 56-inch-diameter pipelines to
be constructed from the Yamburg field. One of these--the Progress
pipeline--will parallel the Urengoy-Uzhgorod export pipeline. Gas
from this line--not expected to be ready for delivery until 1989
--is intended primarily for export to Eastern Europe but could
also be used to supplement exports to Western Europe.
Using the modeling capabilities, the potential of the Soviet
gas transmission network to meet future demand by adding the six
planned new pipelines has been analyzed. Some of these new
pipeline routes have been widely discussed, but others remain the
subject of much conjecture. Pipeline routes were projected based
on regional needs to reduce restrictions and
add flexibility. Where possible, the Soviets probably will use
existing station locations, adding compression capacity as
The six new lines should increase the total pipeline
capacity from West Siberian gasfields by 245 bcm to 670 bcm per
year. Total nationwide capacity from the major producing areas
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would irv:rease to more than 1,045 bcm per year by 1990.or upon
the coml,letion of all six pipelines--one of which is completed
between Yamburg and Yelets The increased 25X1
system capacity should be sufficient to handle all projected
increases in Soviet production for at least the next decade. Even
if production grows at just 3 percent, however additional
pipelines will be required by the year 2000. 25X1
Gas Network Vulnerability
The Soviet pipeline network has sufficient flexibility and
redundancy to cope with most, but not all, types of problems. In
general, the network is capable of rerouting gas to alternative
systems that are able to transport larger than normal flow rates
on a continuous basis. As the network expands, however, the
operation and switching requirements become greater and more
complex.
Despite efforts to modernize the network, the Soviets
will still face some problems in switching operations to divert
gas from one area to satisfy increased demand in other areas. The
Soviets, even though they have successfully built one of the
largest gas transmission networks in the world, have had
difficulty operating and maintaining sophisticated equipment
purchased from the West. In addition to occasional operational
problems, the network is also susceptible to problems caused by
equipment malfunction, interruptions of flow because of pipeline
or valve ruptures, and seasonal demand surges.
A large number of contingencies have been simulated along
with seasonal demand surges to help analyze the potential impact
of various problems on Soviet domestic supplies and export
deliverability and to assess Soviet options to offset supply
shortfalls. Although possible scenarios are limitless, analysis
has been concentrated on those most affecting exports and gas
deliveries to Moscow. It was assumed that the Soviets would
assign a high priority to maintaining supplies to Moscow and to
Western Europe and that any necessary curtailments would
primarily affect other domestic consumers or East European
Equipment Problems
Problems caused by equipment downtime--either planned such
as scheduled maintenance or unplanned in cases of failure or
sabotage--can be lengthy if spare parts or the technology needed
for repairs are not readily available. Although the Soviets
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normally stock sp.,-,-e parts for the Western equipment they have on
line, problems reportedly have arisen that have caused downtime
to exceed several months. Spare equipment at each pipeline
booster station usually can be brought on line to handle the
shutting down of equipment for routine maintenance. If multiple
units are off line or spare equipment is not available, these
stations could restrict the deliverability of Soviet export or
domestic systems. The reduction of available equipment for gas-
pressure boosting--loss of one or more compressors or turbines--
at a given station can be simulated by reducing the available
horsepower on the model. This simulation effectively increases
the distance between stations, resulting in increased pressure
drops along the pipeline and the reduction of capacity. It was
found that:
--In any pipeline system, even the loss of all compressor
stations along the pipeline without rupture of the
pipeline itself will still permit flows ranging from 20 to
30 percent of capacity, depending on such factors as the
length and size of the pipeline and field pressures.
--Export pipeline systems operating at 1985 levels would
have to lose at least three sequential compressor stations
before exports would be affected. When operating at
capacity, a pipeline is affected most by the loss of
sequential compressor stations. For a 56-inch pipeline,
such as the Orenburg or Urengoy-Uzhgorod export pipelines,
the loss of several stations in sequence increases the
distance between remaining operating stations and
considerably reduces system capacity.
Equipment Impairment Caused by Trade Denial
Trade embargoes on equipment related to existing pipelines
probably would have only a minimal effect on gas exports by 1990
but would affect domestic consumption. Western-produced equipment
such as compressors and turbines are used in various parts of the
Soviet pipeline network. A major boycott--that included the
cooperation of European manufacturers--of spare parts needed to
service these units would affect the entire network.
Among the export systems, the Orenburg and Urengoy-to-
Uzhgorod pipelines would be most affected. The Orenburg export
pipeline uses western turbines exclusively along its entire
length, and the Urengoy-to-Uzhgorod export pipeline uses Western
equipment in 33 of its 40 compressor stations. The loss of every
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station using Western equipment--on both the Orenburg and
Urengoy-Uzhgorod pipelines--would reduce 1985 export capacity at
Uzhgorod to nearly 37 bcm per year from the current level of over
81 bcm. This capacity loss, however, would have reduced total
exports by only 23 percent at 1985 export levels.
After the addition of the Progress pipeline in 1989--which
will use mainly Eastern Bloc- or Soviet-made equipment--the
effect of a boycott would reduce export capacity at Uzhgorod by
38 percent, causing a loss of only 12 percent of projected 1990
exports of 115 bcm. The Northern Lights system--although slightly
affected by an embargo--has the potential to compensate for the
loss of exports, although domestic cutbacks including
redistribution of flows to Moscow would be required.
--While operating at capacity, loss of the last compressor
station--or last two stations--on each of the four major
export systems just prior to entering Eastern Europe would
have significant impact on pipeline capacity:
--For the Orenburg export system, the loss of the last
station would cause a 25-percent loss in capacity.
--The Urengoy-Uzhgorod export system would lose 17
percent of its capacity if the last station were
eliminated.
--The Northern Lights export system would suffer a drop
of 22 percent in capacity if it lost its last two
stations. Because of the proximity of the stations to
one another, the loss of just one would not reduce
capacity substantially.
--The Shebelinka export system would lose 21 percent of
capacity with the loss of its last station.
--A major outage along the Shebelinka export pipeline--the
only Soviet export system exclusively using electric
motor-driven compressors--affecting all stations could
reduce its export capacity by 63 percent.
Flow Interruption
Rupture of the major pipeline corridor leading from the
Urengoy gasfield would be the most devastating problem the
Soviets could face. In the current pipeline configuration, the
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destruction of all. pipelines in this corridor would disrupt gas
flow in seven pipeline systems--including the Urengoy-to-Uzhgorod
export pipeline and the Northern Lights--which now handle over 40
percent of current Soviet production. Loss of this corridor in
harsh winter weather conditions would cause severe problems in
all sectors of the Soviet economy. The entire northern half of
the country would be affected, and gas supply, except to Moscow,
would be severely restricted for as long as three months.
Even in this case, however, the Soviets could maintain
export flows to Uzhgorod at 1985 levels. The Urengoy-to-Uzhgorod
export pipeline has the capability to receive gas from the
Central Asia-Center system at Algasovo, from the North Caucasus
system at Yelets, and possibly from the Shebelinka system as it
crosses near Kiev. In addition, current deliveries to Uzhgorod
from the Northern Lights system could be offset by use of excess
capacities in the Orenburg and the Urengoy-Uzhgorod export
A similar problem in this same corridor after development of
the new Yamburg systems would be even more devastating. Six
additional pipelines with a capacity of over 245 bcm per year
would traverse the same general area. Losses would amount to more
than 50 percent of total Soviet production by 1990, projected at
nearly 800 bcm. Exports--which otherwise would be projected at
115 bcm for 1990--would be affected; not all could be restored by
diverting gas from other systems, and the entire Soviet economy--
by this time more heavily dependent on gas--would suffer until
repairs are made.
A rupture of the four pipelines on the Northern Lights
system in the Northern economic region would have the most
serious impact on an individual system. Because the Northern
Lights system is running at near full capacity in this area, a
disruption would curtail production by 14 percent at current
levels, virtually halting all gas deliveries to the entire
northern half of the nation and forcing other systems to divert
gas to Moscow and Uzhgorod to make up for lost supplies. This
system may become even more vulnerable because current Soviet
plans do not include adding a pipeline through this area to
relieve system constraints. Several other new lines planned for
completion by 1990, however, will provide gas to common consumers
such as Moscow and Eastern Europe, which will help provide some
backup for this system.
Loss of flow through five key compressor stations in the
Soviet gas network--Yelets, Gryazovets, Algasovo, Aleksandrov
Gay, and Novopskov--would result in the reduction of 85 percent
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of capacity to Moscow,,at least 50 percent of export capacity,
and the reduction of nearly 45 percent of overall domestic
consumption. In addition, nearly all system switching capability
west of the Urals would be lost. Such a loss would require only
that the pipelines and valves used for switching from one
pipeline to another be simultaneously destroyed. The additional
loss of compressors at these stations would be a major annoyance
but would not add to the reduction in capacity. Once the
pipelines and valves were repaired--usually a one-month
operation--consumption could be restored to near-normal levels
even if compressors were lost.
Effects of Seasonal Demand
The Soviets have had difficulty coping with seasonal gas
demand variation. Gas consumption exhibits very pronounced
hourly, daily, and seasonal demand variations. Shorter term
variations can be handled relatively simply with the limited
amounts of storage capacity within the Soviet Union. Each
pipeline system is also capable of accommodating minor variations
in demand through the use of line pack--or pumping in more gas
than is removed. Seasonal variation, however, creates a more
serious problem for the gas industry and is the major factor
determining gas demand fluctuation in a specific region. The
ratio of industrial to domestic use and the types of industrial
users also influence seasonal variation. Industrialized regions
in the USSR with cold or temperate climates may have winter peak
demands two or three times greater than summer requirements.
Standard methods used to deal with seasonal demand swings
include:
--Varying gas production accordingly and underutilizing
pipeline capacity in summer months.
--Installing storage capacity near market areas large enough
to offset gaps between peak demands and supply shortfalls
or deficient pipeline capacity.
--Making gas available during offpeak periods to users who
normally consume another fuel.
The Soviets have used all of these methods to some extent
but have failed to prevent seasonal gas shortfalls. According to
published accounts, during the initial years of gas development
in the 1950s, no buffer or storage areas were available and
pipeline capacity had to be underutilized during offpeak periods.
Older gasfields that are being depleted west of the Urals could
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be used for gas storage, but none is available L. the northern
portions of the USSR, where seasonal swings are greatest. The
Soviets have experimented with artificial underground reservoirs,
but these are expensive and progress in developing and using them
has been slow. As of 1976, the goal for operating underground
storage capacity was about 27 bcm, approximately 4 percent of
current production, which would be very little help in meeting
Soviet seasonal fluctuations. In comparison, Western gas systems
typically have underground storage amounting to approximately 25
percent of production. Underground storage sites are currently
located near Moscow, Leningrad, Riga, Minsk, Dolina, Kiev,
Saratov, Orenburg, Mary, Yerevan, and Tashkent.
Even with this extensive pipeline network, the lack of
adequate storage has given the Soviets considerable difficulty in
meeting peak winter demands, reportedly forcing the Soviets to
curtail supplies to some customers. The Baltic, Belorussian, and
Northwest economic regions are especially susceptible to
emergency shutdowns because they are supplied entirely by the
Northern Lights system, which apparently was nearly fully
utilized when accommodating average monthly flows in 1985. To
handle the problems that arise during peak winter months in
meeting export commitments, the Soviets could divert gas
scheduled for delivery to Moscow from the Northern Lights system.
Other systems could then compensate for loss of gas to Moscow
from the Northern Lights system--at some expense to their own
.operating flexibility.
Large gas systems react very slowly to this type of
switching operation, however, and several days may elapse before
gas diverted from Moscow would reach export locations. With the
aid of the simulation model, more than four days would be
required under ideal operating conditions to divert all flow
through the Northern Lights system from Moscow--14 bcm per year
delivered by branch lines at Gryazovets and Torzhok--to Uzhgorod.
In reality, it could take up to three times longer, because gas
systems such as these are rarely at a steady-state condition and
smooth gas transfers between systems without minor operational
fluctuations rarely occur. This type of problem may well have
been responsible for the Soviets' past slow responses to
increasing gas demand during harsh weather conditions.
The problems caused by seasonal demands in the northern
portion of the USSR could be alleviated by:
--Construction of another large-diameter pipeline, including
compressor stations, from West Siberia to Brest.
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--Adding underground storage near peak demand areas.
--Gaining access to the northern regions from other systems
within the Soviet network.
Other than the experiments with artificial underground
storage, the Soviets, according to their published papers on
pipeline construction projects, do not appear to be planning any
pipelines linking the Northern Lights with other systems or
construction of any new pipelines through the north. The problem
of meeting seasonal demand variation is, therefore, likely to
persist.
Implications and Outlook
The flexibility of the Soviet gas network gives Moscow a
range of options in devising an energy and export policy for the
1990s. The Soviets will have an excess capacity of 30 bcm
available at the Czechoslovak border by 1990 that Moscow could
use, either to try to capture a larger market share in the West
or to increase the substitution of gas for oil--above current
projections--in Eastern Europe. If it chooses the first option,
however, Moscow must continue to invest heavily in its export
system or face steep erosion of its export capability by
increasing domestic and East European gas demand by the late
The flexibility of the Soviet gas system is particularly
important with respect to future gas exports to Western Europe.
The Soviets' share of West European gas supplies is already
projected to increase from 13 percent in 1985 to approximately 20
percent by 1990, but the Soviets probably will be in a good
position to increase their market share beyond this level if they
choose. Under the current construction schedule, six additional
large-diameter pipelines, bringing gas from the giant Yamburg
gasfields, will be completed by 1990, and at least one of these
will supply gas to the Czechoslovakian border--increasing
capacity available to export gas to Eastern and Western Europe.
The Soviets could export to the West an additional 20 bcm above
projected levels by 1990 and still maintain an excess capacity of
10 bcm--approximately 10 percent of estimated exports--to help
cover peak demand swings. Additional gas for export could be
available at Romania's border for sale to Turkey and Greece.
Overall, the Soviet Union will have enough capacity by 1990 to
more than double 1985 sales to the West of about 34 bcm.
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Whether the Soviets capitalize on this opportunity to
further expand their market share in Western Europe will hinge
largely on the progress of North Sea gas development. Statoil--
Norway's state owned oil company--recently completed negotiations
to supply gas to Western Europe from the first stage of
development of its giant gasfields at Sleipner and Troll,
beginning in 1993. A decision on the second phase of the
development of Troll must be made by about 1995 if Western Europe
is to continue meeting most of its anticipated growth in demand
into the early 2000's. An aggressive Soviet marketing effort
could help derail this project.
To compete with North Sea gas, Moscow would have to price
its gas more attractively in export markets and further expand
its export pipeline network in the 1990s. At a minimum, it will
have to build capacity to compensate for the diversion of the
Progress pipeline gas to the West from its original intent--to
meet growing East European consumption requirements into the next
decade. An early indication of a Soviet decision in this
direction would probably be an announcement of an additional
export pipeline to be completed in the mid-1990s. This would mean
that more Soviet gas would be available well before large volumes
of North Sea gas would flow to the continent.
The Soviets also face growing demand for gas in Eastern
Europe and at home. If Moscow decides not to seek a larger share
in the West European gas market--above the 20 percent we project
for 1990--it probably will concentrate its efforts on even
greater gas-for-oil substitution at home and in Eastern Europe to
free more oil for sale to the West. Analysis shows the pipeline
network has the potential for additional gas substitution and,
even without additional export pipelines, Moscow could further
increase gas use for that purpose.
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Appendix
Regional Gas and Fuel Consumption
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Iq
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1. Capacity estimate assumes that gas production is not a
constraint--that is, producing gasfields can deliver as much gas
as the system can handle. The estimate also incorporates
hydraulic limitations downstream from the production zones that
arise as the systems' capabilities to further deliver gas
diminish. These constraints have been quantified using the
pipeline simulation model.
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Secret
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