THE USSR AND ILLICIT DRUGS: FACING UP TO THE PROBLEM

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP97R00694R000600530001-6
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 29
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: March 25, 2011
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: November 1, 1986
• Content Type: REPORT

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53
Directorate of
Intelligence
The USSR and Illicit Drugs:
Facing Up to the Problem
GI 86-10083X
SOV 86-10054X
November 1986
Covv 300
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Directorate of Secret
Intelligence
Facing Up to the Problem
The USSR and Illicit Drugs:
Narcotics Division, OGI,
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or Chief, Domestic Policy
may be addressed to the Chief, International
This paper was prepared by Office of
Global Issues, and Office of Soviet
Analysis. Comments and queries are welcome and
Secret
G186-10083X
SOV 86-10054X
November 1986
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Summary
Information available
as of6 October 1986
was used in this report.
Facing Up to the Problem
The USSR and Illicit Drugs:
South Asia to Western Europe.
In sharp contrast to past official efforts to conceal the existence of a drug
problem in the USSR, the regime of General Secretary Gorbachev is
providing extensive publicity on this topic. This media attention, along with
a few concrete measures taken to facilitate the work of government drug
organizations, suggests that the Kremlin is gearing up for an assault
against illicit drugs. This would be a logical extension of the drive against
alcohol abuse and be consistent with Gorbachev's overall effort to strength-
en law and order. The USSR's drug problem is fueled by:
? The Soviets' lack of expertise and experience in dealing with illicit drugs
and failure to make a major commitment of resources in this area.
? The close relationship between drug use and other societal problems such
as crime and corruption, family instability, youth alienation, and a desire
to imitate Western trends.
? Soviet users and dealers who illegally divert supplies from legal drug
crops.
? Widespread drug use in Afghanistan among Soviet troops, some of whom
smuggle drugs back into the USSR.
? Increased cross-border drug trafficking, particularly from South Asia,
which includes some of the world's top drug producing and trafficking
countries.
? An incipient role as an international conduit for drugs transported from
behind the government's decision to take a more aggressive stance.
By Western standards, the drug problem in the USSR is small; alcohol re-
mains the Soviets' number-one drug of choice. Fragmentary data suggest
that Soviet addicts number in the hundreds of thousands, compared with
several million in the United States. Nonetheless, illicit drug use is
increasing, especially among Soviet youth. The growth of drug use among
privileged youth from Russian ethnic backgrounds-the USSR's future
leaders-causes the Kremlin particular concern. This development and its
association with societal maladies such as crime are most likely the reasons
tackle the drug problem on a comprehensive basis.
The official approach to combating the drug problem, as in the case of al-
cohol problems, has been largely punitive. Most apprehended addicts are
sent to facilities that differ little from prison camps. Drug laws are tough
but poorly enforced. In any event, the Soviets lack the medical treatment
facilities, cadre of professionals, educational programs, specialized law
enforcement units, and eradication equipment that would enable them to
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GI 86-10083X
SOV 86-10054X
Nnvemher I9R6
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Given the high priority Gorbachev assigns to taking on problems that
strain the social fabric and discipline, it seems that he will move more
vigorously than his predecessors against the drug problem, much as he did
against alcoholism in 1985. There are reasons to believe that the Gorba-
chev regime does have the capability to prevent or at least slow down the
growth of drug abuse:
? Unlike heavy drinking, a deeply entrenched habit sanctioned by
centuries-old tradition and involving a huge proportion of the Soviet
population, drug abuse is an incipient problem that has not taken root
among the population at large except perhaps in Muslim areas of the
USSR.
? Since most Soviet drugs come from internal sources, at least for now the
Soviets can largely deal with the problem internally. Thus, the Soviets
may be able to stabilize the drug problem in the short term through the
inexpensive method of a law enforcement crackdown.
However, if the USSR's domestic illicit supplies are curtailed, demand
could lead to increased cross-border smuggling and more international
trafficking through the USSR to Western Europe. As the Soviets face up
to both domestic and cross-border drug problems, we expect that they will
become more active in multilateral drug control programs. The USSR
plans to participate in the UN's World Conference on Trafficking and
Drug Abuse in June 1987; and it has hinted that it may join Interpol, the
international police agency, sometime in 1987. Although this involvement
will be on the Kremlin's own terms, we believe that the Soviets will become
increasingly cooperative during the next few years.
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Current Soviet Drug Scene
Soviet Drug Users
Links Between Drug Use and Other Domestic Problems
5
Internal Production and Marketing of Illicit Drugs
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Drug Use Among Soviet Troops in Afghanistan
8
Cross-Border Trafficking
12
Soviet Policy Response to the Drug Problem
14
The Legal Framework
17
Drug Education and Prevention
18
Drug Treatment and Rehabilitation
18
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The USSR and Illicit Drugs:
Facing Up to the Problem
Under General Secretary Gorbachev, the Soviet Gov-
ernment is both publicizing and developing solutions
to a variety of social problems that it previously
played down. A case in point is the regime's 1985
alcohol control initiatives. Illicit drug activity is small
in comparison to alcoholism in the USSR, but it
nonetheless contributes to broader societal problems
that are forcing the Kremlin to act. Although a Soviet
antidrug program is likely to be focused inward on
drug abuse, concern over trafficking probably will
cause a move into the international arena that will
bring Soviet officials into contact with the United
States on a number of drug issues over the next few
years.
Increased Soviet press coverage and official state-
ments in recent months indicate heightened regime
concern about illicit drug activity in the USSR. In
sharp contrast to past efforts to conceal the drug
problem, the Gorbachev leadership is providing pub-
licity that since April 1986 has assumed the propor-
tions of a minicampaign (figure 1). We estimate that
the number of drug-related articles during the first six
months of 1986 are more than twice the number that
appeared from 1980 to 1985. Moreover, public atten-
tion is no longer concentrated in the Caucasian and
Central Asian republics but is reflected in periodicals
throughout the country:
? In mid-April the Moscow Komsomol youth newspa-
per published the first in-depth expose of the nation-
wide drug problem, acknowledging the existence of
Soviet pushers, addicts, and drug-related crime.
? A June Izvestiya article acknowledged that the
"growing problem" of drug abuse has begun to
affect children and expressed regret that "we have
shown ourselves to be ill-prepared to fight this evil."
? In mid-July, Literaturnaya Gazeta published a let-
ter to the editor written by a mother of two drug
addicts in Odessa who lamented that "soon the
poppy harvest will start pouring into the city. The
militia is doing nothing to control this. We can't be
silent about this."
Since April, a number of high-level officials have
addressed the drug issue publicly:
? Moscow party chief Boris Yeltsin, a Politburo mem-
ber and Gorbachev protege, stated in a July inter-
view that "drug addiction has increased greatly."
? In late July First Secretary of the Georgian Com-
munist Party Patiashvili noted at a local party
meeting that prominence was being given "to the
task of nipping in the bud such negative phenomena
as narcotics addiction that push people into crime."
His predecessor in Georgia and now Foreign Minis-
ter Eduard Shevardnadze had previously told a
meeting of republic law enforcement personnel that
"drug addiction, which ruins people's health and
brings about their moral degradation, is not being
fought with sufficient vigor by us."
? Also in July, at a conference in Kharkov attended
by prosecutors from a number of union republics
and oblasts, USSR Procurator Aleksandr Rekunkov
called for a stepped-up effort in the struggle against
drug addiction. The attendees concurred on the
necessity for studying drug use nationwide.
? In a May interview the head of the leading Soviet
psychological institute publicly urged that a cam-
paign be launched against drug addiction similar to
that against alcoholism.
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Figure 1. Soviet media on illicit drugs "When the Illusion
Vanishes " (left). "Dangerous Addiction"(right).
? Later in August, in a lengthy piece in Literaturnaya
Gazeta, interviewed police, farm, and health offi-
cials called for urgent measures to combat the
cultivation and use of drugs. RSFSR Health Minis-
ter Anatoliy Potapov stated, "It's high time this evil
(of drug abuse) was denounced loud and clear."
? In an August issue of Izvestiya, I. Usmankhodz-
hayev, First Secretary of the Uzbek Party Central
Committee, admitted that both drug addiction and
the cultivation of narcotic plants were widespread
problems in the republic.
? At an October conference of social scientists, Secre-
tary Yegor Ligachev stated that "energetic mea-
sures are being taken to erect barriers against drug
addiction."
? At a September meeting held by the Ukrainian
Central Committee, Politburo member Vladimir
Shcherbitskiy complained about the ineffectiveness
of educational and preventive measures in dealing
with the drug problem.
The Kremlin's public acknowledgment of a domestic
drug problem broke a longstanding taboo. Until 1986
senior Soviet officials dismissed drugs as a feature of
Western moral decay not found in the USSR. The
recent turnaround is partly the result of Gorbachev's
call for openness, or glasnost, in the press. In striking
contrast to Brezhnev, who suppressed information of
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domestic problems to avoid stirring up public criticism
of the regime's failure to deal with them, Gorbachev
is publicizing these problems to marshal public sup-
port behind his policy initiatives. He probably believes
it is necessary to portray the drug problem more
candidly to raise public awareness and to condition
the population to accept the need for vigorous; remedi-
al measures.
Current Soviet Drug Scene
The exact size of the USSR's drug problem is un-
known both to the Soviets and to us. Ministry! of
Internal. Affairs (MVD) statistics on social maladies
are state secrets. Official data that are released are
fragmentary and seemingly inconsistent. In recent
years data published in Soviet professional journals
have indicated that the official number of "registered
narcotics addicts" in the entire USSR has hovered
around 2,500 (in a population of about 280 million).
Moscow party chief Boris Yeltsin, however, publicly
acknowledged in July 1986 that Moscow alone has
3,600 registered addicts. Government figures repre-
sent only those-addicts who are registered, the term
used for those who have been arrested or turned in for
narcotics abuse. Yeltsin affirmed that his figure of
3,600 registered addicts in Moscow included only
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those people who were involuntarily registered, and he
readily admitted that there are many who are not
registered.
We believe that Soviet authorities themselves do not
have a good handle on the total number of drug users,
but the total number of addicts
is much higher than that officially reported:'
authorities put the number
of addicts in the republic at 40,000.
? I (there were 50,000 drug
users in Moscow in the late 1970s.F
accor ing to MVD
estimates, there were 100,000 addicts in Moscow in
1984 and three to four times that many occasional
users of narcotics.
several Soviet
cities along the Volga River-Kazan', Saratov,
Gor'kiy, and Ul'yanovsk, each with a population of
more than I million-are said to have between
20,000 and 30,000 addicts each.
In an apparent effort to improve its ability to size up
the problem, the Georgian Republic earlier this year
conducted a large-scale survey on drug use. An
August 1986 Izvestiya article disclosed that, while the
survey did not reveal exact totals of addicts, it did
conclude that the drug problem in Georgia is rising.
Although drug use appears to be a growing phenome-
non in the Soviet Union, the problem is still small by
Western standards. The higher unofficial estimates
' Compounding the difficulty of assembling accurate figures on
Soviet drug use is the problem of definitions. Even Soviet drug
specialists do not always differentiate between narcotic drugs and
milder substances, whose psychological and physiological effects
differ substantially. In addition, very different forms of drug
dependence are often referred to in Soviet literature as "addiction,"
whether the dependence is psychological, physical, or both. Finally,
persons who merely experiment with drugs are not always distin-
guished from actual addicts. Thus, whether or not officially
released statistics on drug use have been manipulated to accommo-
date political motives, they do not appear to reflect scientific
Georgian Survey of Drug Abuse
Two field surveys of "hundreds" of drug addicts in
Georgia, conducted by the laboratory of criminal
sociology of the Georgian MVD related that:
? Drug addiction exists at all social levels-among
workers, villagers, children of doctors, teachers,
and scholars.
? The majority of those questioned (85.6 percent)
were 16 to 35 years old. Of these, half were 20 years
old or younger.
? More than one-half came from well-to-do families,
and the majority had secondary and incomplete
higher educations.
? Ninety percent obtained their drugs either from
pharmacies or from hospital medical personnel.
Eighty percent of the drug users obtained their
drugs from points outside the Georgian SSR. Nine-
teen such geographical sources within the USSR
were mentioned, mainly cities in other areas of the
Caucasus and in Central Asia.
put the number of Soviet drug users in the hundreds
of thousands; in the United States, in addition to the
widespread use of marijuana, current users of cocaine
number more than 4 million and heroin users about
500,000, according to the National Institute of Drug
and Alcohol Abuse.
Soviet Drug Users
Drug use is not new to the USSR; many ethnic groups
of Central Asia and the Caucasus have used hashish
and opium for centuries (figure 2). Until the 1970s
drug use was largely confined to those southern
regions. dru use began
to spread on a small scale in the 1960s.
drug abuse
among criminals and in Soviet prisons first became
noticeable during that period. A recent article in the
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Figure 2
Soviet Drug Production Centers and Routes of International Trafficking
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Romania Kiev
ra i n ian
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/
Dnepropetr vsk
Donets
k`asnodar
ise,
Turkey rg67, ///// Cas
Saudi
Arabia
Persian
Gulf
Arms n, bilisi
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Nea //s;Ism.
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Turkmen
S.S.R.
Kazakh
S.S.R.
= Opium poppy
o Opium
o Cannabis
El Manufactured drug
Lake
Balkhash
The United States Government has not recognized
the incorporation of Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania
into the Soviet Union. Other boundary representation
is not necessarily authoritative.
0 500 Kilometers
I t
0 500 Miles
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Moscow youth newspaper also fixed the spread of
drug use at this time, which coincides with when
drugs became fashionable in the West.
? Hashish and marijuana appear to be more widely
used than opium-derived products among Soviet
youth because they are less expensive. One hundred
grams of hashish costs 40 to 50 rubles.
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during the 1970s drug use
expanded into northern European areas of the USSR,
especially in the larger cities of the Slavic and Baltic
republics, and among Soviet youth of all social class-
es. It is probably this extension of drug use from
traditional areas into elite youth circles that alarms
Soviet authorities.
the majority of the
USSR's drug users are young, usually in their teens or
twenties. the
recent converts to drug use are primarily urban,
educated youth from the privileged social stratum.
drug use was rising among the
children of "important officials," who could afford the
habit. divided drug users into
three categories: bored and affluent children of top
party and military officials; working class juveniles,
described by the press as "hooligans," who often lack
parental supervision, belong to street gangs, and
become pushers to pay for their habits; and young
school children who accept offers of drugs out of
curiosity and believe drug use is a sign of maturity.
Moscow addicts also
include "decent" personalities such as scientists, writ-
ers, physicians, and famous athletes.
These different segments of Soviet society are using a
broad range-in price and kind-of narcotic
substances:
? Drugs used by affluent users include morphine and
codeine preparations, which, at a cost of 400 rubles
per gram, are considered expensive.
? Students, workers, minor criminals, and homosex-
uals use a cheaper, potent narcotic called kuknar,
which is made from dry poppyheads. Known as one
of the "hardest and strongest" narcotics, kuknar
results in a very painful withdrawal syndrome but is
considered a bargain at 150 to 200 rubles per
kilogram.'
(1983 average).
? Che fir, a highly concentrated tea extract with a
high caffeine content, causes a substantial high. It
is legally produced from tea and is widely used by
Slavs in Siberia and in forced labor camps, where it
is openly available and cheap.
? LSD and cocaine are not common in the USSR
because of the complicated processing procedure
and the lack of indigenous sources of supply.
Links Between Drug Use and Other
Domestic Problems
Like alcoholism, drug abuse is associated with a wide
range of social maladies that worsened during the
1970s and early 1980s: divorce and family instability,
crime and corruption, youth disaffection and alien-
ation, and a general waning of ideological belief and
lowering of popular morale. Greater contacts with
Westerners in recent years have given impetus to drug
use among Soviet youth infatuated with Western
trends and fashions. For some, more leisure time and
an increase in disposable income during a period of
consumer shortages have been contributing factors.
At the same time, drug use feeds a variety of domestic
ills by increasing opportunities and incentives for
corruption, helping to cause family breakups, aggra-
vating already serious national health problems, and
further straining social cohesiveness and discipline.
For some "golden youth," as sons and daughters of
the elite are called, drugs have become a symbol of
rebellion and a means of emulating the West:
people, including children of ranking CPSU offi-
cials, was directly linked to drug use.
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? A young Moscow teenager said that she and her
friends smoked hashish because they wanted to keep
up with Western trends and that using drugs was
the "in" thing to do.
? In a recent book, Chingiz Aitmatov, noting the
weakening hold of ideology on Soviet youth, said
that, for many of them, drugs have become a symbol
of "entering the West."
? A June 1986 Komsomolskaya Pravda article
blamed drug use among children and youth on
"families for whom material values long ago pushed
spiritual and moral order into the background."
Georgian sociologists, in a recently published study,
asserted that "hedonism" is the main reason for the
spread of drug addiction.
? Another recent article in Moskovskaya Komsomo-
lets, noting that the drug problem was acute among
children of the affluent, concluded that drug use in
the Soviet Union can be traced in part to weakened
family values.
Gorbachev's stern antialcohol campaign, under way
since May 1985, may have stimulated drug use by
raising the price of alcohol and reducing its availabil-
ity.' In early June several Soviet newspapers reported
that some youth have reacted to the restrictions on
liquor by turning to substitutes such as raw poppy
extract, paint thinner, and prescription medicines.
Open Soviet press sources affirm a connection be-
tween drugs and crimes, ranging from apartment
burglaries to murder, and indicate that drug-related
crime is on the rise. According to an October 1986
Izvestiya article, a Soviet legal official reported "a
steady growth in the number of solved crimes linked
to drugs." Georgiy Morozov, in a mid-May 1986
Sovetskaya Kultura interview, linked narcotics use
and crime and cited as proof West German statistics
showing 64,000 crimes connected with drug abuse in
1983. Yuri Dyachenko, chief of the Kuibyshev MVD
antidrug section, recently told a Sovetskaya Rossiya
reporter that "bloody crimes are sometimes commit-
ted over a codeine tablet, an ampule of morphine, or
hashish cigarettes." Other newspaper articles have
hinted at the involvement of organized crime, al-
though most drug trafficking appears to be carried
out by small-time entrepreneurs rather than large-
scale networks.
Drug use also is beginning to contribute to a variety of
health problems in the USSR. A physician at a
children's hospital noted in 1984, for example, that
there was a rise in the number of addicted mothers
giving birth. There is little evidence thus far linking
drug abuse to AIDS or needle-transmitted hepatitis;
but Soviet drug addicts
reuse hypodermic needles, and in June officials pub-
licly acknowledged one AIDS case caused by intrave-
nous drug use. RSFSR Health Minister Potapov
recently admitted that "drug addiction often goes
hand in hand with homosexuality."
Internal Production and Marketing of Illicit Drugs
Most of the USSR's illicit drugs come from internal
sources-cultivation, production, and marketing all
occur within Soviet borders-although cross-border
trafficking from South Asian countries, like Afghani-
stan, supplies some drugs. According to an August
article by a Soviet MVD official, 80 percent of illicit
narcotics are produced from licit domestic crops, with
the remaining 20 percent coming from illegal diver-
sions from medical institutions.
Two main crop sources for illicit drugs exist within
the USSR. Cannabis is cultivated legally in the
southern USSR, and the plant's tough fiber, known as
hemp, is used for making rope and twine (figure 3).
Although most of the cannabis native to the USSR
contains only a small percentage of narcotic sub-
stances, it is cultivated illicitly for marijuana and
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hashish.4 According to several Soviet officials quoted
in the press; however, a type of cannabis with higher
levels of narcotic substances is grown illicitly near; the
Aral, Black, and Caspian Seas; in the Central Asian
republics of Kirghiz, Tajik, and Kazakh; and in the
Donetsk area of the Ukraine.
a marijuana production center was
located in Tajik. Hashish is produced throughout the
Some marijuana and hashish is also derived from wild
cannabis, which contains even smaller amounts of
narcotic substances than the licit, cultivated cannabis.
According to a top Soviet agriculture official quoted
in an August 1986 issue of Literaturnaya Gazeta,
wild cannabis grows on more than 1 million hectares
in the Chu Valley of Kirghiz alone, with another 1
million hectares in the Far East, from Khabarovsk to
Zabaikal. The same agriculture official reported that
cultivated cannabis covers only 86,000 hectares. We
have not seen comprehensive official data on the
USSR's cannabis growing areas and are unable to
confirm these figures, which may be little more than
the Soviet-Afghan border in Tajik. The poppy heads
are used in licit morphine production, and the seeds
are used for cooking. Although many of the legal
poppyfields are patrolled to ward off illicit harvesters,
Soviet press accounts affirm that numerous drug
dealers and users raid the fields. The focus of official
concern appears to be the large-scale diversion of
opium poppies from state-run farms scattered from
the western Ukraine to the Volga uplands, a span of
more than 1,600 kilometers.
Hashish, marijuana, and opium derivatives are readi-
ly available in the southern republics at most of the
local bazaars, although many users harvest their own
supplies. a large opium
market is operating in the Ukraine. Georgian drug
dealers are said to obtain some supplies from L'vov,
Donetsk, and Kiev.
Widespread corruption in the USSR facilitates the
internal production and marketing of illicit drugs:
drug trafficking
flourishes in the Derbent region of the Dagestan
Autonomous Republic because of an agreement
between opium poppy growers and police officers,
who reportedly receive 2,000 rubles per hectare of
opium poppies.
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inflated guesses.
Opium poppies are grown legally in the Georgian,
Ukrainian, Belorussian, and Uzbek Republics, in the
Kuibyshev area of the Russian Republic, and along
Marijuana is the dried, tobacco-like product of the cannabis plant;
hashish is a more processed product of cannabis that consists of
compressed resinous powder. Hashish usually contains a higher
concentration of the psychoactive agent delta-9-tetrahydrocannabi-
nol (THC) than marijuana because of the additional processing.
with the drug trade because of widespread
kickbacks.
when drug
dealers were arrested in Moscow in the early 1980s,
most bribed their way out of jail within one or two
days. the militia
generally ignores the drug situation in Moscow
because junior- and medium-ranked militiamen
themselves are obtaining drugs on the black market.
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narcotic substances by bribing the guards.
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Drug Trafficking in the Soviet Capital
it is as easy to obtain illicit drugs in
Moscow as it is in any major US city.
both drug users and
'feel free and quite comfortable in Moscow. " F
drugs can be
acquired in more than 300 places in the capital.
Market dealers, or "street pushers, " are known to
operate from Cheremushkiy Market, the Central
Moscow Market, Leningradskiy Market, and Arbat
Square,
in the early 1980s, dealers who stood
on Leninskiy Prospect with ready syringes were ap-
proached by addicts in automobiles who stretched
out their arms, received injections, and departed
without ever having to get out of their cars. When the
weather got cold, these dealers moved to Vnukovo
Airport. The Salyut Hotel in Moscow was used as a
drug distribution point in the early 1980s.
during that time on a "hot" day nearl
1 kilogram of pure morphine was distributed.
Soviet teenagers in
Moscow talking openly about puffing plan and ana-
sha (types of hashish), popping tranquilizers, sniffing
chemical fumes, and drinking a toxic, mind-numbing
concoction known as BF, or Boris Fedorovich, that is
made from butylphenol glue.
a number of teenage hippies often use
marijua-
na use by Soviet students is not a rare occurrence.
Drugs are usually brought from the southern repub-
lics to northern cities by train or automobile. Some
dealers and users also grow their own opium poppies
at dachas just outside of Moscow,
"Tourist dealers," who live in regions
where poppies grow and travel to Moscow to sell
wholesale quantities of illicit drugs, usually obtain
their supplies from state opium poppy farms. Dealers
often process the collected product with crude and
cheap "home technology" to purify it and sell it at
Numerous Soviet press reports tell of dealers and
users who flock to the state opium poppyfields. A June
1986 Komsomolskaya Pravda article depicted groups
of dealers and addicts converging on Central Asian
poppyfields from the Baltic region and from the
Russian cities of Orenburg, Orel, and Krasnodar.
These visiting groups often stay for days and collect
sacks of opium poppies, according to the article. One
enforcement official in the Kuibyshev region publicly
stated that the availability of narcotics in the area is
like "home brew flowing from the kitchen tap.'
10 percent morphine for medical purposes.
Dealers and addicts obtain processed narcotics, such
as morphine and codeine-based medicines, from medi-
cal personnel, as well as from civil defense enterprises.
Criminal channels reportedly supply the Moscow
black market with opiates obtained from robbing
drugstores, hospital storage facilities, and railroad
cars transporting medicinal drugs. Some directors of
drugstores and hospitals cooperate with various com-
mercial narcotics traders. Dealers can obtain medi-
cines containing narcotic substances from pharmaco-
logical plants in Khar'kov, Tomsk, Ufa, Kazan',
Navoi, and Moscow. Some narcotics dealers buy
narcotics contained in medical supplies of geological
teams going to remote parts of the Soviet Union.
Some physicians and therapists sell prescriptions for
drugs containing narcotic substances. Illegal home
laboratories also supply the black market with narcot-
ics. Dealers also bribe or swindle civil defense ware-
house managers to borrow individual protective kits
and replace the synthesized narcotic substance that
each kit contains with water or a cheaper painkiller.
Dealers obtain similar narcotics and reusable syringes
from military supply stores, which stock ampules of
Drug Use Among Soviet Troops in Afghanistan
drug use among Soviet
troops in Afghanistan is based on fragmentary infor-
mation.
higher prices.
Consequently, there is no conclusive
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evidence indicating that drug use among the troops in
Afghanistan has reached epidemic proportions or that
the drug problem has impaired the performance of the
Soviet forces. Nonetheless, the frequency
and the nature of some
anecdotal information suggest that drug use among
Soviet troops in Afghanistan is increasing. Some
reported instances include:
of Soviet conscripts in Afghanistan used drugs.
Drug addiction also has been reported in the So-
viets' more elite units,
? Troops barter weapons, ammunition, gasoline, and
other supplies for drugs.
Soviet soldiers in Kabul using
hashish and selling equipment to purchase drugs.
Soviet
gear can be found at market bazaars known for
drug trafficking. These bazaars have been identified
in such places as Kabul's Rishkour City District,
Jalalabad, Herat, and along the Qandahar-Chaman
road in southeastern Afghanistan.
Soviet troops stationed
outside of Kabul, particularly along the main over-
land communication routes between Kabul and the
USSR, are a major market for the drug trade
(figure 4).
? Afghan truck and bus drivers routinely carry drugs
to bribe Soviet soldiers manning checkpoints. As-
saults and robberies of bus passengers by Soviet
soldiers were frequent before drivers started carry-
ing drugs,
Alcohol, the Soviets' traditional drug of choice, is
more difficult to obtain than are hashish and opiates
in Afghanistan. Unlike Soviet military officers, con-
scripts do not receive a monthly alcohol allowance;
and a liter bottle of vodka, for example, can cost one
month's pay for enlisted personnel. Soviet soldiers
can, however, easily acquire illicit drugs, notably
hashish, because Afghan drugs are cheap and plenti-
ful. There is no ban on opium poppy cultivation in
Afghanistan, and little
has been done by either Soviet or Afghan officials to
curb drug production (figure 5).
Moscow has asked the
Afghan Government to be more effective in eradicat-
ing drug production;
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substantiates reports of increased 25X1
opium poppy cultivation in traditional Afghan grow-
ing areas since the Soviet invasion.'
most of.the heroin and hashis
consumed by Soviet troops is produced in Nangarhar,
Konarha, and Helmand Provinces.
low morale, lack of
discipline, the young age of many conscripts, and long
lulls between combat are factors in the troops' drug
use. Soviet military doctrine and tactics are not suited
to the drawn-out fighting against the Afghan insur-
gents. Soviet soldiers are poorly trained for counterin-
surgency warfare and are misinformed about the
Afghan situation
they were told the troops would defend the
USSR's border and would fight Chinese and US
mercenaries. Many soldiers smoke hashish to "take
Soviet authorities
by pilots has led to an increase in helicopter crashes.
In another incident, a Soviet tank crew was killed
when their vehicle was driven off the road into the
Kabul Gorge. Military investigators said the acci-
dent was the result of the driver's heroin addiction.
are increasingly concerned about drug use in the
Afghanistan-based forces, but the USSR is saying
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Figure 4
Major Smuggling Routes of Afghan Drugs Into the Soviet Union
Boundary repre-entation is
not necessarily authoritative
Opium poppy cultivation
Province boundary
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little publicly. To date, the Soviets have not taken any
drastic steps to curtail the drug problems among their
troops in Afghanistan. For example,
the Soviet military has not attempted to
troy opium poppyfields. Soviet commanders in
outlying areas of Afghanistan, where drug use among
troops is particularly high, have adopted a tactic of
rotating troops between posts more frequently to
disrupt dealer-user relationships. The measure, how-
ever, has not been successful,
Since 1984 Soviet officers
have made soldiers more accountable for their weap-
ons, reportedly to prevent soldiers from trading them
for drugs. For example, Soviet military police have
established roadblocks in Kabul to look for any
suspiciously large amounts of military equipment
Soviet troops might be accumulating for drug trades,
the strict controls against narcotics abuse by
Soviet troops in Kabul have become increasingly
effective. Any soldier found guilty of selling or trading
a military weapon is arrested and immediately sen-
tenced to a military jail in the USSR.
ome Afghan insurgents, or muja-
hideen, occasionally entice Soviet troops with drugs to
ensnare them or to barter for weapons. The insurgents
generally deny involvement in the drug trade, al-
though Afghans who support the insurgency admit to
supplying Soviet soldiers with drugs. Nonetheless, we
doubt that the drug trade constitutes an organized,
large-scale effort by the insurgents.
involvement of any kind with
hashish and opiates among their people is prohibited
on the basis of their conservative Islamic principles.
Others, however, have no scruples about selling nar-
cotics and traditionally have trafficked drugs. Never-
theless, we believe that individual mujahideen or
insurgency supporters purvey drugs to Soviet troops
and to any other buyer as well.
Cross-Border Trafficking
The USSR as a Market
As with numerous other countries, drug trafficking
into the USSR is accomplished through the time-
honored methods of smugglers. We suspect that drug
smugglers capitalize on the fact that drug interdiction
is new to the Soviets, and customs personnel are not
trained in or equipped for drug identification and
seizures. In addition, smug-
glers get illicit drugs into the Soviet Union by bribing
customs officials at the borders. We do not have
comprehensive data on the frequency and quantities
of illicit drugs that cross into the USSR, but we judge
that the flow of trafficking is regular and increasing.
A key factor contributing to the Soviet Union's cross-
border trafficking is its geographic location. The
USSR's southern regions border some of the world's
top drug-producing and trafficking countries, such as
Pakistan, Afghanistan, Iran, and Turkey. We believe
that most of the illicit drugs sent to the Soviet market
from the south originate in Afghanistan, which is an
increasingly popular avenue for South Asian drug
smuggling. This drug trade puts greater pressure on
Soviet customs officials who apparently concentrate
on checking identifications of travelers and movement
of war-related cargo along the Soviet-Afghan border.
We also suspect that cross-border smuggling into the
USSR is made easier by the ethnic ties between South
Asians and Soviet Asians, who are traditional drug
users and could offer non-Soviet smugglers easier
cross-border trafficking channels.
Most of the illicit drugs bound for the Soviet market
from Afghanistan probably are brought in by return-
ing Soviet military troops. Reports of drug smuggling
into the USSR have increased since the Soviets
invaded Afghanistan in 1979:
270 Soviet personnel
were implicated in 1983 in connection with a smug-
gling operation between Kabul and Moscow. Soviet
soldiers involved in a smaller narcotics ring along
the Afghan-USSR border were being investigated
by the KGB in late 1985,
Ithe KGB
was ordered to investigate drug smuggling from
Afghanistan to the USSR via military transport.
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Soviet soldiers returning from Afghanista
with 150- to 200-gram balls of hashish.
widespread smuggling of radios
and tape recorders, as well as hashish and opium,
out of Afghanistan by Soviet soldiers. This smug-
gling reportedly was accomplished by bribing Soviet
Naval personnel who were serving as customs offi-
cials at the USSR-Afghan border.
? In a case not involving Soviet troops, an Afghan
saw illicit drugs being smuggled from Afghanistan
into the USSR by civilian couriers at the following
border crossing points: via the Keleft overhead
pipeline, at Sher Khan Bandar by ferryboats, and in
Termez on a Soviet railway line.
We believe that the majority of illicit drugs shipped
into the USSR comes from South Asia, but supplies
also filter in from other sources. For example, Lenin-
grad militia officials acknowledge that heroin is
smuggled in by Soviet and foreign sailors
The Black Sea port
Odessa, long a center of black-market trafficking in
the USSR, is probably a major entry point for illicit
cle impound bureau arrested more than 50 Polish
citizens along the Soviet-Polish border in a six-month
period for drug smuggling. Most of the confiscated
drugs reportedly were marijuana and cocaine.
The USSR as a Conduit
Although not yet a major transit route, the USSR is
being used more frequently by traffickers as a conduit
for South Asian-produced drugs moving to markets in
the West. This may be an attempt by the trafficking
groups that supply drugs to the Soviet market to carve
out a niche in the more lucrative markets of Western
Europe. It may also reflect an attempt by established
international traffickers to locate secure alternative
routes to replace traditional routes that have been
identified and come under stricter enforcement. Tur-
key, for example, has long been a transit point for
South Asian drugs, but traffickers now face higher
risk there because Turkish officials have beefed up
interdiction efforts. The Soviet Union, with its lack of
experience in interdiction and drug enforcement, pro-
vides a relatively low-risk alternative to these sophisti-
cated, international traffickers. For example, if illicit
drugs are well concealed in other cargo, they can cross
the USSR by truck without much difficulty. Once
shipments clear inspection at the Soviet border, there
usually is no careful examination of transit goods at
checkpoints within the USSR if the shipping papers
are in order. Inspection procedures at Soviet ports
and, to a lesser extent, airports are also not designed
to detect and seize concealed drugs.
Several recent cases support our view that drug
smuggling through the Soviet Union is increasing. For
example, illicit drugs have been discovered on Aero-
flot flights from South Asia to Western Europe via
Moscow's Sheremetevo II Airport:
? In a 10 April 1986 Moscow Izvestiya article, N. A.
Bazhenov, First Deputy Prosecutor General of the
USSR, cited cases from 1985 in which fairly small
amounts of hashish were discovered on Aeroflot
flights. A Jordanian, an Australian, and a Briton
were imprisoned in the USSR for carrying the drugs
in amounts of 10 kilograms or less. They were flying
from New Delhi to Zurich with a stopover in
Moscow. In another case, a Danish man was impris-
oned for three months in the USSR after Soviet
customs authorities found 3.6 kilograms of hashish
in his luggage. The Dane, who was arrested in
December 1985 at the Moscow airport, was flying
from New Dehli to Denmark. These flight routes
confirm reporting that identifies India as a major
refining and trafficking center for drugs that are
then shipped to Europe and North America.
? The US Embassy in Moscow confirms that the less
expensive Aeroflot routing from South Asia to
Western Europe via Moscow continues to be used
by small-time drug smugglers. Embassy consular
staff, who have access to nonpublic areas of the
Moscow airport, report seeing Soviet sniffer dogs in
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use. All incoming Ariana (Afghan-flag carrier)
baggage is checked by the dogs, and they apparent-
ly are targeted against other flights arriving from
South Asia.
Larger amounts of drugs, especially heroin, are smug-
gled across the USSR on overland and maritime
routes. The shipments usually originate in Afghani-
stan, Pakistan, and India:
the USSR.
Thus far, the USSR's antidrug efforts lack the teeth
Gorbachev put into his 1985 alcohol control initiative.
Soon after Gorbachev made the alcoholism campaign
a top national priority, the USSR Council of Minis-
ters created a 28-point set of marching orders to
implement the program. In addition, the Presidium of
the USSR Supreme Soviet enacted a statute signifi-
cantly stiffening every area of the Soviet legal code
dealing with alcohol consumption, sale, and produc-
tion. These types of tough nationwide measures are
still absent in the Soviets' antidrug efforts. Moreover,
Soviet action against domestic drug problems is hin-
dered by a lack of trained enforcement and medical
personnel. Soviet drug control agencies have limited
experience in combating what is a recent problem for
There are indications, however, that the Soviets are
gearing up for an assault on drug abuse-as a logical
extension of the drive against alcohol and, more
generally, a part of Gorbachev's overall effort to
strengthen law and order. Along with the onset this
spring of the media focus on drugs, some regional
party organizations have begun to take concrete mea-
sures to combat addiction. In the most striking effort
to date, Moscow authorities launched a citywide drug
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Soviet Official Attention to the Drug Problem Before the 1980s
USSR Supreme Soviet Presidium ukase stipulates the assessment of responsibility for narcotics use
and stepped-up efforts against the sale of narcotics.
First national popular press item revealing drug abuse among youth is printed in the journal Krokodil.
Academy of Sciences' scientist is arrested for producing kilogram amounts of LSD (this is the first
reported use of LSD in the USSR).
Decree by the RSFSR Supreme Soviet provides for detention of persistent drug takers for up to two
years in "curative labor dispensaries."
USSR Supreme Court issues decree "On Court Cases Dealing With the Theft of Narcotics, the Illegal
Manufacture, and Distribution of Narcotic, Dangerous, and Toxic Substances. "
First drug couriers from Southeast Asia's Golden Triangle are caught at Sheremetyevo Airport.
World Health Organization International Seminar on "Topical Problems of Present-Day Narcology"
abuse program this April. The Moscow party commit-
tee reprimanded city legal and medical services for
past mistakes and specifically ordered that enforce-
ment officials ensure proper storage and use of medi-
cines.'
We expect that further measures will be taken,
although the Kremlin will have to make a greater
commitment to fighting illicit drugs and back its
antidrug enunciations with material resources and
training. The government seems to be focusing on
three general areas in its antidrug efforts: vigorous
and consistent enforcement of drug laws; drug educa-
tion and prevention programs, particularly for youth
and medical personnel; and improved drug treatment
and rehabilitation programs.
" As early as 1984, the Moscow militia instituted several methods to
fight the drug addiction problem in the city. These included
registration of addicts during roundups; apprehension and detention
of other suspected addicts; forced medical examinations by physi-
cians or narcologists; roundups in districts haunted by addicts; and
resettlement of addicts out of Moscow, usually following the failure
of prison or treatment centers to solve the problem.
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Enforcement
Improved law enforcement has been a key theme of
the Soviet Government from the Kremlin down to
local levels. The Soviet press has openly reported on
drug-related arrests, the replacement of at least one
top drug official, and the creation of new drug
enforcement units. Recent drug cases publicized by
the Soviet press suggest that tougher measures are
imminent. According to the 6 August Sovetskaya
Rossiya, a number of Soviet doctors and nurses have
recently been found guilty of illegally selling drugs
from medical institutions. In one case, a nurse at a
convalescent home near Moscow was sentenced to
death for stealing drugs and for unspecified "severe
consequences" that resulted from her actions. In
another incident publicized in this newspaper article,
a medical worker at Sklifosovsky Emergency Hospital
in central Moscow was found guilty of peddling stolen
drugs from the hospital. The Georgian press reported
that a republic Komsomol Central Committee Bureau
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meeting this spring dealt with the case of four mem-
bers apprehended for possession and use of drugs. The
investigation also disclosed evidence of protectionism
and other abuses on the part of schools attended by
the youths. ~
Dr. Eduard Babayan, the USSR's foremost authority
on drug and alcohol abuse for the past decade and its
representative to the UN Commission of Narcotic
Drugs, was removed this spring from his post in the
Ministry of Health, which is the USSR's top drug
enforcement agency.' Babayan, who played down the
Soviet drug problem and opposed draconian measures
against drinking, was reprimanded for urging "sensi-
ble moderation" in alcohol consumption instead of
taking a more aggressive stance. Clearly, he was out
of step with the drive to toughen enforcement of both
alcohol and drug laws.
In a move that could affect future drug trafficking in
the USSR, Soviet customs has been reorganized.
Earlier this year, the Ministry of Foreign Trade was
relieved of responsibility for customs and a new
Customs Directorate was created under the Council
of Ministers. The head of this new directorate public-
ly stated that "drug addiction is a misfortune that
quite evidently has affected us, too," and announced
that Soviet customs would become more "vigilant"
against the smuggling of contraband, including drugs.
Soviet enforcement agencies are starting to imple-
ment relatively small antidrug programs, and the
police are beginning to tackle the problem directly in
the fields:
? The MVD is organizing new antidrug units,
working on installing electric alarm systems in
poppyfields, and studying the experience of the
Kharkov district, in the Ukraine, which reportedly
consolidated poppyfields to make them easier to
guard.
' The Ministry of Health, the Ministry of Internal Affairs (MVD),
the KGB, and the Customs Directorate are the main drug enforce-
ment agencies in the USSR. According to US Embassy reporting
from Moscow, the Narcotics Control Commission of the Ministry
of Health coordinates the work of these four organizations.F_~
? Izvestiya reported in June 1986 that authorities had
used helicopters to pinpoint illicit opium poppyfields
in Uzbek and other areas of Central Asia. The
operation involved mounted and foot patrols in the
valleys of the Amu Darya River and roadblocks set
up by the highway police.
? In August, Izvestiya reported that local authorities
of the Karakalpak area of Uzbek had been severely
criticized for failing to deal effectively with the
growing of illegal opium poppies. According to the
government paper, an investigation in May revealed
170 cases of illicit poppy growing in the Karakalpak
region; 5 hectares of poppies were destroyed, grow-
ers were prosecuted, and five people were expelled
from the party.
? Sovetskaya Rossiya in late August ran a long
article outlining measures undertaken in the Kuiby-
shev oblast to counter drug trafficking and abuse,
including the use of airborne and mounted patrols
and police raids of fields.
? Uzbek authorities reported in mid-September that
dozens of hectares of poppies had been destroyed in
the Karakalpak, Fergana, Dzhizak and other ob-
lasts of the republic.
Although it appears that local police officers and the
MVD are trying to curb illicit cultivation and produc-
tion, these enforcement efforts remain small. Soviet
press reports have conceded that eradication measures
in some areas are implemented only in fits and starts
and are not sufficiently backed up by organizational
and educational work:
? Komsomolskaya Pravda in early June 1986 severe-
ly criticized the lack of training of the police in
combating the theft of poppies from fields. The
article reported that hundreds of hectares of poppy-
fields in the Volga region remain unguarded. In
January a regional guard conference decided to
erect watchtowers, but
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The USSR's criminal code on illicit drug activities,
enacted in 1974, stipulates the following:
? Persons convicted of manufacture, acquisition, stor-
age, transportation, or sale of illicit drugs face up
to 10 years confinement, with or without confisca-
tion of personal property. The decree does not
specify a minimum sentence for these acts, but it
does outline a harsher penalty for those involved
with "large amounts" of illicit drugs (no gram
specification) or those committing a second offense.
If convicted a second time, an individual can be
sentenced to six to 15 years, with or without
confiscation of personal property.
? Foreign citizens arrested in the USSR for drug
smuggling can be imprisoned from three to 10
years. For those convicted of cross-border smug-
gling, the sentence can carry an additional two to
.five years. The period of pretrial investigative de-
tention is usually limited to two months, but can be
extended up to nine months with the permission of
the USSR's procurator general. Consular access is
permitted during this period.
? The maximum penalty for possession of illicit
drugs, without intent to sell and not in combination
with other drug offenses, is three years plus treat-
ment if addiction is detected. The law does not
differentiate between various drugs. The penalties
? In Kuibyshev one official recently complained about
the lack of helicopters and guards; another decried
the "lack of a comprehensive approach."
The lack of experience and adequate equipment for
eradication and interdiction limits the government's
ability to follow up its tough talk against drugs with
strong action.
The Legal Framework
The USSR Supreme Soviet enacted national drug
laws in 1974, and no major amendments have been
made since then. Drug offenses outlined in the crimi-
nal code include possession, storage, transportation,
are the same for all types of drugs. There is no
minimum amount for the possession offense to
become operative. When "very large" amounts (no
gram specification) are involved, the offense may
fall under one of the "aggravated" categories that
carry stiffer penalties.
? Theft of medicinal drugs is punishable by up to five
years imprisonment and from three to 10 years for
a repeated offense. Once again, no minimum sen-
tence is included in the decree, and there is no
breakdown of penalties according to quantities of
drugs stolen.
? The illicit cultivation of cannabis and opium pop-
pies can lead to a prison sentence of up to five years.
Setting up or maintaining dens for narcotics con-
sumption is punishable by imprisonment for five to
10 years.
? "Instigation of narcotics use" is punishable by up to
five years. If minors are involved, the maximum
sentence is 10 years. No minimum sentence for
either offense is spelled out in the code.
? Fines can be levied for obtaining drugs without a
doctor's prescription. An offender can be fined up to
50 rubles for this offense. Parents or guardians are
held liable for juveniles' use of narcotic substances
without a doctor's prescription.
and sale of illicit drugs; cross-border smuggling by
foreigners; theft of pharmaceutical drugs; illicit culti-
vation and manufacture of drugs; and forging a
doctor's prescription to obtain drugs. The Soviet
Government's approach to the drug problem has been
mostly punitive, and the laws reflect this heavyhanded
response.
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By Soviet criminal code standards, the drug laws are
not extremely harsh, but they are not soft either.
Soviet media have reported at least one recent execu-
tion in the USSR for drug theft, although the death
sentence seems to be a rare occurrence for drug
offenses. We lack information on such things as the
number of drug cases brought before Soviet courts,
the USSR's conviction rate in drug cases, and what
constitutes a typical drug sentence-information that
could aid in assessing the adequacy of the law.
Nevertheless, it seems that drug sentences in the
Soviet Union are more arbitrary than in many other
countries because offenses and penalties are not
sharply defined in the criminal code. For example,
minimum sentences are not stipulated for all drug
offenses. As the USSR perceives the drug problem to
be worsening, the laws for producing, selling, and
using drugs may be made tougher. A key issue in the
effectiveness of the laws, of course, will be the degree
and consistency of enforcement.
Drug Education and Prevention
Until recently very few Soviet drug education and
prevention programs existed. There is little or no
education policy established to educate Soviet young
people, who are probably much less cognizant of the
health hazards than Western youth. In an August
1986 Sovetskaya Rossiya interview, for example, a
young drug addict claimed that "poppies are good for
your health." Georgiy Morozov of the Serbskiy Insti-
tute said in a recent Soviet press interview that
"serious educational work" is needed to effectively
control illicit drug activities. He cited young people's
inexperience with and ignorance of drugs as a cause of
drug abuse and addiction.
Traditionally, officials discouraged talk of drug edu-
cation problems and warned that too much publicity
would cause youth to experiment with drugs. This
ostrichlike approach has now been reversed. The
current volume of articles by addicts and parents as
well as a television documentary in Georgia are
clearly intended to educate the population to the
harmful consequences of using drugs. Morozov's insti-
tute and other centers within the Ministry of Health
are organizing grants for drug education programs.
Making headway rapidly, however, will require ear-
marking resources to upgrade the priority of drug
education. Soviet press articles have acknowledged
that a major problem in setting up effective drug
education programs is the lack of Soviet drug experts
who can lead them.
Drug Treatment and Rehabilitation
Drug rehabilitation programs are few and ineffective.
In mid-August RSFSR Health Minister Potapov stat-
ed that only one-fourth of the registered addicts were
being medically treated, often in a cursory fashion for
seven or eight days, and that 90 percent of these
returned to addiction. More extended "treatment" is
largely coercive.
Addicts rarely seek treatment themselves if only
because of the system's punitive approach in dealing
with them. All suspected drug users are registered
with the militia even if evidence of drug abuse is only
circumstantial. If the addict is not released through
luck or payment of a 300- to 500-ruble bribe, the
addict is admitted to a narcology dispensary where
psychiatrists determine the status of the addiction.
Once diagnosed, addicts are dealt with in various
ways:
? Many users who are caught are accused of being
dealers and given lengthy prison sentences with no
medical assistance.
? Other drug patients, especially those who became
addicted through treatment for illness, are sent to
psychiatric hospitals and clinics, where they do not
receive specialized care but are confined with alco-
holics and mental patients.
? According to Potapov, the current Soviet recom-
mended treatment for addiction is isolation and
withdrawal for at least 60 days.
? Most drug abusers, however, receive compulsory
treatment in Labor Treatment Facilities (LTPs),
which differ little from prison camps. Addicts sent
to LTPs are not paroled until certified cured. Ac-
cording to US Embassy reporting from Moscow,
active "treatment" at an LTP can last three years,
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followed by two years of "controlled observation."
LTP clinics force addicts to withdraw from narcot-
ics without receiving limited doses to ease the
transition. The LTP's compulsory "therapy" results
in a very low cure rate.
Treatment also appears to vary from republic to
republic and even from city to city. In Odessa in the
mid-1970s, for example, drug abusers were registered
with the public health department and local pharma-
cies and received controlled doses of medicines. C
in Moscow in the early
1980s, after an addict was reprimanded three times,
he was sentenced by a court to jail for three years if
he was unemployed and had no family. If he had a
family and was employed, he received forced medical
treatment in a labor dispensary.
Some evidence suggests that Soviet authorities are
rethinking their approach to drug abuse. A recent
article written by a Soviet judge, for example, prom-
ised confidentiality and exemption from criminal li-
ability for addicts who voluntarily sought help. The
Moscow evening newspaper recently published infor-
mation about a hotline that drug addicts could call
with guaranteed confidentiality. Because there are
almost no Soviet doctors treating drug addiction and
no known courses of instruction in drug therapy in the
USSR's medical education institutions, a major effort
to launch an effective rehabilitation program might
not show results for several years.
The Soviet drug abuse problem pales in comparison to
the alcohol problem but appears to have grown
enough to cause concern at high levels within the
regime. It combines with alcohol abuse and other
manifestations of societal stress to impede Gorba-
chev's overall effort to shore up social discipline,
strengthen law and order, and restore popular respect
for the regime's ability to assert its authority and to
make domestic improvements.
A comprehensive program to deal with drug abuse
would severely tax the already overburdened Soviet
medical system. Implementing effective measures to
rehabilitate addicts would require a major commit-
ment of resources at a time when economic con-
straints make this especially hard to do. Nevertheless,
there are reasons to believe that the Gorbachev
regime does have the capability to prevent or at least 25X1
slow down the growth of drug abuse:
? Unlike heavy drinking, a deeply entrenched habit
sanctioned by centuries-old tradition and involving a
drug 25X1
ortion of the Soviet population
ro
hu
e
,
p
g
p
abuse is an incipient problem that has not taken root
among the population at large except perhaps in
Muslim areas of the USSR.
? Because most Soviet drugs come from internal
sources, at least for now, the Soviets can largely
deal with the problem internally. In this regard, the
Soviet problem is strikingly different from the US
problem; the US drug market draws so heavily on
external supplies that purely internal measures of
control not directed at the sources of production are
insufficient.
Thus, even if the Soviets do not embark on a costly
program of rehabilitation and better medical treat-
ment, they may be able to stabilize the drug problem
in the short term through the less expensive method of
a law enforcement crackdown. Over time, however, if
domestic supplies are curtailed, increased demand for
external supplies could give impetus to smuggling.
Moreover, as long as the war in Afghanistan drags on,
young Soviet soldiers will rotate through Afghanistan,
be exposed to drugs there, and in some cases carry
drug habits back to the USSR.
Because of the potential for expanded cross-border
smuggling, the Soviets are likely to become more
inclined to cooperate in international efforts against
the illicit drug trade. However, the USSR will proba-
bly pursue international involvement in typical Soviet
style, actively seeking assistance for drug control but
hedging on supplying detailed information about Soviet-
related drug cases or material resources for interna-
tional programs. Nonetheless, the Soviets have al-
ready shown some interest in broadening the UN
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convention, or treaty, on narcotic drugs. When the
UN Commission on Narcotic Drugs met in early
1986, the Soviet representative, Oleg Nikolayevich
Khlestov, was elected second chairman to the commis-
sion's Bureau of Officers.' After the election of offi-
cers, members discussed the UN-sponsored World
Conference on Trafficking and Drug Abuse, which is
set for June 1987 in Vienna. The commission mem-
bers agreed that the 1961 convention on combating
drug traffic is outdated, and therefore a new conven-
tion will be discussed at the world conference. We
believe that the Soviets will help update the conven-
tion, although they may approach proposals more
cautiously than other UN commission members. Dur-
ing the commission meetings Khlestov confirmed that
the USSR supports the drafting of a new convention.
He indicated that the US draft proposal might be too
ambitious, according to US Embassy reporting from
Vienna, but repeatedly said that the Soviets are
committed to keeping irrelevant political issues out of
the world conference discussions.
Although Moscow's strong sense of sovereignty limits
the Kremlin's interest in bilateral drug efforts, we
believe that Moscow will more actively participate in
multilateral drug enforcement outside the UN frame-
work. For example, the general secretary of Interpol,
the international policy agency, predicted this spring
that the USSR will join the organization sometime in
1987. One East European country, Yugoslavia, is
already participating in multilateral drug control pro-
grams and provides a precedent and model for social-
ist bloc involvement. According to US Embassy re-
porting from Belgrade, the Yugoslav police are very
active in Interpol, which helps train the Yugoslavs in
interdiction, drug identification, and drug testing
methods. Drug enforcement training has become rou-
tine for all Yugoslav customs and police officers. The
training apparently has paid off because the Yugo-
slavs have made important contributions to interna-
tional interdiction efforts. We believe that Moscow
might permit international organizations like Interpol
to train Soviet customs officers in drug enforcement.
Although the Soviets may be hesitant at first to fully
participate on the international level, we expect that
they will become increasingly cooperative in the next
few years.
25X1
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