ARTIC PETROLEUM DEVELOPMENT: WESTERN CAPABILITIES AND SOVIET NEEDS

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP97R00694R000600500001-9
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 39
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: March 31, 2011
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: November 1, 1986
• Content Type: REPORT

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From the Soviet standpoint, a major disadvantage of
this approach is continuing dependency on the West
for equipment deliveries and spare parts. An effective
multilateral embargo could bring the entire project to
a standstill. During the gas-pipeline embargo in 1981-
82, the Soviets had some options that permitted the
project to move forward. An embargo of custom-made
Arctic-grade fixed platforms and all the attendant
production, storage, and transportation equipment
would create greater delays and higher costs. For this
reason, we believe Moscow is apt whenever possible to
rely on non-US suppliers-whom they perceive as
more reliable-or on US subsidiaries in countries that
are not likely to impose economic sanctions.
Joint Development Strategy. Capital and hard cur-
rency shortages and the need to minimize risks arising
from their own limited offshore experience could lead
the Soviets to seek joint development agreements with
Western firms. This would probably be the fastest
way to develop a major discovery, and could also
permit the development of small-to-moderate oilfields.
Moscow probably recognizes that even with state-of-
the-art Western equipment, operating expertise is
essential. The USSR lacks the skilled management
and labor to operate complex offshore equipment.
Although a joint development approach has the im-
portant advantages of sharing the considerable risks
and capital outlays, Moscow would have to overcome
major institutional obstacles before entering into joint
oilfield projects with Western firms. A joint develop-
ment agreement would require Soviet economic plan-
ners to relinquish some degree of control and would
also highlight Soviet technological dependence on the
West. Soviet military leaders, and especially the naval
commanders, would also be reluctant to accept the
presence of Western personnel permanently stationed
in Arctic areas, particularly the Barents Sea.' The
naval bases of the Kola Peninsula and the White Sea
are home port to a quarter of the Soviets' major
surface warships and almost two-thirds of its nuclear-
powered submarines (see figure 11). Furthermore, the
ports near Murmansk provide the Soviets their only
year-round direct access to the Atlantic Ocean. The
waters near the coast are used by Soviet ships and
aircraft to test their weapon systems and maneuvers.
Western observers on oil-related platforms would
have the opportunity to collect valuable information
on naval operations. If the military could not com-
pletely block the introduction of Western oil plat-
forms and support crews from the Barents Sea, it
would at least strongly oppose facilities near Soviet
naval bases, local naval operating areas, or ocean
Although we see increasing evidence that the Soviets
may expand the scope of their economic arrangements
with Western firms, joint oil and gas development
projects probably will not-at least in the near term-
materialize. Soviet officials have indicated that the
consumer goods sector and some manufacturing in-
dustries are the most likely areas for any forthcoming
joint ventures; extractive industries will reportedly be
excluded. Nevertheless, the likelihood of joint operat-
ing petroleum projects hinges to a large degree on the
level of USSR onshore oil production during the
1990s. If oil production begins to fall sharply and
approach a level that is inadequate to cover domestic
needs and if Soviet offshore Arctic development is
beset with problems, then Moscow would perhaps see
joint operating agreements as more palatable than
reliance on imports of oil or throttling the domestic
economy through forced reductions in oil allocations.
Onshore Arctic Petroleum Equipment
Capabilities and Needs
As the Soviets move farther north in West Siberia to
develop onshore gasfields, they are encountering prob-
lems in drilling in continuous permafrost and in
moving and setting up equipment. The press has
reported that development drilling at the Yamburg
gasfield is proceeding slowly and is behind schedule.
After 1990, the Soviets plan to develop gasfields on
the Yamal Peninsula where the environmental condi-
tions will be even more severe.
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Figure 11
Petroleum Exploration in the Barents Sea
100 200 Kilometers
1
100 200 Miles
Norwegian
Kola
Peninsula
albard
N rway)
Nordkapp
(Nort) Cape)
Soviet m=
Union
'~7A khangel'sk
oNaval base
(figure indicates number of bases)
Ostrov Kolguyev
(Kolguyev Island)
White
Sea
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In onshore Arctic oil development, the Soviets are
moving steadily northward in both Tyumen' and in
the Komi ASSR, and they plan to bring the
Khar'yaga and Novyy Port fields-located above the
Arctic circle in the continuous permafrost zone-on
line during 1986-90. Although most Middle-Ob' oil-
fields are not in a continuous permafrost region, the
operators are often confronted with similar problems
because thawing of the upper layer of the sporadic
permafrost during the May-September period turns
much of the area into swamp.
Delegations of Soviet drilling experts have
recently traveled to the US North Slope and to
Canada on two occasions to inspect Arctic drilling
operations. The Soviets are reportedly particularly
impressed with the shirt-sleeve environment of the rig
floor even in severe weather conditions and with the
ability to move drill rigs efficiently by air.
Soviet rigs are not designed for
Arctic conditions. They are unusually heavy and
cumbersome, and the Soviets have admitted that only
one-half of the Soviet rig inventory is drilling at any
given time while the other half is being disassembled,
en route, or being reassembled at a new site. The
Soviets have also reportedly admitted Siberian opera-
tions cannot cope with a temperature below -351F
because the diesel fuel on the rig begins to congeal. In
the collapse of
casing in permafrost is a problem that has almost shut
down some Soviet Arctic fields. Besides wanting to
learn North American drilling techniques, the Soviets
are interested in purchasing US cementing and mud
technology and chemicals used in well fracturing and
well testing.
trans-
portation and logistics are major onshore bottlenecks.
Large areas in which the Soviets are working are
covered with water during the summer, and the
Soviets have shown particular interest in purchasing
all-terrain and heavy-lift vehicles such as the rollogon,
which would permit year-round transport of produc-
ing rigs and heavy equipment. The Soviets also want
to acquire the technology to construct foundations for
structures in permafrost areas and modularization
techniques for petroleum facilities including utility
modules. The Soviet press has reported that Moscow
has contracted to purchase six gas-cooling plants from
the French firm Sofregaz. One of the plants is
currently under construction at the north end of the
Urengoy gasfield. Soviet technicians who will operate
the facility were trained in France.
Although Western Arctic equipment is not essential
for Soviet gas development, it would improve efficien-
cy greatly. Access to Western modularized Arctic
drilling rigs that can be disassembled, airlifted, and
erected at a new location in 18 days-as compared
with often several months for Soviet rigs-would
speed Siberian exploration drilling considerably. The
Soviets could also use Western modularized gas and
gas condensate treatment facilities. The press has
indicated that modularized units used for constructing
the gas treatment plants at Urengoy need to be
enlarged substantially for use at Yamburg, especially
because the Soviets plan to develop Yamburg at a
faster rate.
We believe that hard currency constraints will lead
the Soviets to make selective purchases of some
items-drilling rigs, insulated casing, rollogons, and
modularized gas plant components-with the intent
of copying part or all of the embodied technology.
Domestically produced equipment-whether based on
Soviet or Western design-although not as good as
the Western equipment, could be produced to supple-
ment these imports.
Western Business Opportunities With the Soviets
West European and
Asian countries view the USSR as a potential growth
market for their petroleum equipment industries-
especially for specialized equipment to develop the
Soviet onshore and offshore Arctic (see figure 12).
This hope is based primarily on a belief that during
the 1990s the Soviets will have to begin intensive
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Figure 12
Relative Strength of Key Countries Engaged in Arctic Petroleum
Equipment Manufacturing, Operations, and Technology, 1986
? Developing capability 0 Potential capability
Engineering and
United
Canada
Finland
France
Japan
Norway
United
West
Equipment Categories
States
Kingdom
Germany
Arctic onshore
Drilling rigs
?
?
0
0
0
0
0
Specialized transport
?
?
0
0
0
0
0
0
Drilling/production
?
?
0
0
0
0
0
0
Construction
?
?
?
E
0
0
0
0
Arctic offshore
Drilling rigs
Design
?
?
?
?
0
1 ?
0
?
Construction
0
0
?
0
?
O
0
0
Production platforms
Design
?
?
?
0
?
0
?
Construction
?
?
?
0
?
0
0
0
Specialized vessels
0
?
?
0
?
?
0
?
Operations
?
?
0
0
0
0
0
Technical support
?
?
0
0
0
?
0
0
Arctic research facilities
0
?
?
0
?
?
0
?
Arctic-grade steel
0
0
?
0
?
0
0
?
development, of their Arctic resources to slow declines
in oil production. Soviet officials at high levels have
I encouraged foreign suppliers by dangling the potential
i of large development projects such as Sakhalin Island
and the Barents Sea. In a meeting between Gorbachev
and the American industrialist Armand Hammer,
j Gorbachev indicated interest in acquiring offshore
petroleum equipment and technology for hostile envi-
ronment operations, according to the US Embassy.
Many foreign firms have already taken advantage of
the marketing opportunity resulting from the imposi-
tion of US export controls on petroleum equipment to
the USSR by filling the void left by departing US
companies. These companies are eager to maintain
Secret
equipment.
and increase their share of the Soviet market, espe-
cially because the current oil industry depression has
intensified international sales competition. Cutbacks
in high cost development projects such as in the North
American Arctic and the North Sea have also created
incentives for many domestic suppliers of Arctic
equipment and technology to look toward the Soviet
Union-the only major customer in the world outside
of North America requiring Arctic petroleum
Canadian firms are in an excellent position to benefit
from Soviet requirements for Arctic petroleum equip-
ment because of their Arctic operational experience
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and capability to offer either onshore or offshore
equipment and technology. In particular, the Soviets
have sought out Canadian state-of-the-art Arctic on-
shore drilling equipment and technology, Canadian
all-terrain vehicles and Canadian ice expertise,
Moscow's interest
in Canadian petroleum equipment is reinforced by the
Soviet perception that they are buying US petroleum
technology and expertise without having to deal with
US Government export restrictions. According to the
US Embassy in Moscow, the Canadians have not
hesitated to play on this point with the Soviets.
Canadian companies have promoted sales of Arctic
equipment to the Soviet Union by attending trade
fairs in Moscow and inviting Soviet delegations to
inspect Canadian Arctic equipment and development
projects including offshore drill sites in the Beaufort
Sea.
Japanese joint-
venture involvement in large Soviet energy projects is
a good possibility because Japan has sufficient steel
production and fabrication capacity as well as li-
censed access to most Western technology.
The Scandanavian countries of Norway, Sweden, and
Finland are all still trying to position themselves to
sell Arctic equipment to Moscow, particularly for
offshore development. The Soviets have responded by
raising the possibility of collaborative development of
the Barents Sea. Finland has pioneered the sale of
Arctic offshore equipment to the Soviets and has
developed its offshore petroleum equipment industry
around this business. The Soviets have used this
exchange to acquire state-of-the-art Western offshore
equipment via the Finnish firms. Sales are made as
part of a bilateral trade agreement in which the
Soviets sell oil and gas to the Finns in exchange for
industrial equipment, including offshore drilling rigs
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In our judgment, Canadian manufacturers such as
Dreco can meet all but extremely large orders for
drilling equipment. In the onshore Arctic transporta-
tion field, Foremost has made numerous sales of all-
terrain vehicles and is currently engaged in a joint
venture with the Soviet Union to manufacture
rollogon-type vehicle, according to press reports. Off-
shore equipment and technology sales will probably be
limited to engineering consulting and operational
support because Canadian yards cannot compete with
those in the Far East or in Finland.
Japan is the only country with facilities to fabricate
Arctic offshore drilling units capable of operating in
severe ice conditions. Japanese companies won these
orders because of state-of-the-art production facilities,
high-quality Arctic-grade steel, and competitive pric-
ing. Because orders for the North American Arctic
offshore market are not expected until oil prices
rebound, Japanese companies are hoping to develop
ice-resistant offshore drilling and production plat-
forms for the eastern Soviet Union, including use in
Sakhalin Island development. In our judgment, Japa-
nese interest in the Sakhalin project is probably driven
by the potential of large equipment orders rather than
a nearby source of natural gas-which is available
from many other countries in Asia. Japanese compa-
nies also are expecting large Soviet orders for such
Arctic-grade tubular goods as line pipe and casing.
and specialized Arctic-class vessels.
Finnish companies are
currently preparing to compete in the development of
offshore production platforms for Arctic waters by
signing technology-sharing agreements with US and
reportedly are pessimistic about trade relations with
the Soviets in energy and see Soviet demand for large
orders of offshore equipment drying up unless a large
structure is found in the Barents Sea. The Finns,
however, are still interested in selling onshore equip-
ment and services to the Soviets, and
Rauma Repola is seriously inter-
ested in manufacturing Arctic drilling rigs under a
US license. In addition, the Soviets have approached
the Arctic Research Division of the Technical Re-
search Center of Finland requesting assistance in
developing the Yamburg gasfield,
The Soviets are particularly interested in
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a turnkey project that includes construction of a port,
pumping stations, pipelines, and camp facilities on
permafrost.
Norwegian companies have been actively courting
Soviet officials about participation in the development
of the Soviet offshore-particularly the Barents
Sea-and have been given the green light by the
Norwegian Government to seek engineering and con-
struction contracts, according to the US Embassy in
Oslo. So far, the only concrete business acquired by
Norwegian firms is Boconor's master plan for devel-
opment of the Barents Sea. The Norwegians believe
that they have the advantage of local experience and
could provide nearby access and maintenance facili-
ties to a Barents Sea development project. A Norwe-
gian company, Barents Base Kirkenes, is touting the
development of Kirkenes, Norway, as a major supply
base for the Barents Sea. The same company has also
played a key role in establishing Kirkenes Engineer-
ing-a group of nine Norwegian, one Finnish, and one
Swedish engineering firm-to offer engineering ser-
reports from the US Embassy in London, offshore
technology was highlighted, although the British
came away with the impression that the Soviets
intend to play down offshore oil exploration and
concentrate on activities onshore.
? French engineering companies, including C. G.
Doris, Technip, and ETPM, have been working on
conceptual designs for Arctic offshore drilling and
production systems. Technip hopes it is in position to
win a major engineering contract to develop the
Sakhalin Island LNG facility if the project is
approved, according to industry press reporting.
? Emerging industrial nations such as Brazil and
South Korea also could be in a position to supply
the Soviets offshore equipment. Brazil has state-of-
the-art offshore technology for early production
systems-potentially useful for development of the
Barents Sea, and South Korea will probably soon
give the Japanese stiff competition in the manufac-
vices to the Soviets for the Barents Sea.
Sweden has a long Arctic tradition in shipbuilding
and navigation, and 12 Swedish companies have
formed the Swedish Arctic Offshore Group to help
market their expertise. According to press reporting,
government-level discussions have been held with the
USSR on cooperative development of the Barents
Sea. The Swedish semisubmersible rig builder
Gotaverken Arendal has developed state-of-the-art
floating production systems that could have applica-
tion for the ice-free areas of the Barents Sea.
Besides Canada, Japan, and the Scandinavian coun-
tries, many other countries with sophisticated petro-
leum equipment industries are vying for a piece of the
Soviet onshore and offshore Arctic petroleum equip-
ment market:
? The United Kingdom is making a major effort to
sell oil and gas equipment to the Soviet Union and,
according to press reporting, made a trade agree-
ment in April to share energy technologies, includ-
ing harsh environment technology and equipment
for ice-resistant offshore structures. According to
ture of ice-resistant platforms.
The Soviet Union now confronts choices on Arctic
petroleum development that will affect its petroleum
production levels in the 1990s. The need for a new oil-
producing region is likely to lead to a greater effort in
the Arctic. If Moscow elects to expedite offshore
Arctic development, its only viable option would be to
rely heavily on Western equipment and technology.
Because of the need to expand production of onshore
oilfield equipment during 1986-90 and the scarcity of
investment resources, we do not believe that the
USSR can establish a significant manufacturing ca-
pability for offshore Arctic equipment before 1995.
Moscow would probably prefer to remain the sole
operator and developer of its Arctic resources, but, if
oil production declines rapidly, Moscow may turn to
the West for operational expertise and management
to minimize delays.
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The likelihood of large Soviet petroleum resources in
the Arctic and the low level of Soviet technology
applicable to the region create a potential source of
Western leverage in dealing with Moscow. Because
Arctic technology is diffused-among a variety of
Western supplies, however, we see little opportunity
for the United States alone to exert much influence on
Soviet Arctic development, or to use that development
as a point of leverage in bilateral relations. The large
potential market the Soviets represent will make it
difficult for the United States to persuade its Western
allies to adopt joint policies that might jeopardize
their access.
Moscow appears to be developing a selective approach
to US Arctic equipment and services companies. The
pattern of Soviet dealings with US companies has
been to seek out operational advice-particularly for
drilling in permafrost conditions-and engineering
assistance in developing preliminary engineering de-
signs for offshore Arctic structures.' The Soviets have
visited US Arctic onshore operations at least twice in
the last two years.
The Soviets have also shown interest in purchasing
selected US equipment for Arctic development such
as Arctic drilling rigs, rollogons for all-terrain travel,
and transport aircraft capable of delivering rigs in the
Soviet Arctic.
Besides selected Arctic equipment purchases, the
Soviets have indicated interest in purchasing US
manufacturing capability for Arctic equipment.
gear, I These plants
probably would be built on a turnkey basis, although
the Soviets have recently floated the idea of joint
ventures with foreign firms, according to
press reporting.
Aside from advanced remotely operated vehicles
(ROVs) and COCOM-controlled electronic sensing,
measuring, and computer-related equipment-mostly
used in the exploration phase-very little petroleum
equipment used in Arctic onshore and offshore devel-
opment has military uses.' Moreover, the current
depression in the international petroleum equipment
industry and the traditional reluctance of most
COCOM countries to agree to controls on sales of
industrial equipment and technology to the Soviet
Union make it unlikely that existing controls on
petroleum equipment can be expanded.
Although US companies are world leaders in offshore
Arctic development-especially in fields such as con-
ceptual engineering for ice-infested waters and project
management in harsh environment areas-adequate
Arctic equipment and services are available in other
countries to preclude major dependence on US suppli-
ers. The Soviets remain cautious toward large-scale
petroleum equipment deals with US firms because of
the recent 1981-82 pipeline-equipment embargo and
existing petroleum equipment controls. If equipment
quality is critical and US equipment is clearly superi-
or to other Western equipment, however, Moscow
would probably opt to buy the US equipment. Before
any large-scale deal or joint development project
could be consummated, Moscow would probably de-
mand delivery guarantees or stiff financial penalties
for breach of contract.
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interest in buying facilities to manufacture subsea
systems and other petroleum drilling and production
equipment such as drilling rig modular and downhole
6 A major stumblingblock to these plants are COCOM controls on
computer-related technology, including closed-loop manufacturing
systems that the Soviets deem crucial for improving reliability of
their equipment and industrial productivity.
' ROVs have alternative naval application in mine neutralization
and object search and retrieval. ROVs that can dive below 1,000
meters and have sophisticated robotic equipment are covered under
COCOM controls.
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The primary effect of nonparticipation by US compa-
nies in the development of the Soviet offshore Arctic
probably would be to stretch out the time required to
put fields on stream. However, as foreign firms gain
even more experience working offshore in harsh envi-
ronments, this differential will diminish substantially.
Soviet offshore experience in harsh environment areas
will also increase, further reducing the advantage of
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Appendix
Foreign Availability of Arctic Petroleum
Equipment, Technology, and Services a
Nabors Drilling, Ltd.
Canada
25,000-ft capable. Manufacturing relationship with Dreco.
Cardwell
Canada
Mobile workover rig specialist.
Foundex Exploration
Canada
Builds very light Arctic helicopter transportable rigs.
Rauma Repola
Finland
Joint-venture discussions with Dreco-Canada.
Offshore drilling rigs-fabrication
(includes drill ships, jack-ups, semisub-
mersibles, and Arctic mobile caissons)
North Atlantic Contractors
Canada
Partnership of Norwegian Contractors, the Lundigran Group, and
Dillingham Construction, Ltd. to design and build concrete platforms
offshore eastern Canada.
Newfoundland Offshore Development
Group
Canada
Partnership of C.G. Paris of France and four local Canadian
companies.
Versatile Davie, Inc.
Canada
Shipyard that specializes in harsh environment offshore rigs.
Rauma Repola
Finland
Builds semisubmersibles, jack-ups, and drill ships for USSR.
Hitachi Zosen
Japan
Built "Polar Pioneer" semisubmersibles for Norsk Hydro for $90
million.
Nippon Kokan (NKK)
Japan
Built Concrete Island Drilling System (CIDS) for Global Marine-US.
Ishikawajima-Harima Heavy
Industries Co. (IHI)
Japan
Built Molikpaq drilling unit for Beaudril-Gulf Canada.
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Foreign Availability of Arctic Petroleum
Equipment, Technology, and Services a (continued)
Sumitomo
Japan
Planning to build graving docks for Arctic drilling production systems.
Kawasaki Heavy Industries
Japan
Built ice-strengthened semisubmersible "Zapata Arctic."
BOS Pacific S.A.
Mexico
Joint venture between Bouygues-France and Kaiser-US.... No units
fabricated.
Offshore drilling rigs-design
(includes drill ships, jack-ups, semisub-
mersibles, and Arctic mobile caissons.
Arctic production system designers
noted)
Canmar
Canada
Subsidiary of Dome Petroleum. Designed "SSDC" Arctic mobile
drilling vessel.
C. G. Doris
France
Joint venture with Fluor. Developing Jack Down Arctic Monopod
(J-DAM).
Bouygues Offshore
France
ETPM
France
Tecnomare
Italy
Joint venture Aith Brown & Root. Developing technical feasibility of
steel platform for Barents Sea.
Gusto Engineering
Netherlands
Designed drillships and jack-ups fabricated b> Rauma Repola for
USSR. Designed Bow Valley's "Grizzle" harsh environment jack-up.
Marine Structure Consultants, Ltd.
Netherlands
Joint venture with Sumitomo for design for "DSS-40" Arctic-class
semisubmersible.
Polar Frontier Drilling A/S
Norway
Joint venture between W. Wilhelmsen and Sonat. Designed semisub-
mersible for Norsk Hydro.
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Foreign Availability of Arctic Petroleum
Equipment, Technology, and Services a (continued)
Sols Group-AEG-Telefunken
West Germany
Designing subsea early production system for Arctic fields.
Demenix, Thyssen, Bilfinger & Berger
West Germany
Designed concrete gravity monocone production platforms.
Production platforms-fabrication
Rauma Repola
Finland
Joint venture with Brown & Root for fabrication of steel platforms.
Valmet
Finland
Joint venture with Foster Wheller-UK for fabrication of steel plat-
forms. Built test cone platform to be used in Bay of Bothnia.
Dillingham Corp.
Canada
Joint venture with Lundrigans, Ltd. and Norwegian Contractors to
build offshore Nova Scotia platform.
Nippon Kokan (NKK)
Japan
Designed with US company Arctic Mobile Drilling Platform (AMDP).
Gotaverken Arendal (GVA)
Sweden
Early production system specialist.
Hyundai
South Korea
Norwegian Contractors
Norway
Concrete platform specialists.
Specialized onshore transportation
equipment-fabrication
Komatsu
Japan
Major suppliers to USSR of bulldozers and pipelayers.
Foremost
Canada
Builds wheeled and tracked all-terrain vehicles (ATVs).
Specialized Arctic equipment-
fabrication
Can-Ocean Resources (Nova Corp.) Canada Develops Arctic subsea production concepts and equipment. Subsidiary
in the United Kingdom.
Huurre Group Finland Built 22 complete village modules for USSR export gas pipeline
project.
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Foreign Availability of Arctic Petroleum
Equipment, Technology, and Services a (continued)
Specialized Arctic offshore vessels-
fabrication
Summa Corp.
Canada
Built minisubmarines designed to test Arctic transportation systems.
Versitile Pacific Shipbuilding, Ltd.
Canada
Icebreakers, supply ships.
Saint John Shipbuilding, Ltd.
Canada
Icebreakers, supply ships. Built Gulf Canada's supply ship-Kigoriak.
Rauma Repola
Finland
Research vessels, supply ships, tankers.
Hollming
Finland
Research /service vessels for Arctic.
Wartsila
Finland
World leader in icebreaker construction and offshore support vessels
including cranes, dredgers, and pipelayers. Building 34,000-dwt oil rig
transport vessel for Soviets. Also builds air cushion vehicle (ACVs) for
use in Arctic. Joint venture with Arctic Transportation, Ltd.
Valmet
Finland
Supply ships, research vessels, pipelayers, icebreakers.
O&K Tagebau and Scheffstechnik
West Germany
Building one of the world's largest self-propelled suction dredgers.
Nippon Kokan (NKK)
Japan
Built icebreaking supply vessel Ikaluk for Beaudril-Gulf Canada.
Mitsui
Japan
Built Arctic Archimedean screw tractor for offshore operations.
Hitachi Zosen
Japan
Building submersible base for Canmar for operation with SSDC.
Liaaen
Norway
Built seismic supply vessel-"GECO Echo."
ISE
Canada
Built umbilical-free ROV "Arcs" for operations under the ice. Building
world's biggest commercial nuclear submarine "SAGA N" with
Comex of France for Arctic subsea oil and gas operations. Scheduled
reactor startup date in 1988.
Ulstein Group
Norway
Group has 40 percent of world's market of offshore vessels under
construction. Specializes in vessels designed for specific geographical
areas. Numerous licensing agreements.
Far East Levingston Shipbuilding
(FELS)
Singapore
Building icebreakers tugs for USSR for Arctic regions.
Oil companies and service companies
with Arctic expertise
Peter Bowden Drilling
Canada
Joint venture with Western Ocean to drill in Hudson's Bay using
Dutch-owned ice-class drillship "Neddrill 2."
Beaudril (Gulf Canada Resources)
Canada
Arctic offshore drilling subsidiary.
Foundex Exploration
Canada
Arctic exploration drilling specialists.
Pan Arctic Oil
Canada
54 percent owned by Petro Canada. Produced first commerical oil from
Canadian Arctic islands in early fall, 1985.
Arctic Transportation, Ltd.
Canada
Joint venture between Fednav, Ltd. and Crowley Maritime Corp.
Icebreakers, survey vessels, supply ships, barges for Arctic waters.
Neste Oy
Finland
Investigating providing seismic oil exploration services to USSR for
operations in Arctic waters.
GECO (Schlumberger)
Norway
One of world's largest exploration companies. Recently purchased by
Schlumberger.
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Secret
Foreign Availability of Arctic Petroleum
Equipment, Technology, and Services - (continued)
Saga Petroleum
Norway
Discussions with Soviets concerning exploration and development for
the Barents Sea.
Norsk Hydro
Norway
Operating off northern Norway using "Polar Pioneer
semisubmersible.
Stated
Norway
State-owned company; largest in Norway.
Kirkenes Engineering
Norway
A consortium of Norwegian, Finnish, and Swedish engineering firms.
Established to offer engineering services for the Barents Sea and Kola
Peninsula.
Pomor Oil
Norway
Subsidiary of Pomor Nordic. Signed cooperation agreement with
GECO to negotiate with Soviet authorities on seismic studies in the
USSR.
Boconor
Norway
Consortium of six companies. Concluded a cooperation agreement with
USSR regarding design of platforms suited to the Barents Sea wave
forces, wind, ice, and temperatures.
Barents Base Kirkenes A/S
Norway
Oil and gas service support to the development of the Barents Sea.
Bugsier-Rederei and Bergungs
West Germany
Arctic towing services.
British Petroleum
United Kingdom
Exploration with Statoil on Slavbard Island, Norway.
Engineering and technical support for
ice-infested waters
Weir-Jones Engineering Consulting, Canada Ice force sensor specialist.
Ltd.
SOLS Group
AEG Telefunken
Deminex
Thyseen-Nordsewerke
West Germany
Develops subsea oil loading system for early production of Arctic fields.
Arctic Offshore Engineering Group
Finland
Specializes in behavior of structures in Arctic environment.
Stal Refrigeration
Sweden
Ice island design specialists.
Skipskonsulent A/A
Norway
Designs Arctic-Antarctic expedition ships and tankers for Arctic
services.
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Secret
Foreign Availability of Arctic Petroleum
Equipment, Technology, and Services a (continued)
Nagasaki Technical Institute
Japan
Mitsubishi's frozen sea experimental facility. Studies influence of
frozen seas on offshore structures.
Centre for Frontier Engineering
Research at University of Alberta
Canada
National Research Council at
St. Johns, Newfoundland
Canada
Onshore and offshore Arctic construction testing. State-of-the-art ice
basin.
Alfred-Wegener Institute for Polar
Research-Bremerhaven
West Germany
Handles West German Antarctic research vessel RV Polarstern.
Hamburg Ship Model Basin
West Germany
Tested Gulf's Kulluk Arctic drilling rig.
Wartsila Arctic Research Center
Finland
World's leading ice laboratory.
Technical Research Centre of Finland
Finland
Ice-going vessel research activity.
Continental Shelf Institute-
Trondheim
Norway
Barents Sea geophysical work: geoscience hydrography.
Norwegian Hydrotechnical
Laboratory
Norway
Tests influence of freezing sea spray on offshore platforms.
Nutec Norwegian Underwater
Technical Center
Norway
Underwater technology research.
CMI, Christian Mechesen Institute
Norway
Meteorology and oceanography instrument technology.
Arctic and Antarctic Scientific
Research Institute-Leningrad
USSR
Icebreaker expertise.
Marintek
Norway
Tests ship models and offshore structures. Studying waves force on
conical structures and concrete platforms under Arctic conditions.
Moscow Institute of Civil
Engineering-Moscow
USSR
Arctic port construction research.
Siberian Branch of the Academy of
Science-Novosibirsk
USSR
Research into effects of sea ice on structures.
Manufacturers of specialized steel and
oil country tubular goods (OCTG) for
Arctic conditions
Nippon Steel
Japan
Produces seamless casing and rubing for cold regions.
Kawasaki
Japan
Produces seamless casing and rubing for cold regions.
Kobe Steel
Japan
Low-temperature steel for Arctic offshore drilling rigs.
Tubemuse
Belgium
Arctic-grade OCTG servoces.
Mannesmannrohren-Werke AB
West Germany
Line pipe/downhole tubulars.
Thyseen Aktien Gesellschaft
West Germany
Line pipe/downhole tubulars.
Stahlwerke Peine Salzgitter
West Germany
Line pipe/downhole tubulars.
Neles OY (Rauma-Repola)
Finland
Supplies steel to offshore and shipbuikding industries.
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Secret
Secret
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/11/18: CIA-RDP97R00694R000600500001-9