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• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP97R00694R000600290001-3
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• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: August 1, 1986
• Content Type: REPORT

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Confidential
Moscow's Fisheries Development
Program in the
Non-Communist Third World:
The New Offensive
Confidential
GI 86-100395
August 1986
()9E
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Moscow's Fisheries, Development
Program in.the
Non-Communist Third World:
The New Offensive
A Research Paper
Reverse Blank
Confidential
GI 86-10039S
August 1986
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Moscow's Fisheries Development
Program in the
Non-Communist Third World:
The New Offensive
Key Judgments The Soviets over the past year and a half have moved decisively to protect
Information available their extensive and profitable fishing interests in the non-Communist Third
as of 30 April 1986 World. Successful initiatives include:
was used in this report.
? The extension of Soviet fishing operations in the Pacific through an
August 1985 licensing agreement with Kiribati, the first with a develop-
ing state in the South Pacific.
? A 25-percent increase in 1984 over previous total pledges in fisheries
assistance to LDCs through provision of $100 million in new aid that will
expand shore facilities in Africa for use by the Soviet fleet.
Moscow is also working to gain additional fishing rights in the western
Pacific, an area hitherto fished mostly by US and other Western fleets. F_
The new Soviet assistance brings LDC fisheries aid to more than half a bil-
lion dollars under a program that has grown steadily since it began in
earnest in the late 1960s. Although this miniprogram represents only about
an estimated 2 percent of total Soviet economic pledges to non-Communist
LDCs, its impact has been extensive, profitable to Moscow, and highly cost
effective in terms of financial outlays. For example, for less than $10
million annually, the USSR has:
? Gained access to ports and fishing grounds for its fishing fleet in 44 less
developed countries.
? Supported $80-125 million a year in hard currency earnings from fish
exports.
? Overcome fuel and services bottlenecks at home (where trawlers some-
times spend inordinate amounts of time in port because of congestion or
diesel shortages) by using the resources of LDC ports for resupply.
? Supported its annual marine catch of 8-9 million metric tons with at least
2 million metric tons from LDC waters.
? Improved the domestic protein supply without the costly investment
required for equivalent results from farm production.
? Improved intelligence gathering capability and potential in case of need.
Research activity to catalog seabed resources also has provided valuable
economic information about the coastal and territorial waters of 30
countries under the fisheries aid program.
The program has not served Moscow's fishing aid customers nearly as well.
It has failed to develop viable fishing industries in LDCs and has not
helped LDCs remedy their pressing food needs. LDC complaints have
centered around:
? Soviet failure to meet contract obligations to construct promised shore
facilities or train local personnel.
Confidential
GI 86-10039S
August 1986
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? Harmful Soviet fishing practices that reduce availability of fish to local
fleets.
? Fish shortages caused by not delivering promised amounts of fish or
delivering less desirable varieties.
In spite of Moscow's well-known penchant for not honoring fishing pacts,
LDCs continue to deal with Moscow for political reasons, for short-term
gains in the form of licensing fees, and because they lack alternative
financing for fisheries development.
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Contents
Key Judgments
iii
The Soviet Fishing Fleet: Wide Ranging and Profitable
1
The Fisheries Aid Program: Entree at Bargain Prices
1
An Outreach Program for the 1980s
2
Dissatisfaction With the Aid Program
3
Why LDCs Accept Soviet Fisheries Aid
4
USSR: Assistance to Fishing Industries in LDCs, 1959-31 December 1985
7
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Moscow's Fisheries Development
Program in the
Non-Communist Third World:
The New Offensive
The Soviet Fishing Fleet:
Wide Ranging and Profitable
The Soviet Union has one of the world's most active
fishing industries. It is a significant earner of hard
currency as well as a source of food for the USSR's
population. Soviet exports of fish products have aver-
aged about $250 million annually since 1975, and
reached $360 million in 1983, with at least one-third
of these exports going to hard currency customers. F
In recent years, the USSR's annual ocean catch has
averaged about-8-9 million metric tons, second only to
that of Japan, according to UN statistics. The Soviet
catch peaked at 9.4 million tons in 1976 and fell
steadily until 1978 as 200-mile exclusive economic
zones (EEZs) came into force for most countries.
Anticipating establishment of these zones, Moscow
had begun in the early 1970s to revise traditional
fishing practices by concluding agreements to fish
LDC waters (which contain two-thirds of the world's
fish resources). This process accelerated after the
United States, Canada, and European countries ex-
cluded the USSR from some of its most important
fishing grounds in 1977. In the 1980s the catch from
LDC waters has nearly offset earlier losses elsewhere.
At the same time, expenditures on this program have
been very modest. Only about $10 million in aid flows
annually to LDCs under Soviet fishing aid agree-
ments. Moscow probably also has paid another $10
million annually in recent years for licensing fees and
the use of drydock facilities. In contrast, the returns
from the fishing aid program are enormous:
? The Soviet catch from coastal waters bordering
exclusively on LDCs accounts for about one-third of
Moscow's recorded marine catch, according to UN
statistics (see figure 1).
? The minimum allowable catch from the territorial
waters of only six African countries (Angola, Guin-
ea, Guinea-Bissau, Mauritania, Mozambique, and
Sierra Leone) was valued at about $300 million at
average prices for the USSR's African catch in
1984. Soviet underreporting of catches and poach-
ing could double this value, according to many
fishing experts. At least $1 billion worth of fish is
caught every year by the Soviets off LDC coasts.
? Through sales to West European customers, Mos-
cow earns at least $100 million in hard currency
annually on the catch from LDC coastal waters. F
The Fisheries Aid Program:
Entree at Bargain Prices
The fisheries aid program was Moscow's earliest
means to gain entree to LDC ports and servicing
facilities. Since its first extension of fisheries credit to
Guinea in 1959, the USSR has used this cost-effective
program to gain a presence in the fishing sector of 44
non-Communist LDCs. By 1986 the USSR had
pledged more than $500 million in fisheries aid and
proposed 24 joint ventures, of which 12 have become
operational. In 1985 about 1,000 Soviet fisheries
personnel were providing technical services to LDCs,
and more than 750 LDC trainees were studying
fishing in the USSR.
Joint Ventures: An Effective Instrument
The Soviet fishing program in the non-Communist
Third World has evolved from a search for logistic
support in the 1960s, through a focus in the early
1970s on obtaining licensing agreements, to its cur-
rent multifaceted format that uses aid, licensing fees,
and the establishment of joint ventures with partners
reluctant to commit resources without equity partici-
pation.
The USSR has preferred licensing agreements as the
most direct way to gain access to LDC resources
without a potentially burdensome commitment to
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Figure 1
USSR: The Marine Catch--
Total Soviet
catch
2
Latin American
catch
upgrade local fishing sectors. Under these arrange-
ments, the USSR pays a flat fee based on the size of
the catch. But where necessary, it enters joint ven-
tures with countries (such as'Argentina and Maurita-
nia) where tight governmental restrictions on foreign
fishing make licensing arrangements illegal, or where
the LDC partner insists on capital investments. In
contrast, most LDCs prefer joint ventures or aid in
the belief that they will be able to develop their local
industries.
A review of Soviet agreements shows that the usual
joint-venture arrangement provides for 51-percent
ownership by local interests and 49 percent by Sov-
rybflot, the Soviet foreign trade entity under the
Soviet Fisheries Ministry that handles foreign fisher-
ies matters. Moscow provides capital in the form of
trawlers, port development, processing facilities, and
training, while the LDC provides port access and
repays its share of the initial capital investment with
profits from the venture. Since the late 1970s, Mos-
cow has generally provided concessionary aid (which
requires the highest degree of financial commitment)
only to longtime partners who show signs of abrogat-
ing fishing agreements.
The Soviet fisheries program of the 1960s emphasized
bunkering agreements to support fishing activities in
distant waters. The first agreement was signed with
Guinea in 1959 for onshore storage facilities. It was
followed by aid to 17 other African countries as
Moscow moved into the rich sardine grounds in the
South Atlantic. Thereafter, the USSR shifted atten-
tion to the maritime nations along the Indian Ocean
and to Latin American countries in the Southern
Hemisphere. For most countries, Soviet assistance
agreements provided for improved port facilities for
cargo handling, storage of goods, refrigeration, and
ship repairs; trawlers; research; and technical assis-
tance and training for LDC crews. In return, the
USSR gained worldwide access to shore facilities for
its fleet and was able to repair and refuel vessels,
transfer crews, and process some of the catch on-
shore.
Although few ports around the world deny Soviet
ships access for fueling and provisioning, spacious
anchorages and well-equipped facilities are needed to
service Soviet trawler and factory ship fleets that
often number 100 or more. By the early 1970s, the
Soviets had fisheries agreements that entitled them to
bunkering and transshipment points in almost every
area fished by their vessels.
An Outreach Program for the 1980s
Moscow's current strategy combines offers to new
LDC recipients with offers of new programs for old
customers to keep their interest. Moscow's most re-
cent targets have been the microstates of the south-
west Pacific, where Soviet persistence recently paid
off with a licensing agreement with Kiribati. This
small island nation is the first to respond to a number
of Soviet offers of fisheries assistance to countries of
the western Pacific and Indian Ocean. The one-year
renewable agreement with Kiribati allows the Soviets
to fish for tuna (Moscow's first such venture, using
tuna boats built recently in Poland), but does not
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African catch
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provide port rights for refueling or reprovisioning.
Moscow agreed to pay $1.7 million for one year's
fishing rights, at least 10 percent of Kiribati's budget
for 1985. The prospects for Soviet agreements with
Vanuatu and Western Samoa apparently have im-
proved since the accord with Kiribati was signed. F_
The Soviet Union's interest in the rich southeastern
Pacific fishing grounds off Latin America and in
Antarctic krill reserves has also led Moscow to pursue
fishing agreements in Latin America with renewed
vigor in the past two years. In Peru, where the Soviets
have access to shore facilities they built at Paita in the
1970s, energetic lobbying by Moscow to maintain its
presence in Peruvian waters has increasingly come
under attack by domestic fishing interests. The Soviet
fleet off Peru currently is operating under a short-
term licensing agreement because the new govern-
ment is undecided about renewing a fishing agree-
ment that, in effect, allows Moscow unlimited access
to Peru's resources because of Lima's inability to
police its waters.
While the USSR pursued its aggressive campaign in
the southwestern Pacific and Latin America, it also
continued its contacts in Africa. In the 1980s the
USSR has signed new fisheries aid agreements with
Angola, Guinea, Madagascar, and Seychelles and
renewed agreements with Mozambique and Sierra
Leone. It has made offers to Cape Verde, Congo, and
Mauritius for the renewal of fishing privileges that
have lapsed over the past few years. The agreements
with Angola and Guinea are notable for their large
size and their broad scope. These agreements call for
port construction, processing facilities, and develop-
ment of artisanal and deep sea fishing-activities that
we believe will enable Moscow to maintain its pres-
ence in the fishing industries of these countries. F_
Dissatisfaction With the Aid Program
Once an LDC has signed a Soviet fishing agreement,
it often finds that the USSR falls far short on
implementation. Complaints have surfaced in several
areas.
Failure To Meet Contract Obligations. An almost
universal criticism is that thTSovietcdo not provide
the facilities and training promised under agreements:
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? In Ghana, the USSR did not train Ghanaians to
operate the trawlers provided them and pulled out of
Ghana's industry when Accra ran short of cash to
pay for Soviet experts and spare parts. Ghana's fleet
was left crippled.
? A $40 million project in Somalia to relocate nomads
and to use them in developing a local fishing
industry was a complete fiasco. The only beneficia-
ries were the Soviets who were allowed to fish
Somalia's waters as part of the agreement. Somalia
received no profits from the joint venture; its share
went to pay the operating costs of the Soviets, who
dominated the company. Cancellation of the agree-
ment in 1977 was greeted with popular acclaim.
Similar complaints about not receiving promised
equipment have come from Guinea, Guinea-Bissau,
Morocco, and Mauritania.
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Harmful Fishing Practices. Soviet fishing practices
often do substantial damage to the local industry,
according to Western experts. The Soviets have been
guilty of overfishing in Angola, Cameroon, Chile,
Guinea, Mauritania, Morocco, Pakistan, and Peru. In
Sierra Leone, the Soviets have been observed using
extrafine mesh nets that do not permit young fish to
escape, fishing so close to shore that their trawlers
destroy nets set out by local fishermen, and illegally
fishing in the coastal spawning grounds.
Fish Shortages. The USSR's fish deliveries under
quota agreements fail to meet even the most minimal
LDC food production goals. Under typical fishing
agreements, fish deliveries to LDCs generally com-
prise 8 to 15 percent of the total catch. Soviet trawlers
often underreport their catch, reducing the amount of
fish they must surrender for local consumption:
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Red Herrings
Displaying increasing sensitivity to LDC accusations
about fishing abuses, Moscow's fisheries ministry
responded for the first time at a press conference in
Sierra Leone in May 1984. The minister asserted that
Moscow loses $5-10 million a year in Sierra Leone
because of the great distances its fleet must travel.
He said the Soviets continued to honor the agreement
because "We are of the opinion that we are providing
help to the people of this country."
? Some countries believe that the Soviets cheat by
transferring most of their catch to processing ships
at sea rather than bringing it into port. The quality
of the fish the Soviets deliver often is poor, com-
posed of undesirable varieties and badly preserved.
? Severe fish shortages have been reported in previ-
ously well-stocked markets in Angola, Equatorial
Guinea, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, and Mozambique
since fishing agreements were signed with the
USSR.
among the local people.
Why LDCs Accept Soviet Fisheries Aid
Developing countries have a number of reasons for
signing fishing agreements with the Soviet Union in
spite of well-publicized evidence that such agreements
may be detrimental to their industries in the long run.
The most pressing is economic need. Fishing resources
often represent an important source of food, employ-
ment, and revenue for the poorer LDCs. Although
their coastal waters may contain rich fish resources,
LDCs often lack both the means to exploit them
efficiently and to protect them from poaching by
other nations. To an LDC with few funding alterna-
tives, the Soviet aid program appears to offer opportu-
nities to develop this potentially important area.
Politics play a role as well. Angola, Mozambique, and
Nicaragua signed fishing agreements with Moscow
shortly after the Soviets became their major military
supplier because they believed the Soviets also would
improve domestic fishing industries. Now these coun-
tries' dependence on the USSR for assistance in
combating insurgencies makes it hard for. them to
resist Soviet pressures to conclude damaging fisheries
agreements even though they are dissatisfied with
Soviet efforts.
Outlook
Moscow's recent successes in the southwestern Pacific
have given it entree into an area where it traditionally
has had no presence. Moscow has been able to
capitalize on the resentment of island nations over
American disregard for their jurisdiction over migra-
tory species, such as tuna, in their exclusive economic
zones to encourage the island governments to review
their policies excluding Soviet fishing in the area.
Increasing economic problems and declining aid con-
tributions from traditional donors also attract these
countries to Soviet offers. A Soviet fishing presence in
the 14.5 million square kilometers of territory present-
ly claimed by these island states would end the
Western monopoly in the area.
As long as Western countries remain indifferent to
the development of viable fishing and conservation
programs in the Third World, LDCs will continue to
sign agreements with Moscow in spite of known
Soviet violations and the general dissatisfaction of
most recipients with the program. For example, Guin-
ea, which has criticized its fishing agreement with the
Soviets and has sought Western aid and investment,
was forced to renew its agreement with Moscow in
July 1984 because no Western donors responded to a
Western estimate in 1983 that Guinea's fishing indus-
try could be properly established for less than $5
million. The new Soviet agreement involves new aid
commitments and a much larger Soviet presence in
Guinea's fishing industry. In the case of Kiribati,
Moscow's high bid for licensing arrangements, about
$1.7 million for one year, exceeded aid or commercial
offers from any other source.
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An Intelligence Spinoff
Although the fishing fleet as a whole does not have an
explicit intelligence collection mission, individual
ships report on targets of opportunity and are occa-
sionally tasked by Soviet military and intelligence
organizations. In some cases Soviet fishing vessels
may represent the only Soviet presence close to a
naval action. In addition, Moscow's right to change
fishing crews and/or to make port calls to service the
fishing fleet enables it to move agents in and out of
the country, provides another source of information
on foreign coasts and ports, and helps it to dissemi-
nate Soviet propaganda. In wartime, the Soviet fish-
ing fleet would be subordinated to the military and
could perform some replenishment operations.
The economic intelligence derived from the fisheries
and oceanographic research program probably is far
more useful to Moscow than other types of irEforma-
tion gathered by the fishing fleet. Fisheries research
vessels under contract to LDCs provide the Soviets
not only with the data on fish stocks and varieties
necessary to fish successfully in LDC waters, but also
data on seabed mineral resources off LDC coasts.
The USSR has conducted extensive studies in the
waters of 30 LDCs under its fisheries aid program. F_
For Moscow, access to LDC waters and ports will
continue to be the most critical element in maintain-
ing and expanding the Soviet fishing industry. Until
now, the USSR's richest fishing grounds have been
the northwest Pacific and northeast Atlantic; in these
areas, fishing operations have reached capacity. The
UN Food and Agricultural Organization estimates
that the greatest unexploited fish resources lie in the
west Indian Ocean and the Southern Hemisphere,
including the Antarctic. Moscow is expanding its use
of fisheries aid programs to acquire bunkering and
fishing rights to exploit these waters through an
aggressive program of offers to Latin American and
western Pacific countries, while maintaining its pro-
gram in Africa.
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Appendix
Table 1
USSR: Fisheries Aid to Non-Communist
LDCs, by Year
Total 516
1959-74 204
1975 63
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Table 2
Soviet Assistance to Non-Communist LDCs
for Fisheries Development, 1959-December 1985 a
Total
515
247
North Africa
36
9
East Asia
17
15
Algeria
4
4
Indonesia
15
15
242
76
Argentina
5
0
61
10
Chile b
10
0
1
1
Nicaragua
15
5
5
1
Peru
2
2
1
0
South Asia
24
21
2
NEGL
Bangladesh
15
15
14
3
India
2
2
37
10
Maldives b
NEGL
0
Guinea-Bissau
11
8
Pakistan
4
4
Kenya
2
0
Sri Lanka
3
0
Liberia
NEGL
NEGL
Middle East
164
119
Mauritius b
5
2
Egypt
16
2
Mozambique
24
24
Iran
9
8
Senegal
4
4
Iraq
25
25
Seychelles
20
NEGL
North Yemen
15
12
Sierra Leone
7
7
South Yemen
99
72
In the case of joint ventures, only grants and credits for financing
Soviet equipment and partner country equity shares are included;
costs of training and Soviet advisers are excluded.
b Program discontinued.
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Table 3
USSR: Status of Fishing Programs in
Non-Communist LDCs
Brazil
Burma
a Although no recent activity has been noted under the agreement,
we have no information of the cancellation of the accord.
b Joint ventures.
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Table 4
USSR: Assistance to Fishing Industries
in LDCs, 1959-31 December 1985
Country Year Agreements and Protocols Remarks Value .
(million US $)
Algeria 1968 Protocol under October 1963 line of Agreement expired in 1969. Exchange 4.5
credit: provides 18 trawlers, port con- of experts discussed by bilateral eco-
struction, and oceanographic research nomic commission in 1968-69.
assistance.
Mauritania 1973 Grant for oceanographic research lab- Laboratory completed.
oratory at Nouadhibou; staff of 25
provided free until locals are trained.
Five-year agreement modifiable at
one-year intervals gives Soviets fishing
rights within a 30-mile limit; number,
size, and type of craft specified in the
agreement. A mandatory percentage of
catch is to be processed at the under-
utilized Nouadhibou facilities. In re-
turn, Soviets agree to provide technical
assistance in fisheries research and pay
undisclosed annual royalties.
1975 Protocol established joint fishing com-
pany under 1973 agreement: to include
a fish-processing complex, 33 Soviet
vessels, and 30,000 tons of fish annual-
ly for Mauritania. Two trawlers pro-
vided free of charge.
1976 Protocol to 1973 agreement.
1978 Agreement renewed for five years with
annual protocols.
After the coup of July 1978, agree-
ment was canceled and new negotia-
tions were begun to replace licensing
system with a joint venture.
1981 Protocol to establish joint venture, Mausov in operation, has licensed 46 16.0
Mausov: 60 percent owned by Mauri- Soviet vessels.
tanian interests. Soviet vessels to fish
Mauritanian waters in return for in-
vestment in processing complex and
ship repair facility.
Morocco 1966 Credit for fishing boats.
1973 Under United Nations Development Processing plant not built.
Program, Food and Agricultural Orga-
nization: fisheries research on Soviet
vessels, training in USSR, and creation
of training center in Morocco. Joint
company to be organized to operate
leased Soviet vessels in Moroccan
coastal waters and to construct and
operate a fish-processing plant and re-
frigeration warehouse.
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Table 4 (continued)
Morocco
1978
1984
1985
Tunisia
1976
Sub-Saharan
Africa
Angola
1976
Agreement for joint companies, import No joint venture formed.
of surplus Moroccan fish, assistance in
organizing Moroccan maritime person-
nel, aid in cannery and export opera-
tion, and fisheries studies on Soviet-
supplied research vessels. For five-year
period.
Protocol on cooperation in fishing.
General protocol on forming a number
of small joint fishing and processing
ventures with equal joint ownership
and an increase in annual 6-year fish-
ing scholarships to 55. Moscow also
proposed formation of joint venture
similar to the one with Mauritania.
Agreement for joint Tunisian-Soviet No activity noted.
company to develop Tunisian industry
and protocol for continued fisheries
research and Soviet assistance.
Agreement on joint fishing venture in- In 1978, Moscow donated four fishing
cluding: boats and two trawlers to be manned
Marine survey. by Soviet crews. Cooperation continues
Survey and development of national in fleet formation, development of port
fishing industry. infrastructure, and training.
Modernization of fish-processing
enterprises.
Provision of vessels and training.
In return, Soviets received exclusive
fishing rights within Angola's 200-mile
zone, plus facilities for anchorage, re-
pair, provisioning, and unloading.
1977 Grant-fisheries aid.
Protocol to provide:
30,000 tons of fish to Angola per
year.
10 additional trawlers and technical
services.
1978 Grant of six fishing boats.
Protocol on aid in training and con-
structing several fish processing plants.
1979 Grant of fisheries protection vessel.
Protocol for joint fishing project,
1979-81, training of Angolans.
1983 Grant of second fisheries protection
vessel.
Value
(million US $)
0.5
10.0
1984 Fishing agreement to cover eight years. Angolans renegotiated agreement in 50.0
Soviets to establish fisheries complex 1985.
with wharves, repair facilities, and cold
storage complex on credit basis.
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Table 4
USSR: Assistance to Fishing Industries
in LDCs, 1959-31 December 1985 (continued)
Value
(million US $J
Benin 1977 Agreement probably includes con- No progress beyond research stage. 0.5
struction of shore facilities and a joint
venture.
Cape Verde 1979 Credit-expansion of port facilities. 5.3
Equatorial 1973 Soviets given fishing rights and use of Agreement allowed to lapse by Equa- 0.5
Guinea Luba port facility; Soviets to provide torial Guinea in 1979.
fish and train Guinean personnel on
Soviet trawlers. Joint venture,
Ecopesca, formed.
The Gambia 1973 Survey of local fisheries resources. No implementation beyond initial 0.1
survey.
1975 Protocol to construct port facilities,
provide fishing vessels and training.
Ghana 1960 Protocol to construct fishing complex Work suspended after 1966 coup, re- 11.2
at Tema, including processing and cold sumed in early 1970s. Drydock facili-
storage plants, shop to produce fishing ties completed by Ghana in 1967.
gear, eight fishing boats.
1961 Credit-10 fishing trawlers. Delivered.
1963-64 Protocol to 1960 agreement for float- Fisheries assistance continued as only
ing dock, training of 100 Ghanaians, program after the overthrow of
equipment for fisheries school, and N'Krumah.
joint research.
1976 Protocol to increase Soviet participa- No activity noted.
tion in Ghanaian fisheries and to cre-
ate a joint Soviet-Ghanaian company
for production and processing of tuna.
Guinea 1959 Under a $35 million line of credit a Completed 1963; expanded 1968. 2.3
cold storage plant at Conakry. Technical training provided.
1962 Under a credit of $13 million, port Four seiners delivered in 1966. Soviet 8.0
machinery, 10 fishing vessels, and cold and Guinean personnel operate boats.
storage plant. Repair facilities under construction.
1966 Authorized Soviets to fish in Guinea's Soviets have fished Guinean waters but
EEZ in return for 60 three-year schol- have not provided promised shore facil-
arships for study in the USSR; con- ities and technical assistance.
struction of dock and repair facilities
at Conakry.
1969 Renewed the 1966 protocol and ar- Soviets to provide 50 percent of their
ranged for the lease of Soviet trawlers catch to Guinea.
through June 1979.
1973 Grant for oceanographic research cen- Completed.
ter at Conakry.
1974 Protocol permanently assigned hydro- Agreement expired in 1976. Short
graphic vessel to Conakry and provided term licensing of Soviet vessels until
service and repair facilities for it. 1981.
1981 Fishing cooperation agreement. Soviets Being implemented.
licensed to fish in Guinean waters for
annual flat fee of $0.8 million, to sell
10,000 tons of fish on Guinean market,
to train Guineans in fisheries manage-
ment, and to develop fishing industry.
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Table 4 (continued)
Guinea 1984 Grant of 150 tons of fish.
Agreement granting the Soviets fishing
rights in return for fishing boats, a
refrigerated warehouse, and an ice
plant, supply of 10,000 tons of fish
annually, training to Guineans, and
rental fees to the government. Moscow
has allocated $2.2 million for fisheries
development study.
Guinea-Bissau
1975
1977
1978
1984
Kenya
1964
Liberia
1981
Mauritius
1970
1974
Mozambique
1976
0.2
25.0
Agreement for joint commercial ven- Five boats delivered 1975; fish process- 10.5
ture "Estrela do Mar," with Soviets ing facilities completed 1980.
supplying five refrigerated trawlers
and 90 percent of the personnel. Also,
a 10-year agreement allowing five-year
renewal for fisheries research, training,
and technical assistance establishing
fishing fleet and processing plants. Re-
ciprocal rights granted Soviets for five
boats. Technical services for cash.
Protocol implementing cold storage
plant at Bafata, port modernization,
fisheries infrastructural development,
transfer of four ships, and building
repair docks.
Renegotiated 1975 agreement for
straight partnership with joint receipts
after operating costs split two ways.
Soviets to drop operating charges for
ships.
Grant of fish. 0.2
Under a $44 million line of credit, Training and supply of vessels in 2.0
USSR agreed to construct fish cannery 1965-68.
and related facilities, training, and
supply of vessels.
Soviet research vessel conducted sur- Completed.
vey of Liberian waters.
Credit for two trawlers, marine equip- About $1 million worth of fishing gear 5.0
ment, and services of specialists. Re- delivered.
newable at three-year intervals.
Accord signed in 1974 and renewed in Agreement allowed to lapse by
1976 calls for joint venture for re- Mauritius in 1980.
search and supplying local markets
with 60 tons of fish annually. Ten
trainees to study in USSR each year.
General fishing agreement includes a
joint venture, technical assistance to
fishing industry construction of refrig-
eration and port facilities, and leasing
Soviet boats to Mozambican facilities.
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Table 4
USSR: Assistance to Fishing Industries
in LDCs, 1959-31 December 1985 (continued)
Mozambique 1977 Protocol to 1976 credit agreement on
training crews and constructing port
facilities in return for 10 to 15 percent
of catch and use of port facilities.
1979 Five-year agreement to form joint ven-
ture, Mosopesca. Soviets to provide
four boats.
1980 Agreement to provide repair facility at
Maputo including floating drydock,
workshop, and training center. Repair
facilities to service Soviet fishing fleet.
1983 Protocol to supply three additional
fishing boats to Mosopesca.
1984 Protocol to assist in setting up fishing
cooperatives.
Senegal 1965 Agreement to develop fisheries; con-
duct research; construct tuna complex;
provide 10 tuna boats, fishing equip-
ment, and training.
1968 Protocol for study of deep sea fish
resources.
1971 Protocol for joint fisheries survey and
Soviet training program.
Seychelles 1978 Agreement for research, development
of fishing industry, and training of
Seychellois.
1984 Agreement to construct two floating
drydocks with total capacity of 800
tons to repair fishing boats and patrol
craft at Victoria and Felicite Island
under credit.
Sierra Leone 1976 Agreement provides for joint studies of
fisheries resources, port construction,
and a joint venture, Sierra Fishing Co.
1977 Protocol for continued cooperation in
constructing fishing harbors, training
personnel, establishing facilities for
maintenance and repair, and drawing
up fisheries development plan and re-
search program. Eighty scholarships
established for study in USSR.
1978 Ten-year extension of 1976 agreement;
annual protocols determine activities.
Remarks
Value
(million US $)
Agreement implemented.
5.0
Joint venture Mosopesca formed; four
boats delivered in 1980.
0.4
Completed in 1982.
18.5
Deliveries completed in 1985.
0.3
Complex declared not feasible in 1966.
Tuna boats delivered 1969-73.
4.4
Senegal permits bunkering, crew
change, and light repair under the
1965 agreement, but no fishing within
territorial waters. Dakar reportedly
finds the bunkering trade profitable
enough to overlook 200-mile zone fish-
ing violations.
Research completed; two patrol boats 0.2
provided as grant. In abeyance.
Seychelles reluctant to go ahead with 20.0
the installation as part of current mod-
ernization effort.
Joint company formed and in opera- 7.0
tion.
Quay constructed, equipment deliv-
ered, and marine training school estab-
lished. Three fishing boats provided in
1980.
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Table 4 (continued)
1985
In protocol to 1961 line of credit,
USSR agreed to provide credits for
equipment for constructing a fish can-
nery at Laas Qoray with annual capac-
ity of 6 million cans a year.
Credit for fishing industry develop-
ment ($19 million), port and processing
facilities ($9 million), training center
for 2,200 trainees, expansion of ship-
yard for fishing boats.
Grant for fishing industry development
and refugee resettlement.
Survey of fishing potential of Red Sea
and Nile; fish cannery to be estab-
lished at Jabal al Awliya.
Protocol under $20 million credit in-
cludes marine equipment and construc-
tion of fish drying and cold storage
plants.
Agreement to carry out fisheries re-
search in Tanzanian waters.
Agreement under a 1956 credit to pro-
vide trawlers and establish a fishing
complex.
One-year licensing agreement permits
17 Soviet vessels to operate in
Kiribati's EEZ until August 1986 for a
fee of about $1.7 million annually.
Agreement for joint company to estab-
lish Singapore's first fully integrated
seafood processing and storage com-
plex and to provide local market with
seafood and fishmeal.
Agreement for Soviet fisheries assis-
tance, port construction, and possible
joint venture.
Agreement for joint fisheries research,
training, construction of fishing port,
and joint fishing company.
Remarks _ Value
(million US $)
Survey completed in 1964. Cannery 0.4
feasibility reports prepared in 1965,
but no subsequent activity.
Marine equipment delivered. Cold 0.9
storage and drying plants canceled.
Tanzania dissatisfied with inadequate
reports that Soviets made available.
$12.5 million worth of trawlers deliv- 15.1
ered; shipyard and oceanographic
school completed.
Fishing operations began in October,
Kiribati has requested Soviets to sub-
mit a proposal for a detailed agreement
involving shore facilities.
The joint venture company, Marissco,
processes and markets 65,000 tons of
fish annually, mostly in Europe.
Preliminary oceanographic studies
completed.
Following surveys, Soviets agreed to
establish fishing port and crabmeat
plant under a 1967 line of credit.
Agreement for development of fishing
ports, training on Soviet vessels, tech-
nical school, and rental of Soviet fish-
ing vessels.
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Table 4
USSR: Assistance to Fishing Industries
in LDCs, 1959-31 December 1985 (continued)
Colombia
1981
Guyana
1977
1978
Jamaica
1979
Mexico
1978
Nicaragua
1981
1982
1984
1985
Panama
1982
Peru
1971
Cooperation between Colombian firm Possibility of formal joint venture.
Impescol and Soviet firm Pesconsa to
exploit Colombian fishing resources
with Soviet vessels.
Agreement on technical assistance and No activity noted.
training.
Protocol established joint company for
catching, processing, and selling shell-
fish.
Agreement to provide USSR fishing Jamaica canceled agreement in 1983
rights in Jamaican waters in exchange without implementation.
for Soviet vessels, research and train-
ing, and establishment of a joint ven-
ture.
Agreement on joint venture involving Negotiations on joint venture stalled.
Soviet technical assistance to Mexico.
Value
(million US $)
Agreement for cooperation in fishing. Joint venture under negotiation, 5.0
Soviets to provide training and techni- fishing studies completed.
cal assistance, and to establish fishing
institute at Bluefields. Joint venture to
be formed.
Protocol providing for the construction Port development at San Juan del Sur 10.0
of a repair facility at San Juan del Sur. may have been suspended.
Soviets to provide floating drydock and
pier. They will pay Nicaragua $0.2
million yearly for use of facility by
Soviet tuna fleet.
Scientific protocol calls for study in
commercialization of Pacific coast
fishing grounds.
Two-year economic protocol calls for Under way.
Soviet technical assistance to fishing.
Agreement to permit bunkering of
Soviet fishing fleet at the port of
Vacamonte.
and establishing a joint fisheries re- completed in 1975. Port equipment
search program. Allows trawlers and installed in 1976.
fish factory ships facilities at Peruvian
ports and access to Peruvian waters.
Agreement valid for 10 years, and
renewable for three-year periods after
1981.
Agreement provides aid in construct- Commission on Soviet-Peruvian fisher- 2.5
ing fisheries complex at Paita, training ies cooperation formed in 1972. First
Peruvians at Soviet fisheries institutes, and second stage of Paita complex
1972 Protocol for port construction and
training of 30 Peruvians on Soviet
research vessel.
Confidential 16
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Table 4 (continued)
Peru 1983 Contracts with El Pacifico and Mer- Pacific Fishing Enterprise acting as
curio firms and Peruvian Government intermediary for Sovrybflot, and leased
to permit Soviets to catch up to 55,000 Soviet trawlers to fish territorial wa-
tons of hake, saurel, and mackerel in ters. Studies by Soviet research vessels
Peruvian waters. Peru to receive 10 to began October 1984.
12 percent of catch.
1984 Contract permitting Soviet catch of up
to 200,000 metric tons. Peru to receive
5 to 12 percent of catch.
1985 Temporary agreement signed extend-
ing 1984 contract for Soviet trawlers to
operate off Peruvian coast for three to
four months in return for 15 percent of
the catch.
Value
(million US $)
Egypt 1964 Agreement included Soviet ships for Three-year fish survey in south Mcdi- 15.0
deep sea fishing and research, techni- terranean completed 1970.
cal training, and assistance in develop-
ing fishing center on the Red Sea.
1967 Number of Egyptians training in
USSR increased from 200 to 300.
1969 USSR agreed to train additional 100
Egyptians.
1971 Agreement to provide Egypt with In 1971, Soviets train Egyptians in 1.5
12,000 tons of fish annually, undertake Atlantic fishing. Trawling equipment
a joint fisheries survey, and assist in delivered, survey completed. USSR
developing Lake Nasser. supplying fish at a highly favorable
price.
1972 Agreement on additional equipment, Survey and training completed.
training, surveys, technical assistance,
and construction of wharf on Red Sea.
1973 Soviet ships to provide Egyptians fish- Status of joint venture unknown since
ing off African coast with fuel and abrogation of friendship treaty in
fishing tackle and to deliver frozen fish March 1976.
to Alexandria.
1975 Protocol on training and trawling
equipment for deep sea operations.
1983 Protocol on cooperation in fishing. So- The sale of fishing boats and equip-
viets to supply Egypt with 26,000 tons ment to Egypt under discussion.
of frozen fish in 1983 and to train
Egyptians.
Iran 1963 Agreement to develop Caspian Sea re- First section of hatchery and cold stor- 2.0
sources, including equipment for large age plant completed 1969. Port equip-
fish hatchery, marine survey, and rec- ment arrived periodically after 1968.
lamation work.
1966 Agreement under a $17 million trade Completed.
credit to expand port and construct
cold storage plant.
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Table 4
USSR: Assistance to Fishing Industries
in LDCs, 1959-31 December 1985 (continued)
Protocol for fisheries survey of Persian
Gulf.
Confidential
Agreement for six additional fish
hatcheries on the Caspian Sea.
A 1959 credit agreement allocated un-
specified aid for fisheries development.
Agreement to establish a research cen-
ter, processing and storage facilities, to
improve ports, and to train Iraqis. Al-
lowed Soviet fishing fleet to enter Iraqi
ports. Soviets also to deliver 60 fishing
vessels over a five-year period, to es-
tablish repair bases, and to aid devel-
opment of fishing industry.
Protocol for joint Iraqi-Soviet fishing
company, Rafidain, with capital of $51
million headquartered in A] Basrah, to
begin with five vessels. Protocol provid-
ed for sea shipping and building Iraq's
tanker and fishing fleet.
Protocol on equipment for training
centers. Soviets to plan development of
fishing industry and give technical as-
sistance to joint company.
Agreement on developing fisheries in-
dustry, including port and cold storage
facilities and shipyard construction.
Protocol covering two repair shops,
seven fishing boats, processing facili-
ties, and technical training.
Protocol for expanding Al Hudaydah
facilities.
Grant for fishing industry development
included research, maritime equip-
ment, a training center at Al Mukalla,
and feasibility studies for canning and
cold storage facilities. Three complete-
ly equipped seiners to be furnished by
USSR.
Three fishing boats delivered under
1972 protocol.
First of Soviet-built ships delivered in 25.0
1971, three more in 1972, and eight in
1973.
Soviets delivered two 841-ton ships
equipped for fishing, freezing, and can-
ning in 1977.
Repair facility workshop and cold stor- 8.0
age plant at Al Hudaydah completed;
seven fishing boats delivered.
Completed.
Seiners, engine, and nets delivered in
1970. Training center established.
Cannery design completed in 1971 and
the Soviets agreed to supply an oil and
flour unit. Surveys for cold storage
plants completed.
Protocol for Soviet supply of three
additional fishing boats under 1969
grant described above.
Agreement for creation of joint compa-
ny, expansion of port facilities, and
additional fishing vessels under an ad-
dition to 1972 line of credit.
Value'
(million US $)
Fishing port established at Hujaj, five 17.8
trawlers valued at $7.8 million deliv-
ered under a 1976 protocol-two me-
dium-size trawlers delivered in Decem-
ber 1976 and three small vessels in
March 1977. Soviets completed can-
ning plant at A] Mukalla and a fish
meal plant at Aden in August 1978.
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Table 4 (continued)
Country
Year
South Yemen
1979
1980
Syria
1974
Bangladesh
1972
India
1966
1978
Maldives
1976
Pakistan
1965
1968
Sri Lanka
1971
Agreements and Protocols Remarks Value
(million US $)
Protocol on cooperation in fishing. Two Projects being implemented. 35.0
research vessels to explore resources in
Gulf of Aden; two shore-based scientif-
ic labs to be established; five Soviet
trawlers to fish South Yemeni waters.
South Yemen to receive 2,000 tons fish
per year and two trawlers, whose catch
to be sold on Yemeni market.
Additional credit for facilities at fish- Two wharves, a floating drydock, a 40.0
ing port in Aden. central workshop, and a production
unit under construction.
Fisheries development, Buhayrat al
Asad (Al Asad Lake).
Grant for 10 fishing boats, refrigera- Boats delivered. Cold storage plants 15.0
tion facilities, a training center, and and center completed.
Soviet technicians.
Deep sea fisheries assistance to include Completed.
use of two Soviet trawlers and con-
struction of shipyard.
India asked Moscow for further assis- No agreement reached.
tance. Possibility of joint venture ex-
plored.
Agreement for assistance to local fish- No activity noted.
eries and training aboard Soviet trawl-
ers.
Agreement to supply trawlers. Delivered. 1.6
Agreement for oceanographic re- Soviet experts studied land facilities in 2.0
search, design of a fishing port, and 1968. In 1969, three Soviet trawlers
training of fishermen. began training fisheries personnel and
conducting a two-year fishing survey.
Agreement for technical training and
establishment of training center, joint
fisheries operations, and possible fu-
ture purchase or rental of Soviet fish-
ing vessels.
Oceanographic research began Febru- 3.0
ary 1972. Soviet technicians arrived in
1973 to assist in setting up training
center. In 1977, 20 scholarships grant-
ed for training Sri Lankan personnel.
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