MOSCOW'S FISHERIES DEVELOPMENT PROGRAM IN THE NON-COMMUNIST THIRD WORLD: THE NEW OFFENSIVE

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP97R00694R000600160001-7
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• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: March 18, 2011
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: June 1, 1986
• Content Type: REPORT

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Directorate of -
Intelligence
Moscow's Fisheries Development
Program in the
Non-Communist Third World:
The New Offensive
GI 86-10039
June 1986
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Directorate of Secret
Intelligence
Moscow's Fisheries Development
Program in the
Non-Communist Third World:
The New Offensive
Analysis.
This paper was prepared by
of Global Issues, and'
Office
Office of Soviet
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GI 86-10039
June1986
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Moscow's Fisheries Development
Program in the
Non-Communist Third World:
The New Offensive
Key Judgments The Soviets over the past year and a half have moved decisively to protect
Information available their extensive and profitable fishing interests in the non-Communist Third
as of 30 April 1986 World. Successful initiatives include:
was used in the report.
? The extension of Soviet fishing operations in the Pacific through an
August 1985 licensing agreement with Kiribati, the first with a develop-
ing state in the South Pacific.
? A 25-percent increase in 1984 over previous total pledges in fisheries
assistance to LDCs through provision of $100 million in new aid that will
expand shore facilities in Africa for use by the Soviet fleet.
? An agreement to install drydock facilities in Seychelles that could
facilitate ship repairs in the Indian Ocean.
? The establishment of a joint-venture fishing company and installation of
a drydock in Mauritania under a June 1985 agreement that will give the
Soviet fishing fleet port rights all along the Atlantic coast of Africa.
? Resurrected talks with Indonesia on a joint fishing venture to replace an
agreement that has not been used for 20 years.
Moscow is also working to gain additional fishing rights in the western
Pacific, an area hitherto fished mostly by US and other Western fleets.
The new Soviet assistance brings LDC fisheries aid to more than half a bil-
lion dollars under a program that has grown steadily since it began in
earnest in the late 1960s. Although this miniprogram represents only about
an estimated 2 percent of total Soviet economic pledges to non-Communist
LDCs, its impact has been extensive, profitable to Moscow, and highly cost
effective in terms of financial outlays. For example, for less than $10
million annually, the USSR has:
? Gained access to ports and fishing grounds for its fishing fleet in 44 less
developed countries.
? Supported $80-125 million a year in hard currency earnings from fish
exports.
? Overcome fuel and services bottlenecks at home (where trawlers some-
times spend inordinate amounts of time in port because of congestion or
diesel shortages) by using the resources of LDC ports for resupply.
? Supported its annual marine catch of 8-9 million metric tons with at least
2 million metric tons from LDC waters.
? Improved the domestic protein supply without the costly investment
required for equivalent results from farm production.
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Research activity to catalog seabed resources also has provided valuable
economic information about the coastal and territorial waters of 30
countries under the fisheries aid program.
Despite its small size, the Kremlin's fishing program has reached more
LDCs than any other form of Soviet development aid (outside technical
services and training). It is the only significant Soviet economic effort in six
countries and Moscow's only extensive program in Africa. In recent years,
the USSR has branched out in its search for new fishing clients; in addition
to the recent agreements, it also has offered facilities to Burma, Cape
Verde, the Comoros, Uruguay, and six island.nations in the western
Pacific.
In our judgment, the program has not served Moscow's fishing aid
customers nearly as well.
it has failed to develop viable fishing industries in LDCs and has
not helped LDCs remedy their pressing food needs. LDC complaints have
centered around:
? Soviet failure to meet contract obligations to construct promised shore
facilities or train local personnel.
? Harmful Soviet fishing practices that reduce availability of fish to local
fleets.
? Fish shortages caused by not delivering promised amounts of fish or
delivering less desirable varieties.
In spite of Moscow's well-known penchant for not honoring fishing pacts,
LDCs continue to deal with Moscow for political reasons, for short-term
gains in the form of licensing fees, and because they lack alternative
financing for fisheries development. Nonetheless, we believe that Western
aid and private-sector investments in LDC fleet and shore facilities,
training programs, and patrol capabilities could persuade even some of
Moscow's hardline LDC fisheries clients-such as Angola and Mozam-
bique-to reduce, or even eliminate, Soviet fishing programs. Some major
fishing countries, such as Japan and Spain, have already begun to put
together commercial fishing packages that contain attractive development
benefits such as the construction of shore facilities and training. The
United States is also exploring a regional fisheries program for the
Southern and western Pacific.
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Key Judgments
The Soviet Fishing Fleet: Wide Ranging and Profitable
1
The Fisheries Aid Program: Entree at Bargain Prices
1
Joint Ventures: An Effective Instrument
2
An Outreach Program for the 1980s
4
Dissatisfaction With the Aid Program
7
Why LDCs Accept Soviet Fisheries Aid
8
USSR: Assistance to Fishing Industries in LDCs, 1959-31 December 1985
11
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Moscow's Fisheries Development
Program in the
Non-Communist Third World:
The New Offensive
The Soviet Fishing Fleet:
Wide Ranging and Profitable
The Soviet Union has one of the world's most active
fishing industries. It is a significant earner of hard
currency as well as a source of food for the USSR's
population. Soviet exports of fish products have aver-
aged about $250 million annually since 1975, and
reached $360 million in 1983, with at least one-third
of these exports going to hard currency customers.
In recent years, the USSR's annual ocean catch has
averaged about 8-9 million metric tons, second only to
that of Japan, according to UN statistics. The Soviet
catch peaked at 9.4 million tons in 1976 and fell
steadily until 1978 as 200-mile exclusive economic
zones (EEZs) came into force for most countries.
Anticipating establishment of these zones, Moscow
had begun in the early 1970s to revise traditional
fishing practices by concluding agreements to fish
LDC waters (which contain two-thirds of the world's
fish resources). This process accelerated after the
United States, Canada, and European countries ex-
cluded the USSR from some of its most important
fishing grounds in 1977. In the 1980s the catch from
LDC waters has nearly offset earlier losses elsewhere.
The Fisheries Aid Program:
Entree at Bargain Prices
The fisheries aid program was Moscow's earliest
means to gain entree to LDC ports and servicing
facilities. Since its first extension of fisheries credit to
Guinea in 1959, the USSR has used this cost-effective
program to gain a presence in the fishing sector of 44
non-Communist LDCs (tables 1 and 2). By 1986 the
USSR had pledged more than $500 million in fisher-
ies aid and proposed 24 joint ventures, of which 12
have become operational (table 3). In 1985 about
1,000 Soviet fisheries personnel were providing tech-
nical services to LDCs, and more than 750 LDC
trainees were studying fishing in the USSR.
Table 1
USSR: Fisheries Aid to Non-Communist
LDCs, by Year
Total 516
1959-74 204
1975 63
1976 7
1977 16
1978
1979
1980 58
1981 21
1982 10
At the same time, expenditures on this program have
been very modest. According to our data, only about
$10 million in aid flows annually to LDCs under
Soviet fishing aid agreements (less than 1 percent of
total Soviet aid disbursements to non-Communist 25X1
LDCs). Moscow probably also has paid another $10
million annually in recent years for licensing fees and
the use of drydock facilities. In contrast, the returns
from the fishing aid program are enormous:
? The Soviet catch from coastal waters bordering
exclusively on LDCs accounts for about one-third of
Moscow's recorded marine catch, according to UN
statistics (see figure 1).
? The minimum allowable catch from the territorial
waters of only six African countries (Angola, Guin-
ea, Guinea-Bissau, Mauritania, Mozambique, and
Sierra Leone) was valued at about $300 million at
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Table 2
Soviet Assistance to Non-Communist LDCs
for Fisheries Development, 1959-December 1985 a
a In the case of joint ventures, only grants and credits for financing
Soviet equipment and partner country equity shares are included;
costs of training and Soviet advisers are excluded.
b Program discontinued.
average prices for the USSR's African catch in
1984. Soviet underreporting of catches and poach-
ing could double this value, according to many
fishing experts. At least $1 billion worth of fish is
caught every year by the Soviets off LDC coasts.
? Through sales to West European customers, Mos-
cow earns at least $100 million in hard currency
annually on the catch we estimate comes from LDC
waters.
These factors make the USSR's fisheries aid effort
the most profitable economic aid program in the
world.
Joint Ventures: An Effective Instrument
The Soviet fishing program in the non-Communist
Third World has evolved from a search for logistic
support in the 1960s, through a focus in the early
1970s on obtaining licensing agreements, to its cur-
rent multifaceted format that uses aid, licensing fees,
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Table 3
Soviet Joint Fishing Ventures in LDCs
Cofistraco (Cameroon)
1979
Ecopesca (Equatorial Guinea)
1973
Estrela do Mar (Guinea-Bissau)
1975
Fransov (France)
1976
Marissco (Singapore)
1976
Mausov (Mauritania)
1984
Mosopesca (Mozambique)
1979
Rafidain (Iraq)
1976
Sierra Fishing Co. (Sierra Leone)
1976
Somalfish (Somalia)
1973
Minority interest owned by Sovhispan, Iberles.
Activities include fishing in West Africa, market-
ing of fish, import of Spanish commodities.
49-percent Sovrybflot ownership. Activities in-
clude fishing in Guinean waters and marketing of
fish.
49-percent Sovrybflot ownership. Activities in-
clude fishing in the Atlantic and marketing of
fish. In 1985, opened branch office in Dakar,
Senegal, to market fish in Western Europe.
50-percent Sovrybflot, 32- percent Interagra own-
ership. Activities include representing Soviet fish-
ing interests in West Africa; fishing, processing
and marketing of fish; and providing technical
services for the Soviet fishing fleet. Holds 20-
percent interest in Sierra Fishing Company.
49-percent Sovrybflot ownership. A purely com-
mercial company involved in the import, process-
ing, and marketing of fish. Provides technical
services for the Soviet Pacific fishing fleet.
49-percent Sovrybflot ownership, 40-percent
Mauritanian Government ownership, and I1-per-
cent private ownership.
49-percent Sovrybflot ownership. Activities in-
clude exploitation of fish and shrimp resources in
Mozambique.
49-percent Sovrybflot ownership. Activities in-
clude fishing in the Persian Gulf and the Indian
Ocean.
20-percent Fransov ownership. Activities include
fishing in Sierra Leone's waters, processing and
marketing of fish.
49-percent Sovrybflot ownership. Activities in-
cluded fishing in Gulf of Aden and Indian Ocean
and marketing of fish. Dissolved in 1977.
50-percent Sovrybflot ownership. Activities in-
clude fishing in Africa and Latin America, mar-
keting of fish products, and technical services for
the Soviet fleet. Subsidiaries: Pesconsa (fishing),
Iberles (import/export), Soviemex (construction).
Sovhispan and Iberles hold minority interest in
Cofistraco, a Cameroonian venture. Provides re-
provisioning services to the Soviet fleet.
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arVI Cl
Figure 1
USSR: The Marine Catchy
Total Soviet
catch
0 1971
Latin American
catch
problems posed by 200-mile EEZs,
and the establishment of joint ventures with partners
reluctant to commit resources without equity partici-
pation. This flexible approach responds to guidelines
set by a special commission formed by the Soviet
Minister of Fisheries in the mid-1970s to study the
The USSR has preferred licensing agreements as the
most direct way to gain access to LDC resources
without a potentially burdensome commitment to
upgrade local fishing sectors,
Under these arrangements, the USSR pays a
flat fee based on the size of the catch. But where
necessary, it enters joint ventures with countries (such
as Argentina and Mauritania) where tight govern-
mental restrictions on foreign fishing make licensing
arrangements illegal, or where the LDC partner
insists on capital investments. In contrast, most LDCs
prefer joint ventures or aid in the belief that they will
be able to develop their local industries.
A review of Soviet agreements shows that the usual
joint-venture arrangement provides for 51-percent
ownership by local interests and 49 percent by Sov-
rybflot, the Soviet foreign trade entity under the
Soviet Fisheries Ministry that handles foreign fisher-
ies matters. Moscow provides capital in the form of
trawlers, port development, processing facilities, and
training, while the LDC provides port access and
repays its share of the initial capital investment with
profits from the venture. Since the late 1970s, Mos-
cow has generally provided concessionary aid (which
requires the highest degree of financial commitment)
only to longtime partners who show signs of abrogat-
ing fishing agreements. In 1985, however, Moscow
again began using aid offers to attract new clients in
the Western Pacific.
According to our data, the Soviets have signed joint
fishing venture agreements with 24 countries, al-
though up to now only 12 joint companies have
actually been formed. One of the most active has been
the joint venture with Spanish companies (Sovhispan)
founded in 1971 to provide goods and services for the
Soviet Atlantic fishing fleet. Moscow owns majority
shares in Sovhispan and directs its operations. Sovhi-
span has been a convenient tool for the Soviets in
negotiating fishing agreements with LDCs. For exam-
ple, Sovhispan (rather than Sovrybflot) represents
Soviet interests in the USSR's joint venture with
Cameroon, has negotiated with Angola and Kenya
concerning fishing agreements, and may negotiate
future agreements in Latin America on Moscow's
behalf, Similarly, the
Soviet-French joint venture Fransov, in which Mos-
cow is also the major stockholder, has been used in
Sierra Leone and Tunisia.
An Outreach Program for the 1980s
Moscow's current strategy combines aid offers to new
LDC recipients with offers of substantial new aid to
old customers to keep their interest (table 4). Mos-
cow's most recent targets have been the microstates of
the southwest Pacific, where Soviet persistence re-
cently paid off with a licensing agreement with Kiri-
bati, according to the local press. This small island
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The Early Years: Logistics Paramount
The Soviet fisheries program of the 1960s emphasized
bunkering agreements to support fishing activities in
distant waters. The first agreement was signed with
Guinea in 1959 for onshore storage facilities. It was
followed by aid to 17 other African countries as
Moscow moved into the rich sardine grounds in the
South Atlantic. Thereafter, the USSR shifted atten-
tion to the maritime nations along the Indian Ocean
and to Latin American countries in the Southern
Hemisphere. For most countries, Soviet assistance
agreements provided for improved port facilities for
cargo handling, storage of goods, refrigeration, and
ship repairs; trawlers; research; and technical assis-
tance and training for LDC crews. In return, the
USSR gained worldwide access to shore facilities for
its fleet and was able to repair and refuel vessels,
transfer crews, and process some of the catch on-
shore.
Although few ports around the world deny Soviet
ships access for fueling and provisioning, spacious
anchorages and well-equipped facilities are needed to
service Soviet trawler and factory ship fleets that
often number 100 or more. By the early 1970s, the
Soviets had fisheries agreements that entitled them to
bunkering and transshipment points in almost every
area fished by their vessels.
nation is the first to respond to a number of Soviet
offers of fisheries assistance to countries of the west-
ern Pacific and Indian Ocean. The one-year renew-
able agreement with Kiribati allows the Soviets to fish
for tuna (Moscow's first such venture), using tuna
boats built recently in Poland, but does not provide
port rights for refueling or reprovisioning. Moscow
agreed to pay $1.7 million for one year's fishing
rights, at least 10 percent of Kiribati's budget for
1985. According to US Embassy reporting, the pros-
pects for Soviet agreements with Vanuatu and West-
ern Samoa have improved. since the accord with
Kiribati was signed. Fiji, the Solomon Islands, Tonga,
and Tuvalu reportedly also are reconsidering Mos-
cow's overtures (despite previously rejecting Soviet
fisheries offers), in the wake of the Kiribati agree-
ment.
The Soviet Union's interest in the rich southeastern
Pacific fishing grounds off Latin America and in
Antarctic krill reserves has also led Moscow to pursue
fishing agreements in Latin America with renewed
vigor in the past two years. In Argentina, where the
Soviets had an inactive agreement dating from 1974,
Moscow has negotiated intensely for the formation of
a joint venture to exploit Antarctic krill. In Peru,
where the Soviets have access to shore facilities they
built at Paita in the 1970s, energetic lobbying by
Moscow to maintain its presence in Peruvian waters
has increasingly come under attack by domestic fish-
ing interests, according to the local press. The Soviet
fleet off Peru currently is operating under a short-
term licensing agreement because the new Garcia
government is undecided about renewing a fishing 25X1
agreement that, in effect, allows Moscow unlimited
access to Peru's resources because of Lima's inability
to police its waters. According to US Embassy report-
ing, Moscow also has:
? Extended a $10 million credit to Nicaragua to build
a fishing port at San Juan del Sur for the Soviet
Pacific fishing fleet.
? Signed an agreement with Panama for bunkering
rights in Vacamonte.
? Obtained short-term licenses in Colombia through
Pesconsa, Sovhispan's fishing subsidiary.
? Made offers of fisheries aid to Brazil and Ecuador
in 1983, and to Uruguay in 1984.
While the USSR pursued its aggressive campaign in
the southwestern Pacific and Latin America, it also
continued its contacts in Africa. In the 1980s the
USSR has signed new fisheries aid agreements with
Angola, Guinea, Madagascar, and Seychelles; re-
newed agreements with Mozambique and Sierra Le-
one; and conducted a coastal survey for Liberia,
It has made offers to 25X1
Cape Verde, Congo and Mauritius for the renewal of
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Table 4
USSR: Status of Fishing Programs in Non-Communist LDCs
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fishing privileges that have lapsed over the past few
years. The agreements with Angola and Guinea are
notable for their large size-a total of $75 million-
and their broad scope. These agreements call for port
construction, processing facilities, and development of
artisanal and deep sea fishing-activities that we
believe will enable Moscow to maintain its presence in
the fishing industries of these countries after several
years of squabbling over the terms of fishing agree-
ments.
Dissatisfaction With the Aid Program
Once an LDC has signed a Soviet fishing agreement,
it often finds that the USSR falls far short on
implementation. Complaints have surfaced in several
areas.
Failure To Meet Contract Obligations. An almost
universal criticism, according to US Embassy report-
ing, is that the Soviets do not provide the facilities and
training promised under agreements:
? In Ghana, the USSR did not train Ghanaians to
operate the trawlers provided them and pulled out of
Ghana's industry when Accra ran short of cash to
pay for Soviet experts and spare parts. Ghana's fleet
was left crippled, according to Embassy reporting.
? A $40 million project in Somalia to relocate nomads
and to use them in developing a local fishing
industry was a complete fiasco. The only beneficia-
ries were the Soviets who were allowed to fish
Somalia's waters as part of the agreement. Somalia
received no profits from the joint venture; its share
went to pay the operating costs of the Soviets, who
dominated the company. Cancellation of the agree-
ment in 1977 was greeted with popular acclaim,
with delighted Somalis brandishing placards read-
ing, "Not only we but our fish in the ocean are
protesting against the Soviets for ill treatment."
? In Guinea-Bissau, the government has complained
that not one Guinean has been trained or even works
on the ships provided to the joint Soviet-Guinean
fishing company. Instead, Guinea-Bissau pays the
Soviets $1,500 a day to operate these vessels.
Similar complaints about not receiving promised
equipment have come from Guinea, Morocco, and
Harmful Fishing Practices. Soviet fishing practices
often do substantial damage to the local industry,
according to Western experts. The Soviets have been
guilty of overfishing in Angola, Cameroon, Chile,
Guinea, Mauritania, Morocco, Pakistan, and Peru. In
Angola and Mozambique, fishermen are up in arms
because the Soviets use a vacuum method on the
seabed that has stripped the coastline of shellfish. In
Sierra Leone, the Soviets have been observed using
extrafine mesh nets that do not permit young fish to
escape, fishing so close to shore that their trawlers
destroy nets set out by local fishermen, and illegally
fishing in the coastal spawning grounds. Soviet boats
are known to poach even in the waters of countries
where they have agreements, such as Angola, Mauri-
tania, and Peru.
Fish Shortages. The USSR's fish deliveries under
quota agreements fail to meet even the most minimal
LDC food production goals. Under typical fishing
agreements, fish deliveries to LDCs generally com-
prise 8 to 15 percent of the total catch. Soviet trawlers
often underreport their catch, reducing the amount of
fish they must surrender for local consumption, ac-
cording to a UN fisheries expert. Embassy and press
reports detail the specifics of Soviet practices:
? Guinea-Bissau believes that the Soviets cheat by
transferring most of their catch to processing ships
at sea rather than bringing it into port. The quality
of the fish the Soviets deliver often is poor, com-
posed of undesirable varieties and badly preserved.
? Severe fish shortages have been reported in previ-
ously well-stocked markets in Angola, Equatorial
Guinea, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, and Mozambique
since fishing agreements were signed with the
USSR.
? In Sierra Leone, the government may purchase
additional quantities of fish from the joint venture,
but it must pay in hard currency. In addition, most
of the fish received from the venture has to be sold
abroad to meet operating and amortization costs for
the joint company.
These shortages have earned the Soviets much ill will
among the local people. In Luanda, for example,
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the overthrow of Macias, the agreement was allowed
Displaying increasing sensitivity to LDC accusations
about fishing abuses, Moscow's fisheries ministry
responded for the first time at a press conference in
Sierra Leone in May 1984. The minister asserted that
Moscow loses $5-10 million a year in Sierra Leone
because of the great distances its fleet must travel.
He said the Soviets continued to honor the agreement
because "We are of the opinion that we are providing
help to the people of this country. "
dissatisfied Angolans marched on the local ministry of
fishing to protest shortages caused by the Soviet
agreements,
Why LDCs Accept Soviet Fisheries Aid
Devloping countries have a number of reasons for
signing fishing agreements with the Soviet Union in
spite of well-publicized evidence that such agreements
may be detrimental to their industries in the long run.
In our view, the most pressing is economic need.
Fishing resources often represent an important source
of food, employment, and revenue for the poorer
LDCs. Although their coastal waters may contain
rich fish resources, LDCs often lack both the means to
exploit them efficiently and to protect them from
poaching by other nations. To an LDC with few
funding alternatives, the Soviet aid program appears
to offer opportunities to develop this potentially im-
portant area.
Politics play a role as well. Angola, Mozambique, and
Nicaragua signed fishing agreements with Moscow
shortly after the Soviets became their major military
supplier because they believed the Soviets also would
improve domestic fishing industries,
Now, in our view, these countries' depen-
dence on the USSR for assistance in combating
insurgencies makes it hard for them to resist Soviet
pressures to conclude damaging fisheries agreements
without outside help even though they are dissatisfied
with Soviet efforts. Similarly, in Equatorial Guinea,
the Marxist Macias regime continued a flawed agree-
ment because of reliance on Soviet military aid. With
to expire, according to US Embassy reporting.
To obtain an agreement, the Soviets sometimes court
influential locals to lobby on their behalf, according to
US Embassy sources:
? Sierra Leone's joint venture with the Soviets, the
Sierra Fishing Company, is headed by Jamil Said
Mohammed, a close friend of former President
Siaka Stevens. Because of his influence, the USSR
has been able to continue the agreement despite
domestic protests.
? In Peru, the USSR circumvented the Peruvian
Navy's opposition to Soviet fishing by setting up a
joint venture with a private Peruvian company using
Cuban officials to persuade the Fishing Minister, a
senator, and a relative of the Foreign Minister to
use their influence to bring about an agreement.
? In Mauritania, the USSR joined forces with a
Soviet-trained Mauritanian to get the joint fishing
venture Mausov in operation in 1984. The joint
venture had been in the planning stage for more
than 10 years.
Outlook
Moscow's recent successes in the southwestern Pacific
have given it entree into an area where it traditionally
has had no presence. Moscow has been able to
capitalize on the resentment of island nations over
American disregard for their jurisdiction over migra-
tory species, such as tuna, in their exclusive economic
zones to encourage the island governments to review
their policies excluding Soviet fishing in the area.
Increasing economic problems and declining aid con-
tributions from traditional donors also attract these
countries to Soviet offers. A Soviet fishing presence in
the 14.5 million square kilometers of territory present-
ly claimed by these island states would end the
Western monopoly in the area, and could be detri-
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
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In our judgment, as long as Western countries remain cow is expanding its use of fisheries aid programs to
indifferent to the development of viable fishing and acquire bunkering and fishing rights to exploit these
conservation programs in the Third World, LDCs will waters through an aggressive program of offers to
continue to sign agreements with Moscow in spite of Latin American and western Pacific countries, while
known Soviet violations and the general dissatisfac-
tion of most recipients with the program. For exam-
ple, Guinea, which has criticized its fishing agreement
with the Soviets and has sought Western aid and
investment, was forced to renew its agreement with
Moscow in July 1984 because no Western donors
responded to a US agribusiness task force estimate in
1983 that Guinea's fishing industry could be properly
established for a modest $4 million. The new Soviet
agreement involves new aid commitments and a much
larger Soviet presence in Guinea's fishing industry. In
the case of Kiribati, Moscow's high bid for licensing
arrangements, about $1.7 million for one year, ex-
ceeded aid or commercial offers from any other
source. Nonetheless, in our judgment, because of
persistent complaints about Soviet programs, fisheries
clients could be weaned from Soviet fishing programs
with Western assistance and investment.
In many cases, Western fishing fleets have also acted
irresponsibly by depleting local fish stocks, underre-
porting their catches, and failing to provide assistance
to develop local fleets. According to Western fishing
experts, foreign fishing in LDC waters should be
accompanied by a measured development of LDC
capabilities through conservation, training, and the
provision of modern trawlers, fishing gear, and pre-
serving and storage facilities ashore. These goals
appear to be achievable through private organizations
by the formation of joint ventures that provide the
necessary technology and training in the course of
their operations.
For Moscow, access to LDC waters and ports will
continue to be the most critical element in maintain-
ing and expanding the Soviet fishing industry, accord-
ing to Western experts. Until now, the USSR's richest
fishing grounds have been the northwest Pacific and
northeast Atlantic; in these areas, fishing operations
have reached capacity. The UN Food and Agricultur-
al Organization estimates that the greatest unexploit-
ed fish resources lie in the west Indian Ocean and the
Southern Hemisphere, including the Antarctic. Mos-
maintaining its program in Africa.
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Appendix
USSR: Assistance to Fishing Industries
in LDCs, 1959-31 December 1985
Country Year Agreements and Protocols Remarks Value
(million US $)
Algeria 1968 Protocol under October 1963 line of Agreement expired in 1969. Exchange 4.5
credit: provides 18 trawlers, port con- of experts discussed by bilateral eco-
struction, and oceanographic research nomic commission in 1968-69.
assistance.
Mauritania 1973 Grant for oceanographic research lab- Laboratory completed.
oratory at Nouadhibou; staff of 25
provided free until locals are trained.
Five-year agreement modifiable at
one-year intervals gives Soviets fishing
rights within a 30-mile limit; number,
size, and type of craft specified in the
agreement. A mandatory percentage of
catch is to be processed at the under-
utilized Nouadhibou facilities. In re-
turn, Soviets agree to provide technical
assistance in fisheries research and pay
undisclosed annual royalties.
1975 Protocol established joint fishing com-
pany under 1973 agreement: to include
a fish-processing complex, 33 Soviet
vessels, and 30,000 tons of fish annual-
ly for Mauritania. Two trawlers pro-
vided free of charge.
1978 Agreement renewed for five years with After the coup of July 1978, agree-
annual protocols. ment was canceled and new negotia-
tions were begun to replace licensing
system with a joint venture.
1981 Protocol to establish joint venture, Mausov in operation, has licensed 46 16.0
Mausov: 60 percent owned by Mauri- Soviet vessels. Mauritania receives
tanian interests. Soviet vessels to fish nearly $35 million per year from the
Mauritanian waters in return for in- venture.
vestment in processing complex and
ship repair facility.
1985 Agreement signed for floating dry- In September 1985, the Soviets began
dock. to move a floating drydock and 200
technicians to Nouadhibou port to ser-
vice Soviet fishing vessels.
11 Secret
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USSR: Assistance to Fishing Industries
in LDCs, 1959-31 December 1985 (continued)
Country Year Agreements and Protocols Remarks Value
(million US $)
1973 Under United Nations Development Processing plant not built.
Program, Food and Agricultural Orga-
nization: fisheries research on Soviet
vessels, training in USSR, and creation
of training center in Morocco. Joint
company to be organized to operate
leased Soviet vessels in Moroccan
coastal waters and to construct and
operate a fish-processing plant and re-
frigeration warehouse.
1978 Agreement for joint companies, import No joint venture formed.
of surplus Moroccan fish, assistance in
organizing Moroccan maritime person-
nel, aid in cannery and export opera-
tion, and fisheries studies on Soviet-
supplied research vessels. For five-
year period.
1985 General protocol on forming a number
of small joint fishing and processing
ventures with equal joint ownership
and an increase in annual 6-year fish-
ing scholarships to 55. Moscow also
proposed formation of joint venture
similar to the one with Mauritania.
Tunisia 1976 Agreement for joint Tunisian, French, No activity noted.
and Soviet company to develop Tuni-
sian industry and protocol for contin-
ued fisheries research and Soviet assis-
tance.
Sub-Saharan
Africa
Angola 1976 Agreement on joint fishing venture in- In 1978, Moscow donated four fishing
cluding: boats and two trawlers to be manned
Marine survey. by Soviet crews. Cooperation continues
Survey and development of national in fleet formation, development of port
fishing industry. infrastructure, and training.
Modernization of fish-
processing enterprises.
Provision of vessels and
training.
In return, Soviets received exclusive
fishing rights within Angola's 200-mile
zone, plus facilities for anchorage, re-
pair, provisioning, and unloading.
Protocol to provide:
30,000 tons of fish to Angola per
year.
10 additional trawlers and technical
services.
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Country Year Agreements and Protocols Remarks Value
(million US $)
Protocol on aid in training and con-
structing several fish processing plants.
1979 Grant of fisheries protection vessel.
Protocol for joint fishing project, 1979-
81, training of Angolans.
1983 Grant of second fisheries protection
vessel.
1984 Fishing agreement to cover eight years. Angolans renegotiated agreement in 50.0
Soviets to establish fisheries complex 1985
with wharves, repair facilities, and cold
storage complex on credit basis.
Benin 1977 Agreement probably includes con- No progress beyond research stage. 0.5
struction of shore facilities and a joint
venture.
Cameroon 1979 Agreement to form joint venture,
Cameroon Fishing and Trading Co. Joint venture formed.
(Cofistraco).
Equatorial 1973 Soviets given fishing rights and use of Agreement allowed to lapse by Equa- 0.5
Guinea Luba port facility; Soviets to provide torial Guinea in 1979.
fish and train Guinean personnel on
Soviet trawlers. Joint venture,
Ecopesca, formed.
The Gambia 1973 Survey of local fisheries resources. No implementation beyond initial 0.1
survey.
1975 Protocol to construct port facilities,
provide fishing vessels and training.
Ghana 1960 Protocol to construct fishing complex Work suspended after 1966 coup, re- 11.2
at Tema, including processing and cold sumed in early 1970s. Drydock facili-
storage plants, shop to produce fishing ties completed by Ghana in 1967.
gear, eight fishing boats.
1961 Credit-10 fishing trawlers. Delivered.
1963-64 Protocol to 1960 agreement for float- Fisheries assistance continued as only
ing dock, training of 100 Ghanaians, program after the overthrow of
equipment for fisheries school, and N'Krumah.
joint research.
1976 Protocol to increase Soviet participa- No activity noted.
tion in Ghanaian fisheries and to cre-
ate a joint Soviet-Ghanaian company
for production and processing of tuna.
Guinea 1959 Under a $35 million line of credit a Completed 1963; expanded 1968. 2.3
cold storage plant at Conakry. Technical training provided.
1962 Under a credit of $13 million, port Four seiners delivered in 1966. Soviet 8.0
machinery, 10 fishing vessels, and cold and Guinean personnel operate boats.
storage plant. Repair facilities under construction.
1966 Authorized Soviets to fish in Guinea's Soviets have fished Guinean waters but
EEZ in return for 60 three-year schol- have not provided promised shore facil-
arships for study in the USSR; con- ities and technical assistance.
struction of dock and repair facilities
at Conakry.
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Secret
USSR: Assistance to Fishing Industries
in LDCs, 1959-31 December 1985 (continued)
Guinea 1969 Renewed the 1966 protocol and ar- Soviets to provide 50 percent of their
ranged for the lease of Soviet trawlers catch to Guinea.
through June 1979.
1973 Grant for oceanographic research cen- Completed.
ter at Conakry.
1974 Protocol permanently assigned hydro- Agreement expired in 1976. Short-
graphic vessel to Conakry and provided term licensing of Soviet vessels until
service and repair facilities for it. 1981.
1981 Fishing cooperation agreement. Soviets Being implemented.
licensed to fish in Guinean waters for
annual flat fee of $0.8 million, to sell
10,000 tons of fish on Guinean market,
to train Guineans in fisheries manage-
ment, and to develop fishing industry.
1984 Grant of 150 tons of fish.
Agreement granting the Soviets fishing
rights in return for fishing boats, a
refrigerated warehouse, and an ice
plant, supply of 10,000 tons of fish
annually, training to Guineans, and
rental fees to the government. Moscow
has allocated $2.2 million for fisheries
development study.
Value
(million US $J
0.2
25.0
Guinea-Bissau 1975 Agreement for joint commercial ven- Five boats delivered 1975; fish process- 10.5
ture "Estrela do Mar," with Soviets ing facilities completed 1980.
supplying five refrigerated trawlers,
and 90 percent of the personnel. Also,
a 10-year agreement allowing five-year
renewal for fisheries research, training,
and technical assistance establishing
fishing fleet and processing plants. Re-
ciprocal rights granted Soviets for five
boats. Technical services for cash.
1977 Protocol implementing cold storage
plant at Bafata, port modernization,
fisheries infrastructural development,
transfer of four ships, and building
repair docks.
1978 Renegotiated 1975 agreement for
straight partnership with joint receipts
after operating costs split two ways.
Soviets to drop operating charges for
ships.
1984 Grant of fish.
Agreement revised. Soviet fishing re-
stricted to coastal waters.
Kenya 1964 Under a $44 million line of credit, Training and supply of vessels in 2.0
USSR agreed to construct fish cannery 1965-68.
and related facilities, training, and
supply of vessels.
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,coca
Country Year Agreements and Protocols Remarks Value
(million US $)
Liberia 1981 Soviet research vessel conducted sur- Completed.
vey of Liberian waters.
Mauritius 1970 Credit for two trawlers, marine equip- About $1 million worth of fishing gear 5.0
ment, and services of specialists. Re- delivered.
newable at three-year intervals.
1974 Accord signed in 1974 and renewed in Agreement allowed to lapse by
1976 calls for joint venture for re- Mauritius in 1980.
search and supplying local markets
with 60 tons of fish annually. Ten
trainees to study in USSR each year.
Mozambique 1976 General fishing agreement includes a
joint venture, technical assistance to
fishing industry construction of refrig-
eration and port facilities, and leasing
Soviet boats to Mozambican facilities.
1977 Protocol to 1976 credit agreement on Agreement implemented.
training crews and constructing port
facilities in return for 10 to 15 percent
of catch and use of port facilities.
1979 Five-year agreement to form joint ven- Joint venture Mosopesca formed; four 0.4
ture, Mosopesca. Soviets to provide boats delivered in 1980.
four boats.
1980 Agreement to provide repair facility at Completed in 1982.
Maputo including floating drydock,
workshop, and training center. Repair
facilities to service Soviet fishing fleet.
1983 Protocol to supply three additional Deliveries completed in 1985. 0.3
fishing boats to Mosopesca.
1984 Protocol to assist in setting up fishing
cooperatives.
Senegal 1965 Agreement to develop fisheries; con- Complex declared not feasible in 1966. 4.4
duct research; construct tuna complex; Tuna boats delivered 1969-73.
provide 10 tuna boats, fishing equip-
ment, and training.
1968 Protocol for study of deep sea fish Completed.
resources.
1971 Protocol for joint fisheries survey and Senegal permits bunkering, crew
Soviet training program. change, and light repair under the
1965 agreement, but no fishing within
territorial waters. Dakar reportedly
finds the bunkering trade profitable
enough to overlook 200-mile zone fish-
ing violations.
Seychelles 1978 Agreement for research, development Research completed; two patrol boats 0.2
of fishing industry, and training of provided as grant. In abeyance.
Seychellois.
1984 Agreement to construct two floating Seychelles reluctant to go ahead with 20.0
drydocks with total capacity of 800 the installation as part of current mod-
tons to repair fishing boats and patrol ernization effort.
craft at Victoria and Felicite Island
under credit.
15 Secret
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USSR: Assistance to Fishing Industries
in LDCs, 1959-31 December 1985 (continued)
Country
Year
Sierra Leone
1976
1977
1978
Somalia
1963
1975
1975
Sudan
1961
Tanzania
1966
1982
Indonesia
1964
Kiribati
1985
Singapore
1975
Malaysia
1974
Agreements and Protocols Remarks Value
(million US $)
Agreement provides for joint studies of Joint company formed and in opera- 7.0
fisheries resources, port construction, tion.
and a joint venture, Sierra Fishing Co.
Protocol for continued cooperation in Quay constructed, equipment deliv-
constructing fishing harbors, training ered, and marine training school estab-
personnel, establishing facilities for lished. Three fishing boats provided in
maintenance and repair, and drawing 1980.
up fisheries development plan and re-
search program. Eighty scholarships
established for study in USSR.
Ten-year extension of 1976 agreement;
annual protocols determine activities.
In protocol to 1961 line of credit, Completed 1970.
USSR agreed to provide credits for
equipment for constructing a fish can-
nery at Laas Qoray with annual capac-
ity of 6 million cans a year.
Credit for fishing industry develop- Suspended 1977.
ment ($19 million), port and processing
facilities ($9 million), training center
for 2,200 trainees, expansion of ship-
yard for fishing boats.
Grant for fishing industry development Suspended in 1977.
and refugee resettlement.
Survey of fishing potential of Red Sea Survey completed in 1964. Cannery 0.4
and Nile; fish cannery to be estab- feasibility reports prepared in 1965,
lished at Jabal al Awliya. but no subsequent activity.
Protocol under $20 million credit in- Marine equipment delivered. Cold 0.9
cludes marine equipment and construc- storage and drying plants canceled.
tion of fish drying and cold storage
plants.
Agreement to carry out fisheries re- Tanzania dissatisfied with inadequate
search in Tanzanian waters. reports that Soviets made available.
Agreement under a 1956 credit to pro- $12.5 million worth of trawlers deliv- 15.1
vide trawlers and establish a fishing ered; shipyard and oceanographic
complex. school completed.
One-year licensing agreement permits Fishing operations began in October,
17 Soviet vessels to operate in Kiribati has requested Soviets to sub-
Kiribati's EEZ until August 1986 for a mit a proposal for a detailed agreement
fee of about $1.7 million annually. involving shore facilities.
Agreement for joint company to estab- The joint venture company, Marissco,
lish Singapore's first fully integrated processes and markets 65,000 tons of
seafood processing and storage com- fish annually, mostly in Europe.
plex and to provide local market with
seafood and fishmeal.
Agreement for Soviet fisheries assis- Not implemented.
tance, port construction, and possible
joint venture.
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secret
Country
Year
Portugal
1975
Spain
1971
1975
Argentina
1974
1980
Chile
1968
1971
Colombia
1981
Guyana
1977
1978
Jamaica
1979
Mexico
1978
Nicaragua
1981
Agreements and Protocols Remarks Value
(million US $)
Agreement to provide Soviet equip-
ment for fishing vessels and training of
Portuguese personnel.
Agreement to establish joint processing Sovhispan in operation; it freezes,
company, Sovhispan, Canary Islands. packs, and markets products caught by
Soviet fleet in the South Atlantic.
Agreement to set up joint fishing com-
pany, Pesconsa. Soviet interests repre-
sented by Sovhispan.
Agreement for joint fisheries research, Preliminary oceanographic studies 5.0
training, construction of fishing port, completed.
and joint fishing company.
Protocol providing for joint exploration Joint venture under discussion.
of fishing resources south of the 46th
parallel and the establishment of a
joint venture to exploit krill.
Following surveys, Soviets agreed to Suspended.
establish fishing port and crabmeat
plant under a 1967 line of credit.
Agreement for development of fishing Suspended.
ports, training on Soviet vessels, tech-
nical school, and rental of Soviet fish-
ing vessels.
Cooperation between Colombian firm Possibility of formal joint venture.
Impescol and Soviet firm Pesconsa to
exploit Colombian fishing resources
with Soviet vessels.
Agreement on technical assistance and No activity noted.
training.
Protocol established joint company for
catching, processing, and selling shell-
fish.
Agreement to provide USSR fishing Jamaica canceled agreement in 1983
rights in Jamaican waters in exchange without implementation.
for Soviet vessels, research and train-
ing, and establishment of a joint ven-
ture.
Agreement on joint venture involving Negotiations on joint venture stalled.
Soviet technical assistance to Mexico.
Agreement for cooperation in fishing. Joint venture under negotiation, fish- 5.0
Soviets to provide training and techni- ing studies completed.
cal assistance, and to establish fishing
institute at Bluefields. Joint venture to
be formed.
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USSR: Assistance to Fishing Industries
in LDCs, 1959-31 December 1985 (continued)
Value
(million US $)
1982 Protocol providing for the construction Port development at San Juan del Sur 10.0
of a repair facility at San Juan del Sur. may have been suspended.
Soviets to provide floating drydock and
pier. They will pay Nicaragua $0.2
million yearly for use of facility by
Soviet tuna fleet.
1984 Scientific protocol calls for study in
commercialization of Pacific coast
fishing grounds.
1985 Two-year economic protocol calls for Under way.
Soviet technical assistance to fishing.
Panama 1982 Agreement to permit bunkering of So- Not yet implemented.
viet fishing fleet at the port of
Vacamonte.
Peru 1971 Agreement provides aid in construct- Commission on Soviet-Peruvian fisher- 2.5
ing fisheries complex at Paita, training ies cooperation formed in 1972. First
Peruvians at Soviet fisheries institutes, and second stage of Paita complex
and establishing a joint fisheries re- completed in 1975. Port equipment
search program. Allows trawlers and installed in 1976.
fish factory ships facilities at Peruvian
ports and access to Peruvian waters.
Agreement valid for 10 years, and
renewable for three-year periods after
1981.
1972 Protocol for port construction and
training of 30 Peruvians on Soviet
research vessel.
1983 Contracts with El Pacifico and Mer- Pacific Fishing Enterprise acting as
curio firms and Peruvian Government intermediary for Sovrybflot, and leased
to permit Soviets to catch up to 55,000 Soviet trawlers to fish territorial wa-
tons of hake, saurel, and mackerel in ters. Studies by Soviet research vessels
Peruvian waters. Peru to receive 10 to began October 1984.
12 percent of catch.
1984 Contract permitting Soviet catch of up
to 200,000 metric tons. Peru to receive
5 to 12 percent of catch.
1985 Temporary agreement signed extend-
ing 1984 contract for Soviet trawlers to
operate off Peruvian coast for 3 to 4
months in return for 15 percent of the
catch.
Egypt 1964 Agreement included Soviet ships for Three-year fish survey in south Medi- 15.0
deep sea fishing and research, techni- terranean completed 1970.
cal training, and assistance in develop-
ing fishing center on the Red Sea.
1967 Number of Egyptians training in
USSR increased from 200 to 300.
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v i iCl
Country Year Agreements and Protocols Remarks Value
(million US $)
1969 USSR agreed to train additional 100
Egyptians.
1971 Agreement to provide Egypt with In 1971, Soviets train Egyptians in 1.5
12,000 tons of fish annually, undertake Atlantic fishing. Trawling equipment
a joint fisheries survey, and assist in delivered, survey completed. USSR
developing Lake Nasser. supplying fish at a highly favorable
price.
1972 Agreement on additional equipment, Survey and training completed.
training, surveys, technical assistance,
and construction of wharf on Red Sea.
1973 Soviet ships to provide Egyptians fish- Status of joint venture unknown since
ing off African coast with fuel and abrogation of friendship treaty in
fishing tackle and to deliver frozen fish March 1976.
to Alexandria.
1975 Protocol on training and trawling
equipment for deep sea operations.
1983 Protocol on cooperation in fishing. So- The sale of fishing boats and equip-
viets to supply Egypt with 26,000 tons ment to Egypt under discussion.
of frozen fish in 1983 and to train
Egyptians.
Iran 1963 Agreement to develop Caspian Sea re- First section of hatchery and cold stor- 2.0
sources, including equipment for large age plant completed 1969. Port equip-
fish hatchery, marine survey, and rec- ment arrived periodically after 1968.
lamation work.
1966 Agreement under a $17 million trade Completed.
credit to expand port and construct
cold storage plant.
1971 Protocol for fisheries survey of Persian
Gulf.
1973 Agreement for six additional fish Construction under way.
hatcheries on the Caspian Sea.
Iraq 1959 A 1959 credit agreement allocated un-
specified aid for fisheries development.
1969 Agreement to establish a research cen- First of Soviet-built ships delivered in 25.0
ter, processing and storage facilities, to 1971, three more in 1972, and eight in
improve ports, and to train Iraqis. Al- 1973.
lowed Soviet fishing fleet to enter Iraqi
ports. Soviets also to deliver 60 fishing
vessels over a five-year period, to es-
tablish repair bases, and to aid devel-
opment of fishing industry.
1976 Protocol for joint Iraqi-Soviet fishing Soviets delivered two 841-ton ships
company, Rafidain, with capital of $51 equipped for fishing, freezing, and can-
million headquartered in Al Basrah, to ning in 1977.
begin with five vessels. Protocol provid-
ed for sea shipping and building Iraq's
tanker and fishing fleet.
19 Secret
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USSR: Assistance to Fishing Industries
in LDCs, 1959-31 December 1985 (continued)
Protocol on equipment for training
centers. Soviets to plan development of
fishing industry and give technical as-
sistance to joint company.
Agreement on developing fisheries in-
dustry, including port and cold storage
facilities and shipyard construction.
Protocol covering two repair shops,
seven fishing boats, processing facili-
ties, and technical training.
Protocol for expanding Al Hudaydah
facilities.
Grant for fishing industry development
included research, maritime equip-
ment, a training center at Al Mukalla,
and feasibility studies for canning and
cold storage facilities. Three complete-
ly equipped seiners to be furnished by
USSR.
Protocol for Soviet supply of three
additional fishing boats under 1969
grant described above.
Agreement for creation of joint compa-
ny, expansion of port facilities, and
additional fishing vessels under an ad-
dition to 1972 line of credit.
Protocol on cooperation in fishing. Two
research vessels to explore resources in
Gulf of Aden; two shore-based scientif-
ic labs to be established; five Soviet
trawlers to fish South Yemeni waters.
South Yemen to receive 2,000 tons fish
per year and two trawlers, whose catch
to be sold on Yemeni market.
Additional credit for facilities at fish-
ing port in Aden.
Fisheries development, Buhayrat al
Asad (Al Asad Lake).
Grant for 10 fishing boats, refrigera-
tion facilities, a training center, and
Soviet technicians.
Deep sea fisheries assistance to include
use of two Soviet trawlers and con-
struction of shipyard.
Value
(million US $)
Repair facility workshop and cold stor- 8.0
age plant at Al Hudaydah completed;
seven fishing boats delivered.
Seiners, engine, and nets delivered in
1970. Training center established.
Cannery design completed in 1971 and
the Soviets agreed to supply an oil and
flour unit. Surveys for cold storage
plants completed.
Three fishing boats delivered under
1972 protocol.
Fishing port 17.8 established at Hujaj 17.8
five trawlers valued at $7.8 million
delivered under a 1976 protocol-two
medium-size trawlers delivered in De-
cember 1976 and three small vessels in
March 1977. Soviets completed can-
ning plant at Al Mukalla and a fish
meal plant at Aden in August 1978.
Two wharves, a floating drydock, a
central workshop, and production unit
under construction.
40.0
Boats delivered. Cold storage plants
and center completed.
15.0
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Country Year Agreements and Protocols Remarks Value
(million US $)
1978 India asked Moscow for further assis- No agreement reached.
tance. Possibility of joint venture ex-
plored.
Maldives 1976 Agreement for assistance to local fish- No activity noted.
eries and training aboard Soviet trawl-
ers.
1968 Agreement for oceanographic re- Soviet experts studied land facilities in 2.0
search, design of a fishing port, and 1968. In 1969, three Soviet trawlers
training of fishermen. began training fisheries personnel and
conducting a two-year fishing survey.
Sri Lanka 1971 Agreement for technical training and Oceanographic research began Febru- 3.0
establishment of training center, joint ary 1972. Soviet technicians arrived in
fisheries operations, and possible fu- 1973 to assist in setting up training
ture purchase or rental of Soviet fish- center. In 1977, 20 scholarships grant-
ing vessels. ed for training Sri Lankan personnel.
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/11/18: CIA-RDP97ROO694ROO0600160001-7
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/11/18: CIA-RDP97R00694R000600160001-7
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/11/18: CIA-RDP97R00694R000600160001-7
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/11/18: CIA-RDP97R00694R000600160001-7
Figure 2
USSR: Fisheries Relations With Non-Communist LDCs, 1985
Valid agreement C~~lp4 Agreement calls for joint venture
ioi
Outstanding offer
SIA
VAR. 4
(N. YEMEN(
LI EBLI EB RIA~
CONGO
KENYA
TANZANJ
COMOROS
CHIL!E
200-nautical-mile maritime zone
BANG ESE
Secret
-PAPUA
NEWtG IEA
707773 (545038) 5-86
COSTAA
Cancelled agreement
23
Secret
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/11/18: CIA-RDP97R00694R000600160001-7
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/11/18: CIA-RDP97R00694R000600160001-7
Secret
Secret
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/11/18: CIA-RDP97R00694R000600160001-7