INSURGENCY: 1985 IN REVIW

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP97R00694R000600020001-2
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 81
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: March 22, 2011
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: April 1, 1986
• Content Type: REPORT

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Directorate of
Intelligence
Insurgency:
1985 in Review
An Intelligence Assessment
et.l et
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April 1986
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Directorate of Secret
Intelligence
Insurgency:
1985 in Review
An Intelligence Assessment
This paper was prepared by the Insurgency Branch
of the Office of Global Issues. Country assessments
were prepared by the Offices of African and Latin
American Analysis, East Asian Analysis, and Near
Eastern and South Asian Analysis.
Comments and queries are welcome and may be
addressed to the Chief, Foreign Subversion and
Instability Center, OGI,
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GI 86-10025
April 1986
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Contents
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Scope Note
vii
Summary
ix
Introduction: The New Face of Insurgency
1
Net Assessments
3
El Salvador ALA
3
Favorable Trends
3
Dangerous Problems Remain
3
Implications for the United States
4
Nicaragua-- 4LA
7
The Setting
7
Government Strategy and Rebel Response
7
The Political Battle
9
Outlook
9
PeruH ALA
11
Sendero Luminoso
11
The Tupac Amaru Revolutionary Movement (MRTA)
13
Counterinsurgency: Garcia's Strategy
13
Prospects
14
Angola? ALA
15
Government Military Gains
15
Luanda's Strategy
15
UNITA's Support
17
Balance of Forces
17
Prospects
17
Ethiopia ALA
19
Background and Objectives of the Insurgencies
19
Eritrea Province
19
Tigray Province
19
Government Objectives
21
The Military Balance
21
The EPLF
21
The TPLF
21
Government Forces
22
Outlook
22
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Mozambique?ALA
23
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Evolution of an Insurgency
23
RENAMO'S Origins and Growth
23
Tribal Base
25
Grievances
25
Reforms
25
Military Balance
25
Political Factors
26
Ideology
26
Prospects
26
AfghanistanH NESA
29
The Setting
29
Strategies and Goals
29
Political Capabilities
29
Military Capabilities and Performance
30
Outlook
31
The Philippines-0EA
33
The Communist Party: Organization for Revolution
33
Communist Fronts: A Weak Link
33
The Alarming Growth of the New People's Army
35
Government Forces in Disarray
36
Leadership Problems
36
Resource Constraints
36
Institutional Infighting
36
Civic Action
36
Outlook
37
Cambodia-0EA
39
Background
39
Vietnam's Aggressive New Strategy
39
The DK Adjusts
41
The Non-Communists Falter
42
The 1985-86 Dry Season: A New Pattern Emerging?
42
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Briefs
45
Colombia
45
Guatemala
45
Ecuador
45
Chile
46
Iraq
46
Namibia
46
South Africa
47
Sudan
47
Chad
47
Sri Lanka
48
Thailand
48
Burma
48
Laos
48
Appendixes
A.
Global Order of Battle
49
B.
Soviet and Soviet-Surrogate Support for Client Regimes, 1980-85
51
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Scope Note
Insurgency:
1985 in Review
This review summarizes the status of 22 major insurgencies as of January
1986. Full assessments of the nine most serious conflicts provide informa-
tion on the origin of the insurgency, the capabilities and performance of
each side, and the prospects of the conflict. Thirteen additional conflicts,
including two incipient insurgencies, are also briefly summarized. An
introduction discusses the major changes in the dynamics of insurgency
during the past decade, and the appendixes contain order-of-battle statis-
tics, data on Soviet and Soviet-surrogate support to insurgents and client
regimes,
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Summary
Information available
as of 24 March 1986
was used in this report.
Insurgency:
1985 in Review
Secret
On the basis of our assessment of the insurgencies covered in this review, we
draw five general conclusions concerning the past 12 months and anticipate
the year ahead:
? The Communists' performance as counterinsurgents has not been particu-
larly impressive in the past year. Only in Cambodia, where Vietnam
carries the combat burden, has there been significant counterinsurgent
progress during 1985. In Mozambique, Ethiopia, and Nicaragua, stale-
mate conditions have emerged and are likely to endure during the next
year. Because of the high political, economic, and military costs of
countering an insurgency, stalemates almost always favor the insurgents.
Furthermore, despite some counterinsurgent successes in Angola and
Afghanistan, we anticipate continued insurgent aggressiveness in both
conflicts during the next year.
? A review of 1985 fails to reveal any striking developments in Soviet
strategy or tactics in support of leftwing insurgents or embattled Marxist
regimes. Although their battlefield performance has improved in Afghani-
stan, progress against the insurgents has not been significant. Develop-
ments in Africa and Nicaragua, where the Soviets play a support and
advisory role?often through Cuban surrogates?suggest a costly long-
term commitment in support of fragile Marxist regimes.
? The governments in El Salvador, Guatemala, and the Philippines and the
South Africans in Namibia achieved noteworthy progress in their
counterinsurgency efforts during this past year. Each of these gains, in
part, reflected improvements in the government's military and political
performance. Especially in El Salvador and the Philippines, the power of
elections for enhancing popular support was dramatically illustrated. In
addition, disunity and low morale among the guerrillas in each of these
countries were strong contributors to government success. We currently
see no evidence of a significant shift during 1986 in the momentum that
now favors these four governments.
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? We anticipate that the insurgencies in the Philippines, Peru, Colombia,
Sri Lanka, and Sudan will intensify during the coming year. In addition,
we expect the incipient conditions in Chile to deteriorate in favor of the
Communists. We also expect an upturn in urban terrorism in El
Salvador, Peru, and Colombia as insurgents seek to augment their rural
strategy with an urban component.
? We also anticipate that the insurgencies in Iraq, Ecuador, South Africa,
Burma, and Laos will continue at roughly their current level of intensity
during the next 12 months. While none of these conflicts currently has
the capability to topple the regime, each constitutes a continuing drain on
government, political, and military resources.
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Insurgency:
1985 in Review
Introduction: The New Face of Insurgency
In some respects, little has changed in the last few
decades in the way unconventional wars are fought
and countered. However, our extensive and in-depth
analysis of every major insurgency since World War
II shows that there have been a number of significant
changes in the dynamics of insurgent conflict?espe-
cially during the past decade?that have altered the
face of insurgency and complicated the process of
coping with it.
We believe insurgency has become the most prevalent
form of warfare in the Third World. By our estimate,
there are at least 22 major insurgent conflicts in
various stages of development, numerous minor insur-
gencies, and several incipient situations?Chile, Ec-
uador, and Zaire?of concern. Moreover, unlike the
immediate postwar period, few of these conflicts are
anticolonial in nature. Most of today's insurgencies
are based on grievances directed at local regimes. We
have considerable evidence that Communist elements
in many unstable nations have been effective in
exploiting these grievances and are the central actors
in many of today's insurgent conflicts.
the
Soviets and their allies have developed a sophisticated
infrastructure that provides considerable training, lo-
gistic, political, economic, and military support to
leftwing revolutionary groups. These efforts, coupled
with technological advances in weaponry, make to-
day's leftist guerrilla better armed, better trained, and
better equipped than ever before. Moreover, we have
evidence that the Cubans and Nicaraguans have
recently stepped up their efforts to support numerous
insurgent organizations in Central and South
America.
Insurgent causes have also benefited from the sub-
stantial increase in coverage afforded by the news
media. The kidnaping of Salvadoran President Duar-
te's daughter by Farabundo Marti National Libera-
tion Front guerrillas, the reactions of the Sandinista
1
government in Managua to the latest Nicaraguan
Democratic Force initiative, the threat posed by the
Communist Party of the Philippines/New People's
Army in the Philippines, the latest maneuverings of
Jonas Savimbi on behalf of National Union for the
Total Independence of Angola in Angola, and the
plight of Nelson Mandela and his African National
Congress movement in South Africa have all made
regular appearances on television's nightly news and
the front pages of the major world press. This in-
creased coverage has enhanced the international im-
age and?in some respects?the legitimacy of various
groups and, according to scattered evidence, boosted
the morale of the guerrillas. There is, however, n0
available evidence of a direct relationship between
increased media attention and foreign aid.
The number of actors involved in insurgent conflicts
has increased at a significant rate. Not only has the
number of insurgent organizations multiplied substan-
tially?several countries have four or more major
insurgent groups?but new actors have emerged.
links vigilantes and death squads like
those in El Salvador, Guatemala, Argentina, and the
Philippines with what might be termed extralegal
counterinsurgency. Some multinational corpora-
tions?Del Monte Corporation in the Philippines, for
example?threatened by insurgent activity now un-
dertake their own civic action and security initiatives.
In addition, the overlap between narcotics traffick-
ers?often aided by Cubans and Nicaraguans?and
insurgents has increased considerably,
Finally, the last decade has seen the emergence of the
anti-Marxist insurgency. In Afghanistan, Cambodia,
Angola, Mozambique, Ethiopia, and Nicaragua, we
now find Communist regimes that came to power
through various forms of revolutionary warfare facing
their own insurgent threat. Each of these regimeS
relies heavily on Soviet or Soviet-surrogate support.
Consequently, the Soviets have been forced to consid-
er the demands and support requirements of counter-
insurgency, while the United States?despite ongoing
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counterinsurgency concerns in El Salvador and the
Philippines?has begun to consider the essential re-
quirements of aiding insurgents.
These changes in the dynamics of revolutionary war-
fare have rendered the phenomenon a more complex
issue for the policymaker, military officer, and intelli-
gence analyst. For example, to what degree is a
specific insurgency the result of indigenous factors as
opposed to foreign intervention? What types of US
aid and assistance are appropriate for a given counter-
insurgent effort? Which incipient insurgent groups
should be taken seriously? Can we identify those
situations that will require a long-term commitment?
What are the appropriate forms and means for sup-
porting insurgents now engaged in combating Marxist
regimes?
To assist in answering these questions, we have re-
cently developed a comprehensive analytic framework
that provides an assessment of a specific conflict. This
framework was used by each of the analysts who
contributed to this review. The framework focuses on
the setting and origin of the conflict, each side's
strategy for victory, and the protagonists' political and
military capabilities and performance in light of their
strategy.
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Net Assessments
El Salvador
In our judgment, he Salvadoran armed forces?with
critical financial, materiel, logistic, and advisory sup-
port from the United States?broke the military
stalemate with the rebel alliance in 1984 and contin-
ued in 1985 to force tactical changes on the insurgents
that largely reinforced the government's superiority
and disheartened leftist ranks. Nevertheless, we be-
lieve that a decisive victory over the guerrillas within
the next two years is unlikely. The erosion of rebel
manpower will continue to be a relatively gradual and
costly process for the government, and insurgent
leaders will continue to shift tactics in an effort to
offset the widening quantitative and qualitative ad-
vantages of the Salvadoran armed forces. We believe
the government of President Duarte will remain vul-
nerable to dramatic acts of urban terrorism and
ongoing economic sabotage that could slow or under-
mine El Salvador's democratization process.
Favorable Trends
In our judgment, mid-1984 was a major turning point
in the Salvadoran conflict. The inauguration of the
country's first authentic popularly elected civilian
president and the armed forces' decision to sustain
indefinitely a high level of counterinsurgent opera-
tions gave the government a significant political and
military advantage. Since then, the military has main-
tained its allegiance to the reformist civilian govern-
ment, steadily strengthened its administrative and
operational performance, and improved both its hu-
man rights record and its image with the public at
large.
Meanwhile, the guerrillas have lost not only the
military initiative but local support for their cause has
dwindled from their own private 1980 estimates of 15
percent of the population to a level we believe is less
than 5 percent. The guerrillas' increasing reliance,
moreover, on tactics such as murder, robbery, kidnap-
ing, economic sabotage, and indiscriminate use of
3
mines, as well as their public rejection of constitution-
al democracy, have reduced considerably their legiti-
macy overseas. This has been reflected in documented
declines in materiel, funding, and diplomatic support
from foreign governments and groups and harsher
treatment by the international media.
Dangerous Problems Remain
Although we believe that time no longer favors the
Marxist cause in El Salvador, the insurgent move-
ment, in our judgment, will remain a resilient and
formidable enemy, at least through the next two
years. Despite improved government and military
performance, the Duarte administration faces a num-
ber of problems that will continue to hamper its
ability to resolve decisively the insurgent conflict. In
particular, the government's poorly implemented
"National Plan," designed to complement military
efforts to improve rural security with ambitious socio-
economic and administrative development projects at
the local level, remains vulnerable to guerrilla sabo-
tage and harassment. The two-year-old civil defense
program?key to establishing permanent government
control in the countryside?in our opinion, has yet to
gain momentum. This is caused in part by the lack of
material and financial resources and commitment of
local Army commanders to train, outfit, and support
local volunteer units. In those few villages where a
viable civilian defense force has been established,
frequent insurgent attacks and intimidation have tak-
en their toll on the morale of the local populace. The
government will probably continue to face the dilem-
ma of not being able to establish adequate rural
security without active public cooperation or to expect
such cooperation without first maintaining adequate
security for a period of time.
The government also must contend with the rebel
shift in emphasis to an urban strategy that includes
escalating terrorism in the capital and fomenting
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Figure 1
El Salvador: Guerrilla Operating Areas
Santa
Ana
Chalatenango
,
4") 'C sca t
Ahuachapiln / Cabanas
Ahuachapan San \
Salvador '\
Sonsonate r1.1.a Libertadsatva, R. San Vicente
* SAN
Acajutla.
( .5T PL?r1:3(:;{:
), ? La 'Paz
I I
Guerrilla front boundary
Traditional guerrilla base area
Area of relatively free guerrilla
movement
Derartment boundary
50 Kilometers
50 Miles
?
MoraZ6n L.
I San Miguel
Uni6n
North Pacific Ocean
La Unik
\
/ ' Golfo de
Fonseca
Boundary representation
not necessarily authoritative.
707294 3-86
student and labor union unrest. Recent leftist activi-
ties indicate that the insurgents hope to cripple the
economy with widespread labor strikes and force the
government to resort to repressive crackdowns that
would weaken support for the Duarte administration
at home and abroad. Although we do not believe such
activities will be sufficient to bring the government
down, they are likely to cause some important finan-
cial, materiel, and manpower resources to be diverted
from the counterinsurgency effort in the countryside.
Over the next two years, therefore, we believe that
President Duarte will be challenged severely as he
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attempts to consolidate fragile democratic institutions
while the extreme left takes advantage of the open
political environment to try to destabilize the system.
Implications for the United States
Our assessment that the rebels' current activities will
not win them major new momentum is based on the
assumption that US military and economic support is
sustained. We see no near-term possibility that the
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Duarte administration will be able to lessen signifi-
cantly its dependence on US aid and diplomatic
backing. We expect that insurgent strategists increas-
ingly will focus on undermining Washington's rela-
tionship with San Salvador.
various rebel factions plan to
continue targeting US officials for assassination as a
means of convincing Washington that its personnel
are not safe in El Salvador. In our judgment, kidnap-
ings of US Embassy dependents also would be in
keeping with insurgent tactics to intimidate Washing-
ton and achieve greater leverage over the Duarte
administration.
The guerrillas probably hope that such activities will
stir renewed public and Congressional debate over
Washington's role in the Salvadoran conflict and
perhaps force a reduction in US materiel and finan-
cial aid. We also believe the rebels hope that by
weakening US public support for El Salvador they
can increase international pressure for a negotiated
power-sharing arrangement with San Salvador. Al-
though hardline insurgent leaders still aspire to mili-
tary victory,
they appear willing to support?up to a point?efforts
by rebel moderates to establish a dialogue with the
Duarte government as a tactical maneuver until they
can regain political and military momentum.
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Nicaragua
The fighting in N'caragua, which exhibited peaks and
lulls in intensity during 1985, appeared stalemated at
the end of the year, with little indication that either
side can achieve a decisive edge in the near term. The
course of the war has highlighted both the improved
military capability of the Sandinista forces and the
resiliency of the main insurgent group, the Nicara-
guan Democratic Force (FDN). Events also have
underscored the rebels' vulnerability to supply prob-
lems and the vagaries of external supporters. The
drain on Managua's economic and manpower re-
sources has required tighter domestic controls while
further diminishing the regime's popular support and
driving new recruits to the FDN.
The Setting
Organized in 1981 by supporters of former President
Somoza, the rebel forces have grown to include
businessmen, civic oppositionists, and disaffected San-
dinistas. The insurgents claim to be fighting for the
original goals of the revolution?pluralism, a mixed
economy, and nonalignment. Several political parties,
businessmen's organizations, and independent labor
unions comprise the small domestic opposition. In
addition, the traditionally passive population of late
has expressed disgruntlement over the economic situa-
tion, the draft, and state controls in a few spontaneous
demonstrations, according to a variety of US Embas-
sy and press reports.
Of the groups comprising the insurgency, the FDN is
the largest?with some 17,000 troops?and best
equipped. Staging out of Honduran bases, it operates
widely in Nicaragua's northwest, central highlands,
and south-central region. In the south, the forces of
former Sandinista Eden Pastora have dwindled to an
estimated 600 because of supply problems, poor lead-
ership, and Sandinista military pressure.
The Indian insurgents operating
on the Atlantic coast, who number about 1,200, also
have been plagued by logistic shortfalls and political
infighting. Several factions recently formed an um-
brella organization, KISAN, and are coordinating
actions with the FDN.
7
Government Strategy and Rebel Response
At the outset of 1985, Sandinista Defense Minister
Humberto Ortega publicly declared it the year the
insurgents would be defeated. To upgrade military
capabilities, Managua increased the draft, organized
elite counterinsurgency battalions?now numbering
some 12 to 14?and acquired advanced Soviet equip-
ment, such as the MI-25 helicopter gunship. In
addition, according to US Embassy and press report-
ing, the regime relocated much of the population in
the northern border area to deny the FDN safehaven
and create a free fire zone. From February through
May, the government pressured the insurgents in the
north with artillery and multibattalion sweeps?inter-
dicting infiltration routes, disrupting insurgent con-
centrations across the border in Honduras, and forc-
ing the rebels to expend scarce ammunition.
For their part, the anti-Sandinistas concentrated on
small-unit tactics and ambushes, maintaining their
integrity as a fighting force and incorporating the
swelling number of recruits that increased FDN ranks
from 14,000 to 17,000 during 1985.
delays in
deliveries by international arms dealers and lack of
adequate air resupply capabilities strained the FDN's
resources, and more than half of its combatants
sought refuge in Honduras during the Sandinista dry-
season offensive. Moreover, Nicaraguan cross-border
shelling induced Tegucigalpa to order the relocation
of insurgent resupply points out of the range of
Sandinista artillery and to place restrictions on rebel
activities within Honduran territory.
By late spring, the rebels had redressed some of their
supply difficulties, and an increasing number of troops
were able to bypass Sandinista blocking positions
along the border and penetrate deeper into Nicara-
gua. The leasing and acquisition of new aircraft
improved resupply capabilities,
and the resumption ot US
funding boosted morale. Moreover, the regime was
forced to spread out its troops to counter expanded
insurgent actions in central Zelaya, Boaco, and Chon-
tales Departments. The FDN has sporadically chal-
lenged the regime with aggressive rebel attacks in
Esteli and Chontales Departments in midsummer and
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Figure 2
Nicaragua: Insurgent Operating Areas, 1985
H o u r as,
,/'
TEGUCIGALPA
El
Salvador
7??
?c
Go/lo de
Fonseca
Puerto',
Lempira
-4
KilS\
Jinotega /
/ '7?
Madri
/
\ 5 Esteli-f,
1... Estali c , -'-V-Nc ZS..... Zelar Caribbean
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Chinandega 1 Nr- C
Matagal
Puerto Cabezas
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MANAGUA* . /
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?nagual,LMasaya .
j
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Carazo! fin
North Pacific .)-/-
Ocean
Lago de
Managua
Rivas
Nicaraguan Democratic Force
(ED N)
KISAN
Sandino Revolutionary Front
(FRS)
Misurasata
--- Department boundary
75 Kilometers
75 Miles
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Nicarag
Lago de
ua
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Mi ur
Blue elds