SOVIET ARMS TRANSFERS TO VIETNAM

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• Collection: General CIA Records
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• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 26
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: March 22, 2011
• Sequence Number: 2
• Publication Date: March 1, 1986
• Content Type: REPORT

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Directorate of-
Intelligence
to Vietnam
Soviet Arms Transfers
--seerer-
GI 86-10023
March 1986
Copy 282
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Directorate of Secret
ICI Intelligence
Soviet Arms Transfers
to Vietnam
This paper was prepared by ~ Office of
Global Issues. Comments and queries are welcome
and may be directed to the Chief, International
Security Issues Division, OGI, on
Secret
(:186-10023
March 1986
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Soviet Arms Transfers
to Vietnam F-I
Key Judgments The Soviet Union supplies virtually all of Vietnam's military needs at no
Information available apparent financial cost to Hanoi. We estimate the value of Soviet military
as o/ 10 January 1986 deliveries since 1980 at $3.2 billion, making Vietnam Moscow's sixth-
was used in this report.
leading arms client in the Third World and, after Cuba, the second-largest
recipient of grant aid. 25X1
Soviet military aid has made Vietnam the dominant regional military
power in Southeast Asia and is probably one of the most important,
enduring factors affecting political and military developments in the
region. Soviet assistance has, for example, enabled Vietnam to pursue its
war in Cambodia while maintaining strong forces along the Chinese
border; to assert its claims to disputed offshore islands and oil exploration
sites; and to gradually standardize and modernize its ground, air, and naval
forces. F__-] 25X1
Moscow receives several significant benefits from its aid to Vietnam:
? Vietnam has granted the USSR large-scale use of naval and air facilities
at Cam Ranh Bay. Soviet forces based there give Moscow a continuous
military presence in the region, which enhances Soviet ability to surveil
US forces in the area in peacetime and to threaten those forces and
Pacific-Mideast sea lanes in war.
? Strengthened Vietnamese forces are a military counterweight to China.
Vietnam's Army creates a substantial barrier inhibiting China from
projecting its military influence in Southeast Asia. 25X1
Despite the importance of Soviet aid to both Vietnam and to the USSR,
Moscow limits the assistance. Vietnam receives far less assistance than
other Soviet clients such as South Yemen, Angola, and Ethiopia in relation
to the size of its armed forces, and it receives less sophisticated weaponry
than most of Moscow's major recipients. We believe Moscow sees little
reason to be more generous because Vietnam has no alternative suppliers,
cannot pay cash, is able to pursue its policies with the current aid, and is re-
luctant to make concessions to Moscow such as granting outright control of
Cam Ranh that might bring more aid. The Soviets also may want to avoid
giving China and the ASEAN states additional reasons for turning to the
United States for military assistance. F__1 25X1
iii Secret
GI 86-10023
March 1986
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Barring another large-scale Chinese attack on Vietnam, we believe the
amount of Soviet military aid to Hanoi will remain about the same through
the rest of the decade. Vietnam will receive sufficient equipment to
maintain its forces at current strengths and enough consumables and
replacement items to prosecute the war in Cambodia at the current level of
intensity. Some new weapons, such as MIG-23 fighters, T-62 or T-72
tanks, and larger frigates, probably will be added to keep Vietnam's forces
technologically equal to China's. Vietnam may be forced to grant the
USSR longer term and more extensive rights at Cam Ranh Bay in return.
China and the ASEAN states will continue to perceive Vietnam's large,
Soviet-supplied forces as a serious threat and are likely to respond in
several ways:
? There will be increasing cooperation among the ASEAN states and
between them and China in supporting the Cambodian resistance
militarily and politically. The United States is likely to be encouraged by
the ASEAN states to play a larger role diplomatically and possibly to
provide arms to the resistance.
? ASEAN states will urge the United States to provide them with more so-
phisticated weapons on better credit terms to counter stronger Vietnam-
ese forces. West European firms will compete with the United States to
modernize ASEAN inventories.
? The ASEAN states will expect the United States to maintain a military
presence in the region, including basing and joint exercises, to help deter
Vietnamese attacks and provide the military edge to defeat combined
Vietnamese-Soviet forces in a larger conflict.
? China will maintain military pressure on its border with Vietnam,
including keeping large forces in the region, as well as shelling Vietnam-
ese forces and making limited cross-border attacks.
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Key Judgments
iii
Introduction
Background and Overview
The Last Five Years: A Stable Aid Program
I
Military Value of Soviet Arms Aid to Vietnam
2
Sustaining an Enlarged Army
2
Expanding and Modernizing Air Defenses
4
Slow Improvement in Naval Forces
5
Soviet Advisory and Training Program
6
Training in the USSR
6
The Balance Sheet for Moscow
7
Cam Ranh Bay
7
A Counterweight to China
9
Modest Cost to Moscow: Vietnam's Second-Class Status
9
Regional Responses to Soviet Aid
I I
Outlook: A Steady Course Ahead
12
Alternative Prospects
13
Implications for the United States
14
A. Vietnamese Arms Transfers and Military Training
15
B. Soviet Military Assistance to Laos and Cambodia
17
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Gull
of
Thailand
KampOng
Salim
Dao Phu
Ouoc
050 100 Kilometers
0 _ r
50 100 Nautical Miles
yt
ang
China
South
Chula
Sea
Boundary representation is not
necessarily authoritative Names
in Vietnam are shown without
diacritical marks.
Hainan
Dao
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Soviet Arms Transfers
to Vietnam F-I
The USSR has been Vietnam's chief arms supplier
since at least the early 1960s and in recent years has
provided virtually all of its new military equipment at
no apparent financial cost to Hanoi. This assessment
evaluates recent trends in the Soviet-Vietnamese arms
transfer relationship, the impact of Soviet arms deliv-
eries on Vietnam's military capabilities, the benefits
Moscow receives from its substantial aid program,
and the response of China and other Southeast Asian
states to it. The likely future course of the Soviet aid
program and its implications for US interests in the
region also are addressed. F--]
Soviet military assistance to Vietnam began to in-
crease in 1978 after several years of decline following
the withdrawal of US forces from South Vietnam
(figures 1 and 2). Moscow's military aid jumped from
an estimated low of $11 million in 1977 to $90 million
in 1978 as Hanoi became involved in new conflicts in
the region. Large-scale Soviet military transfers re-
sumed in 1979 when Hanoi's invasion of Cambodia
was followed by a Chinese attack on Vietnam. F_
Soviet military aid reached an alltime high of almost
$1.8 billion in 1979. More than 150,000 tons of
military equipment were delivered: improved M IG-21
fighters, T-54/55 tanks, SA-3 surface-to-air missiles,
and other items to replace wornout weaponry. Some
deliveries of crucially needed equipment were made in
a two-month-long airlift much like the previous Soviet
effort in Ethiopia in 1977 (table I). We estimate that
more than 2,500 Soviet advisers also arrived to help
with the integration of new equipment and the reorga-
nization of Vietnam's forces. Aid remained high at an
estimated $1.4 billion in 1980, with delivery of 90,000
tons of military equipment, but dropped to $400
million, or about 50,000 tons, the next year, probably
because of integration difficulties and a decline in the
immediate Chinese threat.
The Last Five Years: A Stable Aid Program
Deliveries of military goods in the last five years have
stabilized at an annual average of more than $600
million, ranking Vietnam sixth among Moscow's arms
clients in the Third World (table 2). Vietnam's steady
acquisition of new military equipment, in our view,
has been driven by its efforts to modernize and to
some extent reorganize its forces. Beijing's invasion
brought home the magnitude of the Chinese threat.
The invasion prompted Vietnam to substantially ex-
pand its forces in the three northern military regions
and to improve its capabilities to defend territorial
waters and disputed island holdings. At the same
time, Hanoi has sought to sustain its forces in Cambo-
dia. Given these major strategic demands, Hanoi is
dependent on external military aid. Vietnam can
produce only small numbers of light arms, ammuni-
tion, and simple boats, and we believe that even this
limited production capability is dependent on Soviet
machinery, spares, and technical advice.
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Figure 1
Estimated Value of Military
Deliveries to Indochina, 1977-85
Billion US S
2.0
The exact terms of Soviet military assistance are
unknown, but, because Vietnam has little of economic
value to offer Moscow, we believe the aid is highly
concessionary:
? We believe Hanoi pays no hard currency for its
arms. Soviet-Vietnamese economic trade is on a soft
currency basis. Moreover, Hanoi could not pay even
if Moscow demanded hard currency. Vietnam has
meager foreign exchange reserves and has defaulted
on its hard currency debt of $1.6 billion to Western
states and international organizations.
? The Soviets probably provide most of the military
equipment as a grant in exchange for basing privi-
leges, as well as for across-the-board Vietnamese
support of Moscow's policies.
? Moscow may sell some equipment under long-term
loans at concessionary terms, but most of these are
probably forgiven.
Figure 2
Estimated Soviet Military Tonnage
Delivered to Indochina, 1977-85
Soviet military deliveries have helped Vietnam
achieve its two major military goals-maintaining a
strong deterrent to a second Chinese invasion and
improving its ability to fight in Cambodia. In recent
years, Hanoi has provided new equipment to its forces
defending the Chinese border to maintain their local
superiority over Chinese forces, and has begun to
bolster its forces in Cambodia.
Sustaining an Enlarged Army
Following the Chinese invasion, Hanoi increased its
northern armed forces to 600,000 to 800,000 men. Its
first priority was to provide these units with more
T-54/55 and PT-76 tanks, a variety of armored
personnel carriers, towed as well as self-propelled
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Table 1
Major Equipment Delivered to Vietnam, 1977-85
Combat aircraft
2
2
191
83
9
12
50
SI
17
Transport aircraft
I
I
18
11
31
17
0
4
0
Helicopters
0
2
33
36
31
29
2
0
2
Tanks
0
0
200
53
6
25
153
100
38
Other armored vehicles
0
0
146
62
14
3
0
69
0
Self-propelled artillery
0
0
202
0
0
0
0
0
0
Towed artillery
0
0
314
45
0
58
18
12
vn
Surface-to-air missiles
0
0
262
100
0
120
135
tin
12
Major surface vessels
0
2
0
0
0
0
0
3
0
Minor surface vessels
0
5
10
21
5
3
8
2
5
11 Major surface vessels include frigates; minor include missile craft,
patrol craft, minesweepers.
artillery, and other equipment (figure 3). Since the
end of the buildup in 1982, the Army has concentrat-
ed on replacing wornout equipment in all of its units,
usually with new items of already available weapons,
and on supplying ammunition and other day-to-day
needs for units in Cambodia. The range of equipment
imported includes all of Hanoi's major weapon sys-
tems, such as tanks, APCs, and artillery, as well as
engineering equipment, small arms, ammunition,
trucks, and modern medicines. In 1983 and 1984
armored vehicles dominated Soviet deliveries to the
ground forces. In 1985 engineering equipment ac-
counted for the bulk of deliveries; most of the rest
consisted of tanks, artillery, and rocket launchers
(figures 4 and 5).
is old and poorly maintained.
The Vietnamese Army needs a steady stream of
replacement equipment because much of its inventory
poor maintenance probably has caused
equipment to age prematurely. Small arms captured
by Thai forces in 1985, for example, were rusted, and
many had broken stocks. Neglect made most US
equipment unusable within a few years after its
capture, according to reports from visitors to Vietnam
Spare part stocks for US trucks were
running out by 1981 and we
believe other types of equipment have fared little
better. Vietnam is gradually replacing the large num-
bers of US M 113 APCs, 105-mm artillery, and other
arms still in use in Cambodia. 25X1
The focus on force maintenance has allowed for some
standardization and modernization. The Army's mix
of weapons is narrowing; only a few types of arms are
being received to replace a variety of Soviet and
remaining US and Chinese weaponry. We believe
logistic problems have been simplified as a result, and
maintenance and training probably are becoming
easier because the Army is familiar with the types of
arms it receives. Recent Soviet deliveries have allowed
some modernization; improved versions of standard
weapons, such as T-55s and heavy artillery, are
replacing older models.
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Table 2
Moscow's Major Arms Clients
in the Third World, 1981-85 a
Recipient Value of Deliveries Share of Total
(million US $) (percent)
Total 48,400 100
Syria
Iraq
Libya
India
Cuba
Vietnam
Algeria
Angola
Afghanistan
Ethiopia
Others
7,350 15
6,750 14
4,240 9
3,950 8
3,300 7
3,150 7
2,900 6
2,550 5
2,100 4
1,950 4
10,160 21
Figure 3
Estimated Soviet Armored
Vehicle Deliveries to Vietnam, 1977-85
Replacement of wornout arms, however, does not fill
several gaps in Hanoi's inventory. For example, no
additional self-propelled artillery has arrived since
1980, and the number of armored personnel carriers
delivered is insufficient to allow development of bal-
anced mechanized forces. In addition, the Army has
not received enough trucks to maintain its mobility
and logistic support system.
Expanding and Modernizing Air Defenses
Soviet deliveries during and immediately after the
Chinese invasion allowed Vietnam to expand and
modernize its Air Force and air defenses (figure 6). In
1979 and 1980 a large number of late-model MIG-21
fighters replaced wornout MIG-17s and -21s, as well
as all of the remaining US and Chinese fighters.
Hanoi also bolstered its SA-2 and SA-3 SAM units in
the north with several hundred missiles and launchers.
In addition to strengthening its air defenses against
China, between 1980 and 1982 Vietnam created
fighter-bomber and attack helicopter units and in-
creased its transport fleet with the acquisition of 40
SU-22 fighter-bombers, at least 25 MI-24/25 attack
helicopters, and 35 AN-26s (figure 7).
Unlike the Army, the Air Force has continued to
acquire additional capabilities in the last three years.
More than 100 MIG-21s have highlighted recent
deliveries-probably to replace older Soviet aircraft.
SA-2s and SA-3s continue to arrive, and in 1985
Hanoi received its first two MI-17 helicopters, which
we believe eventually will replace its older MI-8s.
We believe replacement aircraft are in constant de-
mand because of natural attrition, the short service
life of older Soviet aircraft, and Hanoi's limited
maintenance capability. The MIG-21, for example,
can fly only about 2,000 hours-half as long as
comparable Western fighters
In addition, the aircraft's engine has to be
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Figure 4
T-54/55 and PT-76 Tanks as a Percent of
Estimated Operational Tank Inventory
Other
Total: 700
Total :
1,000
total:
1,000
T-54/55: 200
T-54/55:
400
T-54/55:
550
PT-76: 100
PT-76: 200
PT-76
2S0
Other: 400
Other:400
Other: 200
Despite the problems, the addition of new MIGs, in
our view, has essentially standardized and helped
modernize the Air Force (figure 8). Standardization
probably is easing maintenance and logistic burdens,
although we believe Hanoi remains dependent on
Moscow for spare parts and major overhauls. New
equipment acquisitions have also enabled the Air
Force to improve its counterinsurgency capabilities in
Cambodia. MI-25 helicopters and AN-26 aircraft
have been used in attacks on resistance groups in
Cambodia]
Slow Improvement in Naval Forces
The Vietnamese Navy is gradually improving its
capabilities, especially antisubmarine warfare (ASW),
to defend Vietnam's offshore islands and coastal
waters. Older vessels are being replaced and new
types of weapons capable of performing new missions
added. Naval modernization began before the Chi-
nese invasion Hanoi's first two Petya frigates ar-
rived in 1978 and probably was driven initially by
Hanoi's desire to assert claims to disputed islands and
territorial waters following the end of the Vietnam
war in 1975. We believe the Chinese attack acceler-
ated the pace of the Navy's development; most of
Hanoi's new patrol craft arrived in 1979 and 1980
(figure 9).
To date, naval acquisitions have included about 60
small vessels, including eight Osa patrol craft armed
with SSN-2 missiles, Turya hydrofoils, minesweepers,
and landing craft. Hanoi also acquired a squadron of
KA-25 ASW helicopters and four "Mail" amphibious
reconnaissance/ASW aircraft in 1982. Several patrol
craft and three additional Petyas arrived in 1984.
Although technology of the new equipment is of 1960s
vintage, it significantly improves the fleet's capabili-
ties. The new ships replace a large number of old
Soviet, Chinese, and US ships, including Hanoi's only
other frigates. The acquisitions primarily give Hanoi a
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better ASW capability and an expanded missile at-
tack capability. In spite of these improvements, the
Vietnamese Navy remains greatly inferior to China's
naval forces and essentially unable to challenge Bei-
jing's submarines. We believe that Soviet training and
maintenance assistance are crucial to the Navy (table
3).
Soviet Advisory and Training Program
Moscow's military advisory group of up to 2,500
personnel is its largest advisory presence in the Third
World outside of Cuba, Syria, and Afghanistan. It is
involved in a wide range of activities, touching on
every aspect of the armed forces except personnel
assignment and party activities.
Soviets are attached to Vietnamese units down to at
least the division level and, in some cases, in the
Army, down to the regimental level. Soviet advisers
also teach at military academies and may serve on
individual ships . They also
provide technical advice on maintenance and use of
The Soviet advisory presence in Vietnam, although
large in absolute terms, is small compared to the
presence in other Soviet Third World clients when the
size of Vietnam's armed forces is considered. In
Vietnam the 2,500-man Soviet advisory group serves
an armed force of more than a million men. In
contrast, South Yemen has 1,000 advisers for 30,000
troops; Angola, 1,200 for 50,000; and Ethiopia, 1,700
for 200,000-and these numbers do not include the
large Cuban and East European presence in these
nations (table 4).
The lower density of the Soviet advisory presence
probably reflects a combination of Vietnam's greater
military capabilities and less willingness on the part of
Hanoi to become dependent on Soviet advisers. We
believe that the Vietnamese Army and Air Force need
less help in tactical training because of their combat
experience and familiarity with the equipment they
receive. In our view, the Navy is less skilled and
probably requires a higher concentration of Soviets.
Vietnamese resentment of Soviet advisers also limits
their role, although the amount of friction is minor:
Vietnamese commanders fre-
on it.
In
our view, Vietnamese officials' pride in their own
military history contributes to their resentment of
the Soviet advisers.
Haiphong
dockworkers' dislike for Soviet advisers probably
helped lead to their removal.
and party affairs.
also limit Soviet influence by excluding advisers
from two areas that we believe are important to
control in Vietnam's Communist system-personnel
the Vietnamese
Training in the USSR. We estimate that more than a
thousand Vietnamese receive training in the USSR
each year, although we lack information to determine
the exact numbers involved. Military education in the
Soviet Union probably focuses on special courses and
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Figure 6
Soviet Combat Aircraft Deliveries to
Vietnam, 1977-85
SU-17/22
MIG-21
more advanced training, supplementing the extensive
training Soviet advisers provide in Indochina.
the best students from the Air
Force Command and Technical School at Nha Trang
undergo additional years of training in the USSR, for
example. This program alone reportedly includes a
few hundred students at any one time. In addition,
more technical
Third Wo
courses, such as aircraft and naval training, are
taught in the Soviet Union. We believe that most
training for new equipment is also initiated in the
USSR, as is the case for most
The Soviet arms aid program has provided several
significant political and military benefits for Moscow.
Most important are the basing rights and the military
pressure on China. Moreover, we believe that Moscow
perceives the costs of its military aid to Hanoi to be
reasonable, partly because it is less generous than aid
to other Soviet Third World arms clients that provide
Cam Ranh Bay
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Vietnam has granted the USSR use of naval and air
facilities in return for aid. Moscow began continuous
use of Cam Ranh Bay in 1980 and has steadily
expanded the facilities into its largest operational base
in the Third World, dwarfing its base at Dehalak'
Island off Ethiopia. improve-25X1
ments since 1980 include several docks, a petroleum 25X1
storage area, and satellite communications facilities. 25X1
Six to eight TU-95/142 reconnaissance/ASW air-
craft and 16 TU-16 naval aircraft-including 10
attack versions-are stationed at the base. A squad-
ron of MIG-23 fighters arrived in 1984 to provide air
defense. The USSR also maintains two to five subma-
rines, six to 14 surface combatants, and eight to 20
auxiliaries at the base (table 5). 25X1
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Figure 8
Vietnam: Estimated Composition of
Front-Line Fighter, Fighter/Bomber Forces
150
The use of Cam Ranh Bay provides several advan- loo
tages for the Soviets:
? In peacetime, it expands the USSR's ability to
surveil US forces in the region.
? In wartime, Soviet naval forces at Cam Ranh could
threaten sea lines of communication. Cam Ranh
might divert US forces from missions against the
home waters and bases of the Soviet fleet, at least
initially.
? Cam Ranh provides Moscow with a continuous
presence in the region and may help deter another
major Chinese attack on Vietnam.
? It serves as a base from which Soviet naval rein-
forcement of the Indian Ocean squadron can be
supported.
We do not know the terms of the agreement between
Moscow and Hanoi concerning use of Cam Ranh Bay.
Moscow has used aid to try to obtain long-term base
rights from other clients. For example,
the Soviets offered Aden naval
craft in return for a base in 1983. The level of Soviet
investment in Cam Ranh also suggests that Moscow
may have achieved long-term basing rights-we
doubt that the Soviets would want to be open to
Vietnamese pressure in annual negotiations on access.
Whatever the exact terms, we believe that each
increase in rights at Cam Ranh probably is negotiated
and tied to further aid.
Hanoi has not granted Moscow complete control of
Cam Ranh. To assert its sovereignty and maintain
leverage over the Soviets, Vietnam has kept naval
infantry and a small helicopter training unit at the
base and occupies one pier. Also, many Soviet im-
provements to date are semipermanent, such as use of
floating piers. Nevertheless, recent developments sug-
gest that Soviet use of the base continues to expand.
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the Soviets are
Cam Ranh.
continuing to refurbish and construct facilities at
A Counterweight to China
We believe that strengthening Vietnamese forces
benefits the USSR by posing a military and political
challenge to Beijing. Vietnam is able to maintain its
grip on Indochina and keep China from gaining
dominance in Southeast Asia because of Soviet aid.
Hanoi is also able to maintain its presence on islands
in the South China Sea that Beijing might otherwise
occupy. Moreover, we believe Moscow values the
establishment of militarily strong states, such as India
and Vietnam, on China's southern flank, even though
they pose no offensive threat to China.
Modest Cost to Moscow:
Vietnam's Second-Class Status
Soviet military aid to Vietnam is less generous given
the size of Hanoi's forces than Moscow's aid to
many other Third World arms clients. Moreover,
Moscow has not provided Hanoi with arms as modern
as those delivered to other LDCs in recent years.
I lanoi's best weapons are slightly improved versions
of weapons first produced in the I 950s and I 960s,
while other customers such as India, Iraq, Syria, and
Libya have received equipment almost as modern as
the Soviets' own. Other nations that are as poor and
dependent on Soviet largess as Vietnam- -Ethiopia
and Angola, for example have received MIG-23s,
while Hanoi has only the less capable MIG-2I. Cubi25X1
which, like Hanoi, is dependent on and ideologically
linked to Moscow, has MIG-23s: SA-6, -8, and -9
SAMs: and submarines. Vietnam has only SA-2s
and -3s (tables 6 and 7).
We believe Moscow limits its aid to Vietnam for
several reasons:
25X1
25X1
? The current level of aid is sufficient for achieving
Moscow's purposes. Hanoi is able to maintain its
regional position with the current level and quality
of Soviet aid, and this aid has provided the USSR
with major benefits. Moscow provides more modern
and expensive weapons to clients whose regional
position is less secure, such as Cuba, or to customers
that can pay or turn to other suppliers, such as
Libya, India, or Iraq. 25X1
? Vietnam can offer Moscow no money and little else
in return for more aid, except possibly longer term
basing rights or increased influence on Vietnamese
policy or personnel, both of which we believe Hanoi
is reluctant to do. the 25X1
Vietnamese already resent their present degree of
dependence on the USSR.
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An increasing amount of Soviet aid for Vietnamese
and People's Republic of Kampuchean (PRK) forces
in Cambodia has been delivered through the Cambo-
dian port of Kompong Som since 1983. The use of
Kompong Som shortens logistic lines and reduces
wear and tear on equipment destined for use in
Cambodia. For example, more
than half of the new tanks delivered to Indochina last
year went to Cambodia; previously all were delivered
to Vietnam.
The shift in delivery locations, in our view, reflects
the shift in Hanoi's priorities from strengthening its
northern forces to' deter another Chinese "lesson" to
increasing the tempo of the war in Cambodia. Before
1983 most deliveries went through the Vietnamese
ports of Haiphong and DaNang. Forces opposing
China received new arms, while units in Cambodia
relied on older equipment including captured US
arms, such as M-113 APCs and 105-mm artillery,
No aircraft or helicopters and only a few small patrol
boats have been delivered directly to Cambodia, and
we expect all other air and large naval equipment to
continue to go directly to Vietnam. Hanoi's fleet is
deployed to defend Vietnam's coastline, especially the
approaches to Haiphong, and is just beginning to
press claims to potential offshore oilfields and to the
disputed Spratly and Paracel Islands in the South
China Sea. DaNang is the delivery and assembly port
for all fighter aircraft sent to Indochina. We also
expect that any new, more advanced ground weaponry
will be delivered to Vietnamese ports for use first on
the Chinese border.
? Moscow may provide relatively unsophisticated
weapons to avoid angering China and the ASEAN
states and prompting them to obtain more sophisti-
cated arms from the United States and others.
China's best conventional weapons are roughly
equivalent to Vietnam's. Although the ASEAN
states are beginning to receive better weapons, such
Table 3
Vietnam's Naval Inventory
Equipment Type
Year
Acquired
Estimated Operational
Equipment
1978
1982
1985
Light frigates
1978-85
2
2
5
Pre-1978
4
2?
2?
Missile attack
craft
1978-85
0
6
8
Pre-1978
4
4
0
Patrol craft,
minesweepers
1978-85
5
38
59
KA-25 ASW
helicopters
Pre-1978
1978-85
200,
0
200
14
200
14
BE-12 reconnais-
sancc aircraft
1978-85
0
4
4
Hanoi has more than 200 older patrol craft; the number opera-
tional is unknown, but probably very low, Also, many are riverine
craft not suitable for coastal or ocean operations.
Table 4
Soviet Military Advisers in
Selected Third World Countries
Size
Arm
of Number of Nu
ed Forces Soviet Advisers Adv
Tro
mber of
isers Per
ops
Vietnam 1,00
0,000 2,500
Angola 5
0,000 1,200 1:3
5- 1:50
Ethiopia 20
0,000 1,700 1:1
20
South Yemen 3
0,000 1,000 1:3
0
as the F-16,~ they hope
to rely on a qualitative edge in in the face of Viet-
nam's greater numbers of weapons.
Moscow has
refused Vietnamese requests for MIG-23s on the
grounds that Hanoi does not need them.
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Table 5
Soviet Naval and Air Presence
in the Third World
Vietnam
South
Yemen
Ethiopia
Angola
Aircraft
ASW'/recon-
6-8
2-4
0-2
0-2
naissance
I ightcr
14
(1
0
0
Bomber
16
0
0
0
Ships
Major surface
4
0-2
0
I
Minor surface
6-10
0
0
2
Submarine
2-5
0-2
0-2
0
Auxiliaries
8-20
0-10
0-4
2-4
The Soviet Indian Ocean squadron fluctuates in site and operates
primarily from the base at Dehalak' Island off Ethiopia. Besides the
aircraft, no Soviet units are stationed permanently in South Yemen.
equipment In addition,
Beijing has made withdrawal of Hanoi's troops from
Cambodia one of its three conditions for improved
Sino-Soviet relations.
ASEAN has reacted to Hanoi's increasing military
strength by making joint efforts to oppose the pres-
ence of Vietnamese forces in Cambodia and by
strengthening their own forces. In 1985, for example,
the ASEAN states made coordinated diplomatic pro-
tests to Moscow over Soviet arms support of Vietnam
in Cambodia, according to State Department report-
ing. Most ASEAN states also launched force modern-
ization programs after Vietnam invaded Cambodia
and began to rebuild its military strength, although
budgetary constraints have forced cutbacks of
planned expansions. Malaysia, for example, is fortify-
ing Swallow Reef in the Spratly Islands and develop-
ing 25X1
a naval base in Sarawak in part to offset Viet
nam's increasing naval strength
reluctant to increase military aid.
? Moscow provides about $1 billion in economic aid
each year, including petroleum, capital goods, and
help in infrastructure development. The two aid
programs are probably not directly tied, but the
burden of the economic aid may make the Soviets
We believe China and the non-Communist states in
Southeast Asia feel threatened by Moscow's support
for Hanoi in Cambodia and by the increasingly
capable Soviet and Vietnamese forces in the region.
They have responded to the Soviet-Vietnamese chal-
lenge in several ways.
China has put military pressure on Vietnam, sought
Western arms technology, and placed conditions on
improved relations with the USSR partially in re-
sponse to Hanoi's policies that Moscow's large-scale
backing makes possible. China maintains large forces
along the border with Vietnam, shells Vietnamese
forces regularly, and makes limited cross-border at-
tacks, Beijing also sup-
plies the Cambodian resistance with arms and other
. Thailand decided to develop a better air
reconnaissance system after one of its aircraft was
shot down near Cambodia in 1985 25X1
25X1
Chinese-ASEAN cooperation, which began in the
mid-1970s, has also increased in response to Viet- 25X1
nam's Soviet-supplied military operations in Cambo-
dia. while area 25X1
states, especially Indonesia and Malaysia, still consid-
er China a threat in the long term, they believe Hanoi
poses the more immediate threat. Partly as a result,
China and the ASEAN countries have developed
direct trade and political ties since 1979, and they
coordinate diplomatic opposition to Vietnam's occupa-
tion of Cambodia and Moscow's support of the ag-
in supplying the Cambodian resistance Beijing pro-
vides the arms and Bangkok controls distribution
and Singapore may buy some Chinese arms for the
resistance.
25X1
I
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Table 6
Soviet Arms Provided to Selected Clients
Equipment Vietnam Angola Ethiopia South
Yemen
SU-22 X X
MIG-23 X
MIG-25
MIG-27
SU-25
M I-8 X X
MI-17 X X
MI-25 X X
MI-26
PT-76 X X
T-54/55 X X
T-62 X
T-72
SA-2 X
SA-3 X X
SA-5
SA-6 X
SA-8 X
SA-9 X
SA-13 X
Light frigate X
Frigate
Submarine
X X
X X
X X X
x X X
We expect the value of Soviet military aid to Vietnam
to remain roughly the same through the rest of the
decade, barring major changes in the regional envi-
ronment. Moscow's aid will continue to sustain Viet-
nam's war in Cambodia at its current level, and the
bulk of military deliveries are likely to be consum-
ables, spare parts, and replacement parts in support of
the decade.
In our judgment, the quality of arms delivered in the
future will probably improve, both to maintain
Hanoi's ability to resist Chinese pressure and to
improve Moscow's access to Cam Ranh Bay. The
Soviets are likely to provide Hanoi equipment roughly
as capable as China's best. The number of major
items of equipment delivered probably will decline,
however, because Hanoi is not likely to expand its
armed forces much beyond the size created in the last
five years. The greater cost of more sophisticated
items also will reduce the number Moscow is willing
25X1
25X1
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Table 7
Comparison of Soviet Military
Deliveries to Vietnam and Other
Third World Nations, 1981-85
transport aircraft as replacements for older equip-
ment, although the effects on modernization will be
modest.
Vietnam
South
Yemen
Ethiopia
Angola
Number in armed
1,000,000
30,000
200,000
50.000
Iorees
Estimated value of 3.2
0.9
2.0
2.6
deliveries (billion US $)
1 onnage delivered
2210
68
145
170
(thousand metric tons)
Value of deliveries
3,200
30,000
10,000
52,000
per man (U.S $)
Military tonnage
0.28
2.27
0.7
3.4
per man (metric tons)
to deliver. Over time, Hanoi's inventory of such major
arms as fighter aircraft, tanks, and SAMs probably
will decline because the more advanced equipment
will not replace wornout arms on a 1-for-I basis. In
our view, the new equipments' increased capabilities
will probably offset the decline in numbers.F_~
? The Navy may receive submarines as well as re-
placements for old patrol craft. A submarine force
would improve Hanoi's ability to contest Chinese
forces in the South China Sea and allow Vietnam to
keep pace with area states, such as Indonesia, that
are acquiring submarines. Vietnam probably will
also receive additional Petyas and eventually larger,
more capable frigates.F___1 25X1
Vietnam's new equipment will still lag several genera-
tions behind the arms exported to more favored
clients. Nonetheless, in return, the Soviets may ac-
quire broader access to Cam Ranh Bay, such as more
extensive shore facilities and basing rights for more
aircraft. Greater access, coupled with even modest 25X1
improvements in Vietnam's arms inventory, will pro-
vide a continuing incentive for China and ASEAN to
cooperate in opposing Hanoi. We doubt that Moscow
will strengthen Vietnam's ground forces to the point
of encouraging even bolder cross-border operations in
Thailand, but Hanoi may be encouraged to demon-
strate its claims in the South China Sea through the
We believe each service will receive some new equip-
ment by 1990:
? The Army should acquire more capable tanks and
probably more self-propelled artillery. Vietnam's
T-54/55s will become increasingly vulnerable to
Chinese antitank weapons and probably will begin
to be replaced by T-62 or even T-72 tanks. The
addition of more self-propelled artillery would re-
duce the vulnerability of Hanoi's batteries to Chi-
nese counterbattery fire.
for the MIG-23 Flogger,
? The Air Force probably will receive better fighters
and air defense missiles. Vietnam already has asked
and we believe Moscow probably will pro-
vide it to counter China's effort to upgrade its F-7
and F-8 fighters and possibly Thailand's acquisition
of F-16s. Moscow may also transfer more advanced
SAMs, such as the SA-6. Hanoi will continue to
receive better helicopters, such as the MI-17, and
Alternative Prospects
Soviet arms deliveries to Vietnam could increase or
decrease significantly, given certain less likely devel-
opments. We believe Soviet aid could increase and
include more advanced items if:
? Increasing resistance in Cambodia required a sub-
stantially increased Vietnamese effort to retain con-
trol. The USSR would probably provide many more
anti-insurgent weapons, such as MI-25 gunships.
? China launched a second invasion of Vietnam. The
Soviets would support Hanoi by undertaking anoth-
er major sea and air lift of both new and replace-
ment equipment.
? The Soviets wanted permanent use or control of
Cam Ranh Bay, and Hanoi were able to drive a
hard bargain. New weapons would probably be
delivered more quickly in this instance.
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? Relations between Moscow and Beijing deteriorated
significantly. The Soviets would increase pressure
on China by introducing more advanced arms into
Vietnam.
? Offshore oil production began and improved Viet-
nam's economic position. Although we believe the
current pace of Vietnamese exploration precludes
this development in the next five years, it would
enable Hanoi to offer hard currency for more
modern Soviet arms. Also, Hanoi might buy a few
arms from non-Communist countries to try to pres-
sure Moscow into providing more or better equip-
ment.
Alternatively, we believe arms transfers could drop if:
? The war in Cambodia were settled diplomatically or
gradually died out. Hanoi would need less support
from Moscow, especially consumables.
? Sino-Soviet relations improved significantly. Mos-
cow would still provide enough aid to maintain its
basing rights, however.
We believe that the strengthening of Hanoi's forces
by substantial Soviet arms transfers and the resultant
benefits that accrue more directly to Moscow have
several implications for US interests in the region:
? Stronger Vietnamese naval and air forces and the
continued Soviet presence at Cam Ranh Bay will
pose a more serious threat to the security of states in
the region friendly to the United States. Southeast
Asian states will expect the United States to main-
tain a military presence in the region capable of
defeating these forces in a regional conflict.
? Expanding Soviet forces at Cam Ranh Bay also will
pose an increasingly direct threat to the ability of
US forces to keep area sea lanes open in war. The
development of shore facilities and air defenses at
Cam Ranh will increase the ability of Soviet forces
based in Vietnam to sustain operations independent
of the Soviet homeland, especially with submarines,
in at least the initial stages of a conflict.
? ASEAN states will expect more US security assis-
tance, including transfer of sophisticated arms
the F-16A/B, the M60A1 tank, and new items such
as modern minehunters and submarines, surveil-
lance radar and aircraft, and possibly precision-
guided munitions-to maintain their technological
edge over Hanoi's forces. West European nations
will compete with the United States to meet these
needs, and the United States will face pressure to
offer better credit terms and licensed production or
lose sales. The high costs of new systems coupled
with tight ASEAN budgets will create additional
pressure for easier terms.
? China and the ASEAN nations will try to maintain
close political and military relations with the United
States. Soviet aid enables Vietnam to maintain its
large presence in Cambodia, and, as long as Hanoi
remains there, China and the ASEAN states will
encourage Washington to play a greater role in
trying to break the deadlock.
? Vietnam's continuing total dependence on the
USSR may lead Hanoi to become more deeply
involved in supporting Moscow's policies in the
Third World. Vietnam is already the source of
many small arms for Communist and leftist insur-
gent groups, including two-thirds of the arms cap-
tured in Central America, according to US military
reporting. If the USSR decided to support Commu-
nist insurgents in the Philippines or elsewhere in the
region, we believe Vietnam could serve as a focal
point for arms smuggling and training. Vietnam
probably would be reluctant to do so, however,
because, if detected, such efforts would undermine
Hanoi's efforts to get ASEAN states to cease their
aid to the Cambodian resistance.
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Appendix A
Vietnamese Arms Transfers
and Military Training
Vietnam became a minor supplier of arms and mili-
tary training in the past decade for both financial and
ideological reasons. Hanoi produces almost no mili-
tary goods of its own, but has tried to sell some of the
US weapons it captured in 1975 and has transferred
some of this equipment to other Communist states.
Vietnam's effort to earn hard
currency by selling arms has largely failed. Hanoi
began offering to sell US arms in the late I 970s to
several countries, including Nicaragua, Iran, Ethio-
pia, and Angola, as well as to private arms dealers,
but we believe the only
sales concluded were for spare parts to Iran and
Ethiopia, both of which have limited access to other
suppliers. most of Viet-
nam's US-origin equipment is in very poor condi-
tion especially the major equipment and we be-
lieve this limitation has precluded any large salts.
Vietnam's training program for insurgents and mili-
tary personnel from radical countries has been more
extensive. Cubans, North Koreans, Salvadorans, Hon-
durans, Palestinians, and Dominicans have all re- 25X1
ceived unconventional warfare training in Vietnam,
Vietnam is willing to send instructors to other coun-
tries.
We believe
We believe that Hanoi
provides at least some of this training at the urging of
other Communist countries:
25X1
? PLO members were offered various courses by the 25X1
USSR in several Communist countries in the late
1970s, including Vietnam, from which they could
choose the most useful,
We be-
Hanoi has given captured US arms to ideological
allies, however. Two-thirds of the weapons taken from
Communist and leftist insurgents in El Salvador are
US small arms that were once sent to Vietnam,
munist insurgents in Central America.
licve Vietnam sent these weapons to Cuba, which in
turn transshipped them to Nicaragua and the Corn-
North Korea, the USSR, and
China received small numbers of US weapons in the
late 1970s, and these nations may have become
secondary sources of US weapons originating in Viet-
nam. We believe North Korea may have supplied
some arms to Nicaragua, and
25X1
25X1
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Appendix B
Soviet Military Assistance
to Laos and Cambodia
Laos
The Soviet Union increased its military aid to Laos at
the same time it renewed large-scale aid to Vietnam.
Moscow is Vientiane's largest arms supplier and has
delivered an estimated $340 million since 1978. We
believe this aid has consisted mostly of a few thousand
tons of light arms and assorted ammunition each year.
More than 100 tanks, a few helicopters, transport
aircraft, and 30 MIG-21 aircraft have been delivered,
The Soviets have a large advisory presence in Laos,
given the size of Vientiane's forces. More than 100 of
the 500 advisers believed to be in Laos provide
support for the Air Force, and
ters on routine flights.
limited extent for influence in Laos.
for example, that the Laotian leader-
ship is split into pro-Vietnamese, pro-Soviet, and
neutral factions. he Soviets
sought successfully to take over a military academy
from Vietnamese advisers. Whatever competition oc-
curs is probably kept at a minimum for several
reasons. Moscow cannot realistically challenge
Hanoi's dominant position, given the presence of
50,000 Vietnamese troops in the country, and the fact
that Soviet aid for Laos must pass through Vietnam.
Moreover, we believe Moscow has little reason to
challenge Vietnam for control of Laos its geograph-
ic position offers little of value, and, by supporting
Vietnam in Laos, Moscow both curries favor in Hanoi
and forestalls China's influence in Indochina.
million in equipment since 1979 and some support to
Vietnam's large training and advisory program in the
country. the USSR
is largely responsible for the development of Cambo-
dia's Air Force and tank forces. Cambodians began
receiving pilot training in the USSR in 1980, and
Soviet advisers are training tank and artillery crews in
Cambodia . We expect Cambo-
dia to assemble its first M IG-2now
training in Vietnam - this year 25X1
Cambodia received patrol boats from the USSR in 25X1
1984. 25X1
We believe that the Vietnamese-Soviet rivalry in
Cambodia is minimal and will remain low, but, if it
intensified, it would be potentially more serious than
in Laos. Unlike Laos, Cambodia's direct access to the
sea could serve to preserve a Soviet foothold in the 25X1
region if Moscow's ties to Hanoi deteriorated. The
current presence of 150,000 Vietnamese troops in the
country precludes a Soviet challenge for influence in
the short term, but Khmer-Vietnamese antagonism
and the cadre of Cambodians trained in the USSR 25X1
could threaten Hanoi's position if it removed its forces
from Cambodia. The prospects of rivalry intensifying,
however, are remote within the next five years. More-
over, Moscow would not abandon the more strategi-
cally placed and larger Vietnam for Cambodia, in our
view. Nonetheless, a stronger Soviet presence in
Phnom Penh could enhance Moscow's bargaining
position with Hanoi and provide a fallback position if
its ties to Vietnam deteriorated.
Cambodia
Soviet military involvement in Cambodia has grown
alongside that of Vietnam. Moscow is Phnom Penh's
largest military supplier, providing at least $260
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