EGYPT: VULNERABILITY OF NILE WATER SUPPLY

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP97R00694R000500730001-5
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 21
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: March 18, 2011
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: March 1, 1986
• Content Type: REPORT

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Directorate of-
Intelligence 25X1
Egypt: Vulnerability of
Nile Water Supply
Seer-et
GI 86-10021
March 1986
Copy 235
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Directorate of Secret
Intelligence
Nile Water Supply
Egypt: Vulnerability of
Office of Near
(Comments
and queries are welcome and may be directed to the
Chief, Geography Division, OG I
Secret
(1186-10021
March 1986
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Egypt: Vulnerability of
Nile Water Supply 25X1
Key Judgments Egypt is in transition from water abundance to water shortage. Reductions
IiIormation available in the Nile River's flow resulting from the recent Sub-Saharan drought
as oI 2.Y Fehruarr /986 highlighted Egypt's precarious dependence on the river- the country's only
uA used in this report. significant source of water. For six straight years (1979-85), water flowing
into Lake Nasser-Egypt's huge reservoir on the Nile behind the Aswan
High Dam-never exceeded 55.5 billion cubic meters (bcm) annually, the
amount allotted to Egypt by a 1959 agreement with Sudan. During these
six years, Egypt discharged from Lake Nasser not only more water than
the amount that flowed in but also more than its 55.5-bcm allotment. As a
result, Lake Nasser's level declined, and the High Dam's electricity output
diminished. If the drought had continued another two years, the amount of
reserve water available for irrigation would have been entirely depleted.
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Normal rainfall occurred in late summer of 1985, but, considering recent
climatic trends, drought could recur at any time. If normal rainfall
continues, permitting storage in Lake Nasser to be replenished, Egypt has
some time to improve water use and allocation. Nevertheless, we believe
Egypt must act forcefully and urgently to forestall a possible future water
crisis. 25X1
At Egypt's current rate of population growth, the Nile will have to support
twice as many people by the year 2010 as it does today. Planned
agricultural expansion that will merely slow the widening of Egypt's food
deficit will require a 15-percent increase in water use by the year 2000.
(The country, which was a net food exporter as late as 1970, now imports
50 percent of its food.) 25X1
Even as Egypt's own water demand is increasing, population, agricultural
development, and, consequently, water use in upstream Sudan and Ethio-
pia are increasing. Until now, Egypt has been getting a portion of Sudan's
share of the Nile because Sudan has not used its full share of water
allocated by the 1959 agreement. If Sudan had used this water during the
past six years, Lake Nasser's usable storage would have been depleted last
year. Sudan, in pursuing plans to further develop its irrigated land,
eventually will increase its water consumption beyond its allotment,
claiming that water to be saved through various conservation projects will
offset the increase. However, the chief conservation project the .longlei
Canal-has been stalled for several years by an insurgency in southern
Sudan. Therefore, in the next 15 years or so, Sudan's use could exceed its
allotment, leading to confrontation with Egypt. 25X1
Secret
Gl ,1'6-1Q02!
A9urrh / I,6
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With a large population and few resources, Ethiopia is eager to develop its
own Nile waters. Ethiopian plans to build a series of dams on the Blue Nile
are of grave concern to Egypt because 85 percent of the Nile's water
originates in Ethiopia. Ethiopia has not participated in major meetings of
the Nile riparian states, nor has it acknowledged any usage rights of
downstream users. Already frosty relations between Addis Ababa and
Cairo may deteriorate to the point of conflict should Ethiopia initiate
large-scale unilateral development projects on the Nile.
Even discounting the possibility of future drought, Egypt will experience a
drawdown on its existing water resources through growth in its own
demands and increased use upstream. To meet future needs, Egypt must:
? Continue to improve water use efficiency through conservation measures
and education of farmers. (Egyptian farmers resist changing centuries-
old water use practices that are both extremely wasteful of water and in-
jurious to soil quality.)
? Support efforts to complete the Jonglei Canal and other upstream
conservation projects.
? Seek and develop new sources of water. Ground water is the most likely
new water source because desalinization is overly expensive.
Potential water shortages in Egypt have important implications for Egypt's
domestic and foreign policies-and for US interests. Failure to provide
adequate water supplies for agriculture, industry, and electric power
generation would place additional strains on the government and create
pressures to take action against upstream water users. Although Cairo
would probably be able to procure needed food supplies in the event of irri-
gation water shortages, additional imports would further aggravate already
severe financial problems. Egypt is already the second-largest recipient of
US economic aid; a population outstripping its water and food supplies is
certain to require more. Actions needed to head off the problem also
require foreign assistance. USAID involvement in projects to improve
agricultural productivity and irrigation efficiency will require a long-term
commitment to realize a significant effect
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Key Judgments
Introduction
Water Supply
Blue Nile
White Nile
Main Nile
Water Management
The Drought
Water Use
Agriculture
Electricity
Political Perspectives
Upstream Use
Relations With Neighbors
Domestic Concerns
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Figure I
The Nile Basin
* Nicosia
et;ano
Beirut*
I"faeI
Tel Aviv-Yafo,
Syria
Damascus:
,,-\ Iraq
*Amman
V Jordan
* \! ~.j
Cairo
Aswan Dam Aswin
/Aswan I,rw Dam/Aswan High
Dann
Khartoom* Khashm
Khazzen al Oizbah
Jabal B/ Awliya' 08M
Tanzania
Dar as Salaam*
Figure 2
Nile Flow
26.5
tion3
evaporations
-- _ 2.5
t 22.5 " 4.0
A 11....
rainfalls
5.5
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Egypt: Vulnerablity of
Nile Water Supply
The Nile River, Egypt's only significant water source,
is totally dependent on rainfall far to the south-
mainly in Ethiopia. Before the completion of the
Aswan High Dam in 1970, Egypt suffered whenever
the lands at the headwaters of the Nile experienced
drought. For more than a decade after the dam's
completion, water stored in seasons of above-average
rainfall provided Egypt with a sufficient amount of
water to cover short periods of drought. During the
drought in Sub-Saharan Africa from 1979 to 1985,
however, the Egyptians were obliged to draw down
reservoir reserves to critically low levels. Only late
summer rains in the Ethiopian highlands in 1985
saved them from serious water allocation and conser-
vation decisions.
Egypt relies on the Nile for irrigation, inland naviga-
tion, industrial and domestic consumption, and elec-
tricity generation. With an ever-increasing popula-
tion, the country has no near-term options other than
conservation and increasing its use of Nile water.
Therefore, should drought resume, Egypt's water
situation will be more precarious than it was during
1984-85, especially if Sudan and Ethiopia continue to
use an increasing amount of Nile water upstream.
More than 91 percent of Egypt's 60.7 billion cubic
meter (bcm) annual average water supply comes di-
rectly from the Nile, and another 8 percent comes
indirectly from the river through downstream reuse.'
The 6,671-kilometer Nile River the longest river in
the world drains an area three times larger than
Egypt that includes portions of nine countries: Egypt,
Sudan, Ethiopia, Uganda, Zaire. Rwanda, Burundi,
Kenya, and Tanzania (figure 1). None of the Nile's
The Nile is probably one of the most studied and
most measured rivers in the world, as evidenced br
the open availability of annual records on Nile River
flow, Lake Nasser levels, and electricity generation.
Such annual records are necessary' to determine
trends; monthly records, however, are required to
monitor the current situation. During, the height of
the recent drought crisis, timely reporting ht' the US
Embassy in Cairo was our primary source of'inf'r-
mation. At other times, reporting on the water situa-
tion tends to he fragmentary.
Data on water use are less reliable, mainly because
water use is much harder to measure. Academics, the
Egyptian Ministry of Irrigation, and U.SAII) disagree
on water use figures, particularly' those regarding
agricultural use and the tremendous amounts o%
water wastage associated with the irrigation systems.
Water use f figures in Sudan are probably even more
questionable. F__~ 25X1
Nile water arising in the eight upstream nations.
water originates in Egypt itself because rainfall there
is negligible. To meet its needs, Egypt must rely on
The Blue Nile is the more important of the Nile's two
main tributaries, supplying Egypt with most of its
water some 57 percent (figure 2). Annual discharge
from the Blue Nile's source ---T'ana Hayk' (Lake
Tana), in the Ethiopian highlands--is estimated at
3 bcm. Numerous tributaries along the Blue Nile's
course boost its flow to an average of 54 bcm annually
at Khartoum. The Blue Nile carries to the main
stream the rich volcanic silt of Ethiopia that each year
replenished the lower Nile Valley and Delta before
the completion of the Aswan High Dane.
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White Nile
The White Nile begins as the Kagera River in
Burundi. After collecting water from the basins of
Lakes Victoria, Kyoga, George, Edward, and Albert,
the White Nile leaves Uganda. By the time the river
reaches Mongalla in southern Sudan, the flow has
increased to about 30 bcm. At this point, however, the
river enters As Sudd--80,500 square kilometers of
stagnant swampland-where it loses about half of its
volume to evaporation as it meanders slowly through
the dense vegetation. North of As Sudd, the Nahr
Subat (Sobat River) replaces much of the water lost in
the swamp, so that the river's annual flow at Khar-
toum is 28.5 bcm.
Main Nile
The White Nile and the Blue Nile merge to form the
main Nile at Khartoum. Downstream from Khar-
toum, the Nahr `Atbarah (Atbarah River) is the only
major tributary, increasing the Nile's average historic
discharge to 84 bcm annually at Aswan. The At-
barah, the Blue Nile, and the Sobat all originate in
the Ethiopian highlands; together, they account for
about 85 percent of the Nile's annual flow. Although
numerous seasonal wadis lead into the Nile north of
the mouth of the Atbarah, the amount of water they
add to the main stream is negligible. This stretch of
the Nile between the Atbarah and the Delta is the
world's longest without perennial tributaries.
The flow of the Nile varies seasonally because of
varying climatic conditions in Ethiopia. Rainfall
around the equatorial lakes of Africa and, conse-
quently, discharge of the White Nile vary little
throughout the year. Rainfall in the Ethiopian high-
lands, on the other hand, is highly seasonal picking
up in April, peaking in August, then dropping off
dramatically in October. This rainfall pattern ac-
counts for the seasonal surge in the Blue Nile, and
accounted for the flooding of the Nile each September
before construction of the Aswan High Dam (figure
Superimposed on the Nile's seasonal pattern is an
annual flow that varies considerably from year to
Figure 3
Seasonal Flow of the Nilea
Billion cubic meters
25
From White
Nile
I I 1 ! 1 1 1 f 1 1
year. Since 1871 the annual natural yield 2 at Aswan
has ranged from 150 bcm in 1878/79' to 42 bcm in
1913/ 14 (figure 4). Extreme fluctuation in annual
flow prompted 19th century Nile authority Sir Wil-
liam Willcocks to remark, "Mean years are of no
value, since the surplus of one year is not available for
the next."
Natural yield-- a hypothetical estimate of discharge at Aswan
assuming no Sudanese withdrawal is used to compare historic
records of Nile flow with today's figures. Until Sudan began
extensive irrigation schemes in the 1920s, natural yield and actual
flow at Aswan were nearly identical. Because Sudan now uses
approximately 16 bcm annually, today's actual flow is well below
natural yield; this explains why actual inflows of 40.5 bcm in
1982/83 and 37 bcm in 1984/85 represent higher flows than the
1913/ 14 figure of 42 bcm.
' The Nile's hydrological year runs rom I August through 31 July
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Figure 4
Annual Natural Yield at Aswan
Billion cuhic metcr~
160
I I ,. _L__L__1__i_i__ i I iI I I I I I 11 I I I I I I I I I 11 I 1 I I I I 1 I 11 I I 1 1 I I J
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Albert, and a regulator dam on Lake Victoria.` These
projects were designed to provide protection against
floods and droughts and to.regulate the river's flow
Because of the Nile's seasonality and year-to-year
unpredictability, several attempts to regulate the
river's flow have been undertaken during this century.
Since 1900, five dams-the Er Roseires and Sennar
on the Blue Nile, Jabal al Awliya on the White Nile,
Khashm al Qirbah on the Atbarah, and Aswan Low
Dam on the main Nile-were built to provide season-
al storage of the Nile's waters. These dams trap the
final portion of the annual surge, releasing it later in
the year when needed. Combined storage of these
facilities, however, is 16.4 bcm--only 20 percent of
the average annual flood. This was not enough to tide
Egypt over a severe drought year.
Recognizing the need for over-year storage, the Egyp-
tian Council of Ministers approved the Century Stor-
age Scheme in 1949. This plan called for the construc-
tion of several projects, including a canal bypassing
As Sudd, over-year storage in Lake Tana and Lake
for agricultural expansion in the delta.
When Gamal Abdul Nasser came to power after the
1952 Egyptian revolution, he elected to temporarily
abandon the Century Storage Scheme and, instead,
concentrate on a single project that would meet the
same water storage and regulation goals while serving
as an immediate showcase of Third World develop-
ment. Consequently, in 1960 construction began on
the Aswan High Dam. Egyptian officials expected the
dam to accomplish the following:
? Reduce flood and drought damage.
? Increase the amount of land under cultivation.
' This last project became the Owen Ialls Dam and is the only
portion of the Century Storage Scheme so far completed. The dam
provides power to Uganda, but Egypt receives little benefit from the
water stored in Lake Victoria in the absence of another dam at
Lake Albert and a canal through As Sudd.O 25X1
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? Increase the agricultural production on existing
land by allowing perennial irrigation, thereby per-
mitting double and triple cropping in parts of Upper
Egypt.
? Improve navigation conditions.
? Provide large amounts of cheap electric power.
? Permit the development of a small fishing industry
on the dam's reservoir.
The river was blocked by a coffer dam in 1964, and
the High Dam was completed in 1970 (figure 5). The
reservoir-called Lake Nasser in Egypt and Lake
Nubia in Sudan-was filled nearly to capacity by
1975. When full (183 meters above sea level, 13
meters below the dam's crest), the reservoir has a
surface area of approximately 5,000 square kilometers
(roughly the size of Delaware), and extends 500
kilometers upstream. The total capacity of the reser-
voir is 164 bcm, of which the lowest 30 bcm is dead
storage (below the spillway level), 90 bcm is long-term
storage, and the upper 44 bcm is for flood protection.
Although some of its expected benefits have yet to be
fully realized, the Aswan High Dam nevertheless has
been a boon to Egypt. Without its regulatory effects,
Rainfall Seasonality at the
Headwaters of the Nile
southward again, rainfall drops off.
Seasonal patterns of rainfall around the Equator are
a result of movement of the belt of the earth receiving
the sun's direct, perpendicular rays. This belt is an
area of low pressure characterized by ascending air
masses that yield large amounts of rainfall. To fill
the hole left by the rising air, air masses from north
and south move toward the Equator to form the
intertropical convergence zone (ITC). Equatorial re-
gions experience the rainfall effects of the ITC year-
round, but most markedly around the spring and fall
equinoxes, when the sun is directly overhead. This
accounts for the fairly consistent rainfall in the Lake
Victoria region, with slight peaks in April-May and
September-November. As the Earth revolves and the
Sun's direct rays move northward, the ITC follows,
so that by July it is centered approximately 18 ?
north latitude over Africa, supplying the Ethiopian
highlands with seasonal rain. As the ITC retreats
Conditions similar to the current African drought
occurred in the 1820s and 1830s, from 1900 to 1915,
and in the 1940s. Following a series of wet years in
the 1950s, dramatic changes have taken place in the
rainfall patterns of the Sub-Saharan region, particu-
larly that of the Sahel. Essentially, the ITC with its
associated precipitation-yielding air masses has not
moved as far north each year as it had earlier.
Precipitation, which had been averaging 15 percent
above normal in southern areas and 35 to 40 percent
above normal along the Saharan fringe, began a
gradual decline.
Egypt would have suffered from floods in 1964 and
1975 and from droughts in 1972/73 and 1976/77.
Most recently, water stored behind the dam during
years of abundant rainfall in the I 970s insulated
Egypt from the effects of the devastating drought in
Ethiopia and Sudan from 1979 to 1985.
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Figure 6
Lake Nasser: Cross Section
172-178 ni. normal
seasonal variation
164 m. Occ 1984
and Nov 1985
156.5 m. Aug 1985
145 m: damage to turhincs
1411 nt: turhines shut down
86 m, bottom
444m flood storage
90-km3 live storage
30-km3
dead storage
The drought pattern that affected the Nile River
watershed from 1979 until at least mid-1985 began in
the late 1960s in the western areas of Sub-Saharan
Africa and gradually spread eastward to include the
countries in the Nile basin. The western Sub-Saharan
region experienced continuous drought from 1968
through 1973, with precipitation deficits ranging from
15 to 40 percent. Rainfall over the region increased
considerably during 1974 and 1975, leading to reports
that the drought had ended. In 1976, however, it
returned.
(figure 6 and 7).
From 1968 through 1979, rainfall was above average
in much of the Nile watershed, and Lake Nasser
experienced only two years of deficit flow 1972/73
and 1976/77. During these two dry years, water
previously stored behind the dam allowed Egypt to
withdraw approximately 55 bcm the usual annual
discharge. Between 1968 and 1979, the reservoir level
rose 22 meters, and its volume increased by 73 bcm
Beginning in 1979, however, drought conditions ex-
tended into the eastern Sub-Saharan region. Western
Ethiopia the source of most of the Nile's water
suffered severely, resulting in six years of below-
average Nile flow. Rainfall in the highlands was as
low as 25 percent of normal in 1984. Near-normal
rainfall fell in the Nile basin in 1985, although it was
distributed erratically. To term this the end of the
drought now, however, might be just as premature as
it was in 1975.
Despite the Niles fluctuation from year to year,
water records since 1700 suggest a hundred-year flow
cycle with periods of high flow in midcentury and
periods of low now at the beginning of each century.
On the basis of this perceived cycle and current world
weather patterns, some climatologists foresee the pos-
sibility of below-average rainfall continuing for the
next 15 to 20 years. Most meteorologists agree,
however, that they lack the quantitative data and
methodology to scientifically predict the onset and
duration of drought, particularly in Africa.
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Figure 7
Lake Nasser: Inflow, Discharge,
and Reservoir Volume
Billion cubic meters
120
Discharge a
Reservoir
volumed
I 1 '. I 11 L... - -L. I I I 1
1969!70 74/75 79/80 84/85
w;ucr vcar,
Volume it, of 31 July (lowest level).
During the six years of drought, discharge from
Aswan annually averaged 57.3 bcm-an amount
greater than that allotted to Egypt in the 1959
bilateral Agreement for the Full Utilization of the
Nile Waters. Discharge, previously averaging 55.2
bcm between 1968 and 1976, was increased in 1977-
78 and 1978-79, presumably as a result of increased
demand. Even though the Ministry of Irrigation
released 62 bcm and 60 bcm during those two years,
no water deficit resulted, as inflow remained slightly
greater than outflow. During the subsequent drought
years, however, discharge remained high, as inflow to
Lake Nasser dropped dramatically and Egypt with-
drew stored water. If, instead, discharge during the
past six years had averaged 55.2 bcm, Egypt would
now have an additional 13 bcm behind the dam, and
the hydroelectric problems that occurred as a result of
lowered reservoir levels would have been far less
severe
Prudent water management should have called for
effective conservation measures during at least the
past year or two to cushion the effects if the drought
had continued.
USAID officials estimate that, of the water dis-
charged in a typical year, only about 55 percent is
used productively. During 1982, for example, when
58.7 bcm were released, Egypt productively used only
31.8 bcm, allocated as follows:
Total
31.8
Agriculture
27.1
Municipal
1.8
Industry
Power/ navigation h
0.3
., Despite its seeming precision, this is only a rough estimate.
Egyptian water authorities and other experts cite water use figures
that vary by as much as 35 percent from the AID estimates.
h The 2.6 bcm shown as used for power/ navigation represents water
releases from Aswan during periods when the water is not required
for other uses downstream.
The remaining 26.9 bcm of lost water, according to
AID and Egyptian water experts, is divided almost
equally between irrigation conveyance losses and on-
farm losses and waste. This lost water eventually
enters the sea, seeps into the ground, or evaporates.
These losses would be even higher were it not for
extensive reuse of irrigation drainage water, which
requires costly repumping.
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Of all uses, only power generation was directly affect-
ed by the recent drought. Normal release of water
stored in the reservoir saved the downstream users
from the necessity of adopting any conservation mea-
sures. If the drought had continued, however, AID
experts estimated that a reduction of irrigation flows
would have been unavoidable by mid-1986.F-
self-sufficiency.
Agriculture
The recent drought in the lands of the Nile headwa-
ters had no appreciable effect on Egyptian agricul-
ture. If, however, reduced rainfall upstream had
continued and annual inflow and discharge had re-
mained at average 1979-85 levels, Egypt would have
depleted Lake Nasser's live storage by 1988. At that
point Egyptian water supplies would have consisted of
the Nile's annual flow (which in the past six years met
only 83 percent of Egyptian use), and, at most, 4 bcm
of ground water. The cropped area would have had to
be reduced proportionally (or the crop mix changed),
and Egyptian food production would have dropped to
below today's already poor level of about 50 percent
year-round and was double cropped (figure 8).
Egyptian agriculture is almost entirely dependent on
irrigation from the Nile River. Except for a narrow
strip along the Mediterranean Sea, rainfall in all parts
of Egypt is in most years inadequate for nonirrigated
agriculture. The present irrigation system has been
developed since the early 1800s, following centuries
during which Egyptian agriculture was limited to one
crop per year following the annual Nile flood in
August and September. Perennial irrigation became
significant after completion of the first low dam
(barrage) to channel water into distribution canals in
1861. By the end of the 19th century some 1.5 million
hectares was under perennial irrigation, and by
1980 after completion of the Aswan High Dam
virtually all of Egypt's present cropland was irrigated
Perennial irrigation, however, brought with it new
problems, chief among them waterlogging and in-
creased soil salinity. According to USAID, production
on one-third of the cropland has been reduced by
these factors alone, and two-thirds of the land suffers
from poor drainage, presaging future production prob-
lems. The primary cause of the salinity and waterlog-
ging is a rising water table --the result of seepage
from the distributing canals, the inadequacy or
Figure 8. Archimedes' screws dray ing water
from canals. This and other primitive irrigation
nonexistence of drainage systems, and the propensity
of the Egyptian farmer to overwater. This tendency to
overwater is a result of several factors: the farmer's
general ignorance of plant needs, unlevel fields, ineffi-
cient irrigation pumps, and the Ministry of Irriga-
tion's unpredictable system of water distribution,
which prompts the farmer to take as much water as he
can when he can get 25X1
Irrigation efficiency--the ratio of the amount of
water used by growing plants to the amount of water
drawn from the Nile ranges from about 25 percent
to a high of 75 percent, but probably averages no
more than 45 percent. Increasing average irrigation
efficiencies to about 65 percent, which USAID be-
lieves is technically feasible and has been routinely
accomplished in Israel and Jordan, would provide a
savings of at least 10 bcm annually. In the long run,
existing open-ditch irrigation, which is the dominant
Egyptian practice, will have to be converted to sprin-
kler and drip irrigation to minimize water losses.
Experience has shown, however, that without contin-
ual prodding by outside "experts" the Egyptian farm-
er will revert to his old ways and engage in irrigation
practices that effectively waste a large share of the
available water.
Oversvatering is often blamed on the tact that slater is available to
the L.gyptian farmer without charge and therefore is of marginal
value to him. Actuall>, cost is significant, for the slater must be
lifted onto the fields, and the rental price of at ss;ttcr buffalo to
power the pumps should provide incentive against pumping more
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About 2.8 million hectares of Egypt's total territory
is under cultivation, most of it double cropped. This
is barely 3 percent of the country's area, and almost
all of it is in the delta or within a few kilometers of
the Nile above Cairo. More than half of this land
(allowing for double cropping) is devoted to food
production, and about 17 percent is used for growing
livestock fodder. Another 10 percent is planted in
cotton, which, together with cotton products, makes
up one-third of Egypt's exports. Almost two-thirds of
the food-producing area is planted in grains-princi-
pal among them corn, wheat, and rice. The other
three major food categories are vegetables, fruits, and
sugar cane. Cotton, rice, and sugar cane require
relatively large amounts of water, but also yield a
high value per hectare, and may thus represent wise
land use.
Food production in Egypt is currently growing at an
annual rate of about 2 percent, while the population of
more than 50 million is increasing at 2.8 percent a
year and will double in about 25 years if left un-
checked. This presents Egypt-a net food exporter
only 15 years ago-with a growing food gap that
necessitates massive foreign (almost half US) aid
inputs each year. To increase agricultural output,
Egypt has successfully reclaimed some 375,000 hect-
ares of new land in the past 30 years. Current plans
call for development of 0.85-1.25 million hectares of
additional new land-more than half of it in the
Eastern Delta and Sinai-by the year 2000. All of the
estimated 8.8 bcm of water needed to cultivate this
land is intended to come from the Nile and is
supposed to be made available through improved
irrigation and water use efficiency. We believe, how-
ever, that, even if only a small portion of these new
lands is developed, Egypt will be hard pressed to
divert water to them, especially in times of prolonged
drought.
Electricity
The principal effect on Egypt of the upstream
drought, and the resulting lower water levels of Lake
Nasser, was to temporarily reduce hydroelectric out-
put. About one-third of the 29 billion kilowatt hours
(bkWh) generated by Egypt in 1984 came from two
hydroelectric power stations-the Aswan High Dam
(26 percent) and the Aswan Low Dam (7 percent).
Output of the two dams that year was about 9.4
bkWh, as compared with 11.8 bkWh in 1983. Electri-
cal output declined further in 1985 as the water level
stayed below optimum.
To generate power at 100-percent capacity, the level
of Lake Nasser must be at least 165 meters above sea
level. The water level fell below this in July 1984 for
the first time since 1974, when the reservoir was
filling. By April 1985 the water level had reached
159.5 meters, resulting in a reduction of power-
generating capacity by 10 percent-some 175 mega-
watts. During the summer of 1985, generating capaci-
ty remained well below the maximum, falling to 79
percent of capacity when the water level dropped to
156.5 meters in August. Numerous brownouts in the
Aswan area resulted. Although the level of the lake
had risen to 164 meters by November 1985, power
capacity remained about 3 percent below optimum.
If the water level were to fall below 145 meters,
prudent operation of the turbines would call for them
to be shut down to avoid rust damage. Because
USAID will be replacing the old, Soviet-built turbines
over the next several years, the Egyptian Electricity
Authority had decided to operate the units below this
critical level if need be. This would still permit power
generation at 65-percent capacity. At 140 meters,
however, all units would have to be shut down because
of air intake. To reach 140 meters, the reservoir would
have had to lose some 30.6 bcm of water from the
August 1985 level-equivalent to the net deficit
between May 1984 and August 1985.
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Water held in Lake Nasser flows through 12 hvdro-
turbine generators, each capable of producing 175
megawatts. Since only 10 units operate at one time,
maximum generation is 1,750 megawatts. The spill-
ways carry the water not needed for power generation
to the downstream canal. Because the dams dis-
charge is controlled by the Ministry of Irrigation,
power production varies seasonally with the needs of
irrigation, ranging from a maximum of 1,750 mega-
watts during August through October, to a minimum
of 900 megawatts during December through Febru-
arv. Electricity is conveyed from the transformers by
two 500-kilovolt transmission lines nearly 800 kilo-
meters to Cairo, and by eight 132-kilovolt lines to the
Aswan area.
above-average rainfall are necessary.
Egypt's power supply will continue to be affected in
1986, even if this year's rainfall is normal. On the
basis of last year's highest level (164 meters in
November) and assuming average monthly inflows
and discharges, we estimate that the reservoir level
will drop to 161 meters by May and may reach last
year's low in August 1986 before returning to higher
levels. During this time, power generation will remain
below 100-percent capacity. For the reservoir to stay
above 165 meters year-round, one or more years of
In the long term, however, hydroelectricity will not
play as large a role in Egypt as it now does. Because
Egypt's hydroelectric potential has nearly been met,"
hydroelectric production is likely to remain stable
over the next several years, given normal upstream
rainfall. Demand for electricity, on the other hand, is
expected to continue to grow with increases in popula-
tion and industrial expansion. Although Egypt is
currently reviewing bids by foreign contractors to
build its first nuclear reactor at Ad Dab`ah, other
nuclear power plants are not likely to be built in the
near future because of prohibitive construction and
operation costs. Egypt will more likely increase the
number of oil- and gas-fired generators (the amount
of energy generated by these stations has already
more than tripled since 1976) or turn to coal as a
power source. Should a major drought occur in the
future, the relative impact of disrupted hydroelectric
sources on the nation's energy supply would be less
than it would be now.
Egypt's total dependence on the Nile for survival
mandates a constant and extraordinary preoccupation
with the security of the river that is as old as Egyptian
civilization. These concerns, which are amplified dur-
ing times of drought, underlie Cairo's policy of trying
to maintain good working relations with Nile Valley
countries, especially Sudan and Ethiopia. Sudan in
particular is viewed as a southern extension of Egyp-
tian territory, and close ties to Khartoum are an
axiom of policy. Egypt has also participated actively
in meetings of the multilateral Undugu group-a
broad coalition of most Nile riparians ' with common
interest in maximizing water usage and preventing,
through group pressure, independent policies damag-
ing to other members.0 25X1
"That is, hydroelectric potential has nearly been net unless one
counts the ambitious, multibillion-dollar scheme to connect the
Mediterranean to the Qattara Depression, which would generate
some 10,000 megawatts through the resulting diIIcrence in eleva-
tion. To date, the project remains on paper. 25X1
As of the groups third meeting in August 1985, the following
states arc members: Egypt. Sudan, Uganda, Rwanda, Burundi,
Zaire. Tanzania, and the Central African Republic (not a Nile
riparian). Although invited, Ethiopia and Kenya have yet to join.F
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Upstream Use
Until recently, Egyptian fears of upriver tampering
were more psychological than real, as long as up-
stream states were too underdeveloped to affect the
water flow. The gradual economic development of
these states in the postcolonial period, however, has
led to a number of irrigation and other water diver-
sion schemes that threaten to diminish Egypt's water
supply.
Concern over water sharing resulted in the Agree-
ment for the Full Utilization of the Nile Waters,
signed by Egypt and Sudan in 1959. Based on the
then average natural yield at Aswan (84 bcm), and on
the then assumed benefits and losses of the future
Lake Nasser, the agreement allotted Egypt 55.5 bcm.
Sudan's allotment, as measured at Aswan, is 18.5
bcm-equivalent to a flow of 20.5 bcm as measured
around Khartoum, upstream of which occurs most of
Sudan's consumption! The agreement also considered
a l0-bcm annual evaporation loss from the then
planned reservoir. The net benefit of any increased
yield in wet years was to be divided equally between
Egypt and Sudan. However, no provision was made
for years of reduced yield.
The agreement also considered the great volume of
Nile basin water lost in the swamps of southern Sudan
and called for development of projects to reduce these
losses. The costs and net water yield of these projects
were to be evenly divided. To date, only one of the
projects has been started. Construction of Phase I of
the 360-kilometer Jonglei Canal, which is planned to
divert water around As Sudd, at present is halted at
80-percent completion by insurgency in the region.
When and if completed, Phase I will increase yield by
4.3 bcm, according to project planners. Together with
the Jonglei Canal Phase II and other projects still
on paper, the Nile's yield is planned to increase by
18 bcm. Egypt's 9-bcm share of these projects would
help serve as insurance against future drought
(figure 9).
At present, Sudan's annual net water use is estimated
to be between 15.5 and 16.5 bcm. Almost 90 percent 9
of this is used to irrigate the 1.7 million hectares that
make up the various agricultural schemes along the
before it reaches Aswan
Nile and its tributaries in the central part of the
country. (These irrigated lands produce almost all of
the nation's cotton-its principal export crop-as well
as large amounts of oilseeds and grains.) Sudan uses
irrigated land much less intensively than does Egypt.
At any given time, as much as 40 percent of the land
lies fallow. This accounts for water needs per hectare
in Sudan that are only half those in Egypt. Private
households and industry use only 3 percent of Sudan's
water. Storage losses make up the remainder of
Sudan's annual water needs.
One reason Egypt survived the recent drought was
because Sudan has yet to use its full share of Nile
water allotted under the 1959 Agreement. As mea-
sured at Aswan, the amount of water that Sudan uses
annually is as much as 3.7 bcm less than its 18.5
entitlement. Therefore, assuming relatively constant
Sudanese use, about 22 bcm of extra water-water
that Sudan legally had the right to use-flowed into
Lake Nasser during the past six years. If Sudan had
used its full annual entitlement, reservoir volume last
July would have been around 30 bcm; all live storage
would have been gone, and generation of hydroelec-
tricity would have been nil.
If Sudan implements all the water-consuming pro-
grams called for in the 1979 Master Water Plan, the
US Bureau of Reclamation estimates that by the year
2000 it will be using some 26 bcm annually-5.5 bcm
more than its current entitlement, as measured at
Khartoum. Sudan's share of water saved by various
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
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conservation projects, including the Jonglci Canal and
a similar canal/flood embankment system diverting
water from the Khawr Machar (Machar Swamp) and
its high evaporation rates, would offset the increase in
planned use. At present rates of construction, howev-
er, we believe that Sudan will be hard pressed to meet
its conservation and usage goals in the next 15 years.
The only other riparian state of immediate concern to
Egypt is Ethiopia. Here, where 85 percent of the
Nile's water originates, plans developed with US
assistance before 1964 called for the use of 4 bcm a
year to irrigate areas along the Blue Nile and At-
barah Rivers. None of the water-using components of
these plans has gone beyond planning stages.
In the Lake Tana region, however, Italy is beginning
a series of' water regulation projects associated with
the Ethiopian Government's policy of population re-
settlement. By September 1986, the Italian Assis-
tance Fund plans to have completed the first phase of
a small dam on the Beles Wenz, creating a 10-million-
cubic-meter (mcm) reservoir. Several even smaller
downstream dams will follow, eventually providing
hydroelectric power for the area. Italy's most ambi-
tious project will be a dam at the outlet of Lake Tana,
raising the lake by 2 meters. A canal and tunnel
system will then convey Lake Tana water to the Beles
Valley for the irrigation of about 200,000 hectares:
such an irrigated area would use I bcm to 2 bcm
annually. Despite Italian assurances that a dam at
Lake Tana will not reduce the Nile's flow, but rather
will provide regulation beneficial to all parties, Egypt
remains concerned
result in open conflict.
Relations With Neighbors
We believe competition for Nile water will increase in
the next 15 years. Some development schemes, such
as the Jonglci Canal, ultimately may provide more
water, but not in the quantities needed to sustain
Egypt's burgeoning population and the development
policies of the upstream states. At current rates of
population growth, we estimate the river will have to
support twice as many people by the year 2010 as it
does today. This competition probably will lead to
strains between Egypt and upstream states, and may
In the event of prolonged drought, Egypt will proba-
bly rely on diplomacy to keep the water flowing, but
this option has limits. The US Embassy in Khartoum
reports that many Sudanese believe Egypt intends to
reap the lion's share of benefits from cooperative
water projects, and they resent Cairo's argument that
Sudan has other sources of water as well as a much
smaller population. Khartoum, meanwhile, is preoccu-
pied with an ongoing insurgency in the south and
appears in no hurry to complete the now suspended
Jonglei Canal, which lies in a contested area. Further-
more, the greatest of the Nile schemes the Aswan
High Dam and the bulk of Lake Nasser lies within
Egypt itself and enables the country to weather the
effects of drought far more easily than its upstream
neighbors.
Egypt has virtually no diplomatic leverage over Ethio-
pia. With a population of more than 40 million, no oil
or coal, and a history of recurrent drought, Ethiopia is
eager to begin exploiting its own Nile resources.
According to the US Embassy in Cairo, recent reports
that Addis Ababa plans a series of dams along the
Blue Nile have deeply shaken Egypt, yet Cairo's
attempts to discuss the issue have been rebuffed and
its diplomats have not been allowed to visit the areas
in question. In addition, although Ethiopia recently
joined the other riparian states at a Nile River
resources workshop in Bangkok, Addis Ababa has
refrained from participating in the Undugu group. In
our view, frosty relations have forced Cairo to behave
cautiously and to avoid initiatives Addis Ababa could
interpret as provocative.F____1 25X1
Egypt maintains sufficient defense forces to guard
against any threat to the river within its own territo-
ry- such as Libyan leader Qadhafi's reported plans to
attack the Aswan High Dam. An Egyptian surgical
attack on any future Ethiopian dams would be an act
of desperation and is highly unlikely, in our judgment,
for political and logistic reasons. However, Egypt
probably would consider supporting major dissident
forces in northern Ethiopia in hopes that a large
active insurgency would occupy Addis Ababa's ener-
gies and preclude dam construction, particularly in
contested areas.
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Domestic Concerns
We believe prolonged drought by itself is unlikely to
threaten political stability in Egypt unless food stocks
were allowed to become perilously low in the wake of
decreased agricultural production. Even so, civil un-
rest would probably ensue only if the government
were obviously derelict in procuring needed food
supplies from abroad. Such dereliction is highly un-
likel .
With the bulk of the population clustered on the
banks of the Nile, transportation of food to needy
areas would not be a problem. Finally, the Egyptians
are no strangers to drought, and the buffer provided
by Lake Nasser should give Cairo ample leadtime to
head off potential famine. The mechanism for food
imports is already in place Egypt has not been self-
sufficient in food for at least a decade and currently
imports more than half of its food requirements.
We estimate that by the year 2000 Egypt's available
water supply will increase by 4.8 bcm, from the
present 60.7 bcm to 65.5 bcm annually."' This projec-
tion is based on the assumption that Egypt will
increase its use of groundwater and reuse of irrigation
water and that Sudan will complete at least Phase I of
the Jonglei Canal project. Because these variables can
only be roughly approximated and could be affected
by political and economic changes within Egypt and
in the upstream nations, we have developed a range of
best case and worst case water supply scenarios for
the year 2000:
Worst
Case
Best
Case
Probable
Total
54.5
75.5
65.5
weragc inflow at Aswan
58.0
58.0
58.0
Increase resulting from up-
0.0
4.5
2.5
stream conservation projects
Decrease resulting from up-
9.0
0.0
- 3.7
stream use
Ground eater
0.5
1.0
0.7
Reuse
5.1)
1_.0
8.0
On the basis of several academic and government
projections, we believe that Egyptian water demand in
the year 2000 will be about 67 bcm, slightly more
than our estimate of the probable supply and consid-
erably more than our worst case scenario.
Egypt suffered few ill effects from this past drought
only because:
? Above-average rainfall in the mid-1970s had creat-
ed a reserve from which Egypt could draw.
? Almost 4 bcm annually flowed into Lake Nasser
that, by entitlement, could have been used by
Sudan.
? The drought did not continue a seventh year.
In the future, Egypt cannot rely on this combination
of circumstances. Considering the precarious nature
of the future supply-and-demand situation, if rainfall
remains normal (allowing little or no reservoir buildup
from excess rainfall) and if Sudan develops its agricul-
tural lands to the extent that it uses its full water
allotment or more, Egypt will be unable to pass
through a similar drought in the future without
disastrous consequences for its economy. Such a
situation would be likely to lead to confrontation with
upstream users over sharing of water resources.
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