INCIPIENT INSURGENCY: CHILE, ECUADOR, AND ARGENTINA

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP97R00694R000500700001-8
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 25
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: March 18, 2011
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: March 1, 1986
• Content Type: REPORT

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Directorate of =-'??
Intelligence
Argentina
Incipient Insurgency:
Chile, Ecuador, and
GI 86-10017
March 1986
Copy 2 3 0
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Incipient Insurgency:
Chile, Ecuador, and
Argentina
This paper was prepared by
Office of Global Issues. It was coordinated with the
Office of African and Latin American Analysis,
and the Directorate of Operations.
Comments and queries are welcome and may be
directed to the Chief, Foreign Subversion and
Instability Center, OGI
Secret
GI 86-10017
March 1986
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Incipient Insurgency:
Chile, Ecuador, and
Argentina
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Key Judgments Through a detailed study of past insurgencies, we have identified a
Information available consistent pattern of signs that a revolutionary group is developing the
as of 7 February 1986 organization, acquiring the resources, and undertaking the antigovernment
was used in this report.
activities associated with a serious insurgent threat. We used this analytic
framework to assess the present incipient insurgent movements in Chile,
Ecuador, and Argentina. We believe
that none of these
countries faces an immediate insurgent threat. However, conditions in the
three countries vary significantly:
? In Chile, the Communist Party (PCCh) with its affiliated terrorist
group-the Manuel Rodriguez Patriotic Front (FPMR) -is developing
the potential for a serious insurgent challenge to the Pinochet govern-
ment within the next few years.
? In Ecuador, the group Alfaro Vive, Carajo! (AVC) is also developing-
but at a much slower pace-into a viable insurgent organization.
? In Argentina, we find no indication of an emerging insurgent threat of
any serious proportion.
Chile's current social and political environment is turbulent and conducive
to the development of an insurgency. The PCCh is attempting to exploit
these conditions by developing its armed faction, recruiting thousands of
new members, acquiring extensive foreign assistance, stockpiling weapons,
and-through the FPMR-perpetrating terrorist activities. Although their
lack of broad-based popular support and conflict within their leadership
currently hinder PCCh efforts, we believe the Communists are developing
the organization and logistic base to support an armed insurrection within
a few years. Moreover, Chile's smaller Movement of the Revolutionary
Left is also rebuilding its support base, receiving extensive foreign assis-
tance, and acquiring weapons at a significant rate.
Ecuador's relative tranquillity has started to fray at the edges. Although
we believe a government-threatening situation is unlikely in the near
future, the AVC has become an irritant to the Febres-Cordero administra-
tion. The AVC is attracting new members, expanding its guerrilla training
activities, increasing its supply of arms, receiving military and political
training from Colombia's M-19, and engaging in violent activities. Never-
theless, AVC initiatives are on a significantly smaller scale than those of
the PCCh in Chile, and its political organization and program will require
considerable development before the AVC can mount an effective chal-
lenge to the Febres-Cordero regime. Ecuador's incipient insurgent threat
iii Secret
GI 86-10017
March 1986
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could be nipped in the bud if the government would press the military and
police to cooperate, take prc.npt steps to improve the capabilities of both
services, and succeed in obtaining counterinsurgency training and equip-
ment from foreign sources.
We believe the current situation in Argentina is not propitious for an
insurgency. Although political violence is on the rise in Argentina, it is
primarily the work of scattered groups of rightwing radicals with no
insurgent designs. Furthermore, the two formerly powerful insurgent
groups-the Montoneros and the Worker's Revolutionary Party/People's
Revolutionary Army-are currently restricted in their activity by a lack of
internal leadership and popular support.
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Key Judgments
Introduction
A Framework for Analyzing Incipient Insurgency
Chile: A Growing Insurgency Threat
2
The Social-Political Climate
2
A Leading Actor and One Aspirant
4
The PCCh
4
The MIR
6
Ecuador: A Potential Insurgency Threat
7
The Social-Political Climate
7
One Leading Actor and Three Aspirants
8
AVC
8
The PCMLE
10
The PSRE
11
The PCE
II
Prospects for Group Cooperation
II
Argentina: A Minor Insurgency Threat
11
The Social-Political Climate
12
The Floundering Left
13
The Montoneros
13
The PRT/ERP
15
Terror From the Right
15
16
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An insurgent organization must recruit and train personnel, obtain
information on potential adversaries, locate and procure materials
for its operations, raise funds, and produce and distribute services
or products. An insurgent organization is distinguished from most
others by the use of violence to accomplish the group's ultimate
goal: to erode existin law, order, and authority and supplant them
with its own.77
? Evidence of multiple thefts of weapons.
? Evidence that a group has access to or has stolen special
equipment for example, multiple thefts of amateur band trans-
ceivers, hand-held VHF/UHF radios, directional antennas, cas-
sette recorders, calculators, typewriters, and printing presses.
? Evidence of robberies, kidnap ransoms, narcotics income, or
Indicators that are manifestations of insurgent activities will
become apparent as the group:
? Seeks where and how to obtain resources people, food, materi-
el, finances, and information.
? Determines how to use and develop these resources-strategy,
tactics, indoctrination, training, logistic support, and operations.
? Decides how to target the existing social, economic, and political
in addition to searching for signs of a potential insurgency, it is
useful to assess the strength and depth of the alleged guerrilla
movement. This framework presents indicators-which have both
a quantitative and a qualitative dimension designed to help an
analyst determine whether a serious insurgency is developing. They
Organization and Recruitment:
? Sudden departure of large numbers of young and/or skilled
people for some form of training or indoctrination.
? Defection of a noticeable number of members, especially leaders,
from one political party or organization to a more radical party.
? Measurable increase in ideological proselytizing in rural areas.
? Increase in travelers from proinsurgency countries or the return
of exiles.
? Reports of cells in urban areas.
? Press leaks on guerrilla plans or programs to change the country.
Training:
? Reports of people training with arms or the identification of
nongovernment military training sites.
? Reports of people receiving training outside the country or of
Acquiring Resources:
? Discovery of arms and materiel caches, collections ofpolice
uniforms or military clothing, stockpiling of explosives.
Outside Support:
? Evidence of money, training, arms, and materiel provided by
foreign governments.
? Evidence of assistance from or cooperation with foreign insurgent
groups. F_~
Actions/Use of Violence:
? Emergence of radical violence, including bombings and attacks
against government personnel and buildings, essential utilities,
symbolic targets, or foreign-owned properties.
? Reports of infiltration into the government, labor unions, and
political parties.
? Overzealous support of land reform, including non-government-
sponsored expropriation of land or the establishment of squat-
ters' encampments.
? Sightings of armed people in rural areas.
? Reports of meetings at which discussions center on initiating
violence.
? Discovery of forgeries and counterfeiting capabilities.
? Assassinations of authority figures or religious leaders.
? Violence in foreign countries directed against the diplomatic
community of the country of concern.
? Production and circulation of large quantities of radical
propaganda.
? Establishment offront organizations.
Popular Support:
? Evidence that insurgents have connections with legitimate
groups-political parties, labor unions, the church.
? Growing media coverage of insurgent activities.
? Evidence that the number of sympathizers is growing for
example, people who are not formal members but support
demonstrations.
? Indications that the insurgents are increasingly sensitive to
public attitudes and reactions.
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Incipient Insurgency:
Chile, Ecuador, and
Argentina
Government counteraction against insurgencies can
be extremely effective if it is initiated early-during
the incipient stage, when they are most vulnerable.
Similarly, foreign support at this time for either the
insurgents or the government can be crucial to the
conflict's outcome. Identification of incipient insur-
gent movements before they become a full-blown
threat to existing governments is, therefore, critical to
all parties.F_~
The concept "incipient insurgency" encompasses situ-
ations ranging from those in which subversive activity
by a new insurgent group is a potential threat to those
in which antigovernment incidents occur frequently
and display organization and forethought. By defini-
tion, the outbreak of guerrilla warfare signals the
passage of an insurgency from its incipient to a more
advanced stage.
We developed a framework for evaluating the poten-
tial seriousness of an incipient insurgency and used it
to assess the insurgency situation in Chile, Ecuador,
and Argentina. These case studies were chosen be-
cause of the countries' diverse political systems, cul-
tural traits, economic problems, propensity toward
unrest, and the differing degree to which each country
is faced with a developing insurgency problem.n
While many developing countries experience some
form of incipient insurgency, only a few of these
nascent movements ever become a serious threat to
the government. A full-blown, government-
threatening insurgency is a large, complex, protracted
political-military activity. Such an effort requires
extensive organization. Any revolutionary group seek-
ing to mount a formidable insurgent threat must
develop an organizational structure, acquire weapons
and supplies, recruit and train people, gather intelli-
gence, and broadcast beliefs and goals. It may also
choose to incite riots or work stoppages, infiltrate the
legitimate political apparatus, and engage in terror-
ism. These organizing activities are the defining char-
acteristics of an insurgency in its incipient stage. 0
We have developed a conceptual framework, which 25X1
encompasses these organizing activities, to help us
identify those incipient insurgent movements with the
potential to mount a serious challenge to an incum-
bent regime. Our framework assumes that the major
preconditions for an insurgency are-to some de-
gree-already in place:
? A predisposing environment-the existence of popu-
lar grievances and lack of faith in the government.
? A catalyst-a revolutionary group able to exploit
these grievances and initiate the activities required
for an infant insurgency to flourish.
We developed our framework by conducting an exten- 25X1
sive review of the academic literature related to the
incipient stage of every major insurgency since World
War II. Special attention was devoted to the writings
of insurgent leaders and others who described the
developmental activities of various movements. Simul-
taneously, an external study to identify indicators of a
growing insurgent threat was contracted and the
results melded with our own research.'
We divided the various signs of a growing insurgent
threat into six categories: organization and recruit-
ment, training, outside support, action/use of vio-
lence, and popular support (see inset, "The
Framework"). Evidence of four occurrences should, in
our judgment, be considered especially alarming: 25X1
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Id/, Ail vibe
Falkland Islands
~IS~aS Mnl.inasl
Boundary representation i.
not necessarily autnoru.nv.
? The receipt of substantial assistance-funds, arms,
or training-from foreign governments or other
insurgent groups.
? The receipt of extensive guerrilla training.
? The acquisition and caching of large quantities of
weapons and supplies.
? The creation of an organization, with both a politi-
cal and a military arm, which is capable of substan-
tially increasing its membership.
Chile: A Growing Insurgency Threat
The Chilean Government is currently faced with a
series of interrelated problems that could fuel an
insurgency. Political parties-all of which are techni-
cally illegal-are agitating for an early return to
democracy, the economy suffers from inflation and
high unemployment, and the radical left is actively
engaged in terrorism. While we do not anticipate the
outbreak of guerrilla war in the next two years,
according to press information,
signs of a growing insurgent threat are already
evident:
? Foreign governments have escalated their training,
financing, and arming of radical leftists in Chile.
? A sizable Chilean exile community in Latin Ameri-
ca and Europe actively funnels resources and per-
sonnel into Chile to aid radical leftists.
? Terrorism continues at a high rate despite govern-
ment countermeasures.
? Some radical leftist groups are actively organizing
and expanding their membership at significant
rates.
? Radical leftist activities are becoming more wide-
spread throughout the country.
The Social-Political Climate
President Augusto Pinochet, ruling dictator of Chile
since the 1973 military coup that ousted Salvador
Allende, heads a government that has now faced more
than two years of frequent, violent demonstrations. In
part, the problem has been Chile's faltering economy,
which has endured three years of recession or stagna-
tion, an unemployment rate officially pegged at 13
percent, and an inflation rate of about 30 percent.
After experiencing healthy economic growth during
the 1970s, an increasing number of Chileans are now
faced with subsistence salaries and little hope of
improvement in the next few years. In addition,
widespread discontent has been fueled by the govern-
ment's laborious transition to democracy. With the
government's refusal to negotiate with the opposition
coalition formed in 1985, tolerate a free press, or hold
elections, popular frustrations have few outlets short
of civil disobedience or-in the case of the radical
left-terrorism (see photos).
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7)pical antigovernment demon-
strations and riot scene in
Pinochet has shown his willingness to deal forcefully
with what he views as attempts to erode the stability
of his regime, as evidenced by his declaring a state of
siege during the countrywide riots in 1983 and 1984.
Embassy reporting indicates that the Chilean security
forces have sufficient resources to deal effectively
with subversive actions. Fourteen Chilean police offi-
cers (Carabineros) have been implicated in the March
1985 slaying of three Communist Party members, and
there is speculation in the press that the Carabineros
were involved in the deaths of a police detainee in
February of that year and a university student three
months later. Moreover, a rash of assaults on individ-
uals linked to human rights advocates, exiles, and
Communist Party members also occurred in 1985.
Although the perpetrators have been "unidentified
civilians," the press further speculates that active or
retired security force members were involved.)
For the present, considering the strength of the police,
we believe the Pinochet government remains firmly in
control and the threat of widespread insurgent violent
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in the near term remains low. We have seen no
evidence to suggest that the Chilean populace is
prepared to support insurgent violence or that centrist
and rightist political elements would collaborate with
the radical left to overthrow the Pinochet regime.
Nevertheless, the radical left will continue to benefit
from any further economic deterioration and from
any additional government action that undermines the
democratic opposition as a meaningful political actor.
Over the longer term, Pinochet's intransigence toward
the moderate opposition and any further curtailment
of human rights could cause the situation to deterior-
iate and provide an opportunity for the radical left to
make gains through violence. Our analysis shows, for
example, that two radical leftist groups in particular
are mobilizing for action, one at an alarming rate.
A Leading Actor and One Aspirant
We believe the Chilean Communist Party (PCCh) is
developing the organization and logistic base capable
of supporting an armed struggle in the next few years.
Another group-the Movement of the Revolutionary
Left (MIR) -has also shown some insurgent potential
but is currently overshadowed by the PCCh. F----]
The PCCh. A pro-Moscow party with legal status
until 1973, the Chilean Communist Party once advo-
cated a "peaceful road" to socialism, according to its
official party line. Following the Pinochet coup, how-
ever, the PCCh was declared illegal and forced under-
ground. This change in status-coupled with events in
Nicaragua in 1979, and
alleged Soviet urging-prompted the PCCh
to revise its approach. In September 1980, the party's
Secretary General publicly enunciated the essence of
a new party line-armed struggle. F__-]
In late 1983,
the PCCh reinforced its commitment to violence by
supporting the formation of a new terrorist group-
the Manuel Rodriguez Patriotic Front (FPMR). We
believe that the PCCh did not create the FPMR but
has made every effort to dominate and direct the
organization:
? The FPMR was originally composed of leftist radi-
cal youths from a variety of organizations, but the
PCCh is now placing an increasing number of its
own trained youths in FPMR ranks
tween 20,000 and 30,000 adult members and
installing its members at every level of FPMR
leadership.
During the past two years, numerous signs have
pointed to the PCCh's becoming an insurgent threat
of potentially serious proportions:
- Despite a government crackdown on the PCCh
and its isolation in the Chilean political sphere,
Communist Party membership has grown and
continues to grow at a significant rate.
the PCCh is also
a 1984 recruitment
drive doubled the PCCh membership to be-
This growth rein-
orces the PCCh's position as the second-largest
political party in Chile.
20,000 youth members
the size of
the FPMR, we estimate that this group now
numbers several hundred.
maintains a sepa-
rate armed wing-possibly as large as 2,000
members-in a reserve status.
the PCCh has organized local-
level "Rodriguez Militias" to protect PCCh-
controlled slum areas in the major cities.
a sizable
number of PCCh members-adults and
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youths-have received guerrilla training provid-
ed by the USSR, Algeria, East Germany, Cuba,
Nicaragua, and Bulgaria. Reinfiltrated, often
through Argentina, these trainees are subse-
quently assigned either to the party's armed
reserve or to the FPMR.
aid in the form of arms, training, propaganda,
and funds is received from the USSR, East
Germany, Bulgaria, Cuba, Nicaragua, and Al-
geria. We believe that the Soviet Union is
probably the most generous of these benefac-
tors, and press and radio reports show that the
PCCh Secretary General resides in Moscow.
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The PCCh also receives support from foreign
Within Chile, the PCCh has conducted guerril-
la training for members near Concepcion and in
remote parts of the country
subversive groups. For example,
the Argen-
tine Communist Party and the Montoneros are
providing training and weapons to the affiliated 25X1
FPMR.
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The PCCh is actively involved in arms smug-
gling
? Actions/use of violence:
PCCh-sponsored terrorism and risk taking by
affiliated FPMR members have escalated. The25X1
FPMR has-in the past two years-engaged ir 25X1
bombings, attacks on police stations, kidnap-
ings, and disruptions of TV broadcasts. These
actions have claimed police and civilian lives, as
well as sacrificed FPMR members.
providing weapons and ammunition to the
PCCh, although we are unaware of the exact
types.
Well-organized PCCh exile components con-
tribute extensively to the party's effort to ex-
pand its resources. Press reports indicate that
PCCh fundraising campaigns abroad bring in
hundreds-of-thousands of dollars every year,
and the contributions are growing.
exiles also help funnel
arms and trained guerrillas into Chile.
ment support.
future Communist 25X1
plans call for increasing this violence but with
an eye to being more selective and reinforcing
PCCh objectives, such as expanding popular 25X1
support.
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FPMR activities have shown increased bravado
and tactical sophistication. Even during last
November's state of siege, the FPMR was able
to carry out activities-including power black-
outs-that blanketed most of the country. Ac-
cording to a variety of press and Embassy
reporting, the PCCh has also begun to hit
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American targets, including a car bombing at
the American Consulate and bombings of Mor-
mon churches and ITT and Chase Manhattan
offices.
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- PCCh-organized protests in early September
1985 were the best organized and most violent
in two years. Although only a partial success,
these protests reduced economic activity by
disrupting businesses and transportation
networks.
the PCCh's
organization is extensive; is active throughout the
country; and is the guiding hand behind a num-
ber of front organizations, local help groups, and
labor unions. Included in its fronts are the Met-
ropolitan Poor People's Coordinator, the Cultural
Coordinator, Women of Chile, the Committee in
Defense of the Rights of the People, and the
Committee in Defense of the Rights of the
Youth. In labor, the El Surco Campesino Union,
the Mine Workers' Union, and the Construction
Workers' Union are PCCh dominated. The
PCCh also influences the Metropolitan Workers'
Command, the General Grouping of Chilean
Educators, and the Chilean Human Rights
Commission.
According to Embassy reporting, the PCCh has
also created the Popular Democratic Movement
(MPD), a political front including other radical
organizations, which is designed to compete
openly in the existing political environment.
We believe, in the aggregate, these signs indicate that
the PCCh is amassing the capability to pose a serious
insurgent threat to stability in Chile within the next
several years. Whether they will initiate widespread
insurgent activity, however, will depend on political
and economic developments inside Chile and on the
PCCh's ability to rectify difficulties currently retard-
ing their organizing efforts.
Although the PCCh has successfully attracted sup-
porters from various sectors of Chilean society, we
believe it remains unable to fully mobilize these
groups to achieve its goals. Many PCCh-sponsored
strikes and demonstrations during 1984 and the first
half of 1985 were abysmal failures; sporadic violence
was sparked, but physical control of neighborhoods
and work stoppages could not be sustained. The
partial success of the PCCh-sponsored demonstrations
in September 1985 was significant because the mod-
erate opposition and the Catholic Church discouraged
participation. However, these demonstrations fell far
short of the type of rioting tha. could bring the
government to its knees.
Finally, the PCCh continues to experience problems
controlling its affiliate, the FPMR.
FPMR commando groups-still mostly com-
posed of Cuban-trained PCCh youths and a variety of
leftists from other organizations-have been known to
initiate violent activities without official party approv-
al. Some of these activities have been counterproduc-
tive, generating animosity instead of support among
the public.
The MIR. Another radical group-the Movement of
the Revolutionary Left-is currently active in Chile,
although it does not possess the resources, following,
or cohesiveness of the PCCh. Founded in 1965, the
MIR is a Marxist-Leninist, anti-US, Castroite guer-
rilla organization whose peak activity occurred during
the Allende regime in the early 1970s. The MIR once
boasted 10,000 members until it was targeted and
decimated by government security forces following
the 1973 coup. It is now trying to regain its strength
after numerous setbacks.
We currently see a few concrete indicators that the
MIR is trying to increase its strength:
? MIR members-estimated active membership is
400-have received insurgent training in Cuba and
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Libya, ~ Em-
bassy reporting describes MIR guerrillas as better
prepared and more professional than their FPMR
counterparts.
? A raid on a safehouse in La Paz, Bolivia, uncovered
a two-year-old arms smuggling operation that fun-
neled weapons into Chile, possibly for the MIR.
Additionally, press reports of a police capture of a
large arms shipment-which included antitank
weapons-in the Peruvian-Chilean border area
linked the weapons to the MIR.
Guayaquil
0 50 100 150 Kilometers
0 50 100 150 Miles
some?y ,ep,esama0on a
nm nacaasarily -m-18110.
situation could develop.
While these signs and the MIR's past reputation are
sufficient to cause concern for the Pinochet govern-
ment, we believe this insurgent group is not large
enough and currently lacks the organizational capa-
bilities, resources, and political savvy to mount a
serious insurgent threat. Should the PCCh and the
MIR pool their resources, however, a more serious
the two may cooperate in political mat-
activities and armed actions.
ters-through the MPD-but each generally main-
tains its distance and autonomy in organizing
Latin American analysts have long considered Ecua-
dor to be a peaceful haven in a continent ravaged by
revolution, but its relatively tranquil existence is
starting to fray at the edges. An examination of the
country's political, economic, and social climate re-
veals a complex mesh of problems and unsettling
changes. While we believe a government-threatening
situation is unlikely in the near future, some signs of a
potential insurgent threat are already in evidence,
? Foreign governments and insurgents are providing
increasing amounts of arms, money, and effective
guerrilla training to Ecuadorean leftist groups.
? A new phenomenon, the use of violence by leftist
groups, has emerged, with some incidents resulting
in deaths. 25X1
? Subversive activities are occurring in both urban
and rural areas of the country.
? Some guerrilla training is taking place within 25X1
Ecuador.
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The Social-Political Climate
Ecuador, like most developing countries, has experi-
enced economic difficulties in recent years. In the late
1970s and early 1980s, the country experienced the
classic "boom-bust" cycle of a single-export economy:
its economy soared following the discovery of oil
reserves in the Oriente, then collapsed in 1982 with
the drop in oil prices. While the government has been
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successful-compared with other Latin American
countries-in reversing the recent recession, its eco-
nomic adjustments and belt-tightening have contrib-
uted to the frustrations of workers and the middle
class who had grown accustomed to the rising wealth
of the 1970s]
The current administration, elected in 1984 and head-
ed by President Febres-Cordero, is characterized in
the Ecuadorean press as a fiscally conservative, pro-
US government that supports free enterprise and
encourages foreign investment. Open sources show
that Febres-Cordero has been successful in reschedul-
ing Ecuador's debt and has lured some foreign inves-
tors to help boost his country's economy. However, his
policies have done little to improve housing and
human services. Consequently, Febres-Cordero has
been an easy target for the left, which depicts him as a
puppet of foreigners and unconcerned with the plight
of Ecuador's poor. F__-]
Ecuador's universities have served-since the return
to civilian rule in 1979-as a haven for many of these
leftists whose criticisms have begun to wear at the
patience of the Febres-Cordero government. While
Febres-Cordero's predecessor championed a human
rights policy that supported the Latin American
tradition of autonomy for universities and prevented
police and military troops from entering campus
grounds, Febres-Cordero has stated publicly that he
intends to crack down.
he is trying to alter university funding to deny
certain groups financial support and ensure that
academic trips do not include travel to Soviet Bloc
countries. Febres-Cordero's "get tough" policy was
also evident in his government's reaction to a widely
publicized kidnaping by leftists of a Guayaquil busi-
nessman in late August 1985. Several of the kidnap-
ers-some while in police custody-as well as the
innocent victim were killed.
We believe these minimal crackdowns will, however,
do little to combat the growing tide of subversive
activity, terrorism, and insurgent organizing now evi-
dent throughout Ecuador. Combating these problems
will require an enhanced effort by a government
bureaucracy and security forces currently ill prepared
for the task. Ecuador's loose legal
system lacks strong antisubversion laws, and a strong
habeas corpus writ aids leftists in gaining rapid
release from jail. Moreover, the government has been
reluctant to admit that it is confronted with a poten-
tial insurgency problem and has, therefore, not allo-
cated the resources to cope with it. Our Embassy
reports that the Ecuadorean military does not have a
career intelligence branch, lacks a planning director-
ate for civic action problems, will not cooperate or
share information with the police, and has insufficient
funding to allow for the development of dedicated
counterinsurgency units. Against this backdrop, at
least one Ecuadorean group is hard at work building
toward an insurgency.
One Leading Actor and Three Aspirants
We believe the group Alfaro Vive, Carajo! (AVC) is
becoming a significant insurgent organization. Three
other groups-the Communist Party of Ecuador/
Marxist Leninist (PCMLE), the Revolutionary Social-
ist Party of Ecuador (PSRE), and the Ecuadorean
Communist Party (PCE)-show virtually no signs of
becoming serious insurgent threats and are currently
engaged in only limited subversive activities. Their
motivations, convictions, and strategies require exten-
sive development before these groups will be able to
challenge the government.
The AVC. Alfaro Vive, Carajo!'s 2 beginnings as an
insurgent organization in 1983 were hardly auspi-
cious. Seventeen of its members were arrested in
Esmeraldas Province during one of the group's first
military exercises, and its other activities were little
more than minor media events. In 1984, more mem-
bers were arrested by the police, and their confessions
led to the discovery of safehouses and foiled AVC
plans.
During the past year, however, the AVC has begun to
establish a more impressive performance record, in-
cluding a successful attack on a naval base, a clever
' Roughly translated, Alfaro Vive, Carajo! means Alfaro Lives,
Damn It! and is a tribute to a popular Ecuadorean revolutionary,
Eloy Alfaro, who led an unsuccessful revolt in the early 1900s. F
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Cordero government.
prison break that freed four AVC members, and a
well-planned raid on a poorly guarded Quito police
warehouse in which more than 100 weapons were
stolen. As a result, the AVC is becoming a growing
irritant-if not yet a challenge--to the Febres-
The AVC is significantly expanding its indigenous
resource base-funds, personnel, training, and mate-
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tive signs of a deepening AVC threat are the
following:
The AVC is attracting new members at a
substantial rate; we estimate its size has tripled
since 1984.
we peg the membership
at somewhere between 300 and 500. We also
estimate that fewer than 300 are highly dedicat-
ed, action-oriented participants. Most of the
AVC's members are probably recruited from
college campuses, where the AVC has extensive
contacts
the AVC's future recruitment efforts will also
target farmers and workers.
-- The AVC has expanded its insurgent training
activities. In addition to the training it has
previously conducted in Esmeraldas Province,
the AVC is
now conducting paramilitary training in the
east Ecuadorean jungle and that several AVC
members were sent to the Oriente to identify
some AVC members travel to
El Salvador, Nicaragua, Colombia, and Cuba to
receive guerrilla instruction.
Weapons are also obtained through AVC raids
on government installations. In March 1985,
the AVC raided a Quito police station, obtain-
ing 100 rifles and 20 pistols, according to press
accounts. In May 1985,
the AVC stole weapons during a 25X1
raid on the Manta Naval Base. 25X1
There is substantial evidence of a close relation-
ship between the AVC and the M-19, the well-
established Colombian insurgent group. The
AVC has received extensive military and politi-
cal training from the M-19,
and we believe this relation-
ship is a major reason for the recent sophistica-
tion and success of AVC operations.
the AVC's
governing body, the Central Committee, is
headquartered in Colombia,
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the AVC
is also seeking closer coordination and support
from other Latin American liberation fronts
from Nicaragua, and
a political arm to augment their military capabil-
ities the
AVC wants to gain the political backing of
"progressive" representatives in Congress and to
establish a front to represent the group publicly
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some AVC members have served
? Actions/use of violence:
- The AVC has shown a determination to expand
operations beyond Quito and Guayaquil by
conducting activities in both rural and urban
areas. part
of the AVC strategy is to establish operational
bases in all areas of the country.
Recent AVC insurgent activities have increas-
ingly demonstrated the group's ability to plan
complex operations and its willingness to take
risks. For example, in August 1985, the AVC
conducted its first serious kidnaping-a virtual
rite-of-passage for guerrilla groups. The opera-
tion, a joint effort with the M-19, ended when
Ecuadorean security forces stormed the build-
ing in which the kidnap victim was being held.
Although seven insurgents died as a result of
this operation, the AVC has announced it will
continue to kidnap Ecuadorean "oligarchs."
- The AVC leadership has indicated that they
want to expand their organization by developing
and convey its political beliefs.
We believe the AVC's newfound capabilities and
plans represent impressive gains for an inchoate insur-
gent organization. However, the AVC is far from
achieving the status and potential of several other
Latin American insurgents-for example, Peru's
Shining Path; El Salvador's FMLN; or the AVC's
patron saint, the M-19. The AVC still lacks the
extensive organization and resources of these groups
Should the govern-
ment improve its capabilities and dedicate resources
to countering insurgent activity, the AVC would be
vulnerable. While President Febres-Cordero has made
some improvements and pledged to enact needed
reforms, we judge that not enough has been done.
offer the public a viable political alternative.
The AVC also currently lacks a broad base of popular
support. Although intrigued by the AVC, the Ecua-
dorean public generally remains opposed to violence.
Consequently, we believe, on the basis of Embassy
reporting, that the AVC has not received backing
from any sector of the populace, except for students.
Furthermore, we believe the AVC lacks the political
leadership required to generate popular support and
elicit cooperation from other Ecuadorean leftist
groups. While AVC rhetoric espouses a desire to
change the Ecuadorean economic and political sys-
tems-"to establish a people's government"-its po-
litical goals form a generic, leftist wishlist that fails to
The PCMLE. The Communist Party of Ecuador/
Marxist Leninist shows only minor signs of incipient
insurgent activity.
Albania is the sole source of foreign
government support for the PCMLE, and the group's
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labor organizations.
only known source of external paramilitary training is
a Colombian insurgent group, the People's Liberation
Army. The PCMLE's main activities are political and
often legal. The PCMLE holds key positions in
Ecuador's legal Popular Democratic Movement, is
active in militant student groups, and is influential in
In July 1984, the PCMLE did conduct paramilitary
training for its entire organization over a three-day
period This
annual training reportedly included hand to hand
combat, party discipline, small-arms training, molotov
cocktail design, judo, and clandestine cross-country
movement. However, we have seen no sign that the
PCMLE plans to put this training to use.
the group recognizes that its small size and
activity.
insufficient resources limit its destabilizing potential.
Rather, the group aims to exert its influence and
create unrest through student groups and through its
own youth movement-the Revolutionary Youth of
Ecuador. Additionally, the PCMLE reportedly doubts
its ability to withstand a government backlash and
subsequent repression should it engage in more violent
Ecuador are generally insubstantial ones.
The PSRE. The few incipient insurgent indicators
associated with the Revolutionary Socialist Party of
the PSRE receives some assistance
from Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, Cuba, and Nicara-
gua-vehicles, printing presses, arms, money, and
guerrilla and propaganda training-and is maintain-
ing some guerrilla capability. However, we do not
believe its resource base is of worrisome proportions,
and the
Prefect of Esmeraldas Province.
PSRE's known record of criminal activity consists of
two bank robberies in 1983. Resembling those of the
PCMLE, the PSRE's activities have primarily been
political. The PSRE has organized strikes and demon-
strations, and recently one of its members was elected
engages primarily in political activities.
The PCE. The pro-Moscow Ecuadorean Communist
Party is the most passive of Ecuador's subversive
groups. The PCE, like the PCMLE and the PSRE,
the PCE controls the 25X1
Broad Leftist Front party and Ecuador's largest labor
federation-the Ecuadorean Confederation of Work-
ers. The PCE also maintains a significant influence in
the Workers' Unity Front.
We have seen no evidence of foreign-supplied arms,
guerrilla training, or links between the PCE and
foreign insurgents. Moreover, the party appears unde-25X1
cided about whether to develop a guerrilla capability.
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Prospects for Group Cooperation. Unification of
Ecuador's subversive groups would pose a significant
threat to the country's stability by challenging the
government with a radical leftist front that in the
aggregate-would possess significant resources.
Nonetheless, we do not believe such a union will
evolve in the near future. AVC efforts to promote a 25X1
cohesive leftist challenge to the Febres-Cordero gov-
ernment have been largely unsuccessful. F_ 25X1
both the PCMLE and 25X1
the PSRE refuse to support the AVC, partially to 25X1
protect their own autonomy and out of fear of govern-25X1
ment retribution. Furthermore, we see no indication
of cooperation between the PCMLE, the PSRE, and
the PCE. 25X1
Argentina: A Minor Insurgency Threat
Violence has long been a factor in Argentine politics
and its sources historically have been indigenous the
government, often military juntas, forcefully quelling
discontent or guerrilla groups at war with the regime.
While the current political situation in Argentina is 25X1
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South
Atlantic
Ocean
Boundary representarlon is
nor necessarily eorriorlrarve.
Falkland Islands
IIslsis Mal-as)
characterized by the sporadic outbreak of violence, we
see none of the signs of a growing or serious insurgent
threat:
? Despite an increase in terrorist activity during the
past year, the overall level of terrorism remains low.
? Although police raids have uncovered some arms
caches and evidence of arms smuggling, the quanti-
ties have not been alarming compared with other
Latin American situations.
tions of guerrilla instruction have been observed.
? While exiled members of insurgent groups are
trying to obtain foreign support, we have little
evidence of success.
? Although radical leftists are infiltrating student and
agricultural groups, we believe these activities cur-
rently pose a minor threat.F____1
Moreover, the most serious of the indicators listed
above-terrorism and arms caches-generally are not
attributable to actions by the left. Rightwing extrem-
ists have most often been the source. Because they
lack organization and resources, however, we do not
believe that these extremists constitute an incipient
insurgent movement.
The Social-Political Climate
We believe the current situation in Argentina is not
conducive to insurgency, although the country's social
and political culture has often been characterized by
extremism that gravitates toward chaos. The current
civilian democracy-the latest government in 50
years of flip-flopping civilian and military regimes-is
widely popular, and there is little indication of any
support for a violent solution to the country's lingering
problems.
Alfonsin inherited a plethora of problems when he
succeeded the military junta in October 1983; these
included a shattered economy, political fallout from
the Falklands defeat, and a grassroots demand for
justice following the abuses and repression of a mas-
sive counterterrorist campaign. To cope with these
difficulties, Alfonsin:
? Launched a new economic program designed to
reduce the federal deficit, lower the inflation rate,
and appease the middle class. This program staved
off economic chaos in 1985, and the International
Monetary Fund was sufficiently pleased to recom-
mend a rescheduling of Argentina's debts.
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? Brought the nine junta members who ruled Argenti-
na during the antiterrorist campaign to trial; a few
lower ranking officers may also be prosecuted for
human rights violations. These trials should partial-
ly appease human rights groups that are currently
agitating for justice. Simultaneously, by limiting
prosecutions to a few military officers, Alfonsin
should, for the most part, be able to avoid provoking
the military.
? Balanced the military trials with the prosecution of
Mario Firmenich-founder of the Montoneros guer-
rilla group-and other insurgent leaders. By forcing
Firmenich's extradition from Brazil on charges of
homicide and kidnaping, Alfonsin has shown the
right wing he will not play favorites, while sending
out a warning to the left that a resurgence of
guerrilla activities will not be tolerated.
? Gutted the government's civilian intelligence ser-
vices in order to purge them of individuals left over
from the so-called dirty war against terrorism in the
1970s.
reporting.
? Taken steps through significant trade and commer-
cial agreements with Cuba and Nicaragua to per-
suade each to refrain from any future support for
Argentine leftist movements, according to Embassy
To Alfonsin's advantage, the advent of democracy in
Argentina has allowed for greater political freedom
and once again given Argentines a sense of stake in
the system. It has also undermined the appeal of the
radical left by removing the perception of a common
enemy-the junta. But Argentina's nascent democra-
cy remains troubled by persistent political factional-
ism. Because of the disarray in the Peronist party, we
believe there is currently no credible civilian alterna-
tive to Alfonsin. Consequently, the only alternative
remains the military, which is now staying out of
politics but has a suspicious and defensive attitude
toward Alfonsin that eventually could lead it to
challenge civilian rule again.
In late October, Alfonsin exacerbated the tension
between his administration and the military by arrest-
ing 12 alleged conspirators, six of whom were military
officers. The arrests were clumsily executed, and
Alfonsin subsequently declared a state of siege to
justify the detentions. Although the arrests received
popular support, Embassy reporting indicates that the
bungling government procedures and state of siege
only served to fuel military grievances.)
press accounts indicate that
many in the military are also disturbed by Alfonsin's
assault on the security forces-especially his purging
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of officers associated with the dirty war-and his cuts
in the defense budget, which they believe have weak-
ened Argentina's defenses against resurgence of radi-
cal violence. Moreover, despite effective antisubver-
sion laws, distrust, rivalry, and a lack of coordination
and communication are typical of the various security
organizations that must implement them, according to
Embassy reporting. While the government probably
could contain sporadic attacks by the left, a concerted
effort by leftist insurgents or rightwing extremists
could threaten the still fragile government. Fortunate-
ly, from Alfonsin's perspective, there is little evidence
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The Floundering Left
Argentina has long been the home of a number of
insurgent groups, especially the once powerful and
notorious Montoneros and the Worker's Revolution-
ary Party/People's Revolutionary Army (PRT/ERP). 25X1
While these insurgents rocked Argentina's stability in
the 1970s, their orga- 25X1
nizations are now weak and ineffective. Most of their
members are still in exile, and their activities remain
unpalatable in the political climate of a popular
democracy
The Montoneros.
the once formidable Montoneros are now a fictiona-
lized radical organization in the midst of a search for
its identity. F_ I 25X1
one of these factions-part of the Monton25X1
eros' provisional leadership-met in April 1985 to
discuss the need for organizational cohesiveness and
direction. We believe these discussions indicate that 25X1
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the Montoneros are hoping to rebuild their organiza-
tion in anticipation of an eventual return to promi-
nence and violence. We have observed a few signs that
support this belief:
the
Montoneros are pressing hard to infiltrate student,
labor, and political groups, including leftist factions
of the Peronist party, the Peronist University Youth,
and the Union of Secondary Students.
urban front organiza-
tions are being developed-for example, the Peron-
ist Syndicates Association and the Peronist Trade
Union Groups.
the Montoneros have also developed a rural
front strategy designed to capitalize on growing
discontent in agricultural areas of the country and
infiltrate rural cooperatives in Buenos Aires and
Santa Fe Provinces.
? The Montoneros continue to keep their cause in the
public eye by publishing the magazine Latino
America.
The Montoneros are beset with leadership problems
that will limit their effectiveness for the foreseeable
future. Besides the recently extradited Firmenich, two
other Montonero leaders were arrested upon their
return to Argentina in December 1983. The rest of
the Montonero top leadership, Robert Perdia and
Fernando Vaca, are currently seeking political asylum
abroad.
The Montoneros are a nationalistic, antioligarchy
organization with ideological roots in Peronism and
Marxism-Leninism. Now primarily identified by
their political arm, the Peronist Montonero move-
ment, the Mon-
toneros seek to reunify the fragmented Peronist
movement-or at least influence it-and work to-
ward establishing a "national liberation movement."
Originally organized as a legal Peronist youth group
in the late 1960s, the Montoneros emerged in 1970 as
a guerrilla organization. It was disowned by Peron
upon his return to power in 1973. The Montoneros
then merged with the Revolutionary Armed Forces
and the Armed Forces of Liberation-two other
Argentine guerrilla groups-and incorporated Com-
munist themes.)
Between 1970 and 1975, the Montoneros grew into a
large, well-structured insurgent organization that en-
gaged in assassinations, bombings, and kidnapings-
the ransoms from which netted millions of dollars.
the Montoneros
had the capability to manufacture weapons and ex-
plosives and smuggle arms into the country. Many of
these weapons probably still exist in hidden caches.
When General Videla seized power in March 1976, he
immediately mounted a major antiguerrilla cam-
paign that succeeded in crippling the Montoneros.
This campaign is now referred to as Argentina's dirty
war. Although the Montoneros weakly continued
some activities, including terrorism, until the late
1970s, by 1979 most of what was left of the organiza-
tion had fled the country.
its members now live in Mexico, Nicaragua,
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Montonero membership also remains small, and ex-
ternal support for the Montoneros remains passive.
the Montoneros.
any foreign government or insurgent group is current-
ly providing arms, training, finances, or material to
The PRT/ERP. The Worker's Revolutionary Party/
People's Revolutionary Army is also a small, troubled
group with the bulk of its members living in exile.
Moreover, for the present, the PRT/ERP has adopted
We believe the PRT/ERP probably retains resources
from the 1970s and have observed a few signs that the
group is rebuilding:
? They are infiltrating Argentina's Intransigent Par-
ty, labor groups, and human rights organizations,
? Press reports have stated that the ERP and the
Montoneros may begin cooperating, including ef-
forts to infiltrate labor unions.
? The group maintains its foreign contacts in Mexico,
Nicaragua, Cuba, and Bolivia
? A small ERP group, possibly operating indepen-
dently, was actively training members in rural areas
in November 1984
The PRT/ERP: Argentina's Trotskyist Insurgent 25X`l
The Trotskyist PRT/ERP evolved from a 1968 split
in Argentina's Revolutionary Worker's Party between
Guevarist and Leninist factions. The Guevarist fac-
tion-the Worker's Revolutionary Party (PRT) or El
Combatiente-looked to the Cuban revolution as the
model for bringing change to Argentina and favored
immediate armed action. The PRT formed its armed
wing, the People's Revolutionary Army (ERP), in
1970. While the PRT/ERP never achieved the size or
wide support of the Montoneros, the group's military
prowess was impressive. PRT/ERP attacks against
military installations during the period 1973-75 at
times displayed remarkable planning, execution, and
firepower. fl 25X1
The PRT/ERP made a fatal move in the mid-1970s
when it changed its strategy from urban to rural
insurgency. This decision weakened the organization
and made it more vulnerable to government attacks
in both areas. Major defeats in 1976 virtually eradi-
cated the organization. Some members managed to
flee the country and tried to establish a PRT/ERP in
exile. However, the group received little external
support and eventually split into factions, according
to Embassy sources. 25X1
the work of rightwing radicals. These extremists
engage in robberies, shootings, bombings, and kidnap-
ings that target journalists, human rights activists,
politicians, and union members. On the basis of
Embassy reporting, we believe the participants are ex-
military or former security officials-most of whom
were purged form the security forces when Alfonsin
took office-although current employees may also be
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groups-the Brigade 10, the Argentine Anti-Commu-
nist Alliance, and the Iron Guard Group-that are
involved in violent activities. These rightwing extrem-
ists do not, in our judgment, constitute an incipient
insurgency, although they threaten Argentina's stabil-
ity. We have seen no evidence to suggest the existence
of a coherent guerrilla organization, foreign support,
or a political program.
During the past two years, the PCCh in Chile has
mounted a determined and successful effort to recruit
new members, provide training to its guerrillas, obtain
increased foreign support, acquire weapons and re-
sources, and garner popular support. The party has
doubled in size to 30,000 members and controls an
armed wing and neighborhood militias. Moreover,
with the help of the Soviets and Bloc countries, arms
and trained guerrillas are being smuggled into the
country in an effort to build an insurgent support
base. We expect such external support to grow unless
Chilean security forces secure the borders better and
stem the flow of weapons and foreign-trained guerril-
las to the country
Popular support for the insurgents is, in our view, the
most important factor that will determine whether a
full-blown insurgency develops in the next few years.
Although Pinochet is currently keeping the lid on
subversion, we believe certain actions within the
country could cause the situation to deteriorate. Vio-
lent riots and demonstrations could prompt Pinochet
to curtail human rights further and possibly give him
an opportunity to crush the moderate opposition. Such
repression would polarize Chilean society and might
lead the moderates to throw their support behind the
radical left, a development crucial to the launching of
a successful PCCh insurgency. Additionally, PCCh
assassinations of key government figures-possibly
including Pinochet-might spark a repressive back-
lash severe enough to provoke popular revolution and
Ecuador's AVC is significantly expanding its indige-
nous resource base-funds, personnel, training, and
materiel-and we expect this trend to continue in
1986. Additionally, the AVC has refined its actions
and has shown a new capacity for terrorism, as
evidenced by the attacks on a police warehouse and a
naval base, the kidnaping of a wealthy businessman,
and a successful prison break. Although the AVC has
grown from a dozen members to several hundred, it
still lacks extensive resources and benefits largely
from the limited capabilities of the Ecuadorean secu-
rity forces. Consequently, we believe that only a
dramatic change in Ecuador's political situation or in
the quality of its security forces will alter the current
balance. If the government is able to provide-or
secure from abroad-improved counterinsurgency
training and equipment, and achieve greater coopera-
tion between the police and the military, we believe
Ecuador's incipient insurgency threat could be nipped
in the bud.
Argentina's formerly powerful insurgent groups-the
Montoneros and the PRT/ERP-remain small, lack
popular support, and receive little external support.
Moreover, most of the current political violence in
Argentina is the work of scattered groups of rightwing
extremists. Because neither the radical left nor the
radical right possess significant guerrilla resources,
we believe an Argentine insurgency is highly unlikely
in the next few years. Should the political/ economic
environment deteriorate drastically, a military coup
challen ire nascent democracy is more likely to
occur.
unrest among the Carabineros and the military.
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/11/18: CIA-RDP97R00694R000500700001-8
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/11/18: CIA-RDP97R00694R000500700001-8
Secret
Secret
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/11/18: CIA-RDP97R00694R000500700001-8