INTERNATIONAL BOUNDARY DIGEST: THE MIDDLE EAST

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP97R00694R000500660001-3
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 123
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: January 24, 2011
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: March 1, 1986
• Content Type: REPORT

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Directorate of
Intelligence
International Boundary Boundary Digest:
The Middle East
An Intelligence Assessment
-Snret--
GI 86-10008
March 1986
Co? 359
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Directorate of Secret
,! Intelligence
International Boundary Digest:
The Middle East
An Intelligence Assessment
This paper was prepared by
Office of Global Issues, with contribu-
tions from CPAS. Comments and queries are wel-
come and may be directed to the Chief, Geography
Division, OG I,
Secret
86-11,MS
Man h I 9S6
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Preface
Infiirmation available
ii ol September 1085
?I'a.N Used in this report,
except where otherwise noted
on individual revisions.
International Boundary Digest:
The Middle East
Secret
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This Digest on the Middle East is the first in a series of regional digests
that the Office of Global Issues plans to produce on international
boundaries that either are in dispute or suggest by their characteristics
potential for disagreement. The boundary information is categorized for
ease of use, particularly by the current intelligence officer, when fast-
breaking border incidents occur and charges and countercharges relating
to border issues are made:
? Border Basics. Description of the border's length, status of demarcation,
and its physical and cultural characteristics.
? Significant Developments. Summary of related issues as they affect
political relationships.
? Frontier History. Review of the history of the frontier and the diplomatic
evolution of the boundary.
? Current Developments and Outlook. Assessment of current border issues
and prospects for their resolution. 25X1
Other border factors economic value or potential, ethnic mix, population
pressures are also noted as they pertain to border issues. A chronology of
important dates affecting boundary status is included, and key boundary
references are cited. A map, or maps, accompanies each boundary
discussed to highlight the disputed sectors and territory and to illustrate
other factors and relationships. 25X1
Maritime boundary disputes involving nearby islands or coastal features
related to boundary controversies also are included in the Digest. This
publication, however, omits the more than 300 continental shelf and other
maritime boundaries, many yet to be delimited, between the world's 139
coastal states and discussion of other types of maritime boundary and
jurisdictional conflicts. 25X1
The US Government rarely takes an official position on the validity of a
particular claim in a boundary dispute. Boundary representation on maps
produced by the US Government is complicated by map scale and the
amount of detail shown. Four categories of boundaries are normally
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depicted on US Government maps: international boundary, indefinite
boundary, boundary in dispute, and other lines of separation. Maps of
disputed areas carry the disclaimer "Boundary representation is not
necessarily authoritative."
Background
Disputes over international boundaries are a common cause of internation-
al tension and conflict. Almost half of the world's nations share land
boundaries that are disputed. Additionally, disputes are sometimes revived
over boundaries long settled, particularly where regional political align-
ments are fluid and internal political conditions change rapidly. Boundary
issues are a major foreign policy concern of the United States. Disputes be-
tween nations friendly to the United States present sticky diplomatic
dilemmas in that each party to the dispute will at some point exert pressure
on Washington to support its view of the issue.
Fixed, geographically precise international boundaries are a recent devel-
opment in international relations. Although ancient political entities?
nomadic groups, tribes, and kingdoms?recognized geographical limits to
their authority and control, these limits were usually vague and shifting,
and located in distant and lightly populated frontier zones. Ancient borders
often followed easily recognized physical features, such as mountain
ranges, deserts, and swamps; sometimes rivers served to separate different
ethnic groups. Some states, however, built walls, or constructed other
physical barriers, to define limits of control, regulate trade, and control the
movement of people and the establishment of settlements.
Modern international boundaries marked with pillars, cleared strips, and
other physical means of identification accompanied the evolution of the
nation-state system in Europe that commenced in the late 17th century.
Advances in mathematics, geodesy, surveying techniques, and cartography
permitted states to compile reliable maps of their territory and to more
accurately draw their boundaries. New nations were born, colonies were
established, and older nations that relied on distant buffer zones for their
borders gradually were forced or chose to define their boundaries with
greater precision. Increasing population pressures and the need for more
land led to the settlement of frontier lands and the necessity to establish
definite state limits.
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Boundary disputes originate from a variety of causes and for different
reasons. The degree of national passion and emotion aroused over a
boundary-territorial dispute is often wildly disproportionate to the size and
value of the area disputed. Occasionally, international boundaries, long
settled by treaty and demarcated, are used as a pretext?citing alleged
violations or "incidents" to publicize deep-seated quarrels between states
and to inflame public opinion. 25X1
Types of Boundary Disputes
The list of causes for border disputes is lengthy, but in general there are
three major situations that lead to disagreement:
? Disputes arising from the boundary marking itself, usually in the
interpretation of details and the lack of precise geographic data.
? Disputes as the consequence of territorial and economic expansionism.
? Boundary problems created from state succession and the desire to
renegotiate old boundary treaties. 25X1
In all boundary disputes the political-military strength of the state and
domestic politics have as much or more to do with the raising (or perhaps
reviving) of boundary-territorial questions than the legality and justifica-
tion for boundary adjustment. Once a dispute is aired and a nation presents
its case publicly, all types of evidence good, bad, and irrelevant are used
to convince other states of the justice of the particular nation's claim.
Occasionally, disputes will be settled without rancor, but more often they
sputter along for years, even decades. Still others may go to a third country
or an international tribunal for arbitration and settlement, and at times
armed conflict helps settle the issue. 25X1
For example, the Argentina-Chile boundary originally was delimited on
the assumption that the line of high peaks also coincided with the
watershed. Later exploration revealed that the watershed was well east of
the line of highest peaks. Controversy over this and a later dispute over
which stream was the headwater stream that affected the boundary had to
be resolved through British arbitration. 25X1
Colonial boundaries defined by the European powers in the Americas,
Africa, and much of Asia from the 16th through the 19th centuries were
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often hastily drawn and without benefit of detailed knowledge of the
terrain. This lack of precision frequently led to later disputes over the
boundary when the compilation of more accurate maps revealed the errors.
In some cases, colonial boundaries were drawn so as to keep intact
homogeneous ethnic and economic areas, but this was more an exception
than a rule.
The creation of new states, particularly in ex-colonial territories, frequently
is a cause of border problems. New states often attempt to redress old
grievances and improve their internal political standing through threats or
acts of belligerence against neighboring states. This may lead to the revival
of ancient claims and the demand to renegotiate old boundary treaties.
Boundary Terms
Terms used in boundary disputes and boundary making possess special
meanings that are often ignored or misapplied in press reports and in the
speeches of national leaders when referring to border problems. Some of
the more common terms and definitions are:
? Boundary. A line that marks the limits within which the state exercises
its sovereign rights.
? Border. Border is often used as a synonym for boundary, but the term has
a more generalized meaning of area or territory close to or in proximity
to the actual line of separation on the ground between the states. The
terms border zone and borderlands suggest the areal elasticity of the
word. See frontier.
? Delimitation. The determination of where a boundary should be drawn
through use of verbal description, usually in a treaty or similar diplomat-
ic proceedings. The verbal description varies as to detail but contains
sufficient references to physical features?midline of a river, a water-
shed, a mountain crest?and to specific points identified by geographical
coordinates to permit a joint team of surveyors and technicians to
demarcate the boundary on the ground. A map showing the agreed
delimitation line usually is appended to the agreement.
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? Demarcation. The act of marking a boundary on the ground, as defined
in the treaty or other document, by means of pillars, monuments, or other
type of markers. Demarcation teams provided for in the treaty usually
make or update ground surveys of the local topography. The end product
is a more detailed point-to-point description of the boundary (markers are
numbered or lettered consecutively) that is combined with one or more
large-scale maps showing the exact alignment and individual markers. To
be binding, the proceedings, resulting from the team's work and issued as
a protocol or annex to the original treaty, must be signed by each nation.
? Frontier. A zone or area, usually of considerable length and breadth, that
indicates the approximate limits of political authority. No exact limit is
set to a frontier until a boundary agreement is reached and the boundary
is demarcated on the ground. The term frontier to denote a nation's
outward territories is not a synonym for the term boundary.
? Thalweg. The middle of a river channel, or its principal channel where
more than one exists, of navigable streams that form an international
boundary. Recent international law holds that the thalweg is the
boundary in navigable rivers, failing any special agreement to the
contrary. A thalweg boundary may divide the river into two very unequal
parts; the thalweg also may change because of flooding and other natural
causes. Nations usually have an agreement to resolve boundary questions
when rivers shift their courses. In nonnavigable streams, international
boundaries are usually defined by median lines. Detailed maps delineat-
ing the riverine boundaries are a standard part of the boundary
documentation.
? Territorial sea. A belt of sea and underlying seabed and subsoil adjacent
to the coast where the coastal state is sovereign. This sovereignty extends
to the airspace over the territorial sea. Under international law, the
maximum breadth of the territorial sea is 12 nautical miles (the US
claims a 3-nautical-mile breadth) from the baseline. In the territorial sea,
ships of all states enjoy the right of innocent passage, and in international
straits, ships and aircraft have the right of nonsuspendable transit
passage.
? Continental shelf. As defined by the 1982 United Nations Convention on
the Law of the Sea, a nation's continental shelf comprises the seabed and
subsoil seaward of the territorial sea extending to the outer edge of the
continental margin or to a distance of 200 nautical miles from the
baseline, whichever is greater. 25X1
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Contents
Page
Preface
Background
Types of Boundary Disputes
Boundary Terms
III
iv
vi
Introduction
1
I ran-Iraq
3
Border Basics
5
Significant Developments
5
Frontier History
5
Current Developments and Outlook
6
Border Treaties and Key Dates
7
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Afghanistan-lran
9
Border Basics
11
Significant Developments
1 1
Frontier History
I I
Current Developments and Outlook
11
Border Treaties and Key Dates
12
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Iraq-Kuwait
15
Border Basics
17
Significant Developments
17
Frontier History
17
Current Developments and Outlook
18
Border Treaties and Key Dates
18
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Arabian Peninsula
21
Border Basics
23
Significant Developments
-)3
Frontier History
23
North Yemen?Saudi Arabia
24
Saudi Arabia?South Yemen
74
North Yemen -South Yemen
74
Oman South Yemen
?s
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Oman?Saudi Arabia
25
Al Buraymi Oasis
25
Saudi Arabia?UAE
25
Oman-UAE
26
Current Developments and Outlook
26
Border Treaties and Key Dates
27
Persian Gulf
29
Border Basics
31
Significant Developments
31
Bahrain-Qatar
31
Strait of Hormuz (Iran-UAE)
31
Other Gulf Boundaries
32
Border Treaties and Key Dates
33
Egypt-Israel
35
Border Basics
37
Significant Developments
37
Frontier History
37
Current Developments and Outlook
38
Border Treaties and Key Dates
38
Israel-Jordan
41
Border Basics
43
Significant Developments
43
Frontier History
43
Current Developments and Outlook
45
Border Treaties and Key Dates
45
Israel-Lebanon
47
Border Basics
49
Significant Developments
49
Frontier History
49
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Page
50
50
Current Developments and Outlook
Border Treaties and Key Dates
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Lebanon-Syria
53
Border Basics
55
Significant Developments
55
Frontier History
55
Current Developments and Outlook
56
Border Treaties and Key Dates
56
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Israel-Syria
59
Border Basics
61
Significant Developments
61
Frontier History
61
Current Developments and Outlook
62
Border Treaties and Key Dates
62
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Syria-Turkey
65
Border Basics
67
Significant Developments
67
Frontier History
67
Current Developments and Outlook
68
Border Treaties and Key Dates
68
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Greece-Turkey: Aegean Dispute
71
Basics
73
Significant Developments
73
Background
73
Current Developments and Outlook
75
Treaties and Key Dates
75
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Cyprus
77
Border Basics
79
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Significant Developments
79
Frontier History
79
Current Developments and Outlook
80
Border Treaties and Key Dates
80
Other Middle Eastern Boundaries and Territorial Disputes
83
Iran-Pakistan
87
Iran-Turkey
87
Iraq-Jordan
87
Iraq?Saudi Arabia
89
Iraq-Syria
89
Iraq-Turkey
89
Jordan?Saudi Arabia
91
Jordan-Syria
91
Kuwait?Saudi Arabia
91
Qatar?Saudi Arabia
93
Tiran and Sanafir Islands
93
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International Boundary Digest:
The Middle East
Introduction
In no major world region are border and territorial
disputes as disruptive to regional stability as in the
Middle East. Border and territorial issues, although
but part of the larger pattern of tension and hostility
caused by deep-seated hostilities among ethnic, reli-
gious, and traditional groups, often provide the pre-
text for polemics and at times open warfare. Rivalries
among outside powers, particularly the superpowers
with their political, economic, and strategic interests
in the region, pose additional complications and the
possibility of still wider conflict.
Current boundary-territorial disputes have ancient
roots, some dating to Biblical times, others to the
several centuries of Ottoman rule. More recent politi-
cal decisions created additional problems and deep-
ened embitterness. Following the dismemberment of
the Turkish Empire after World War I, Britain and
France assumed control over part of the area through
League of Nations mandates. These actions delayed
Arab hopes for the establishment of either a unified
Arab state or at least a federation of states. The
creation of Israel in 1948, coinciding with the with-
drawal of British and French influence, led to a series
of wars essentially over the question of the existence
of Israel and its territorial limits.
The increasing importance of oil as a source of energy
has contributed to political dissension and tension in
the Middle East. Added complications are the vague-
ness or lack of boundaries in areas inhabited by
nomadic tribal groups, the growing importance of
offshore oil deposits and their ownership, and the
control over narrow straits guarding the entrances to
the Middle East.
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Middle East
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Iran-Iraq
The design of this report permits updating of border ittformation. Changes
and additions will be disseminated to holders of this Digest as necessary.
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Iran-Iraq Border
\) 6
(r :;'c,,,'
Otermyqh
? (Lake Uenkl)
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Iran Usk
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anchora e given to Iran
Abadan
Little Zab
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Iran-Iraq Treaty, 1937
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hdad
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International boundary
Railroad
Road
Hawr a
Harnmar
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Az Zubayr
Shall al
Arab
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Scale 1 4,500,000
0 50 100 Kilometers
0 30 80 Miles
800415 (A05374) 10-85
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dare Khomeyni
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P(15lill? ()Oh'
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Iran-Iraq
Border Basics
The Iran-Iraq boundary extends for 1,458 kilometers
between the tripoint with Turkey and the mouth of
the Shatt al Arab waterway. No single geographical
feature or principle was used to limit the boundary.
In the north, the boundary follows mountain crests,
often a drainage divide, and occasionally rivers.
Farther south, the boundary follows the low foothills
of the Zagros Mountains along ridges, ravines, and
sometimes roads. In the south, the boundary is made
up of straight-line segments across plains and
swampy areas. In the Shatt al Arab, the boundary
follows the midpoint of the deepest navigable channel
(thalweg).
The boundary was most recently demarcated in 1975.
There are 730 pillars numbered south to north from
B. P. 1 to B. P. 125112. The boundary in the Shatt
(about 105 kilometers) is marked by 60 points identi-
fied by geographic coordinates and plotted on hydro-
25X1 graphic charts. Iraq, however, has renounced the
1975 treaty that defines the boundary.
The border crosses lightly populated territory. Sig-
nificant exceptions are the port cities along the Shatt
al Arab. Although the large Kurdish population in
both northern Iran and Iraq has long been a divisive
25X1 issue in Iranian-Iraqi relations, the alignment of the
boundary has not figured in the quarrel.
25X1
Significant Developments
Disputes over the Iran-Iraq border provided a pretext
for Iraq's invasion of Iran in September 1980. Imme-
diately before the outbreak of hostilities, Iraq abro-
gated the Algiers treaty of 1975 that, when signed,
seemed to resolve contentious border issues that had
plagued relations between the two nations for more
than a century. Although military actions were initi-
ated over land border areas (where Iranian forces
reportedly held territory that was to have been trans-
ferred to Iraq by terms of the 1975 treaty), the more
important border issue was the Shatt al Arab. This
waterway, formed by the confluence of the Tigris and
5
Euphrates Rivers, serves as the border for 105 kilome-
ters. The 1975 treaty?the Algiers Agreement had
fixed the boundary along the thalweg, or deepest
navigable channel. This reversed, however, nearly 150
years of border history and tradition whereby Iraqi
(and earlier Turkish) sovereignty over the entire wa-
terway and control of its shipping had been recog-
nized. Although border problems have now been
subsumed in the larger context of the Iranian-Iraqi
conflict, any delimitation of the boundary will almost
certainly be a major issue when peace negotiations are
undertaken. 25X1
Frontier History
The border between Iran and Iraq (formerly Persia
and the Turkish Ottoman Empire) initially was de-
fined generally by a 1639 treaty.' It was not until the
second Treaty of Erzurum (1847), however, that a
more precise boundary was delimited through the
work of a mixed commission of Turkish, British,
Iranian, and Russian officials. More important, this
treaty for the first time used the lower course of the
Shatt al Arab to define the southernmost section of
the border. This treaty is the legal foundation for the
current boundary. 25X1
During boundary proceedings, the Turkish represen-
tative introduced language setting the boundary along
the eastern bank of the waterway, thus placing all of
it under Turkish sovereignty. The reason given for
placing the boundary along the left bank, instead of
using the deepest channel or a median line, was that
the Shatt al Arab is Iraq's only outlet to the sea
whereas Iran has a long coastline on the Persian Gulf.
This argument is the major justification usually cited
for Iraqi sovereignty over the entire waterway.
Iran's unhappiness with the Shatt al Arab boundary
deepened after the discovery of oil early in the 20th
century. The development of a petroleum center at
Abadan increased Iranian shipping on the river. Iran
'The name Persia was used until 1935. For the purposes of clarity,
Iran will be used throughout. Iraq emerged as a political entity
following World War I and termination of the Turkish Ottoman
Empire. Iraq, initially under British mandate, was admitted as an
independent state to the League of Nations in 1932.
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also chafed over anchorages in Turkish waters to its
ports on the left bank and the payment of Turkish
import duties. Negotiations ensued that led to the
1913 Constantinople Protocol. Although the treaty
confirmed Turkish sovereignty over the Shatt al Arab,
Iran gained jurisdiction over its anchorages serving
the port of Muhammerah (now Khorramshahr). The
1913 agreement also provided for the demarcation of
the land boundary by pillars, a task completed in
1914.
Friction over the border continued during the 1920s
and 1930s as Iranian use of the Shatt al Arab
expanded. Iran exerted pressure to force change,
sending naval craft up the Shatt in defiance of Iraqi
navigational rules. Direct negotiations between the
two countries led to a new treaty (1937) that again
confirmed Iraqi sovereignty over the waterway, al-
though it modified the Constantinople Protocol of
1913, by using the thalweg to define a short segment
of the boundary opposite the Iranian city of Abadan.
The treaty also stated that the Shatt "shall remain
open for merchant ships of all countries" and stipulat-
ed that a later agreement be reached to govern
maintenance, pilotage, collection of dues, and other
administrative matters.I
The navigation convention of the treaty concluded in
1937 was never honored. This shortcoming, combined
with Iran's subordinate role in the administration of
the Shatt al Arab, contributed to a renewal of Iranian
pressures to move the boundary to the thalweg. In
1969 Iran abrogated the 1937 treaty; Iranian-Iraqi
relations worsened; and in 1975, at the initiative of
President Boumedienne of Algeria, the two countries
met and signed yet another treaty (the Algiers Agree-
ment) that ended Iranian support for the Kurdish
rebellion in northern Iraq. The 1975 treaty contained
protocols on redefining the land and waterway bound-
aries, of which the most significant was agreement to
use the deepest channel of the Shatt to define the
boundary. For the first time Iraqi sovereignty over the
Shatt's waters was restricted to the western half of the
waterway. The boundary settlement included detailed
regulations for joint navigation of the Shatt and
provided for a redemarcation of the land boundary
with an increased number of markers.
Secret
The border issue was quiet until the Iranian revolu-
tion. Iraq then began to talk about regaining full
sovereignty over the Shatt al Arab. In 1980 Iraq
specified several small areas along the land boundary
from which Iranian forces had not withdrawn, accord-
ing to terms of the 1975 agreement, a disagreement
possibly caused in part by the use of different maps.
In September of 1980, just before the outbreak of
war, Iraq abrogated the Algiers treaty.
Current Developments and Outlook
Iraqi leaders stated when the 1980 war began that
they had no territorial ambitions. According to press
items, Iraqi aims were to "liberate" border areas that
Iran occupied in defiance of the 1975 treaty and to
enforce a reversion to the pre-1975 boundary in the
Shatt. These objectives were publicized at a time
when Iraqi leaders believed that Iran was weak and
that military pressure would lead to the ouster of the
Khomeini regime, which publicly was for the over-
throw of the Iraqi Government and the support of
Iraqi Shia dissidents.
The protracted hostilities have muted boundary ques-
tions. A decisive victory by either nation, however,
would dictate which of the two basic versions of the
boundary would be followed. Despite some confusion
over the precise delineation of the land boundary,
perhaps caused by terrain conditions, the 1975 border
demarcation based on work done in 1913-14 probably
will be followed. The boundary in the Shatt, however,
will depend on the victor-vanquished equation. A
decisive Iranian victory would keep the post-1975
status quo, using the thalweg; an Iraqi triumph would
return to pre-1975 conditions and Iraqi sovereignty
over the waterway and control of navigation.
If the war ends inconclusively, other solutions to the
problem may emerge. These include various compro-
mises of which joint control or internationalization of
the waterway are the most feasible alternatives. There
are precedents for a solution that separates the issue
of rights and sovereignty over a border waterway from
the issue of use and obligation. The importance of the
Shatt waterway, because it is clogged with silt and the
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hulks of several dozen ships sunk early in the war, has
been temporarily eclipsed. It would require extensive
salvage work of perhaps a year plus dredging to return
the waterway to its pre-1980 condition. The postwar
importance of the waterway in border negotiations
will depend in part on the long-term feasibility of
alternate routes Iraq has been developing since 1980.
Border Treaties and Key Dates
1639
Treaty of Peace and Demarcation of Frontiers, signed
at Zohab, 17 May. Initial border division, confirmed
by later treaties.
1847
Second Treaty of Erzurum, 31 May. Redefines border
and establishes Shatt al Arab as border under Turkish
(Iraqi) sovereignty although permitting use of the
waterway to Persia (Iran). Basic boundary alignment
established remains unchanged.
1913
Constantinople Protocol, signed at Constantinople on
4 November. Provides for detailed delimitation of
boundary and demarcation of land boundary. Allows
Iranian anchorages opposite port of Muhammerah
(now Khorramshahr).
1937
Frontier Treaty between Iraq and Iran, signed at
Tehran, 4 July. Slight modification of 1913 treaty
revising boundary in vicinity of Abadan. Opens river
to merchant ships of all countries equally.
1969
Iran abrogates 1937 treaty. Commerce on Shatt
continues.
1975
Treaty Relating to the State Boundary and Good-
Neighborliness Between Iran and Iraq, signed at
Baghdad, 13 June. Known as Algiers Agreement and
followed by series of protocols relating to boundary
matters. Redefines boundary in Shatt according to
thalweg; land boundary redemarcated, setting up
additional markers.
7
1980
On 17 September Iraq abrogates 1975 treaty and
announces aim to enforce a reversion to pre-1975
boundary on Shatt. Heavy fighting commences on 22
September. 25X1
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Afghanistan-Iran
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and additions will be disseminated to holders of this Digest as necessary.
25X1
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Afghanistan-Iran Border
Gonabad.
Torbat-e Heydariyeh
Khtwi.
(Wen.
62
SOVIET
UNION
Torbat-e Jam.
Roshkhvar
Khvaf7
bit '
.Sedeh
Birjand.
IRAN
Tambat
? ? slam Dealt
Do Gharen
Botinciary Pillar I
tr&Boundary Pillar 39
Boundary Pillar 40
Kalateh ye Kabad
(Kalateh ye KabedehL 5
?Asadabad
Sarbisheh?
Sahlabad?
?Doroh
Nehbandan?
Boundary Pillar 90
International boundary
Railroad
Road
alt? 1 3,600.000
0 50 100 KlIonleters
I
0 30 60 Mlles
Safidabee
.Nosratabad
'" ? r. (ri
Towraghondi
.Herat
Adraskan
?Gareh-ye Now
AFGHANISTAN'
Shindand.
Farah.
Lathe Joveyn
') '2
10,
? , r
Hormak ,
? ?le
Zabol
Xtrt(ak
?Littak
?Chakhanser
Zaram
Present river flow
Delaram
800416 (A05376) 10-85
Secret
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Afghanistan-Iran
Border Basics
The Afghanistan-Iran boundary extends roughly
north-south for about 936 kilometers between bound-
ary tripoints with the USSR and Pakistan. The
boundary was delimited and demarcated piecemeal
between 1872 and 1935. Some 39 pillars were used to
mark 70 kilometers (out of 226 kilometers) of the
northern section of the boundary (1888-91); 90 mark-
ers were placed (1905) to demarcate 300 kilometers of
the southern section of the boundary; and only 38
boundary monuments were set to demarcate the 410
kilometers of the lightly populated central section of
the boundary in 1935.
There is no single dominant physical feature in the
border area. Border terrain varies from relatively low
hills and mountains to huge salt flats, brackish lakes
and marshes, and sandy or rocky plains. Boundary
makers used small streams and wadis, minor water
divides, and ridges interspersed with straight-line
25X1 segments to mark the boundary on the ground. The
border area is lightly populated by Persians, Pash-
tuns, Tadjiks, Baluchs, and other ethnic groups.
The economic significance of the borderlands revolves
around the availability and control of water. Water
has been the primary cause of past disputes and a key
25X1 factor used by boundary commissions to determine
the boundary alignment.
Significant Developments
The twin events of the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan
and Iran's Islamic Revolution, both during 1979,
added a new dimension to Afghan-Iranian relations
and to the potential for future border disputes. The
new factors are the large numbers of Afghan refugees
who fled into Iran, the relative ease of cross-border
movement, Afghan resistance groups operating in
western Afghanistan, and Soviet countermeasures
taken against them.
The ancient quarrel over water usage in the lower
Darya-ye Helmand threatened to erupt anew in 1979-
80 as Afghanistan began to build a new, upstream
11
dam. A halt (1980) in construction, however, and
internal economic changes brought on by political-
military conditions have for the present defused the
issue. 25X1
Frontier History
The history of the Afghanistan-Iran border is recent,
with boundary delimitation and demarcation taking
place in the period from 1872 to 1935. Four separate
arbitration commissions defined the boundary. Three
of the commissions were headed by the British, a
result of a provision of the Treaty of Paris in 1857
that called for British mediation of Afghan-Iranian
disputes. 25X1
The southern section of the boundary was the first to
be legally fixed. Here, Persian and Afghan groups
pressed claims to use of the Darya-ye Helmand waters
that empty into a large basin of semipermanent lakes
and marshes, where grazing and agriculture flourish.
Disputes over the territory and its waters eventually
led to a request for arbitration. A commission headed
by Major General Goldsmid delimited the border in
1872 by dividing the basin, locally known in Iran as
the Daryacheh-ye Sistan; in some areas the boundary
separated irrigation control points and portions of
canals in one country from the remainder of the
system in the other. A key provision of the award was
that neither side should construct "works" to interfere
with future water supplies. The Goldsmid commission
did not survey the area on the ground nor did the
award provide for boundary demarcation. Neither
side was pleased with the award, but both were forced
to accept it. 25X1
A short stretch of the northern section of the bound-
ary was next settled by terms of an award in 1891
drawn up by Major General MacLean, a British
officer assigned to head the arbitration team. At issue
was a small basin claimed by both Iran and Afghani-
stan that, although once cultivated, had been aban-
doned. A compromise solution was accepted by both
sides and a detailed description as to the placement of
the 39 boundary markers was made. The remainder of
the northern section of the boundary follows the
Harirud, a major river of Afghanistan that flows into
25X1
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the USSR. Specific language stating that the bound-
ary followed the river was not prepared, however,
until the final boundary award was made in 1935.
The dispute over water use in the southern section of
the boundary arose again in the early 1900s. A minor
change in the channel used by the Helmand in its
delta and a severe drought in 1902 caused competition
and dispute over water supplies. A call for arbitration
resulted in the sending of a large British commission
to the area, headed by Colonel McMahon. Because
the McMahon commission was instructed to follow
the delimitation set by the earlier Goldsmid commis-
sion, McMahon's duty was to properly interpret the
language of the agreement when compared to more
recent, detailed topographic maps of the area. Bound-
ary markers were then described in text and placed in
the ground. The award also clarified and refined
language used to define the amount of water to be
made legally available to Iran.
The remaining central section of the boundary was
defined in 1935 after a minor dispute had arisen over
an area adjoining a section of boundary demarcated
earlier. A commission, headed by Turkish General
Altai, not only produced an agreed compromise, but
also proposed that the remainder of the boundary be
defined and demarcated. This was accepted and some
38 pillars were erected to demarcate 410 kilometers of
border.I I
Current Developments and Outlook
Radical political changes in Iran and Afghanistan
after 1979 have had little effect on Afghan-Iranian
relations regarding their common border. Despite the
provocative possibilities in the border area?Afghan
refugees in Iran, the flareup from time to time of
insurgent activity in western Afghanistan near the
border, and countermeasures by the Soviets?both the
Iranians and the Soviets have been cautious and not
allowed the border itself to become a divisive issue.
A longer term and perennially sensitive issue concerns
water rights to use of the Darya-ye Helmand in the
southern section of the Afghanistan-Iran border. A
water-sharing treaty, signed in 1973 and finally rati-
fied in 1977, was intended to end decades of
Secret
bickering. Afghan development plans unveiled during
the 1970s, however, called for a new dam, upstream
some 70 kilometers from the border. When complet-
ed, the dam would seriously disrupt downstream
hydrology, particularly in Iran. Although water sup-
plies guaranteed by treaty would not be affected, the
possibility of Iran gaining additional water supplies
would be foreclosed. Work on the dam was halted in
1980, and a resumption of construction probably
would cause serious political reverberations in Iran.
Border Treaties and Key Dates
1857
Treaty of Paris provides for British arbitration of
Afghan-Iranian disputes.
1872
Goldsmid Award defines boundary, after dispute over
water and grazing rights, although no demarcation is
provided of lower Helmand (Sistan) area.
1891
MacLean Award settles local dispute and provides for
demarcation of short section of northern boundary.
1905
McMahon reaffirms boundary defined in 1872 and
provides for demarcation following disputes over wa-
ter rights. Water apportionment clause included.
1935
Altai Award settles local dispute and closes 390-
kilometer gap between MacLean and McMahon
Awards. The thalweg of the Harirud is the declared
boundary for most of the northern section.
1973
Helmand Waters Treaty signed, ending two decades
of bickering over water allotments.
1977
Helmand Waters Treaty ratified, although not publi-
cized in Afghanistan because of sensitivity of issue.
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1978-80
Construction of Kamal Khan Dam (Chakhansur proj-
ect) under way on Helmand; Iran bitterly opposed,
fearing hydrological changes in Iran and cap on water
availability when project completed.
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Iraq-Kuwait
The design of this report permits updating of border information. Changes
and additions will be disseminated to holders of this Digest as necessary.
25X1
15 Secret
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Iraq-Kuwail Border
IRAQ
Al Barah (province)
Al Abraq
?
?Ar Rawdatayn
KUWAIT
'
tett tlt I tt
hilt, et
17MI
SAUDI
ARABIA
Al Jahrah.
Al Abdall.
?Umm Oudayr
KUWAIT
Al Manwa'?
Al Ahmadi?
Al Wafrah
?
Ow as
Sablyah
Az Zawro
.Mina al Ahmadi
Min Abd Allah
, Mini Su'ud
?
48
MaJthtar an
Klftwaysita
.177-?
(A01377) 10 85
Secret
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Iraq-Kuwait
Border Basics
The Iraq-Kuwait boundary, about 240 kilometers in
length, has been neither surveyed nor demarcated.
Even the language of the 1913 Anglo-Turkish Con-
vention that initially defined the border is vague, with
references to features no longer identifiable. The
border was drawn on the basis of separating nomadic
tribes who held allegiance to the Shaykh of Kuwait
from those under the jurisdiction of Turkish authori-
25X1 ties of Al Basrah Province. Thus, much of the border
alignment is in reference to the location of wells
traditionally used by these nomadic groups.
The boundary cuts across mostly barren desert and
steppe terrain that is inhabited only seasonally by
herders with their flocks. An exception is the eastern
end of the border where scattered farming areas are
found and small villages located. This easternmost
boundary sector, plus the ownership of some offshore
islands, is disputed. The proximity of the boundary
25X1 to important Iraqi facilities, present and planned, is
the key factor in the dispute.
Significant Developments
Since the start of the Iranian-Iraqi war, Kuwait has
made several unpublicized attempts to resolve border
and territorial problems with Iraq. Baghdad, however,
has been uncooperative and until mid-1984 proposed
deferring boundary negotiations until the war with
Iran is over. The strategic significance of the Iraq-
Kuwait border issue is tied to the growing importance
of the port of Umm Qasr and its adjacent waterways
to Iraqi access to the sea. The vulnerability of Iraq's
major port, Al Basrah, was demonstrated early in the
25X1 war by closure of the Shatt al Arab, the waterway
that serves it.
According to media reports, Iraq in mid-1984 offered
to sign a border agreement if Kuwait would lease
three offshore islands to permit monitoring of Iranian
shipping. Kuwait has some leverage in any border
talks because it provides considerable support and has
permitted supplies to be routed through Kuwait to
17
Secret
support Iraq's war efforts. Kuwait is strengthening its
claim on the key offshore island of Bubiyan by
constructing a bridge (1983) to the island, building a
perimeter road, and stationing military personnel
there. 25X1
Frontier History
The Iraq-Kuwait border dispute has its origins in
Kuwait's evolution as an independent state and its
former political relationships to the Ottoman Empire
and Great Britain. The present Kuwaiti ruling family
has governed the area in and around the town of
Kuwait, an important port and shipbuilding center on
the Persian Gulf, since the mid-18th century. By
1829, however, the growing influence of the Ottoman
Empire forced Kuwait to recognize the suzerainty of
the Turks. Tribute was paid, and in 1871 Kuwait was
placed under the administrative jurisdiction of Al
Basrah Province, then part of the Ottoman domain in
Mesopotamia that is now Iraq. 25X1
Kuwait's Shaykh Mubarak, fearing complete political
domination by the Ottomans, requested and received
(1899) a guarantee of British protection. In 1913 an
Anglo-Turkish Convention was signed that defined
Kuwait's external borders. To secure Shaykh Mubar-
ak's support in British plans to free what is now Iraq
from Turkish control, Britain recognized the Shaykh-
dom as "an independent government under British
protection" shortly after the beginning of World War
I. After the Ottoman Empire was dismembered fol-
lowing World War I, Britain for a time governed Iraq
under a League of Nations Mandate arrangement as
well as continued its relationship with Kuwait. A later
British Memorandum (1923) reaffirmed the 1913
boundary delimitation, including Kuwaiti ownership
of the offshore islands. 25X1
Kuwait gained its independence in 1961 and within a
week was threatened by official Iraqi announcements
that Kuwait was "an integral part of Iraq." Baghdad
cited a number of legal points to support its view,
although the weight of diplomatic and legal evidence
provides support for Kuwait's independent status.
After British troops were rushed to Kuwait, Iraq
backed down and after a change in governments in
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1963 agreed to recognize "the independence and
complete sovereignty of the State of Kuwait." Despite
this profession of faith in Kuwait's independence, Iraq
soon resumed its border and territorial claims. In
1973 Iraq seized a Kuwaiti police post, the adjoining
territory near Umm Qasr, and some additional land,
requiring the intervention of other Arab powers to
force an Iraqi withdrawal. In 1976 another military
confrontation arose over alleged poaching of Iraqi oil
by Kuwait.
Current Developments and Outlook
During the 1970s proposals by both sides at settling
the dispute were discussed but ultimately rejected.
The postponement of border talks probably strength-
ens Iraqi views of the need to provide additional
territorial insulation for its link to the Persian Gulf
via the port of Umm Qasr. Kuwait owns the islands
located astride Iraqi's fragile maritime lifeline. In
addition, the land border is located on the outskirts of
Umm Qasr. These locational facts, in Baghdad's view,
are imperatives to press hard for territorial accommo-
dations from its much smaller and weaker neighbor.
Iraqi territorial demands probably include the
following:
? A strip of territory several kilometers deep from the
beginning of the land boundary near Umm Qasr
and extending inland for a distance of possibly 20
kilometers.
? Acquisition or lease of the small island of Warbah
that controls access to Umm Qasr.
? Ownership or lease of the northern half of the
larger, low-lying island of Bubiyan, which overlooks
Iraq's access to the Persian Gulf and to a planned
naval base on the Iraqi shore some 8 kilometers
away.
In past discussions, Kuwait has indicated interest in
some territorial accommodations, including a possible
leasing arrangement regarding Warbah and a redefi-
nition of the border near Umm Qasr. Kuwait has
strongly opposed, however, concessions affecting Bu-
biyan, an island they view as vital to the security of
the port of Kuwait. To bolster its sovereignty over
Bubiyan, Kuwait constructed a bridge to the island
Secret
and is now building a road there. Press reports in
August 1984 indicated a renewed Iraqi attempt to
lease Warbah and another island, Faylakah, for pur-
poses of monitoring Iranian activities directed against
Iraq and Iraqi shipping. Iran would probably threaten
retaliation against Kuwait if this were done. If border
talks resume, resolution of the issue will likely turn on
the questions of leasing agreements or, possibly, some
form of joint control over contested territories.
Border Treaties and Key Dates
1829
Sheikh of Kuwait recognizes suzerainty of Ottoman
Empire.
1871
Kuwait included as an administrative district of Al
Basrah Province and the Kuwaiti ruler is appointed
district governor.
1899
Shaykh Mubarak signs agreement with Britain plac-
ing Kuwait under British protection.
1913
Anglo-Turkish convention contains articles delimiting
Kuwait's boundaries.
1923
Britain issues memorandum affirming, in nearly iden-
tical language, Kuwait's border with Iraq as implied
in 1913 treaty.
1932
Iraq becomes independent and in exchange of letters
with Britain agrees to honor Iraq-Kuwait boundary.
1961
Kuwait becomes independent and Iraq announces
almost immediately that Kuwait will be placed under
the jurisdiction of Iraq's Al Basrah Province. Britain
intercedes on Kuwait's behalf.
1963
Iraq's new regime announces recognition of Kuwait's
independence and sovereignty but does not reject
territorial claims.
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1973
Iraq seizes Kuwaiti border post and additional terri-
tory; withdraws from post and some of the border ter-
ritory after Arab countries intervene. Border closed.
1973-78
Attempts to negotiate boundary issues produce vari-
ous proposals for territorial adjustments, but no
agreement.
1976
Border with Iraq reopened.
1984
Iraq offers to sign border agreement in exchange for
lease of offshore islands to monitor Iranian shipping.
Secret
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Arabian Peninsula
The design of this report permits updating of border information. Changes
and additions will be disseminated to holders of this Digest as necessary.
25X1
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Arabian Peninsula
Ash Sham*
QUAN '
Aa's al
haymah
*Ash_Sharigah
,,lubayy
UNITED ARA
-EMIR
7
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Bandar- Bandar-e
Mogbayell Lengeh
Has al Khaymah
Ash Sharitilah
ABU DHABI
UNITED ARAB I1 mirates
eUnited
7. Atals
1.4 * EMIRATES 1
Saudi Arabia-
United Arab
Emirates
Agreement, 1974
SAUDI ARABIA I
British proposal, 1935 ---"" ,
(Riyadh Line) ' I
* ? a
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?HIOP A
800418 (A05378) 10-85
Secret
Boundary representation is
not necessarily authoritative
22
International boundary
International boundary, indefinite
Administrative line
Railroad
Road
Seal, 1 15 500.000
200 400 Kilometers
120 240 Miles
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Arabian Peninsula
Border Basics
Most Arabian Peninsula boundaries are indefinite
and disputed. Saudi Arabia's claimed boundaries
with its peninsula neighbors?North and South
Yemen, Oman, and the United Arab Emirates
(UAE)?extend for about 2,650 kilometers through
or on the margins of the vast Rub' al Khali (Empty
Quarter). In general, Arabian Peninsula boundaries
and border claims are located in barren, dune-strewn
plains, although in places the terrain is rough and
broken, cut by wadis and gullies. Some boundary
sections?notably between North Yemen and Saudi
Arabia and between North and South Yemen?
extend through rough hilly and mountainous terrain.
Most border areas are uninhabited or populated only
seasonally by nomadic groups. Exceptions are the
occasional oases, some of which have figured in
disputes, and scattered villages in the hilly border
terrain of the two Yemens. Hampering the resolution
of peninsula border disputes are the political alle-
giances of various tribal groups living in or near the
border and the presence, or suspected existence, of oil
25X1 deposits in disputed territory.
Significant Developments
Since the 1974 agreement between Saudi Arabia and
the UAE defining their common boundary, there has
been little progress toward settling other Arabian
Peninsula disputes. In some disputes, tribal relation-
ships with the central government and competition for
their loyalties are important factors to resolving dif-
ferences; in other disputes the oil factor has raised the
stakes and acted to slow negotiating efforts until
geophysical prospecting has been completed. The
recent emergence of the peninsula states as indepen-
dent political entities and the development of nation-
alistic feelings and attitudes have made it more
difficult to make the kinds of territorial concessions
needed to resolve many of the disputes.
23
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Frontier History
The European concept of territorial sovereignty and
fixed boundaries is a recent concept in the Arabian
Peninsula. Traditionally, states consisted of a confed-
eration of tribal groups that included some oases and
agricultural villages, and perhaps coastal towns. The
land borders normally were in desert country?the
habitat of nomads. The territorial limits of nomadic
tribes were often extensive but vague, marked by
wells and grazing lands and the routes between them.
Some of the grazing areas were used by more than
one tribal group?a complicating factor in efforts to
define a static boundary. Environmental conditions?
a shortage of forage, a drying up of wells?often led
to territorial changes. The political loyalties of the
nomadic tribes to shaykhs or other leaders, not states,
also shifted at times and contributed to the vague and
imprecise limits of state authority. 25X1
Britain's growing role in Arabian Peninsula affairs
during the latter half of the 19th century did not
initially disturb these traditional political relation-
ships. Britain's primary interest was to secure its sea
lanes to India; British policy, in fact, was to avoid
territorial commitments that London reasoned would
in time lead to disagreements, conflict, and the need
to introduce ground forces. 25X1
Later, increased interest in Arabian Peninsula affairs
by other powers, especially Turkey, led to disagree-
ments and the imposition of fixed boundaries. An
Anglo-Turkish agreement provided for the partial
delimitation (1903-05) of what is now the boundary
between North and South Yemen. A broader, more
inclusive agreement, the 1914 Anglo-Turkish Conven-
tion, attempted to define British and Turkish spheres
of influence in the region by delineating a line?the
so-called Violet Line?that ran northeast from Aden
to Bahrain. In 1955 Great Britain defined on a map
its version of the heretofore shadowy southern bound-
ary of Saudi Arabia. This was termed the Modified
Riyadh Line to distinguish it from an earlier (1934)
British-defined Riyadh Line. Neither line was accept-
ed as authoritative by Saudi Arabia, whose own and
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somewhat conflicting claims extended much farther
south. The current Saudi definition of its southern
borders is shown on a recent (1984) map. The 1955
British declaration favored the coastal states, then
under British protection, and was intended to restrict
Saudi encroachment into the desolate Rub' al Khali.
The status of individual boundary disputes and issues
is as follows:
North Yemen-Saudi Arabia. About 320 kilometers of
the Yemen Arab Republic's (North Yemen's) bound-
ary with Saudi Arabia, drawn from the Red Sea
inland across mostly rough, hilly terrain, was demar-
cated in 1936 as far east as the Najran area. A 1934
treaty ended fighting between the two countries and
provided for boundary delimitation and demarcation,
although some sections of this boundary, perhaps
because of the difficult terrain, were not demarcated.
No agreement, however, was reached over the re-
mainder of the boundary extending east and south of
Najran to South Yemen. The Yemeni base their
claim on the 1955 British-delineated Modified Ri-
yadh Line. This line placed a large tract of sparsely
populated, largely desert country in North Yemen,
but in an area where Saudi Arabia also has claims
and some influence with local tribes.
The poor communications from the capital, Sanaa,
into North Yemen's disputed northeastern quadrant
has made the area difficult to control and administer.
Border clashes occasionally occur, and an incident in
late December 1983 near Najran, apparently the
result of Yemeni antismuggling operations, resulted in
casualties and the buildup of Saudi forces in the
border area. A further complication has been the
discovery of oil (1984) within North Yemen in a
concession area, part of which lies within Saudi-
claimed territory. Saudi pressures to resolve the dis-
pute and to delimit the border have been unsuccessful.
Saudi Arabia-South Yemen. Boundary claims be-
tween Saudi Arabia and the People's Democratic
Republic of Yemen (South Yemen) differ markedly.
South Yemen's claims are based on the 1955 British
proclamation drawing the boundary in a series of
Secret
straight-line segments along the southern margins of
the Rub' al Khali. The de facto boundary corre-
sponds, as far as is known, with this British view of
the border. Saudi Arabia's boundary claims have
varied, but, according to a 1984 map, the border
claimed lies much farther south, cutting across much
of the rough, dissected hills of the Hadhramaut.
Border tensions between the two countries were high
in the years following the British withdrawal from
Aden in 1967. During the next two years, both
countries sponsored border incursions in the other's
territory. The border remained a sensitive issue for a
number of years as South Yemen supported insurgent
activities against both Oman and North Yemen. Even
after Riyadh established diplomatic ties with Aden in
1976, relations remained cool until a series of internal
changes led South Yemen, after 1982, to pursue more
moderate external policies. By late 1982 a high-level
meeting between Saudi and South Yemeni officials
had an agenda on which border issues, including talks
about fixing the boundary, were included. Despite
improved relations, no boundary agreement has been
reached.
North Yemen-South Yemen. A joint British-Turkish
commission delimited (1903-05) about 400 kilometers
of the border, the alignment of which was later
confirmed by the 1914 Anglo-Turkish Convention.
The boundary begins at the Red Sea and ends in hilly
terrain at Wadi Bana. Boundary markers, if in fact
placed, apparently no longer remain. North and
northeast of Wadi Bana the boundary was defined in
general terms, terminating in the sands of the desert.
Although dissident activity flourished in North Ye-
men during the 1970s and early 1980s, and a signifi-
cant amount of aid for the dissidents was supplied
from and through South Yemen, territorial issues
were not a factor. Nevertheless, the imprecise align-
ment of the boundary?particularly that portion
northeast of Wadi Bana?is a potential source of
disagreement.
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Oman-South Yemen. In 1965 British officials defined
an administrative boundary to separate the Aden
Protectorate from the territory of the Sultanate of
Muscat and Oman. This administrative line consists
of four straight-line segments ending in the desert to
the north. Periodic border incursions and South
Yemen's support for Omani rebels in southwestern
Oman raised tensions. Through diplomatic initiatives
taken by Kuwait and UAE, the two governments
agreed in late 1982 to hold discussions and to include
the issue of border delimitation as an item on the
agenda. A cease-fire line, at places between the two
claims, complicates the issue. The Omanis also claim
25X1 Habarut fort, which is apparently located on the
border.
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Border talks have been held off and on since Septem-
ber 1983, although no agreement has been reported.
Oman is satisfied with the 1965 administrative
boundary, but South Yemeni officials have proposed a
new alignment apparently based on older claims and
agreements that would move the present boundary
to the east and provide South Yemen additional
territory in which oil prospects may be present. Any
agreement would be open ended, however, until both
nations have resolved their border differences with
Saudi Arabia.
Oman-Saudi Arabia. The difference between Saudi
and Omani border claims range from 80 to as much
as 200 kilometers. The usual factors are present: oil
deposits in the disputed area and the political ties of
tribal groups inhabiting the area. In general, Saudi
claims at their most extreme incorporate nearly all of
the desert country of the Empty Quarter amounting
to about one-third of Oman's territory and extend
Saudi-claimed borders to or near the highlands that
fringe, in greater or lesser degree, the Omani coast.
The Saudi-claimed border is based on presumed ties
with tribal groups of the area. The Omani claim rests
on the tribal affiliations and the British definition of
the boundary made in 1955.
In mid-1983 Saudi Arabia reaffirmed its claims,
increasing tension between the two countries. Seismic
survey teams working for Saudi Arabia have at times
strayed into Omani-claimed territory. In late 1983
Omani and Saudi troops had a standoff at some wells
25
Secret
located near, but apparently a number of kilometers
beyond, the Omani-claimed border into Saudi Arabia.
Omani militia were ordered to the wells, where
Omani personnel had earlier installed pumps. The
wells reportedly are the only source of water for about
100 kilometers and had traditionally been used by
Omani tribes en route to seasonal pastures. In Febru-
ary 1985 another incident took place when Omani
troops disarmed a Saudi patrol discovered within
Omani-claimed territory. 25X1
Al Buraymi Oasis. The dispute over the Al Buraymi
Oasis has been the most widely publicized of those
among Arabian Peninsula countries. Oman, the UAE,
and Saudi Arabia each have laid claim to the small,
remote oasis. During the early 1950s Saudi Arabia
reasserted earlier claims by dispatching troops to
occupy the area. The Saudis' rationale for this action
was to counter the inclusion of the oasis within an oil
concession zone drawn up by a company based in Abu
Dhabi. When arbitration failed to resolve the dispute,
a force of British-led Omani troops drove the Saudis
from the area in 1955. Subsequently, Britain pro-
claimed its Modified Riyadh Line that placed Al
Buraymi some 200 kilometers outside of Saudi terri-
tory a boundary solution not accepted by Riyadh.
As part of the 1974 Oman-Saudi Arabia border
settlement, Saudi Arabia relinquished its claim to the
oasis. Presently, the majority of the villages of the
oases are controlled and administered by Abu Dhabi.
25X1
The precise alignment of the boundary within the
oasis is unclear. Oman has belatedly recognized the
importance of the rapid modernization of the Abu
Dhabi sector of the oasis. The Omanis, now pushing
development of their sector, recognize the interdepen-
dence of the two sectors and are promoting coopera-
tion rather than confrontation. 25X1
Saudi Arabia-UAE. The boundary between Saudi
Arabia and Abu Dhabi, the largest and westernmost
of the UAE, was defined by terms of an August 1974
agreement between the two states. Although the
general provisions of the agreement are known, the
exact details of boundary delimitation have not been
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made public. The terms grant Saudi Arabia a section
of the coast on the Persian Gulf, just east of Qatar, of
about 60 kilometers in width. Additional, relatively
narrow strips of territory were gained by Riyadh to
the south, leaving about three-fourths of the Shaybah-
Zararah oilfield in Saudi hands. In return for these
territorial concessions, Saudi Arabia reportedly relin-
quished its long-held claims to the Al Buraymi Oasis,
now divided between Oman and the UAE, and ex-
tended diplomatic recognition to the UAE.
The Saudi Arabia?UAE boundary consists of a series
of straight-line segments extending south and east
through desert terrain before turning north near the
well of Umm az Zumul. The remaining 200-kilometer
section of the boundary extends north to the Al
Buraymi Oasis. Saudi officials state that the southern
and eastern sections of the boundary up to Umm az
Zumul were demarcated in the late 1970s. The
northern section of the boundary cannot be demarcat-
ed until Saudi Arabia and Oman settle their boundary
disagreement. If Saudi claims are the basis for an
eventual agreement, the tripoint of the UAE?Saudi
Arabia?Oman borders would be near the Al Buraymi
Oasis; if the Omani view prevails, the trijunction
would be at or near Umm az Zumul.
The significance of the agreement for Saudi Arabia is
that its "window on the Gulf" alleviates Riyadh's
concern about strategic access to the southern Gulf.
Some future economic gain may also be realized. Gulf
waters in this area are too shallow for the construction
of a port, but a pipeline and offshore terminal could
be constructed to transport oil.
Oman-UAE. Boundary disputes between Oman and
the UAE have arisen in the Musandam Peninsula
where a wedge of UAE territory separates the north-
ernmost part of Oman from the rest of the country.
The confusing hodgepodge of tribal areas, most of
them small enclaves of the seven UAE shaykhdoms
that border on Oman, has led to disputes, one of
which relates to offshore resources. According to the
US Embassy in Muscat, senior Omani officials still
question the legality of the British surveys made in
the 1950s that established the boundaries of the seven
shaykhdoms.
Secret
In the northwest, Oman has quarreled with Ra's al
Khaymah, one of the emirates, over some 16 kilome-
ters of the coast; on the eastern side of the peninsula,
Oman has contested the boundary with Ash Shariqah,
another of the emirates. Both disputes arose during
the 1970s. Despite announcements made in 1979 and
1981 that agreements had been reached, official
documentation concerning the details of the presumed
settlement?delimitation of the borders and proce-
dures for demarcation?have not been released.
The boundary between Abu Dhabi, the largest of the
emirates, and Oman is complicated by the 1974 Saudi
Arabia?Abu Dhabi (UAE) boundary agreement that
realigns this particular stretch of border south of the
Al Buraymi Oasis. This revised boundary, which
would allocate some 600 square kilometers to Abu
Dhabi, is apparently not an issue between the two
countries. The relaxed "live and let live" approach to
these boundary differences is appropriate in that the
Oman-UAE boundary will not be final until Oman
and Saudi Arabia agree on the terminal point of their
boundary adjoining the Abu Dhabi border.
Current Developments and Outlook
Progress in resolving the numerous border disputes
and issues between and among Arabian Peninsula
nations has been slow and halting. In nearly all of the
disputes, preliminary talks have been held in an
attempt to narrow differences and to find a basis for
compromise and agreement. A key player is Saudi
Arabia whose southern frontier adjoins all of the other
peninsula states. The de facto boundaries between
Saudi Arabia and its southern neighbors are more or
less along the line proposed cartographically by the
British three decades ago. This border is favored by
the peninsula states because it maximizes their terri-
torial limits. The Saudis, however, still maintain
claims considerably beyond the British-drawn line?
in essence the interior desert?leaving the mountains
and coastal areas to the Yemenis and Omanis. These
claims are based in part on tribal alliances and on the
possibility that additional oil reserves may be found
on disputed tracts. Despite differences and the slow
and intermittent nature of the talks, the continuing
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threat to regional security has helped promote a
general consensus among Arabian Peninsula rulers
not to allow the border issues to lead to conflict.
Border Treaties and Key Dates
1903-05
Joint British-Turkish commission defines Aden-
Yemen, now North Yemen?South Yemen boundary.
1914
Anglo-Turkish Convention signed, confirming earlier
Yemeni boundary and defining on map, through
drawing Violet Line, respective spheres of influence in
Peninsula Arabia.
1934
Treaty of Taif ends fighting between Saudi and
Yemeni forces and provides for boundary
delimitation.
1936
North Yemen?Saudi Arabia boundary delimited as
far north as Najran area.
1955
Great Britain defines cartographically by a series of
straight-line segments southern borders of Saudi Ara-
bia, termed Modified Riyadh Line. Saudi Arabia
rejects British definition.
1950s
British surveys of Trucial States (now the UAE)
define boundaries of individual states and their
boundaries with Muscat and Oman (now Oman).
1965
British officials define on map, using series of straight
lines, the "administrative boundary" between British
protectorates of Aden (South Yemen) and sultanate of
Oman.
1974
Saudi Arabia and UAE reach boundary agreement
providing Saudi access to southern Gulf and transfer-
ring other narrow strips of territory to Saudi Arabia
from Abu Dhabi.
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1979-81
Border differences between Oman and UAE reported-
ly settled, but no details released. 25X1
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Persian Gulf
The design of this report permits updating of border information. Changes
and additions will be disseminated to holders of this Digest as necessary.
25X1
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Persian Gulf
nset A
Dezfal
Ahvaz
MOted-e $ole
fleet B
Scale 1.4,000,000 IRAN
O 25 50 Kilometers
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O 15 30 Mlles '
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c;13
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horramshah
Abadan
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rOt
Kuwait
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'AMOR'. ARAB Dibmi .
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25 45'
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28
IR AN
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? \'-
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1.500,00Ij
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114han? 0
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?
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at DAM
Ad Dammaib
SAUDI
6
ARABIA
Ras Tanuri
!Inbar
Manama
Al?' .441\Khuwayr
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.A4
Huf0f
Doha
see Inset A
(Iranian occupied)
Re's at
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Duhay
mm
llama
A N
Risn Diba
Administrate r
'Musay'ld
ft/
4
in dispute
Abu
Dhabi.,
??,:`
ce,
Agreed-upon maritime
boundary
Railroad
Road
Scale 1.6,230,000
O 80 160 Kilometers
O 50 100 Miles
UNiD
1
54
28
? ? 26
Gulf
Fujayrah ir
hints ()mx)
no defined boundary
uhar
0 M A
Boundary representation is
50 nut neeesserilYlautheritatire.
2-7
800419 (A05381) 10-85
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Persian Gulf
Border Basics
The Persian Gulf is a narrow, virtually enclosed arm
of the sea bordered by three major states (Iran, Iraq,
and Saudi Arabia) and five small Arab countries
(Bahrain, Kuwait, Qatar, Oman, and the UAE). The
small size of the Gulf about 900 kilometers in length
and between 200 and 300 kilometers in width, and its
many islands have directly contributed to a number
of sovereignty disputes and related problems on the
division of marine areas. A dispute between Iran and
the UAE over several islands located at the western
approach to the narrow Strait of Hormuz the en-
trance to the Gulf concerns other Gulf states be-
cause of the leverage it gives Iran, which occupies the
islands, to disrupt Gulf shipping. Many disputes over
the division of the Gulfs waters, however, have been
resolved.
Significant Developments
Despite progress over the past 15 years to resolve
outstanding differences, particularly the division of
the seabed, several disputes remain to be settled. The
more important ones, primarily because they are
intertwined with the Iranian-Iraqi conflict, involve the
northern third of the Gulf and Iran, Iraq, and Kuwait.
These disputes are treated in individual boundary
assessments. Seven continental shelf boundary agree-
ments have been concluded, namely: Iran-Oman, part
of the Iran-UAE boundary, Qatar-UAE, Iran-Qatar,
Bahrain?Saudi Arabia, Bahrain-Iran, and Iran?Saudi
Arabia. Disputes still unresolved, including both is-
land and marine areas, are discussed or summarized
in the succeeding paragraphs. Although the 1974 land
boundary agreement between Saudi Arabia and the
25X1 UAE gives Saudi Arabia Gulf frontage, there is no
information on what maritime boundaries adjust-
ments will be made.
Bahrain-Qatar. A dispute persists between Bahrain
and Qatar over the small, barren island of Hawar and
its ring of islets; failure to resolve the sovereignty issue
also prevents the two states from dividing the Gulf
waters between them.
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The dispute is unusual in that Hawar is located some
23 kilometers from Bahrain, but lies a mere 2.5
kilometers off the Qatar coast. The barren island is
not suited for agriculture or much else, but the
potential for oil on Hawar, or in the waters near it, is
sufficiently high to attract the interest of oil compa-
nies. Bahrain maintains a small military garrison on
the island.
25X1
In the late 18th century, the Khalifa family, then
located in northern Qatar, moved to Bahrain and
established themselves as its rulers. They continued to
retain some political influence in northern Qatar for
several more decades. These historical facts presum-
ably figured in Great Britain's ruling in 1939 that
Hawar belonged to Bahrain. At the time, London
controlled the foreign policy of both Bahrain and
Qatar. Bahrain's ownership of Hawar was reaffirmed
by Britain in 1947.
25X1
Qatar dismisses these claims on the grounds that the
stay of the Bahraini ruling family in Qatar does not
give Bahrain permanent sovereignty over areas once
within its political domain. Qatari officials also sug-
gest that London's ruling was influenced by a British
oil company based on Bahrain and its belief that oil
deposits existed on or near Hawar. Qatar's claims, in
contrast, are based not on legal grounds but primarily
on Hawar's geographical proximity. At low tide, it is
possible to wade from Qatar to Hawar. Other "geo-
graphical, historical, legal, and logical indications,"
according to Qatar officials, point to Qatar's owner-
ship.
25X1
Several efforts since 1975 to mediate have ended in
failure. Bahrain reportedly refused to submit the case
to the International Court of Justice. Despite reaffir-
mation of their conflicting claims, usually related to
announcements concerning plans for oil surveys and
drilling test wells, the common ties and mutual inter-
ests between the two countries are growing and
suggest eventual compromise and a resolution of
differences.
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Strait of Hormuz (Iran-(JAE). The western approach-
es to the Strait of Hormuz are dotted with a number
of islands, most of which are located near the Iranian
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shore and under Iranian sovereignty. In 1971, imme-
diately before British withdrawal from the area, Iran
seized three islands?Jazireh-ye Tonb-e Bozorg (Tunb
at Kubra or Greater Tunb), Jazireh-ye Tonb-e Ku-
chek (Tunb as Sughra or Lesser Tunb), and Jazireh-ye
Abu Musa (Abu Musa)?lying more or less in mid-
channel that had been controlled by the Trucial
States (now the UAE) and thus under British protec-
tion.
The dispute over the three islands dates to the 19th
century when the islands were under the jurisdiction
of the Shaykh of Lengeh, who controlled an area
centered on the port of what is now known as
Bandar-e Lengeh located on the northern (Iranian)
side of the Persian Gulf. The Shaykh of Lengeh was
an Arab whose ancestoral ties were in the two small
shaykhdoms of Ash Shariqah (Sharjah) and Ra's at
Khaymah, now part of the UAE, on the southern side
of the Gulf. British forces apparently used the islands
to help curb piracy and protect their growing interest
in the Gulf region. By terms of a treaty in 1853 with
the shaykhdoms of the Trucial coast, Great Britain
legally acquired the authority to enforce maritime
peace and adjudicate disputes, an obligation strength-
ened by later treaties in the 1890s. Subsequently,
Britain defended the Trucial claims to the islands.
Tehran bases its claim on seizure of Lengeh in 1887.
Despite efforts to occupy the Gulf islands, none of the
attempts resulted in a permanent presence. Britain's
announcement in 1968 of its intention to withdraw
politically from the region caused the shaykhdoms of
Ras al Khaymah to claim the Tunbs and Ash Shari-
qah, the island of Abu Musa. The Shah of Iran,
however, also announced in early 1971 plans to secure
the islands. An agreement was subsequently reached
between Iran and the Shaykh of Ash Shariqah for
joint control of Abu Musa. A provision in the agree-
ment provided for sharing of revenues from drilling
ventures near the island (oil was discovered with
production commencing in 1974). Iran has since forti-
fied Greater Tunb and Abu Musa.
The Iranian occupation of the islands on the day prior
to British withdrawal precipitated sharp anti-Iranian
and anti-British reactions throughout much of the
Arab world. Iraq threatened to militarily intervene to
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regain the islands for Arab claimants. When Iran
declared a war zone around the islands in September
1980, shipping had to be rerouted to a new channel
south of and outside the 12-mile limit around Abu
Musa.
In December 1982 Iran signed the UN Convention on
the Law of the Sea and asserted its right to restrict
innocent passage through Iranian territorial seas.
Tehran also maintained that the United States, as a
nonsignatory of the convention, would not have transit
passage rights through the Strait of Hormuz (the
transit channels, however, now lie wholly within
Oman's territorial waters). The United States inter-
prets transit passage as a customary right, to which it
is entitled and which may not be impeded. Iran's
letter to the UN Secretary General in December 1983
asserted that "freedom of navigation is possible only
under conditions of security . . ." and that it is
impossible to isolate the security of one littoral state
from the security of the others. Iranian restriction of
passage through the Strait of Hormuz, if attempted,
would involve interdiction of ships in Omani waters.
The transit issue and threat to shipping remain highly
contentious and somewhat dependent on the progress,
tactics, and eventual resolution of the protracted war
between Iran and Iraq.
Other Gulf Boundaries. Several marine boundaries in
the Gulf remain to be defined because of the continu-
ance of the Iran-Iraq war and other disputes. Bound-
aries not yet decided include:
? The Iran-Iraq marine boundary.
? Kuwait's boundaries in the Gulf with Iran, Iraq,
and Saudi Arabia.
? The boundary between Bahrain and Qatar, unde-
fined because of the dispute over Hawar.
? The land boundary disagreement between Oman
and some of the emirates of the UAE delays the
definition of a marine boundary between the two
nations.
Although a short segment of the Iran-UAE shelf
boundary has been negotiated, but not ratified by the
UAE, the dispute over ownership of the islands at the
32
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western approaches to the Strait of Hormuz requires
resolution before the entire shelf boundary between
them is defined.
Border Treaties and Key Dates
1958
Saudi Arabia and Bahrain decide (22 February) Gulf
boundary, using equidistance method between base-
points on both coastlines.
1968
Saudi Arabia and Iran agree (24 October) to sea
boundary; reflects equal exchange of areas in relation
to equidistant line and settles ownership of two
islands.
1969
Qatar and Abu Dhabi (later UAE) agree (30 March)
to marine division, mostly based on nonequidistant
methods.
Iran and Qatar agree (20 September) to Gulf bound-
ary, disregarding Iranian, Qatari, and UAE islands in
drawing lines. Note: 1974 Oman?Saudi Arabia land
boundary agreement presumably changes this line.
1971
Iran and Bahrain agree (17 June) to marine boundary
connecting to earlier negotiated Iran?Saudi Arabia
and Iran-Qatar maritime boundaries.
On 30 November, one day before British transfer of
power to UAE, Iran seizes Greater and Lesser Tunb
and Abu Musa, claimed by UAE shaykhdoms.
/974
Iran and Oman agree (25 July) to maritime boundary,
using modified equidistant method. Iran and UAE
sign (31 August) shelf agreement; boundary heeds
extension east and west. Agreement ratified by Iran,
but not by UAE.
1980
In September Iran declares war zone and shifts
shipping channel 12 nautical miles south of Abu
Musa.
25X1
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Egypt-Israel
The design of this report permits updating of border information. Changes
and additions will be disseminated to holders of this Digest as necessary.
25X1
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Egypt-Israel Border
Ar',Arish
Gaza Strip
ha teh cu,copied -
status
In he determined
Khan Y
Ashq0on
Yad Mor jkhayY' Oiryat-#
Gat
West Bat
(Israeli occup
pis to be dete
Alta
;Ujaylah
Bin Hasanah ?
EGYPT
An Nakhl
?
International boundary
Point disputed by Israel
Railroad
Road
1-100.0M)
13 30 Kilom,tels
it
10 20 Miles
800420 (A05384) 10 85
Secret
'Ayn at
Ousaymah ?
Ni?iana
At Awjd)
Mi4pe
Ramon
A Border marker
Scale 1:540,000
0 2 Kilometers' '
r
0 1 Mile
Aviya onesta
hotel)
Al Kuntillah
?
36
satiation is
authoritative
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Egypt-Israel
Border Basics
The Egypt-Israel boundary in the Sinai is 266 kilo-
meters in length, extending from a point on the
Mediterranean Sea near Rafah to Taba, a point near
the head of the Gulf of Aqaba. The boundary was
originally delimited and demarcated in 1906; 14
markers were initially placed to mark the alignment,
and a number of supplementary markers were erected
later. The crests of hills and other physical features,
many of them intervisible, were used as sites for
many of the markers. By terms of the 1979 peace
treaty between Egypt and Israel, the boundary was to
be redemarcated using the earlier 1906 demarcation
25X1 for guidance. During redemarcation a number of
disputes arose over the precise location of individual
markers and the boundary alignment.
25X1
The border crosses the Sinai Peninsula, a region of
generally barren, desolate desert terrain. An excep-
tion is a narrow strip of densely populated coastal
plain at the extreme northern end of the boundary.
The remainder of the border passes through rough
plateau and mountainous terrain. Some sections,
particularly in the north, are blanketed with sand
dunes.
The only significant population along the border is in
the north where the boundary adjoins the Gaza Strip.
A predominantly Palestinian population is found
here, many housed in refugee camps and resettlement
areas. There are also 12 Israeli settlements in Gaza.
The rest of the borderlands is essentially unpopulat-
ed except for a scattered and transitory Bedouin
population. In a few areas near the border, a little
agriculture is found when sufficient rain or other
water sources are available to permit the growing of
crops.
Significant Developments
Territorial problems relating to the Sinai did not
vanish with the signing of the 1979 peace treaty
between Egypt and Israel. Before the withdrawal of
Israeli forces on 26 April 1982, a joint boundary
37
commission was formed to redemarcate the boundary,
using the earlier 1906 demarcation work as guidance,
and to settle such issues as vehicle-crossing points and
crossing procedures. During the work of the boundary
commission, a number of disagreements arose all of
them raised by Israel over the precise location of
some of the boundary markers. Most were minor,
involving only a few meters in their placement, al-
though at one point in the southern half of the border
the difference amounts to about 2.5 kilometers. The
most important dispute, however, is the location of the
terminal point of the boundary at Taba where a
luxury beach hotel (the Aviya Sonesta) and other
tourist facilities opened in 1982 at locations up to
several hundred meters west of the traditional bound-
ary. Other beach facilities had opened during the
1970s. Discussions in 1982-83 over Taba were incon-
clusive. A meeting in late January 1985 between
Israeli and Egyptian officials produced limited agree-
ment over some functions of the multinational ob-
server forces (MFO) to be deployed in the disputed
Taba area. 25X1
Frontier History
The definition of the Egypt-Israel boundary in the
Sinai evolved from a unilateral British announcement
in 1892, issued under the auspices of the Egyptian
Khediviate, stating that an administrative line sepa-
rating Egypt from Turkish-ruled Palestine should be
defined. The proposed administrative line ran from
near Al `Arish in a southeasterly direction to the head
of the Gulf of Aqaba. Turkey did not officially
respond with a counterproposal until 1906, when it
suggested that a line be drawn from Al `Arish to the
southern tip of the Sinai Peninsula. Negotiations
ensued and an agreement reached to align the bound-
ary from Rafah on the Mediterranean coast to Taba,
located near the head of the Gulf of Aqaba. An initial
traverse was completed in May-June 1906 that deter-
mined the coordinates of a series of provisional points
along an approximate boundary line. After the agree-
ment was accepted and signed, a joint commission of
British and Turkish officials demarcated the border
by placing intervisible markers along most of the
25X1
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boundary. In the vicinity of Taba, the boundary points
were marked on site by agreement between Turkish
and Egyptian representatives.
The boundary was not affected by the demise of the
Ottoman Empire and the establishment of a British
mandate in Palestine after World War I. The emer-
gence of Israel and the first Arab-Israeli war (1948-
49) caused minor changes. In the extreme northern
part of the boundary, Egyptian forces occupied a
narrow strip of territory, now known as the Gaza
Strip, east of the old boundary. About 40 kilometers
south of Gaza, a demilitarized zone was established
around the Al `Awja' oasis (called Nizzana by Israel)
adjacent to the boundary.
Israel captured the Sinai in 1956, but under pressure
returned the territory to Egypt in 1957, although the
former demilitarized zone at Al `Awja' was retained
by Tel Aviv. Israel militarily captured the Sinai once
more and also the Gaza Strip in the brief 1967 war.
Israeli control of the Sinai was relinquished in April
1982, when by terms of the 1979 peace treaty the old
boundary was reaffirmed.
Current Developments and Outlook
Taba and other disagreements over the boundary have
dragged on since 1982 with little progress. Both
governments face internal political problems in a
settlement: for Egypt, to acquiesce to the current
territorial status quo; for Israel, to relinquish territory
now held. Egyptian officials want the issue resolved
through arbitration, believing that Cairo's case is a
strong one. Tel Aviv
will try for a joint ownership arrangement of Taba
and its lucrative tourist business, a resolution Cairo
almost certainly will reject. The border problem,
however, is also tied to broader Egyptian-Israeli issues
and progress in improving relations between Cairo
and Tel Aviv. The Egyptian-Israeli meeting at Beer-
sheba of 27-29 January 1985 resulted in an agree-
ment to allow the MFO to enter the disputed area but
in disagreement as to its function. Israel insists that
the MFO force has limited functions and that the
Israeli police presence continue; Egypt contends that
the Israeli police activities in Taba violate the "letter
and spirit" of the Egyptian-Israeli peace treaty. Fur-
ther talks on Taba are scheduled. If an agreement on
Secret
Taba is reached, the remaining boundary differences
should be easier to resolve.
Border Treaties and Key Dates
1892
British unilaterally proclaim boundary between Egypt
and Ottoman Empire extends from near Al `Arish
direct to head of Gulf of Aqaba.
1905-06
Tension over Sinai rises as British want land depth to
protect Suez and as Ottoman Sultan wants area at
head of Gulf of Aqaba for railroad.
1906
British and Turkish Governments exchange notes (14-
15 May) on Sinai border delimitation with agreement
over demarcation signed on 10 November.
1917
Palestine comes under British military rule and in
1922 becomes British Mandate.
1948
British forces leave Palestine (15 May); Israel be-
comes state; Arab states invade Israel.
1949
Armistice reached, ending Arab-Israeli hostilities.
Armistice line follows Sinai boundary except for
Egyptian control of Gaza and demilitarized zone at
Al `Awja' (Nizzana).
1956-57
Israel attacks Egypt, captures Sinai; Israel withdraws
(March 1957) from Sinai and retains control over Al
`Awja'.
1967
Israel recaptures Sinai (June).
1975
Egypt and Israel agree to staged Israeli withdrawal
from western Sinai.
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1978
Israel begins construction of hotel on Egyptian side of
boundary at Faba.
1979
Egyptian-Israeli peace treaty calls for Israeli with-
drawal by 26 April 1982 and restoration of 1906
boundary. Treaty provides for UN (later multination-
al) forces and observers in Egypt adjacent to
boundary.
1981-82
Joint commission demarcates boundary except at nine
separate areas where disputes arise over marker
placement.
1982
Israeli forces withdraw except at Taba and three
other locations. Israeli hotel (Aviya Sonesta) opens for
business.
1984
Growing internal political pressures in Egypt to force
resolution of dispute.
39 Secret
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Israel-Jordan
The design of this report permits updating of border information. Changes
and additions will be disseminated to holders of this Digest as necessary.
25X1
41 Secret
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Israel -Jordan -NN et Bank Border
Inset A
Tiberias
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buoys!
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Al Aqabeh
Secret
Al 'Aqabah
Oat].
t110E11, vr
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Israel-Jordan
Border Basics
The de facto boundary between Israel and Jordan
extends north to south for roughly 455 kilometers
from a point on the Yarmuk River to the head of the
Gulf of Aqaba. The boundary south of the Dead Sea
is technically part of the 1949 Armistice Line; a
section of the boundary north of the Dead Sea is part
of the 1967 Cease-Fire Line. Both these northern and
southern "lines" correspond to Jordan's boundaries
that were defined though never demarcated when
Transjordan was created in 1921.
According to the 1978 Camp David accords and
subsequent statements made by US officials, the final
status of the West Bank territory controlled by
Jordan (1948-67), its relationship with its neighbors,
and the Israel-Jordan boundary are to be negotiated
among the concerned parties. Pending completion of
this process, US policy regards the status of the West
Bank as yet to be determined.
The northern section of the boundary follows the
Yarmuk River west for a short distance before joining
the meandering course of the Jordan River. The
Jordan Valley is fairly broad in places 10 to 13
kilometers wide?and good agricultural land exists
in strips of river floodplain and wadi bottoms that
can be irrigated. A sizable Arab population, including
many Palestinian refugees, inhabited the West Bank
side of the valley when Jordan administered the area.
Some of this population fled to the East Bank of
Jordan during the 1967 war; only a small number
have been repatriated. Israeli settlements have been
constructed on West Bank lands, including the Jor-
dan Valley.
25X1
The 175-kilometer southern section of the boundary
extends south from the Dead Sea and follows the
Wadi al'Arabah (called Nahal Ha'Arava by the
Israelis)?part of the geological depression known as
the Great Rift Valley, much of it below sea level, that
extends from Mozambique to Syria. The southern
borderlands consist of fiat to rolling desert terrain,
cut here and there by smaller wadis and backed by
rugged hills and mountains. Traditionally, the bor-
derlands held only a scattering of Bedouins. Israeli
settlements have been established and a little agricul-
ture is practiced on the Israeli side. On the Jordan
side, the population still is scanty, mostly Bedouins.
Israel has erected security fences and established
strict controls along nearly all sections of its bound-
ary with Jordan. 25X1
Significant Developments
The major boundary dispute between Israel and Jor-
dan is essentially a territorial and legal problem over
the West Bank?whose ultimate resolution is tied to
deeply complicated political issues. Less contentious
disputes involve much of the southern section of the
boundary and a short section of the northern bound-
ary. In the south, the boundary?actually the 1949
Armistice Line is aligned along the center or deep-
est part of the Wadi al `Arabah. Israel has construct-
ed a security fence along the boundary and for part of
the distance the fence is from 1 to several kilometers
east of where Jordan claims the Armistice Line is
located. Another dispute is the division of territory
43
immediately south of the Dead Sea. A third area in
dispute is at the juncture of the Nahr al Yarmuk
(Yarmuk) and Jordan Rivers. No progress has been
made in several low-key approaches by Jordan over
the years to resolve these border differences.
Frontier History 25X1
Transjordan was founded in 1921, a result of the
interplay of rising Arab nationalism, Zionism, and the
downfall of the Ottoman Empire and the subsequent
mandate system set up to administer territories previ-
ously controlled by Turkey. In 1921 the British-
administered Palestine Mandate was subdivided to
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create the Arab Emirate of Transjordan. Transjor-
dan's boundary with Palestine was defined in 1922 in
very general language to begin at a point 3.2 kilome-
ters west of the town of Al `Aqabah, thence up (north)
following the Wadi al `Arabah, through the Dead
Sea, along the River Jordan to its juncture with the
Yarmuk River, and following that river to the Syrian
border. The boundary was later drawn on 1:100,000-
scale topographic maps, labeled "not demarcated."
The failure to demarcate their common boundary
apparently created no serious problems between
Transjordan and Palestine before 1948 and the estab-
lishment of the state of Israel. When the first Arab-
Israeli war was ended by the 1949 Armistice, the
Armistice Line shown on an accompanying map
appeared to follow the older boundary between the
two states except in the West Bank area where Arab
forces were in military occupation of Palestine. The
West Bank territory of more than 5,800 square
kilometers was defined by an Armistice Line that ran
west from the Dead Sea, then north to include part of
Jerusalem (with an Israeli exclave on Mt. Scopus),
and eventually back to the east to join the Jordan
River at a point about 70 kilometers north of the
Dead Sea. During the 1967 war Israel quickly seized
the West Bank and in effect returned the boundary to
its pre-1948 position. Israel (1967) unilaterally
enlarged the boundaries of Jerusalem, adding about
65 square kilometers of West Bank territory.
The most significant boundary question, aside from
the West Bank territory, is the alignment of the
border in the Wadi al `Arabah. Israel has constructed
a security fence along some 120 kilometers of the
border. The fence encroaches from 1 to 7 kilometers
east of the boundary as depicted on older topographic
maps. Within the fenced territory is a dirt security
road and bits of cultivated land, and a few water
wells. Unfortunately, the alignment shown on the
1949 Armistice Agreement map is at too small a scale
for locational precision. Although the Armistice Line
is defined on the map as representing "military
positions as surveyed in March 1949 by UN ob-
servers," it is assumed that the Armistice Line was
intended to follow the defined, although undemar-
cated, boundary previously existing between the two
Secret
countries. Most of the Armistice Line was subse-
quently marked on the ground with pylons by the
Mixed Armistice Commission.
The location of the Armistice Line immediately south
of the Dead Sea is also in dispute. A potash refinery,
built in 1936 and located on what is now the Israeli
side of the border, is supplied from saltpans, some of
which extended into then Transjordan. During the
1950s and early 1960s Jordan complained that Israel
was expanding saltpan operations into Jordanian ter-
ritory. The disagreement is over the location on the
ground of the ill-defined 1949 Armistice Line and
interpretations of the vague wording of the 1922
border delimitation in an area where the Wadi al
`Arabah is not present. An additional complication for
future negotiations is the gradual lowering of the
water level in the Dead Sea and the consequent
expansion of land at the shallow south end of the sea.
There is disagreement over the southern terminus of
the boundary at the head of the Gulf of Aqaba. The
1922 agreement specified that the boundary began at
a point 3.2 kilometers west of the town of Al `Aqabah.
On later topographic maps, the boundary was depict-
ed at a point about 4.8 kilometers to the west, instead
of 3.2 kilometers. In 1946, however, the boundary was
repositioned to start at a point 3.2 kilometers west of
Al `Aqabah, and about 4 kilometers of the boundary
was demarcated to where it intersected the earlier
drawn line. Because UN officials used an older map,
the 1949 Armistice Line showed the terminal point
and alignment in accordance with pre-1946 condi-
tions. Israel has used the 1946 repositioning of the
boundary terminus to expand resort development at
Elat and to extend a line of buoys more or less due
south into the Gulf that narrows access to Jordan's
port at Al `Aqabah.
Also disputed is a small parcel of land at the juncture
of the Jordan and Yarmuk Rivers. The territory,
roughly triangular in shape, probably amounts to
about 3 square kilometers and is occupied by Israel.
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Although the old boundary between Jordan and Pal-
estine used the rivers to define the boundary, the 1949
Armistice Line map depicts the line cutting diagonal-
ly southwest-northeast from the Jordan to Yarmuk
just before their juncture. Although they have not yet
arisen, disputes are also possible where the sinuous
Jordan River forms the boundary because changes in
the channel caused by flooding presumably "move"
the boundary as well.
Current Developments and Outlook
The Israeli-Jordanian boundary disputes have not
been widely publicized. Although Jordan shows the
disputed areas on its maps and atlases, its protests
have been low level, directed at third parties the
United States and UN officials to point out Israeli
incursions. Generally, however, Jordan has been con-
cerned only when there are potential conflicts with
Jordanian development programs or rights of access.
In the mid-1970s Jordan's construction of a road
parallel to the southern border caused concern be-
cause its proposed alignment would intersect the
Israeli security fence at several points. The Israelis,
however, reacted by moving their fence west, permit-
ting Jordanian road construction to proceed.
The small scale of the armistice map and faulty
cartographic representation of the Armistice Line?
the width of the line is easily 500 to 700 meters
provide grounds for differing interpretations. In addi-
tion, the topographic character of the Wadi al 'Ara-
bah as to its "center" or "deepest point" also leaves
room for differences that would need resolving during
boundary negotiations. Israel has made the point that
in places changes in the channel of the Wadi al
'Arabah negate the location of the boundary as
interpreted from the 1922 agreement. The boundary
issue is likely to remain duiet unless some new
development, such as an oil strike in the borderlands,
requires a precisely defined and agreed upon bound-
ary.
Border Treaties and Key Dates
1921
Establishment of British Mandate over what is named
Transjordan, separating territory from British-ruled
Palestine territory (west of the Jordan River). Abdul-
lah (grandfather of King Hussein) confirmed as ruler
of a semiautonomous Emirate of Transjordan.
45
Secret
1922
Palestine Order-in-Council defines Transjordan's
boundaries with Palestine, such as the Jordan River?
Dead Sea?Wadi al 'Arabah?Gulf of Aqaba Line. No
provision for demarcation.
1946
Short section (4 kilometers) of southern boundary
demarcated north from Gulf of Aqaba.
25X1
1948
March treaty with Britain grants full sovereignty to
Transjordan.
Israel established (May 14) and Arab nations invade
on following day.
1949
UN-administered armistice ends first Arab-Israeli
war; Armistice Agreement contains maps delineating
line separating opposing armies; Jordan occupies
West Bank, about 5,858 square kilometers. Except for
West Bank boundaries, Armistice Line conforms gen-
erally to Jordan-Palestine border.
1950
West Bank formally annexed (only Britain and Paki-
stan recognized action) and name changed to Hash-
emite Kingdom of Jordan.
25X1
1967
Israel seized West Bank territory; Cease-Fire Line of
7 June along Jordan River south to Dead Sea recon-
firms older Jordan-Palestine border.
25X1
1975-76
Minor crisis over Jordanian roadbuilding in southern
boundary section averted when Israel relocates securi-
ty fence erected east of Armistice Line.
25X1
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Israel-Lebanon
The design of this report permits updating of border information. Changes
and additions will be disseminated to holders of this Digest as necessary.
25X1
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!icc ref
',lad-Lebanon llorder
Az Zahram Kaf
Ansar
,Az Zrariyah
nro^,
Abl)aslyah
?
0A42air Naffikt
Al Qunayhra
A
u yqah
airyat Bahk
Secret
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Israel-Lebanon
Border Basics
The Israel-Lebanon boundary, technically the Israel-
Lebanon Armistice Line of 1949, is 79 kilometers in
length measured west to east from Ra's An Naqurah,
on the Mediterranean, to the trijuncture of the Israel-
Lebanon-Syria boundary. Since Israel's occupation of
the Golan Heights (1967), the de facto tripoint pres-
ently is located another 20 kilometers to the north-
east on the lower slopes of Mount Hermon. The 1949
Armistice Agreement stipulated that the Armistice
Line was to follow the former Lebanon-Palestine
boundary officially defined by the Anglo-French
Boundary Convention (1920), demarcated by 38
boundary posts (1922), and ratified in 1923.
The boundary alignment follows the crest of low hills
and ridges in the west, cuts across somewhat higher
(600 to 900 meters) and more rugged terrain in the
central sector, and in the eastern sector runs north-
south along the western rim of the Great Rift Valley
overlooking the 'Emeq Hula (Hula Valley) before
25X1 winding its way to a point near Al Ghajar. Parts of
the boundary consist of short straight-line segments
connecting individual markers.
25X1
When the boundary was established, the population
of the border area was mostly Arab (Shia Muslims)
with a few Jewish settlements in Palestine. A few
Christian villages were interspersed in southern Leba-
non. Since 1948 Jewish settlement has increased, and
since 1969 there have been additional population
displacements and a net population loss in southern
Lebanon caused by people fleeing from Palestinian
guerrilla attacks into Israel and Israeli military
operations.
Significant Developments
Since the military invasion of Lebanon in 1982, Israel
has exercised complete control over the boundary and
border area. There have been no changes made in the
alignment other than some slight adjustments made
prior to 1982 to allow for road changes and to
49
accommodate security fencing. The boundary align-
ment has not figured in discussions initiated to settle
the political and security relationships between Leba-
non and Israel. 25X1
25X1
Frontier History
The Lebanon-Palestine (later Israel) boundary was an
outgrowth of early 20th-century political events: the
decline and overthrow of the Ottoman Empire, which
controlled much of the Middle East; the scramble and
rivalry between Great Britain and France over the
division of the Ottoman possessions; the rise of Zion-
ism; and Arab nationalism and aspirations.
Proposals to divide Turkish territories began during
World War I, and many plans were considered to
satisfy the several groups with interests in the region.
In the end, however, the military occupation of the
area by British and French troops forced decisions.
Zionist aims, supported by the British, were to secure
additional water, notably to incorporate the head-
waters of the Jordan River within a Jewish-dominated
state and to gain access to the Nahr al Litani, to
support future development and provide arable land
for Jewish settlers. France's desire to maximize its
area of control led to the concept of a Greater
Lebanon state. In 1920 a compromise was reached on
dividing the Ottoman territory and a Lebanon-Pales-
tine boundary defined; initially both states were to be
mandates of Great Britain and France, respectively.
Although the boundaries of Palestine included all
Jewish colonies, the territorial limits of Palestine
failed to incorporate territory that would augment its
meager water supplies. 25X1
The 1920 convention defining the boundary paid
scant attention to actual ground and terrain condi-
tions. Consequently, the 1922 boundary demarcation
caused division of some village and individual land
holdings and disruption of local trade and transporta-
tion. These local problems were resolved in a 1926
agreement (Lebanon-Palestine-Syria) that established
procedures allowing border inhabitants freedom to
cross the boundary without the usual formalities.
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Although Israeli forces advanced into southeastern
Lebanon during the first Arab-Israeli war (1948-49),
the terms of the Armistice Agreement called for the
Armistice Line to follow the former Lebanon-
Palestine boundary. The border area remained quiet
over the following 20 years, in part because an Israeli-
Lebanese Mixed Armistice Commission carefully
marked the Armistice Line in 1950 to prevent acci-
dental crossings and incidents. Stricter regulations,
however, also stopped the easy cross-border travel and
economic activities of the past.
The peaceful character of the border area changed
after 1969, when Palestine Liberation Organization
(PLO) forces moved into southern Lebanon. The next
15 years saw cross-border raids, invasions, civil war,
and since 1982 Israeli occupation of southern Leba-
non. There was considerable damage to border vil-
lages and a general depopulation, much of it tempo-
rary, of the border area. During this time Israel
constructed (1974) a security fence along the border
together with other security measures designed to
prevent illegal entry. In 1976 a "good fence" policy
was instituted to permit and regulate a limited
amount of cross-border travel and trade and to
nurture linkage between villagers in southern Leba-
non with Israel.
Current Developments and Outlook
Despite the prolonged period of military activities in
and near the border, there are no indications that
either an Israeli-Lebanese settlement or the with-
drawal of Israeli forces from Lebanon would change
the location of the boundary. Israel has, however, in
the construction of its border security fence and struc-
tures encroached in some areas onto the Lebanese side
of the border. The border terrain favors infiltration
from the north and is militarily unfavorable to Israel.
It is possible that in a settlement some minor alter-
ations in the boundary may be agreed upon, probably
in a context of boundary redemarcation based on
updating the 1923 boundary treaty. Israel's major
interest in the border area is to maintain a buffer area
of some depth on the Lebanese side that would be
under Israeli or a surrogate's control.
Secret
Border Treaties and Key Dates
1920
Franco-British Boundary Convention signed in Paris
(23 December) delimits boundary but fails to incorpo-
rate within Palestine the river basin areas (Jordan and
Litani) desired by Zionists. French Mandate for Leb-
anon and Syria and British Mandate for Palestine
established.
1922
Mixed Anglo-French commission marks boundary on
ground.
1923
Agreement signed in Paris (7 March) on demarcation
of border between "Greater Lebanon" and Palestine.
Three maps at 1:100,000 scale appended, showing
marker placement and terrain.
1926
Agreement between Lebanon-Palestine-Syria, signed
at Jerusalem (2 February), over administration of
frontier and division of land holdings; alignment
unchanged.
1949
Lebanon and Palestine sign Armistice Agreement (23
March); Article V, Section 1, states that "Armistice
Demarcation Line shall follow the international
boundary between Lebanon and Palestine."
1950
Boundary marked in greater detail by mixed Israeli-
Lebanese team to prevent inadvertent border crossing
by local inhabitants.
1969
Palestinian guerrilla presence in southern Lebanon
ushers in cross-border shellings and raids, prompting
Israeli reprisals and preemptive strikes in southern
Lebanon.
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1974
Israel constructs elaborate security fence and related
installations to prevent border crossings.
1976
Israel establishes "good fence" program specifying
border crossing points to permit limited and super-
vised contact and trade in border area.
1978
Israeli military invasion north to Nahr at Litani
attacking guerrilla base area; withdrawal after three
months.
1982
Israeli invasion and occupation of southern Lebanon.
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Lebanon-Syria
The design of this report permits updating of border information. Changes
and additions will be disseminated to holders of this Digest as necessary.
25X1
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I ,ebanon-S ria llortler
Al
Amdahl
36?30'
all Kalakh Hilhayrat
It0rialA
37 00
Al fluyr /
34 10A
Me( tilt Vt3 1/1
Al Mind
fjpoh
Al Bairtin
Bsharri
?
tAfA, Pbs
Balabakk
d r
Inset
An Nabk
'Assaf
al Ward
A Ad Maur
\-A
t"
1 BayI.
ad Din Jab
Janni
f ?
t$`
Day al
Ashayir
ca.ie I 2,1.000
KllormAttArs
NA110,
Inset 11-
35
- 33 30
'tIlamas
36 3573
Nat, al Warren(
(Mirror, Spring)
ab al Luwayzaht,
3b
SYRIA
M 4101
irflr see
\?4n) IrnS
,{
Al /A
Kiswah
Sara'
36
A
AA sA 0,
iA0A.A. ill5 I, AAAA
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Lebanon-Syria
Border Basics
The Lebanon-Syria boundary--estimated at about
375 kilometers in length?was initially established in
1920 when France divided the mandate into separate
Syrian and Lebanese territories. Only two short
sections of the boundary have been settled. No com-
25X1 prehensive border treaty, however, has been signed.
25X1
25X1
Most of the central and southern sections of the
boundary are aligned southwest-northeast along the
crests of hills and mountains; occasionally, the
boundary is aligned in wadis or stream valleys. The
northern third of the boundary, however, leaves the
mountains and is aligned northwest and then west
across plains and low hills. The north westernmost
section of the boundary follows the An Nahr al
Kabir, a stream that empties into the Mediterranean
at Al 'Aridah.
The border area is fairly well populated even in the
mountainous areas, traditionally places of refuge
from invaders. The border population and the diverse
ethnic and religious identifications of the inhabitants
have not openly figured in the low-key disagreements
over the boundary alignment.
Significant Developments
Neither Syria nor Lebanon has voiced much concern
or widely publicized a failure to delimit and demar-
cate their common border or their differing interpre-
tations of the boundary alignment. A joint commis-
sion worked periodically after 1958 to delimit the
boundary, but agreement apparently was reached for
only two short boundary sections. Maps issued by the
two countries continue to show border differences, of
which the most significant are those in the area where
the main route from Damascus to Lebanon's Al Biqa'
(Bekaa Valley) crosses the frontier and at the village
of Al Ghajar at the southern end of the border.
55
Frontier History
The Lebanon-Syria boundary has been neither delim-
ited nor demarcated in its entirety, and verbal de-
scriptions of the boundary alignment are generalized.
The ambiguous status of the boundary results from
agreements reached following protracted negotiations
over the disposition of the former Turkish domains in
the Middle East. The territory now comprising Syria
and Lebanon was placed under French mandate. In
September 1920 France separated the area, adding
coastal districts and the Bekaa Valley to Mount
Lebanon and thus creating the modern state of Leba-
non. No legal description of the boundary accompa-
nied this administrative measure nor was provision
made, since both Syria and Lebanon were under
French control, for border delimitation and demarca-
tion. 25X1
The vague definition of the boundary was not reme-
died in Lebanon's first constitution (1926), which
merely stated that: "Its frontiers are the present ones
which are officially recognized by the mandatory
French Government, and by the League of Nations."
The revised constitution of 1943 struck this clause and
in its place inserted a more specific boundary descrip-
tion that referred to rivers and "summit lines" sepa-
rating river valleys and other physical features. Part
of the description, however, stated that the boundary
followed the borders of certain administrative dis-
tricts. The boundaries of older Turkish administrative
districts apparently were meant to coincide with
mountain crests in some areas, but in other areas
administrative lines were drawn without apparent
reference to physical features.
25X1
Lebanon and Syria gained full independence by 1946,
but neither country hurried to delimit and demarcate
their common boundary. Official Lebanese topo-
graphic maps in the late 1950s, for example, carried
no boundary with Syria; government ministries and
officials marked individual maps by hand using older
French maps for boundary alignment guidance. At
that time Lebanon had no official position as to the
border alignment. In the late 1950s the two countries
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finally agreed to appoint a mixed boundary commis-
sion to review the border situation and to delimit those
sections of the boundary not clearly defined. The
commission apparently worked fitfully and slowly and
after a decade (1969) reported agreement and delimi-
tation of only "50 to 60 kilometers" of the boundary.
Agreement was reached on the river boundary (the An
Nahr al Kabir) in the north and a section of the
boundary of about 55 kilometers marked by 49
boundary posts extending from approximately
34?00'N to 34?14'N in the northeast. Officials stated
that terrain features and village borders were the
major criteria used to fix the boundary. Lebanese
topographic maps printed in 1964 show the boundary
presumably recognized by the government.
The major border differences that emerged in the late
1950s and early 1960s, apparently through Syrian
actions, include:
? A Syrian salient of about 6 by 2 kilometers, ex-
tending southwest from the main Damascus?Bekaa
Valley route. The salient incorporates the village of
Mazra` at Dayr at `Ashayir (Ma`zar), reportedly a
Syrian-inhabited village, blocking easy Lebanese
access to the border. Syria probably occupied the
area in the late 1950s or early 1960s.
? A small area centered at the village of Al Ghajar
and including the Nab' al Wazzani (Wazzani
Spring), a major water source for the Nahr al
Hasbani (lower Hasbani River) in Lebanon. The
traditional, although undemarcated, boundary had
split the village of Al Ghajar. The northern part of
the village, inside Lebanon, was reunited when
Syria moved the boundary north in 1963 (possibly
earlier) about 0.5 kilometer to facilitate digging a
canal from the Wazzani Spring to the Golan
Heights. Israel seized the area in 1967 and contin-
ues to use the de facto alignment as its border with
Lebanon.
? South of Al Ghajar, the Hasbani River formed the
Lebanon-Syria boundary for about 4 kilometers
until the Israel border was reached. Israeli maps
now show the boundary along the western bank, in
places up to 500 meters from the river, from just
south of Al Ghajar to the boundary tripoint.
Secret
Although other border differences appear minor and
probably related to cartographic problems of map
scale and the amount of topographic detail, reporting
from a boundary commission member in 1969 stated
that a "large number of errors" in the boundary
remain.
Current Developments and Outlook
It is unlikely that Lebanon-Syria boundary differ-
ences will be resolved soon and the entire boundary
delimited and demarcated. Little pressure exists to
reach agreement, and the fluid political-military situ-
ation in Lebanon points toward a continuation of the
status quo. Although the border area has been
described in the past as where "frontier residents
seem to be somewhat tolerantly casual about the
boundary," Syria has closed the border during politi-
cal crises. Furthermore, since the mid-1970s Syria has
disregarded the boundary and Lebanese sovereignty
to place military units in Lebanon in response to
internal Lebanese political problems and Israeli ac-
tions in southern Lebanon. Syrian interests are proba-
bly best served by leaving the boundary issue unre-
solved and the boundary alignment imprecise.
Lebanon, whose political future is tied to regional
political problems and their solution, has little bar-
gaining power and more pressing political issues than
the status and alignment of its boundary with Syria.
Border Treaties and Key Dates
1920
Mandate for Lebanon and Syria awarded to France
(April).
France separates Lebanon from Syria (September)
through addition of former Turkish administrative
districts and enlarging area of core Lebanese
settlement.
1926
Lebanese constitution adopted, but boundary with
Syria defined only in terms of existing administrative
units.
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1943
Lebanon revises and amends 1926 constitution; in-
cludes a more specific but still generalized description
of Lebanon-Syria boundary. Lebanon declares its
independence.
1946
Syria achieves independence.
1958-59
Lebanon and Syrian appoint joint boundary commis-
sion to delimit boundary.
1967
Syria loses Golan Heights to Israel.
1969
Reporting from joint boundary committee states that
only "50 to 60 kilometers" settled and that a large
number of errors in the boundary remain.
57 Secret
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Israel-Syria
The design of this report permits updating of border inlOrmation. Changes
and additions will he disseminated to holders of this Digest as necessary.
25X1
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Israel-Syria Border
An NahaIf
at TOM
Mt Helton'
40 hit
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eiran Heights k
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--"Kair Nish s?c,
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Tiberias'
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Ramat /
Manshimim./
fr
.Umm Sharq
Kinnerat
"Yayne'el
-,4:I0d000d
Booadary roprosontation is
not necessartly outhnritattio
Armistice Line. 1949
Demilitarized Zone limit, 1 949
United Nations Disengagement
Observer Force (UNDOF)
limit, 1974
Railroad
Road
Scale 1 460 000
0 5 10 Kilornetets
iii 11 i ,
0 3 6Mii,s
800424 (A053941 10-85
Secret
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Israel-Syria
Border Basics
The Israel-Syria boundary is approximately 76
kilometers in length extending roughly north-south
from the tripoint with the Lebanon boundary to the
juncture with the Jordan boundary. The boundary
was demarcated in 1922 by a joint Anglo-French
commission also charged with marking the Lebanon-
Palestine boundary. Consequently', the 32 markers
placed along the Palestine-Syria boundary were num-
bered north to south from 39 to 71 and were part of a
numbering sequence begun at the western end of the
Lebanon-Palestine border. The major portion of the
boundary was primarily aligned along the base of the
uplands marking the eastern rim of the 'Emeq Hula
(Hula Valley). In the south, the boundary was drawn
10 meters from the shoreline of Lake Tiberias (Sea of
Galilee) regardless of the water level along the
northern half of the lake and then paralleled the lake
at distances of from 2 to 3 kilometers before turning
east to the Jordanian border on the Nahr al Yarmuk
(Yarmuk River).
Since 1949 the de facto boundary has differed from
the de jure border, a result of Arab-Israeli wars. The
1949 Armistice Line followed the older Palestine-
Syria boundary except in three areas designated as
demilitarized zones where Syrian forces had pushed
west of the border. In the brief 1967 war, Israeli
forces advanced from several to more than 20 kilom-
eters into Syria before cease-fire lines were drawn.
Israel seized additional Syrian territory east of Al
Qunaytirah in the 1973 war but withdrew in 1974
when minor modifications in these lines were made. A
narrow bitlfer strip known as the UNDOF (United
Nations Disengagement Observer Force) area or zone
and roughly a kilometer or so in width, is patrolled
by UN troops. The present disengagement lines in the
Golan Heights, previously' one of Syria's more pros-
perous agricultural areas, pass through semiarid
rocky hills and rolling plains. Nearly all of the
Syrian population fled or were forced out in 1967;
almost no one has been allowed to return. More than
30 Israeli settlements have been established in the
Golan.
61
Significant Developments
Israel's de facto annexation of the Golan Heights (14
December 1981) provided a legal cap to a long period
of steadily tightened Israeli control over the area.
Since 1967 Israel's policies have been to establish a
presence in the Golan Heights by prohibiting the
return of the Syrian inhabitants of the areas, through
razing many former Syrian villages, and by establish-
ing a number of Israeli agricultural settlements. The
population, once in excess of 100,000, has been re-
duced to about 13,000 Druze a religious, Islamic-
derived sect concentrated in a few villages in the
northeastern corner of the Golan?and about 8,000
Israeli settlers located in roughly three dozen settle-
ments. Despite these steps and the annexation bill
passed by Israel's Knesset, no other nation has recog-
nized the legality of the action. 25X1
Frontier History
Syria, although briefly attaining independence follow-
ing World War I, became a French Mandate in 1922
following lengthy negotiations between France and
Great Britain. These negotiations, dividing up the
territorial remains of the Ottoman Empire, were
complex, involving not only Anglo-French interests
and rivalries but also those of the Zionists and Arab
leaders. The eventual definition of Palestine's borders
was colored by British notions, based on a 19th-
century atlas of the Holy Land that depicted the
Biblical limits of Palestine.
25X1
The delimitation of the Palestine-Syria border was
spelled out in an agreement signed in Paris (23
December 1920), and the boundary demarcated by an
Anglo-French team in 1922. The demarcation was
approved in 1923 by Britain and France. In the north,
the boundary began at the point where the Nahr al
Habasni joins the Lebanon-Syria boundary, extended
east for 5 kilometers, then was drawn almost due
south along the base of the escarpment overlooking
Hula Valley and Lake Tiberias before turning south-
east to meet the Yarmuk River and the Transjordan
boundary. Although not apparent nor appreciated
initially, the alignment of the boundary at the foot of
considerably higher terrain overlooking Palestine was
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later to prove an important factor in the military and
political relationships between the two countries
Fighting between Arab states and Israel in 1948
ended with armistice agreements, the last being be-
tween Israel and Syria. Delay was caused by Syrian
military occupation of territory west of the established
boundary, a presence that threatened Israeli control
and development of the fertile upper Jordan Valley.
The Armistice Line followed the old boundary except
in three areas, totaling about 66 square kilometers,
militarily occupied by Syria. These three areas were
established as demilitarized zones in which UN offi-
cials had certain powers. Each nation interpreted
differently the legal status, rights, and obligations in
the zones: Israel held that its sovereignty in the zones
was complete, except for the military prohibitions
stated in the Armistice; Syria felt that the zones were
internationalized territory with only the United Na-
tions having authority to settle disputes arising in and
over the zones.
Disputes arose over jurisdiction within the zones,
particularly over land ownership and Israeli develop-
ment plans for drainage and related water control
projects. A lengthy number of problems and incidents
were referred to UN officials; some reached the
Security Council for settlement. Syria and Israel
seldom agreed on either the facts or the proposed
solutions of these issues. The number of incidents and
the severity of the responses taken by the two govern-
ments increased over the years with shootings, use of
artillery, and airstrikes
In June 1967 Israel seized the demilitarized zones and
quickly advanced up the Golan escarpment 20 to 25
kilometers into Syria, occupying about two-thirds of
the Syrian Province of Al Qunaytirah. Cease-fire lines
were established and marked on the ground, and UN
forces patrolled a narrow buffer zone between the two
forces to keep the peace. The 1973 Arab-Israeli war in
the Golan Heights ended with Israel extending the
area under its control in a bulge toward Damascus. In
1974 the Golan Accord resulted in the disengagement
lines, termed A and B, which roughly coincided with
the 1967 cease-fire lines except in the Ar Rafid and
Al Qunaytirah areas. The accord resulted in the
destroyed city of Al Qunaytirah being returned to
Secret
25X1
Syrian civilian administration, although it was located
in the UNDOF.
Current Developments and Outlook
There is almost no chance in the immediate future for
an Israeli-Syrian agreement on border issues, primari-
ly because any boundary rectifications are unlikely in
the absence of a general Arab-Israeli peace settle-
ment. Until then, Israel has no intention of relinquish-
ing the rolling plains and hills of the Golan Heights
and its commanding terrain overlooking the Hula
Valley. The Golan is not a prime area of historic
Jewish settlement?although some Jewish settlements
and synagogues once existed there?and the area,
together with southwestern Syria and northwestern
Jordan, was included in the territorial proposals sub-
mitted by Zionist leaders before the establishment of
the mandate over Palestine. These extensive claims
were put forth in an attempt to obtain control of the
Jordan River and adjoining river basins to meet
possible future water needs of a Jewish state. The
water issue is important in the northwestern corner of
the Golan, which contains the headwaters of the Nahr
Baniyas, a Jordan tributary. The southern Golan
adjoining the Yarmuk River, which forms the bound-
ary with Jordan, also figures in a dispute between
Israel and Jordan over alleged Israeli use of Yarmuk
water in the occupied Golan Heights. Security con-
cerns, however, remain the single most important
factor in Israeli policy toward Syria. For Syria,
regaining the Golan Heights is a key foreign policy
objective
Border Treaties and Key Dates
1920
Franco-British Boundary Convention signed in Paris
(23 December); defines Lebanon-Syria boundary.
1922
Anglo-French commission demarcates Palestine bor-
der with Lebanon and Syria; markers numbered 39 to
71 placed along 76 kilometers of the boundary.
1923
Britain and France accept work of demarcation team
(7 March).
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/944 1981
Syria recognized as independent state by United Israeli Knesset (December) passes bill extending Is-
States. raeli law, legislation, and administration to the Golan.
25X1
1946
France evacuates all troops from Syria.
1949
Armistice between Syria and Israel establishes Armi-
stice Line that follows international boundary except
in three areas where Syrian troops have occupied land
west of the boundary. Syrian-held areas termed De-
militarized Zone. Map at 1:50,000 scale delineates
Demilitarized Zone and Demarcation Line.
1951-67
Disputes over land ownership, water control measures,
and related issues in Demilitarized Zones. Other
issues raised and incidents lead to exchanges of fire
and airstrikes. Tensions and severity of military re-
sponses increase during mid-1960s.
/967
Six-Day War results in Israeli occupation of Golan
Heights of 20 or more kilometers east of boundary.
Many residents flee; most of the remainder expelled.
Israeli census enumerates only 6,400 Syrian residents
in Golan, out of 100,000 or more before the war.
/968
Initial paramilitary outposts and Israeli settlements
established on Golan.
1973-74
October 1973 war and negotiations end with disen-
gagements agreement (31 May 1974) establishing
lines roughly identical to 1967 cease-fire lines except
in Ar Rafid and Al Qunaytirah areas; includes terri-
tory between Israeli (Line A) and Syrian (Line B)
forces monitored by UN personnel but under Syrian
civilian administration.
1978
Camp David accords call for Syria and Israel to
negotiate future of Golan Heights and to conclude a
peace treaty.
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Syria-Turkey
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and additions will be disseminated to holders of this Digest as necessary.
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ria-TurkQ Border
40
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40
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Syria-Turkey
Border Basics
The Syria-Turkey boundary, about 822 kilometers in
length, extends from the boundary tripoint with Iraq
on the Tigris River west across a mainly semiarid
steppe region to the Mediterranean Sea.
The border was defined by terms of a Franco-Turkish
agreement (October 1921). The first two sections of
the boundary were delimited according to a treaty
signed between France, the mandatory power for
Syria at the time, and Turkey in May 1926. The
third and easternmost section of the boundary was
not settled and delimited until 1929, confirmed by
another Franco-Turkish agreement signed in June of
that year. One of the provisions of the 1921 agree-
ment established Alexandretta Sanjak (district) as an
autonomous district, located within Syria at the
western end of the boundary. This district, which had
a large Turkish population, was the subject of later
negotiations in the 1930s that resulted in its incorpo-
ration by Turkey in June 1939. This section of the
Syria-Turkey boundary was demarcated by 448 pil-
lars and additional supplementary markers.
Most of the border area is barren, sparsely populated
semiarid plains cut here and there by wadis. At the
western end, however, the border crosses a mix of
hills and plains, which is mostly cultivated and has a
comparatively high rural population density. The
boundary alignment follows no distinctive terrain
feature or features; the numerous straight-line seg-
ments connect small hills or similar features and
elevation points. One unusual feature is that about
300 kilometers of the boundary is aligned along a
railroad.
Significant Developments
The transfer of the Alexandretta District to Turkey in
1939, termed Hatay Province in Turkey, has been a
contentious issue between the two states ever since.
Although Syria has never officially accepted the
transfer, done while France was the mandatory power
for Syria, the issue has not been actively pursued in
67
Secret
recent years. Syrian maps, however, continue to show
the Syria-Turkey boundary as it existed before 1939.
Border tensions have at times continued, although
they have been low-key in recent years.
25X1
Frontier History
The Syria-Turkey boundary was initially defined by
terms of the Treaty of Sevres (August 1920), signed
by the existing Turkish Government but rejected by
nationalist leaders who later established the Turkish
Republic. France, wearying of its military role in
Turkey quietly negotiated a later agreement in Octo-
ber 1921 that included a boundary definition more
favorable to Turkey. The same agreement (also known
as the Franklin-Bouillon Agreement) specified that a
special autonomous area in northwestern Syria, the
district of Alexandretta with a large Turkish minority
population, should be established. The Treaty of
Lausanne (1923) ended foreign intervention and fight-
ing in Turkey and recognized the 1921 agreement
fixing the Syria-Turkey boundary. 25X1
The lengthy border was delimited and demarcated
during the period 1925-29. The first section fixed on
the ground extended from the Mediterranean Sea east
to the railway station of Cobanbey, located on the old
Baghdad Railway. Boundary delimitation was con-
firmed by a Franco-Turkish convention of 30 May
1926. The second boundary section, also confirmed by
the 1926 treaty, extended west to east between the
rail stations of Cobanbey and Nusaybin. This section
of the international boundary is unusual in that it
follows the railroad with the track, stations, and
sidings, and, as the treaty states, "all the existing
installations employed in the working of the line will
belong to Turkey as forming part of the railway
track." The third and easternmost section of the
boundary, extending from Nusaybin to the Iraqi
tripoint located at the confluence of the Tigris and the
Habur Nehri, was delimited by an agreement signed
between Turkey and France on 22 June 1929. This
section had been in dispute and Turkish troops had for
a time occupied posts south of the 1921 line. In a
followup annex to the agreement, dated 3 May 1930,
it was stated that the boundary would follow the
thalweg of the Tigris wherever it moved.
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Negotiations between Syrian and French officials in
1936 included a Turkish request for a reconsideration
of the status of the Alexandretta District. The ques-
tion was referred to the League of Nations, which
decided (1937) that Alexandretta should be a self-
governing state with economic and political ties to
Syria. The Turkish community, however, gained con-
trol in the elections that followed. Subsequently, in
direct negotiations between Turkey and France in
1939, France accepted the absorption of what was
termed the Republic of Hatay by Turkey. Distur-
bances broke out in Syria over the territorial transfer
and what Syrian leaders believed was insufficient
effort by France to defend their interests. Boundary
demarcation, meanwhile, had been completed in
1938, with minor modifications made in the spring of
1939, and confirmed by a boundary protocol signed at
Antioch.
No adjustments in the boundary have taken place
since 1939. Border tensions have at times been high,
particularly in 1957-58, although factors other than,
or in combination with, border issues have usually
caused ill will between the two states. Much of the
border on the Turkish side has been mined, although
since the early 1960s there have been periodic reports
of plans to remove the minefields. Military posts near
the border and border patrols attempt to deal with
smuggling and illegal border crossers. Border issues
that have caused friction include minor disputes over
water rights, land holdings in the border area by
citizens of the other country, local cross-border travel,
and smuggling. Smuggling is the most serious prob-
lem and involves illicit drug trafficking, the bringing
of Turkish sheep into Syria, and the movement of
miscellaneous contraband. Since at least 1960, Syrian
and Turkish officials have periodically met to resolve
local disputes.
Current Developments and Outlook
There are presently no major border problems, or
other issues, likely to cause any significant territorial
adjustments. The alignment of the border generally is
well marked, although occasional references to
destroyed or missing markers suggest a need for
redemarcation in some areas. The Alexandretta issue
periodically flares in Syria, representing an easily
grasped emotional issue that can be used to arouse
Secret
anti-Turkish sentiments. Although official Syrian
maps continue to show the Syria-Turkey border as if
the 1939 transfer had not taken place, this is less an
ominous sign of Syrian intentions than a practical
legal device to keep alive?if barely?a now some-
what ancient territorial dispute.
Border Treaties and Key Dates
1916
Sykes-Picot agreement between Great Britain and
France divides eastern Turkish territories, assigning
Syria and southeastern Turkey to France.
1920
Treaty of Sevres (10 August) declares Syria indepen-
dent (under mandate to France) and defines Syria-
Turkey boundary.
1921
Franco-Turkish agreement (20 October), also termed
Franklin-Bouillon Agreement, redefines Syria-Turkey
boundary 20 to 60 kilometers or so to the south and
states that the special administrative district of Alex-
andretta (within Syria) would be established.
1923
Treaty of Lausanne (24 July) confirms 1921 Syria-
Turkey boundary.
1926
Franco-Turkish convention of Angora (30 May) de-
limits boundary, consisting of the two westernmost
sections extending from Mediterranean to railroad
station of Nusaybin.
1929
Franco-Turkish protocol (22 June) provides detailed
delimitation of third, remaining boundary section
from Nusaybin to Iraqi tripoint.
1937
Treaty between France and Turkey makes Alexan-
dretta District of Syria autonomous under joint
French-Turkish guarantee.
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1939
Franco-Turkish protocol (19 May) provides details of
demarcation (1938-39) of Alexandretta with Turkey.
Agreement between France and Turkey confirms
annexation of Alexandretta District to Turkey;
minor modifications in boundary alignment agreed to
earlier.
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Greece-Turkey:
Aegean Dispute
The design of this report permits updating of border information. Changes
and additions will be disseminated to holders of this Digest as necessary.
25X1
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Greece-Turkey Border
Edirne
(Adrianople) tKirkiarelii
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International boundary
Line of separation indicating
island sovereignty
----- Railroad
Road
Scale 1:J,000,000
0 40 80 Kilometers
0 25 50 Miles
800426 (A05396) 10-85
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72
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Greece-Turkey: Aegean Dispute
Basics
More than 2,000 islands lie between Greece and
Turkey in the Aegean Sea. The islands extend north-
south for nearly 700 kilometers from Thrace to
Crete. With the exception of several islands near the
entrance of the Dardanelles, all of the islands are
under Greek sovereignty.
Only 100 or so of these islands are inhabited, and
they have a solidly Greek population of a little less
than 1 million people. Those islands most affected by
the various disputes between Greece and Turkey?
and eastern Aegean groups and the
have a population of less than 400,000
the northern
Dodecanese
people.
The Aegean disputes are complex, and at issue are
continental shelf rights, definition of territorial sea
limits, delimitation of airspace boundaries, and air
traffic regulations. Greece's sovereignty over the
numerous Aegean islands?a few lying as close as
5 kilometers from Turkey is not contested at this
time.
Significant Developments
Disputes between Turkey and Greece in the Aegean
Sea have simmered for many decades, but tensions
between Athens and Ankara have noticeably in-
creased in recent years. Reasons include the discovery
of oil in the early 1970s, Turkey's military seizure of
part of Cyprus in 1974, the organization of Turkey's
IV Army (Army of the Aegean) in 1975, and the
development of additional Law of the Sea concepts
that have complicated attempts to resolve differences.
Since the election of Prime Minister Papandreou in
1981 and after the Turkish Cypriot declaration of
independence (November 1983), the intermittent bi-
lateral political dialogue between the two countries
virtually ceased. The side effects of the Aegean
disputes have also complicated NATO command and
control arrangements, disrupted NATO joint exer-
cises in the region, and slowed progress in important
NATO planning meetings.
73
Background
The Aegean dispute has its roots in mutual animos-
ities that have persisted between Greeks and Turks
since the collapse of the Byzantine Empire, the rise
and fall of the Ottoman Empire, and the Greek war of
independence. By the early 20th century Greece had
expanded its frontiers to include much of modern-day
Greek territory. By the terms of the Treaty of Sevres
(1920) that divided former Ottoman possessions,
Greece was in line to acquire most of Thrace, the
Dodecanese (except Rhodes), several islands near the
Dardanelles, and a mandate over the port of Izmir
(Smyrna) and its then largely Greek-populated hinter-
land. But Greek military forces operating on the
Turkish mainland (1919-22), lacking support from the
European powers, were driven out of Turkey in 1922,
a humiliation that produced an exodus of more than 2
million Greek refugees from Anatolia to Greece and
supplied additional fuel for Greek-Turk animosities.
More important, under the terms of the peace treaty
between Turkey and the allied powers (Treaty of
Lausanne) in 1923, Greece was forced to recognize
Turkish sovereignty over areas earlier allocated to
Athens in the Treaty of Sevres. One exception was the
disposition of the Dodecanese Islands, which were
ceded to Italy.
25X1
After World War II Greece regained the Dodecanese
Islands. The organization of the North Atlantic
Treaty Organization (NATO) brought Greece and
Turkey together militarily, and both are members of
the Council of Europe. These potentially useful rela-
tionships, promoting joint efforts and policy coordina-
tion, were offset by growing disputes arising from
development of Law of the Sea concepts of territorial
seas limits, rights to underseas resources and their
determination, and international airspace definitions.
Another related problem is that different groups of
Aegean islands fall under different national legal
provisions. The territorial seas limits and problems of
defining the continental shelf are particularly vexing
because of the proximity of the numerous islands to
one another and to the Turkish mainland. Attempts to
resolve the continental shelf disputes led to bilateral
talks (1976-81) that produced proposals but no solu-
tions. 25X1
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Greek-Turkish Disputes in the Aegean
Issue
Territorial seas
Does Greece have the right to claim a
12-nautical-mile territorial sea in the
Aegean?
Airspace
Must military aircraft flying in Aegean
FIR , file flight plans with Greek civilian
air traffic controllers?
Is Greece's claim of a 10-mile airspace
around its islands valid?
Continental shelf
How should a continental shelf shared by
two states be delimited? Should islands be
used as base points if the equidistance
method is applied?
Militarization of Greek islands
May Greece place regular military forces
on islands despite specific treaty
prohibitions?
Can the Greeks militarize the island of
Limnos?
NATO issues
Should the Greek island of Limnos be
included in NATO exercises?
What arrangements should be made for
Aegean command and control?
Greek View
Yes. International law recognizes this
right. Extension of territorial waters would
not interfere with normal navigation.
Yes. Military aircraft must file flight
plans. Athens cites 1944 ICAO treaty
clause on safety, other ICAO resolutions.
Turkish View
No. A 12-mile zone would close off Aegean
international waters and would not be
equitable.
No. The 1944 ICAO treaty expressly exempts
international military aircraft from this
requirement.
Yes. Athens declared a 10-mile zone by
presidential decree in 1931, and Turkey
did not challenge it until 1974.
Greek islands are entitled to a continental
shelf according to international law. Pref-
erably, islands should be used as base
points.
Yes. If Greek security from "Turkish
threat" requires it.
Yes. The Montreux Convention super-
sedes previous convention restricting
militarization.
Yes. Exercises defending the Turkish
Straits should include Lemnos (Limnos).
No. This is a unique claim; it has no basis in
international law or practice.
Many Greek islands sit on the natural prolon-
gation of the Anatolian shelf. This and other
special circumstances in the Aegean make an
equidistance line based on island inequitable.
No. Greece is violating several treaties in so
doing.
No. Treaty provisions restricting militariza-
tion were not specifically replaced by
Montreux.
No. NATO should continue to leave out areas
in dispute such as Limnos.
Turkey should not have security responsi-
bilities over Greek territory. Athens wants
return to pre-1974 arrangements (Greek
control of Aegean). Establishment of
NATO's Larisa headquarters must follow
agreement on command and control
responsibilities.
Turkey needs a security zone west of FIR line.
SACEUR agreement provides for modifica-
tion in pre-1974 command and control
arrangement.
Flight information regions (FIRs) are air traffic control zones
allotted by the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO).
FIRs are intended to protect the safety of air passengers and do not
represent geographical or legal boundaries.
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The variety and complexity of the territorial and
related Aegean issues is summarized in the table.
Current Developments and Outlook
The Turkish Cypriot declaration of independence
(November 1983) not only worsened mutual suspicion
but eroded hopes that discussion of the Aegean issues
might resume any time soon. The long history of the
Aegean region and the changing political status of its
territory provide context for current policies, atti-
tudes, and actions. Greece views Turkey as a clear
and present danger to Greek territory; Greece's for-
eign policy revolves around Turkey and perceptions of
the Turkish threat. Turkey's disputes with Greece,
however, represent only one group of foreign policy
problems within a broad range of issues important to
Turkey's national interests. A major obstacle to re-
solving the territorial and jurisdictional disputes is
that each side can cite numerous precedents and
examples to bolster their case. In both countries the
force of public opinion often shapes policy decisions
and constrains compromise, thus making the resolu-
tion of extremely tangled and complicated problems
even more difficult.
Treaties and Key Dates
1829
Greek independence recognized in Treaty of Adriano-
ple after several centuries as part of the Ottoman
Empire, but territory truncated in relation to tradi-
tional area.
1913
Conclusion of Balkan wars; Greek annexation of
Crete and most but not all of the Aegean Islands.
1920
Treaty of Sevres allocates Aegean Islands plus Izmir
(Smyrna) and its hinterland to Greece.
1919-22
Greek invasion and occupation of western Turkey
leads to defeat and expulsion of Greek forces.
1923
Treaty of Lausanne abrogates provisions of Sevres
treaty. Greece retains Aegean Islands except those
near the Dardanelles; Dodecanese Islands ceded to
Italy.
75
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1931
Athens proclaims 10-mile airspace around its territory
and extends width of territorial seas for air navigation
purposes to 10 miles.
1947
Dodecanese Islands ceded by Italy to Greece.
1972
Oil discovery in Aegean, off island of Thasos.
1973
Map published in Turkey's Official Gazette (1
November) drawing median line between Greek and
Turkish mainlands and showing about 40 percent of
Aegean as Turkish petroleum claim.
1974
Turkey invades Cyprus; controls 37 percent of terri-
tory in north, following Greek-engineered coup at-
tempt. Greece withdraws from military arm of
NATO.
25X1
1975
Turkey creates "Aegean Army" along Aegean coast
with headquarters in Izmir.
Both sides issue conflicting "notices to airmen" that
effectively close Aegean airspace to commercial air
traffic.
1975-76
Appeals to Security Council and International Court
of Justice lead to Bern Declaration in which both
countries agree to refrain from actions that would
prejudice further negotiations.
1980
Both nations withdraw air restrictions; commercial air
travel over Aegean resumes.
Greece rejoins NATO as full member.
1976-81
Periodic bilateral talks on ways to resolve continental
shelf issue.
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1981
Greek Prime Minister Papandreou breaks off talks.
1983
Turkish Cypriots proclaim a "Turkish Republic of
Northern Cyprus."
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Cyprus
The design of this report permits updating of border information. Changes
and additions will be disseminated to holders of this Digest as necessary.
25X1
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Cyprus
Kokkiir
Ayios
Arm/roan]
Dhavlo
Trikomo
vostam
inis
thienou /
otgina
Larn
Famagusta
Varosha
ylophaghotr
Dhekelia N
Paphos
Cyprus Govern
k area)
Episkom
Western Sovereign
Base Area
Limassol
).Altratiri
Vasilikos
Cape Apostoles
Andreas
Cape Greco
Eastern Sovereign
Base Area (U.K.)
United Nations Buffer
Zone limit
Railroad
Road
Scale 1 1,350,000
? 15 30 Kilometers
0 10 210 Miles
800427 (A05397) 10-85
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Cyprus
Border Basics
Cyprus is a strategically situated island (9,248
square kilometers), tucked into the northeastern
corner of the Mediterranean. The island, about 80
kilometers south of Turkey and about 850 kilometers
from Athens, has since 1974 been physically divided
into two areas?one controlled by Turkish Cypriots
(35 percent) and the other by Greek Cypriots (60
percent). The remaining territory comprises a UN-
administered buffer zone separating the two, and two
"sovereign base areas- retained by the United King-
dom under terms of the 1960 agreement that granted
Cyprus independence.
The UN buffer zone runs generally east-west but
follows no distinctive physical or cultural feature. It
is manned by a 2,350-man UN peacekeeping force, up
.I6r Security Council renewal every six months. The
buffer zone in one or two places is about 5 kilometers
wide, but generally is only 2 to 3 kilometers in width.
25X1 In the capital city of Nicosia, the buffer is the so-
called Green Line that contains the single official
transit point between the two sectors.
Before the conflict on Cyprus, Greek and Turkish
Cypriots coexisted and commingled on the island.
During the communal fighting in the 1960s the
Turkish Cypriots, outnumbered 4 to 1 by the Greek
Cypriot majority in a total population of 600,000,
began to coalesce in enclaves throughout the island.
After the Turkish military intervention in 1974, there
was a mass dislocation of the population?Greek
Cypriots and minority groups moved to the south and
some 47,000 Turkish Cypriots moved to the north.
The division of the island left the Turkish Cypriots in
control of more than half of the best cropland,
including about two-thirds of the cereal-producing
areas and most of the citrus areas.
25X1
79
Significant Developments
The stormy relationship between Greek and Turkish
Cypriots worsened after the Turkish Cypriot declara-
tion of independence in November 1983. Only Ankara
recognized the new regime. Despite US requests for
restraint, Turkish Cypriots have moved ahead on
programs and actions designed to reinforce the sym-
bols and mechanisms of statehood. Efforts by the UN
Secretary General did result in a resumption of talks
in the fall of 1984. A summit meeting in January
1985 collapsed, however, with no indication as to
when the next round of talks might convene.
25X1
Frontier History
Greek settlement and culture have been dominant in
Cyprus for more than 3,000 years and account in part
for the 20th-century Greek Cypriot political move-
ment for enosis (union with Greece). The expansion of
the Ottoman Empire resulted in Turkish conquest of
the island in 1571. Three centuries of Turkish rule
spurred the growth of a Muslim population comprised
of Turkish soldiers and others who settled there, plus
gains through intermarriage and converts to Islam.
Great Britain assumed responsibility for administra-
tion of the island, by terms of an 1878 treaty with
Turkey, and annexed Cyprus outright in 1914.
25X1
Cyprus prospered economically under British admin-
istration, but the improved living conditions and
standards did not suppress demands by Greek Cyp-
riots for union with Greece. The Turkish Cypriots, on
the other hand, far outnumbered by the Greek Cyp-
riots, desired some form of communal autonomy and
guarantees of security to protect their minority status.
After World War II Cypriot riots and other antigov-
ernment actions increased in severity, particularly
after 1955 and the outbreak of full-scale guerrilla
warfare coupled with intensifed intercommunal vio-
lence. In late 1958 lengthy and complicated negotia-
tions began that ended with a compromise solution- -
neither union with Greece nor partition but the
establishment of an independent Republic of Cyprus
on 16 August 1960.
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Intercommunal violence, however, commenced anew
as the delicate balance of political power between the
two peoples began to fall apart. Twice tensions rose to
dangerous levels (1963-64 and 1967), requiring the
diplomatic intervention of the United States to avert
warfare. In 1974 Greek Cypriot rightists and the
Greek military government in Athens staged a coup
that temporarily ousted President Makarios. Turkey
responded by landing troops on the island and during
fighting in July and August secured slightly more
than a third of the island before a cease-fire became
effective. A mass movement of Turkish and Greek
Cypriots followed, each fleeing to the areas controlled
by their compatriots. The establishment of a UN-
administered buffer zone and the limited contact
between the two areas mean that the two communities
are living in a state of de facto economic, political,
and social separation.
The effects of partition reflect resources available in
each sector. The Turkish sector gained more than half
the arable land, and agriculture continues to generate
most of the income. Manufacturing has remained
stagnant, largely because of the lack of skilled man-
agers and workers caused by the flight of Greek
Cypriots to the south. The Greek Cypriot sector has
economically diversified with development of a grow-
ing, export-oriented light-industry sector and tourism.
Overall, the Greek Cypriot?controlled portion of the
island has a developing and, by regional standards,
prosperous economy. In the north, by contrast, the
Turkish Cypriot sector has made minimal economic
progress over the past decade, is visibly poorer, and
still relies heavily on Ankara for support.
Current Developments and Outlook
A political resolution of the Cyprus problem has
dimmed since the Turkish Cypriot declaration of
independence in November 1983 and the aborted
talks of January 1985. Since 1976 the United Nations
has managed to initiate on-again, off-again talks
between the two sides, and some limited agreements
have been reached that would provide for a federal
governmental structure, an independent, nonaligned
state, and joint participation in administration of the
government. But the major issues are complex and the
positions of the two sides far apart. Greek Cypriots
Secret
want the Turkish Cypriot territory considerably re-
duced from its present size, plus recovery of the once-
booming tourist town of Varosha and the citrus-
growing area of Morphou; Turkish Cypriot views are
to concede little territory. Turkish Cypriots insist on a
weak central government containing enough checks
and balances, plus veto power, to ensure their security
and autonomy; Greek Cypriots want a strong central
government and demand a mechanism that will pre-
vent governmental deadlock. There also continues to
be differences on such issues as freedom of movement,
settlement and land ownership rights, guarantees and
guarantors of a settlement, the withdrawal of Turkish
troops and ultimate troop numbers, and the very
procedures used in negotiations to reach settlement.
Prospects for settlement rest on a continuation of
mediation efforts with backing from Western powers.
Even here, the two sides hold different views as to the
role of mediation and third parties. The continued
partition of the island?especially if coupled with
resumption of arms purchases by the Greek Cypriots
and a reinforcement of Turkish troops?would in-
crease the chances of military conflict through acci-
dent or miscalculation if not through design.
Border Treaties and Key Dates
1878
Cyprus Convention (4 June) in which Turkey "con-
sents to assign the island of Cyprus to be occupied and
administered by England." Britain institutes "Cyprus
tribute," continued until 1927, a major source of
discontent underlying later Cypriot unrest.
1914
Britain annexes Cyprus outright after outbreak of
World War I.
1915
Britain offers Cyprus to Greece as inducement to
enter World War I; Greece declines offer.
1923
By terms of Treaty of Lausanne, Turkey recognizes
Britain's annexation of Cyprus.
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1931
Riots by Greek Cypriots against British tax proposals;
imposition of harsh measures deepens anti-British
animosities.
1955-58
Anti-British demonstrations, strikes, and guerrilla
warfare; in 1958 intercommunal strife increases.
1958-60
Negotiations among Britain, Turkey, and Greece lead
to series of agreements granting Cyprus independ-
ence, granting Britain two "sovereign base areas,"
and allowing Greece and Turkey to garrison 950 and
650 troops, respectively, on the island.
1974
Athens-inspired coup against Makarios, followed by
Turkish invasion of the island.
1977
Talks between Greek and Turkish Cypriot leaders
(Makarios and Denktash) under UN auspices, agree
on guidelines: in terms of government (nonaligned and
bicommunal), territory (economic viability and land
ownership), movement and settlement (to be negotiat-
ed on basis of bicommunal nature of future federa-
tion), and power of central government (to safeguard
unity of Cyprus).
Stage 11 talks on territory and constitutional proposals
end in failure.
1978
Joint US-UK-Canadian Plan rejected by both sides.
/979
Summit between Greek and Turkisk Cypriot leaders;
agreement on 10-point framework for negotiations.
Talks resume, but break down.
1981
UN presents guide for negotiations, seeking agree-
ment on less contentious issues.
Negotiations get bogged down in details; broken off
by Turkish Cypriots.
81
1983
Turkish Cypriots unilaterally declare independence
after rejecting earlier UN plan for resumption of
talks. UN condemns Turkish Cypriot move.
1984
UN Secretary General meets separately with Presi-
dent Kyprianou and Turkish Cypriot leader Denktash
in series of "proximity talks."
1985
UN Secretary General holds summit, but talks quick-
ly break down. 25X1
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Other Middle Eastern Boundaries
and Territorial Disputes
The design of this report permits updating of border information. Changes
and additions will be disseminated to holders of this Digest as necessary.
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Other Middle Eastern Boundaries
and Territorial Disputes
Most of the remaining Middle Eastern international
boundaries have been delimited and demarcated for
many years. Although unforeseen events and inci-
dents are always possible, the characteristics of the
boundaries and their recent history suggest that pros-
pects are slight for a border dispute. Available Inter-
national Boundary Studies (IBS) prepared by the
Office of the Geographer, Bureau of Intelligence and
Research, Department of State, are listed on the
following pages.
Secret
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Secret
1301111dill
Iran-Pakistan
Demarcated (195S-s9)
1 reals Iran-Pakistan Agreement II ebru-
ary I 9)
No. 167. March 1979
Iran-Turkey
status: Demarcated (1937)
'Freak: Teheran Convention (1932)
IBS: No. 17, January 1964
Iraq-Jordan
Status:
Treat.y:
Delimited (1984); probablv demar-
cated (1984)
Agreement (March 19(14) ratified
in April (Jordan) and May (19(14).
Adjusts boundary initially, delimit-
ed in 1932.
No. 9(1, April 1970 (outdated by
19(14 agreement).
I ength
(A aometer.s1
909
499
134
t-tarmakZ.
Zahedan' S.sindak
?ihash
IRAN
Sar avail
Iranshahr. _- ZSboIi
#
Sarbaz!
iSTA)-)
/
Dalbandin:
Stun).
PAKISTA4-
- Gila Ladgasht
aluchistall
- 0--
-
Kiihak - .4-
' Panigur
if
Pisan t .Nland _
, -
d
, Railroad
WO Kala
, Turbat Hushab
- ? Roa
14
Bandar Gavater. .1,4vv'aill-,, cale 1.9,000,00
;
Behesfai Gwadar
800429 1A00497) 10 85
0 80 160 Kdo meters
50 100 We,
lode
Karakose
Bogubayazit
,.
iatnos Maku
Ercig
TURKEY
Ozalp
4+- Gotur
V.ap
Baskale fthahpur
irnak Yuksetovai orumiy?et
Zakhfi
8004
ZibSr
05498) 10-.85
Jolfa
?, "\4R A tsJ,A).,,,
sufian
Tabriz
? Railroad
5X1
-25X1
S2))12 I 6,000,000
40 80 K1109109
1
25 501)/111),
JORDAN
.1kilaPaOat
al Jufar
(H-4)
800431 1A05506110-85
RoOlah.
IRAQ Ar
H-3
(ol) pol)19,11,1 slaw) site)
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Secret
Boundary I.engt h
(kilometers)
Iraq-Saudi Arabia 686
Status: Delimited, demarcation to follow
Treaty: Iraqi-Saudi 'Treaty (December
19811
IBS: No. 111, June 1971, (outdated bv
1981 agreement)
Note: A diplomatic note from Saudi Arabia's Ministry- of Foreign
Affairs, 14 February 1983, to the American Fmbassv in Jiddah
stated that the Neutral /one was to be divided, making the border
"as straight as possible." Although no of demarcation agree-
ment has been received, a recent (19841Saudi map and other
information strongly suggest that the Neutral /one has in fact been
divided and the new boundary established.
Iraq-Syria
Status:
Treaty:
1135:
Iraq-Turkey
Status:
Treaty:
1135:
Several short sections demarcated:
remainder delimited
League of Nations Commission
(September 1932)
No. 100, March 1978
Demarcated initially, (1926-27);
agreement to redemarcate signed
in late 1981
Treaty of Angora. United King-
dom. Iraq, and Turkey (June 1926)
No. 27, January 1964
BAGHDAD
Ar Rutbah
Al javvf.
Badanah".:Ar.an
Karba( ???
AI Kat'
?Nukhayb An Najaet
IRAQ
SAUDI ARABIA
Raftuf.
Railroad
Priarl
Lin.ah
Jtale 1:10,000,UlK)
O 100 270 Kilometers
1 1
O 60
120 Miles - (
800432 0549 0 85 tdrCre'rr,=;:ii( -'
d Drwaniveh
As Somme
Ah Niairiyah
-
Jallbah
?As Selman
hag- Sauclt Araki,
Noutral Zoo,
Hafer al Ratio 25)(1
Al Gaystimab?
605 Railroad
- Road URKEY--
Mardin
331
89
Scats) 19,400,000 , ?
80 160 Kllometers Tail Kushik"--
50 100 Mile:, Al Rasakah4r
Ash n
Aleppo Ar Raquah Shaddad Snjar?
I A
Dayr az Zavvr? 2hr
SYRIA Al Mayadin
? Sail' Ahar
DAMASCUS
800433 (A05500) 0 85 (
Abn Kama'Al.
Ar Ruthah
?
.Zakhu
Mosul
Al Hadr.
Ash Sharqat,.\.
IRACtl
25X1
Irbil
.k,
Karkfik"
'Anah
Ga'im
Hadithatn
Ar Ramadi ?
BAGHDAD
..Eruh
.Sirnak
?
TURKEY
HakkarL,
Yuksekova.
zre
Zakhii
Railroad
Cukurca
+.0,4 ,
Al 'Amadiyah_
4Oalmik
IRAQ
Ayn Sifni ,,,Aqrah
Az Zibar
Scale 1-3.400,000
O 25 50 Kilometers
O 15 30 Miles
800434 (A05504) 10 85
osul
Rayat.
Rawandhz
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lion [Mar \
Jordan Sandi %rabbi
rI,iI is Delimited
1 re.it) Jordan Situdi Arabia Agreement
( itgu,t 1965)
I 11`-1 No 60, 1)ecember 1965
.1 terda I1-s ria
Delimited
I rem \ \ nglo- I rench Protocol (October
11
1 No. 94, December 1969
Kinivait Saudi Arabia
Status. 1)emarcated (1967)
I reaty K tiV. all Saudi Arabia Agreement
Oul N, 1965)
I BS. No. I WI, September 197(1
I ength
(Ai/on/eters(
742
175
160
Tel Aviv-Y
Gaza
Al Malraq#.
Az Zarqif
MMAN ? Azraq ash-
' Shishan
1(01/f
?ArT Nabk
.AI Galranah
JORDAN
nayzah
Al Jafr
?
a's an
Naqb
b-a-h""
, Mudawwara
A "-
'Tut:"
800 5 (A05508)-10-85- -
AI Bi'r
Jurayf
SAUDI
ARABIA
?AI 'Isawiyah
An Nabk
Abu Clasr
(oasis)
Railroad
Road
Scale 1'6,300,000
0 50 100 Kilometers
0 30 6.0 Milos
/ wiyab
An;
N
JDAMASCUS
/01.1t,6n teerlv aFtrdo rna;I:1( iusNenogoaFg)emlnernet
Qunaytiraliii,
Color'iiios,,gaheti
oicuplid),
Irbid.
Busra ash
Sham
WAel raqs,MBaa,f,k'
(Israeli occupied
taint td be determined)
As Sall JORDAN
r? Az Zargel
*AMMAN
A05502) 10-85
?As Suwayda'
Sab 'Abar?
'YRIA
t4ai7i,71,1111,111,1=i11?
Mahanat
al Juffir
Railroad
Road
25X1
Scale 1.4,000,000
30 60 Kilometers
0 20 40 Mile
/Al Jatuat
K.uwait
S
KUWAIT
?
Al Fubaybil
Mina 'Abd Allah
.1',1a1ar al HIM
??Al Claysumah
C The. area was d,vicled in 1969 with the
prowsion that all revenues and/,r oil ,
trom anywhere in the former zone would,
be shared equally
Al Wafrah'.
San
SAUDI ARABIA
Road
Scale 1:3,400,000
o 25
1
15
50 Kilometers
30 miles
800437 (A05501) 10-85
Al Wari'ah.
Garyat al Ulya?
Su'Od
Ra's al
A.??Khatii
Al Misliabe
An Nu'a
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Boundar .ength
(kilometerl)
Qatar-Saudi Arabia 8))
Status: Delimited (190)
Freaty: Border agreement between Qatar
:old Saudi Arabia reached in 1965,
exact date unknown.
I BS: None
No official confirmation has been
reeds ed concerning ratificition of
the agreement nor of plans for de-
marcation.
I erritorial
Tiran and Sanafir Islands
Barren islands, strategically located at the entrance to the Gull of
Aqaba. occupied by Fgyptian troops (with the consent of the
Government of Saudi Arabia) in January 1950 to monitor shipping.
Israeli forces dislodged Egyptians in the June 1967 war and
retained possession until the Fgyptian-Israeli Peace Treaty became
effective in April 1982. A small detachment of multinational forces
:Ind observers and Egyptian civil police were deployed on the
islands. Egypt claimed islands in 1957 and has since asserted
'control- or claimed sovereignty. Saudi Arabia has rejected Egyp-
tian claims.
A 1.1 Li I
.Uinm Bab
Al Kir anah
?
Abu
A ."Samrah
As SalwU
Mazra at
.Turayna
Road
I?2 000.000
25 5,0 501on3,1,
0 15 30 0111,-.
00046) 03055/ 11 10 HI,
Doha *
.AI Wakrah
*Musay Id
EGYPT
Sharm
ash Shaykh
?
Hoo128
Nabq.
Ash .
Shaykh Flumaye.
(ruins)
Road
I
4 1-1131h..
2
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