COMMUNIST PENETRATION OF SOUTH AMERICAN LABOR

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP97R00694R000500250001-8
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 15
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: January 18, 2011
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: September 1, 1987
• Content Type: REPORT

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#eeret
Communist Penetration of
South American Labor
Author/Production Officer
Attached for your information
and retention is a copy of your
publication which was sanitized
by CPAS/ISS. Also included is a
copy of the control sheet showing
those countries that received
copies of the re ort.
GI J 10059/S
September 1957
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Communist Penetration of South American Labor
Summary
Information available as of 26 August 1987 was used in this
report.
Although the Soviet track record to date has been
mixed, manipulation of local labor movements probably offers
Moscow the best chance for building covert political
influence in South America in the future. The USSR and, to
a lesser extent, Cuba have long targeted South American
labor and have mechanisms well in place to exploit the
opportunities presented by the return of democratic rule in
a number of countries in the region.
Research indicates that the Soviets and Cubans, with
Moscow generally taking the lead, exercise influence over
target labor unions and confederations through extensive
guidance and funding to local Communist parties that
intensively target organized labor; use of Soviet-controlled
front groups, such as the world Federation of Trade Unions;
and establishment of union-to-union ties to the Soviet All
Union Central Council of Trade Unions and the Cuban Central
Organization of Trade Unions. Moscow and Havana have been
particularly successful in drawing both Communist and non-
Communist unionists to their substantial and well-funded
training programs. East Germany and Czechoslovakia support
Soviet and Cuban penetration efforts by providing training
Although Havana has supported Moscow's labor programs,
primarily through training, it has generally given lower
priority to targeting labor organizations. In recent years,
however, Cuba has begun to mount its own limited operations
to penetrate labor movements, aiding ultraleftist groups in
competition with local pro-Moscow Communist parties. These
activities are apparently more an effort to maximize
opportunities for Cuban influence than an attempt to
undercut Soviet labor programs.
With Moscow's backing, local Communist parties in
Bolivia, Colombia, Peru, and Uruguay have achieved
significant labor influence that serves several purposes:
--Moscow and Havana have used this influence to rally
Latins in a variety of foreign policy causes, such as
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opposition to the Pinochet regime in Chile and to
assistance to the Nicaraguan insurgents.
--In the cases of Bolivia, Peru, and Uruguay, the
Soviet-backed parties have been able to take
advantage of traditionally radical labor movements to
develop strongholds in key economic sectors and to
press moderate opposition policies intended to
prevent the return of military rule.
--In Colombia, superior organization, proven
performance in obtaining favorable labor agreements,
and a 10-year decline in democratic labor have given
the Communist Party substantial labor. influence,
which it is exploiting in its efforts to enhance the
party's political standing.
In three other countries--Argentina, Chile, and
Ecuador--the Communists have had only limited success, but
recently have significantly increased in their penetration
efforts:
--The Argentine Communist Party has won positions in
several local unions.
--As part of its efforts to oust Pinochet, the Chilean
Communist Party is increasing its efforts to improve
the party's influence in labor.
--The Ecuadorean Communist Party has established a new
trade union school to improve cadre labor training.
Although South American governments are generally aware
of Communist efforts to penetrate national labor movements,
their responses--with the obvious exception of Chile--have
largely been limited.
Nonetheless, Soviet and Cuban efforts to penetrate
South American labor are constrained by a number of other
factors: the position of the penetrated union in the
country's labor movement, the political power of organized
labor overall, factionalism within South American labor,
internal dissension within the Communist parties themselves,
and competition from the ultraleft. Competition from the
ultraleft probably poses the most significant limitation.
By moderating their demands on newly democratic governments
to prevent the return of the military, the local Communists
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have generally made themselves vulnerable to challenges by
more radical labor elements.
There are indications that Moscow is beginning to make
overtures, both directly and through local Communist
parties, to some of the ultraleftist labor groups that
Havana supports. Durable cooperation between Communist
party-sponsored labor groups and the ultraleft could pose
significant political challenges to several governments in
the region. Nonetheless, in light of General Secretary
Gorbachev's expected visit to Latin America within the next
year, Moscow probably will not risk undermining its efforts
to build diplomatic credit in the region by lending full
support to ultraleftist labor groups.
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Although the USSR continues to be wary of high-risk
ventures in Latin America, General Secretary Gorbachev
appears to accord South America a higher priority than did
past Soviet leaders. There are indications, for example,
that he plans to visit several countries in the region this
year or early in 1988. Havana, like Moscow, reportedly
views South America as the choicest target for building
long-term influence in Latin America. Thus, the Cubans have
been work' hard ecent years to expand ties to South
America.
The Soviets and Cubans target many sectors of South
American society, but they value labor in particular because
it is a powerful tool of mass mobilization and can directly
threaten a government's stability. A number of factors make
South American countries especially attractive targets for
exploitation. Because of the well-developed labor movements
in these countries, Communist success can yield substantial
political benefits. Perhaps most important, many countries
are in precarious financial situations, with faltering
economies and heavy foreign debt obligations. As South
American governments try to manage their debt obligations,
often through austerity measures, the likelihood of labor
unrest--and,the opportunity for Communist exploitation--
increases.
In addition to using labor as a general-purpose tool
for building influence in the region, Communist labor
penetration probably serves a variety of Soviet policy
goals. Depending on the country targeted, such penetration
is used as:
--A lever to pressure South American governments to
change their domestic policies or to oppose Western
policies on such issues as Nicaragua.
--A counterweight to the influence of more radical
political parties, whose policies might induce
military takeovers.
--An instrument to further the political position of
Communist parties in the target countries.
--A tool for mass mobilization to oppose or destabilize
a regime.
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--A mechanism to build international support for Soviet
and Cuban foreign policy positions.
Research indicates that the Soviet Union and Cuba
exercise influence over South American labor unions in
several ways:
--Guidance to local Communist parties from the
International Department of the Communist Party of
the Soviet Union (CPSU/ID) and, to a lesser extent,
the America Department of the Cuban Communist Part
(PCC/AD).
local Communists are the primary tools
Moscow uses in penetrating South American labor.
While both the Soviets and Cubans deal with an array
of leftist unions, they work predominantly with
unions influenced by the local party. All of the
South American Communist parties--with the exception
of that in Venezuela--work in labor coalitions to
some degree, with the ultimate goal of unifying the
labor movement in a national organization under their
control.
--Contacts with the Soviet-dominated World Federation
of Trade Unions (WFTU), based in Prague, and its de
facto regional affiliate in Mexico City, the
Permanent Congress of Trade Union Unity of Latin
American Workers (CPUSTAL). WFTU and its associated
organizations sponsor labor training and seminars in
the region.
--Bilateral ties to the Soviet All Union Central
Council of Trade Unions (AUCCTU)--which oversees
WFTU--or the Cuban Central Organization of Trade
Unions (CTC). The AUCCTU's International Department
takes the lead in developing contacts with South
American labor groups.
A Major Investment in Labor Training
The Soviet Union, Cuba, and East Germany reportedly
have extensive training programs for South American
unionists. Labor training in the USSR is conducted by the
AUCCTU Higher Trade Union School in Moscow, where courses
run 10 months. The Fritz Heckert Trade Union College near
Berlin, which is run by the East Germans, prepares Latin
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American and other Third World unionists to be teachers at
trade union schools in their native countries, offering a
three-year program. Cuba also provides labor
training to Third World unionists at e azaro Pena
National Trade Union Cadre School in Havana. The school is
directed by the World Federation of Trade Unions (WFTU) but
is administered by the Cuban Central Organization of Trade
Unions. WFTU also uses the leftist Lombardo Toledano
Workers University (LTWU) in Mexico City to train midlevel
Latin American--primarily non-Mexican--labor officials.
Moscow and
Havana also try to cultivate regional unions by offering
scholarships for the children of labor unionists.
a Soviet labor course in the
early 1970s indicated that the curriculum included
economics, Marxist philosophy, Soviet history, social
psychology, labor law, and ''Soviet reality." Although Bloc
labor courses still contain considerable ideological
training, Moscow has since updated its curriculum
to include subjects more a uned to worker interests, such
as unemployment and labor activity. The Soviet All Union
Central Council of Trade Unions (AUCCTU) can now
organize labor courses especially geared toward Latin
America, and is publishing an instruction manual for labor
education in Latin America to be distributed to regional
Communist labor training schools
Moscow and Havana have trained hundreds of Communist
and some other leftist unionists from South America:
--The Soviet Embassy in Bolivia provides
labor leaders and young workers with scholarships to
attend training courses and universities in the USSR.
Czechoslovakia and the GDR offer similar
scholarships. In addition, about 15 labor leaders
and workers are sent to Cuba every three months for
labor training that includes instruction on Marxist-
Leninist ideology. Havana also grants 20
scholarships annually for long-term university
training, awarding many of the scholarships to
children of labor leaders, especially those of
miners.
--In 1981 about 75 unionists from the Communist-
dominated Trade Union Confederation of Colombian
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Workers (CSTC) completed a yearlong labor training
course in Moscow. Two years later about 40 Colombian
unionists were scheduled for labor training in
Communist countries.
--In the early 1980s about 200 Ecuadorean unionists,
many from the ranks of the Communist-dominated
Ecuadorean Workers' Confederation (CTE),
traveled to Communist countries on annual exchange
and training programs.
The Soviets and Cubans also support local Communist
party labor schools. For example, the labor college of the
Communist-dominated General Confederation of Peruvian
Workers has strong links to Bloc countries and makes use of
training from the Fritz Heckert Trade Union College. Soviet
Bloc training often involves highly coordinated efforts
between several countries and organizations.
Apparent Methods of Funding
Soviet Bloc funding to local Communist parties for
labor activities--other than training or travel expenses--is
more difficult to document. Presumably all of the pro-
Moscow parties receive some Soviet money, but onl in rare
instances are uses for the funds specified.
/ Since all o
the regional parties emphasize labor penetration efforts,
however, it seems inevitable that some Soviet funding for
local Communist parties goes toward infiltrating labor.
the Soviet
Union has several ways to fund labor penetration efforts.
Moscow can give money to Communist parties specifically for
their labor activities.
/Presumably the International Department of the
Communist Party of the Soviet Union provides most such
funding in that it oversees relations with nonruling foreign
Communists.
The Soviets also provide money through the Soviet All
Union Central Council of Trade Unions (AUCCTU). International
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Department section for Latin America.
In addition, Cuba lends limited
financial support to some regional trade unions./
Soviet and Cuban Competition?
Although the Cubans have generally taken a backseat to
Moscow in the labor arena, in recent years Castro has
increased ties to groups that are in direct competition with
local Communists for influence in labor. In Bolivia, the
Cubans are building ties to the ultraleftist Movement of the
Revolutionary Left-Masses that is challenging the Bolivian
Communist Party for dominance in key labor federations, such
as the mine workers.
Havana's policy of building ties to ultraleftist labor
groups apparently is more an effort to maximize
opportunities for expanding influence than an attempt to
undercut Soviet labor penetration activities. Cuban
dealings with Communist rivals appear to be significant
almostin Bolivia. Although Cuba seems largely to be
pursuing its own policy agenda, Castro would be unlikely to
act without having at least Moscow's tacit consent. Cuban
ties to ultraleftist labor in the region provide Havana with
opportunities for influence that are independent of the
fortunes of local Communist parties, some of which are
experiencing internal problems or are losing support to more
''vigorous'' parties.
Soviet-and Cuban-backed Communist parties usually begin
their penetration efforts from the bottom up by attempting
to place their members in local union positions or by
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recruiting new party members from among local unionists. In
Argentina, for example, the Argentine Communist Party (PCA)
has been working for several years to insert its members
into the work site and regional levels of labor
organizations. Although not entirely successful, the PCA
has made some gains: in March 1986 a slate of far-left labor
leaders sponsored by the PCA and the Movement Toward
Socialism reportedly won control of an important local union
of the Federation of Meat Workers in Buenos Aires.
Even when a local Communist party has its own labor
confederation, it may choose to work through a larger front
organization with parties of roughly similar political
orientation. For example, while the Ecuadorean Communist
Party (PCE) maintains its own labor confederation, it is
also influential in the Unitary Workers Front (FUT). In a
country with a myriad of political actors like Ecuador,
working in a coalition with other parties improves PCE
chances of building influence.
In addition to serving as a tool to influence
government policy, Communist labor penetration serves as:
--A base for attempting to prevent the return to
military rule. The Soviets and Cubans reportedly
view the recent transitions to democratic governments
in several South American countries as permitting
freer action by local Communist parties. In a number
of countries, including Uruguay and Peru, the
moderate opposition policies of the Communist-
influenced confederations attempt to prevent
destabilizing labor unrest by radical leftists that
might cause the military to step in. That is
especially the case in Peru. Because Moscow wants to
coax the Peruvian Government into closer ties, it has
kept the pro-Soviet, Communist-dominated General
Confederation of Peruvian Workers on a tight leash
since Garcia took power in July 1985.
--A complement to Communist participation in the
democratic political process. The Colombian
Communist Party (PCC) has developed a well-funded and
well-organized labor program that it uses to build
its political support and that-of the Patriotic
Union, the political front of the PCC-associated
insurgent group, the Revolutionary Armed Forces of
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Colombia. The political payoff of PCC efforts--in a
country with a well-developed democratic system--has
apparently been limited.
--A tool for regime destabilization. In Chile, the
Soviet-influenced Chilean Communist Party (PCCh) has
been attempting to increase its influence in labor to
help mobilize the Chilean population against the
Pinochet government.
local Communist parties
have achieved significant labor penetration in four
countries:
--The Bolivian Communist Party, despite setbacks in
recent years, continues to maintain strong influence
in several unions, including the mine workers,
factory workers, state employees, urban school
teachers, and bank employees.
--In Colombia, the Communist party, which previously
controlled the nation's second-largest labor
confederation, is moving quickly to exploit the
recent formation of a new national confederation.
--Despite ultraleftist opposition, the Peruvian
Communist Party virtually controls the country's
largest labor confederation.
--In Uruguay, the Communist party dominates the only
officially recognized labor body.
In three of these countries--Colombia is the exception-
-the Communists have been able to take advantage of
traditionally radical labor movements to develop strongholds
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in key economic sectors. In Colombia, superior party
organization, proven performance in obtaining favorable
labor agreements, and a 10-year decline of the country's
democratic labor confederations have contributed to the
Communists' success.
In four other countries, we believe that the Communists
have had only limited success but are increasing their
penetration efforts: The Argentine Communist Party has
recently made gains in several local unions and federations,
often by forming working alliances with non-Communist
leftist parties.
The Chilean Communist Party is pushing hard to build
grassroots labor support as part of its efforts to oust
Pinochet and stands to gain from widespread opposition to
the government and determined Soviet and Cuban support. The
Ecuadorean Communist Party--with substantial help from
Moscow and Havana--has opened a new trade union school to
improve labor training of cadres. Despite intensfied
Communist activities, the makeup of the labor movements in
these countries has seriously hampered Communist efforts.
While Moscow and, to a lesser extent, Cuba have devoted
considerable resources to penetration of South American
labor, the success of their efforts often depends on factors
over which they have little control, such as the
significance of labor as a political actor. In addition,
changing economic fortunes can alter--perhaps radically--the
traditional influence enjoyed by a particular union or
confederation. Government policies can also frustrate
Communist efforts to exploit labor penetration.
Moreover, Soviet and Cuban efforts to penetrate South
American labor appear to be constrained by several
distinctive features of the South American political and
labor scenes:
--South American labor is highly factionalized.
Unified labor movements that local Communist parties
might potentially penetrate and control are few.
--The anti-Soviet nationalism of many South Americans
reduces the appeal of Communist parties with known
pro-Soviet orientations.
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--The Communists face strong competition from the
ultraleft for influence in the labor movements of
many South American countries.
--Some local parties are experiencing internal dissent
resulting from generational changes in party
membership and leadership. The leadership of the
parties has aged and many parties have been accused
by younger, more militant members of being forces
advocating the status quo rather than meaningful
change
Challenges from the ultraleft and internal Communist
party dissension pose a major dilemma for Moscow. On the
one hand, the Soviets advise local Communist parties to
formulate moderate opposition policies to counter
ultraleftist policies that might bring on military rule. On
the other hand, moderate opposition leaves the Communists
vulnerable to criticism from more militant party members and
accusations from the ultraleft that the Communist parties
are losing their credentials as "revolutionary" parties
and are allying with the state. Moderate Communist
opposition, consequently, risks gains by the ultraleft.
Moscow and Havana regard labor penetration as a long-
term investment and labor training is one of the most
powerful tools they possess for expanding their influence in
regional labor movements over the long run. Increasing
numbers of South American confederation officials have
attended Soviet Bloc labor courses, including both Communist
and non-Communist unionists. The impact of this effort on
South American labor will be evident when unionists who have
gone through Bloc training programs attain positions of
importance in future years.
The Soviets and Cubans have the mechanisms of labor
penetration well in place and will undoubtedly continue to
exploit the new opportunities for influence--especially
greater freedom of action for local Communist parties--
presented by the return of democratic rule in a number of
countries in South America. Moscow's
guidance to Communist parties in the region indicates that
Moscow is pushing them to rejuvenate their leaderships and
formulate more dynamic party policies. Soviet interest in
improving relations with regional governments--as evidenced
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by General Secretary Gorbachev's proposed trip to South
America--is unlikely to lead to a decrease in their labor
penetration activities. Rather than cut back its labor
penetration in its efforts to court Peru, for example,
Moscow has instead used its influence to try to limit labor
unrest that might harass the government.
Soviet and Cuban labor penetration activities are
likely to continue to be successful in Colombia, Peru, and
Uruguay--although competition from the ultraleft in the
latter two countries will challenge party efforts. In
Bolivia, ultraleftist competition, coupled with the collapse
of the key Communist labor stronghold--the mining sector--
may overturn the Bolivian Communist Party's traditionally
dominant position in Bolivian labor.
Moscow and Havana are likely to benefit less from the
labor operations of the Communist parties in some South
American countries, largely because of the strength of other
political parties active in labor. Although the Argentine
Communists are making some inroads into the Peronist-
dominated labor movement at the local level, they will
probably not attain any significant national influence in
the near future because of the overwhelming influence of the
Peronists. The Venezuelan Communist Party, overshadowed by
the Democratic Action Party in Venezuelan labor, has even
less of a chance of success than the Argentine party. In
Ecuador, Communist labor penetration efforts will enjoy
limited success but probably will continue to be hampered by
competition from numerous parties.
In Chile, Moscow and Havana will continue to assist the
Chilean Communist Party (PCCh) in its labor activities as
part of their campaign to remove Pinochet from power.
Nonetheless, the PCCh's ability to mobilize labor against
Pinochet is constrained by anti-Communist sentiment in the
country, and PCCh success will largely be determined by the
overall level of economic hardship and opposition to the
government that develops.
Given the unevenness of Western programs to strengthen
democratic labor elements South American labor over the long
term will continue to be susceptible to inroads by local
Communist parties and by the ultraleft. The programs of
radical-left labor groups are threatening to Soviet-backed
labor organizations. Havana and Moscow's overtures to the
ultraleft probably will not result in durable cooperation
between the ultraleft and Moscow-backed Communist parties
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