AFGHANISTAN'S EXPANDED OPIUM TRADE: BYPRODUCT OF WAR

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP97R00694R000500240001-9
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 23
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: January 5, 2011
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: September 1, 1985
• Content Type: REPORT

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Directorate of
Intelligence
Afghanistan's Expanded Opium
Trade: Byproduct of War
G/ 85-10147
September 1985
ropy 4 3 6
GI 85-10147
September 1985
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. ~``~"~:~~ Directorate of
m\~, Intelligence
~~~p~
~I~
Afghanistan's Expanded Opium
Trade: Byproduct of War
This paper was prepared by
Strategic Narcotics/Eurasia-Africa Branch,
Office of Global Issues. Assistance was provided by
Analytic Support Group. It was coordinated with the
Department of State and the Drug Enforcement
Agency
Comments and queries are welcome and may be
directed to the Chief, Terrorism/Narcotics Analysis
Division, OGI
Secret
G185-10247
September 1985
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Afghanistan's Expanded Opium
Trade: Byproduct of War
Key Judgments Afghanistan's narcotics industry has expanded since the Soviet invasion,
/reformation available and we anticipate continued growth. Economic disruptions caused by the
as cif ISAugust /985 Soviet invasion and the wartime environment have substantially increased
was used in this report.
the attractiveness of opium poppy cultivation, heroin refining, and narcot-
ics smuggling. Poppy cultivation is expanding and probably will stimulate
further narcotics trafficking and processing activities. Many Afghans have
long grown and smuggled narcotics, and individuals loosely associated with
insurgent groups probably participate in the trade. Available evidence,
however, does not indicate large-scale, organized exploitation by the
insurgents.
We judge that the Afghan Government is unlikely to crack down on popp25X1
farmers, laboratory operators, and narcotics traffickers. Indeed, UN
officials believe that much of their financial and technical aid is being used
to fight the insurgents rather than to attack the narcotics trade. Moreover,
Afghan authorities at all levels are willing to
aid traffickers for a price.
Even if the Afghan Government were to institute control programs, the
narcotics trade would be difficult to suppress because most of the activity
takes place in insurgent-controlled areas beyond Kabul's authority. More-
over, the Soviet-backed Karmal regime is preoccupied with combating the
insurgency, and as long as the narcotics trade neither finances the
insurgents' efforts nor seriously affects the Soviet military campaign,
government authorities have little incentive to curtail an activity that helps
to keep the economy afloat. Increased Soviet concern over drug abuse by
troops, however, could encourage interdiction efforts, at least in the cities
where authorities are able to exercise control.) 25X1
Afghanistan's role as a heroin supplier to international markets probably
will expand as long as the instability and strife continue. In the absence of
any concerted effort at narcotics control within Afghanistan, the ability of
neighboring authorities to intensify their interdiction efforts offers the only
alternative for limiting Afghan narcotics exports. We do not expect Iran to
move decisively against narcotics traffickers; but Pakistan may step up
enforcement, at least in some cities, to stem its rising drug abuse.
iii Secret
G/ 85-10247
September 1985
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Key Judgments
--
Introduction
---
The War: Incentives for the Opium Industry
__ _ ____
Afghanistan's Expanded Opium Trade: The Evidence
iii
1
---
1
2
Cultivation
2
__ - ----
Processing
7
__ - - _ __.
Smuggling
8
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The Role of the Government
10
_
The Role of the Refugees and Insurgents
_.
11
......_... .
- - - _ -
Refugees
__
11
___
Insurgents
13
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Afghanistan's Expanded Opium
Trade: Byproduct of War
new growth in the narcotics industry
Introduction
The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in December 1979
disrupted incipient government narcotics control pro-
grams and gave rise to insurgent warfare in opium-
producing areas. It also drastically reduced reporting
on the narcotics trade severely
restricting our ability to assess narcotics production
and traffickin in Afghanistan. Nevertheless, our
analysis of limited reporting
still available suggests that the disruptions of tradi-
tional social and economic patterns in the country
have not hampered and may have even stimulated
fishing opium trade.
The War: Incentives for the Opium Industry
The predominantly agrarian Afghan economy has
been seriously hurt by the Soviet hostilities: irrigation
networks are being neglected, distribution and mar-
keting systems disrupted, and a significant part of the
labor force has taken flight or been displaced. The
small industrial sector also has been plagued by labor
and raw material shortages, frequent power black-
outs, and fuel rationing, severely disrupting trade and
commerce. Such unsettlement does not always have
similar negative effects on illegal economic activi-
ties-black-marketeering or smuggling, for exam-
ple-and, indeed, the evidence suggests that the civil
war environment in Afghanistan has spawned a flour-
costs are low.
Opium poppies are an ideal cash crop for subsistence
farmers when wartime conditions disrupt commerce
in traditional crops. They are a hearty, multi-purpose
crop that yield a variety of products besides opium
gum. The seeds can be eaten whole or processed into
poppyseed cake or edible oil, the seed pods can be
used for medicines or liquor, the straw for fuel, and
the resulting ash for soap. Since opium does not spoil,
it can be stored or stockpiled indefinitely. Profits from
selling opium are as much as two to three times more
than the next most profitable crop, yet cultivation
Drug Abuse by Soviet Troops
Drug use among the Soviet troops is a growing
problem. widespread
25X1
25X1
the Soviets frequently 25X1
sell boots, clothing, and ammunition to shopkeepers
in the bazaar in return ,for drugs 25X1
by Soviet soldiers were commonplace before they 25X1
drivers started carrying adequate supplies of drugs to
bribe the soldiers when stopped at checkpoints. As 25X1
proof of the contention that Soviet troops are becom-
ing increasingly desperate for drugs,
the bazaars where one could see an abundance of
Soviet gear, especially.lield jackets, all swapped by
soldiers in exchange for drugs.
Isolated incidents suggest the Soviets believe that
drug abuse has impaired the performance of their
troops in Afghanistan, but there is no evidence that
drug abuse alone has lessened the overall military
readiness of the.forces. The problem probably is not
as severe as the infectious diseases and alcoholism
among both the troops and the officers. Drug usage,
however, could become more of a problem.for the
Soviets as troops on rotation out of'Afghanistan bring
the narcotics into the Soviet Union and Eastern
Europe. Some East European countries have attrib-
uted an increase in hashish use to Soviet troops
reassigned there ,from Afghanistan.
Wartime disruptions, in our view, also make heroin
refining an attractive enterprise. Heroin is more prof-
itable than opium-1 kilogram of heroin is worth
substantially more than the 10 kilograms of opium
used to produce it. It is less bulky to transport and
more easily concealed than opium, and the processing
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laboratories are small, simple to start up, difficult to
locate, and easily moved. War also produces a poten-
tial new source of demand for refined opiates-the
soldier.
Smugglers and merchants have similar incentives to
move into the opium trade. War disrupts regular
trade patterns and encourages smuggling. Smugglers
regularly operate outside normal distribution and
transportation networks, and the disruptions enhance
their ability to travel surreptitiously and to bribe
officials. Although the war increases demand for
smugglers' services, it also adds to their risks, which
encourages them to turn to high-profit, illicit contra-
band. Merchants, finding their established markets
adversely affected, also seek alternative commodities,
such as opium and heroin, to trade.
Afghanistan's Expanded Opium Trade: The Evidence
Part of the case for Afghanistan's expanded opium
trade depends on circumstantial, uncorroborated, or
secondhand information. The frequency of the report-
ing and the nature and number of allegations, howev-
er, strongly suggest that the opium trade continues
unabated.
Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) and State
Department reporting, indicates that Afghan farmers
are cultivating opium poppies throughout the country,
that heroin is now being refined in Afghan laborato-
ries, and that Afghan smugglers are taking advantage
of the insurgency to increase their involvement in the
drug trade.
Cultivation. A wide variety of evidence indicates
poppy cultivation in Afghanistan is becoming more
widespread (figure 1). Reporting from Islamabad,
Pakistan, predicts that the 1985 opium crop in Af-
ghanistan may be 25 percent greater than that for
1984, which by our estimate was 140 to 180 metric
tons.' DEA reporting claims that individual farmers
are devoting a higher percentage of their acreage to
poppies in traditional growing regions, and ~~
poppies are even cultivated in nontraditional growing
areas
reports of
increased acreage to poppies in traditional growing
Nangar-
ar Province, the major producing region, reveals that
in some areas of the province approximately 50 to 70
percent of the cultivated fields are planted to poppy,
compared to 30 to 40 percent last year (figure 2).
Nangarhar traditionally accounts for about two-thirds
of all poppyfields in the country, and, if opium
production in Nangarhar has more than doubled,
Afghanistan's total production for 1985 may be as
high as 300 metric tons. A count of poppyfields in
other provinces indicates similar increases in the
number of fields of poppy. We are unable to confirm
the expansion of poppies to nontradi-
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tional areas. Nevertheless, we believe that the expan-
sion in traditional areas alone is sufficient to boost
25X1
production this year by at least 70 percent.0
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Figure 2
Crop Growth in Eastern Afghanistan, Late March 1985
~~, ~;.i~r . ,
~F \`
'~' HIND ;~~t;~Qao~;~1
International boundary
Province boundary
Approximate scale
10 20 Miles
This Landsat scene centers on Nangarhar Province in
eastern Afghanistan where nearly two-thirds of the poppy crop
is cultivated. Snowmelt feeds the irrigation networks here, and
this image, taken shortly before poppy flowering, reveals
ample snowfall in the mountains. Contrary to reports of a
drought during this year's growing season, the deep red color-
ing in the valleys indicates high crop vigor and the ros ects
for good yields. Opium is a major cash crop here
about 50 to 70 percent o t e cu trvat-
ed fiel s were p an e o poppy in some areas this year.
Jalalabad, seen in the middle of the image, is a major market
~~ a
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Figure 3
Areas of Poppy Cultivation and Major Military Activity
~r4*~~'~t+or id'i
?Wiiatie3ltw?
We suspect that poppy cultivation in Afghanistan is
unaffected by the war, largely because of the nature
of the fighting. Most of Afghanistan's poppy is culti-
vated in small, scattered fields in remote mountain
valleys away from Soviet and government military
operations, which have been directed mostly against
specific, accessible targets along main roads or near
important towns (figure 3).Z Many operations are
focused attempts to relieve besieged garrisons or halt
Intense poppy cultivation
Scattered or suspected
poppy cultivation
Major military activity
-?- Province boundary
Road
0 100 200 Kilometers
I i i i
0 100 200 Miles
insurgent infiltration along the Afghan-Pakistani bor-
der or the Afghan-Iranian frontier. The use of air-
power also has limited combat on the ground that
could have disrupted poppy planting or opium har-
vesting (figure 4). Government operations in the past
year suggest less interest than before in acquiring
control over remote rural areas and more willingness
to countenance insurgent control there, or at least a
low level of activity.
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Figure 4
The Poppy Season in Afghanistan
_ Sowing ~ Harvesting
I'a,tern, southern, and
western ~~rovincesa
L --1 ---1----_. _. ~. ~ ~_._--~-- _.~ __ ~~_ __ ~ __
Jan Feb Mar Apr May Jun Jul Aug Sep Oct Nov Dec
~~ (lmllnned liir Kabul, ~ung;irhur, Konurh a, Lugh man, Lowgar, Kapisa, Ilcimand rind Uruzgan
Pru~ince.. I'rubahl~ ennilur in Iler:u.
S~~ring xo~cing ;nut summer harvesting is Ilkch char.ic~cristic of much of the popp~~ crop, but
pusahl~ some is protin us a Hlnicr crop.
'~ (~nnfirmed
upports these conclusions
about the likely impact of military operations on
poppy cultivation no signs of wide-
spread crop burning or destruction of irrigation sys-
tems; bomb damage and craters are seen most often in
villages and along roadways. We estimate that the
destruction of crops and farms caused by military
operations affects only a small portion of cultivated
land, less than 1 percent of total farm crop areas
observed on satellite imagery.' We judge that the
rugged landscape and numerous irrigation ditches
restrict access to fields in remote areas to foot soldiers
or heliborne troops, who are more concerned with the
battle at hand than with destroying poppyfields.
The manner in which insurgents conduct their opera-
tions limits the effects of the war on agriculture. At
times it appears the insurgents deliberately divert
their operations from farming areas and from their
sometime supporters. Operating in small mobile
bands, they have engaged Soviet and government
forces in brief, confined battles. Generally, insurgents
attack regime garrisons, Soviet installations, radar 25X1
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The War in the Poppy-Growing Provinces
Analysis of several military operations in poppy-
growing regions during thefall of 1984 and early
spring of 1985 illustrates why the hostilities probably
have little negative effect on poppy planting or har-
vesting:
? Kabul increased its military operations in mid-
October 1984 in Nangarhar Province and continued
at that level of activity through the end of the year.
Major battles during this time of the year could
have limited sowing and damaged seedlings, but
most of the activity was aimed at relieving garri-
sons and interdicting insurgent supply caravans and
occurred near major roadways crossing the ,4lghan-
Pakistani border rather than in the countryside.
? Lowgar Province was the site o,/'similar military
efforts late in 1984, but
the operations were primarily along important sup-
ply routes and did not ctJlect farming areas away
from the roads.
? From the end of 1984 through early 1985 there was
heavy fighting in Herat Province. Although we
know little about the poppy crop in Herat, we doubt
that it was affected if the Soviets used the same
tactics as used in Lowgar and Nangarhar Provinces.
? Qandahar Province was the scene of heavy~ghting
in January 1985, but the activity was limited to
insurgent attacks against the airport, Soviet and
government posts, a Soviet military convoy, and
daily skirmishes in the bazaar. The Soviets re-
sponded by bombing nearby villages, but we doubt
major damage was irtilicted on the more remotely
located poppyfields.
? In late March 1985 insurgents attacked an Afghan
base northeast of Lashkar Gah in the Helmand
Valley. Although the heavy airstrikes before the
insurgents' withdrawal could have delayed the
opium harvest, we believe that farmers had ade-
quate time to harvest their opium because the
airstrikes ended in early April.
? Konarha Province was the scene of fighting in
February 1985. Most military operations in Kon-
arha, however, occurred along the province's main
roads in the valleys of the Darya-ye Konar and its
major tributaries, the Landay Sind and the Darya-
ye Pich. Although some airborne orces were used
in the mountains, nalysis indi-
cates little destruction of the terraced poppyfields.
? Paktia and Paktika Provinces have been the scene
of constant battles as Soviet and Afghan troops
have attempted to relieve insurgent pressure on
regime outposts. The government conducted a
blockade and sweep operation in Paktia in late
October 1984, but we doubt that the poppy crop was
damaged because many regime units here, hard
pressed to hold their posts against guerrilla as-
saults, have little time to conduct massive field
operations that could destroy crops. These prov-
inces, however, have experienced considerable popu-
lation loss that may have reduced poppy
cultivation.
? Kapisa and Laghman Provinces, often the location
of Soviet offensives, are mountainous with only
scattered poppy cultivation on smaller-than-average
fields in terraced agricultural areas. Farmers prob-
ably had d(f~culty planting or harvesting their
fields because of thefighting, but we consider it
unlikely that destroyed poppyfields in these areas
will affect total Afghan production.
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25X1 outposts, border posts, military supply convoys, air-
ports, and highways. Many insurgents are also part-
time farmers, which tends to reduce hostilities during
planting and harvesting seasons.
Processing. Evidence indicates that trafficking orga-
nizations in Afghanistan have had the capability to
process opium into morphine and heroin since the
25X1 mid-1970s I
We doubt that Afghan laboratories manufacture
large amounts of pure heroin or compare in number
with those in Pakistan.' Reporting about increased
heroin refining activities involving Afghans began
about three years after the Soviet invasion:
? In early 1983, DEA sources reported laboratories in
Nangarhar Province, and other sources later corrob-
orated the presence of the laboratories.
? By the fall of 1983, DEA had learned of the
existence of at least 40 heroin laboratories in Nan-
garhar Province alone.
? In mid-1984, DEA reported the spread of laborato-
ries to areas outside of Nangarhar Province~ne
near Kabul, four in Helmand Province, and nine in
Ribat.5
We have received no reporting of any government
crackdown on heroin refineries.
the proliferation of
small heroin laboratories continues in Afghanistan. In
March 1985, reliable DEA sources reported that
many temporary laboratories were set up to process
opium following the harvest in April. US Embassy
sources in Kabul also claim that numerous heroin
laboratories are located east of Kabul near the Af-
ghan-Pakistani border.
Most heroin laboratories in Southwest Asia process raw opium
into crude heroin base (Number 2 Heroin) or smoking heroin
(Number 3 Heroin), but more laboratories
are refining pure heroin (Number 4 Heroin), particularly in Paki-
stan. Pure heroin is also referred to as injectable heroin or heroin
hydrochloride.0
' Ribat is a village somewhere in the Afghan-Iranian-Pakistani
triborder area.
We judge that the increase in the number of heroin
refineries reflects the traffickers' belief that Afghanis-
tan's lawless, war-torn environment is ideal for refin-
ing heroin with impunity. DEA sources in Pakistan 25X1
report that many heroin refiners have relocated to
pect that some laboratories also may be shifting from
Pakistan to Afghanistan because of the increase in
Afghan opium production and decrease in Pakistani
cultivation. 25X1 25X1
Other, more circumstantial evidence also suggests an
increase in heroin processing in Afghanistan.
Soviet soldiers regularly barter
items in the Afghan bazaars for heroin. Heroin
powder is readily available in Afghan cities and
frequently traded in the bazaars of Jalalabad, Qanda-
har, and Herat, as well as other cities and towns
(Kabul, Mazar-e Sharif, Towr Kham, Farah, and
Zaranj), according to all available evidence. The
distance of some of these locations from Pakistani
laboratories suggests nearby refining in Afghanistan.
DEA reporting also indicates that Pakistani authori-
ties have seized heroin en route from Afghanistan.
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We believe that military operations have little effect
on heroin refining activities in Afghanistan. Few 25X1
laboratories are located in areas that are potential
military targets, such as the important villages or
major roadways. the laboratories are
in remote mountain areas where government control
is limited. Like Pakistani operations, most Afghan
heroin laboratories are so-called garage or kitchen
operations-easily established, crudely constructed,
and using existing buildings in outlying villages and 25)(1
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farm compounds. It is unlikely that the laboratories
would be distinguishable from normal agricultural
buildings, and, if destroyed, they easily could be
reestablished
Smuggling. Smuggling has long been a way of life for
many Afghans, and available evidence indicates that
Afghan drug smugglers have taken advantage of the
insurgency-related disruption to increase their activi-
ties. We receive numerous reports of drug smuggling
throughout Afghanistan and of bazaars well supplied
with narcotics. Drug smuggling into Pakistan and
Iran is also common, according to numerous DEA
reports.
Afghan smugglers have a large number of well-
established routes, most of which cross unguarded
borders with Pakistan and Iran. Before the insurgen-
cy, tribal caravans traveled west across northern
Afghanistan carrying opium to the consumers in Iran
and the processing laboratories in eastern Turkey.
Traditionally, opium was brought from almost all the
growing regions to Herat, a commercial center in the
western part of the country. There, arrangements
were made to smuggle the opium across the border
into Iran. Caravans carried some of the opium south
to Qandahar Province and from there west across
Helmand and Nimruz Provinces into Iran or south
into Pakistan and west across Baluchistan-these
routes facilitated diversion of the cargo to the Persian
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The Opium and Heroin Trade
In Afghanistan, opium is purchased initially by a
local dealer, who may himseUbe a grower, or by a
dealerfrom a nearby town. Usinga human carrier, an
animal caravan, or a motor vehicle, the dealer takes
the opium from the growing area to a major center or
bazaar, where it is either stockpiled by an opium
broker or sold directly to smugglers. The broker
usually maintains a stock of about 4 tons of opium.
He will sell to refiners or may refine opium himself
When his opium stocks run low, he orders more from
the dealers in the growing areas. Brokers and refiners
in the Afghan bazaars supply the smugglers. Usually,
the smugglers transport their cargo in vehicles or on
pack animals to villages near the border. These
villages serve as staging areas where the opiates are
transferred to pack animal caravans to begin the
journey across the border trails into Pakistan. Once
inside Pakistan, the opiates are transferred to anoth-
er pack animal caravan, or to small trucks, for
delivery to the brokers and refiners in the North-
West Frontier Province (NWFPJ bazaars. The NWFP
brokers and refiners are the major regional wholesal-
ers who move the opium and heroin by car or truck to
major traffickers in Karachi or Lahore, who, in turn,
generally supply the international trafficking net-
25X1 works that supply the United States and Europe.
According to US Embassy reporting, Afghan drug
smugglers take advantage of the traditional money
bazaar between Peshawar and Kabul-a hundi net-
work of partnerships based on family and tribal
relationships-to finance the flourishing narcotics
trade. The hundi-called Hawala in Afghanistan-is
an instrument of credit and exchange in Southwest
Aria that predates and bypasses banking institutions.
The small chit of paper authorizing delivery of a
specific amount of money to the bearer has been
replaced by the telephone. Transactions between the
receiver in Kabul and distributor of hundi funds in
Peshawar are now authorized by phone. The hundi
dealers simply convert rupees to Afghanis at whatever
exchange rate the market establishes; a transaction
takes only three days to complete. A separate system
also operates between Quetta and Qandahar.
We believe that the Soviet invasion has altered the use
of traditional smuggling routes and added a new
dimension to narcotics trafficking in Afghanistan.' To
avoid contact with roadblocks and other increased
security measures, smugglers began moving their
drugs to the nearest border. Smugglers from the less
important, northern-producing provinces, such as
Balkh, Konduz, and Baghlan, continued their treks
southwest to Herat; but new routes were needed from
the major growing areas on the eastern border to
Pakistan. The need to develop routes leading east was
reinforced further by a crackdown on heroin laborato-
ries in Turkey. As a result, Jalalabad (Nangarhar
Province) became the major marketing center in
Afghanistan for transshipment to Pakistan. Some
changes in routes were made to adjust for the disloca-
tions of the insurgency. For example, smugglers from
the Helmand Valley still travel to Qandahar, but now
are more likely to head east to Pakistan than west to
Iran.
Five years after the Soviet invasion, Afghan smug-
glers have adapted to the fighting and security mea-
sures, and we believe they may be in an even stronger
position than before the hostilities began (figure 6).
They have managed to maintain access to their old
smuggling routes and connections, while developing
new ones with Pakistani organizations. Smuggling
east to villages near the Khyber Pass and into Paki-
stan occurs on a much larger scale, and Pakistani
trafficking organizations in the North-West Frontier
Province have expanded their operations to handle
more narcotics. Afghan smugglers are also crossing
the Afghan-Soviet border near Iran. According to
DEA analysis, the location of several seizures in Iran
at or near the Soviet border suggests that this route is
being used. We doubt that drug smuggling through
the Soviet Union is a regular occurrence, however,
because Soviet security measures along the Afghan
border are quite thorough and movement across this
border is tightly controlled.
Declassified in Part -Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/11/11 :CIA-RDP97R00694R000500240001-9
 Declassified in Part -Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/11/11 :CIA-RDP97R00694R000500240001-9
Secret
Figure 6
Narcotics Smuggling Routes
BounAery reprenenle