SPACE WARC: REGULATION OF THE GEOSTATIONARY ORBIT

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP97R00694R000500130001-1
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 32
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: March 18, 2011
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: July 1, 1985
• Content Type: REPORT

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/04/24: CIA-RDP97R00694R000500130001-1
Space WARC:
Regulation of the
Geostationary Orbit
GI 85-10204
July 1985
f Directorate of
Intelligence
C o p y 4 1 0
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/04/24: CIA-RDP97R00694R000500130001-1
 25X1
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/04/24: CIA-RDP97R00694R000500130001-1
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/04/24: CIA-RDP97R00694R000500130001-1
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/04/24: CIA-RDP97R00694R000500130001-1
Directorate of Secret
Intelligence
Space WARC:
Regulation of the
Geostationary Orbit
This paper was prepared by~
of Global Issues, with a contribution from
YOGI.
25X1
25X1
25X1
Security Issues Division, OGI,
Secret
GI 85-10204
July 1985
25X1
25X1
25X1
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/04/24: CIA-RDP97R00694R000500130001-1
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/04/24: CIA-RDP97R00694R000500130001-1
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/04/24: CIA-RDP97R00694R000500130001-1
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/04/24: CIA-RDP97R00694R000500130001-1
Secret
Space WARC:
Regulation of the
Geostationary Orbit
Key Judgments The International Telecommunication Union (ITU) will convene a global
Information available conference next month on radiofrequencies and orbital slots for communica-
as of l July 1985 tions satellites. The outcome of the conference will affect future US Govern-
was used in this report.
ment and commercial development of satellite communications and could,
under some scenarios, threaten current military communications systems.
The Space World Administrative Radio Conference (Space WARC) was
called for by a coalition of developing countries bent on securing rights to
future use of the geostationary orbital slots and frequencies, which they
perceive as limited.
The key technical issue at the first session of the conference, scheduled to
run through August and September, is devising a new method for planning
use of orbital slots and frequencies. Implementation of the new procedures
will not be considered until the second session of Space WARC, scheduled
for 1988. Many of the developing countries want to establish a system of
prior planning that would permanently assign orbital slots and frequencies
to each country, regardless of current use patterns. Most developed coun-
tries, including the United States and the Soviet Union, oppose this ap-
proach for the most heavily used frequency bands on grounds that it would
create inefficiencies in their operations and stifle future developments in the
space telecommunications industry.
We believe that this session of the conference is likely to opt for prior
planning in some form for some frequencies. The particular form adopted,
the reaction of other countries with major investments in space communica-
tions, and the implementation will determine whether, and which, US
interests are affected. At worst, the conference could select a rigid plan
supported not only by almost all developing countries, but in which most
developed countries also acquiesce. This would effectively bind the United
States to the plan and could limit US commercial satellite interests and
force the United States to alter some military communications and radar
operations. The most likely outcome would plan little-used frequencies, a
development that could disrupt some US Government operations. F__-]
Political rhetoric, as in all UN-associated conferences, will play a visible and
important role. The most sensitive is likely to be the Soviet Union's use of the
forum to push its campaign against the US Strategic Defense Initiative
(SDI). The Soviets are certain to have lined up Bloc and some Third World
support for their anti-SDI campaign. On technical matters the Soviets are
generally in accord with US positions. As in other international meetings
iii Secret
GI 85-10204
July 1985
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/04/24: CIA-RDP97R00694R000500130001-1
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/04/24: CIA-RDP97R00694R000500130001-1
Secret
where their technical interests coincide with US interests, they will let the
Western industrial nations take the lead in arguing with Third World states.
Other political issues that could complicate life for the United States
include:
? UK-Argentine debate of sovereignty over South Atlantic Islands.
? A Cuban condemnation of US Radio Marti broadcasts.
? A credentials conflict, possibly over participation by Israel
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/04/24: CIA-RDP97R00694R000500130001-1
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/04/24: CIA-RDP97R00694R000500130001-1
Secret
Background and Introduction
The Key Issue: Planning
Political Issues
The Developing Countries
The Soviet Union and Its Allies
The Western Nations
Developments Leading Up to Space WARC
The Third World and the Consultative Process
3
9
10
11
Principles Governing the Geostationary Satellite Orbit 17
Recent UN General Assembly Resolutions on the Outer Space 19
Arms Race
Soviet Draft Resolution for 1985 Administrative Council 21
Legal Impact of the Space WARC 23
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/04/24: CIA-RDP97R00694R000500130001-1
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/04/24: CIA-RDP97R00694R000500130001-1
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/04/24: CIA-RDP97R00694R000500130001-1
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/04/24: CIA-RDP97R00694R000500130001-1
Secret
Space WARC:
Regulation of the
Geostationary Orbit
In August 1985 the International Telecommunication
Union (ITU) will convene the first of two sessions of a
Space World Administrative Radio Conference
(Space WARC). Delegates to this conference will
consider revising the regulations established in 1963
and last revised in 1979 governing space telecom-
munications systems using satellites in the geostation-
ary orbit (see inset, The Geostationary Satellite Or-
bit). Many developing countries are concerned that
room in the orbit required for geostationary satellites
at appropriate frequencies for transmitting via such
satellites will be "used up" before these countries are
technologically and economically ready to use space-
based telecommunications systems. According to the
agenda set by the ITU, the conference seeks to
"guarantee in practice, for all countries, equitable
access to the geostationary satellite orbit and to the
frequency bands allocated to the space services utiliz-
ing it."
The stakes are high. The geostationary orbit plays a
key role in the economic and military security of
many developed countries, especially the United
States. Some of the major users of the orbit have
much to lose by altering the manner in which its use is
now regulated (see inset, US Interests at Space
WARC). The technologically advanced industrialized
countries will be pitted against the less developed
states. Both sides will be striving to maximize future
positions in the telecommunications game. But where-
as the "North" believes it can probably best reach its
goal through evolutionary tinkering with the existing
system for regulating those frequencies of primary
interest, the "South" believes it can probably best
satisfy its perceived needs through radical or revolu-
tionary departures from the status quo.
Space WARC is technically empowered to consider
all of the space telecommunications services (see inset,
The Space Satellite Services). We believe that most
If a satellite is launched into a circular orbit in the
plane of the equator at the right altitude (approxi-
mately 35,800 kilometers), it will orbit the Earth at
the same rate that the Earth rotates on its axis
beneath it. When viewed from the Earth, the satellite
will appear suspended over afixed point on the
Earth's equator. The circle in space formed by all
such orbits is called the geostationary satellite orbit,
and satellites in such an orbit are called geostation-
ary satellites. Earth stations can remain directed at
such satellites without the need for expensive, com-
plicated tracking equipment. Among the functions of
satellites in this orbit are telecommunications and
broadcasting.
Geostationary satellites using the same frequency
bands may interfere with each other. Other uses of
the same frequencies may also lead to interference.
Interference occurs, depending on:
? The separation between the areas on Earth the
satellites are servicing.
? The technology in the satellite and its Earth sta-
tions (particularly the directivity and polarization
of antennas).
? The separation between the satellites.
? Other systems, not in the geostationary satellite
orbit or on Earth (such as aircraft and ships), using
the same frequency bands.
Space technology is rapidly evolving, allowing a 25X1
greater satellite communications capacity and closer
spacing of like frequency satellites than before. F___-]
of the effort will focus on the Broadcasting and Fixed
Satellite Services. Another potentially controversial
topic on the agenda is consideration of a new service
dedicated to radiobroadcasting from space. Political
issues ranging from Soviet opposition to the US
Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI) to a challenge to
Israeli credentials could also come up.
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/04/24: CIA-RDP97R00694R000500130001-1
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/04/24: CIA-RDP97R00694R000500130001-1
Secret
The United States makes more use of the geostation-
ary orbit and spectrum than any other nation. A long-
term, detailed plan that allows each country equal
orbit slots and frequency assignments infrequency
bands of US interest would jeopardize US commer-
cial and Government operations, particularly mili-
tary systems. Such a plan would most likely favor the
domestic interests of the LDCs over the global strate-
gic and commercial interests of superpowers. Among
the US concerns are protection of
? The Defense Satellite Communications System.
This primary US Government communications sys-
tem uses the 7/8-GHz band in the Fixed Satellite
Service worldwide. The United States is committed
to this system through the 1990s.
? Commercial Fixed Satellite Service. The US Fed-
eral Communications Commission has applications
or indications of applications for more of the do-
mestic arc than can be accommodated at the 4/6-
GHz band using current technology. The situation
at the 11/14-GHz band over the Americas is tight-
ening. Rigid planning based on assignments for all
countries would worsen this situation.
? US military radar operations in the 3.4- to 3.7-GHz
band. According to a US Government study, the
United States has invested $11 billion in US air-
borne and shipborne systems operating worldwide
in this spectrum. INTELSAT, the LDCs, and
INTERSPUTNIK want to expand domestic satel-
lite operations to this band. The 1979 WARC
agreed to reallocate the band on a shared basis to
the Fixed Satellite Service and urged abandonment
of radar operations in the 3.4- to 3.7-GHz band by
1985. If domestic satellites begin using these fre-
quencies, US radars such as those supporting
A WACS, Phoenix, and AEGIS will interfere with
the satellite operations.
? US and NATO military fixed and transportable
communications operations in Europe in the 4.5- to
4.8-GHz band. If this band is allocated to North
American and European commercial satellites, the
military systems could interfere with satellite
operations.
? US airborne reconnaissance platforms operating at
14.5 to 14.8 GHz. US airborne intelligence collec-
tors operate worldwide using the 14.5- to 14.8-GHz
band. WARC-79 allocated this frequency band
along with other spectrum for feeder links to the
Broadcasting Satellite Service plan. If Region 1 and
3 countries plan feeder links in this band, the
military may no longer be able to use these
frequencies.
? Global operations. A rigid plan or a plan based on
regions could limit US access to the geostationary
satellite orbit for commercial and military
satellites.
? US policies for competitive access. If a rigid plan-
ning method is imposed by the Space WARC, the
method could disrupt the current US practice of
promoting competitive access to the geostationary
orbit by any entity that can demonstrate financial
capability and market demand for its service.
? US monetary obligations. The US Government is
concerned about the rising costs of international
organizations and has established a policy of zero
net program growth and absorption of nondiscre-
tionary cost increases, such as inflation of costs and
salaries, on its assessed international organization
obligations. Decisions in Space WARC could in-
crease budget costs for the ITU.
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/04/24: CIA-RDP97R00694R000500130001-1
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/04/24: CIA-RDP97R00694R000500130001-1
Secret
Fixed Satellite Service. This service is used to
transmit voice, data, and telex signals. Also used for
distributing television signals from space to Earth
and feeding signals to the Broadcasting Satellite
Service.
there are satellite-to-satellite links in the space re-
search service. Use of this service is anticipated in
future systems.
Earth-Exploration Satellite Service. A satellite is
used to collect information about the characteristics
25X1
25X1
25X1
Broadcasting Satellite Service. Signals are transmit-
ted or retransmitted by satellites to Earth for recep-
tion by the public. Currently, spectrum has only been
allocated for television signals; however, a radio
service is under consideration.
Mobile Satellite Service. Earth stations on land, at
sea, or on aircraft may send and receive signals from
space.
Radiodetermination Satellite and Radionavigation
Satellite Service. Signals used for navigation and
determining location. Satellites that provide this
function do not currently use the geostationary orbit.
Space Operation Service. Designed to facilitate
tracking, telemetry, and command functions of any
satellite.
Intersatellite Service. No operational satellite sys-
tems have been implemented in this service, although
The Key Issue: Planning
The method for planning the placement of satellites in
the geostationary orbit and use of appropriate fre-
quencies in ways to avoid interference with other
users will underlie all of the technical discussions at
Space WARC. Currently, a country planning to
launch a satellite is expected to inform other ITU
members no more than five years before the launch.
The launching country then coordinates its plans with
other countries that have existing or planned systems
so that interference will not occur among the satellites
or other systems and registers the final technical
details with the ITU. This registration provides inter-
national recognition and is the only international
protection a country has against interference from
other systems.
of the Earth and its natural phenomena.
operational.
Meteorological Satellite Service. This service is a
subset of the Earth-Exploration Satellite Service.
Several geostationary meteorological satellites are
Standard Frequency and Time Signal Satellite Ser-
vice. No operational satellites vet. The Bureau Inter-
national De 1'Heure will probably regulate this ser-
vice.
Space Research Service. Satellites arefor scientific
research, data relay between near-Earth and deep
space and corresponding Earth stations, and testing
of new technology. These satellites vary widely. F_
Amateur Satellite Service. Several experimental sat-
ellites that fill educational and scientific roles and
promote new communications skills among users. No
amateur satellites currently use the geostationary
orbit.
Many countries that have not yet begun to use space
communications services believe that current proce-
dures favor the industrialized countries and that
adoption of rigid planning is essential (see inset, Rigid
Planning at High-Frequency Broadcasting WARC).
As early as 1970, some developing countries began to
express the view that industrialized countries would so
intensively use the geostationary orbit and frequencies
allocated to space services that these resources would
soon be used up. They expressed concern that when
they were financially and technically able to deploy
their own systems they could not do so without
interfering with existing systems.
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/04/24: CIA-RDP97R00694R000500130001-1
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/04/24: CIA-RDP97R00694R000500130001-1
Secret
Rigid Planning at High-Frequency
Broadcasting WARC
LDC proposals for rigid planning would not be unique
to the Space WARC. The LDCs advocated a similar
concept for the 1984 High-Frequency Broadcasting
WARC (HF WARC) but agreed to a test of a
'planning method" that is neither long term nor a
priori in nature. The result of this testing will be
presented to the second session of the HF WARCfor
Soviet Union is supporting rigid planning in a limited
and little-used area of the frequency spectrum, largely
to curry favor with the LDCs at little cost to itself.
Australia has proposed a form of rigid planning
because its space needs are minimal and few countries
will launch satellites in the part of the geostationary
orbit useful to Australia. Canada may also propose a
rigid planning method for a limited portion of the
orbit and spectrum. We believe Ottawa's real motiva-
tion is to assure itself that the United States will not
deprive Canada of opportunities to use the orbit.
approval, modification, and final decision.
a key NAM leader,
Srirangan of India, said that the planning problems
of Space WARC are not directly parallel with those
of the HF WARC. He stated that, unlike the geosta-
tionary orbit, high frequencies are not a limited
resource. Also, ground-based, high frequency broad-
casting transmitters are more easily altered than
satellites. Once most satellites are launched, altering
their technical characteristics and frequencies is diffi-
cult.
Furthermore, Srirangan said that the position of the
LDCs at Space WARC will be much harder and more
political than it was at the HF WARC. In contrast to
their position with respect to shortwave broadcasting,
most LDCs have little to lose because they have little
or no money invested in space communication (except
for INTELSAT participation).
Rooted in philosophical notions about an "equitable
division of resources," the LDC position on planning
has also been affected by practical experience. For
example:
? During the prelaunch coordination process in the
late 1970s, India had to reduce the capacity of its
first communications satellite because of potential
interference with an existing Soviet satellite.
? Indonesia was forced to change the location of its
Palapa satellite because of potential interference
with INTELSAT, the Soviet Statsionar system, and
the Indian satellite.
LDCs are not alone in their support of rigid planning,
although their demands cover a broader range of the
orbit and frequency spectrum than do others. The
The merits of flexible versus fixed plans will be
compared in discussions on planning the Fixed Satel-
lite Service and the Broadcasting Satellite Service.
Work on planning the Broadcasting Satellite Service
has been under way since 1977 (see inset, Broadcast-
ing Satellite Plans). This process has set the stage for
consideration of a plan for the Fixed Satellite Service.
When the ITU put together the first two of three
regional broadcasting plans in 1977, it locked itself
into the technology of the time. This became apparent
in 1983 when planners for Region 2 took advantage of
new technologies in developing a plan that is far more
efficient than the 1977 efforts.
A fear of getting locked into similar inefficiencies in
planning for the Fixed Satellite Service is fundamen-
tal to the resistance of most current users of satellites
to any form of rigid planning. Most users believe that
a rigid plan that went beyond today's "publish, con-
sult, and register" provisions would limit the future
development and capacity of satellites in the geosta-
tionary orbit and reduce incentives for developing
more efficient technology. A rigid plan would also, in
their view, be wasteful because it would encourage
countries to reserve orbital positions and frequency
assignments far into the future, potentially leaving
large portions of the orbit and frequency spectrum
unused. Rigid plans could undercut, or be undercut
by, changes in other telecommunications technologies
such as microwave and fiber optics.
Technical Issues
As the debate on planning methods unfolds, we
believe that the conference will finally concentrate on
25X1
25X1
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/04/24: CIA-RDP97R00694R000500130001-1
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/04/24: CIA-RDP97R00694R000500130001-1
Secret
WARC-77. In 1977, the ITU convened a World
Broadcasting Satellite Radio Conference (WARC-77)
to regulate television broadcasting from satellites.
According to a US delegate to that conference, most
European nations wanted a worldwide plan that
detailed satellite system characteristics and allotted
frequency channels to each ITU member. The official
said that the Europeans believed a detailed plan was
necessary to provide guaranteed access for the future
broadcasting satellite systems of developing nations.
The United States and other countries opposed such
a plan because countries would be restrained by long-
term projections and technology that would become
obsolete, wasting spectrum before allotments were
used. Regions I and 3 (Europe and Asia) developed a
detailed a priori plan, assigning the broadcasting or
downlink frequencies to countries in the two regions.
The WARC-77 plan was incorporated into the ITU
Radio Regulations at the 1979 WARC. Regions I
and 3 must now plan the uplinks or feeder links that
provide programs to the satellites at Space WARC.
RARC-83. Region 2 (Western Hemisphere) countries
postponed planning broadcasting satellites for six
years. At a regional administrative radio conference
in 1983 (RARC-83), Region 2 delegates developed a
plan that included not only the downlink broadcast-
ing frequencies but also thefeeder links. This plan
cannot enter into effect until it is incorporated into
the ITU Radio Regulations. The Space WARC has
the power to incorporate the conference final acts. F_
Comparing the Plans. After only six years, technol-
ogy had progressed so that Region 2 was able to
portions of the frequency spectrum currently desig-
nated for use by satellites but not much used. This
poses a threat to some US and Western military
communications and radar systems that now operate
in portions of this spectrum where some countries-
including Algeria and India-would argue they do
not belong. Rigid planning in these frequency ranges
accommodate more channels using less spectrum.
The Region 2 plan also provides better standards for
protection from interference by other satellites.
comparison of the two plans follows:
150 countries and
territories
252 service areas
11.7 to 12.5 GHz
(Region 1)
11.7 to 12.2 GHz
(Region 3)
40 frequency channels
(Region 1)
24 frequency channels
(Region 3)
19.18-MHz spacing
35 orbital positions, with
clusters of two or more
satellites
5 channels per service
area (Region 1)
4 channels per service
area (Region 3)
56 countries and
territories
130 service areas
12.2 to 12.7 GHz
(Region 2)
14.48-MHz spacing
5 Caribbean beams,
1 Andean beam
48 orbital positions, with
clusters of two or more
satellites
Nonuniform orbital
spacing
32 channels per service
area
could force the United States to change or limit the
use of these military systems:
? US AWACS, Phoenix, and AEGIS radars could at
times interfere with satellites permitted to operate
from 3.4 to 3.7 GHz.
25X1
25X1
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/04/24: CIA-RDP97R00694R000500130001-1
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/04/24: CIA-RDP97R00694R000500130001-1
Secret
? NATO tactical communications systems that oper-
ate in the 4.5- to 4.8-GHz range would in some
cases interfere with satellites permitted to use those
frequencies.
? Planning in the 7/8-GHz range would limit the
flexibility of US Government and NATO satellites.
the US SDI. Under the guise of restraining "non-
peaceful uses of outer space," the Soviets and their
friends are preparing to undertake a number of
actions aimed at SDI:
It is less likely-but still possible-that the confer-
ence could decide to adopt a rigid planning approach
to those portions of the frequency spectrum already
heavily used by commercial communications satel-
lites. Should this happen, US operators might have to
accept higher interference levels, use less efficient
technologies, and severely limit the number of new
satellites they could place in the geostationary orbit.
At the very least, such a decision could lead to closer
scrutiny of US operators for compliance with ITU
rules.
Other technical sticking points may include:
? Europe, Africa, and Asia need to agree on frequen-
cies for the uplinks (Earth to satellite transmissions)
to their television broadcast satellites. US military
operations could interfere with some of the candi-
date frequencies.
? The conference has been asked to adopt, at this
session, a plan for television broadcast satellites for
the Americas. Key countries from the other two
regions, including the Soviet Union and some West
Europeans, oppose adoption of the plan until they
have settled on the assignment of the uplinks men-
tioned above. US commercial operators will find it
difficult to secure financial backing for development
of television broadcast satellites until a plan is
internationally recognized.
? Most members of the conference, except the Soviets
and their allies, would like to agree on setting up a
new satellite service for radiobroadcasting from
space. Candidate frequencies considered so far in-
terfere with existing users; the conference probably
will agree to broaden the range of frequencies to be
considered.
Political Issues
The political issue most likely to plague the United
States at Space WARC is a Soviet-inspired attack on
? State Department reporting from Geneva indicates
that the Soviet Union recently passed out a draft
proposal calling on the ITU to consider studying the
"disastrous consequences" of spreading the arms
race to outer space.
? According to State Department reporting, in Au-
gust 1984 the Soviet Ministry of Communications
told the ITU Secretary General that the Soviets
would focus their efforts on getting the UN General
Assembly (UNGA) to adopt a resolution that serves
Soviet purposes at Space WARC (see appendix D,
Recent UN General Assembly Resolutions on the
Outer Space Arms Race).
? At the 1982 ITU Plenipotentiary Conference, the
Preamble to the Convention was changed at the
insistence of India, Algeria, Iraq, Kuwait, and the
Eastern Bloc to read, "having regard to the growing
importance of telecommunication for the preserva-
tion of peace ... with the object of facilitating
peaceful relations ... have agreed to establish this
Convention."
? Colombia and Kenya proposed that Space WARC
consider the utilization of the geostationary orbit for
nonmilitary ends and "exclusively for peaceful
purposes" at a meeting in preparation for Space
WARC, according to diplomatic reporting.
As in many UN-affiliated meetings, including an ITU
meeting in 1982, there will be some anti-Israel rheto-
ric
Nonetheless, technical issues involving
Israel now exist that increase the opportunity for
controversy. In 1984, Israel notified the ITU of its
intention to sponsor the placing of a satellite in the
geostationary orbit. More than 20 nations, mostly
African and Arab, complained to the UN and ITU
25X1
25X1
25X1
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/04/24: CIA-RDP97R00694R000500130001-1
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/04/24: CIA-RDP97R00694R000500130001-1
Secret
Secretaries General about the Israeli plans. The Ar-
abs want to avoid public recognition of Israel and also
believe the proposed satellite will interfere with the
ARABSAT system.
Several other political issues could also draw attention
at the conference:
? UK-Argentine debate over South Atlantic Islands.
The 1983 Regional Broadcasting Plan gives Buenos
Aires assignments to islands disputed with London.
The United Kingdom shall take exception to this
part of the Western plan. Argentina is adamant in
gaining international recognition for the plan's
assignments.
? Cuban condemnation of Radio Marti. We cannot
rule out the possibility that Havana will publicly
condemn Radio Marti. Space WARC's agenda does
not include conventional radiobroadcasting, but
Castro may choose this public forum to voice his
displeasure.
? Election of conference and committee chairpersons.
Unlike past ITU conferences where North-South
and sometimes East-West lines delayed choosing
conference officers, we believe the countries will
agree in advance on a candidate to chair the
WARC. Choosing committee heads may be more
contentious (see inset, Delegates Under Consider-
ation for Conference Leadership Posts).
? Special treatment. The LDCs seek special rules for
developing countries using the geostationary orbit.
Colombia insists that "taking into account the
special economic position of the LDCs" is the
essential purpose of Space WARC. Japanese offi-
cials think the LDCs may propose attaching eco-
nomic value to orbit slots.
? Sovereignty. If the LDCs become sufficiently un-
happy with Western conference positions, they may
give lipservice to claims over the geostationary orbit
by the equatorial countries. The Equatorials, led by
Colombia, Ecuador, Kenya, and Indonesia, insist
that other countries seek permission before launch-
ing geostationary satellites into positions above their
respective territories (see inset, Chronology of the
Equatorials).
Delegates Under Consideration
for Conference Leadership Posts
The following people have been suggested for confer-
ence positions:
? Professor Ilija Stojanovic from Yugoslavia is Well-
and favorably known in his field. According to US
telecommunications officials, he has shown no ten-
dency to allow ideological or political consider-
ations to influence his judgment on ITU matters.
? Rumulo Furtado of Brazil has a ministerial post.
Secretary General Butler thinks that Furtado may
not be available for the position.
? K. P. R. Menon of Malaysia was suggested by the
United Kingdom and Switzerland. According to
diplomatic reporting, Secretary General Butler may
not agree with this selection.
? Noureddine Bouhired of Algeria was proposed by
the Soviets. Secretary General Butler claims he
told the Soviets that Bouhired was unlikely to
obtain much support.
? Stephen Challo of Kenya has been suggested by
Secretary General Butler for committee leadership.
Butler believes him to be a capable NAM candi-
date, according to State Department officials.
? Francisco Pinheiro of Brazil has also been suggest-
ed by Secretary General Butler to head a commit-
tee. Pinheiro demonstrated an ability to work with
developed and developing countries at the 1984
conference preparatory meeting, where he helped
achieve a difficult compromise on defining
planning. "
? Kavouss Arasteh of Iran has indicated an interest
in a leadership position, according to State Depart-
ment reporting. During past ITU conferences, he
has been a strong proponent of LDC positions.
? Stanley Malumbe of Kenya has been proposed as a
committee chairman, according to Secretary Gener-
al Butler. This, Butler says, would be a `package
deal" with the appointment of Stojanovic.
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/04/24: CIA-RDP97R00694R000500130001-1
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/04/24: CIA-RDP97R00694R000500130001-1
Secret
? In October 1975 during the UN General Assembly,
Colombia first claimed a segment of the geostation-
ary orbit above its national territory. The next year
Ecuador and Panama joined Colombia in this
stand.
? In 1976, seven equatorial countries Colombia,
Congo, Ecuador, Indonesia, Kenya, Uganda, and
Zaire-issued the Bogota Declaration asserting
that segments of the geostationary satellite orbit
above their territories are an "integral part" of the
territory over which the equatorial countries exer-
cise complete and exclusive sovereignty. Brazil had
observer status.
? At the 1979 WARC, Colombia, Congo, Ecuador,
Gabon, Kenya, Uganda, Somalia, and Zaire spoke
of "adopting regulations guaranteeing rational and
equitable access to the geostationary satellite or-
bit. " They proposed prior agreement for the use of
orbital positions over the territory of equatorial
states. Indonesia reaffirmed its stand on the 1976
Bogota Declaration.
? These countries spoke out again at UNISPACE in
1982 and succeeded in inserting a phrase in the
conference report indicating their belief that the
orbit "should not be included in the concept of
outer space and its utilization should be regulated
under a sui generis regime. " They also succeeded in
inserting, "the special geographical situation of
particular countries" in reference to a planning
method for the geostationary orbit. (According to
State Department reporting, the majority of nations
interpret special geographical situations as
We believe that investment in space systems, affili-
ations with global and regional telecommunications
systems, and political alignment will, for most nations,
determine positions at the Space WARC. The indus-
trialized nations have the greatest stake. A few
developing countries have their own satellites. Most
problems of using the geostationary orbit in regions
such as in the northern latitudes or mountainous
areas and not as problems peculiar to the equatori-
al region.)
? At the ITU Plenipotentiary in 1982, the Equator-
ials inserted "the special geographical situation of
particular countries" into the ITU Convention.
? The geostationary orbit has been discussed during
sessions of the UN Committee on the Peaceful Uses
of Outer Space (COPUOS) since the late 1970s. The
1983 UN General Assembly voted to elevate the
subject's status to a working group. Some countries
are supporting the creation of a regime for the
geostationary orbit to assure that it is used for
peaceful purposes and that it is distributed equita-
bly. State Department reporting indicates that,
during the 1984 Legal Subcommittee session of
COPUOS, the equatorial states of Colombia,
Kenya, Ecuador, and Indonesia introduced geosta-
tionary orbit principles that recognized their sover-
eignty over the orbit. According to US officials,
during private conversations an Indian delegate
said that the G-77 did not fully agree with these
principles, and an Indonesian official indicated that
his country was "not enthusiastic" about the princi-
ples (appendix D).
? In April 1985, Colombia wrote to the US State
Department protesting US occupancy of the Colom-
bian geostationary orbit. Colombia claims the Unit-
ed States did not get Colombia's approval to put a
satellite in orbit above its territory.
LDCs, however, merely subscribe to international
systems. Major country groups operating at Space
WARC will include:
? The LDCs.
? The Soviet Union and its allies.
? The Western developed nations.
? Global and regional satellite organizations)
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/04/24: CIA-RDP97R00694R000500130001-1
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/04/24: CIA-RDP97R00694R000500130001-1
Secret
The Developing Countries
The 101-member Non-Aligned Movement (NAM)
will work actively in the Space WARC to organize
LDC positions.
key leaders have been working for more than a year to
coordinate positions and seek consensus. Cameroon
reportedly is the telecommunications coordinator, and
the most active participants are Algeria, India, Iran,
Iraq, Kenya, and Yugoslavia. Despite efforts to
achieve a consensus, the NAM countries may not, in
our view, speak with one voice during Space WARC.
Brazil, China, India, and Indonesia, for example, have
their own communications satellites and consequently
will be less eager to make changes that could affect
existing systems.
The Soviet Union and Its Allies
The Soviet Union is the second heaviest user of the
geostationary satellite orbit and, like the United
States, will seek to protect its continued access to the
orbit and the frequency bands allocated for use by
satellites (see inset, Common US and Soviet Goals).
We believe the USSR will try to achieve this objective
but try, at the same time, to appear to side with the
LDCs. State Department reporting indicates that the
USSR may also raise outer space disarmament issues
at Space WARC.
The Soviet Union and its allies Bulgaria, Cuba,
Czechoslovakia, the German Democratic Republic,
Hungary, North Korea, Mongolia, Poland, Romania,
and Vietnam-meet regularly during ITU meetings.
Moscow's allies usually support Soviet positions dur-
ing open debate, and, with the exception of Romania,
they invariably vote as a bloc.
The Western Nations
In our judgment, the Western industrial nations that
have an investment in the geostationary orbit will
agree generally with US objectives for the conference.
Differences, however, exist:
? The European nations, under the apparent guidance
of the United Kingdom, oppose incorporation of the
Western Hemisphere broadcasting plan into the
ITU Radio Regulations, according to State Depart-
ment reporting. We believe they want to finish their
own broadcasting plan first so that all the regional
plans can be reviewed at the same time.
As heavy users of the satellite spectrum and geosta-
tionary satellite orbit, the United States and the
Soviet Union share interests in the outcome of several
conference issues, such as:
? The needfor a planning method that allows heavier
users of the orbit a greater number of satellites and
more spectrum rather than a method that might
infringe on the satellite requirements Moscow and
Washington believe are essential.
? The need for a method that allows flexibility to
implement new technology and meet special needs.
Plans that specify the lowest common denominator
of technology so that all nations can afford it would
limit capacity of the orbit and possibly curb thefull
potential of new systems.
? The need for a planning method that protects
existing and planned satellites.
? The desire not to plan all space services and
frequency bands and probably to channel the plan-
ning desires of the LDCs to some of the less heavily
used frequency bands.
? The desire to obtain a procedure for regulating the
geostationary orbit that meets the real needs of all
countries. Neither the United States nor the Soviet
Union would want a plan that reserves major
portions of the frequency bands and orbit for hypo-
thetical satellite systems that might never material-
ize. A plan that gives orbit to each country could
penalize the operations of countries and organiza-
tions with satellites.
? Bilateral discussions with Australia, Canada, and
Sweden indicate that they support variations of
rigid planning-which they believe can fill their
needs-according to US telecommunications
officials.
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/04/24: CIA-RDP97R00694R000500130001-1
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/04/24: CIA-RDP97R00694R000500130001-1
Secret
We believe that, without full support from countries
such as Australia, Canada, and Sweden, the United
States will face an uphill struggle in avoiding some
form of rigid planning for certain portions of the
spectrum.
Other Groups With Influence
Only countries can vote at ITU conferences. However,
other bodies, both international and regional, may
speak on the floor, write papers, and lobby at ITU
sessions. Of the international organizations, INTEL-
SAT and INTERSPUTNIK probably will play the
biggest roles (see inset, Major Multinational Satellite
Regional groups likely to be active at Space WARC
include:
? The Association of the National Telecommunica-
tions Administrations of the Andean Area
(ASETA). State Department reporting and open
sources indicate that Colombia, Ecuador, Bolivia,
Peru, and Venezuela have coordinated positions for
the conference. These countries are also planning
for regional satellites.
? Pan-African Telecommunications Union (PATU).
This 41-nation organization, a subsidiary of the
Organization of African Unity, has discussed a
regional satellite, AFROSAT.
? African Posts and Telecommunications Union
(APTU). In early 1985, this 12-nation group ratified
a draft agreement for AFSAT, a regional satellite
system. A French company prepared a feasibility
study for the group.
Membership in the three largest global satellite
organizations is as follows:
? The International Communications Satellite Orga-
nization (INTELSAT) includes 109 countries.
? The International Maritime Satellite Organization
(INMARSAT) includes 37 countries.
? International System and Organization of Space
Communications (INTERSPUTNIK) includes 14
countries.
Some countries belong to more than one of these
organizations, and some countries that are not mem-
bers use the organizations' services.
Regional satellite organizations are also forming.
Among the regional groupings are:
? The Arab Satellite Communication Organization
(ARABSAT) with 22 countries.
? The European Telecommunications Satellite Orga-
nization (EUTELSA T) with 20 countries.
? The European Space Agency (ESA) with 11
countries.
These multistate organizations allow groups of na-
tions to combine resources and coordinate their com-
munications with a minimum number of satellites.
Such organizations offer small countries telecom-
munications services without the expenses of individ-
ual national satellites. Some domestic systems, such
as the Indonesian Palapa satellite series, also provide
services to neighboring nations. If planning increases
the likelihood of an increasing number of national
satellites, the role of these multinational satellites
may be diminished.
25X1
25X1
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/04/24: CIA-RDP97R00694R000500130001-1
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/04/24: CIA-RDP97R00694R000500130001-1
Secret
Possible WARC Outcomes: Impact on the
United States and Likelihood of Occurrence
Impact on the United States
Likelihood
(percent probability)
LDCs and some major satellite-owning countries agree
on rigid plan
In frequencies not used by the United States
Neutral
90 (probable)
In commercial frequencies
Negative
65 (possible)
Negative
80 (probable)
US isolated against rigid plan
In frequencies not used by the United States
Neutral
65 (possible)
In commercial frequencies
Negative
40 (unlikely)
Negative
60 (possible)
Consensus with US agreement on new flexible approach
for regulating orbit
In frequencies not used by the United States
Positive
60 (possible)
In commercial frequencies
Positive
50 (possible)
Regions differ Regions I and 3 plan, Region 2 delays
In frequencies not used by the United States
Neutral
40 (possible)
In commercial frequencies
Neutral
40 (possible)
In frequencies of US concern
Negative
40 (possible)
Stalemate/declare failure
Positive
40 (possible)
LDCs pass rigid planning; no satellite-owning countries
support
Neutral
30 (unlikely)
In commercial frequencies
Neutral
30 (unlikely)
In frequencies of US concern
Neutral
30 (unlikely)
New consensus on status quo
Positive
20 (very unlikely)
We believe there is a good chance that Space WARC
will make decisions detrimental to US interests. The
delegates may either make decisions outright at the
first session or make some provisional decisions and
ask an intersessional group to study the choices. Odds
are that the LDCs and some major satellite-owning
countries will agree on a rigid plan affecting some
frequencies currently used by the United States for
purposes relating to national security. The degree of
planning may be a delicate mix that some can call "a
priori" and others call "flexible" (see the table for the
range of possible WARC outcomes).
The best hope for the United States is that other
satellite-owning countries stand firm either on main-
taining flexible procedures for regulating the orbit
or as a fallback position-on limiting planning
schemes to just enough of the spectrum to satisfy
LDC demands. If the satellite-owning countries re-
main united in opposition to whole-scale planning,
then even if the conference votes for such a
scheme the more advanced countries probably
would be in a position to take reservations and honor
the conference's will only in the breach. If, however, a
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/04/24: CIA-RDP97R00694R000500130001-1
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/04/24: CIA-RDP97R00694R000500130001-1
Secret
majority of space-using countries agree to a rigid
planning scheme, the US Government might be
forced to go along, even if it maintained legal opposi-
tion. Not to do so would open up US satellite commu-
nications-both government and commercial-to un-
acceptable levels of random interference.
The next best hope for the United States is that the
conference make only provisional decisions on regulat-
ing the orbit and the spectrum, leaving it to an
intersessional study group to determine feasibility and
make recommendations to the 1988 session. This
would allow time to put additional pressure on other
satellite-using countries to stand firmly behind a more
flexible approach to planning.
Secret 12
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/04/24: CIA-RDP97R00694R000500130001-1
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/04/24: CIA-RDP97R00694R000500130001-1
Secret
Appendix A
Developments Leading Up
to Space WARC
same bands as space services without causing interfer-
ence unless one knew the frequencies and orbital
positions of future satellites.
Regulations-requiring advance publication, coordi-
nation, and notification-governing space systems
using the geostationary satellite orbit and spectrum
were first recommended and partially formulated by
the International Telecommunication Union in 1963,
adopted in 1971, and modified in 1979. They provide
the mechanism for coordinating satellites in the geo-
stationary orbit today. The provisions state that:
? All members of the ITU have a right to an equitable
and rational use of frequency bands allocated to
space radio communications.
? Use and exploitation of the frequency bands allocat-
ed to space services are subject to international
agreements based on justice and equity, permitting
the use and sharing of these bands in the mutual
interest of all nations.
? Countries that have registered with the ITU do not
have permanent authority for their space services
and "should not create an obstacle to the establish-
ment of space systems by other countries." Further-
more, states that have registered with the ITU
"should take all practicable measures to realize the
possibility of the use of new space systems by other
countries or groups so desiring."
The World Administrative Radio Conference for
Space Telecommunication in 1971:
? Defined the broadcasting satellite service from
transmitter to receiver (downlink) and allocated the
first frequency bands to this service.
? Decreed that stations in the broadcasting satellite
service would be established and operated in accor-
dance with agreements and plans adopted by world
or regional administrative conferences.
Proponents of planning forced adoption of the provi-
sion calling for plans and agreements by arguing that
one could not implement terrestrial services in the
The World Broadcasting Satellite Administrative
Radio Conference, the first space planning confer-
ence, was held in 1977 to plan the broadcasting
satellite band near 12 GHz, which it did for ITU
Region 1 (Africa, Europe, and the USSR) and Region
3 (Asia and the Pacific Southwest). The conference
planned in detail the use of five channels per satellite
service area. Region 2 (the Americas) delayed plan-
ning until 1983. Technology had advanced so much
by then that the Region 2 conference planned the use
of 32 channels per satellite service area.
Although these various conferences dealt with satel-
lite services, the 1979 World Administrative Radio
Conference was the first in 20 years with the authority
to revise allocations, regulations, and procedures for
all the services and all the frequency bands. During
the deliberations, some governments argued that the
current regulatory process for satellites using the
geostationary orbit might be inequitable and that
arrangements for rectifying the situation should be
investigated. The conference acted on the following
space matters:
? Calling for a two-session WARC on the use of the
geostationary orbit and the planning of space ser-
vices utilizing it.
? Endorsing the 1971 WARC resolution decreeing
that all stations in the broadcasting satellite service
be established and operated under agreements
adopted by world or regional conferences.
? Allocating several new fixed satellite service bands,
some of which are reserved for feeder links (uplinks)
for broadcasting satellites.
? Incorporating the 1977 Broadcasting Satellite Plan
for Regions 1 and 3 into the ITU Radio Regulations
and adopting a resolution calling for a WARC to
plan feeder links (uplinks) for Regions 1 and 3
broadcasting satellites.
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/04/24: CIA-RDP97R00694R000500130001-1
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/04/24: CIA-RDP97R00694R000500130001-1
Secret
The 1979 WARC resolution that calls for the conven-
ing of the Space WARC states that the geostationary
orbit and radiofrequency spectrum are limited natural
resources and that there is need for equitable access
to, and efficient and economical use of, these re-
sources by all countries. The resolution also states
that the conference shall be convened to "guarantee in
practice for all countries equitable access to the
geostationary orbit and the frequency bands allocated
to space services."
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/04/24: CIA-RDP97R00694R000500130001-1
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/04/24: CIA-RDP97R00694R000500130001-1
Appendix B
The Third World and the
Consultative Process
Prior to most ITU conferences, the Union sponsors a
series of working groups and a preparatory meeting to
consider technical subjects relating to the upcoming
conference. The conference preparatory meeting for
Space WARC took place in Geneva in June and July
1984. Recently, according to US officials, some of the
LDCs, particularly India, have stated that the ITU
consultative process is controlled by the developed
nations and does not represent the views of the
developing countries. The consultative meetings are
open to all nations, but the LDCs claim that the
expenses of attending such meetings are excessive. We
believe that, during the actual Space WARC, the
LDCs may choose to ignore some of the compromises
previously worked out in the consultative sessions.
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/04/24: CIA-RDP97R00694R000500130001-1
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/04/24: CIA-RDP97R00694R000500130001-1
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/04/24: CIA-RDP97R00694R000500130001-1
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/04/24: CIA-RDP97R00694R000500130001-1
Secret
Appendix C
Principles Governing the Geostationary
Satellite Orbit
A working paper was introduced by Colombia, Kenya,
Ecuador, and Indonesia at the April 1984 session of
the Legal Subcommittee of the UN Committee on the
Peaceful Uses of Outer Space. According to State
Department reporting, this working paper contains
eight principles, providing:
? That the geostationary satellite orbit shall be used
"exclusively for peaceful purposes and for the bene-
fit of all mankind."
? That the geostationary satellite orbit is a limited
natural resource to be preserved in the interests of
all states,"taking into account the needs of the
developing countries and the rights of the equatorial
states."
? That the equatorial states "shall preserve the corre-
sponding segments of the geostationary satellite
orbit superadjacent to their territories for the oppor-
tune and appropriate utilization of the orbit by all
states, particularly the developing countries."
? That the equatorial states "shall have preferential
right" to the geostationary satellite orbit segment
above their territories.
? That "placement of a space object" in such segment
shall require "prior authorization" by the underly-
ing state, except in cases of "transit for peaceful
purposes."
? That all states "shall endeavor to cooperate in the
efficient and economic utilization" of the geosta-
tionary satellite orbit.
? That developed countries, international organiza-
tions, and developing countries having space capa-
bilities should "facilitate and accelerate space sci-
ence and technology transfers" to the LDCs.
? That "necessary actions" shall be taken to remove
nonoperational or unutilized space objects from the
geostationary satellite orbit.
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/04/24: CIA-RDP97R00694R000500130001-1
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/04/24: CIA-RDP97R00694R000500130001-1
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/04/24: CIA-RDP97R00694R000500130001-1
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/04/24: CIA-RDP97R00694R000500130001-1
Appendix D
Recent UN General Assembly
Resolutions on the Outer Space
Arms Race
From General Assembly Resolution 39/96,
International cooperation in the peaceful uses of
outer space, adopted without a vote on 14 December
1984:
Gravely concerned at the extension of an arms race
into outer space,
Recognizing that all States, in particular those with
major space capabilities, should contribute actively to
the goal of preventing an arms race in outer space as
an essential condition for the promotion of interna-
tional cooperation in the exploration and uses of outer
space for peaceful purposes.
13. Urges all States, in particular those with major
space capabilities to contribute actively to the goals of
preventing an arms race in outer space as an essential
condition for the promotion of international coopera-
tion in the exploration and uses of outer space for
peaceful purposes.
15. Requests the Committee on the Peaceful Uses of
Outer Space to consider, as a matter of priority, ways
and means for maintaining outer space for peaceful
purposes and to report thereon to the General Assem-
bly at its fortieth session.
20. Requests the Committee on Peaceful Uses of
Outer Space to continue its work, in accordance with
the present resolution, to consider, as appropriate, new
projects in outer space activities and to submit a
report to the General Assembly at its fortieth session,
including its views on which subjects should be stud-
ied in the future.
From General Assembly Resolution 39/59,
Prevention of an arms race in outer space,
vote 150-0-1 (US abstained) on 12 December 1984:
Reaffirming ... of the Tenth Special Session of the
General Assembly, the first special session devoted to
disarmament, in which it is stated that, in order to
prevent an arms race in outer space, further measures
should be taken and appropriate international negoti-
ations held in accordance with the spirit of the Treaty.
Gravely concerned at the danger posed to all mankind
by an arms race in outer space, in particular the
impending danger of exacerbating the current state of
insecurity by developments that could further under-
mine international peace and security,
1. Recalls the obligation of all States to refrain from
the threat or use of force in their space activities;
2. Reaffirms that general and complete disarmament
under effective international control warrants that
outer space shall be used exclusively for peaceful
purposes and that it shall not become an arena for an
arms race;
4. Calls upon all States, in particular those with
major space capabilities, to contribute actively to the
objective of the peaceful use of outer space and to
take immediate measures to prevent an arms race in
outer space in the interest of maintaining internation-
al peace, security and promoting international cooper-
ation and understanding:
9. Urges the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and
the United States of America to initiate immediately
and in a constructive spirit negotiations aimed at
preventing an arms race in outer space and to advise
the Conference on Disarmament regularly of the
progress of their bilateral negotiations so as to facili-
tate its work;
12. Decides to include in the provisional agenda of its
fortieth session the item entitled "Prevention of an
arms race in outer space."
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/04/24: CIA-RDP97R00694R000500130001-1
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/04/24: CIA-RDP97R00694R000500130001-1
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/04/24: CIA-RDP97R00694R000500130001-1
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/04/24: CIA-RDP97R00694R000500130001-1
Secret
Appendix E
Soviet Draft Resolution for 1985
Administrative Council
The Activities of the ITU in Telecommunications and
the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space
Guided by the provisions of the International Tele-
communication Convention (Nairobi, 1982) with re-
gard to the role of telecommunications in the peaceful
uses of outer space, Resolution 36 "collaboration with
international organizations interested in space radio-
communications" and other appropriate resolutions
adopted by the ITU Plenipotentiary Conference
(Nairobi, 1982);
Having considered the annual report of the activities
of the ITU in telecommunications and the peaceful
uses of outer space;
Noting with satisfaction the growing role of the ITU
in this field;
Recognizing the constantly increasing importance of
satellite communication systems in the exploration
and use of natural resources, meteorology, in the
development of the economy, culture, and education
of all countries, particularly the developing countries;
Taking note of Resolution 38/1888J, approved by the
United Nations General Assembly at its 38th session,
inviting the "specialized agencies and other bodies
and programs within the United Nations system to
increase further their contribution within the sphere
of their competence to the cause of the limitation of
armaments and disarmament;"
Taking note also of the United Nations General
Assembly Resolution 39/96 which expresses deep
concern over the extension of the arms race into outer
space and recognizes that all States should actively
contribute to the goal of preventing the arms race in
outer space as an important condition for promoting
international cooperation in the field of exploration
and peaceful use of outer space and invites the United
Nations specialized agencies and other international
organizations to continue and, as far as possible,
broaden their cooperation with the United Nations
Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space and
to report to it on the progress in their work related to
peaceful uses of outer space;
Expressing the general concern of all mankind in the
further exploration and use of outer space for peaceful
purposes;
Mindful that the Treaty on Principles Governing the
Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of
Outer Space, Including the Moon and Other Celestial
Bodies, stipulates that the exploration and use of
outer space, including the moon and other celestial
bodies, shall be carried out for the benefit and in the
interests of all countries and shall be the province of
all mankind;
Referring in particular to articles III and IV of the
aforesaid treaty, point 80 of the final document of the
Tenth Special Session of the United Nations General
Assembly, the relevant provision of the report of the
Second United Nations Conference on Peaceful Uses
of Outer Space A/Conf.101/10, United Nations Gen-
eral Assembly Resolutions 36/99, 37/83, 37/89,
37/90, 37/92, 38/70, 39/59, 39/96 and other rele-
vant resolutions;
Recognizing the danger that would threaten mankind
should outer space become an arena of the armaments
race, which might in particular result in serious
consequences and inflict substantial damage to the
development and existence of satellite
communications;
Noting that the success of World Communications
Year 1983 provided a fresh confirmation of the
importance of the telecommunications infrastructure
both as an essential condition for economic and social
development and as an inseparable element of such
development;
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/04/24: CIA-RDP97R00694R000500130001-1
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/04/24: CIA-RDP97R00694R000500130001-1
Secret
1. Instructs the Secretary General to continue (sic)
and the United Nations, its specialized agencies and
other international organizations in the field of peace-
ful uses of outer space;
2. Requests the directors of the International Consul-
tative Committees to assign to their study groups the
thorough consideration of the disastrous consequences
of spreading the arms race to outer space for the
normal working of satellite communications;
3. Requests the Secretary General to bring this
resolution to the attention of the telecommunication
administrations of the ITU member states and the
appropriate bodies of the United Nations and its
specialized agencies.
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/04/24: CIA-RDP97R00694R000500130001-1
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/04/24: CIA-RDP97R00694R000500130001-1
Secret
Appendix F
Legal Impact of the Space WARC
Delegates at the first session of the Space WARC will
produce a final report. This report does not modify
the treaty instruments of the ITU. However, at the
concluding session of the WARC, delegates will put
the first session's final report, perhaps modified,
together with the work of the second session into the
final acts. The final acts contain modifications for the
ITU Radio Regulations, an international treaty the
United States has ratified. During the final days, the
US delegation may submit statements and counter-
statements to the final protocol of the conference.
Such statements may be responses to statements in
the initial protocol, or they may constitute reserva-
tions to portions of the conference final acts.
Because the final acts modify a treaty instrument, the
executive branch of the US Government must submit
them to the Senate for advice and consent. Subse-
quently, the President has to ratify the final acts. At
the time of ratification, the President may reaffirm
prior reservations.
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/04/24: CIA-RDP97R00694R000500130001-1
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/04/24: CIA-RDP97R00694R000500130001-1
Secret
Secret
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/04/24: CIA-RDP97R00694R000500130001-1