RESHAPING THE NEWS: MOSCOW'S MEDIA PRESENCE IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP97R00694R000500060001-9
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 20
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: December 9, 2010
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: June 1, 1985
• Content Type: REPORT

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Secret
Reshaping the News:
Moscow's Media Presence
in Developing Countries
Secret
GI 85-100761S
June 1985
n,
Copy 0, 4
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Secret
Reshaping the News:
Moscow's Media Presence
in Developing Countries
A Research Paper
Secret
GI 85-10076/S
June 1985
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Reshaping the News:
Moscow's Media Presence
in Developing Countries
Summary Soviet success in establishing relationships with Third World media has
Information available yielded substantial payoffs including:
as of t March 1985 ? Significantly influencing the editorial line or placing its own stories in
was used in this report.
more than 50 major Third World newspapers.
? Recruiting important editors, publishers, and information ministers in
key Third World countries.
? Placing KGB operatives overseas as "correspondents; 60 25X1
to 70 percent of all TASS correspondents are KGB__________ 25X1
Media relationships are developed through one or more of the following
techniques:
? Extensive development assistance to fledgling wire services, print media,
,and government information ministries.
? Journalism training for veteran and apprentice newsmen.
? Cultivating individual newsmen with cash, entertainment, scholarships,
duty-free goods, and free vacations.
? Supporting the expansion of regional wire services in South Asia, Africa,
East Asia, and Latin America.
? Maintaining visibility at UNESCO as an advocate of a larger role for
developing-country media. 0 25X1
These approaches are working. The Soviet overseas media has over 260
correspondents in 7 1 developing countries; TASS alone has acquired 18
new clients since 1982. The Soviets' international front for journalists, in
turn, claims to have trained over 300 newspersons in recent years. Working
through UNESCO, Moscow has sponsored new regional wire services and
shifted the debate on a "new world information order" to alleged abuses of
the Western media. 25X1
Soviet ability to use this influence is evidenced, in turn, by the success of
specific media placement efforts:
? The spate of reporting of US involvement in Indira Gandhi's assassina-
tion required the State Department to publicly deny any US role.
? Reports of alleged coup plotting by the United States in Ghana in 1984
compelled the US Embassy to issue a denial.
? The Guyanese Information Minister recently instructed the state-owned
newspaper to use TASS news items in each edition.
iii Secret
GI 85-10076/S
June 1985
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Moscow's efforts have been unsuccessful in some countries more sensitive
to Soviet abuses of press access or concerned over Soviet media serving as
We expect Moscow's effort to build an overseas media presence to continue
expanding. Novosti inaugurated a special wire service for developing-
country news agencies just last year.
Secret iv
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Summary
Background
Pattern of Coverage -
Soviet Approaches to Developing-Country Media
Media Development Assistance
Journalism Training and Recruitment
Cultivation of Journalists
Support for Independent Regional News Services
UNESCO Visibility
Program Effectiveness
Public Perceptions
Constraints
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Figure 1
TASS and Novosti News Services in Developing Countries
TASS
Nocosti
LASS and Nii osti
TASS
Nocosti TASS No-,ti
?
?
? rMghankta11 ?_?
Guinea- Bissau
Ni
e
i
?
?
Aleeria ? ?
Guyana ?
g
r
a
Pakist
?
? ?
Angola ?_?_
India ?
an
Panam
Argentina ? ?
Indonesia
a
? ?
_
Bangladesh
?
P.D.R.Y. (S. Yemen)
?
Iran ? ?
Per
?
Benin ? ?
Iraq
u
?
Bolivia
?
Philippines
?
?
Botswana
?
Jordan
Senegal
? ?
?
Kenya ?
Sierra L
Brazil ?
?
Kuwait
eone
?
_
_
Burma
Singapore
_
? ?
? ?
Lebanon ?
Sri Lank
?
Cameroon ?
Liberia
a
Sudan
C.A.R. (Central AIr. Rep,) ? ?
Libya
? ?
Colombia
? ?
Mada
ascar
?_?
.
Congo ?
g
Malaysia
Syria
?
Costa Rica
Tanzania
? ?
?_?
Cprus
Mali
?
Fhai land
?
?
Dominican Republic
?
Mauritania
?
Mauritius
Logo
? ?
Ecuador
Tunisia
? ?
? ?
E
y
t
Mexico
Uganda
g
p
?
?
Morocco
? ?
_
Ethio
ia
?
Venezuela
?
p
?
Mozambique
(N
Y
A
R
Y
?
Gabon ?
Nepal ? ?
.
.
.
.
emen)
Z
bi
?
Ghana ? ?
Nicara
ua
am
a
? ?
Guinea
g
?
/imbabwe
Secret
Vi
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Reshaping the News:
Moscow's Media Presence
in Developing Countries
Background
The USSR is undertaking a sustained effort to gain
access to the media of developing countries and
expects significant payoffs at relatively little cost.
Specifically, the Soviets hope their efforts will:
? Help place Soviet propaganda in host-country
media.
? Encourage anti-West coverage.
? Provide cover for KGB operations.
disseminate feature materials, and cultivate Egyp-
tian journalists, civic leaders, and government
officials.
? India accommodates the Soviets' largest overseas
press contingent: 18 correspondents representing at
least four news organizations. Soviet media have
developed close working relationships with Indian
wire services, urban dailies, and the vernacular
press.
Pattern of Coverage
The Soviets have a substantial media presence in the
Third World-over 260 Soviet correspondents in 71
developing countries. TASS, the government news
agency, and Novosti, the Central Committee news
and features agency, have the largest representation.
Eight other Soviet media organizations have limited
but direct representation in developing-country capi-
tals.
Moscow has posted the largest number of Soviet
correspondents to Afghanistan, Algeria, Egypt, India,
and Peru-which together account for over one-
fourth of Soviet media representation in developing
countries:
? Eight Soviet news organizations have a total of 15
correspondents in Afghanistan. They not only pro-
vide Soviet domestic audiences with war news, but
also service Afghan media, all of which are govern-
ment controlled, with foreign news and feature
materials.
? Six Soviet press agencies with 15 correspondents are
resident in Algeria. Although the Algerian Govern-
ment departs substantively from Soviet views on
many international political issues, the large Soviet
media presence suggests that compatible ideologies
and common rhetoric facilitate media exchanges.
? Mubarak has allowed a sizable Soviet press contin-
gent to return-six Soviet media agencies maintain
15 correspondents in Cairo. Within broad con-
straints, Novosti and TASS can issue press releases,
? Twelve Soviet correspondents from six news agen-
cies are in Peru, a disproportionately large contin-
gent for a small country. The contingent's size is a
legacy from the period of leftist military rule (1968-
80) when friendly diplomatic relations prevailed
between Peru and the USSR.
Soviet media representation in developing countries
has expanded significantly in the last 15 years. The
number of news bureaus operated by TASS in devel-
oping countries has risen from 46 in 1970 to 66 in
1985. Novosti has 47 news bureaus in those countries
compared with 16 in 1970. The Soviets now have
TASS or Novosti bureaus in 67 developing countries
altogether, 24 more than in 1970. More bureaus have
been added in Africa than in any other region,
increasing the number from 16 in 1970 to 31 in 1985.
The Soviets have added five news bureaus in Latin
America in the same period.
Soviet Approaches to Developing-Country Media
The Soviets are using five principal approaches to
nurture their relations with the media of developing
countries:
? Development assistance.
? Journalism training and recruitment.
? Cultivation of Soviet-friendly journalists.
? Support for independent, regional news services.
? UNESCO visibility.
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Projecting Soviet Views
In addition to developing direct ties with Third
World media, the USSR publishes and broadcasts
extensively in developing countries. Novosti, by its
own account, produces 60 journals in 45 languages
along with foreign-language books and films. Over 70
percent of Soviet international radiobroadcasts, con-
ducted in 38 languages, are directed toward develop-
ing countries, principally toward East and South
Asia, the Middle East, and North Africa, according
to USIA. Radio Moscow's world service in English
broadcasts 24 hours a day on all shortwave bands.
Radio stations of the Soviet Asian republics broad-
cast to the Middle East, South Asia, and Southeast
Asia. Radio Peace and Progress, sponsored by the
Soviet Committee for Defense of Peace, broadcasts to
developin countries on Radio Moscow frequencies.
correspondents between capitals, with the cost of a
client news agency's Moscow bureau, in some cases,
TASS has negotiated news exchange agreements with
71 developing countries, 18 just since 1982. The July
1984 agreement with Sierra Leone is typical. TASS
agreed to provide its English-language African news
service to the Ministry of Information in Freetown
and to furnish free radio receiving equipment. The
Soviet State Committee for Vocational Training will
train an unspecified number of Sierra Leone journal-
Journalism Training and Recruitment
Extensive training programs for developing-country
journalists teach the Soviet model of journalism-
serving state interests, politicizing the news, and
expecting an ideological commitment from journal-
ists. One program is administered by Soviet embas-
sies which -'T- h 1
Media Development Assistance
The Soviets are vigorously competing with Western
media services by providing the print and broadcast
media of developing countries with services and equip-
ment at little or no cost.' In Liberia, for example, the
national news agency can subscribe to TASS for
$1,000 per year as compared with Agence France
Presse for $23,000 per year. TASS pronouncements
indicate that the standard TASS aid package for
developing-country news agencies currently includes:
? A subscription to TASS world or regional news
service.
? Installation of radio receivers and radio
photocopiers.
? Maintenance and spare parts provided by TASS
engineers.
? Journalism training for news agency personnel.l~
The Soviets subsidize the entire package, and negoti-
ate a formal aid agreement with the client, either
through TASS representatives or the Soviet Ambas-
sador. The agreement usually leads to an exchange of
' This approach to media assistance by the Soviets was discussed in
May 1981 at a conference in Kiev, USSR, among Eastern Bloc
UNESCO national commissions. The commissions agreed that the
Bloc should aggressively promote technical aid to developing-
country media, offer them no-strings-attached financial aid, and
give high priority to training their journalists.
r sc o arships for journalism studies in
the USSR. Nominations are made by Ministries of
Education. The Soviet Government pays all expenses
except transportation, which the Ministries are ex-
pected to sponsor. Another program is contained in
the TASS media aid package. There is a third
program of short-term training in developing coun-
tries for journalists in print media and electronic
The Soviets also use the International Organization of
Journalists (IOJ) to train developing-country journal-
ists. The IOJ has five schools in the Eastern Bloc and
Cuba:
? The IOJ Center of Professional Education of Jour-
nalists in Budapest for radio and television
journalists.
? The Werner Lamberz Institute in East Berlin for
print media journalists.
? The Georji Dimitrov International Institute of Jour-
nalists in Sofia for journalists in economic and
agricultural reporting.
? The Julius Fucik School of Solidarity in Prague for
newscasters.
? The Jose Marti International Institute of Journal-
ism in Havana for apprentice journalists.
25X1
25X1
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Figure 2. IOJ training for jour-
nalists of developing countries
attending the Werner Lamberz
The IOJ also operates a cooperative program with a
journalism school in Bucharest and a training center
for Arab journalists in Baghdad. =
The IOJ further attempts to cultivate media organiza-
tions and Ministries of Information directly through
"world conferences" attended by editors, publishers,
heads of news agencies, radio station managers, and
ministers of information. These meetings publicize
Soviet policies on world issues and promote the Soviet
model of journalism with an elite media audience.
The conferences also help the IOJ Secretariat make
contacts, possibly leading to TASS development assis-
tance, Novosti influence in the local media, or candi-
date students for IOJ schools.
Nationals of 90 developing countries responded to IOJ
invitations to the most recent conference cosponsored
with the North Korean Journalists' Union in 1983,
the "World Conference of Journalists Against Imperi-
alism and for Friendship and Peace" in P'yongyang,
North Korea. The Pyongyang Times reported a large
attendance from developing countries represented by:
? Thirty-one dailies and weeklies.
? Nine news agencies.
? Twenty-two Ministries of Information.
? Twenty-eight radio stations, publishing houses, in-
stitutes of journalism, and universities.
Cultivation of Journalists
The Soviets take pains to follow up the ties developed
in training programs and otherwise ensure that
Soviet-supplied news is actually placed in the print
media of developing countries and, where possible, in
the broadcast media. They attempt to dissuade news
agency editors from using Western wire service re-
leases.
Support for Independent Regional News Services
Moscow has also supported regional news agencies in
Asia, Africa, and Latin America for displacing the
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How the IOJ Attempts To Influence
Third World Journalists
Geza Rybka, Director of the IOJ Center in Budapest,
describes the Center's method for posing Soviet news
stories as alternatives to Western news reports, in
effect placing propaganda on a par with news.
Every student knows that there are four or five big
news agencies that have monopolized the news flow
all over the world. The students are usually aware
of the fact that, until now, especially in foreign
matters, they used to think the way UPI or Reuters
thought. We simply try to open their eyes to the
fact that there is another side to the story, there are
other parts of the world, and that there are also
other sources of information in the world that one
can use for journalistic work.
The teacher tries to suggest ideas like this:
Did you hear a week ago what BBC said? And do
you know what TASS wrote then? Try to compare
it all-and you will get a basis for writing a good
article.
We introduced a new practice recently that every
day the students listen alternately to Radio Mos-
cow and BBC news. They compare the two, draw
their own conclusions, and then report on some
internationally important subject.
So we try very tactfully, if I may say so, but very
honestly to explain to students that a new informa-
tion order is necessary and that it means also not
accepting one agency exclusively as a source of
information.
The Democratic Journalist
April 1984
Western press. Soviet media endorsed the appearance
of the nonaligned news agency pool in 1976 (now
called NAMEDIA), the Pan African News Agency
(PANA) in 1979, the Organization of Asian News
Agencies (OANA) in 1981, and the Latin American
Agency for Special Information Services (ALASEI) in
1983. The IOJ endorsed the Association of ASEAN
News Agencies as well. Moscow News, a Novosti
publication, alleges that these regional news services
are "breaking the monopoly" of the "big four" West-
The Soviets offer substantial material aid to the
nonaligned news agencies. TASS provides communi-
cation links to NAMEDIA and OANA.
Soviet fronts are directly involved in establishing some
of these agencies. For example, the Federation of
Latin American Newsmen (FELAP), regional affili-
ate of the IOJ, organized ALASEI. Both ALASEI
and FELAP are in Mexico City. ALASEI currently
has contracted with 19 Latin American newspapers
and news agencies to provide news services and
information.
UNESCO Visibility
The Soviets have used UNESCO to demonstrate their
support for the aspirations of developing countries in
the media field.' Specifically, the Soviets have pro-
moted their model of journalism at UNESCO, at-
tempted to discredit Western media, and cultivated
the caucuses of developing countries that parallel
In 1972 the Soviets were the first to propose a so-
called New World Information and Communication
Order (NWICO) in a UNESCO General Conference.
NWICO, as defined in UNESCO studies, would
require governments to take responsibility for news
printed or broadcast on their territory which, in turn,
would lead to licensing journalists working in their
countries. Under NWICO, journalists would be guid-
ed by codes of conduct prohibiting stories offensive to
host governments.
UNESCO's International Program for Development
of Communications (IPDC) is particularly important
2 UNESCO sets standards and guidelines for the development of
new media organizations in developing countries, funds confer-
ences, and publishes studies and reports, several of which recently
have encouraged realignment of world news production and dissem-
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Figure 3. Opening of the IOJ
Forum for Peace in Paris on
the fifth anniversary of the
UNESCO Declaration on Mass
Media. From left to right,
Kaarle Nordenstreng, IOJ
President; Jiri Kubka, Secre-
tary General; and Gerard
Gatinot, presidium member
to the Soviets. TASS Deputy Director General Kra-
sikov, in a 1983 Pravda article, stated that the IPDC
is useful to them for monitoring mass media in
developing countries as well as the alleged intrusion of
the Western press in those countries, for helping to
shape developing countries' information policies, in-
fluencing the allocation of multilateral aid, and creat-
ing a "new world media order" on an "anti-imperialis-
tic foundation." IPDC provides seed money for
developing news agencies at the regional level. Both
NAMEDIA and PANA are partially funded by
UNESCO. Aside from subscribers, UNESCO cur-
rently is PAN A's only patron.
Program Effectiveness
The Soviets' methods and approaches for acquiring
access to local media in the developing world have
proved effective. In the formal aid agreements of
1984, Sierra Leone and Guinea-Bissau agreed to
restrict Western wire service reporting on the Soviet
Union in favor of TASS reporting on the subject.
Guyana and Suriname, additional aid recipients, have
experienced a noticeable increase in the volume of
Soviet press material appearing in local print and
broadcast media.
TASS's offers of a world news service at little or no
cost have been particularly successful in Africa in
cases where media cannot afford the cost or do not
have the foreign exchange for a Western wire service.
A considerable portion of African print media, as well
as a few radio stations, use TASS in combination with
Western services.
The Soviets can place stories in more than 50 non-
Communist dailies and weeklies in developing coun-
tries. These outlets range from leftist newspapers in
Mexico City, El Dia (circulation 75,000) and Uno
Mas Uno (circulation 70,000), used occasionally, to
the pro-Soviet, Indian newspaper Blitz (circulation 25X1
350,000) and the magazine Link (circulation 12,000),
used frequently (see table 1). Some are published by
national liberation fronts. Several print Eastern Bloc
and Cuban material as well as Soviet. The Soviets
have access to all of these by having cultivated
individual journalists who usually print what is asked
of them.
The Soviets have helped to shape the UNESCO
debate over realignment of international news services
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Table I
Pro-Soviet Print Media in Developing Countries
and Estimated Circulation a
Bahrain
Estimated Circulation
Print Media
Estimated Circulation
Al-Faqir
NA
L'Essor
40
000
Al-Jamahir
Al-Shabiba
Al-Sharara
Bangladesh
Gonokantha
NA
NA
NA
5,000
Mauritius
Horizons Nouveaux
Nouveau Militant
Mexico
,
4,500
10,000 to
15,000
Sangbad
30,000
El Dia
75,000
Brazil
El Nacional
El Sol de Mexico
80,000
95
000
Correio Brasilense
El Universal
,
200
000
Cameroon
Excelsior
,
184,000
Cameroon Tribune
Uno Mas Uno
70,000
Cyprus
Ta Nea
Nepal
Naya Samaj
3,000
Dominican Republic
Samaya
18,000
La Noticia
The Commoner
7,000
Ecuador
Periodico Del Mediodia
Nicaragua
Barricada
40,000
Siempre Nueva
Peru
Ghana
El Diario de Marka
90,000
Ghanaian Times
150,000
El Observador
100,000
Independent Echo
30,000
La Republica
200,000
People's Evening News
Guyana
40,000
Cartel
Philippines
10,000 initially
Chronicle
Business Day
31,000
India
Blitz
Bombay Daily
350,000
140,000
Evening Post
Seychelles
Nation
70,000
Business Standard
21,000
Sierra Leone
Link
12,000
For Di People
NA
News Today
NA
New Times
NA
Patriot
34,000
Syria
Rajasthan Patrika
120,000
Al Bath
25
000
Indonesia
Tishrin
,
35
000
Merdeka
130,000
Tanzania
,
Jordan
Daily News
39
000
Ad-Dustur
Uhuru
,
100,000
Malaysia
Chung Kuo Pao
a Excluding pro-Soviet Communist Party and "vanguard" ruling
revolutionary party publications.
Source: The Europa Yearbook, 1983.
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to focus almost exclusively on the alleged "colonial
mentality" and "disaster news" orientation of the
Western media and diverted attention from their own
politicized, censored press. Successive Soviet draft
resolutions at UNESCO General Conferences appeal
to the pride of developing countries in establishing
independent news agencies. Since several delegations
represent governments that exercise political control
over their domestic media, the Soviet resolutions,
coupled with active lobbying in the corridors, win
support.
Public Perceptions
In terms of effectiveness with respect to a particular
country, one of the clearest payoffs for the Soviets is
Peru. The Soviets have noticeable access to the Peru-
vian media. The Soviets have invested heavily in Peru;
they have 12 correspondents from Soviet print media,
radio, and television in Lima in addition to a large
Novosti bureau, said to be their best in Latin Ameri-
ca. They entertain local journalists regularly and offer
them "fees" to use Soviet stories and features. They
are particularly influential in three Lima dailies and a
weekly:
? El Diario de Marka. Although editorially indepen-
dent as a leftist paper, it is the most outspoken and
effective anti-US element in the Peruvian news
media and consistently supports Soviet propaganda
themes in its news coverage.
? El Observador. The paper frequently publishes bla-
tantly pro-Soviet stories.
? La Republica. It frequently publishes pro-Soviet
stories and is the most widely read daily in Peru.
? Cartel. It has a hardline, pro-Soviet orientation.
Writers cultivated through the Soviet-Peru Cultural
Association publish anti-US features.
The Soviets have been successful in Congo. During
the 12 years when the United States had no diplomat-
ic relations with Congo, 1965-77, Soviet and Eastern
Bloc access to the Congolese media grew noticeably.
Currently, Congolese journalists accept IOJ scholar-
ships to the East Berlin school for print media journal-
ists, East German journalists conduct seminars for
them in Congo, and the Ministry of Information
employs Soviet media advisers. The national news
The Soviets have relatively greater access to print
media than to radio and TV in developing countries.
Host governments tend to treat radio and TV as more
valuable political resources and reserve them for
their own use. Algeria, Jordan, Lebanon, and the
United Arab Emirates, for example, ban Soviet me-
dia from using their radio and TV but will allow
them to print stories in local newspapers. African
countries generally have the same attitude. In India,
the Soviets can access the independent print media
more handily than they can access government-
controlled radio and TV. However, a few countries
are exceptions: Syria and North Yemen allow the
Soviets access to all media; both countries take direct
news feed from Soviet TV. Radio Mali and Burundi
radio also accept stories and features from resident
Soviet correspondents.
The Soviets do not seem to try as hard with TV as
with radio. They have more competition on TVfrom
American entertainment programing and, in Africa,
from the French overseas news service. TV audiences
are smaller than radio audiences (with the exception
of Costa Rica, the Dominican Republic, Libya, Ma-
laysia, Qatar, and Saudi Arabia, which have more
TV sets than radios: see table 4). Soviet media
agencies have relatively greater access in a few
countries with radio than with TV, except possibly
Syria and North Yemen.
agency subscribes to TASS and ADN, the East
German news service. Coverage of US social issues
and foreign policy is highly selective and critical.
French satellite TV news and nearby Zairean pro-
graming help correct the Soviet version of world news,
but Congolese print media frequently use Soviet
stories.
? The Botswana news agency used free TASS stories
to reduce operating costs.
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? Radio Mali, the country's only station, takes stories
directly from the resident Radio Moscow correspon-
dent with what observers report is a significant
impact on listeners.
? TASS provides Shihata, the Tanzanian news
agency, with its world news service at a concession-
ary price, which, together with the political inclina-
tions of editors, produces more news of Soviet origin
than of Reuters origin appearing in the press.
? Soviet-attributed advertisements in daily papers
have increased both in Costa Rica and Ecuador,
which we believe affects public opinion toward US
Central American policies.
? The pro-Soviet bias of North Yemeni editors,
trained via scholarships to schools in the USSR,
enables TASS to make front page news and
commentary.
? Soviet newsmen have increased their contacts with
the Philippine press.
The Soviets have excellent access to the non-Commu-
nist print media and news agencies of India. The
vernacular-language press is particularly vulnerable
to Soviet influence because many of the papers are
resource poor. The Soviets provide them with cash,
entertainment, and paid advertisements from Indian
firms trading with the USSR. Other forms of induce-
ment include scholarships to sons and daughters of
low-ranking journalists for study in the USSR, prom-
ises of better paying jobs through Soviet and Commu-
nist Party contacts in India, and regular supplies of
The Indian wire service, Press Trust of India (PTI),
has been called Press TASS of India because of
closeness with TASS both in Moscow and New Delhi
as well as frequent association with Soviet disinforma-
tion. A number of pro-Soviet journalists are present in
PTI. Another wire service, India Press Agency (IPA),
specializing in news features, frequently conveys Sovi-
et disinformation. IPA is managed and staffed with
journalists trained at Link and Patriot, two pro-Soviet
publications.
Moscow's effort to access the media in developing
countries directly competes with the "bigfour" West-
ern wire services which, until the 1970s, were the sole
source of foreign news for many such countries. The
Associated Press (AP), in New York; United Press
International (UPI), in Washington; Reuters, in Lon-
don; and Agence France Presse (AFP), in Paris, have
news bureaus in over 100 developing countries and
are highly competitive. All but government-owned
AFP are owned by cooperative press associations.
The Soviets also compete with the Chinese agency,
Xinhua, in several African and Asian countries and
with the Yugoslav news service, Tanjug, which is
influential in nonaligned regional news services. F_
In part because of the Soviets' co-opting some devel-
oping-country media, US Government agencies as
well as private-sector firms face an increasingly hos-
tile press in developing countries in which the Soviets
have created working relationships with local and
national media. India, particularly, has many newspa-
pers hostile toward the United States editorially. The
Soviet-aided print media of Congo have produced
distorted reporting about the United States for several
years with the result that the Congolese public does
not have an accurate or balanced understanding of
US domestic or foreign policies.
The Western wire services are experiencing rising
competition from TASS in developing countries.
Comparative costs of a subsidized service versus a
service at market prices are a disincentive for develop-
ing news agencies to use the Western wire services.
The differential assures TASS of access to new
clients. The Western wire services usually require
payments in hard currency, which many developing
Constraints
The Soviets, however, have not had easy access to all
developing-country media. Some countries have taken
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Table 2
Radios and TVs in Developing Countries a
Africa
Angola
Benin
Botswana
75
NA
Laos
116
15
Malaysia
250
1,040
Cameroon
780
NA
Mauritius
115
85
Central African Republic
85
NA
300
NA
Chad
75
NA
1,500
1,000
Congo
96
5
Philippines
2,185
955
Djibouti
Singapore
490
421
Ethiopia
2,000
36
Sri Lanka
3,000
50
Gabon
100
20
Thailand
7,200
3,000
Gambia, The
100
NA
Caribbean, Mexico, Central and
Ghana
2,000
71
South America
Guinea
125
8
Argentina
10,000
5,910
Guinea-Bissau
20
NA
Bahamas, The
115
50
Ivory Coast
800
562
Barbados
191
52
Kenya
580
75
Belize
71
NA
Liberia
330
35
Bolivia
480
386
Madagascar
910
71
Brazil
17,500
12,425
Malawi
500
NA
Chile
3,250
2,643
Mali
102
NA
Colombia
Mauritius
Costa Rica
190
450
Mozambique
Dominican Republic
225
388
Niger
160
11
Ecuador
1,800
135
Nigeria
5
800
457
900
300
,
320
50
40
10
100
21
Grenada
50
NA
Somalia
95
NA
Guatemala
500
202
Sudan
1,400
109
Guyana
300
NA
Tanzania
2
000
9
Haiti
120
30
Togo
,
190
8
Honduras
1,535
135
Uganda
280
75
Jamaica
857
200
Zaire
500
12
21,000
7,550
Zambia
150
76
Netherlands Antilles
175
57
Zimbabwe
200
97
Nicaragua
200
127
Asia
290
227
Afghanistan
135
13
Paraguay
198
81
Bangladesh
770
252
Peru
Bhutan
12
NA
St. Lucia
90
3
50
30
185
3
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Table 2
Radios and TVs in Developing Countries a
(continued)
The reputation TASS and Novosti have as havens for
KGB operations precedes them in some countries.
Mauritius, for example, refused TASS facilities in
1980 when the Soviet Ambassador requested them.
Caribbean, Mexico, Central and
South America (continued)
Trinidad and Tobago
355
300
Uruguay
1,655
368
Venezuela
Middle East and North Africa
Algeria
3,500
1,325
Bahrain
140
121
Cyprus
400
111
Egypt
Iran
7,500
2,000
Iraq
2,200
535
Israel
1,050
600
546
201
710
Lebanon
1,500
450
Libya
165
170
Oman
250
45
Qatar
75
110
Saudi Arabia
2,700
3,500
Syria
1,800
405
Yemen, People's Democratic
111
37
Republic of
a Estimated by World Radio TV Handbook, 1984.
b Handbook figure may be low because of the absence of an official
Government of India statistic.
reprisals against the Soviet overseas media for fla-
grant abuses of their trade. In addition, policy differ-
ences with host governments may limit Soviet media
activity. In 1980, following the Soviet invasion of
Afghanistan, Pakistan forced the Soviets to close their
Karachi information office. Further, the Soviets
sometimes impede their own efforts with bureaucratic
inertia.
Another limiting factor on the Soviets' ability to
influence developing media is a lack of commitment
by some journalists whom they have attempted to
cultivate. Some of the senior journalists whom IOJ
has entertained at its "world conferences" may have
accepted invitations simply to take advantage of the
free airfare and accommodations. The Malian vice
president of IOJ, for example, not only attended the
P'yongyang conference in 1983, but also has accepted
USIA travel grants. Similarly, trainees who enroll in
IOJ or USSR schools for an education in journalism
may be there because they lacked other scholarship
options.
We fully expect the Soviets to continue to increase
their media presence in developing countries:
? TASS gained four new clients in 1984 for media
development assistance and almost certainly will
solicit additional ones in 1985.
? Novosti has a new wire service, dedicated to devel-
oping-country news agencies, inaugurated in 1983.
? IOJ programs appear to be slated for expansion.
The Soviet effort occurs when several governments of
developing countries are independently creating ob-
stacles for Western reporters in their countries. Chad,
Ethiopia, Ghana, Iran, Iraq, Kuwait, Libya, Nigeria,
Oman, Saudi Arabia, Syria, Uganda, and Zambia
have denied visas to Western reporters assigned to
cover wars, coups, or economic conditions in their
countries within the last year, according to the West-
ern press. If reporters are allowed entry, they are
closely monitored. For example, Iraqi taxi drivers,
working for the Information Ministry, have prevented
Western press photographers from taking pictures of
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economic conditions suggesting poverty or backward-
ness in Iraq. Iraq also has confiscated foreign journal-
ists' typewriters at the airport. Western reporters'
access to several African countries is encumbered
with lengthy visa hassles. Latin American countries
remain relatively open to the Western media, al-
though Brazil, Costa Rica, and Ecuador require for-
eign reporters to register with government-sponsored
journalists' organizations. Under these conditions, the
Soviet effort creates additional obstacles for Western
media access.
1 1 Secret
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