WEST BANK: A HANDBOOK

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• Document Creation Date: December 21, 2016
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• Content Type: REPORT

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Directorate of Secret
Intelligence 25X1
West Bank: A Handbook
Secret
NESA 83-10147
GI 83-10231
September 1983
Copy 3 0 8
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Directorate of Secret
Intelligence
West Bank: A Handbook
Information available as of 1 August 1983
was used in this report.
This paper was prepared by the Arab-Israeli
Division of the Office of Near Eastern and South
Asian Analysis, and the Geography Division of the
Office of Global Intelligence. Biographic material was
contributed by the Office of Central Reference. It
was coordinated with the Directorate of Operations.
Comments and queries are welcome and may be
directed to the Chief, Arab-Israeli Division, NESA,
Secret
NESA 83-10147
GI 83-10231
September 1983
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Contention Over Water Supplies 9
Population and Society 15
Palestinian Society, Lands, and Villages 18
Refugee Camps 21
Land Acquisition 28
Types of Settlements 29
Cereals and Vegetables 37
iii Secret
NESA 83-10147
GI 83-10231
September 1983
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West Bank's Strategic Value
Chronology
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West Bank: A Handbook
Since Biblical times the West Bank has been one of
the world's most hotly contested territories. This and
and hilly region, roughly the size of Delaware, is the
historical homeland of the Jews, Palestinian Arabs,
and several smaller ethnic groups. It is also holy to the
three major monotheistic religions-Islam, Christian-
ity, and Judaism. Today, the West Bank is the focus
of the intractable Arab-Israeli conflict. Attempts to
establish a Palestinian homeland in the territory have
run up against Israel's attachment to the land and its
determination to maintain control over it.
Construction of Jewish settlements in the West Bank
began almost immediately following Israel's occupa-
tion of the territory in 1967. Unlike the Labor
governments, which followed a more limited settle-
ment policy, the Begin government has embarked on
an ambitious program to develop new urban and
suburban communities that would bring the territo-
ry's Jewish population to about 100,000 by the late
1980s.
Today there are about 135 Jewish settlements in the
West Bank, with a combined population of 30,000.
Another 90,000 Jews have settled in areas incorporat-
ed into Jerusalem in 1967. The Israeli Government,
settlement agencies, and private companies have had
little difficulty acquiring land for these projects.
About one-third of the West Bank's territory has
already been requisitioned for military and settlement
purposes, and another one-third is available for leas-
ing to settlements.
Current Israeli policies in the West Bank are aimed at
facilitating the eventual annexation of the territory.
Tel Aviv is committed by the Camp David Accords to
the development of a Palestinian self-governing au-
thority for the territory, but the Begin government's
concept of autonomy would give the region's 721,000
Palestinian inhabitants little real control over the
territory's affairs. The Israeli civilian administration
has in recent years sought to attract Palestinian
leaders to participate in a limited autonomy plan. Tel
Aviv, however, has so far been unable to recruit
Palestinians who would be credible in such a role.
Israel's latest attempt to generate a conservative West
Bank leadership by sponsoring the expansion of Vil-
lage Leagues appears dead.
The overwhelming majority of West Bankers support
the PLO and its call for an independent Palestinian
state in the territory. Many of the rural, uneducated
West Bankers, however, are unprepared to risk their
livelihoods for the sake of a political cause.
The urban, more educated West Bankers-particular-
ly the student population-have the strongest nation-
alist aspirations. As in most traditional societies, it is
this group that is the cutting edge of political change.
The Israelis have been unable to wean these Palestin-
ians away from the PLO. Nevertheless, aggressive
Israeli political and security policies have so far kept
social unrest in the West Bank to what Tel Aviv
considers tolerable levels.
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 Figure 1
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00 100 Kilometers
100 Miles
Alexandria
Egypt
*NICOSIA
Cyprus
7> Bouedary representation is
not necessarily authoritative.
Tel AvivYafoe a *AMMAN
Israeli
r
dete
mi
Strip ~7 Sea`i
Israel y
'Armistice
Line
CAIRO .
Sinai 1 I
Syria
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The West Bank refers to that portion of Palestine that
was annexed by Jordan in 1950 and that has been
occupied by Israel since the 1967 war with the Arab
states.' Roughly the size of Delaware, the territory
extends 130 kilometers from Janin in the north to
Hebron in the south, and as much as 55 kilometers
from the Jordan River in the east to the foothills
overlooking the coastal plain of Israel.
The central sections of Samaria in the north and
Judea in the south consist of broadly rolling limestone
hills, rising above 900 meters in elevation. The prima-
ry topographic difference between the two regions is
that the Samarian hills are interrupted by numerous
valleys, producing a countryside more accessible than
the "closed" hills of Judea. To the west of these
uplands are foothills leading down to the coastal plain
of Israel. To the east, steep cliffs mark the line
between the uplands and the Jordan River Valley,
which descends to 395 meters below sea level at the
Dead Sea. This depression is part of the Great Rift
Valley, which extends from Syria to Mozambique.F-
Temperatures are mild year round, and the climate is
dry. The summer is a time of nearly unrelieved
drought. In general, rainfall decreases eastward and
southward; temperatures increase in the same direc-
tions, and desert conditions prevail on the deep Jordan
Valley floor and in southeastern Judea.
Water Resources
The scarcity of water in most parts of the West Bank
constrains both agriculture and urban development in
the region. As a result, water use has become a
contentious issue between the resident Palestinians
and the occupying Israelis.
The West Bank's theoretical annual potential water
supply of 850 million cubic meters (mcm) originates
mainly from rainwater. Nearly all of this precipita-
tion, however, quickly seeps through the thin soils and
into the porous limestone aquifer that underlies the
area. A small fraction of rainfall is caught in cisterns
' Israeli spokesmen generally refer to the area by the Biblical names
of Samaria and Judea. The term "West Bank" has meaning
primarily in the Jordanian context-to distinguish the Jordanian-
controlled territory west of the Jordan River from that lying to the
The soils of the West Bank uplands are well suited to
agriculture. In the hill regions terra rosa and rendzi-
na soils have been formed. The rich terra rosa is
susceptible to erosion if proper soil conservation
techniques are not practiced. This is one reason why
tree crops are favored over grain crops in the hill
country-they hold the soil better. The yellow-brown
rendzina soils, richer in calcium than the red terra
rosa, are also fertile for farming, especially in the
valleys where they contain a high portion of organic
material. Much of the Jordan Valley and the Judean
Wilderness west of the Dead Sea, on the other hand,
is nonarable. Here are found highly saline and thin
soils, rugged dunes, boulders, and exposed rock. The
only arable soil in this area is alluvial, some of which
remains uncultivated for lack of irrigation water.F_
mcm-becomes surface runoff.
Most of the West Bank's water potential, more than
600 mcm, is held in underground aquifers that are
shared with Israel and which in recent years have
supplied almost 40 percent of Israel's water needs.
Increased pumping from wells in both Israel and the
West Bank has lowered water tables and reduced the
flow of some springs and shallower wells. Moreover,
water from some of the springs and wells, especially in
Judea, is brackish, limiting its value for domestic and
even agricultural uses.
The Jordan River is an additional potential source of
water. Though an estimated 200 mcm could be drawn
from the river during the winter floods, only limited
amounts of water actually are taken. Since the con-
struction of the Israeli security fence in 1967, West
Bankers have been denied access to the Jordan River.
Today the western side of this underutilized river is
available only to the Israelis, who use about 10 mcm
of Jordan River water annually-primarily for irriga-
tion of settlement farms.
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3rcrrt
The Arab village of Lubban ash
Shargivah, along the Nablus-
Ram Allah road, and sur-
rounding olive orchards near
the end of the dry season.=
The Gush Emunim settlement
of Shave Shomeron, looking
south from the ancient Israeli
capital of Sebastiya near the
end of the wet season. The set-
tlement houses commuters to
Tel Aviv and is engaged in vini-
culture. Olive orchards in the
foreground and on surrounding
 The Dead Sea, north of En
Gedi. Steep slopes, such as
those at left, parallel both sides
of the downdropped Dead Sea-
Jordan River rift valley and
inhibit east-west transporta-
Israeli well being drilled along
the Allan road south of the
Israeli settlement of Mevo
Shillo. Well is adjacent to an
 Figure 2
Sea
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4 Tolkarm
Oalgrlyah
Israel
& ndwy representation i$
not necessarily autho, tat,ve
West Bank
Annual Precipitation
0 15 Kilometers
0 15 Miles
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Figure 3
Tel Aviv-
Yafo
eoe~da~y ~ep~eeemaooo a
poi ~e~esaa.~iy amno.nai~~e
200 m m
150
100
50
0
J F M A M J J A S O N D
Temperature in degrees Celsius
Precipitation in millimeters
Jordan
West Bank
Mean Annual
Temperature
Degrees Celsius
17 19 21 23
63 66 70 73
Degrees Fahrenheit
15 Kilometers
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The amounts and sources of water available in various
parts of the West Bank differ sharply. The central
hills, which divide the Mediterranean and Dead Sea/
Jordan River watersheds, receive adequate rainfall for
fruit trees and limited field crops. To the east of these
hills, however, the Jordan River Valley receives only
scant and highly variable rainfall, particularly in the
south around Jericho. In the deserts of southeastern
Judea water sources are limited to a few wells and
springs.
Irrigation. Irrigated land accounts for only about 5
percent of the total cultivated land on the West Bank,
most of it located in the Jordan Valley, where irriga-
tion is mandatory for agriculture. Until the early
1950s Jordan Valley irrigation relied chiefly on tradi-
tional gravity-fed canals. Under Jordanian rule, Arab
farmers began introducing mechanical pumps and
pressurized pipelines from small reservoirs or drilled
wells.
Following the 1948 war and the resulting increase in
Palestinian refugees in the West and East Banks, the
Jordanian Government sought ways to increase irriga-
tion to improve the potential for agriculture and
settlement in the Jordan Valley. Two US firms com-
missioned by the Jordanian Government proposed the
construction of two large canals-one on each side of
the river-to carry water from the Yarmuk River, a
principal feeder of the Jordan. The eastern (East
Ghor) canal was finished in 1966 and at that time
served 12,140 hectares of East Bank land. The 1967
war precluded completion of the second half of the
plan, the West Ghor Canal, which would have served
15,100 hectares in the West Bank. Since then, the
need for such a canal has been reinforced by the rising
salinity and declining flow of the Jordan, caused by
the Israeli construction in 1964 of a conduit diverting
water to Israel from the Jordan River system at Lake
Tiberias.
Contention Over Water Supplies. Under Israeli occu-
pation, the amount of water available to Palestinians
has declined. The greatest water loss has resulted
from construction of the security fence, which cut off
Palestinian access to the Jordan and denied their use
of wells within the border zone. Moreover, prewar
water delivery systems have been left unrepaired, and
Palestinian Arabs are prohibited from developing new
water sources for agricultural purposes. Under Israeli
occupation policy, any new irrigation resources devel-
oped in the West Bank in excess of pre-1967 Palestin-
ian usage may be used only for Israeli settlements.
Wells drilled for Israeli needs have in some cases
depleted nearby ground water sources used by Arabs.
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Arab complaints concerning West Bank water use 25X1
center on the apparently unlimited supplies available
to the Israeli settlements. They note that the settlers,
who make up only 3 percent of the population, are
using 20 percent of the water, and that most of the
pumping from the shared aquifer takes place in Israel,
where per capita water consumption is three times
greater than in the West Bank.l 25X1
Planned growth of the Israeli settlement population in
the West Bank to 100,000 during the 1980s would 25X1
increase Israeli water consumption for domestic uses
to about 6 mcm annually. Moreover, Israel is plan-
ning increases in irrigation which will bring Jewish
agricultural consumption to 40 mcm annually by the
Much of Israel's planned agricultural expansion is
taking place within the border security zone, from
which Arabs are excluded. In early 1983 Jordan
protested that Israel had installed numerous pumps to
irrigate newly cleared land along the Jordan River in
violation of Jordan's riparian rights.) 25X1
For domestic, nonagricultural uses Israel has offered
to connect Arab communities to the Israeli national
water system. Many Palestinian villages and towns
have refused, fearing domination of their lives
through control of the water valve. Ram Allah has
been the exception, being forced to join the Israeli
system when its own wells dried up.
Since 1967 the trend most evident in West Bank
domestic water use has been a sharp decrease in 25X1
reliance on public wells and increasing access to tap
water, which now serves more than 40 percent of
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Figure 5
West Bank: Annual Water Use
- s Israeli agriculture 25
individual households. Of 25 water plants on the West
Bank, 16 are controlled by Arab municipal councils;
the remaining nine, formerly operated by the Jordani-
an Government, have been controlled since 1982 by
the Israeli water company Meqorot (also the supplier
of water to many Jewish settlements on the West
Bank).
Territorial Claims
Palestinian Arab and Israeli claims and contentions
over the West Bank are based on several concerns.
From the Palestinian perspective the area is an impor-
tant part of their homeland, controlled by a foreign,
colonialist power. For most Israelis, the West Bank is
seen as a strategic asset, affording Israel territorial
depth against a possible Arab attack from the east
and protecting the densely populated coastal strip.
Both peoples share a religious and historical attach-
ment to the West Bank. The historical foundation of
Jewish claim to Palestine is based on the fact that
Jewish civilization was created and developed largely
in this area. The West Bank is holy to Muslims and
Christians as well, all of whom revere the Biblical
patriarchs.
To Israel 400-500
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The West Bank has long been the scene of conflict
between hostile forces. It was conquered by the Jews,
Assyrians, Babylonians, Persians, Greeks, Romans,
Arabs, Christian Crusaders, and Ottoman Turks be-
fore it was placed under British jurisdiction in the
Palestine mandate carved out at the San Remo
conference in 1920. Conflicting British commitments
to both Arabs and Jews compounded the difficulty of
determining the area's ultimate disposition. In 1916
Britain promised the Arabs a vast independent state
in the region in an effort to foment an Arab uprising
against the Turks, who were allied with Germany in
World War I. But in 1917, in the Balfour Declara-
tion, Britain promised to allow Jews to establish a
"national home" in Palestine.
Jews had started to migrate to Palestine in the 1880s.
Most settled along the coast and in Jerusalem. At the
time of the Balfour Declaration, the Jewish popula-
tion of Palestine numbered some 56,000 against an
Arab population of 600,000. By 1932 the Jewish
population had grown by some 120,000-primarily as
a result of immigration-whereas a high rate of
natural increase brought the Arab population to
800,000. Over the next five years, immigration from
Germany and Central Europe swelled the Jewish
population to 400,000, precipitating bloody riots in
1936 and a general Palestinian Arab uprising a year
later.
The British, having had little success in controlling
the internecine strife or the heavy postwar Jewish
immigration, referred the whole question of Palestine
to the United Nations in 1947. The UN appointed a
commission of representatives of 11 disinterested
states to inquire and make recommendations. The
majority of the commission members recommended
partition, while the minority advocated a federal state
with autonomous Arab and Jewish provinces. The
partition plan called for the creation of independent
Arab and Jewish states and designated Jerusalem as
an international zone under UN administration. The
plan was adopted by the UN General Assembly on 29
November 1947 but was rejected by the Arab states.
On 15 May 1948 the new Jewish state of Israel was
formally proclaimed and immediately attacked by
neighboring Arab countries.
The war of 1948 forced far-reaching modifications in
the UN partition plan. The Arab state envisaged by
that plan failed to emerge, and the territory it was to
have occupied was divided among Israel, Transjordan,
and Egypt by the armistice agreements of 1949. Israel
got the largest share, some 6,500 square kilometers,
which it formally annexed to the 14,600 square
kilometers allotted to it by the partition plan. Trans-
jordan acquired 5,700 square kilometers, which it
formally annexed a year after the conclusion of the
armistice, transforming itself into the state of Jordan.
Egypt retained control of the Gaza Strip, some 350
square kilometers, which it administered as an Egyp-
tian-controlled territory. Jerusalem was divided be-
tween Israel and Jordan.
The West Bank did not prosper during the 18 years
that it was under Jordanian rule. Many of the Pales-
tinians who left Israel settled in the West Bank or in
East Bank Jordan; in 1950 they constituted two-thirds
of the population of expanded Jordan. The West Bank
had little unused agricultural land or industry to
support its refugee population. In addition, the West
Bank's economy was cut off from its traditional
markets and its access to the sea, and the Jordanian
Government generally favored the East Bank in its
economic development schemes.
Organizations dedicated to the liberation of Pales-
tine-and to the destruction of Israel-soon prolifer-
ated throughout the Palestinian refugee communities
in the Middle East. Jordan was unable to prevent
many of these groups from carrying out guerrilla or
terrorist raids into Israel from West Bank territory.
Military exchanges between Jordan and Israel were
limited, however, to small-scale skirmishes until
5 June 1967, when Israel chose to preempt an appar-
ently imminent attack by a military alliance of Arab
nations. Within three days Israeli ground forces had
reached the Jordan River, gaining control of Jerusa-
lem and the West Bank.
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Figure 7
Palestine Partition Plan
(accepted by the United Nations
General Assembly-29 Nov. 1947)
Arab partition area
Jewish partition area
Jewish land prior to 1948
Israel Today
Jewish land prior to 1948
0 30 Kilometers
3
o 30 Miles
Tel Aviv-Yafo.
Gaza Strip
lts.aen c cup;ed
slat- to be determ.ned
Boundary representation is
not necessarily authoritative
Galati
Heights
t/.ar
occupied)
West Bank
(l r b do/e ed tL
taNa !o be datermmedi Gt
Jordan
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The ensuing 16 years have witnessed a plethora of
plans and proposals dealing with the disposition of the
West Bank. The most important international propos-
al is UN Security Council Resolution 242 of 22
November 1967, which calls for the withdrawal of
Israeli troops from territories occupied during the Six-
Day War and recognizes the right of every state in the
area to live in peace within secure and recognized
boundaries. It also "recognizes that respect for the
rights of the Palestinians is an indispensable element
in the establishment of a just and lasting peace in the
Middle East." UN Security Council Resolution 338,
passed during the 1973 war, basically calls for the
implementation of Resolution 242.
The Camp David Accords, signed on 17 September
1978 by the government heads of Egypt, Israel, and
the United States, represent the first concrete steps
toward implementing Resolution 242. The Accords
call upon Egypt, Israel, Jordan, and the representa-
tives of the Palestinian people to enter into negotia-
tions to resolve the Palestinian problem by providing
"full autonomy" to the inhabitants of the West Bank
and Gaza Strip. The Accords specify that a five-year
transitional period will begin as soon as the Israeli
military government has withdrawn from the West
Bank and Gaza Strip and a self-governing authority
has been elected in its place. Egypt, Israel, Jordan,
and the elected representatives of the inhabitants of
the West Bank and Gaza Strip are then to begin
negotiations on the final status of the territories. To
date, little progress has been made in these negotia-
tions due to Jordan's absence from the talks and to
differences between Egypt and Israel concerning the
meaning of the term "full autonomy."
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West Bank population estimates are based on projec-
tions from the last census, which was conducted by
the Israel Defense Force following the 1967 war.
According to Israeli reports, there were at that time
596,000 inhabitants of the territory. Recent projec-
tions estimate a population of 721,000 at the end of
1982.1 Another 120,000 Arabs reside in East Jerusa-
lem. Average population density, at 131 persons per
square kilometer, is high but far below the 1,290
inhabitants per square kilometer for the Gaza Strip.
The growth rate of this population is strongly affected
by political as well as natural factors. The Arab
population's crude birth rate is about 47 births per
thousand inhabitants. Forty-four percent of the West
Bank's Palestinians are under the age of 15 (see figure
8). Although the natural growth rate is nearly 3
percent, the mean annual growth rate for the West
Bank population is only slightly more than 1 percent.
This difference is explained by migration from the
area. Between 1967 and 1968 high emigration actual-
ly caused the total population to decrease by 1.7
percent. Net emigration has totaled about 143,000
since 1967 and has averaged about 10,000 to 12,000
individuals annually since 1974 (see figure 9). Most of
these emigrants leave for nearby Arab nations, but
others head for North America, South America, and
Europe.
We estimate that 100,000 West Bankers are em-
ployed abroad, and an unknown number of relatives
reside with these workers. This "shadow" population
makes regular visits to the West Bank. For the most
part, the migrant population is not included in West
Bank statistical reports, although its absence is appar-
ent upon examining the sex ratio of the territory. In
age groups between ages 25 and 55, there are only 76
males for every 100 females.
Although rural-to-urban migration is increasing,
about 70 percent of the West Bank's nonrefugee Arab
population is still classified as rural. The majority live
in some 300 to 400 villages of less than 3,000 people,
located mainly in the uplands. The four major urban
areas-Nablus (60,000), Ram Allah-Al Birah
(34,000), Bethlehem (35,000), and Hebron (53,000)-
are located in the central hills along a north-south
axis that runs through Jerusalem (see figure 10).'F-
Labor Force
More West Bankers are employed outside the region
than in the West Bank itself. Of the 100,000 West
Bankers employed abroad, most are in the Gulf states
and Jordan. An additional 40,000 commute to jobs in
Israel, while 93,000 are employed in the West Bank
itself (see figure 11). Job opportunities in the West
Bank are scarce because of the paucity of investment.
The college-educated, except for teachers, have a
particularly hard time finding work either in the West
Bank or in Israel.
Most Arabs who have left the West Bank for Saudi
Arabia, Kuwait, the United Arab Emirates, and
Jordan are skilled workers-many are employed as
teachers, civil servants, bank officials, and engineers.
As the Israeli economy expanded after the 1967 war,
the number of West Bank residents employed in Israel
increased steadily, reaching a peak of 42,400 in 1974.
Most West Bank workers in Israel hold unskilled jobs
in construction, industry, and agriculture. The wide
differentials between West Bank wages and those in
Israel and the Arab states are an inducement to
accept jobs outside the West Bank.
Some 30,000 young West Bankers will be entering the
labor force over the next five years, increasing the
number of West Bank workers at an average annual
rate of 5 percent. Since the soft oil market is forcing
the Gulf states to scale back their development plans,
these countries cannot be counted on to provide job
opportunities for growing numbers of West Bank
workers. The number of West Bankers working in
Israel has stabilized in recent years and is unlikely to
increase any time soon. Finding employment for West
' This estimate is projected from data prepared by Israel's Central
Bureau of Statistics. Because of seasonal migration of workers,
midsummer figures may be 20,000 to 30,000 higher than they
would be in the winter months
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Figure 8
West Bank: Population, by Age and Sex, 1981
Age
75 +
70-74
65-69
60-64
55-59
50-54
45-49
40-44
35-39
30-34
25-29
20-24
15-19
10-14
5-9
0-4
Bank youth will be difficult, and if large numbers of
Palestinians now abroad return for economic or politi-
cal reasons, the problem will be compounded.
Ethnicity and Religious Composition
The great majority of the West Bank population is
Palestinian Arab. About 93 percent of these are
Muslim, predominantly Sunni, and the rest are Chris-
tian. At least half of the Christians are Greek Ortho-
dox; the others follow Greek, Roman Catholic, and
various Protestant creeds. Many of the approximately
40,000 Arab Christians live in the urban centers of
Bethlehem and Ram Allah, where in each case they
75 +
70-74
65-69
60-64
55-59
50-54
45-49
40-44
35-39
30-34
25-29
20-24
15-19
10-14
5-9
0-4
make up about 50 percent of the population. Non-
Arab Christian minorities include Armenians, Nesto-
rians, and representatives of other Eastern Christian
churches. European Catholic orders and European
and American Protestant missionaries are also repre-
sented.
Some 40,000 Bedouins are also dispersed throughout
the West Bank. Many have lived as nomads in the
Judean desert for generations, while others are fairly
recent arrivals-refugees from Israel since the 1948
war. The Israeli military government is establishing
permanent settlements for the Bedouin tribes.
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Figure 9
West Bank: Population and Migration
^ Population
Migration
700
F-I
650
600
550
500
450
400
350
300
250
200
150
100
50
0
5
10
15
The Samaritans, one of the smallest ethnic groups in
the world, number only about 500 persons. Half of
this population is located in the West Bank, around
the town of Nablus. A Jewish sect that follows only
the Pentateuch (the first five books of the Bible), the
Samaritans have maintained their unique religious
beliefs since the 8th century B.C.
A small Jewish population lived in several West Bank
urban centers from before 500 B.C. until this century.
The largest Jewish community lived in Hebron, where
the British counted 757 people in 1917. After World
War I, however, Hebron and other West Bank cities
became hotbeds of Arab nationalism and the locales
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 Patriarchs, whom Islam shares with Christianity and
Judaism. Abraham is claimed by both Jews and
Arabs as the father of their people, the Jews having
descended through his son Isaac, and the Arabs
through Ishmael. Bethlehem and many of the places
where Jesus lived and taught are Christian holy places
today.
Many of the holy sites in the West Bank are claimed
by two or more of the major religions. One such place,
near Hebron, is the Cave of Machpelah-the tradi-
tional burial site of Abraham, Isaac, Jacob, and most
of their wives-which is sacred to Jews and Muslims.
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Downtown Nablus, 1975. The largest community on the West
Bank, Nablus has been a center of Palestinian-Israeli tension and
violence, most recently as a result of announced Israeli intentions
to construct a large urban settlement on nearby Mt. Gerizim.F_
of numerous protests and riots against Jewish immi-
gration. Following riots in August 1929, in which over
60 Hebron Jews were killed, the Jewish community
fled that city. Most of the West Bank's remaining
Jewish population, including the members of the Gush
Ezyon settlement south of Jerusalem, were either
killed or fled the territory in May 1948.
The Islamic, Christian, and Jewish religions each lay
claim to various holy sites in the West Bank. Various
groups of Muslims have inhabited this land since the
time of Muhammad and have established mosques in
every major population center. The Muslims include
among their holy sites those places associated with the
Palestinian Society, Lands, and Villages
Palestinian society on the West Bank is essentially
agrarian. Historically, Arab village life and agricul-
ture were regulated by the Islamic code's agrarian
system. This system classified land into one of several
categories: mulk, those limited areas of private own-
ership; metruka, communal land used for grazing,
wood lots, roads, and other public concerns; mawat,
abandoned land claimed by no one; miri, state land
leased to private owners, particularly farmers; and
wagf, land consecrated through religious institutions
for welfare purposes.
Most farming land traditionally has belonged to the
miri category. Under Ottoman law, both miri and
mulk land could be transferred by will, as long as the
land was evenly divided among the children. The plots
consequently became smaller through time as they
were passed from fathers to sons. This constant
decrease in plot size resulted in farms that were
uneconomical or impractical; small land owners in-
creasingly fell into debt and became tenant farmers.
Many Arab hill villages are located on sites that have
been sporadically inhabited through time, often dat-
ing back thousands of years. Limestone and mud
brick are the principal building materials. The land-
scape around the villages reflects the division of land
into small plots-irregular pieces in the hills and long,
narrow plots in the flatlands below.
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Figure 10
Mearterranean
Sea
Tel Aviv-
Yafo
~"~, 4J ? ? Ram
No&11-,Land { ? e
ee
East ~~ ?
Jerusalemi ?
J _ ^' 4
J7'~ ?1P ?
?
srael 0ethleheem?
I ? _ ' S
l ?
?
Hebron ?
?
euun N
aee9 P,esenl eon ie
not d
n aoty aulhorilatioe
Sea
(
West Bank
Population
Arab settlements
~?ho14o+
? s rp
(data as of 1967)
Israeli settlements
? ?
(data as of 1982)
Refugee camps
- . ? ?
(data as of 1982 )
Jordan
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 Figure II
West Bank: Employees in West Bank" and Israel, by Industry
VAni king in \k,? Ran
-Nnrkinp in Israel
Li U Construction
n ^ Injusln
^ ^ Agriculture bb
25X1
"And after this, Abraham bur-
ied Sarah his wife in the cave of
the field of Machpelah before
Mamre: the same is Hebron in
the land of Canaan. " (Gen.
23:19). The Mosque of Abra-
ham now stands over the tradi-
tional site of the sealed Cave of
Machpelah, or Tomb of the Pa-
triarchs. Dating back to 25
B.C_ the present structure is
shared by Muslims and Jews.
 Mud brick homes of the Arab
village of Siir hug the hillside
northeast of Hebron. Vallee
lands are reserved for agricul-
Most of the smaller villages have a government-
appointed mukhtar, who serves as the head of the
hamula, the basic Palestinian village organization
comprising a group of interrelated families. At least
for the older generation, the hamula determines an
individual's relationship to political and cultural soci-
Palestinians continue to place great emphasis on
family ties. The male head of the family group holds
sway over marriage, family, and business affairs.
Traditional Islamic codes of personal behavior are
still adhered to faithfully by many Muslims. Christian
Palestinians tend to be more urbanized, wealthier,
and better educated than their Muslim neighbors, yet
family and religion play an important role in their
Refugee Camps
As of June 1982 the United Nations Relief and
Works Agency for Palestinian Refugees in the Near
East registered a total of 340,643 Palestinian refugees
in the West Bank.' Of this number, which accounts
' I or relief purtwses, UNRWA defines a refugee as a person and
his children) who lived in Palestine for at least two years mmedi-
atel prior to the 1948 war and who lost both his home and means
for more than 45 percent of the territory's population,
86,206 are registered as residents of the 19 occupied
UNRWA refugee camps.` Although each camp is
administered locally by a leader appointed by
UNRWA, the Agency has no territorial jurisdiction
over the camps; like the rest of the West Bank. they
are under the authority of the Israeli military govern-
The history of these camps dates back to the 1948 war
and immediately thereafter, when hundreds of thou-
sands of Palestinians left Israel for the Arab nations.
Thinking they would soon be able to return, many
resettled as close to their homes as possible, particu-
larly in the West Bank, which absorbed several
hundred thousand displaced persons. Approximately
130,000 of them established residence in what were
expected to be temporary camps. Permanent camps.
however, soon were constructed by UNRWA, which
was established in 1949 to provide temporary relief to
the displaced Palestinians. Since then, UNRWA has
25X1
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Dheisheh, a UNRWA-operated
refugee camp south of Bethle-
hem, has about 6,000 residents.
Ein el-Sultan, a UNRWA-oper-
ated refugee camp north of Jer-
icho. The Israelis have recently
threatened to dismantle the
camp, which has been almost
been the primary means of support for the camp and near Nablus, with 11,000 people. The camps, original-
for some out-of-camp refugees, furnishing housing, ly temporary tent villages, are now condensed, hap-
education, medical services, and food rations for hazard collections of mud brick and concrete block
selected groups. huts. The typical hut houses a family of five and is
Most of the camps are located on the outskirts of the
major West Bank urban areas. The largest is Balata,
about 3 meters square. Living conditions are poor. In
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Table I
West Bank: Population in Refugee Camps
(June 1982)
In Camps
Not in
Camps
Total
Total
86,206
254,437
340,643 a
Nablus
47,089
104,301
151,390
Askar
7,462
Balata
11,081
Far'a
4,048
Camp No. 1
3,505
Nur Shams
4,054
Tulkarm
9,096
Jenin
7,843
Jericho
3,352
5,700
9,052
Aqabat Jabr
2,705
Ein el-Sultan
647
Nu'eima
Kalandia 4,367
Hebron 16,981 59,072 76,053
Dheisheh 5,985
Aida 2,086
Beit Jibrin 1,004
Fawwar
Arrub
3,312
4,594
a Including 4,367 Gaza Strip refugees receiving rations in West
Bank.
Refugee Aid, CARE, Catholic Relief Services, Inter-
national Red Cross, and the American Friends Serv-
ice Committee (Quakers). The main fields of activity
of the international voluntary agencies are the distri-
bution of food rations, rural and economic develop-
ment, health care, and education.. The Israeli Govern-
ment and the Jordanian Government, in cooperation
with other Arab states and the PLO, also provide
social assistance and financial aid to West Bankers.
Health Care. The overall health of the West Bank
population has improved during the last 16 years. In
addition to the salutary effects of the increase in the
West Bankers' per capita income in recent years, the
territory's residents have also benefited from improve-
ments in housing, water supply, and sewage systems.
The infant mortality rate of nearly 80 per 1,000 live
births (compared to 15 per 1,000 in Israel), as well as
the incidence of malnutrition and illness among chil-
dren, indicates, however, that there still is consider-
able room for improvement in health care standards.
The Israeli military government has divided the West
Bank into six health service regions, each with its own
general hospital serving approximately 120,000 peo-
ple. These government hospitals, inherited from the
Jordanians, take care of 87 percent of the West
Bank's hospitalized patients. In addition, there are a
total of 141 public and 65 private clinics, two private
hospitals, 17 dental surgeries, and one state-run men-
tal hospital. The number of physicians has increased
since the Israeli occupation.
The hospitals are, for the most part, well equipped,
although many complex cases are referred to Israeli
hospitals. West Bankers have taken advantage of the
addition to living quarters, most camps feature food increased availability of health care. For example,
and ration distribution centers, a clinic, and separate baby deliveries in hospitals have increased from 13.5
boys' and girls' schools. percent in 1968 to over 40 percent in 1978. Health
Social Services
About two dozen international voluntary agencies
help provide social services to the West Bank's Arab
population. In addition to UN agencies, these include
such private organizations as American Near East
insurance is obligatory for all residents of the West
Bank who work in Israel proper and is optional for all
others.
25X1
25X1
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.School children leaving clacees
at Hi Nahula, north of Jerusa-
Inn. hildren under 1 5 make
up 44 percent of the West
Education. West Bankers, and Palestinians in gener-
al, compare favorably with other Arabs in terms of
their education and literacy levels. Some 250,000
West Bankers about one-third of the total popula-
tion attended school during the 1979-80 school year.
Of this number, about 35,000 were receiving universi-
The Israeli Government administers most of the
territory's 1,000 educational institutions. About 200
schools are privately administered or are run by
UNRWA. The three most important universities are
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Construction of Jewish settlements in the West Bank
was started almost immediately following Israel's
occupation of the territory in 1967. Israeli spokesmen
have justified the program at various times as an
expression of the right of Jews to live anywhere in
"Eretz Israel"--the Biblical land of Israel once occu-
pied by the Jewish people-and as part of Israel's
defense against Arab attack from the east.6
Israel's Labor-dominated government sought to estab-
lish settlements in the West Bank to solidify Israel's
political claim to secure borders. It ruled out an
indiscriminate settlement policy so as to allow for the
possibility of a peace agreement with Jordan that
would include large-scale territorial concessions by
Israel. Labor leaders also rejected outright annexation
of the territory because they were concerned that
absorption of the West Bank's large Arab population
would over time compromise the Jewish character of
Israel. Settlements thus were limited largely to those
areas most likely to be claimed by Israel in peace
negotiations.
For the most part, the location of the 32 settlements
established by Labor in the West Bank followed the
geographic priorities of an unofficial plan formulated
by then Minister of Labor Yigal Allon in July 1967.
Allon proposed creating a security zone approximate-
ly 105 km long and 16 to 24 km wide west of the Dead
Sea and the Jordan River-which would be treated as
Israel's eastern security border. Up to 20 military
outposts would be established in the sparsely populat-
ed zone to deter the crossing of Jordanian or other
Arab forces into the West Bank. In Allon's view,
Israel's continued presence in the Jordan Valley
would give the military the independent capability to
monitor any militarization of the West Bank.
Menachem Begin and his Likud Party-which gained
control of the government in 1977-have brought a
different philosophy to the development of settlements
in the West Bank. Begin and his supporters believe
' In the prestate era, settlement also was a primary instrument in
the Zionists' political struggle. More Jewish settlements implied
more footholds, thereby extending their control over and claim to
that the Israeli Government should strive to regain
the key territories that composed the land of Israel
during Biblical times. Just as settlement activity
before 1948 helped establish a Jewish claim to what is
now Israel, the Likud Party believes a vigorous settle-
ment campaign throughout the West Bank will help
ensure Israeli retention of the territory. Begin believes 25X1
that the potential problems posed by the need to
govern the West Bank's large Arab population are
secondary considerations that can be managed.
In the nearly six years it has been in office, the Begin
government has made significant progress toward its
settlement goals. There are today about 135 Jewish
settlements in various stages of completion in the
West Bank with a population of about 30,000. In
addition, approximately 90,000 Israelis live in areas of
East Jerusalem annexed by Israel after the 1967 war.
Before Begin took office there were less than 5,000
settlers in the West Bank and only about 50,000
Jewish residents in the annexed areas of East Jerusa-
lem.
At the same time that it has increased the number of 25X1
settlements in the West Bank, the Begin government
has also set out to populate new areas of the territory.
Most of the new settlers are moving into those regions
of the West Bank where 95 percent of the territory's
Arab residents live. 25X1
Ariel Sharon, first as Agriculture Minister, then as
Defense Minister, has been instrumental in encourag-
ing expansion of the settlement program. Even after
relinquishing the defense portfolio, Sharon as the
Cabinet's most outspoken hardliner on Palestinian
questions-has continued to reinforce Prime Minister
Begin's inclination to stand firm on settlement ques-
tions. Sharon's replacement, Defense Minister Arens,
also takes a hardline position on West Bank questions-25X1
Another key figure has been Matityahu Drobles,
director of the Settlement Department of the World
Zionist Organization (WZO), whose plan for the West
Bank calls for the control of large chunks of land
surrounding, and hence isolating, concentrations of
Arab population. The settlement pattern is designed
to prevent the eventual creation of an independent
Palestinian state.
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 Figure 12
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Tel Aviv-
Yafo
Lattun
Salient
Jordan
West Bank
Israeli Settlements
May 1983
? Settlement established
June 1967 through May 1977
Settlement established
June 1977 through Dec 1982
Settlement block
(Drobles Plan, Sept. 1980)
Proposed Israeli security one
(Allon Plan, August 1967)
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Figure 13
West Bank: Israeli Settlements and Jewish Population
11 ,NI id~c ii
I'I +(imaicd
30.000 250
_ 50
5,000
The Gush Emunim settlement
of Elon More overlooking Nab-
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The Israeli Government has maintained throughout
that its use of West Bank land is consistent with
international law. Two international agreements are
technically applicable to Israel's role as an occupying
power in the West Bank:
? The fourth Geneva Convention (1949) forbids an
occupying military power from either taking land in
an occupied territory for civilian settlements or
financing their establishment, and states that an
occupying power shall not deport or transfer parts
of its own civilian population into the territory it
occupies. Israel signed this convention in 1951.
? The Hague Convention (1907) forbids the perma-
nent confiscation of land by an occupying power. It
allows, however, an occupying government to use
publicly (or state-) owned land temporarily and to
use privately owned land for military purposes if
compensation is provided.
The Israeli Government argues that the more restric-
tive Geneva Convention does not apply to its activities
in the West Bank because the convention relates only
to relations between two sovereign nations. Jordan's
occupation of the West Bank was recognized only by
Great Britain and Pakistan. Jordan, therefore, has no
sovereign claim to the West Bank, says Israel. Israeli
actions in the territory-Tel Aviv argues-are only
affected by the Hague Convention, which contains
fewer specific restrictions on the actions of the occu-
pying power.
The Israeli Housing Ministry's budget report for
fiscal year 1983 confirms the trend toward locating
settlements in areas close to the pre-1967 border. This
trend will be reinforced by government policies aimed
at encouraging investors and builders to undertake
most of the homebuilding, with the government pro-
viding infrastructure, loans, and grants. Such private-
sector development is most likely to take place where
there is a profitable market-in bedroom communi-
ties within easy commuting distance of Israel's main
employment centers. Currently, about 70 percent of
all settlement construction in the territory is taking
place in five such urban settlements.
Land Acquisition
The manner in which West Bank territory has been
requisitioned for Jewish settlements has changed over
the years. Prior to 1979 an important method of land
seizure was expropriation for "vital and immediate
military requirements." In October of that year,
however, the Israeli Supreme Court ruled that land
expropriated from Arab residents for purported secu-
rity needs was in fact taken for civilian, political
reasons and was therefore illegally acquired. The
court declared that the government had not demon-
strated the military purpose served by the settlement
in question and ordered its removal.
Since this decision, the Begin government has made
extensive use of the 19th century Ottoman land code
and other devices to redefine areas as state land.
Under the Ottoman code anyone who is in need of
mawat land "can, with the leave of the official,
cultivate it on the condition that ultimate ownership
shall belong to the Sultan." The Israelis argue that
they are now administrators of the laws in effect when
the occupation began.
State-owned land forms the bulk of the property
available for settlements, although private Israeli
companies and individuals can also purchase land
from Arab owners. Some state land was owned by
agencies of the Jordanian Government or by the
Jordanian monarchy before 1967 and is now under
Israeli trusteeship. Tel Aviv leases this land to settle-
ments. Much of the land, however, comes from the
large tracts that the government, after physical and
archival survey, decides are state lands.
Following the government's declaration that an area
is state land, local Arab inhabitants have 21 days to
challenge such a declaration or to provide documented
proof of ownership. Prior Israeli administrations ac-
cepted oral testimony, tax records, and other forms of
proof, but the Begin government specifies the need for
formal deeds. Only about one-third of the West
Bank's territory is under secure title. Moreover, deeds
issued by Ottoman authorities and British Mandate
officials often cannot be located, and land records of
the Jordanian Government are incomplete because
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2 A11
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the Jordanian West Bank land survey of the 1960s
was stopped by the 1967 war with only 37 percent of
the territory surveyed and documented.
The Israeli Government has not made public the
extent of land acquired for settlement, but under the
principles it is now following, up to two-thirds of the
West Bank's territory would theoretically be available
for leasing to settlers. In practice, one-third of the
West Bank has already been requisitioned, either for
settlements or military purposes.
Types of Settlements
Many of Israel's political parties are the prime movers
behind Jewish settlement activities in the occupied
territories. Through their affiliated settlement move-
ments, the parties provide political and financial
support to many of the settlements. The Labor
Party-despite its limited territorial ambitions in the
West Bank-supports settlement activity through its
kibbutz and moshav federations. MAPAM-which is
aligned with Labor-is affiliated with several settle-
ments through its own kibbutz federation. The kib-
butz movement of the National Religious Party
(NRP) also supports settlement efforts. Other settle-
ments are affiliated with Herut-part of the Likud-
Poalei Agudat Israel, and the extremist KACH move-
ment. Each of the settlement federations has its own
social, economic, and political philosophies.
West Bank settlements range in size from small
agricultural communities to large urban centers
planned for thousands of inhabitants. About half are
Nahal (Fighting Pioneer Youth) outposts or agricul-
tural communities:
? Civilian agricultural settlements are usually kib-
butzim or moshavim having only a few hundred
settlers. In a kibbutz most property is collectively
owned and collectively worked on the principle that
members should contribute according to their abili-
ties and receive according to their needs. Members
share common dining and social facilities. Ih a
moshav, each family works a separate piece of land.
The size of the individual plots is governed by the
families' ability to work them; hiring outside labor is
discouraged. All moshav members buy their agricul-
tural supplies and market their produce jointly. The
moshav shitufi is a combination of the moshav and
kibbutz; production is cooperative, but income is
divided among the individual members.
? Nahal outposts are paramilitary settlements estab-
lished by the Nahal Corps of the Israel Defense
Forces (IDF). They are founded with the intention
of eventually converting to civilian status, though
some fail to become viable and are abandoned.
Many Nahal outposts are primarily devoted to
agriculture.
Since 1975, Gush Emunim ("Bloc of the Faithful")--
a religious group that combines traditional Jewish and
nationalistic values-has assumed an important role
in the creation of new settlements. Gush Emunim
supports extensive Jewish settlements in the West
Bank as a means of restoring all of the Biblical land of
Israel to Jewish control. Although it is not formally
affiliated with any political party, Gush Emunim is
connected to the social and political structure of the
NRP's youth faction, the Likud, and the Tehiya
Party.
The settlement organizations first present their pro-
posals for new settlements in the West Bank to the
World Zionist Organization. WZO-approved propos-
als are then presented for Israeli Government approv-
al to the Ministerial Committee on Settlements,
which gives the official go-ahead.
? Regional centers are settlements that function as
market towns for four to six smaller agricultural
settlements in the surrounding area.
? Community settlements and urban centers are the
largest Jewish settlements and are the type current-
ly being emphasized by the Begin government.
Community settlements are generally planned for
eventual populations of 1,000 to 1,500. Urban cen-
ters are projected to become complete towns with
20,000 or more inhabitants, but none have reached
that size. These settlements are located within easy
commuting distance of Jerusalem and Tel Aviv and
offer low-cost, desirable housing to Israeli families.
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Daniel, a Gush Emunim settle-
ment in the Enron Bloc south-
west of Bethlehem. Many set-
tlements such as Daniel begin
with prefabricated or mobile
homes, then later build perma-
Kefar Qedumim. a community
settlement west of Nablus.
Mane of the residents commute
to Tel Aviv, others work in one
of the settlement's industries,
which include an insecticide
 E,framh, an urban settlement in
the Egon Binc, has been under
rnnsiruction since 1980. The
vet:lenient plan calls far a pop-
Ma ale Itravim a regional
center !orated on the ridge
overlooking the Jordan Valley.
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Figure 14
Israel: Economic Inducements to Settle on the West Bank
The Housing Ministryprovidesfnancial incentives for West Bank settlers in
the form of low-interest loans and grants. For example, the following
incentives are available to a family that does not already own a home:
Type of
Financing
Zone
I
II
III
IV
Indexed Loan
600,000
470,000
(no interest) c
Indexed Loan
150,000
150,000
300,000
120,000
(with interest) d
? 40Shekel-51.00.
n Repayable in 20 years at 1 percent interest per year during the first four years, 2 percent
per year during the next six years, and 3.4 percent per year during the remaining 10 years.
c Repayable in 25 years, linked 100 percent to consumer price index.
e Repayable in 20 years and 5.7 percent annual interest; linked 100 percent to consumer
price index.
? If a settler remains in a West Bank home for at least five years, the amount is a grant;
otherwise the amount is a loan.
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They are preferred by the Begin government be-
cause they can be built on public land of little or no
agricultural value and because they offer the cheap-
est and most practical way to increase significantly
the Jewish population in the West Bank.
Government Projections
Ariel Sharon commented earlier this year that he
expects some 40,000 Israelis to have moved to the
West Bank by 1983. By 1986 the government hopes to
have 100,000 settlers in the territory, most of them
residing in the new community settlements and urban
centers. Adding the Jewish population of East Jerusa-
lem to this figure, there could be upwards of 200,000
Israelis living on West Bank territory by 1986.
Much of this goal apparently is achievable, though
perhaps not until the late 1980s because of financial
constraints and the limited pool of potential settlers.
Approximately 3,000 new housing units-with a ca-
pacity for 12,000 inhabitants-are being started in
the West Bank each year, and completed housing that
is now unoccupied has a capacity for 12,000 more. To
date, young, middle class Israelis looking for inexpen-
sive housing have shown considerable enthusiasm for
the West Bank communities, particularly the Jerusa-
lem suburbs and the new settlements located on the
border close to Tel Aviv. The Israeli Government is
busy building the infrastructure to handle a signifi-
cant increase in the territory's population. It is likely
that the Jewish population of the West Bank-
excluding Jerusalem-will double, if not triple, by the
end of the decade.
Tel Aviv hopes that most of the funding for these
settlements will come from private sources because it
does not have the financial resources for the current,
accelerated settlement development. Much of the
financing for settlements has been provided by Zionist
organizations, and private companies are now heavily
involved in developing the new satellite communities.
In FY 1983, funding for settlement-related activities
from various government agencies will amount to
about 1 percent of the national budget, or roughly
$250 million.
The boundary between Israel and the West Bank has
virtually disappeared. There are no border check-
points and few signs that one is entering occupied
territory. Increasingly, Jewish settlements in the West
Bank are treated as part of Israel proper. Although
land for the settlements is technically only leased
from the military government, Tel Aviv has reserved
the right to claim sovereignty over the territory in any
future negotiations.
Under international law the military government is
supposed to exercise authority over all of the occupied
territory, but in practice six Jewish regional councils
and five local (urban) councils control most of the
West Bank lands requisitioned for settlement. These
councils answer to the Israeli Ministry of the Interior
and not to the military government. Israelis living in
the West Bank have their own municipal courts,
which are part of the Israeli judicial system. They
vote in their own districts in national elections instead
of through absentee ballots.
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Agriculture
Agriculture has always been the primary sector in the
West Bank economy, but modern agricultural meth-
ods have been introduced on a large scale only in the
past 16 years of Israeli administration. During this
period, production of nearly all agricultural products
has substantially increased. This has occurred despite
a halving of the farm labor force, expropriation of
land and deprivation of water resources by Israeli
authorities, and market restrictions-both in Israel
and Jordan. Because the dry climate, summer
drought, and limited fertile soil restrict the area on
which crops can be grown, animal husbandry is a
traditional and important sector of the rural economy.
Under Jordanian rule, most West Bankers employed
farming methods that had not changed in hundreds of
years. Mechanization was limited-there were only
120 tractors in the territory-and yields were low.
Wheatfields, for example, yielded only one-fourth of
the crop grown on similar size fields in Israel. Irriga-
tion was restricted to the Wadi Farah and the Jericho
oasis, although work was under way to bring large
new areas under irrigation. In 1967, 47 percent of the
population was directly engaged in agriculture, and
another 20 percent derived their livelihood from agri-
culture-related services and commerce.
Under Israeli occupation, agricultural production has
increased through the introduction of chemical fertil-
izers, pesticides, improved seeds, and mechanization.
The last has been most dramatic: in 1982 the number
of tractors had increased by a factor of 22 to 2,606.
Mechanization, a decrease in the amount of land
under cultivation, and the draw of higher paying
industrial jobs in Israel, Jordan, and the Gulf states
have caused a decrease in the farm labor force and a
consequent urban reorientation in West Bank society.
In recent years, agriculture has accounted for 25
percent of employment, more than 35 percent of the
value of gross domestic product, and 25 percent of
export earnings.
Table 2
West Bank Agricultural Production, 1980-81
Value
(million US $)
Quantity
(thousand tons)
Total crops
Field crops
41.2
Vegetables and potatoes
37.4
159.5
Melons and pumpkins
5.2
42.7
Olives
43.3
45.0
Citrus
73.5
Other fruits
105.9
25.7
27.8
38.8
4.6
50.0
Fruit. The most valuable cash crop, olives, occupies
about 53,000 hectares-about 25 percent of the more
than 200,000 hectares in cultivation. Olives are noted
for their erratic fruit-bearing behavior and vary con-
siderably in yearly output. For example, the 1980/81
olive yield was 45,000 tons, compared with 120,000
tons harvested in the 1979/80 season and 21,000 tons
in 1978/79. Olives are grown primarily for oil. In
1981, 222 active oil presses on the West Bank formed
the area's main industry, employing 1,500 people on a
seasonal basis. The Israeli Ministry of Agriculture,
recognizing the importance of the olive crop, has
helped rehabilitate old and weak trees and introduced
fertilizers, pesticides, and the use of a new mechanical
olive picker.
As with the olive, other fruit crops that occupy the
hills of the West Bank rely on the annual rainfall and
usually go unirrigated. Since most of these orchards
are on small, isolated plots, many agricultural opera-
tions are still carried out manually, with some assist-
ance by draft animals. The tree crops include apples,
peaches, pears, almonds, apricots, plums, and figs.
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Figure 15
Tel Aviv-
Yafo
Jordan
West Bank
Arab Fruit Growing
Regions-1967
Bananas
Deciduous fruit
Olives
Table grapes
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The Wadi Farah, an area of
traditional Arab agriculture
based on wells and spring wa-
The Jericho oasis. Here water
from wells and springs and high
temperatures make possible the
growing of dates, citrus fruit,
Table grapes are a major crop of the Hebron Hills.
Low areas east and west of the hill region are frost
free all year, allowing tropical crops to be grown.
Citrus plantations are found where the Sharon coastal
plain extends into the West Bank near Tulkarm and
Qalqilyah. In the Jordan Valley-especially in the
Jericho oasis-warmer temperatures permit the grow-
ing of bananas, citrus fruits, pomegranates, dates,
Cereals and Vegetables. Wheat and barley are the
chief field crops and account for two-thirds of all
cropland. The grain harvest varies with the annual
rainfall, especially in the marginal areas of cultivation
in Judea, and grain is raised entirely for domestic
consumption.
mangoes, and guavas.
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Figure 16
West Bank: Crop Production, by Year
^ olives
^ Other fruit
Citrus
El Melons and pumpkins
Vegetables and potatoes
Fieldcrops
1967/68 68/69? 69/70 70/71 71/72 72/73 73/74 74/75 75/76 76/77 77/78 78/79 79/80 80/81
Crop year
In 1980-81 more than 200,000 tons of vegetables were
raised on the West Bank. The most important vegeta-
ble crops are tomatoes, cucumbers, potatoes, egg-
plants, and onions, though numerous other varieties
are grown as well. Most of the West Bank's vegeta-
bles are grown in Samaria in summer and in the
Jordan Valley in winter. Since 1967 innovations in
farming methods have doubled vegetable production.
New irrigation techniques include sprinkler systems,
drip irrigation, and clear plastic crop coverings. The
only major nonfood crop raised on the West Bank is
the 400 tons of tobacco grown annually in northern
Samaria.
Livestock. Sheep and goats are the most important
livestock in the West Bank, and the effects of decades
of overgrazing can be seen in the denuded and eroded
landscapes throughout the area. Though the number
of flocks has decreased in recent years, the number of
animals has remained relatively constant, resulting in
a much larger average herd size. In 1979 there were
more than 235,000 sheep and 155,000 goats in the
territory. Cattle, now numbering around 15,000 with
the number declining, are mainly of the local breed,
though about one-third of the herd now consists of
Friesian dairy cows. The territory has 800 poultry
farms; in addition, small flocks of chickens are kept in
farmyards and scavenge freely in many villages.
Almost all of the West Bank's production of meat,
milk, and eggs is consumed locally.
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Figure 17
West Bank: Animal Products
A Palestinian shepherd sepa-
rating the sheep from the goats
near the Arab village of Duma,
along the Allon road.
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xc rci
One ofrnane soot'mr shops in
Brddrhrrn. toekine w h Rest
Bank h andi roRv as terii/[s.
timid-carted slice Mood, and
Agricultural Trade. Agricultural exports, mainly fruit
and vegetables, arc outweighed by imports, principal-
ly from Israel. This imbalance will tilt even more in
Israel's favor if Tel Aviv continues to place restric-
tions on West Bank produce going into Israel. Israeli
farmers have complained in the past several years
about the flooding of their markets with West Bank
and Gaza) fruits in season. These are usually sold for
lower prices, due in part to cheaper labor and the lack
of West Bank crop taxes. West Bank farmers charge,
in return, that they are subject to unfair competition
from subsidized Israeli produce and that the restric-
Other Sectors
West Bank industry is small, and most production is
for local consumers or tourists. Although there are a
few firms with over 100 employees, most industrial
plants are small factories or workshops employing no
more than 10 workers, These factories are generally
family businesses or partnerships that have operated
for years, producing such things as cement, textiles,
soap, olivewood carvings, and mother-of -pearl souve-
Uncertainty over the West Bank's political future has
resulted in relatively low levels of investment in
productive assets. Investment in machinery and equip-
ment was only 4.4 percent of GDP in 1980. Most of
the expansion that has occurred has been in sectors
benefiting from high Israeli tariffs designed to protect
Israel's industries. Four pharmaceutical companies
serving the West Bank have been established since
1967, and textile firms are reportedly thriving. Israeli
firms have taken advantage of lower wage rates to
establish production units in the West Bank that
Since most businessmen are not willing to gamble on
the area's political future and no West Bank govern-
ment organization exists to make decisions affecting
economic development, residential construction ac-
counts for the bulk of private-sector investment. Ac-
tivity in the housing sector reflects both rising dispos-
able incomes and the desire of West Bankers to assure
a claim on property under any future political ar-
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Figure 18
West Bank, Israel, Jordan: Economic Indicators
^ West Bank
Israel
^ Jordan
Real GNP
Percent change
35
Insestment as a Share of GNP
40
Consumer Prices
Percent change
30
a
20
-
-
10
It Istinated
h Projected
LCn
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New Palestinian homes along
the Jerusalem-Ram Allah
road. Extensive areas of new
Arab housing on the outskirts
of all West Bank towns are
primarily financed by earnings
in the Gulf states and in Israel.
Financial Flows
Only Israeli banks operate in the West Bank. Their
role in the economy is quite limited-their credit and
deposit facilities are used primarily by Israelis. There
is, however, an extensive network of West Bank
money changers who perform a variety of banking
services such as transferring balances between local
residents and those outside the territory-primarily in
Jordan.
Most economic transactions are in cash. Both the
Israeli shekel and the Jordanian dinar are legal
tender. The Arab population chooses to keep only
minimum balances in Israeli shekels-in part because
of the rapid depreciation of the shekel but also
because of political factors. Substantial savings are
kept in Jordan and elsewhere; political and cultural
factors lead many West Bankers to keep large hold-
ings of cash.
Wages earned in Israel and remittances from mi-
grants to Arab countries have spurred rapid economic
growth-real GNP grew an average annual 12.7
percent since 1968-led by private consumption and
housing construction on the West Bank. Worker
remittances from Arab states are estimated at $200-
300 million annually, while earnings from Israel add
another $200 million. Together these inflows account
for roughly one-third of West Bank GNP. Worker
remittances finance the West Bank's chronic trade
deficit-$215 million in 1980. Most of the area's
imports and exports go to and through Israel. The
remainder, including more than half of all agricultur-
al exports, transit Jordan.
A large portion of the funds available to West Bank
municipalities comes from contributions made by the
Arab states-particularly Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, and
Jordan. Jordan continues to pay the salaries of civil
servants employed by the municipalities prior to the
1967 war. Money pledged to the West Bank at the
Baghdad summit in November 1978 goes through the
PLO-Jordan Joint Fund-Israel occasionally prevents
the transfer of this money to the West Bank-and is
used to help fund various municipal development
projects. The remainder of municipal revenues comes
from local tax collections and funds made available by
the Israeli Government.
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Figure 19
West Bank: Composition of GDP
~erILLIt nre
^ I ransportation and trade
Public Seniics
r%
U (in1 t1 rti0n
Infrastructure
Because there are no railroads or navigable rivers in
the West Bank, transportation is entirely dependent
on the road network. The only airfield that handles
scheduled commercial flights was incorporated into
Israel in 1967 as part of the municipality of Jerusa-
lem.
Roads. The West Bank road network was poorly
developed in 1967 but has since been expanded and
improved by the Israelis, mainly to meet their own
requirements. New and improved roads primarily
connect Israeli settlements and serve both military
and civilian needs; they often bypass Arab villages.
Among the important Israeli-built roads are the Jor-
dan Valley road connecting the string of Israeli
settlements in the Jordan Valley; the Trans-Samaria,
Trans-Judea, and Trans-Judean Desert roads, all
completed within the past few years; and the Allon
Road, finished as far south as Ma'ale Adummim and
projected to reach Arad. Other major local highways
connecting Jerusalem with commuter settlements to
the east and south are also being constructed or are in
advanced stages of planning. Road building in the
West Bank has been speeded up during the past year.
Numerous roads connect the West Bank to Israel, but
only two transit points provide access across the
Jordan River into Jordan. These are the Damiya
Bridge near the Jewish settlement of Massu'a, used
by the Nablus population, and the Allenby or King
Hussein Bridge east of Jericho. A third bridge, the
Abdullah, just north of the Dead Sea, has been closed
since 1967.0 25X1
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Figure 20
West Bank: Trade Flows, 1981
? ? Agricultural
^ ^ Industrial
Agricultural
Industrial
Vehicles. As of 1982 there were 32,194 vehicles in the
West Bank, one for every 22 inhabitants. The years
between 1970 and 1981 have seen phenomenal growth
in the number of both private and commercial vehi-
cles, reflecting the increased prosperity of the average
West Banker in recent years.
The growth of public transportation has been slower
than the statistics indicate. Many of the buses regis-
tered in 1970, already 20 to 30 years old at that time,
are still in service today. The fact that more than 100
different companies operate the buses indicates the
extreme inefficiency in the system. Donkeys, horses,
and even a few camels continue to have a role in local
transport.
Electric Power. Israel has linked several West Bank
municipalities to its national power grid, beginning in
1971 with Tulkarm along the border with Israel. Most
Jewish settlements, including those in the Jordan
Valley, are also plugged into the grid. In 1981 three
new high-tension axes were completed in Samaria,
connecting numerous Arab villages to the Israeli
system
The Israeli military government has also attempted to
gain control of the East Jerusalem Electric Company,
a privately owned Arab company given the power
concession for the Jerusalem area by the Turks and,
later, the British. Failures to provide adequate and
continuous power to the company's 70,000 consumers,
including almost 20,000 Jewish customers in the
Jerusalem suburbs, prompted the Israeli Energy Min-
istry to announce its intention to take over the
company's concession on I January 1981. This at-
tempt was blocked by the Israeli Supreme Court, but
by mid-1981 the government had forced the company
to accept up to 50 percent more power from the Israeli
national power grid.
Aside from the national grid and the East Jerusalem
Electric Company, the West Bank has 12 small
municipal power stations and numerous privately
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Figure 21
West Bank: Motor Vehicles
Thousands of' vehicles
^ 1`1S2
Priv,ae car,
Trucks and commercial vehicles
Fa v,
Tractors
Buses inc' niinihuve,
Special service and other vehicles
N1otorevelea and cootcrs
owned generators that serve small Arab villages and
businesses as well as some of the smaller Israeli
settlements. There are no interconnections among
these local systems, which in many cases are more
than 30 years old.
Communications. There are no indigenous radio or
television stations on the West Bank. Residents with
receivers can pick up the Voice of Palestine (broad-
casting from both Damascus and Baghdad), Radio
Cairo, Radio Amman, and various Israeli stations-a
few of which broadcast in Arabic. As of 1981, 80
percent of all West Bank households owned a radio,
and 60 percent possessed a television set. There are
several newspapers, including the official Israeli Ara-
bic language paper, Al-Anba, the three dailies Al-
Quds, Al Sha'b, and Al Fajr, and several weeklies. Al 25X1
Sha'b and Al Fajr favor the PLO in their editorial
line, while AI-Quds is considered pro-Jordanian. All
of the West Bank publications are subject to Israeli
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Israeli Occupation and Policies
The Israeli occupation of the West Bank since 1967
has triggered a number of changes in the region's
society. The economic links that developed between
Israel and the West Bank have significantly affected
the income and employment of the territory's resi-
dents and led to the emergence of a politically more
sophisticated middle class. The international contro-
versy over the territory's future status has made it
more difficult for West Bankers to ignore political
issues. The prospect of some form of self-government
in the West Bank has placed a premium on the
development of a modern political culture from which
new national leaders can emerge.
Despite this political evolution, Israeli policy in the
West Bank remains the determining factor in the
territory's political life. Various Israeli governments
have, in different ways, sought to control the develop-
ment of the territory's new political culture. Although
the Israeli policies have often not produced their
intended result and have increasingly alienated the
Arab residents, West Bankers, the Jordanian Govern-
ment, and the PLO have been powerless to seize the
initiative from Tel Aviv.
Development of Israeli Policy. Israeli policy toward
the West Bank has undergone significant changes
since 1967. When the West Bank first came under
Israeli control, most Israelis probably expected that
the territory-with the exception of Jerusalem-
would eventually be returned to Jordan in exchange
for Amman's recognition of Israel. Military occupa-
tion authorities confined themselves largely to serving
as proxy administrators of Jordanian law. The lack of
significant political activity by Palestinians in the
West Bank was as much due to policies and habits
established under Jordanian rule as it was to Israeli
restrictions. During the late 1960s and early 1970s,
the Israelis were content to deal with the "notable"
families in the West Bank who had traditionally been
the territory's power brokers.
In the mid-1970s, however, the West Bank's military
government assumed a more active role in the politics
of the territory and attempted to direct the emerging
political aspirations of West Bank residents into chan-
nels the Israelis thought would be constructive. Dur-
ing the voting for village and municipal leaders in
1975 and 1976, the military administration took great
pains to ensure that the elections were relatively open
and democratic. Israeli officials who advocated this
liberalization of West Bank politics believed that the
elections would produce a new echelon of moderate
West Bank leaders who would cooperate with the
military government and who could compete with the
PLO for the allegiance of West Bank residents.
Most of the mayors who were elected in the 1976
municipal elections, however, openly sympathized
with the PLO. Although traditional clan competition
remained an important factor in the elections, those
candidates who were identified with the PLO were
consistent winners.
By the late 1970s, the mayors of the larger Arab
communities in the West Bank had become the most
prominent political elite in the territory. The call in
the Camp David Accords for a self-governing author-
ity in the West Bank focused additional attention on
the mayors. As popularly elected officials, they were
expected to play an important role in the negotiations
to develop some form of autonomy for the occupied
territories during the five-year transition period stipu-
lated in the accords. Like most West Bankers, howev-
er, the municipal leaders rejected the Camp David
process.
Despite their unanimous stand on this issue, the
mayors did not agree on all questions affecting the
West Bank. Ilyas Frayj of Bethlehem, for example,
was receptive to the idea of a West Bank confedera-
tion with Jordan and was thus not always on the best
of terms with the PLO. Other mayors, such as Karim
Khalaf of Ram Allah, Muhammad Milhim of Halhul,
and Fahd Qawasmah of Hebron, supported the con-
cept of an independent Palestinian state in the West
Bank. The mayor of Nablus, Bassani Shak'a, was a
political hardliner often identified with the more
radical Palestinian factions. The differences among
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the municipal leaders were exacerbated by the tradi-
tional rivalries that existed among the various West
Bank communities and by each mayor's aspiration to
be the territory's principal spokesman.
With political parties and territorywide organizations
banned in the West Bank, the mayors-particularly
Khalaf, Milhim, Qawasmah, and Shak'a-were by
early 1979 functioning as a coordinating body for
West Bank political activity. These four municipal
leaders were the driving force behind the National
Guidance Committee, which appeared on the West
Bank shortly after the signing of the Egyptian-Israeli
peace treaty in March 1979. In addition to the West
Bank mayors, the committee's members included
representatives from the Gaza Strip, welfare organi-
zations, universities, and labor unions. The commit-
tee's success in coordinating general strikes and pro-
tests against the Israeli occupation reflected the
growing politicization and frustration of many West
Bank residents.
The mayors and the National Guidance Committee
also were able to provide the PLO with a more direct
means of communicating with the West Bank. The
mayors, whose municipalities depended on Arab
states and the PLO for much of their funding, often
traveled to Amman for legitimate business reasons.
During these visits to Jordan, they would on occasion
meet secretly with PLO officials to discuss conditions
on the West Bank and to coordinate the Palestinian
response to the Camp David Accords and Israeli
moves in the occupied territories.
The Begin government questioned the wisdom of
affording West Bankers openly sympathetic to the
PLO the opportunity to dictate the tenor of the
territory's politics. During its first two years in office,
the Begin government's preoccupation with the Egyp-
tian-Israeli peace negotiations precluded significant
changes in the administration of the West Bank. Once
the peace treaty was signed, however, and the West
Bank's leaders refused to accept the Begin govern-
ment's proposals for limited autonomy, relations be-
tween the military administration and the West Bank-
ers quickly soured.
In late 1979 the military government sought to deport
Nablus Mayor Shak'a because of his role in organiz-
ing West Bank demonstrations. A threatened mass
resignation of the territory's municipal leaders staved
off the deportation, but in early 1980 the military
government postponed indefinitely the elections for
mayors scheduled that April. Most West Bankers
viewed the postponement as a signal that Tel Aviv was
considering ways of restricting the mayors' freedom of
action.
The killing in May 1980 of seven Israeli religious
students in Hebron brought matters to a head. Within
days, Mayors Qawasmah of Hebron and Milhim of
Halhul were deported. One month later, Shak'a and
Ram Allah Mayor Khalaf were seriously injured in
car bombings apparently perpetrated by rightwing
Israeli settlers seeking revenge for the earlier killings.
By the summer of 1980, these four leading members
of the National Guidance Committee were no longer
in a position to organize West Bank political activity.
Tel Aviv in the last three years has continued to seek
ways to limit the activities of West Bank leaders
sympathetic to the PLO. New restrictions have been
placed on the ability of West Bankers to bring Arab
funds into the territory, making it more difficult for
the PLO and Jordan to disburse funds to the territo-
ry's leaders. The military government has also prohib-
ited some West Bankers from traveling to Jordan and
has made it illegal for any West Banker to meet with
PLO officials. In early 1982 Tel Aviv dismissed
several municipal councils and mayors, including
Shak'a and Khalaf, and outlawed the National Guid-
ance Committee. These steps in essence completed the
dismantling of what had become the West Bank's first
territorywide leadership.
Current Israeli Policies. Current Israeli policies in
the West Bank seem to be aimed at facilitating the
eventual annexation of the territory. If Israel remains
permanently in control of the West Bank, one of the
most difficult problems it will confront is how to
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govern the more than 700,000 Palestinian residents of
the territory. The current thrust of Israeli policy
suggests that Tel Aviv would create a separate politi-
cal structure for non-Jewish West Bank residents,
thereby limiting their political role on the national
scene and preserving the Jewish nature of the Israeli
state
In November 1981 Defense Minister Ariel Sharon
separated the civilian administration of the West
Bank from the military government. The decision to
create a separate civilian administration was de-
scribed, at least initially, as a bureaucratic move
intended to make it easier for the military government
to deal with its two main functions: security matters
and management of the West Bank's day-to-day
affairs
In practice, however, the establishment of a civilian
administration marked a new Israeli attempt to shape
West Bank politics. The first head of the civilian
administration, Menahem Milson, a noted Israeli
academic, had been a constant and vocal critic of
previous Israeli policies in the territory, which, in his
view, had handed control of West Bank politics to the
PLO. Rather than sponsor elections for mayors who
would inevitably emerge as spokesmen for the PLO,
the military government, Milson argued, should en-
courage the development of a rural-based leadership
that would presumably be more conservative and thus
more receptive to the Israeli concept of autonomy for
the territory.
The purging of the West Bank's municipal leadership
created a vacuum that Milson proceeded to fill with
just such a rural-based political system-the Village
Leagues. The Hebron Village League, founded in
1978, was the model for the four additional leagues
that were formed in 1982. These associations of
prominent rural leaders were theoretically responsible
only for those matters not under the jurisdiction of the
municipal authorities, but the leagues, encouraged by
Israeli officials, have attempted to supplant the may-
ors and municipal councils as the preeminent govern-
ment structure in the West Bank.
In August 1982 the leagues took an important step
toward expanding their authority in the West Bank by
establishing a regional federation. Mustafa Dudin,
founder of the Hebron league and an ex-Jordanian
Cabinet minister, was elected the federation's presi-
dent.
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The leagues have nonetheless failed to gain significant
political influence among most West Bank Palestin-
ians, who have rejected league leaders' claims to be
responsible representatives of the Palestinian cause.
Most politically active West Bankers have branded
the league members as collaborators. Violent attacks
against league officials have led the Israeli Govern-
ment to permit some members to carry arms, a 25X1
development that has cast additional doubts on the
leagues' political legitimacy.
The optimistic predictions of Israeli officials that the
Sharon approach toward the West Bank would
cleanse the territory of PLO influence have not been
fulfilled during the civilian administration's first 21
months. Most residents continue to view PLO leaders
as legitimate spokesmen for the Palestinian cause.
The civilian administration's hesitant beginning and
frictions between Milson and the military government
led to Milson's resignation in September 1982, al-
though he publicly stated at the time that his action
was due to the government's initial refusal to establish
a commission of inquiry into the massacre of Palestin-
ian refugees in Beirut.
A military man, Brig. Gen. Shlomo Ilia, succeeded
Milson as head of the civilian administration, thereby
blurring the distinction between it and the military
government. Milson's resignation, however, did not
herald a fundamental change in Tel Aviv's policies
toward the West Bank, which are intended to estab-
lish a pro-Israel, anti-PLO leadership in the territory.
The Village Leagues may fail to be the vehicle for
such leadership, but the Begin government-firmly
committed to its claim of Israeli sovereignty over the
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West Bank-will continue to place a high priority on
the development of malleable leaders who can be
groomed to take over many of the civilian functions of
the military government in the territory. Some Israeli
political observers have speculated that divorcing the
civilian component from the military administration
was the first step toward the unilateral establishment
of a "self-governing" authority in the West Bank.F-
The Israeli Government can already claim that some
of the actions taken in the West Bank conform to
the autonomy arrangements stipulated in the Camp
David Accords. According to these arrangements, the
Israeli military government must withdraw from the
occupied territories once a self-governing authority is
in place. Technically, Tel Aviv could argue that the
military government, which has its headquarters in
Israel proper, has already withdrawn from the West
Bank, leaving the civilian administration in its place.
In the absence of a negotiated settlement, the civilian
administration could at some point transfer its duties
to appropriate local leaders-who, according to the
Camp David Accords, would have to be freely elect-
ed--thus giving them control over Palestinian affairs.
The Israeli Government, however, would retain re-
sponsibility for Jewish residents in the territory and
ultimately assert its sovereignty over the West Bank.
Israeli Public Attitudes. Prime Minister Begin has
strong popular support for some, but not all, aspects of
his hardline policy toward the occupied territories.
Polling data indicate that the public considers the
West Bank vital to Israeli security and adamantly
opposes a return to the pre-1967 border, establish-
ment of an independent Palestinian state, or negotia-
tions with the PLO.' Opinion is deeply split about the
ultimate status of the West Bank, however, and
support for Begin's aggressive Jewish settlement poli-
cy has fluctuated over time.
' Public opinion polling is a growth industry in Israel. Numerous
social science organizations, market research firms, academic
institutions, and the media are involved in surveying the attitudes of
Israelis toward individuals and issues. Unfortunately, the wording
of West Bank questions has often changed significantly from poll to
poll. In assessing polling results it is important to pay close
attention to the precise wording of the question and to analyze the
There is widespread agreement in Israel on West
Bank issues that are considered to involve vital securi-
ty interests. A dominant and persistent theme, for
example, is that Israel's security would be unaccepta-
bly jeopardized by withdrawal to the pre-1967 bor-
ders. This position has long been held across the
spectrum of public opinion.
The overwhelming majority of Israelis are adamantly
opposed to the establishment of an independent Pales-
tinian state on the West Bank. While some share
Prime Minister Begin's religious-historical vision of
the territory as part of the traditional land of Israel,
the attitudes of most Israelis seem rooted in security
concerns. Polls have also consistently revealed adverse
reactions to negotiating with the PLO, reflecting
deep-seated fear and mistrust of what most Israelis
regard as an irredeemably "terrorist" organization.
The antipathy with which Israelis view a separate
Palestinian state and the PLO probably contributes to
their strong belief in the importance of Jordan in any
future peace negotiations concerning the West Bank.
Overwhelmingly, and among all groups, Israelis see
Jordan as having a key role in discussions about a
possible peace settlement.
Public opinion is deeply divided on whether to absorb
the West Bank and the Gaza Strip or to trade some
part of it for peace. In a June 1982 poll, 52 percent of
those questioned responded positively when asked if
Israel should retain all of the West Bank and the
Gaza Strip, even if such retention would make final
peace impossible; 40 percent disagreed. Yet in the
same poll, Israelis by 50 percent to 35 percent said
that Israel should remain a state with a Jewish
majority rather than incorporate the largely Arab
inhabitants of the occupied territories in a larger state
that might ultimately have an Arab majority.
Jewish settlements in the West Bank, like the question
of the territory's ultimate status, have generated
much controversy. Opinion on the subject has fluctu-
ated over the years. Opposition to expanding settle-
ment was at its high point after Camp David and the
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Figure 22
Israel: Public Opinion Polls
Support of Jewish Settlement Expansion
(October 1978-October 1982)
Favor
Oppose
Percent
1
IuI I I I I I I I l l I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I i I I I I I I I I I I I I I
1979 80 81 82
Favor
Oppose
Palestinian State
October 1978
October 1979
June 1980
Dealing with PLO
April 1981
June 1981
March 1982
Jordanian Role
in Negotiations
June 1982
October 1982
0 25
Percent
signing of the Israeli-Egyptian peace treaty. It de-
clined, however, as prospects for successful negotia-
tions on the West Bank dimmed.
apathetic. The Israeli Government argues that most
West Bank Palestinians have only a superficial at-
tachment to the PLO based not on any intellectual
identification with the organization's goals but on the
fact that the PLO has a virtual monopoly of the
Attitudes on settlements have also seemed to relate
closely to the public's evaluation of the Begin govern-
ment's overall performance. An increase in support
for settlement expansion between June 1980 and
October 1981, for example, paralleled a rebound in
Begin's personal popularity and the Likud's successful
election campaign in June 1981. Polling results in late
1982 continued to show majority support for expand-
ing the settlements.
Palestinian Politics
The principal assumption behind current Israeli policy
toward the West Bank is that the majority of the
territory's residents are politically conservative or
territory's politics.
In some respects, Israeli perceptions of the West Bank
are correct. Despite the political evolution there in the
last few years, the West Bank largely remains a
traditional, rural-based society. More than half of the
territory's nonrefugee residents, for example, still live
in villages of 3,000 people or less. For most West
Bankers, even those living in the larger urban areas,
family or clan ties are the most important factors in
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Figure 23
Israel: Political Party Attitudes Towards the West Bank
a Total withdrawal from occupied territories and creation of independent
Palestinian state.
h Withdrawal from occupied territories (with only minor border adjustments)
and recognition of national aspirations of Palestinians.
c Withdrawal from densely populated areas of West Bank; retention of
strategic zone along Jordan River and Dead Sea, Latrun Salient, and
Jerusalem environs; West Bank to become part of Palestinian-Jordanian
state.
dNo withdrawal; the Israeli Government will decide when to extend Israeli
sovereignty to West Bank; Palestinian inhabitants of West Bank will enjoy
limited autonomy.
e Immediate annexation of West Bank.
their lives. Even the city of Nablus-the largest and
most politically active West Bank town-is essentially
an overgrown agricultural market center whose in-
habitants are either still farmers or not far removed
from the rural lifestyle.
The Israeli-backed Village Leagues hope to draw
upon the conservative West Bank population to form a
constituency large enough to enable them to challenge
the PLO for political leadership of the territory.
League officials, in fact, are seeking to popularize a
new name for their organizations-the Palestinian
The meager results of many PLO-inspired attempts to
organize large-scale demonstrations or general strikes
have indicated that many West Bankers are hesitant
or unwilling to engage in visible political protests
against the Israeli military government. Participation
levels in general strikes called to protest unpopular
Israeli moves in the territory, for example, have been
inconsistent. Small businessmen, particularly those
with shops in the principal tourist areas, have often
made only token attempts to conform to the strike
calls, and West Bankers who work in Israel have
usually reported to their jobs. In general, the political
and security problems relating to Israel's 16-year
occupation of the territory have been well within what
Tel Aviv considers tolerable limits.
Organizations.
Only in Hebron, however, has the league enjoyed
limited popular success. The Village League there is
the strongest and oldest such group in the West Bank.
It was formed in 1978 before the military government
took an active interest in the concept and thus is not
so tainted by the charge that the leagues are Israeli
creations. In addition, the Hebron area, a religious
center for Muslims, has historically been the most
conservative region in the West Bank. Mustafa Du-
din, in particular, has developed a following among
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the conservative residents of several small villages
near Hebron. In other areas of the West Bank,
however, such as Nablus, the Village Leagues operate
in less hospitable circumstances.
The people of the West Bank are accustomed, more-
over, to dealing on a practical plane with local agents
of the ruling authority without attaching any particu-
lar political significance to the transaction. For centu-
ries most foreign powers occupying the West Bank
delegated many of their responsibilities to a few
wealthy, "notable" families, with whom West Bank-
ers dealt for most basic government services. The
system gave them little experience with participatory
politics.
The military government's attempt to strengthen the
Village Leagues has included delegating to them
many of these same responsibilities. Although the
leagues may thus become more important to West
Bankers, they are unlikely to have any more success in
attracting political support than did the notable fam-
ilies who, during the West Bank elections of the
1970s, lost many votes to PLO-backed candidates. F_
As in most traditional societies, the majority of the
West Bank's residents are more concerned about
earning a living for themselves and their families than
they are about political affairs that often do not affect
them directly. The group in West Bank society that is
most likely to act on its political beliefs is the
educated elite. White-collar workers, professionals,
teachers, students, and journalists-who are the cut-
ting edge of political activity in most traditional
societies-are a growing force on the West Bank. The
Village Leagues are at a distinct disadvantage in
competing with the PLO for such elite support.
There are conservative members of the elite group
who do not agree with PLO goals, but public opinion
surveys and other studies indicate that they are in a
minority. Most West Bank elites are chafing under
the rule of yet another occupying power, and they are
eager to realize their nationalist aspirations. For
them, the PLO comes closest to representing their
views.
The West Bank Elite and the PLO. Over the last 16
years, large numbers of West Bankers have moved
from the agricultural sector to wage labor jobs in the
urban areas of the territory and in Israel. Many
teachers, doctors, and engineers have found employ-
ment with the plethora of international relief agencies
in the territory and even with the Israeli military
government, which employs about 12,000 West Bank-
ers. According to Israeli Government figures, about
18 percent of the West Bank labor force can now be
classified as white-collar workers.
Despite their increasing numbers, the West Bank's
educated elites have had little direct political impact
on the territory. This is due in large part to the ban on
political parties in the West Bank. During the late
1970s the mayors and municipal councils did reflect
the views of most West Bank professionals, but since
the Israeli crackdown on municipal leaders, the West
Bank elite has lacked even that channel for expressing
its political views.
The professional associations and unions formed by
the white-collar workers are now the closest these
West Bankers come to having political organizations.
Most of these professional associations strongly sup-
port the PLO; many, for example, signed petitions in
the late 1970s lambasting the Camp David Accords.
Among the most influential and radical of these
groups are the Arab Thought Forum, the Engineers'
Union, and the Society of Voluntary Workers. Israeli
restrictions on territorywide organizations, however,
make it difficult for these associations to function
effectively by preventing them from coordinating
their activities.
The elites can also make their views known through
the Arabic-language newspapers in the West Bank.
Al Fajr is the territory's most influential newspaper.
It is reported to receive funds from the PLO and its
editorial line often reflects PLO policy. Its effective-
ness is limited, however, by routine Israeli censorship
of the West Bank press.
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Masked Arab youths, protest-
ing Israeli policies in the West
Bank, hurl stones at Israeli po-
lice in the main square of Nab-
Students. Unlike the West Bank's professional and
white-collar workers, the territory's student popula-
tion is more vocal in its support of the PLO and more
strident in its opposition to Israeli rule. About one-
third of the territory's population-some 250,000
people-are students. Young people are almost al-
ways in the forefront of protests and demonstrations,
and they account for most of the casualties in these
disturbances. Students have also become increasingly
involved in Islamic fundamentalist activity as a way
of protesting Israel's occupation.
The West Bank's universities are the principal centers
of anti-Israeli, pro-PLO sentiment. The Bir Zeit and
An Najah campuses are the most politically active,
and both have often been shut down for long periods
by the Israeli authorities. In 1982 Tel Aviv tried to
curtail political activity at the universities by forcing
out pro-PLO faculty members who, according to the
Israelis, are often the prime instigators of student
protests. During the year the military government
deported over 30 Bir Zeit and An Najah professors-
in this case foreign (non-West Bank) teachers who
had to have work permits to remain in the territory-
who refused to sign pledges renouncing their support
of the PLO. Although these Israeli actions may in the
short term disrupt pro-PLO activities on the campus-
es, they have probably only further deepened the
antagonism between students and the military govern-
ment.
PLO Activity in the West Bank. The constant watch-
fulness of Israeli authorities in the West Bank has
prevented the PLO from using its supporters there
more effectively. The PLO has agents in the West
Bank who can relay the organization's policies and
decisions to the territory's residents, and influential
West Bankers who travel to Jordan meet secretly with
PLO representatives in Amman. But unlike the period
of the late 1970s, when the National Guidance Com-
mittee-led by the PLO-backed mayors-was able to
coordinate territorywide activities, the PLO today
does not have a convenient mechanism for supervising
political tactics in the West Bank. In addition, the
high profile of the West Bank's elite makes it difficult
for them to work actively for the PLO without
attracting Israeli attention. Most members of the
West Bank elite know that if they, like the former
mayors, try to develop an active pro-PLO movement
in the territory, the Israeli authorities will react
harshly.
At best, the PLO can let it be known when it
disapproves of possible moves by West Bankers. Re-
cent attempts by some West Bankers to rally support
for the US peace initiative, for example, have faltered
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Despite 16 years of Israeli occupation and the 1974
Rabat summit conference declaration naming the
PLO as the sole legitimate representative of the
Palestinian people, the Jordanian Government still
plays a role in the West Bank. Under international
law, Jordanian law is still technically applicable in
the region, even though the Israeli military govern-
ment has over the years issued some 1,000 adminis-
trative decrees that have significantly modified these
laws.
The principal means Jordan uses to maintain influ-
ence in the territory is financial support. Amman
continues to give subsidies to the West Bank munici-
palities and to pay the salaries of about 6,000 West
Bank residents who were registered Jordanian Gov-
ernment employees prior to the 1967 war. In agree-
ment with Israel, it has maintained an "open bridges"
policy that helps the West Bankers market their
agricultural and industrial products and travel to
and from jobs in Jordan. West Bankers still hold
Jordanian citizenship and carry Jordanian passports
when they travel abroad. In 1980 Jordan reopened
passport offices in the West Bank in an effort to help
West Bankers keep their Jordanian passports current.
In 1978, at the Baghdad Arab summit conference, the
Jordanian-PLO joint committee was formed, giving
Jordan a formal role to play in West Bank affairs for
the first time since the Rabat summit. In conjunction
with the PLO, Jordan administers an Arab aid fund
in part because of the PLO's veto of the move. The
PLO sometimes relies on violence and other forms of
intimidation to maintain political control of the West
Bank. For the most part, however, the West Bank's
political elite believes it to be of paramount impor-
tance that they and the PLO speak with a common
voice.
The Moderates and the Jordanian Connection. The
US peace initiative announced by President Reagan
on 1 September 1982 has sparked renewed interest in
developing a centrist position in West Bank politics.
of $150 million to the Palestinians in the occupied
lands. During 1982, as part of a growing cooperation
between Jordan and the PLO, the mission of the joint
committee was expanded to include coordination of
all policies and actions taken by the PLO and Jordan
on the West Bank.
The Jordanians have taken measures to counter
Israeli political moves in the territory. In March
1982 the Jordanian Government passed a law ban-
ning membership in the Israeli-supported Village
Leagues. The law required Palestinians to renounce
their membership within one month of its issuance or
be tried for treason. Although Amman made no real
effort to implement the law, it blacklisted several
mukhtars (village leaders) for collaborating with the
Village Leagues and ignored official documents
signed by them.
With the breakdown of the PLO-Jordanian talks last
April, the Jordanian Government has implemented a
number of restrictive measures against West Bankers
traveling to Jordan. West Bankers are now permitted
entry into Jordan only via the two bridges over the
Jordan River, thereby preventing West Bankers from
leaving from Israeli-controlled airports or border
crossings. West Bankers are also banned from cross-
ing into Jordan if their Israeli-issued travel permit
prohibits their return before the permit expires. In
addition, the territory's residents are limited to a
30-day stay in Jordan.
ment in the process.
The mayor of Bethlehem, Ilyas Frayj, has been the
principal leader of the West Bank moderates. Al-
though it is difficult to pinpoint who the moderates
are and exactly what they stand for, they can best be
described as those West Bankers who would like the
PLO to be more flexible concerning peace negotia-
tions and who generally support Jordanian involve-
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In late 1982, Frayj circulated a petition that ex-
pressed support for a confederation with Jordan and a
Jordanian role in the peace process, urged the PLO to
accept UN Resolution 242, and called for mutual
recognition between the PLO and Israel. At first
Frayj represented the petition as having at least tacit
PLO support, but once it became clear that the PLO
disapproved of his actions, Frayj sought to convince
influential West Bankers to diverge from the PLO on
this issue.
Frayj's position, however, failed to garner significant
support. The failure of the petition is evidence of the
inability of West Bank moderates to gain widespread
support for a position that might be contrary to PLO
wishes. In addition, most West Bankers see little
utility in antagonizing the PLO as long as Tel Aviv
appears unwilling to consider the US initiative and
Jordan is unprepared to make important moves with-
out first seeking PLO approval.
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West Bank's Internal Security
During the 16 years of Israeli military occupation, the
IDF has had little difficulty in maintaining security in
the West Bank. In the late 1960s the PLO attempted
to organize West Bank resistance against the Israeli
occupation of the territory, but these efforts were soon
quashed by the military authorities. The PLO even
attempted to establish permanent bases in the hilly
areas of the West Bank, but these were systematically
discovered and destroyed by Israeli forces.
The organized PLO presence in the territory is limited
now to undercover agents and small terrorist cells that
seek to avoid detection. Even so, the IDF appears to
have considerable success in ferreting out many PLO
members and sympathizers before they can organize
terrorist activity. In 1978, for example, the Israelis
announced that of the 140 terrorist cells discovered in
the West Bank that year, 100 were unearthed before
they had carried out any terrorist missions.
The military government also has had considerable
success in containing civil disturbances in the territo-
ry, but the resentment that many West Bankers
harbor against the Israelis makes a certain level of
unrest inevitable. Much of the violence is cyclical in
nature, and tensions are often highest during anniver-
saries commemorating important events in the history
of Palestinian nationalism. The highly vocal and
nationalistic school-age population poses a special
problem for Israeli authorities, and the opening days
of school terms are often marked by protests and
demonstrations.
The military government has dealt forcefully with
civil unrest, and it has not hesitated to employ its
discretionary powers of arrest and detention to con-
tain disturbances. The IDF has also followed a policy
of punishing entire groups for the actions of individ-
uals by, for example, razing homes when one family
member is guilty of offenses. The stiffest crackdown
on West Bank demonstrations occurred during 1980
and 1981, when Israeli authorities moved against the
PLO-associated National Guidance Committee,
which had been organizing numerous demonstrations
and strikes.
The continuous flow of Jewish settlers into the West
Bank is evidence of the relatively stable security
situation existing there. Many Israeli settlers, howev-
er, aggravate the security situation by taking actions
that antagonize the territory's Arab residents or by
taking the law into their own hands. Some settlers-
particularly members of Gush Emunim or other fer-
vently nationalistic settlement groups-have, for ex-
ample, squatted on land without prior government
approval or torn down Arab facilities built on disputed
territory. In addition, extremist settlers have formed
vigilante-type groups to carry out terrorist acts
against Palestinians and to retaliate against Arab
violence.
Terrorism
Before the Six-Day War, Palestinian groups and,
during the 1950s, even the Jordanian Army randomly
shelled Israel's coastal plain from the Judean and
Samarian hills, and armed bands frequently crossed
into Israel to carry out terrorist attacks. After the
Israeli occupation of the West Bank, the IDF succeed-
ed in clearing out much of the PLO's infrastructure
from the territory. Israeli settlements built in the
Jordan River Valley were in part intended to help
monitor and stop PLO infiltration from Jordan, al-
though the actual border patrolling has been per-
formed by IDF units. Amman, in turn, after the 1970
civil war that resulted in the ouster of the PLO from
Jordan, also had considerable success in preventing
terrorists from using its West Bank border area as a
staging point for raids into Israeli-held territory.
Consequently, the incidence of terrorist attacks in
Israel declined.
The influx of West Bank laborers to Israel during the
early and mid-1970s, however, has provided the PLO
with a new means of carrying out terrorist attacks
inside Israel. The large number of West Bankers who
work in Israel travel freely and regularly across the
border. Rather than rely on more easily detectable
bands of terrorists, the PLO now depends largely on
individuals who deposit simple bombs in busy Israeli
urban areas and disappear from the scene long before
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Razed Arab house near Qirvat
Arha. The house was destroyed
hr the Israeli military govern-
ment or In extremist settlers
probably because it lacked a
permit and was built on land
designated Jr settlement ex-
an explosion occurs. As a result, the incidence of
terrorist attacks in Israel proper and in Jerusalem has
These terrorist incidents have not had serious effects
on Israeli society-in magnitude they do not approach
the levels of the 1950s. Such attacks, however, will be
impossible to prevent as long as the Israeli economy
West Bank's Strategic Value
In spite of the sharp differences in Israel over settle-
ments and over the degree to which Israel can afford
to compromise in West Bank negotiations, there is
virtually universal agreement that the territory is vital
to Israel's security. No political faction of any signifi-
cance would agree to a treaty that did not permit an
The Israelis stress the importance of denying the
territory to potentially hostile military forces. They
note that Israel's pre-1967 border with Jordan consti-
tuted one of the least defensible boundaries imagin-
able. It left Arab forces in control of high ground
overlooking a coastal plain only 15 to 30 kilometers
wide on which 75 percent of the Jewish population
and half of Israel's industry are located. An armor
thrust from the Arab hills could theoretically have
divided Israel and seriously challenged its defense.
The West Bank itself offered ideal sanctuaries for a
Treaty arrangements that demilitarized the territory
could reduce this threat, particularly if they also
featured force limitations on the Jordanian side of the
border. As long as Israel maintained its overwhelming
qualitative advantages over potential Arab enemies,
its forces could quickly reestablish defensive positions
on the West Bank if they concluded that the treaty
was about to be violated. Israeli planners, however,
looking to a day when their advantages may not be so
pronounced as they are now, would argue they cannot
afford to relinquish their military presence in ex-
change for political arrangements of uncertain dura-
The topography of the territory makes it an attractive
military asset even in an era of modern weapons
capable of spanning it and striking directly at targets
in Israel. In the absence of hostile nuclear forces,
Israel recognizes that the only real threat to its
survival would be an invasion by enemy ground forces.
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 .4 portion of the Israeli security
Ience in the Jordan Valley. The
cleared strip to the right of the
fen,e is harrowedfregaenilr to
help in detecting footprints of
horder crossers. Fields and
ounouaim in the background
The Jordan Valley, edged for most of its length by
chains of steep hills and escarpments, is an ideal
boundary from the military perspective. The few east-
west lines of movement across the valley depend on
breaks and passes through hills that have narrow
choke points. Within the valley itself, military move-
Access to elevated positions increases the effectiveness
of modern battlefield missiles and guided artillery
shells against low-flying aircraft and tanks by improv-
ing the defender's ability to detect targets and vector
appropriate systems against them. In addition, hold-
ing the high ground gives the defender the traditional
advantages in observation and cover and concealment,
and in the channeling of enemy forces into restricted
spaces where they are more vulnerable to interdiction.
The Israeli forces required to defend the valley could
conceivably be reduced over time as Israel acquires
new technologies that achieve better results with less
manpower. Such technologies include "assault break-
er" munitions and "smart" artillery shells that togeth-
er significantly enhance the effectiveness of indirect
fire against offensive armor. With such weapons, well-
prepared, small Israeli enclaves probably could hold
the terrain indefinitely against much larger attacking
Security Value of Settlements
One of the primary justifications for building settle-
ments in the West Bank--at least initially was that
their inhabitants would help to detect and delay a
possible attack from Jordan. This rationale is still
occasionally cited, but several senior Israeli military
officers have noted that the settlements would actual-
ly be it liability in a conventional conflict because, as
happened in the Golan Heights in 1973, the IDf
would be diverted to rescuing these civilians at the
start of the war. By establishing settlements in the
West Bank the Israelis have reduced the area's value
as a buffer zone; the settlements themselves are now
potential targets within range of the Jordan border.
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Table 3
IDF Deployments in the West Bank
Standing
Forces
Maximum
Deployment
97th Brigade
170
3,400
218th Artillery Regiment
105
2,100
21st Command and Support Brigade
2,554
2,554
162nd Armored Division
6,780
11,300
194th Armored Division
1,130
11,300
97th Infantry Brigade
170
3,400
408th Territorial Parachute Brigade
160
3,300
Total
11,069
37,354
West Bank settlements possess only rudimentary de-
fenses, designed to defend against isolated terrorist
attacks or to delay a larger attacking force until help
arrives from the IDF. Most settlement sites are
selected on the basis of economic, religious, or land
availability considerations and not because of their
tactical significance.
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The status of Jerusalem is recognized as the most
difficult of any of the issues that must be resolved by
the parties to the Arab-Israeli dispute. By more or less
general agreement, consideration of Jerusalem will be
one of the final items on any negotiating agenda.
Nevertheless, in order to reach an overall Middle East
settlement, it will be necessary to reach an under-
standing on the ultimate status of the city.
Jerusalem is comprised of the Old City, a walled area
that contains sites considered sacred by Judaism,
Christianity, and Islam; the Arab area outside the
walls north and east of the Old City; the primarily
Jewish area to the west known as the New City; and
the area of the West Bank that was incorporated into
Jerusalem in 1967, consisting of Arab villages and
new Jewish housing developments.
Jews and Muslims consider one part of the city to be
especially sacred: the raised area of 14 hectares in the
southwest corner of the walled city called the Temple
Mount by the Jews because within this area the
Temple once stood. The Western Wall, frequently
referred to as the Wailing Wall, is part of the
retaining wall around the raised area and is consid-
ered holy in Jewish tradition because of its proximity
to the inner sanctuary of the Temple. Located on the
Temple Mount-called Haram al-Sharif by the Mus-
lims-are the al-Aqsa Mosque and the Dome of the
Rock, which according to Muslim tradition is built
over the spot from which Muhammad ascended to
heaven.
The conflict between the forces of Israel following its
creation as an independent state in May 1948 and the
armed forces of the Arab states left Jerusalem a
divided city, with Jordanian forces holding the Old
City and the adjacent areas to the north and east and
the Israeli forces in control of the New City. The 1967
war brought the entire city, as well as the West Bank,
the Sinai Peninsula, and the Golan Heights in Syria,
under Israeli control.
Jerusalem is the focal point and symbol of Israeli
identity. For most Israelis, the reunification of the
city marked the completion of the creation of the
Jewish state. They are determined that Jerusalem
remain a united city, under exclusive Israeli sover-
eignty, and the capital of Israel. The third most
sacred city in the world for Muslims, after Mecca and
Medina, Jerusalem is also of paramount importance
to most Arabs.
Since the 1967 war, the Israeli Government has taken
a series of actions that are clearly intended to make
the reunification of Jerusalem irreversible. This proc-
ess of Israelization, or "creating facts" as the Israelis
have termed it, has involved annexation, expropria-
tion, and the construction of housing for Israeli Jews
in the expropriated areas. In June 1967 the Knesset
approved a series of decrees greatly expanding the
municipal boundaries northeast, east, and south of the
city and annexing the entire area to Israel. In 1968
and 1970 large tracts of land in the newly expanded
city were expropriated by the Israelis. Several major
housing projects for Israeli Jews were subsequently
established on the expropriated land. The effect of
this action has been to separate Arab Jerusalem from
the West Bank. Some government offices, including
the Ministry of Justice, the Supreme Court, and the
Israeli National Police, were transferred to East
Jerusalem shortly after the 1967 war, an action
intended to strengthen Israeli claims to Jerusalem as
its permanent capital.
offices.
In recent years the Likud-dominated government,
which came to power after the national elections in
May 1977, has continued the Israelization of the city.
More land has been expropriated and construction of
additional housing for Israeli Jews begun. Since 1977
there have been a number of reports that Prime
Minister Begin intended to move his office to East
Jerusalem. By 1983 approximately 90,000 Jews had
moved into the 10 large housing developments in the
expropriated areas of East Jerusalem. In July 1980
the Knesset enacted the "Cohen law" making it
virtually impossible for any future government to
change the status of the city without Knesset approv-
al. Construction has also begun on an office complex
in East Jerusalem to accommodate more government
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 Figure 25
Bet
Heron
West Bank
(Israeli occupied -
status to be determined)
Jeruulul
- Airfield
Ra not
Allbn
1C Sanhedriya Givat
!i.`EX-t HaMtvtar
Jerusalem city limit unilaterally
expanded by Israel, 28 July 1967;
see,annexed by Knesset, 30 July 1980.
Newe
Ye agov
South Newe
Ya'agov
u/c
Giv'at
Shapira
+Otd
City)
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Giv'at
Zeev
Gin on
Haddasa
East
Tatpiyot
Sur Whir
West
(Israeli
status to bt
Bethlehem
Mit Gov't HO
to Hebron
(22 km)
i
cwiYN
the fiedlrllt
Names and boundary representation
are not necessarily authoritative.
Built-up area
Israeli-developed area
beyond the Armistice Line
Jerusalem
to Jericho
(21 km)
Ma'ale
Adummim
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 I he Old (m of Jerusalem,
rienrd from the east.A Mies-
Ii... r emeten and a portion (>f
the (itr wall are in thefore-
raurid 1he Dome of the Rock
ce nt(n dominates Mt Moriah,
nr the I ivnple Mount Modern
I4cct Jentsnlem is in the dis-
Apartment (omples in the Je-
rusalem neighborhood of Ra-
mot Illom These modern, hon-
errcnnb-Iik e tuhirles are
recidenecc .1 r Orthodox Jew,c.
Begun in l97?. Rumor Alton
has a population of approxi-
rnate/r 9.200. with plaac for
Since 1967 the Israeli position on Jerusalem has been
that continued Israeli control over the expanded city
is not negotiable. Although government spokesmen
have stated that the future of the city will be dis-
cussed in direct negotiations, they have avoided giving
details on what might be offered the Arabs, and it is
clear that no government is prepared to compromise
on the issue of Israeli sovereignty over the united city.
There is disagreement among Israelis over what role
the Jerusalem Arabs should be permitted to play in
the city. Israeli moderates, such as former Deputy
Mayor Meron Benvenisti, have advocated the recogni-
tion of the religious and cultural integrity of the Arab
community and the creation of self-governing councils
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in Arab neighborhoods. The Likud-dominated coali-
tion, however, has opposed any arrangement that
would even appear to give the Arab community a
separate voice. Benvenisti's recommendation that Je-
rusalem Arabs be allowed to vote and participate in
the self-governing authority envisioned for the West
Bank during the five-year transition period prescribed
in the Camp David Accords drew charges that he was
agitating for the redivision of the city.
For the most part, the Arab states publicly have
adopted a hardline position on Jerusalem. Although
Jordanian King Hussein in early 1972 indicated that
he would agree to Israeli sovereignty over the Arme-
nian Quarter as well as the Jewish Quarter and the
Western Wall plaza, he subsequently toughened his
position and called for the return of all East Jerusa-
lem to Arab sovereignty. Saudi Arabia and Egypt
have also called for Israeli withdrawal from East
Jerusalem. Nevertheless, recognizing that even under
extreme pressure Israel is unlikely to agree to the
return of East Jerusalem to Arab control, we believe
that at least some Arab states, particularly Egypt and
Jordan, may be prepared to compromise on the
ultimate status of the city.
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Chronology
2000-1000
Abraham enters covenant with Yahweh, who prom-
ises Abraham and his descendants land extending
from the Nile to the Euphrates. Abraham's grandson
Jacob, later called Israel, and his family migrate to
Egypt. Jews return to the land of Canaan-roughly
approximate to modern Israel and the West Bank-in
the 13th century B.C. Several small Semitic tribes
already inhabit the region, and the Philistines-a
seafaring people-have settled the coast. Under the
warrior kings Saul and David, Israeli tribes consoli-
date their control over region.
63
Pompey captures Jerusalem for Rome. During Ro-
man rule, several Jewish revolts occur that lead to the
destruction of the Second Temple in 70 A.D. and the
dispersal of Jews throughout the Roman Empire,
leaving them a small minority of the Semitic popula-
tion in Palestine.
395-638
Byzantine rule. Christianity prospers in some towns in
the region, but traditional religions remain important
in the villages.
1000-928 638
Establishment of Jewish Kingdom. After the death of Arab Muslims conquer Jerusalem.
Solomon, kingdom split into two parts-Israel in the
north and Judah in the south. 638-1072
722
Israel falls to the Assyrians.
586
Judah falls to Babylon; leadership taken into captivi-
ty. Destruction of First Temple.
538
Following the defeat of Babylon by the Persians,
Cyrus decrees the return of the Jews to their home-
land and the rebuilding of their temple.
322
Conquest of Palestine by Alexander the Great. After
his death, area is ruled alternately by the feuding
Ptolemids of Egypt and Seleucids of Syria.
167-160
Judah Maccabee leads rebellion against Greeks that
results in establishment of independent Jewish
kingdom.
Palestine ruled by Arabs. Most inhabitants of the
region convert to Islam, but small Jewish and Chris-
tian communities preserve their religious identities.
1099-1291
Palestine ruled by Crusaders.
1291-1517
Palestine ruled by Mamelukes, a military slave class
that controlled Egypt.
1517
Palestine conquered by Turks and governed as part of
Ottoman Empire for 400 years.
1882
Beginning of first aliyah (Jewish immigration to
Palestine). Immigrants come mainly from Russia and
Eastern Europe, where the Czarist government is
following policy of persecution. By 1914, 85,000 Jews
are in Palestine.
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1897
First Zionist Congress held in Switzerland.
1916
Hussein ibn Ali, the grand sharif and amir of Mecca,
leads Arab revolt against the Ottoman Empire. Hus-
sein believes that in return Great Britain will support
the creation of an independent Arab state, which
would include Palestine.
1917
Balfour Declaration issued, stating that British Gov-
ernment favored "the establishment in Palestine of a
National Home for the Jewish people."
1918
Defeat of Turks by British.
1920
Palestine comes under control of Great Britain by
authority of a League of Nations mandate.
1921-22
Britain divides Palestinian mandate and appoints
Abdallah, Hussein's son, as amir of Transjordan.
British prohibit Jewish settlement in Transjordan.
1929
Arabs in Jerusalem riot over acquisition of land by
Jewish immigrants.
1933-39
Jewish immigration to Palestine increases with the
emergence of Nazi Germany.
1936
Arab rebellion in Palestine.
1937
British commission on Palestine recommends parti-
tion of region into Arab and Jewish states with British
retention of mandate over Nazareth, Bethlehem, and
Jerusalem. A second government commission declares
partition impractical.
1945
Britain seeks to limit postwar Jewish immigration into
Palestine. Palestine in effect becomes armed camp
with reprisals and counterreprisals between Jews and
Arabs and by both against British authority.
1946
Britain grants full independence to Transjordan.
1947
Great Britain turns Palestine issue over to UN, which
on 29 November adopts proposal for partition. West
Bank to be part of Arab state; Jerusalem to have
international status.
12 May 1948
Arabs kill 100 Jews at Kefar Ezyon.
15 May 1948
State of Israel declared.
15 May 1948
Arab military forces attack Israel.
3 April 1949
Israel concludes armistice with Transjordan. "Green
Line" drawn as boundary between the two forces.
April 1950
King Abdallah incorporates West Bank into Kingdom
of Jordan. Only Britain and Pakistan recognize this
annexation.
1950
Palestinian terrorist groups, or fedayeen, begin con-
ducting raids into Israel from the West Bank, killing
over 500 Jews between 1951 and 1955. Israeli reprisal
raids into West Bank and Gaza.
January 1964
First Arab summit conference agrees to creation of a
Palestinian entity.
May 1964
Palestine Liberation Organization founded in East
Jerusalem.
5 June 1967
Six-Day War begins.
7 June 1967
King Hussein agrees to truce with Israel, which has
seized West Bank.
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July 1967
Israel annexes East Jerusalem.
September 1967
Israel establishes first West Bank settlement-a
kibbutz-at Kefar Ezyon.
22 November 1967
UN Security Council Resolution 242 calls for Israeli
withdrawal from the occupied territories.
1974
Rabat summit declares PLO to be the sole legitimate
representative of the Palestinian people.
17 May 1977
Likud coalition takes over Israeli Government. New
government regards West Bank as permanent part of
Eretz Israel. Establishment of Israeli settlements
accelerated.
18 September 1978
Camp David Accord. Egypt and Israel agree to set up
an "elected self-governing authority" on the West
Bank and Gaza Strip and to the withdrawal of the
Israeli military government to ensure full autonomy
for the inhabitants. This step is to be followed by a
five-year transitional period leading to final agree-
ment on the status of the territories.
1 September 1982
The United States calls for the establishment of a
federation linking Jordan with the West Bank and for
a freeze on Israeli settlements.
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July 1967
Israel annexes East Jerusalem.
September 1967
Israel establishes first West Bank settlement-a
kibbutz-at Kefar Ezyon.
22 November 1967
UN Security Council Resolution 242 calls for Israeli
withdrawal from the occupied territories.
1974
Rabat summit declares PLO to be the sole legitimate
representative of the Palestinian people.
17 May 1977
Likud coalition takes over Israeli Government. New
government regards West Bank as permanent part of
Eretz Israel. Establishment of Israeli settlements
accelerated.
18 September 1978
Camp David Accord. Egypt and Israel agree to set up
an "elected self-governing authority" on the West
Bank and Gaza Strip and to the withdrawal of the
Israeli military government to ensure full autonomy
for the inhabitants. This step is to be followed by a
five-year transitional period leading to final agree-
ment on the status of the territories.
1 September 1982
The United States calls for the establishment of a
federation linking Jordan with the West Bank and for
a freeze on Israeli settlements.
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Secret
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