NICARAGUA: MILITARY SUPPLY LINKS

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP97R00694R000200700001-1
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 21
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: March 13, 2012
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: August 1, 1983
• Content Type: REPORT

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Nicaragua:
Military Supply Links
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Intelligence
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Nicaragua:
Military Supply Links
Secret
GI 83-10194C
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Nicaragua:
Military Supply Links n 25X1
Key Judgments Nicaragua probably will receive about 10,000 to 15,000 tons of military
Information available equipment from the USSR and its surrogates in 1983, if current trends
as of 12 August 1983 continue. Moscow
.___ ___, --1-- ____, the ultimate source for most military material provided
he USSR apparently has provided only military support
equipment-such as trucks and transport aircraft-directly on its own
vessels.
Thus far the supply system has been relatively easy for Managua and its
suppliers to operate. Some 20 oceangoing ships a month deliver cargo at
Nicaraguan ports; while most do not carry arms, all are in a position to car-
ry goods of value to the Sandinista military. Vessels are always available to
carry such equipment under charter. While many ship operators would not
be inclined to carry material such as military explosives or combat
equipment, almost anything else would be acceptable in the depressed
shipping business. Nicaragua's allies have consequently had no difficulty
arranging the supplemental transportation they need.
As long as delivery needs remain at current levels, this approach fits the re-
quirements of both Moscow and Managua. Should supply needs escalate
substantially, however, the logistic ease with which Managua has been able
to obtain supplies during the past four years would deteriorate, and
Moscow would find it increasingly difficult to avoid more obvious involve-
ment. For example, a larger number of the commercial vessels now serving
Nicaragua might have to be drawn into the military support effort.
Secret
GI 83-10194C
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The weakest link in Nicaragua's supply system is its poor internal transport
infrastructure, which is susceptible to disruptions. If the Sandinistas are
unable to maintain effective control of the two east-west highways or to
sustain the flow of arms upriver from El Bluff, Managua's ability to move
arms and munitions to the interior would be significantly hampered.
Resupply to both coasts would have to be accomplished in a more visible
fashion by sea and airlift, complicating Soviet efforts to remain in the
background.
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Nicaragua:
Military Supply Links
Introduction
Nicaragua continues to receive large inflows of mili-
tary equipment from abroad. If delivery patterns
observed through July 1983 continue, total military
deliveries will equal some 10,000 to 15,000 metric
tons this year-a pace of supply for Nicaragua's
armed forces that, per capita, is slightly greater than
the recent substantial rates of resupply for Cuba's
military. Deliveries to Nicaragua in 1982 were esti-
mated at 7,000 tons. The equipment delivered to
Managua since 1979 has ranged from tanks, other
armored vehicles, and rocket launchers to military-
associated supplies such as trucks, transport helicop-
ters, and expendables including munitions and medi-
cal goods
The Soviet Union is the ultimate source of most of the
military goods sent to Managua, and direct shipments
from Moscow account for about half of the total
tonnage. The Kremlin has worked hard to avoid open
involvement in the arms supply effort, preferring to
stay in the background as much as possible. The bulk
of Soviet direct shipments has consisted of the more
innocuous military-associated support items, includ-
ing such dual-use goods as construction equipment,
tents, and field kitchens. Soviet allies, primarily East
Germany, Bulgaria, and Cuba, have delivered most of
the actual weapons and were probably compensated
later for this effort. Others, such as Libya, also
has also purchased some military goods openly from
Argentina, France, Spain, Brazil, and Japan.F_
Most military supplies have come to Nicaragua by sea
under various shipping arrangements. All direct Sovi-
et shipments have been carried on Soviet ships as-
signed to two USSR-controlled shipping lines that
link the Baltic ports with the Caribbean and Latin
America. The majority of shipments from Cuba prob-
ably have been carried by the four ships belonging to
a joint Cuban-Nicaraguan shipping line. Cuba, how-
ever, has almost certainly used other small Cuban and
Nicaraguan ships to deliver sensitive cargoes. Both
Bulgaria and Algeria have used vessels in their own
merchant fleets to carry arms to Nicaragua. East
Germany recently took yet another course by charter-
ing Panamanian-flag vessels for two deliveries of
support items. A much smaller volume of priority
shipments has probably been sent by air.
Soviet Supply Routes
We estimate that the Soviets have sent directly about
3,000 tons of military-associated goods to Nicaragua
in the first seven a+cnths of 1983; at this rate the total
could reach at least 5,000 tons by the end of the year.
In comparison, total Soviet direct shipments during
1982 amounted to about 3,000 tons
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Sea Shipments. Almost all of the Soviet military
support goods have been delivered by sea to Corinto
exclusively on ships of the two Soviet liner services--
surely reflects Soviet sensitivities toward potential US
reactions to any clear, publicized evidence of direct
Soviet participation in the delivery of arms and
munitions to Managua.
months of this year, 40 Soviet merchant ships arrived
in Nicaragua, compared with 25 for the same period
in 1982.
deliveries at each intermediate stop.
The two liner services operating between Leningrad
and Nicaragua had typically been making three or
four port calls at Corinto per month, but their port
calls surged to 13 in June and nine in July of this year.
Stops along the way usually include port facilities in
West Germany, the Netherlands, Jamaica, Guatema-
la, Costa Rica, and Panama before transiting the
Panama Canal en route to Corinto (figure 2). The
Soviet lines normally employ roll-on/roll-off ships
that can be offloaded quickly or general cargo freight-
ers. Most of their cargoes originate in Europe, al-
though these ships make prearranged pickups and
Air Shipments. Aeroflot, the Soviet national airline,
provides service to Sandino International Airport near
Managua every Monday. The flight, which also serves
Havana, originates in Moscow and makes a refueling
stop at Shannon airport in Ireland. It primarily
provides passenger service for Cuba and Nicaragua,
though the IL-62s that fly the route are capable of
carrying 3 tons of cargo in addition to passengers and
baggage or up to 27 tons of cargo alone. These flights
could be used to send a small amount of high-priority
spare parts, although we have no evidence confirming
that this has occurred.
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Indirect Shipments via Cuba. Evidence points to
Cuba's role as an intermediary for Moscow in supply-
ing arms to Nicaragua, but we have little hard data
on actual deliveries or specific quantities.
Cuban Delivery Systems
We estimate that thus far in 1983 about 1,000 tons of
military supplies have been delivered by sea from
Cuba; the actual amount could be several times this
volume. Sources of information are fragmentary and
the exact tonnage and number of deliveries cannot be
determined. Cuba and Nicaragua jointly own one
liner service (Linea de Caribe) that serves Cuban and
Nicaraguan ports. The ships currently assigned oper-
ate between Havana and Corinto. Cuba also has a
large interest in Namucar, a shipping consortium set
up by the governments of Costa Rica, Mexico, Jamai-
ca, Nicaragua, Venezuela, and Cuba. That line's
three ships serve all members and call frequently at
New Orleans and Los Angeles as well as at other
ports. Other ships from Cuba's merchant fleet also
make voyages to Corinto, and small coastal freight-
ers-some Cuban, some Nicaraguan, and some of
undetermined nationality-shuttle frequently be-
tween Cuban and Nicaraguan ports,
Cuban ships make no stops
between Cuba and Nicaragua other than at the
Panama Canal (figure 2).
details on individual cargoes are rarely available.
Cuba established a new airline this year, Aero Caribe,
to provide regional service. The carrier operates two
or three AN-26 light transport aircraft on cargo runs
to and from Nicaragua and other Caribbean destina-
tions. These planes can carry a little more than 2 tons
of cargo on each flight.
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Regular air service between Cuba and Nicaragua
consists of one scheduled Cubana flight on Wednes-
days using a TU-154 aircraft. In addition, Cubana
operates two or three additional TU-154 nonsched-
uled flights per week and an occasional IL-62 flight.
Each of these aircraft can carry 20 tons or more of
cargo or a mixture of cargo and passengers, but useful
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Third World Suppliers
Other countries that have provided military equip-
ment to Nicaragua include:
? Algeria served as a conduit for four Soviet seaborne
shipments of arms and military-associated equip-
ment in 1981 and 1982, but we have not detected
any arms shipment from Algeria in 1983. Last year
the Algerians told US diplomats that they would no
longer participate in this activity, partly because
they had already repaid any "debt" to the Soviets
through these shipments and partly in response to
US diplomatic pressure. Should the Algerians de-
cide to resume shipments, they have the transport
capability for nonstop delivery by sea but possess no
aircraft capable of nonstop transit.
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Figure 3
Air Routes From Europe and Africa to Nicaragua
The United Statea Government has not recognized
the incorporation of Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania
into the Soviet Union. Other boundary representation
is not necessarily authoritative
HAVANJ
I~T
North
Atlantic
Ocean
>t~ S&ndino tnterny z1I Atnport
Nicaragua PANAMA, Tr,nidad and Tobago
t
L
CC
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,
S
Panama'
South
Pacific
Ocean
B r a z i I ]Recife
MOSCOW
Soviet Union
Flights from the
Soviet Union may
originate tram
venous airfields.
NOUAKCHQS ti,M auritenia
Cape Mali
rsi
inea
CONAKR
South
Atlantic
Ocean
Air route
Refueling stop
Scale 1:80,750,000
Miller Cylindrical Projection
F.R.G.-Federal Republic of Germany
G.D.R.-German Democratic Republic
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Nicaragua's ports and airfields can accommodate a
large volume of supplies-albeit with increasing port
congestion, particularly at Corinto; and significant
improvements to those facilities are under way. How-
ever, the internal transport infrastructure is poor and
susceptible to disruptions; military supplies currently
move along limited road, rail, and river networks with
little or no built-in redundancy.
If the Sandinistas lose control of either or both east-
west highways, or if the regime's ability to move
goods along the Rio Escondido between El Bluff and
Rama (the key arms delivery avenue) is somehow
neutralized, the eastern half of the country would be
effectively isolated from the west and the movement
of arms to some of the areas where they are needed
for fighting would be significantly hampered. Insur-
gent control of one or more of the eastern ports could
have nearly the same effect. Disruption of the road
traffic between Corinto (both the port and the city are
on an island) and the mainland would cause consider-
able inconvenience, at least temporarily, to the flow of
arms and other goods from that port to the interior.
In the case of seaborne deliveries, certain potential
weak points must cause Moscow concern:
? Ships carrying military goods to Nicaragua can in
many cases be identified, and since some of them
trade in the United States-including Soviet, Nica-
raguan, and Panamanian-flag ships engaged in
scheduled liner service-Moscow has to consider the
possibility that non-Soviet owners and governments
could become anxious over possible restrictions on
US port calls.
? If ships from the jointly owned Namucar line
become involved in arms traffic to Nicaragua, Cu-
ba's nervous partners in this consortium could back
out. That would force Havana to accept a larger
proportion of the hard currency operating costs.
Jamaica has already expressed dissatisfaction with
both Cuban control of the group and the high
annual subsidies it must pay the shipping line.
Vulnerabilities of Nicaragua's Supply System
Nicaragua's internal transportation network repre- ? Western governments could take actions to hinder
sents the major weakness in the entire supply system.' Nicaragua's allies from using charter ships operat-
ing under Western flags.
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In the case of airborne deliveries, only Cuba effective-
ly has unlimited access to Nicaragua because of its
proximity and facilities. Access for the Soviets and
their allies is far more tenuous. Given the airlift
capabilities of Nicaragua's suppliers and the distances
between them and Nicaragua, arranging the neces-
sary overflight permission and refueling stops would
be politically difficult (figure 3). No significant air-
borne resupply effort could be mounted from the
Eurasian or African continents without refueling
stops in countries whose governments are sensitive to
the transfer of military goods through their territories.
Key stopping points include Ireland or Iceland, Cana-
da, Cape Verde, Bermuda, Brazil, Trinidad and To-
bago, and Martinique.
Of the Eurasian nations that might provide aid, Iran
and Syria are the only countries having aircraft (the
Boeing 747SP) with the capability to fly a significant
cargo load nonstop from Africa to Nicaragua. Howev-
er, should the Soviets and their allies choose, they
could escape most of these problems mentioned above
simply by ferrying empty aircraft to Cuba and using
them in conjunction with Cuban aircraft-staging
from Cuban airfields-to airlift equipment brought to
Cuba by ship or drawn temporarily from Cuban
inventories.
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Appendix
Nicaraguan Internal
Transport Constraints
Although the shipping and air capabilities of suppliers
are crucial elements in the logistic scheme, in Nicara-
gua's case the primary constraints probably operate
on the receiving end. The capabilities of its suppliers
to support the Sandinista regime with air and sea
shipments greatly exceed any foreseeable level of
need. Short of the supply lines at sea being interdict-
ed, the only factors that could in any way stem the
flow of military goods are the ability of the Sandinista
military forces to absorb these goods, the capacities of
Nicaragua's ports and airfields, and the country's
poor internal transport networks.'
Port Constraints
Six Nicaraguan ports can be used for military resup-
ply by oceangoing vessels (figure 1). Of these, only
Corinto on the Pacific coast has deepwater berths that
can accept large merchant ships at quayside. At the
other ports, lightering from offshore anchorages is
required for all but the smallest ships.
About 70 percent of the nation's seaborne trade passes
through Corinto The port facilities and
town are on an island that is connected to the
mainland by one highway bridge. The general cargo
quay can handle up to four vessels at a time. For small
tankers, there is also a single-berth POL (petroleum,
oil, and lubricant) terminal with product storage tanks
that can hold more than 600,000 barrels. A banana-
loading conveyer system at another pier could be used
to load or unload small boxed cargo. A sheltered
anchorage can accommodate about 10 additional
ships.
On the east coast, El Bluff has been the most
important delivery point for military resupply activity
even though El Bluff has no rail or road
connections to the interior. Entrance to the Bluefields
Lagoon at El Bluff is restricted by a sandbar, and
oceangoing ships must anchor offshore while their
Since last November a $125 million expansion pro-
gram has been under way to enable El Bluff to handle
vessels up to 35,000 deadweight tons (dwt). This
project, with Bulgarian technical and financial assist-
ance is scheduled to be complete by 1987. Present
construction at El Bluff appears to be slow.
Rama "port facilities" consist of a small paved ramp
on the Rio Escondido, a narrow river where shallow
depths restrict passage to ships with drafts of 3 meters
or less_A barge occasionally used as a
floating dock can accommodate one small vessel at a
time. There are no dockside cranes or other support
equipment that would normally be required to offload
other types of ships.
Three other ports, Puerto Sandino and San Juan del
Sur on the Pacific and Puerto Cabezas on the Carib-
bean, would be acceptable for major military deliver-
ies only under wartime emergency conditions. Puerto
Sandino, 60 km south of Corinto, is Nicaragua's only
crude oil delivery point for the Esso refinery at
Managua and can accommodate large tankers
]' San Juan del Sur, on the Costa Rican border, has
no facilities for oceangoing ships. Lightering from an
offshore anchorage to San Juan del Sur's lone quay is
necessary for all but small coastal freighters.' Puerto
Cabezas, a small port on the north Caribbean coast
tanker has been observed this year delivering oil at this facility.
' The Soviets are, however, surveying San Juan del Sur for
upgrading as a fishing port; any such improvements would also
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that reportedly has been used by coastal traffic from
Rama and El Bluff for resupplying nearby troops, has
one pier That pier, which is not sheltered
from the sea, has two small dockside cranes and can
accept small coastal freighters.
Nicaragua's total port capacity is probably adequate
to handle foreseeable priority military shipments.
Corinto currently processes about 20 oceangoing com-
mercial vessels (totaling about 50,000 tons of cargo)
per month. Arms shipments (averaging roughly 2,000
to 3,000 tons) to El Bluff have been processed in about
four to five days; Nicaragua has a few lighters and
barges at the other ports that could be used to unload
cargoes from ships at anchor in a similar period of
Airfield Constraints
While Nicaragua contains more than 250 aircraft
landing areas-including seven airstrips capable of
handling light to medium transport aircraft-only
Augusto Cesar Sandino International Airfield at Ma-
nagua can currently support sustained air operations
The remaining six major airfields-Puerto
Cabezas, Waspam, El Bluff, El Rosario, Montelimar,
and Leon-all lack service facilities. Light transports
flying from Cuba could operate out of all seven, but
large cargo aircraft are still limited to Sandino,
pending improvements under way at most of the other
fields.
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Construction has recently been resumed on the main
runway at Punta Huete, a new airfield near Mana-
gua. Punta Huete could be ready for limited use by
the middle of next year. It reportedly will have the
longest runway-3,500 meters-in Central America
when completed
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Road Constraints
Only one road extends between the Atlantic and the
Pacific coasts, and it traverses hostile territory. This
road, which is only partially paved, connects Puerto
Cabezas with Sebaco; from Sebaco highways extend
traffic must travel 100 km up the Rio Escondido from
El Bluff before reaching Rama's road terminus. Aside
from these two roads, there are no other means of
east-west cross-country ground transport of military
supplies.
south to Managua and north to the Honduran border. Most of the good roads-especially the Pacific high-
The road is being improved with Cuban help, but it way serving the Corinto-Managua corridor-connect
still is a weak transportation link. In southern Nicara- the principal population centers clustered on the
gua a 300-km all-weather road connects the river port
of Rama with Managua. Military supplies and other
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Pacific lowlands. The Inter-American Highway,
which extends north-south from El Espino at the
Honduran border to Penas Blancas at Costa Rica, is
the major overland connection between the northern
and southern portions of Central America. Military
operations in the eastern part of the nation are
difficult to support because no roads cross the often
rough and densely forested terrain.
Railroad Constraints
Rail transport plays little or no part in the transfer of
military equipment or materiel either from the ports
or to the field. The 300-km rail system, constructed
before the turn of the century, has fallen into disrepair
and disuse since the Sandinistas came to power. The
aging main line extends 190 km southeast from
Corinto to Granada on Lake Nicaragua. It consists of
narrow-gauge double track that is usable at present
only on portions of the system. The rolling stock is old,
in need of major repair, and inadequate for even
normal civilian use. Flood damage in May 1982 to a
portion of the system near Corinto-including the
causeway between the port and city of Corinto and
the mainland-has not yet been repaired.
According to the Cuban press, the Sandinistas plan to
take corrective action soon. New construction has
reportedly begun with the aim of refurbishing the
entire line in 10 years and expanding the system to
link El Bluff with Managua and Corinto.
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