IRAQ IS MORE IMPORTANT TO AMERICA THAN MIDDLE-CLASS TAX RATES

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
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• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 13
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: January 17, 2012
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: March 3, 1993
• Content Type: MEMO

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IRAQ IS MORE IMPORTANT TO AMERICA THAN MIDDLE-CLASS TAX RATES
By FLORA LEWIS
Copyright 1993 Flora Lewis
World rights. (800)
(Distributed by New York Times Special Features) _
Inauguration Day Jan. 20, 1993 saw the United States
wallowing in "leadership" grandstanding, making gestures to show
the world it cannot act without Washington and that America can act
when it chooses.
As President-elect, Bill Clinton went along with George Bush's
foreign-policy decisions without a grumble.
Now, the decisions are up to him.
This comes at a time when the ambiguous view of America as "the
world's lone superpower" is wearing thin. The United States needs
to know and the rest of the world is waiting anxiously to hear
exactly what role it intends to play.
Case-by-case responses are not enough. They are ineffective. The
Western allies are getting uneasy.
Bush's last-stretch activism in Somalia, Iraq and Bosnia has
left Clinton with a pile of unfinished operations for which he must
take responsibility, regardless of his pledge to concentrate on
domestic affairs.
Clinton can't start from scratch on these urgent issues, but
neither can. he just plod on. He needs to develop guidelines to
bring some coherence into the flailing effort to show America can
use its power soberly and wisely.
Bush's series of January raids on Iraq were a particularly
mindless example of acting for the sake of being seen as doing
something. Any military value was minimal.
Indeed, Washington announced that the main purpose was to send a
political message. Bush declared: "Let's hope the message gets
through loud and clear."
Did Bush intend Tomahawk missiles as a high-tech version of
carrier pigeons?
Days before taking office, Clinton had-already made a gaffe,
suggesting he could restore "normal" relations with a newly
reformed Saddam Hussein. Clinton's error was then aggravated by his
brief effort to deny he ever said it - a fuzzy attempt at recoup by
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c .
"clarification.11
Clinton was on the right track, however, saying he was not
obsessed with personalities. The cult of personality in America has
done its part to strengthen Saddam.
The Iraqi dictator has been able to do all he can to set himself
up as the great, undefeatable challenger of the mighty West.
Washington's focus has only enhanced his claim.
But Clinton should have said his policy on Iraq would respond to
changes in Iraq's behavior, whoever leads.
There is no reason to think Saddam is capable of any real
reform. For one thing, he has too much at stake now in maintaining
his position. He can't let go or cavil. Saddam's game is life or
death.
A recent statement by Gen. Colin Powell was right. Powell said
large military operations require a political goal as a measure of
success; a message to the deaf is hardly a valid one.
There are political ways to convey political messages support
for the coalition of Iraqi opposition, for example. These ways are
still almost completely ignored by Western leaders.
The military message gets through when it responds to military
provocation for example, chasing Iraqi force out of Kuwait or
enforcing the no-fly zone.
There are also military ways to contradict a rhetorical message:
by inaction.
Again and again, the world has been told to expect imminent
action enforcing the no-fly zone over Bosnia and sanctions against
Yugoslavia. Threats sometimes work, but not when they are repeated
too many times and nothing happens.
The sudden conversion of Serbia's Slobodan Milosevic to insist
on acceptance of the Geneva plan for a nearly dismantled Bosnia
reflects more the power of world opinion than any trembling at the
thought of U.N. force.
The Serbs do feel they've been unfairly singled out for
opprobrium because they've been no good at public relations. They
ask why doesn't anybody complain that the Croatian regular army is
fighting Muslims in Herzegovina and its planes routinely violate
the no-fly zone.
But if anything, Belgrade's attempt to put its public face
together may signal a pause to the fighting in Bosnia, not a
solution. That will still require an active policy to prevent a
spread of the war to Kosovo, Macedonia and beyond, and its renewal
in Bosnia-Herzegovina.
Former CIA director William Colby has said the United States
should arm the Bosnians or quit the area two ways to ensure
plenty more fighting. It is also a way to say the United States
renounces any interest in the affairs of Europe beyond NATO. That
would be devastating and invite greater disasters.
The farewell of former Vice President Dan Quayle was a call for
an armed U.S. space program, not only to gain a Star Wars-type
missile defense but to get offensive control of the `'high
frontier." That would signal U.S. desire for global hegemony, for
which Americans have neither the means nor the will, nor should
they.
This business of America being the world's only superpower has
to be sorted out. Clearly, having either too much or too little
power is both absurd and dangerous.
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America is needed in the world. It must have partners.. But it
must define goals and consider realistic action.
Clinton can't start on this too soon. It's more important than
middle-class tax rates with more potential for impact on
America's economic healTh.
-0-
Copyright 1993 Flora Lewis
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A New
C.I.A.,
Without
Gates
By Flora Lewis
Moscow
No matter how the
K.G.B. is disassem-
bled, Moscow will re-
tain an active mili-
tary and political es-
pionage service. And
the U.S. still needs an effective, com-
prehensive intelligence service. But
the K.G.B. and C.I.A. have largely
kept each other in business as justifi-
cation for much of their activities. As
Communism and the Soviet state
structure crumble and as secrets of
Eastern European spy networks are
disclosed, it has become increasingly
evident that none brought their own
side that much advantage.
So-the U.S. should think carefully
before stumbling on with the C.I.A. as
it exists. There is an opportunity for a
fundamental review of what the
C.I.A. can and cannot do well, what it
should and should not do.
The Congress is preparing the
wrong questions for President Bush's
nominee to head the agency, Robert
Gates. Whatever his role in the Iran-
contra debacle, an especially flam-
boyant but not atypical clandestine
caper, Mr. Gates is steeped in the
traditional C.I.A. approach.
Weirdly, he is credited for being
right in insisting that Mikhail Gorba-
chev's attempt at reform would not
change the Soviet Union and that the
U.S. should not take it seriously. True,
Mr. Gorbachev failed in his original
intcntion of strengthening the Soviet
Union and its Communist Party. But
Mr. Gates failed to see the implica-
tions of Mr. Gorbachev's policies.
He's old school - hardly a qualifica-
tion, tq meet new needs.
He is not alone. An argument is
building that the end of the cold war
meads the C.I.A. should be reinforced
and expanded because there is a dif-
fusion of threats to the U.S. without
there being a No. 1 enemy. Recogniz-
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Date
ing the importance of economic chal-
lenge, advocates want a big effort to
collect economic secrets from allies
and friends as well as potential foes.
This is what Stansfield Turner, the
former Director of Central Intelli-
gence, says in the current issue of
Foreign Affairs. Even Admiral
Turner, who tried to clean things up
at Langley, Va., clings to the idea that
secrecy is the best way to collect and
assess information, which, as he
rightly says, brings power.
He calls for a "symbiotic relation-
ship" between U.S. intelligence and
business, and a willingness, through-
out the Government at least, to pro-
vide a "cover" for spies. "All agen-
cies should be instructed that human
spying is a Presidentially and Con-
gressionally authorized activity and
they should have a role in it," he
writes. Shades of the K.G.B.!
In the search for new missions, do
spooks think they can beat out Ameri-
ca's competitors when what is needed
is energetic, persistent marketing,
long-term investment planning and
labor-management cooperation on
steady, first-quality production?
Mr. Turner grants major C.I.A.
failures: not understanding signs of
the invasion of Kuwait, the unpopu-
larity of the Shah and the rise of the
Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini, the
electoral defeat of the Sandinistas in
Nicaragua and, above all, the decay l
of the Soviet economy. These are
good examples of things that went
wrong, not to speak of the harm done
to U.S. interests in justifying protec-
tion of Gen. Manuel Antonio Noriega
for a long time. But alert reporters,
diplomats and travelers could and did
notice the relevant facts in the cases
he cites.
Senator Daniel Patrick Moynihan
has. proposed eliminating the agency,
sepatating technical from political
intelligence and putting the latter un-
der. the State Department. There are
two drawbacks to this approach. One
is that when responsibility for policy
and critical information are com-
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bined, established policy tends to
force production of the information
that supports its case. The second is
that diversity is suppressed.
Rather, the C.I.A. should be re-
tained as a technical and analytical
service, drastically limiting reliance
on secrecy except in such obvious
matters as trying to infiltrate terror-
ist groups, and with a better sense of
real U.S. interests in the world. The
former deputy director, Bobby In-
man, is a professional who would
understand this. The directorship is
not a job for a swashbuckler like the
late, disastrous William Casey or
Robert Gates.
Flora Lewis is Senior Columnist of
The New York Times.
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Cut the Saudis
Down to Size
sanctions would stay until Mr. Hussein
went. But Washington and Riyadh pre-
PARIS
The gulf war isn't over.
The U.S. is making
noises about bombing,
not elusive nuclear tar-
gets but command
centers if Baghdad
doesn't disclose all nuclear facilities.
And, leaving Iraq, Americans will
join a force in Turkey to ward off
another Baghdad offensive against
the Kurds. The reason for continued
confrontation is that Saddam Hussein
remains in power. What is murky is
waffling U.S. policy and ambivalence
about him.
Having returned Kuwait to its rul-
ers, .he U.S. leaves them to behave as
arrogantly as they please, as though
the war was fought to save the gulf
for autocracy. The Administration
wouldn't put it like that; but it has
ceded to Saudi Arabia an influence on
American policy that blocks the pur-
Washington gives
them too much
leverage.
suit of American purpose.
This is done in the name of "stabil-
ity," the new holy word of foreign
affairs. What the Saudis want is the
status quo, which is not the same as
stability and assures further violent
upheaval sooner or later as repressed
desires for change accumulate.
The Saudi royal family does not
approve of upsetting governments or
making room for democracy. While
some 5,000 family members hold
varying degrees of power and have
many rivalries and disputes, they all
agree on that. There should be no
challenge to family rule, and chal-
lenges to other Arab absolutists could
prove infectious.
The U.S. went along with the Saudi
view that it is better to leave Saddam
Hussein in power than risk a rebellion
that might destroy the Baath regime.
The participants in the summit meet-
ing in London called for open and demo-
cratic elections and suggested that
Flora Lewis is Senior Columnist of
The New York Times.
fer a new strongman; they fear a weak-
ened central power in Baghdad.
That is why Shiites and Kurds were
left to be massacred, and Mr. Hussein
was left with his still impressive force.
It is why, despite Gen. H. Norman
Schwarzkopf's misgivings, the U.S.
signed the first cease-fire in military
history that in effect applied only to the
victorious forces, not to defeated.
Saudi fears of Iran and Iranian-
style Islamic militancy afe intense.
The U.S. has let them override other
concerns, despite the active Saudi
role in promoting Islamic militants
against regimes with which Riyadh
has good relations. Riyadh finances
fundamentalist movements in Alge-
ria, Tunisia, Jordan, Israeli-occupied
territories, which all backed Iraq in
the war, and many other countries.
The important difference to the
Saudis is not so much whether the
people are Shiites or Sunnis but
whether they are republican and anti-
Saudi or not. The official argument is
that some members of the royal fam-
ily have favorite proteges in various
places and can't be stopped from
giving lavish support, regardless of
the kingdom's formal position on fo-
menting trouble among Arabs.
Inside the kingdom, the aggressive
religious police are steadily gaining
power. They are parallel but separate
from the regular police and do not
take orders from the Government.
Half the curriculum in universities is
devoted to religious studies, and
many upper-class people send their
children to school in Bahrain, which
has secular education, or farther
away if they can afford it.
Still, the U.S. accepts Saudi judg-
ments on gulf politics as gospel, and
virtually identifies American interest
with Saudi interest. As an oil man,
President Bush sees their point. The
Saudi Arabian Ambassador, -Prince
Bandar bin Sultan, a nephew of King
Fahd, has special access to President
Bush and top White House and Cabinet
officials. In his book "The Command-
ers," Bob Woodward gives vivid re-
ports of the urbane 42-year-old ambas-
sador's part in pushing the U.S. into the
huge gulf deployment and pushing King
Fahd into accepting it.
It is in our long-term interest that
changes in the world's greatest oil
reserve occur peacefully and, if possi-
ble, democratically. The short-term
urgency is to get rid of Saddam Hus-
sein. Saudi concerns are different and
must not obsess U.S. policy.
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By Flora Lewis
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Here We Go Again -
Arming the Mideast
By Flora Lewis
PARIS
Momentum for a new
arms race in the
Middle East is al-
ready building. As
Yuli Vorontsov, the
Soviet Ambassa-
dor to the United Nations points out,
everybody was so awed by America's
high-tech weapons in the gulf war
that every country in the Middle East
is clamoring for something similar.
The Soviet Union is concerned
about U.S. plans to deliver important
new weapons to its allies - the Arab
nations as well as Israel - and doubt-
less Mikhail Gorbachev brought it up
with Secretary of State James Baker
in their Moscow meeting. Mr. Voron-
tsov says Moscow favors a club of
arms suppliers to prevent the kind of
unrestrained buildup that made Iraq
such a menace.
Saddam Hussein's Iraq was a
Frankenstein monster, created by oil
revenues, competition for the lucra-
tive weapons market and political
rivalry. It could happen again, if not
in Iraq then in some neighboring,
unstable regimes. Nobody can guar-
antee that today's friend won't be-
come tomorrow's enemy.
There is a common interest - be-
tween East and West, Arabs and Is-
raelis and among regional players -
to head off a new capacity for aggres-
sion and vast new arms expenditures
that undermine the development of
civil societies. The international co-
alition against Iraq is likely to remain
intact until there is assurance that
Iraq's stocks of chemical, biological
and nuclear weapons materials have
been destroyed. Soviet officials say
Iraq has a lot more Scuds than it
used, maybe hundreds more, and
these also must be found and de-
stroyed.
But the longer term goal of security
can be compromised by renewing the
regional arms race. The tangle of
national and economic interests is
creating intense pressures to over-
ride the common interest.
Mr. Vorontsov claims Moscow is
determined not to revive old habits.
He says it has refused Syria's plea for
better and more weapons and parity
with Israel, though it continues to
provide parts to resupply existing
Flora Lewis is senior columnist of
The New York Times.
Syrian forces. He says he is confident
his Government will resist the de-
sires of its own military-industrial
complex for larger sales.
But Middle East arms control is
going to be a lot harder than arms
control in Europe. Israel argues, ef-
fectively, that its survival depends on
keeping well ahead of its enemies.
Saudi Arabia, Egypt and Iran can
show that the gulf war proved their
need for truly modern defenses. The
U.S. says it wants to maintain "bal-
ance," but it always seeks it at a
higher level.
It isn't politically possible, and
would certainly be undesirable, to es-
tablish big American bases in the gulf
as the Pentagon once hoped. But the
U.S. military can point to the difficul-
ty and danger of relying on shipping
equipment after a crisis starts.
The compromise tempting Wash-
ington is "prepositioning," which
means to sell the Saudis and gulf
emirates more arms than they can
manage themselves to serve as stock-
The Soviets
have a
better idea.
piles if American forces should have
to return. The Russians say this is
"old thinking," a reflex rather than a
search for security based on an inter-
national agreement among leading
arms suppliers.
The U.S. as yet has no initiative to
propose. The Soviets are thinking of
an approach that would distinguish
between defensive and offensive
arms, worked out initially among the
five permanent members of the Secu-
rity Council. Other suppliers, such as
Germany, Argentina, Brazil and per-
haps Switzerland and Sweden, would
have to be brought in. But the Soviets
argue that would be much easier if
the Big Five set an example.
The simplicity of the idea should
not mask the difficulty of the task.
But it is urgent and specific and
would be lost if utopian notions of
disarmament were allowed to block
concrete proposals. Moscow seems to
be willing. Washington must avoid
hasty commitments to allies and
come up with a plan. ^
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FOREIGN AFFAIRS I Flora Lewis
Running Scared
BUDAPEST
Every country in the East has its
own post-Communist problems.
But they all share the discovery
that things had gotten much worse
than anyone realized.
Dismantling Communist struc-
tures has aggravated economic and
social difficulties, demolishing old
forms of organization and authority
without yet being able to replace
them. But the extent of collapse re-
vealed how shaky it all was, how
much was stripped away, left to rot
from within, emptied of resources.
An American with senior govern-
ment experience remarked recently
that it was a massive intelligence
failure by the West. He was referring
particularly to East Germany, which
had been considered the one relative-
ly successful Communist economy,
and it too turned out to be a sump pit.
It is hard to fault intelligence,
though. There weren't secrets to
steal. The leaders didn't know them-
selves. The most carefully planned,
informant-ridden, intrusive regimes
knew far less about their own societ-
ies than the casual, variegated West
does about itself.
Then what were we so worried
about? Why did the free world feel so
sued a subpoena to the President of
the Republic, Francesco Cossiga, who
had served as Minister of Defense
and Minister of Interior. Prime Min-
ister Giulio Andreotti, who has been
in most governments for the last 40
years, refused opposition demands
for a parliamentary commission.
The suspicion in Italy, Belgium and
other countries is that the groups
were used for domestic political pur-
poses, possibly even terrorism to jus-
tify government crackdowns and de-
fense preparedness. We are just hear-
ing the beginnings of this. Sweden and
Spain were also affected. No doubt
there were Communist offensive con-
spiracies. But the question now is why
democracies felt so weak, or if these-
were counterplots to undermine dem-
ocratic governments in the name of
anti-Communism.
The "Red menace" was taken
deadly seriously by many rational.
people. One reason perhaps was U.S.'
demobilization at the end of World
War II when Europe was still rav-
aged and chaotic, while Stalin man-
aged to conceal the weakness of the
Soviet Union. He did expect to take
threatened, not only by the Soviet A Western
arsenal but also by subversion?
A Western cold-war conspiracy to
fight what seemed imminent danger
is coming to light in Europe. It is
already rocking the Italian Govern-
ment and will touch many others.
There was, it is revealed, an orga-
nized underground, provided with
hidden arms depots, prepared to
launch guerrilla wars and resistance
in the event of invasion from the East
or overthrow of democratic govern-
ments from within.
There were different epic names
for the operations - "Gladio" in Italy
(manned by secret gladiators),
"Rose in the Wind" in France, "Red
Fleece" in Belgium. They were so e-
times directed, but aeneral!Y coor -
nat~by NA! U with participation of
the and British secret service.
Former C.I.A. Director
Colb has confirmed some of this in
recent interviews with Italian jour-
nalists. They also reported at meet-
ing the clandestine groups were
held as recently as a few weeks ago in
Brussels, though several govern-
ments claim it all ended by the 80's.
The Italian Government has said
there were 139 caches of clandestine
arms, explosives and communica-
tions equipment of which 127 were
recovered years ago. They haven't
accounted for the rest.
But Rome has been scandalized
because a junior judge in Venice,
investigating the operations, has is-
cold-war
conspiracy.
over most of Western Europe.
But his real weapon was ideological,
and intellectual. It is hard now to
understand the Communist appeal in
the postwar period. The Communists.,
had the allure of early and vigorous,
anti-Fascism when many had ignored
the Nazis or collaborated.
They promised a brave new world
after the horrors of the Depression
and war, with a moral, vision of jus-
tice. They preached that money, not
Moscow, was the root of all evil, and
the frenetic crusade against Moscow.
only seemed to confirm their argu-
ment. Jean-Pierre Chevenement, now
French Defense Minister, was among
the many who responded proudly, "I
am anti-anti-Communism."
All that is gone, dust, like medieval
disputes about the sex of angels. What
is left? Just money, material well-
being? It was never enough, and it
isn't the reason the West won the long
struggle so dramatically. Freedom,
consent were the bulwarks, and they,
proved their strength. When they are
undermined, it is from within. The
things we do running scared are what
hurt us most. ^
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FOREIGN AFFAIRS
Flora Lewis
Plug In
To
Moscow
PARIS
A ssorted hints have come from
Moscow that the Soviets are
willing to supply intelligence
about Iraq. This could be of critical
importance. Long and intimate in-
volvement with the Iraqi military and
police establishments, from the top
well on down, gave Moscow informa-
tion unavailable anywhere else.
It is a reflection of the astonishing,
still quite incomplete shift in Soviet-
American relations that Washington
has reacted coolly. There are some
valid reasons for caution.
For one thing. there has been an
energetic K.G. s. camnaian for gpiEly
a near now to prettify a deservedly
even the ILG.B. is s our ehem
they are s ve RM in the U.S. ' a
It isn't clear if the hints are just
public relations, or more serious than
such on-the-record statements might
suggest. Last week Vladimir Krvuch-
kov the K.G.B. chairman received
an Associated Press delegationAw
saRE "I am convince that 30 mv
of the Soviet General Staff, tells
American newsmen that he is giving
details about Soviet-made weapons
used by the Iraqis to the U.S. Embas-
sy, but admits that the C.I.A. already
knows most of it. Neither he nor Mr.
Kryuchkov indicated if there were
any terms for the proffered helm huc
they complained that Washington
hasn't signaled much interest.
Washington's view is that there is
still a long way to go before the U.S. is
ready to exchange secrets, as it does
with allies. But it is ready to receive
what is provided, preferably through
America's Moscow Embassy rather
than in leaky Washington.
A distinction needs to be made be-
tween military and political intelli-
gence. The former isn't hard to get
from observation and regional
sources and its use is only in case of
war. But political intelligence could
be decisive in preventing war, which
requires real change in Baghdad.
Talk about negotiating with Sad-
dam Hussein is an illusion. His
threats to fight "to the last drop of
his people's] blood" and that he will
destroy the whole region show how
much he cares about his country. If
he were French his motto would be
Louis XV's "after me, the deluge."
Nor should the U.S. wish to devas-
tate Iraq. Its benighted people are
victims, not the perpetrators of the
crisis. Apart from humane common
sense, it would be geopolitical stupidi.
ty, similar to the mistake of indulging
Mr. Hussein after the Iran-Iraq war.
. The main objective, to prevent any
tyrant from controlling over half the
world's oil, remains valid and there
would be no improvement if Iran or
Syria succeeded because Mr. Hussein
is made to fall Outsiders cannot heal
what ails the Arab states, but they
can avoid creating new monsters
with lopsided support.
The consequences of war are incal-
culable. One way to avoid it is to back
off, a victory Mr. Hussein would be
sure to exploit A surprising article in
the London newspaper The Independ-
ent, linked to the anniversary of
World War II's Battle of Britain,
showed where that reasoning leads.
Terry Coleman, the writer, went
through the archives of British diplo-
macy from 1940 and condemns Win-
ston Churchill for -refusing to probe
Hitler's secret peace offers. He cites
a .message through the British Em-
bassy in Stockholm saying "The
Filhrer feels responsible for the fu-
ture of the white race" and would be
willing to settle for "two economic
units - continental Europe, which is
Germany's, and the British Empire
and America." That would have
brought a hellish peace - for a while.
The other way to avoid war is to get
rid of Mr. Hussein It is what the em,
bargo is really about, and he knows it.
Talk of finding him an "escape
hatch" or "saving face" because his
demands are limited is the kind of
talk Mr. Coleman thinks Churchill
should have entertained in 1940. This
time the world has organized against
aggression, and its determination
should inspire Iraqis.
The Washington Post
The New York Times
The Washington Times
The Wall Street Journal
The Christian Science Monitor
New York Daily News
USA Today
The Chicago Tribune
That is where the Soviets come in.
Mr. Hussein has foiled many coup at-
tempts, with brutal aftermaths, but
the incentive to try again is much
greater now and growing. Moscow
knows a lot about who is who in the
entourage, what might be possible. It
has its own good reasons for wanting
the crisis to end without a fight.
Washington should encourage the
Soviets to pass along useful informa-
tiop, test what they are willing to pro-
vide, and assure that confidence will
be repected. There is too much to lose
without trying it. Mr. Hussein didn't
give us time to get used to the idea of
such cooperation, but it's vital. ^
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Handling Of Saddam
Sets Tone For New Era
VENICE, Italy
The Security Council vote endorsing military
enforcement of the U.N. blockade on Iraq
was an impressive feat of diplomacy. It not
only strengthened the international coalition
against President Saddam Hussein: it blocked the
temptation of American hawks to plunge into war.
The way the Persian Gulf crisis is resolved is
going to have deep impact on world affairs for a
long time. Instead of confirming the United States
as leading partner of all who seek a peaceful world,
going it alone could have reversed the remarkable
consensus creating a new weapon for peace.
Participants at a meeting here of Aspen Institute
Italia on "Economic Policies for a New Era: West-
West and East-West" reflected widespread relief
that the era probably will not start with a bang after
all. The meeting was planned long ago, but every-
body came preoccupied with Iraq, oil and the ques-
tions they provoked.
A major gain so far has been the advance in
American-Soviet diplomatic cooperation. Paul
Nitze, former U.S. arms negotiator, has called for
using the momentum to speed up more far-reaching
arms-reduction agreements: Nitze's careful propos-
als should weigh against the peculiar idea that the
gulf threat makes further arms control and drastic
restructuring of American forces undesirable. This
crisis is in part a result of the global arms race, and
should argue instead for a much sterner, broader
attempt to block it everywhere.
The Soviets can make crucial contributions to
help resolve the crisis. The efforts are delicate and
might have to be discreet, but they are a new test.
They concern intelligence. There are still several
hundred Soviet military technicians in Iraq. They
probably know where the hostages are. More im-
portant, Moscow knows all about Iraqi forces, air
defenses, missiles, equipment, most of it Soviet-
made. That information won't disarm Saddam Hus-
sein, but it must gravely undermine his confidence
if he has to suppose the United States has it.
Most important, no intelligence service anywhere
has the KGB's intimate knnwledgP of Iraqi ntn itiM
especially rivalries and fault lines within the mili-
tary and police establishments, some of them also
organized by former Eastern European security
services.
The one way to avoid war is for the Iraqis them-
selves to bring down their dictator. It is an illusion to
think that outside pressure can induce Saddam to
pull out of Kuwait and let his forces be neutralized.
That would be failure, and he knows his own people
would not let him survive a show of impotence. He
would more likely sacrifice them. Moscow can get
word to the right people.
The Washington Post
The New York Times
The Washington Timer
The Wail Street Journal
The Christian Science Monitor
New York Daily News
USA Today
The Chicago Tribune
?a 12
Date p
Before the gulf crisis, Prime Minister Ruud Lub-
bers of the Netherlands proposed technical aid to
improve the Soviet oil industry as a way to help
Eastern European democracies that will have to
pay hard currency for these imports next year.
West Europeans like the idea. The United States
should support it. That would be yet another innova-
tive example of cooperation for mutual and general
benefit. It is a new era. The Soviets need help and
they can .contribute.
FLORA
LEWIS
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Camarena Dispute
Isn't Neighborly
MEXICO CITY
T he message that President Carlos Salinas de
Gortari wants to send the United States, he
says, is that "Mexico is changing. We want to
be in the international arena." For that, Mexico
must have good U.S. relations, a new confidence to
replace knee-jerk resentment arising from solid
historical reasons and the inevitable weight of a
colossus. And in many ways, that is developing.
Bush and Salinas have good personal rapport.
High-level government contacts are being institu-
tionalized. The 2,000-mile border is increasingly
permeable, with more than 200 million legal cross-
ings last year. Attitudes are evolving.
Still, the underlying reflex is deeply ingrained.
Even Luis Alvarez, leader of the opposition Nation-
al Action Party, PAN, betrays it when he denies
charges of receiving campaign help from U.S. Re-
publicans. "If I did, I'd be sitting in Los Pinos (the
president's office) now," he said unwittingly reveal-
ing the automatic assumptions of America's power
to influence everything here.
So it doesn't take a lot to provoke new anger. The
case of Humberto Alvarez Machain has become a
flash point, symbolizing Mexico's sense of fragile
sovereignty and what it considers U.S. disdain. It
threatens to poison the whole relation, although
diplomats on both sides are eager to prevent that.
It is a nasty case. Alvarez is accused of participat-
ing in the torture death of a U.S. Drug Enforcement
agent, Enrique Camarena Salazar, in 1985. On April
2, Alvarez was kidnapped and turned over to police
in El Paso and now faces trial in California. Every-
one here supposes the Drug Enforcement Agency
was behind the abduction.
The outrage is such that Salinas would win unani-
mous applause if he expelled the DEA from Mexico
in retributioq. He doesn't want to do that. He hasn't
decided whether to demand Alvarez back, which
would challenge the U.S. judicial system, or wait for
the trial and seek extradition. Mexican officials
point out that 28 people have already been jailed in
the Camarena murder case, and say the United
States never asked them to arrest Alvarez.
There is no sympathy here for Alvarez, and Sali-
nas said he ordered the Camarena investigation
reopened. But other Mexicans argue the U.S. reac-
tion to one agent's death is disproportionate when
300 Mexican police have been killed. They feel the
kidnapping was a display of U.S. contempt for and
disbelief in their effort, when America hasn't made
any remarkable progress at home.
Salinas wants a new a ment on rules of alli-
ance tra c ers. U.S. officials say a ex-
c anges of intelligence have improved, but the
Mexicans consider it one-sided. There will have to
be much better, restulanzed cooperation or none.
The recent supreme Court decision ng
American courts jurisdiction over crimes against
American citizens abroad worries the Mexicans.
They admit their judicial system is racked with
corruption but they see the ruling as legalizing
aggressive disrespect for their sovereignty.
But Mexico must be shown that the United States
considers it a willing partner even on such ugly
cases, not just-a back yard for us to clean up because
we can't handle our own addiction.
CopyNeM tt9e Now York Tinos News Service
The WaWinglon OOat
The Platy York Times
The WaMkngton Timm
The WON Stress Journal
The ChrIst R So er cs Monitor
New York Daily wawf
USA Today
The cnic.go Tri me
SI. avts 3 C
DM 7 AAq v
FLORA
LEWIS
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FOREIGN AFFAIRS
Flora Lewis
The Next
Panama
Crisis
WASHINGTON
The next Panama crisis is coming
in exactly eight weeks. Under the
treaty, the term of the American
administrator of the Canal Company
expires on Dec. 31. He must be re-
placed by a Panamanian. Further. the
new head is to be nominated by the
Government of Panama, appointed by
the President of the United States and
confirmed by the Senate.
That was the real, but unmentioned,
importance of the flap over the recent
failed attempt to oust Gen. Manuel
Noriega. American indignation at defi-
ance from the shrewd, corrupt little
dictator turned a serious national itl-
terest into a preposterous personal
vendetta, to the U.S. disadvantage,
Washington had already committed
another in a long string of bumbles in
handling Panan1B, and it rent unno-
ticed. As the treaty provides. General
Noriega had nominated a new adminis-
trator, his crony Carlos Duque. Presi-
dent Bush rejected him without even
bothering to send it to the Senate.
But he went further, blocking a pos-
sible solution. There Could have been a
quiet arrangement, through media-
tors, to make sure General Noriega of-
fered a man the U.S. would accept- He
has been smart enough not to obstruct
for a minute the functioning of the
canal, which is 99 percent of why
Panama matters to the U.S. and the
rest of the world
However, the U.S. said it would not
accept anybody proposed by General
Noriega. That puts Washington in the
position of violating the treaty It
signed, and the Panamanian strong-
man will doubtless make a noisy point
of it, to the distress of all America's
friends and treaty partners.
The ploy the U.S. intends to use is to
appoint the Panamanian who is now
No. 2 in the Canal Company as acting
administrator. He is a highly respected
engineer named Fernando Manfredo,
fully capable of doing the job. But it
isn't clear whether he will agree to put
himself in the middle of the fight.
Washington will argue that choosing
a Panamanian citizen fulfills the
"spirit" of the treaty, and that it has a
right to ignore the letter because the
existing Government is not "legiti-
mate." An acting administrator would-
n't be submitted for Senate approval.
This is t thp 11 R made for itself
when it c ferred the distinction at
tiR merica's currrent No. I bu2a-
boo
were the main reason for our inter
in enema e's a crook. -a drug deal-
er, a thoroughly nasty man once on the
q" oavroll- but that doesn't make
h s except . al. You don't hear the
Pres ent of
for 'ouster of th ' isteLA1
I a amas or Honduran Qenerals
o are just as involved in drgs.
ut we got on General
Noriega and launched amateurish
schemes for not-So-covert action to
show who is boss by proxy. Elliot
Abrams, the rambunctious Assistant
Secretaryof State for Latin America in
the Reagan Administration, cooked up
the idea of a mini-coup in which the
weak Panamanian President fired the
General in early 1488.
The General immediately fired the
President, whom he had installed in
the first place, and the U.S. cut itself off
from Panamanian authorities on
grounds that the Government was then
illegal. Gen. Fred Woerner, head of the
U.S. Southern Command, understood
the intricate problems that posed and
the foolish inversion of U.S. priorities.
He discreetly criticized the policy and
was bounced for his sensible efforts to
keep bad from getting worse.
We have the Joint Chiefs to thank
that things didn't go on to disaster. Mr.
Abrams's next script would have bun-
dled opposition leaders into Quarry
Heights, the U.S. headquarters, sur-
rounded them with U.S. troops, and had
them proclaim a government in exile
on Panamanian territory.
The Washington Post
The New York Times
The Washington Times
The Wall Street Journal
The Christian Science Monitor
New York Daily News
USA Today
The Chicago Tribune
Data S Alh V
Adm. William Crowe, then Chairma:
of the Joint Chiefs, put his foot dowr.
Such folly would have endangeret
every U.S. base in the world, Further
more, the Pentagon figured it coup
take three more U S. divisions to dea
with the possible consequences.
What bothered Admiral Crowe the
most was that the U.S. was supposed tc
take all the risks while the opposition
waited compliantly to be handtt'
power. Those who argued that Wash
ington should have made sure thi<
year's bungled coup would work had r.(
reason to believe General Nonega
rebellious henchmen would give way tt
civilians. More likely, the U S. would
have been saddled with a Nonega
clone whom it had put in power.
The lesson is that flag-waving, pos-
turing and cockamamie plots can't
substitute strategic thought and
si*nd dipl racy. Instead of surrinc
American emotions, the Administra-
tion's responsibility is to make U.S. in-
terests clear. Where Panama is con-
cerned, that is the canal, first, second
and third: Now we are left to face the
real issue. It wop't be easy.
Pap. 38.
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