SOVIET GAME PLAN

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP97M00248R000500220030-9
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 28
• Document Creation Date: December 27, 2016
• Document Release Date: February 11, 2013
• Sequence Number: 30
• Publication Date: August 19, 1985
• Content Type: MEMO

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1 Executive Registry
OS- 3219/1
19 August 1985
MEMORANDUM FOR: Vice Chairman, National Intelligence Council
FROM: Director of Central Intelligence
SUBJECT: SoViet Game Plan
1. This is the project I talked to you about. The first
thoughts are mine, then a note to you outlining some work I'd
like to get brought up to date on Southern Africa, then some work
I have asked Graham Fuller to do, all to support the project I
talked to you about on the telephone this morning.
2. You will get in touch with Theberge, talk about the
project generally, see what he has to contribute and perhaps have
him do some work on the Latin America phase of it. I attach a
memorandum which OGI did for me relative to this.
William J. Casey
Attachments:
DCI memo dated 19 August 1985
DCI memo to VC/NIC, dated 19 August 1985
DCI memo to NIO/NESA dated 19 August 1985
OGI memo dated 13 Aug 1985
STAT,
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19 August 1985
There is a strong view in the United States Intelligence Community that,
over the long term, unless present trends are overturned, the USSR and its
allies are on their way to overturning the world balance of power against
the United States.
It is clear that the Soviets have their problems and that they are severe.
They are not 20 feet tall. They do not carefully orchestrate all the world's
troublemaking. But they do have an arsenal of enormous assets, at least at
present. Their chief such weapons are, briefly:
-- A fairly consistent, general long-range strategy. This is a
patient overall course, one under way now for some decades--one in which
political, military, economic, and subversive goals/tactics all reinforce
one another. This strategy at bedrock is based on continuing outward pressure
on the Third World and all around the USSR's periphery, backed up by a
formidable military shield, in the confidence that ripe plums will continue
to drop and will in time erode the US/Western position in the world, without
Soviet resort to war or major provocation.
-- The existence of many extremely soft situations in the world.
Many of these, perhaps most, are the products of history and would be
occurring even if there were no USSR. But there is a USSR, actively
exploiting these vulnerabilities--the greatest threats in the process being
the further expansion of Soviet military base rights in the world, and of
subversive footholds for the further fanning of revolutionary discontent.
-- As part of these exploitable opportunities, the existence of
ready anti-American audiences here and there: in some locales in the
Third World, where there are substantial grievances against certain US
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policies relating to the Near East, Latin America, and southern Africa;
and in some audiences in Western Europe, where wishful thinking and escapism
abound in some measure.
-- The USSR has certain potent allies and instrumentalities at the
ready. These of course include Soviet military and economical aid and
assistance; a worldwide network of subversive capabilities; radical partners
whose interests coincide with Moscow's in many cases, and whose troublemaking
causes us substantial pain; and Soviet backstage support of certain of the
world's terrorist activities.
-- The absence of strategic consensus among the US and its allies,
and the many constraints we all face in trying to bring effective counterforce
to bear.
The USSR and its allies have countless weaknesses. The US and its allies
have countless strengths not fully tapped. The US has turned around certain
situations in the world, El Salvador a prime example. And there are many
more opportunities in the world awaiting USG initiative--not just reaction.
To the long-range contest between two competing world systems, we and
certain of our non-Communist allies and friends bring extraordinary strengths.
-- These include our great advantage in that high technology necessary
to prevail in the 21st century. The Soviets simply cannot compete here, which
is why they are raising such a hue and cry about SDI. By maximizing the high
tech advantages of Japan and the West, and by doing more to deny technology
transfer leakage to the USSR, we can more than compensate for the Soviet Union's
huge investment in yesterday's armed forces, and in the process place great
new strains on the Soviet economy and society.
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-- Iran - the Soviets are coolly and patiently playing on Iran's
interest in an opening to Moscow.
-- Sudan - a naive regime and an unstable political scene give the
Soviets a fresh target of great strategic significance, to be worked with
the help of Libya, Ethiopia, and the PDRY.
-- South Africa - in its current torment, South Africa is a case
study, needs to be viewed not as an isolated hot spot, but as part of a globe-
girdling phenomenon represented by countries ranging from El Salvador to the
Philippines, South Africa to Chile, Pakistan to South Korea, a necklace of
countries whose governments are non-Communist but authoritarian, each in its
own way embarked on a course of internal reform leading toward democracy.
The struggle over this necklace is a major element of the US-Soviet
competition. Our goal in each country is true democracy; our strategy is
to offer each government our full support--moral even more than material--
while simultaneously using the influence this support brings us to pressure
each government to continue along its power-sharing course. In contrast,
the Soviet goal is to destabilize each country in hopes of bringing to power
Marxist governments; the Soviet strategy is to force each government toward
political repression--for example in response to domestic violence--in hopes
that when the road closes toward evolution the road will open toward
revolution. The key to this strategy is to drive a wedge between the US
and the target government, and by doing so to remove US influence on the
theory that when left to its natural instincts an authoritarian government
will revert to repression. It's a bit like cutting off a reformed alcoholic
from his AA meetings, in hopes the poor devil will weaken and take just one
little nip.
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In South Africa, without in any way getting tangled in the question of
whether the whole thing has been masterminded by some genius in Moscow, it
is an observable and irrefutable fact that in South Africa the Soviet strategy
has now succeeded. Even more appalling, the Soviet strategy has succeeded
in less than six months. Within the other countries that comprise the
necklace I've described, leaders will take note of events in South Africa.
We should anticipate that in at least some of these countries, evolution
toward democracy will be slowed or even aborted. Moreover, leaders in all
these countries will note the breathtaking ease with which the wedge between
the US and South Africa was driven in. This latter fact will also be noted
in Moscow, and within the leadership of all those Western-based "public
interest" groups that did so much to bring about the present debacle. Having
won such a big victory so quickly and so easily, our adversaries would be
fools not to press on to the next target.
Take Chile as a similar target. The Pinochet government is facing a
rising tide of leftist opposition. On the eve of celebrations marking the
12th anniversary of the overthrow of the leftist Allende regime, Chilean
Communists--encouraged, armed, and supported by the USSR, Cuba, Nicaragua,
and Libya--clearly intend to use terrorism as a means to destabilize the
government. The Communists, in cooperation with other leftists, are trying
to force Pinochet to reimpose the stage of siege lifted in June and thereby
implement repressive measures that will polarize the populace and persuade
them that Pinochet can only be removed by means of violence. Help from the
USSR, Cuba, and elsewhere has enabled Chilean Communists to improve their
terrorist capabilities.
120 Chilean
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exiles recently completed urban warfare training in Algeria, East Germany,
Cuba, Nicaragua, and the Soviet Union and are being returned to Chile. Some
of them reportedly participated in the recent violence.
The Soviet Union sanctions terrorist actions in Chile in the name of
national liberation. Luis Corvalan, head of the armed Communist force in
Chile, lives in Moscow, is subservient to Moscow's wishes, and has consistently
followed the Soviet line without deviation. In 1980, he publicly announced
resumption of the armed struggle in Chile, reportedly at Moscow's instigation.
The Soviet Union finances the armed Communist force in Chile, provides timely
propaganda support and lends tactical support in the way of paramilitary
training; however, it apparently prefers to maintain a low profile and let
Cuba, its regional actor, provide the majority of the tactical support.
The Philippines is clearly another ripe target. Drawing on historic
parallels, the Republic of the Philippines is headed for a dramatic regime
change and may be in a pre-revolutionary stage. It is worth looking at the
Philippines in this context: As in pre-revolutionary Iran and Nicaragua
in 1978 and Cuba in 1958, the Philippines is ruled by a corrupt autocrat
whose dynasty it is widely recognized will end with his ouster or death.
Power will go to whomever can seize it. As in Nicaragua and Iran, the
moderate democratic opposition is leaderless, disorganized and lacks a
true popular base except as a protest vehicle to express dissatisfaction
with the regime (as in the 1984 election). As in Nicaragua, Cuba, China
and Vietnam, there is a highly disciplined armed Communist insurgency making
important gains in rural areas. Government military and economic programs
are ineffective.
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26 July 1985
MEMORANDUM FOR: Deputy Director for Intelligence
FROM: Director of Central Intelligence
SUBJECT: Libyan and Cuban Foreign Aid
Costa Rican leftist Echeverria
has recently been successful in obtaining a definitive commitment for
financial support from Cuba and Libya, is but another indication of
Libya's activity in the western hemisphere. In addition, it points up
that Cuba and Libya may well be competing for influence in the region.
2. I would like to have our best summary, by country, of the nature
and extent of both Libyan and Cuban aid to countries throughout Latin
America. This should denote all forms of assistance, whether granted or
promised, known or suspected, etc. This should be coordinated with the
DO.
3. At the same time, I would like to have comparable information for
countries elsewhere in the world where both Cuba and Libya are involved.
cc: DDO
Willian
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EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT
ROUTING SLIP
TO:
ACTION
INFO
DATE
INITIAL
1
DCI
X
2
DDCI
X
3
EXDIR
4
D/ICS
5
DDI
X
6
DDA
7
DDO
8
DDS&T
9
Chm/NIC
10
GC
11
IG
12
Compt
13
D/OLL ?
14
D/PAO
15
VC/NIC
16
NIO/USSR
.
X
17
N10/SP
X
18
C/ACIS
X
20
21
22
SUSPENSE
ug
Date
Remarks
To 5: Please have draft memo and rough
outline for SNIE ready for DCI review
on Monday, 26 August.
3637 (1?-8')
Exekptiye Secretary
1? Aug 85
Date
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Executive Registry
85- 3219
19 August 1985
MEMORANDUM FOR: Deputy Director of Central Intelligence
Deputy Director for Intelligence
Chief, Office of Soviet Analysis, DI
National Intelligence Officer for Strategic Programs
National Intelligence Officer for USSR
Chief, Arms Control Intelligence Staff
FROM: Director of Central Intelligence
SUBJECT: Soviet Game Plan
1. That's a very good analysis you all turned out in two pieces,
entitled "Soviet Gameplan and Implications" and "Talking Points on the
Soviet Game Plan for SDI and the Summit".
2. It has taken me all this time to ponder it, wondering how to
develop and use it. My present thinking is to do two things:
i) A note or a quick think piece on the emerging Soviet game
plan against SDI and its pitfalls - we give up something basic, difficult
to start up again, they recover value of missile reductions fairly quickly
through improved accuracy in existing programs. The new DI study on
improving accuracy along with the Soviet point defense and missile reduction
feelers is the occasion for this.
ii) A SNIE on the stakes at Geneva covering in a comprehensive way
the multiple and sweeping implications in the two papers you gave me. This
would project the impact of various levels of missile reduction on our
vulnerabilities, the Soviet recovery potential, the value of point defense,
the cost of giving up the various options for mid-course an
defense, the NATO and regional implications, etc.
1115
Oa. "
3. I'd like to have a draft of the first item when I return next week
and your ideas on a SNIE to be available in late September or early October.
4. The first item would make the points in Fritz's early memo of
25 July, in somewhat less detail and pick up quickly, without as much
elaboration, the main points in the two most recent memos.
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5. I've marked the elements I would keep on the memos. The first
item need not go into all the pros and cons. It is to sensitize to the
long term and permanent impact of giving up SDI and the likely illusory
and temporary benefit of a cutback in offensive missiles.
Attachments:_
"Soviet Gameplan and Implications"
"Talking Points on the Soviet Game Plan
for $DI and the Summit"
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William J. Casey
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JLUMCI
?
25 July 1985
TALKING POINTS ON THE SOVIET GAME PLAN FOR SDI AND THE SUMMIT
Through informal probes the Soviets have outlined their approach to spiking
SDI through a combination of arms control and internal US politics. In the
next few months we shall probably see more informal embellishments on their
approach, and possibly a formal proposal before the summit.
As so far revealed, the elements of the Soviet approach are:
Tacit "acceptance" of SDI research so long as it stays in the laboratory
because this cannot be practically controlled. The Soviets will
continue, however, to label all SDI activity as destabilizing,
especially anything aimed toward space deployment, operation, or
intercept.
"Strengthening" of the ABM agreement to even more firmly preclude
development, testing, and deployment of systems in space for mid-course
or boost-phase intercept. At a minimum, the Soviets will want to assure
that the continuation of the ABM treaty will give them a veto over the
emergence of any US SDI program "from the laboratory."
Possible adjustments to the ABM treaty to allow for additional point or
limited area defenses which are ground based (and for which the USSR has
earlier deployment options than the US).
In return for which, phased reduction of intercontinental and possibly
intermediate nuclear launchers and warheads in the neighborhood of
25-30%.
The Soviets see this as a promising indirect approach to kill SDI in its
research cradle by
Obliging a post-Reagan administration to seek Soviet approval under the
ABM treaty for any development beyond laboratory research.
Persuading Congress and others that such Soviet approval will never
come; that material SDI progress beyond research will require
abroggation of a just improve ABM treaty; and, therefore, that SDI
research is really a waste of money.
At the same time, the Soviets will expect the Reagan administration to
accept this preclusive mortgage on the future because it
Seems to representa degree of Soviet acquiescence to SDI, for the time
being while...
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Allowing progress on offense-systems arms control for which there is so
much political eagerness, especially at summit time.
The Soviets might see some chance of wrapping this all up at the November
summit. Failing that they would be very happy to get an "agreement in
principle" supposedly binding on the Geneva talks, aiming for an agreement
and another summit in 1986. An agreement in principle would constitute
heavy pressure on US negotiators as well as Congressional budget debates
over SDI.
They might throw in some other features, such as a "compromise" on the
- Krasnoyarsk radar (raising the question as to whether it is wise for us
to make a concession to get them to stop violating an agreement).
The Soviet argument will sound very reasonable:
"Mr. President! If you want us to negotiate seriously about reductions
in strategic offensive forces, you must give us as firm a lock on the
future of SDI as any international agreement can give. For us to match
your program will be impossibly expensive for us. Moreover, we are, as
your own people claim, at a technological disadvantage. Our only real
hedge against this potentially revolutionary development is to keep, and
even enlarge, our big missile force with its great throwweight, so that,
if needed, we can multiply warheads, penaids, and airframe hardness.
Even with your firm commitment not to proceed with SDI development
without our agreement, our marshals will insist that we must keep a
large ICBM force to hedge against the possibility that a future US
president will abrogate the ABM agreement when the results of SDI
research come in."
ittri
This b--?44:won .s the predictable result of our decision last summer, which
seemed so clever at the time, to agree to arms talks on space so long as
they were linked in some way to resumption of START and INF.
Any Way Out?
There are really only three ways out:
In the face of inviting new proposals from the Soviets, we can try to
continue the current policy of claiming that we seek real offensive
reductions while, with regard to space, only negotiating the modalities
of "integrating" new defenses into the strategic equation. This is
going to prove increasingly untenable politically.
We can acquiesce in the Soviet game plan in the hopes that this and
future administrations can keep SDI research alive in the face of treaty
prohibitions on its deployment, and that a future US president would in
fact abrogate or force renegotiation of the agreement if SDI systems
looked sufficiently promising. This is probably where we are headed
unless we come up with a fresh approach, or find some way to break off
the negotiating process ourselves while blaming the Soviets.
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We can try a fresh approach that radically enlarges the "trade off
arena."
This approach would begin by asking whether there is any price at which we
would limit or foreswear SDI. Perhaps there is a price; but it must be very
high and firm. We shall insist on proceeding with $DI research in a serious
way because the world needs a technical escape route from nuclear
vulnerability and because we know the Soviets will also work the
technology. But we are prepared to give the Soviets an agreement, subject
as always to the option of abrogation, that allows them to veto deployment
if:
We can come to some sensible compromise on what constitutes "research"
that allows enough development and testing in space to make for a
reasonable program;
And the Soviets accept our approach to major strategic offensive force
reductions;
And the Soviets accept a sweeping INF and MBFR agreement that virtually
eliminates their offensive threat to Europe, which is the most
destabilizing military threat that our whole strategic posture must
contend with;
And the USSR takes a whole range of concrete and observable measures to
eliminate its destabilizing threat to Third World regions, including
unconditional withdrawal from Afghanistan and termination of support for
the Sandinistas.
And the USSR rigorously lives up to its political and human rights
obligations under the Helsinki agreement.
Thus President Reagan's reasonable answer to Gorbachev's "reasonable"
argument would be:
Mr. General Secretary: We cannot accept your veto over our most
promising unilateral option for escaping or stabilizing the environment
of nuclear vulnerability, which is politically and strategically
non-viable over the long term, unless you take radical and concrete
steps to eliminate the whole range of threats which you present to US,
our allies, and the regions between us. This may seem like a very high
price to you. Indeed it is. But it is not an unreasonable price. You
insist that SDI is very threatening; therefore, you should be willing to
pay a high price to avert or-get influence over it. We belief SDI
offers the promise of transforming the whole strategic environment
toward something much more stable and safe. Technically, it concerns
long-range ballistic missiles. But strategically and politically, as
you realize, it could affect the whole of our relationship. Therefore
we would be crazy to accept your veto over it without fixing the whole
range of-problems that compel us to develop SDI."
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I find this "fresh approach" appealing intellectually because it turns SDI
into leverage on the whole range of interconnected issues that constitute
the real strategic threat, and jettisons our moronic habit of separating and
compartmenting issues that are not only linked but part of a whole.
In practice, however, this would be ver' dangerous because, once we've
admitted that there is some price at which we would sell out SDI, everybody
will jump in to get the price lowered to some "negotiable" level, i.e.,
acceptable to the Soviets.
Therefore, we may have no choice but to pursue the first path, current
policy, knowing that every failing of discipline and clarity in our own
government will slide us gently into the Soviet game'plan.
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Soviet Gameplan and Implications
The Soviets will use the period between now and November to place
themselves in a "heads we win, tails you lose" position. The crux is a
strategic arms control framework offering major reductions (Soviet officials
have hinted at 30 to 40 percent) in and equal limits on strategic offensive
forces in exchange for constraints on SDI development. To maximize pressure
on you Moscow will advertise this framework publicly, alongside the already
publicized Soviet threat to greatly increase the number of weapons in
response to a continuing SDI program.
This Soviet campaign will aim to create the impression in the world and
in Washington that you have no alternative to at least a general agreement
on the Soviet tradeoff framework, short of scuttling all arms control.
Moscow will seek to portray you as choosing between, on one hand, sizeable
reductions in the offensive nuclear threat (and continued adherence to the
ABM Treaty, albeit perhaps with some modifications), versus freedom to
engage in a program for strategic defense, on the other, whose feasibility
is unproved, but which, in any event, will lead to further increases in
offensive forces.
The clearest signal yet of Mosccow's intent to put summit choices before._
the public occurred on 14 August, when Gorbachev stated that a nuclear test
moratorium is a summit issue. And Pravda hinted at the same time the
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possibility of progress in MBFR. Clearly the Soviets intend to generate
public pressure across a broad front of arms control issues to create a
"promising" atmosphere, although they claim they are not optimistic about
the meeting. We are likely to see similar "choice setting" statements
relating to CDE and to matters under consideration in the Geneva-based
Conference on Disarmament (e.g., chemical weapons).
Manipulating the Offensive Forces-SDI Tradeoff
Moscow probably expects the "billboard appeal" of its tradeoff proposal
to be considerable, and that expert critics won't do it much harm. So far,
only a vague framework has been put forward on the record in Geneva.
Various Soviet officials have discussed "illustratively" such specifics as
the amount of reductions, the weapons counting rules, and the dividing line
between research and "development" for SDI, and intimated that the specifics
are all negotiable. But first the US must accept the "principle"--i.e.,
tradeoffs between offensive forces and SDI. The Soviets are likely to use
this approach to parry specific criticisms of their proposal, and we suspect
Gorbachev will adopt this stance at the summit.
The Soviets probably calculate that your agreement to negotiate within
their tradeoff framework will seriously undermine Congressional and public
support for SDI funding and put a brake on the momentum you have achieved
for the overall SDI concept. Conversely, they would expect your refusal to
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negotiate on their framework would have a very damaging impact on your
political standing and your overall foreign policy, especially in Europe, by
demonstrating that your Administration is not interested in arms control but
only in building up forces--both defensive and offensive. (Heads they win,
tails we lose.)
Moreover, if the Soviets are successful in framing public perception in
such "either-or" terms, they could obfuscate the broader promise of your
concept of moving the strategic relationship from one of mutual threat to
mutual security through defense or better offense-defense balances. They
seek to paint SDI as an evil threat of arms race escalation and a block to
real arms control, while obscuring their own long-standing interest in
strategic defense, especially monopolized by them. By offering a radical
proposal, they would hope to make this stick.
The "First Strike" Issue
One of the most vulnerable aspects of the Soviet framework is that it
offers no guarantees--even with "radical" reductions-- that the USSR's first
strike capability (against silos and C3 targets) will in any way be reduced,
or in fact prevented from growing. This threat resides in the 308 SS-18
heavy ICBMs and will continue to for some time. The Soviets know full well
that the US will seek large reductions of this threatening force in a major
agreement and some Soviet officials have hinted that Moscow might be willing
to consider such reductions, if their tradeoff framework is accepted.
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The Soviets to date have steadfastly resisted all attempts to get at
their heavy ICBMs, and the more recent hints of flexibility, may simply be
designed to entice the US to bite on the tradeoff principle without a solid
Soviet concession. On the other hand, we believe the Soviets might offer
and could afford--militarily--to cut their heavy ICBMs if the price were
right--and telling constraints on SDI might be their price.
The SS-18s are the arm that would take out the present US hard
target systems, now mainly our own silo-based ICBMs. The Soviets
see a US hard target (first strike) capability developing in the US
SLBM forces, however, which means that by the 1990s the SS-18 would
not be able to deliver a first, knock out strike against the US
hard target capability. And the part of the US hard target
capability that the SS-18s could hit would be the oldest part,
while the fixed-silo SS-18s became vulnerable to the US SLBM hard
target RVs.
The main characteristic of the new Soviet strategic systems now
entering or about to enter the force is mobility (and thus improved
survivability) in the form of mobile ICBMs and new SLBMs. None of
these systems so far has demonstrated hard target capability. We
have no reason to believe, however, that the Soviets would not be
able--over time--to improve the accuracy of some of their new
mobile systems to where they would have such capability.
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In sum, despite the continuing value to the Soviets of their heavy
SS-18s, they will become vulnerable to a first strike in the
future, and their relative value in the strategic equation seems to
be on the down side of the slope. Meanwhile, at a time when most
of the improvements taking place in Soviet strategic offensive
forces are in the non-hard target but survivable (mobile) strike
force, the US is threatening to develop a future capability to
defend against such forces.
Consequently, the Soviets could calculate that they would have more to
gain than to lose just now by offering substantial cuts in their heavy ICBMs
in exchange for US agreement to the SDI-versus-offensive-force tradeoff
principle. If they do in fact contemplate such a move, we think it likely
they would hold it back as a "pot sweetener" and force the US to bid for
it. We do not, however, rule out the possibility that Gorbachev might put
it on the table at Geneva or--publicly--at some time prior to the summit.
Such a move certainly would be consistant with and maximize the effect of a
strategy designed to create for you the "no viable political alternative"
box.
An opportune time would be when Gorbachev visits Paris in October. Then A.
the spotlight will be on him. Mitterand is moving in directions that may
make him a convenient straight man for Soviet arms control gambits.
Gorbachev will certainly make inviting noises about all the other arms
control progress, e.g. INF, MBFR, CUE, and European detente that could occur
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if only the US gives ground on SDI. During October and November, following
the Gorbachev-Mitterand Summit, you can expect the Soviet arms control PR to
intensify substantially.
Modifying the ABM Treaty
Part of the general Soviet package is an alleged willingness to
accommodate some US concerns for strategic defense by renegotiating the
limits in the present ABM Treaty, to permit more ground based ABM defense,
such as that around Moscow. We are uncertain how seriously the Soviets
intend this. They probably see some potential appeal to those in the US who
see terminal defenses as a substitute for SDI, intended not to make for
mutual defensibility, but for a return to "stable" mutual assured
destruction, based on survivable (protected) offensive forces. But in view
of the fact that the Soviets are so much better positioned to take
advantage--at least in the short term--of higher ground-based ABM limits, we
question how persuasive they think this will look to your administration.
We suspect the chief functions of these particular probes are to encourage
opponents of the full SDI concept, show some flexibility of their own on
defenses, and see if they can't somehow get the US to accept more ABM on the
Soviet side.
None of this need be set in concrete at your meeting with Gorbachev or
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ever, for that matter. The immediate Soviet aim is to get you to agree in
principle that SDI is a bargaining chip and should be constrained if force
reductions are to be sought. Once they have this, they have made great
political yardage against SDI.
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14 August 1985
ISSUES FOR DECISION
Your NSDD No. 183 stipulates a low-key exploratory meeting with Gorbachev in
Geneva. Soviet political actions forecast above, however, are likely to
create great pressures for US movement toward more farreaching strategic
agreements. These pressures will present the following key issues for
decision.
1. Is now the time for a farreaching strategjc agreement with the USSR, or
at least very explicit understandings on the framework of such agreement to
be hammered out in later negotiations?
YES: The political pressures generated by the USSR, especially the
TiV)ting prospect of a big trade off between SDI and strategic
offensive forces, will be costly to resist, particularly if a deal
on heavy ICBMs can be included. The Soviets have leverage on us in
that they could be a more formidable opponent in the future: A
dynamic leadership, the possibility of an improving economy, hot
strategic force programs. At the same time, we have leverage on
them: SDI, our own strategic programs, conventional weapons they
are worried about, your assertive leadership in defense and foreign
policy. However, you must consider, and the Soviets may expect,
that your leadership power for competing with them may decline over
the rest of your term. Now is the time of your maximum relative
leverage, and hence for real bargaining.
NO: Your leverage is not as great now as it is likely to be a few
years hence. Gorbachev is not now ready of a real accommodation
consistent with US security. He seeks the same goals of expanded
military power and political influence with new skill. He wants
the detente back to make things easier for him. But a few years
hence he is likely to discover that his marginal internal reforms
and improved diplomatic PR haven't really reversed world trends
running against the Soviet empire. Then he will be more ready for
a real deal based on retrenchment of Soviet ambitions and respect
for others' security, in return for international tranquity and
help for his economy. If you stick to the program, SDI's leverage
will only grow. Soviet offensive and defensive program options,
while impressive, will not offer the same revolutionary potential.
The US and NATO have the potential to make the Soviets the loser in
long-term strategic competition. Notwithstanding second-term
troubles, you have the power to mobilize that potential if you
apply it.
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2. If "YES" above, are you ready to put SDI on the block as a bargaining
chip in some way?
YES: The spectre of SDI constitutes powerful leverage now which
be used. Technical and political uncertainties are likely
to weaken it in the future; and the Soviets will become committed
to their various "responses" in offensive and defensive programs.
Yet the Soviets recognize that they won't get you to kill SDI
outright; they are ready to "allow" some research in the hopes that
political opposition kills it in stime. This gives you some room to
protect a serious SDI research program and leave the hard decisions
for the future.
NO: If you accept explicit constraints on SDI, beyond those
inherited in the ABM treaty from Nixon-Kissinger, it could be the
political kiss of death for the program. Will Congress vote
billions for a program sure to be blocked by the Soviets at some
future "renegotiation" date or which, otherwise, will require a
post-Reagan administration to abrogate the ABM treaty? The
political kiss-of-death effect will start from the moment you agree
that SDI is a bargaining chip. But the payoff for us would come
only in agreements on offensive forces that will take months to
work out and years to implement. In that time, the Soviets will b
working like beavers on their own SDI and probably find ways to
whittle down their commitment to reductions.
3. If you are ready to put SDI on the block in some way, your first problem
is whether you want to protect a viable research program and how.
Assuming you want to protect a viable SDI research program, you
need to get Soviet agreement on a dividing line between permissible
research and impermissable development, testing, and deployment;
and on what are "components." [We'll need some further technical
discussion here.]
You will want to include some time certain for renegotiation of the
SDI constraints, and some escape clauses for Soviet non-compliance
with other parts of the package. [More technical discussion.]
You will need political understandings with Congress and the allies
that partially negate the kiss-of-death effect on SDI.
4. [This item is important, but perhaps optional in a shorter paper] Any
deal on SDI will be in the context of the ABM treaty. Will you want to
insist on full satisfaction of our compliance concerns regardin9 that
treaty, and possibly others, before you are willing to "reaffirm" it and
enlarge its impact on SDI?
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This is probably a firm political requirement for you domestically,
and a clear requirement for consistency with you entire record on
arms control.
For the ABM treaty, the key is the Krasnoyarsk radar. Will you
insist on its dismantlement? YES: Nothing less will do,
politically and technically. NO: The Soviets won't go this far,
and you won't be able to proveit is necessary.
5. How extensive and what kind of reductions of strategic offensive forces
are required to justify even conditional constraints on SDI?
The Soviets have vaguely hinted at percentage reductions (up to
40%), inclusion of weapon numbers, and subceilings on force
structure, making for an inviting sounding package. We await
firmer details.
As argued above, the Soviets may be willing to talk about
reductions in heavy ICBMs. If not, they are not really interested
in a farreaching agreement. But even if they are willing to
discuss this, a lot will depend on how fast they agree to reduce
them, and how firmly they are held to a reduction schedule after
the US has paid the political price of making SDI a bargaining chip.
The true test issue for gauging whether a reduction scheme is
really stabilizing or not is not the number of launchers and
weapons, but the number of weapons of appropriate quality and
survivability against the targets of the other side. Stability may
not be enhanced if a reduced Soviet force can still cover the US
hard and soft target set in preemptive and retaliatory scenarios
with a strategic reserve left over. If strategic targets in the US
remain at roughly their present number while Soviet forces become
more survivable because of mobility and US force reductions, even a
reduction down to, say, 5000 weapons might work against stability
not for it. To make a force reduction scheme work for stability,
we'll probably have to proliferate targets through mobility (e.g.,
Midgetman), dispersal of C3 and other military targets, like the
Soviets have, and also assure capabilities to attrit their withhold
force in a retaliatory strike (through accuracy, flexibility, recce
capability, etc.). Simply holding cities at risk is not a strategy
even for a reduced force, especially when we continue to give
nuclear guarantees to allies.
Thus, you'll want, not only to go after Soviet force structure (the
heavies) in a reduction scheme, but preserve our ability to put
more survivable and capable reduced US forces into a proliferated
target set, like the Soviets are doing.
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6. The more farreaching an agreement on offensive forces is contemplated
the more urgently will be required arms control agreements in parallel which
address NATO security directly. How far must you go in INF reductions and
also MBFR to make a farreachin9 SDI-offensive force reduction consistent
with our NATO obligations? While complicated, this issue cannot be dodged
except at a very high strategic and political price in the alliance.
The linkage between US strategic capabilities and the protection of
NATO is at the core of US policy and strategy, for the past 35
years and far into the future. Yet this linkage is uniformly
forgotten when inviting strategic arms control deals are on the
table. The results are predictably bad, politically and
militarily. Thus, because Nixon and Ford SALT policy essentially
"forgot about" Europe, the SS-20 ran free, and the Europeans got
upset about both their increased vulnerability and being "left out"
of strategic arms control, the heart of detente. The result was
the whole INF imbroglio, a hurried effort to "recouple" strategy
and arms control.
WA/1.4
Especially if we ar-e-n-ew-fjoang to contemplate a farreaching
strategic deal that exchanges constraints on our most revolutionary
unilateral option for the future, SDI, for extensive reductions in
the strategic forces that ultimately provide NATO's nuclear
guarantee, our alliance obligations require tight linkage to INF
and MBFR.
The INF linkage is fairly obvious, though often neglected. Reduced
US strategic forces cannot leave the USSR with relative superiority
in capability to cover the NATO target set be means of aircraft,
tactical-operational missiles, and residual SS-20s. Thus a
comprehensive theater nuclear force reduction and equalization,
below the level of military targeting requirements, is necessary,
something like the zero-zero option writ large. That will, of
course, magnify the problem of aircraft and other dual-capable
systems.
MBFR is a crucial issue here because it is not Soviet theater
nuclear forces, in the first instance, but Soviet tank armies that
are the truly destabilizing threat to NATO and the origin of our ,
nuclear guarantees. If the power and credibility of US strategic 1
nuclear guarantees is going to be reduced by force reductions --
and they must have this effect if strategic stability, i.e.,
reduced likelihood of use, is the true goal -- then either NATO has
to build up to confident conventional equivalence through numbers
and technology, or the Soviet offensive armored threat has to be
radically reduced, or a combination. If NATO is to be protected
politically and militarily, you cannot sign up to the strategic
deal and leave the theater deal, including conventional forces, for
later negotiation. Nothing is more precious to the Kremlin than
its armored threat to Europe. And nothing would more serve Soviet
imperial purposes than to see the strategic balance become far less
threatening to them while the European regional balance remains
essentially unchanged.
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7. Do you seek to link a farreachin? strategic deal on SDI and offensive
forces with other regional security issues, such as Afghanistan, Central
America, or the Middle East?
YES: The history of arms control negotiations and agreements
ilidicates that linkage to these issues is not a choice; it is a
fact of life. A farreaching agrement with the USSR on force
reductions will take many months, even years to negotiate. The
process and the outcome will not be insulated politically from what
the Soviets are doing in regions of conflict and instability. Some
want to ignore this, others fasten on it; but it is particularly
Soviet actions in the Third World that show what the USSR is really
up to in global affairs and whether a strategic arms control
agreement is seen by them as part of a larger stabilization or, as
has been the case up till now, as a means of keeping the US at ease
while the USSR conducts the strategic competition by other means.
Especially because your administration insists more firmly than any
precedessor and likely successor on seeing the full extent of the
Soviet challenge, you dare not de-link progress on strategic arms
control from some kind of real progress on regional security.
NO: Linkage is a fact of life, but it's too complicated for us to
manage as a policy. To link strategic arms control to Soviet good
behavior in the Third World just means you won't get strategic arms
control. Soviet troublemaking in the Third World will have to be
dealt with on its own terms. The Administration will just have to
be wary that an atmosphere of detente arising from arms control
progress does not cut down our ability to assert power and
influence in third areas, and to combat the Soviets were needed.
You have basically two alternative strategies leading up to the Geneva
meeting:
Stratep A: Go through the set of issues above and decide what
your minimum requirements for a strategic deal are (and hope they
don't leak), decide on your maximum or opening demands, and preempt
inviting Soviet offers with US ideas that set the framework of
debate, e.g., by convincing people before hand that SDI research
must be protected because the Soviets are going to do their own,
that stabilizing reductions cannot be simpleminded, that strategic
argreements must be linked to European security at least, etc.
Strategy B: Stick to the low-key, exploratory mode of NSDD 183,
discipline the arms control bureaucracy accordingly, and wait to
see what the Soviets have to offer that is really concrete.
Meanwhile, get out some of the conditioning arguments in strategy A
to immunize people against Soviet PR. And remind people that
Gorbachev does not walk on water; he has an easy act to follow; his
big problems are ahead of him. Let him stew in them for a while.
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