NSDD-71: U.S. POLICY TOWARD LATIN AMERICA IN THE WAKE OF THE FALKLANDS CRISIS

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP97M00248R000401050001-0
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 9
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: January 7, 2011
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: December 2, 1982
• Content Type: MEMO

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STAT
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CIA TS820360
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No. NSDD 71
COPY 44 (CIA)
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90929
THE WHITE HOUSE
December 2, 1982
MEMORANDUM FOR THE.HONORABLEGEORGE P. SHULTZ
The Secretary of State.
THE HONORABLE'CASPAR W. WEINBERGER
The Secretary of Defense
THE HONORABLE WILLIAM J. CASEY
Director of Central Intelligence
GENERAL JOHN W. VESSEY
Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff
SUBJECT: NSDD-71: U.S. Policy Toward Latin America in the
Wake of the Falklands Crisis (S)-
The President has approved National Security Decision Directive'?71
(NSDD-71), subject as above. A copy of the approved NSDD is attached.
Please ensure special handling of this document to prevent unauthorized
disclosure. (S)
Attachment
NSDD-71
TS 820360, CY Qe- of Cys
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November 30, 1982
Nat ona.e Secun.ity
Deems-Lon Di.nee ive 71
U.S. Policy Toward Latin America
In the Wake of the Falklands Crisis (S)
The Falklands crisis has strained relations with several Latin American
countries and resulted in uncertainty regarding the long-range policy
goals of the United States in the region. This in turn has increased
the potential for instability in Central and South America. (C)
U.S. national interests in Latin America and the region dictate policies
that achieve the following objectives:
? a region free of Soviet-dominated or hostile governments;
? the development of stable and democratic political systems and
institutions which promote respect for basic human rights;
? cooperative bilateral relations to deal with security and other
issues flowing from geographic proximity;
? advancement of major U.S. trade and investment;
? access to raw materials;
? prevention of nuclear proliferation;
? maintenance of stable balances of power among the states in
the region; and
? receptivity to U.S. leadership. (S)
Achieving these objectives has been complicated by the Falklands crisis.
Accordingly, our policy must be aimed at ameliorating the following
specific problems:
o Instability and irredentism in Argentina, which implies new
opportunities for the USSR to gain access to a strategic
position in the Southern Cone;
? Disillusionment with U.S. leadership in Venezuela and
elsewhere, which provides tempting opportunities for Cuba
to reduce its inter-American isolation;
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? The need to improve U.S. relations with Brazil, recognizing
Brazil's increased importance as a potential stabilizing. factor
in South America at a time when mounting economic and financial
difficulties are eroding our ties and influence there and in
the region as a whole.
? The vulnerability of burgeoning free enterprise economies
and. developing.pol.itical institutions to radical insurgent
movements supported by the Soviet Union and/or its
surrogates. -
? The interdiction threat to U.S. aerial and maritime routes
in the Caribbean Basin by potentially hostile airbases and the
introduction/augmentation of Soviet Bloc tactical aircraft and
weaponry. (TS)
In redressing these problems, the highest priority for the United
States will continue to be the reduction -- and. eventual
elimination
--
of the influence and presence of the Soviet Union or
states in our immediate environs -- Central America,
its
the
client
Caribbean
and Mexico. This will be accomplished through a coordinated application
of our diplomatic, economic, military, intelligence and informational
resources in the Caribbean Basin and Central America. (TS)
Our second priority is to restore and reassert United States in-
fluence in South America. To this end we will:
? Maintain our diplomatic position on the fundamental Falklands
issues as it existed prior to the crisis. Specifically: The
U.S. will continue as a neutral on the question of sovereignty
over the'islands and support negotiations, mediation or other
peaceful efforts to resolve this dispute;
? Attempt to preserve a regional political and military balance,
by seeking certification for Argentina and Chile, as eligible
for U.S. military sales, jointly if possible, and as early in
the new Congress as feasible. In order to progress on this
initiative, the State Department will intensify efforts to
resolve those issues that currently proscribe arms transfers
to Chile and Argentina.
? Rebuild a close relationship with Brazil, through:
increased Cabinet-level, government-to-government consultations
renewed cooperation in economic trade and military training
enhanced cooperation in science and technology (particularly
space activities)
a dialogue on-nuclear issues, and
exploration, over time, of arms co-production agreements.
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To develop this process, the U.S. will seek appropriate positive
action by Brazil on the issue of nuclear non-proliferation (e.'g.,
restraint in exports to sensitive regions and progress in dis-
cussions on the Treaty of Tlatelolco and safeguards). We will
further attempt to resolve the matter of nuclear supply and permit
resumed nuclear cooperation with Brazil. As contacts on these
issues show progress, in order to encourage significant movement
on non-proliferation concerns, consideration will be given to
seeking waivers to the Glenn/Symington amendment, permitting
enhanced military training cooperation.
? The U.S. will continue to seek prevention of regional arms
races, to preserve sub-regional arms balances and to upgrade
bilateral military ties. In order to support the legitimate
security needs of democratic governments, the Department of
State, in coordination with the Department of Defense, will
use flexibility, within NSDD-5 guidelines, to respond promptly
to arms transfer requests. Measures will.specifically be taken
to reduce Peru's dependence on Soviet arms supplies.
? Within resource constraints, the U.S. will maintain assistance
efforts in such economically weak states as Bolivia, Ecuador,
and Paraguay. (S)
The aforementioned program -- aimed first at the Caribbean Basin/.
Central American region, and second at South America -- will be
effected in concert with the following overall hemispheric actions:
? The United States will pursue more-active bilateral diplomatic
contacts throughout the continent in order to stay efforts to
alter the Inter-American System. We will use?a series of ad hoc
bilateral cabinet-level meetings with substantial -- though not
exclusive -- economic focus to show that dialogue with the U.S. is
possible. Our Caribbean Basin Initiatives will serve as the
framework for these discussions with the Central American States.
In South America, the U.S. will lead with Brazil, Colombia, Peru,
Venezuela, and then Argentina. Throughout, our goal is to support
free enterprise economies and foster the investment and trade
necessary to their growth.
? U.S. global sugar policy will be reviewed to assess its foreign
and domestic impact on states in the region. If advantageous
to our foreign policy goals, consideration will be given to
establishing more flexible sugar import levels.
? We will use our influence through traditional diplomatic channels
to promote development of democratic institutions and human rights
in order to facilitate U.S. public support for expanded, closer
relationships with the governments concerned.
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o A concerted effort will be made to increase U.S. military influence
in the hemisphere through promotion of U.S. military training and
doctrine, greater use of small mobile training teams, expanded
military personnel exchanges and increased International Military
Education and Training (IMET) resources. To implement this program
the Department of Defense, in cooperation with the Department of
State and the Director of Central Intelligence will develop a
comprehensive prioritized list of defense requirements, by country,
and propose a strategy for implementation.
? ' In,order that we can take a pro-active stance in our relations
with Central and South American states, the DCI will improve
intelligence collection on and analysis of Soviet bloc and Cuban
actions which may create internal instability or problems in
bilateral relations with the U.S. (TS)
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