TERRORIST CRISIS MANAGEMENT POLICY

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP97M00248R000400960002-0
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 12
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: October 18, 2010
• Sequence Number: 2
• Publication Date: February 9, 1983
• Content Type: MEMO

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9 February 1983
MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence
FROM: Chief, International Activities Division
Counterterrorism Group
SUBJECT: Terrorist Crisis Management Policy
1. General - In any discussion of crisis management
policy and procedures during a serious terrorist incident,
one essential point should be established, i.e. that it is
CIA's role to provide or coordinate acquisition of
intelligence and other related support to whichever agency or
mechanism is charged with the management of a given incident.
Under the current ground rules, CIA will provide its full
support to the State Department as the lead agency for
incidents abroad, or to the FBI as the lead agency in a
domestic incident, or to whatever policy-level (NSC)
mechanism which might be called upon to manage an especially
serious incident.
2. Agenda Items
A. Rescind NSDD 3.0. A copy of NSDD 30 and terms of
reference for the Terrorist Incident Working Group created
therein are attached. If NSDD 30 is to be rescinded, what
does DOD find objectionable therein? We know from having
been present at various interagency fora over the past year
that DOD is dissatisfied with State's performance as the lead
agency in overseas terrorist incidents and in some instances
we have also been frustrated with State's role. (It has been
our policy, however, to stay out of these discussions over
who should be in charge.) What does DOD propose as an
alternate? Does DOD wish to abolish the lead agency rule
altogether? If so, what does this mean? To convene the TIWG
(or another group) in every incident, international or
domestic, which is deemed important to U.S. interests? Who
then would be in charge at a location abroad?
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i a
B. Political Level of Command and Control of Terrorist
Incidents. There are two considerations here, command and
control in the Washington, D.C. area and command and control
in the field. The first is open to question and is probably
at the heart of the issue being raised by the Secretary of
Defense. The second seems to permit no leeway since, in the
field, the position of the Ambassador as the President's
personal representative to that country seems inviolate. The
primacy of the Ambassador in the country to which he is
appointed is traditional and has been'reinforced by every
administration since Kennedy. Therefore, "who's in charge"
in Washington seems to be debatable. "Who's in charge" in
the field should not be. In the latter area, we believe DOD
may have in mind a variation of the British system which
calls for the dispatch to the field of a senior official. We
question the value of this proposal.
C. Alternatives to Reactive Counter-Terrorist Policy.
We would take exception to the use of the word "reactive".
In our approach to counterterrorism, the cornerstone is an
aggressive intelligence collection effort to provide advance
notice of terrorist plans, intentions and capabilities. We
have not had the success we continue to strive for, but the
approach of using intelligence to prevent terrorist incidents
is correct and hardly merely "reactive". Nor should
anti-terrorism measures (or target-hardening) to improve
security at airports, borders, and key installation be viewed
as reactive. Each of these areas requires (even demands)
improvement, but we are convinced of the correctness of our
approach.
If the inference is to building a strike force, composed
of American or non-American nationals who would conduct
interdiction operations against terrorist. bases or training
camps, there is the very relevant aupst-inn of 1pnal anhhni+-v
You may recall that this issue surfaced 8 - 10 months
ago from elements in DOD. We thought at the time that
briefings we provided had resolved the problem. We continue
to feel "that the issue arises out of ignorance. DOD simply
does not know what the global network of intelligence and
security services has accomplished. Numerous successes have
been recorded, many in the past year. Perhaps a briefing for
Secretary Weinberger would help to clarify this matter..
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3. Also attached is a letter from Mr. Noel Koch at
Defense to Ambassador Sayre at State which outlines DOD
problems with NSDD 30 in general and the "Lead Agency"
concept in particular. We feel that DOD's argument against
the Lead Agency concept is somewhat overdrawn. The creation
of a viable alternative might well introduce similar
problems.
Attachments
1. NSDD 30
2. Outline for Terrorism
Incident Working Group
3. Mr. Noel C. Koch's letter to
Ambassador Robert Sayre
C/IAD/CT~ I (9 February 1983)
Distribution:
0 - Addressee
1 - DDCI
1 - EXDIR
1 - Executive Registry
1 - ADDO/DDO
1 - DDO Registry
1 - C/IAD
3
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1rIL WWII.. HQU aE
WAiH1 TON
April 10, 1982
NATIONAL SECURITY DECISION
DIRECTIVE NUMBER 30
MANAGING TERRORIST INCIDENTS
The United States is committed, as a matter of national. policy,
to oppose terrorism domestically and internationally.
Efficient and effective management of terrorist incidents
is crucial to this commitment'. Successful management of
terrorist incidents requires a rapid, effective response,
immediate access to institutional. expertise, and extensive
prior planning. Because of these requirements, the
management of terrorist incidents of duration will be handled
in the following manner:
(1) Res onsibilities. If the gravity of a terrorist incident
situation warrants, the Assistant to the President for
National Security Affairs, at the direction of the Vice
President, will convene the Special. Situation Group (SSG)
to advise the President with respect to decision options
on appropriate policies and actions.
(2) The Leeaadd ene~. The coordination of federal response to
terrorist incidents will normally be the responsibility of
the Lead Agency. The Lead Agency will be that agency with
the most direct operational role in dealing with the
particular terrorist incident at hand. It will coordinate
all operational aspects of the incident, including press
and intelligence. The Lead Agency will normally be:
-- The State Department, for international terr.ori:-;-.
incidents that take place outside of US territory.
-- The Department of Justice for terrorist inc_, den i_s
which take place within US territory. Unless
otherwise specified by the Attorney General, the P13I
will be the Lead Agency within the Department ref:.
Justice for operational response to such .incideents.
-- The FAA for highjackings within the special jurisdiction
of the United States.
The Federal Emergency Management Agency will be responsible for
planning for and managing the public health aspects of a
terrorist incident and recovery from the consequences of such
incidents.
SECRET
Review on 10 April 1988
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The Assistant to the President for National Secur i. ty Af faire
will resolve any uncertainty on the. designation of ,~, Lo
Agency or on agency responsibilities.
(3) The Terrorist Incident Working Group. To support thu
Special Situation Group, a Terrorist Incident Working Grou-n
(TIWG) will be established. This group will cor,sisr_ of
representatives from State, the DCI, DOD, FBI, I'>=:'4i. and the
NSC staff, with augmentation from other agencies, as
required. The TIWG will he activated by th,r Assi.st.afit to
the President for National Security Affairs. it will be
chaired by a senior repr.esent.at.,_ve from the NSC sta .f.
The purpose of the TIWG is to provide the SSG with direct
operational support, to ensure interagency coordination,
and to provide advice and recommendations during an incident
The Lead Agency will continue to manage the incident under
the direction and coordination of the TIWG and the SSG.
(4) The Interdepartmental Group on Terrorism. The
Interdepartmental Group on Terrorism (IG/T) , chaired by
the Department of State, will be responsi,-)le for the
development of overall. US policy on terrorism, includi.nrr,
Ln.teh at.ia, policy directives, organi_za. tional i .:uc, ,
legislative initiatives, and int.eragoncy training pr.onrams.
(5) White House Opcrations Group. 1.1'h e
Wbft e ilr~u:'c? CJ ~~, 1tionn
Group, chaired by the Director ot the Whi-, !1o' ne 1i) itary
Office, will have re s-ponsibil ity for i ssu(.!r r-e 1_at.ii..) to
threats or acts of terrorism ci rectecl
or the Vice President or sr ni.nr US o fici.a.l_;
as directed by the President. The NSG staff i.l .l e.f fect.
liaison between this group and the IG/'T and ~T6trc:;.
(6) The Inters enc= Intelligence Cc~mmii,tce on
Interagency Intel 11c e.nce Co cr7i_tt.c e >n er.rori_s -'r;,a c by
the DCI, will provide inte11.1cJr:1ce up` ort- to tie E SG ~tY '.:
the' TIWG. It will focus and coordinate
intelligence efforts to co .~Y,t:c r t ; (:~r i :;t rhrc ,t.:>. In
anticipation of terrorist: the c:,.:,r,ni tt r:: wi 11
concentrate on threat alerts,
rrxrcl ;~, ?c~s:,rn .r,' . ?
required procedural im.l::rovc;:Yr nt ~,,, ,lc r (-, cx x ; n1 c
-dissemination of critical
(7) Planning and Exercises. Ti, orc:or to
management of terrorism 1nC ii' . nt.; , prior tnd
exercise activity are e ssent ii l .
Group on Terrorism will. be t_h e pi"J~11'i'-y
;r?cci,a;l ; ...., ,,.i ;.YYi n
the US Government for pl.annin?.) ind 1p")! ir:;'
To ensure the deve:lopi:Yent of 1T1 Of 1(. iAv0, c.r ?_c ;
interagency exercise
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will appoint an Exercise Committee which will. courdinar_c
the development of a multi-year exercise program a-;d
review all multiple agency counterterrorism exercise.
This committee will assure that the government's
counterterrorism capabilities are maintainerl in a high
state of readiness and that duplication of exercises is
avoided. No multiple agency exercise at the national
level may be held without the recommendation of the 1141T
and the approval of the Assistant to the President for
National Security Affairs.
This National Security Decision Directive supersedes all
previous inconsistent directives and instructions on managing
terrorism incidents.
SECRET
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Terrorism Incident Working Group
Terms of Reference
I. Pu ose: The Terrorism Incident Working Group (TIWG) will be
convened to support the Special Situation Group latter is called upon to supervise the resolution Sof~awmajor
.terrorism incident.
II. Functions: The TIWG will:
--Provide the SSG with direct operational ,support. The TIWG
wil e direct y responsible to the SSG for all matters
relating to the terrorism incident. The TIWG will be
responsive to the taskings of the SSG and will be the medium
by which the SSG tasks the government. The TIWG will. :lave
the authority to take decisions in the name of the. SSG for
those matters not requiring SSG consideration The TIWG
will ensure that the necessary papers are prepared for SSG
consideration. The TIWG will be responsible for the
preparation and dissemination of formal SSG decisions and
-for monitoring their implementation.
-- Ensure interagency coordination. The TIWG will effect
coordination among all the agencies involved in the
management of a major terrorism incident. The TIWG will
have the authority to task the relevant agencies for 'r
and will clear requests from one agency asking for s port
from another. The TIWG will also ensure that informationis
made available to all involved agencies. In this regard,
the
TIWG will receive intelligence input from the Interagency
Intelligence Committee on Terrorism and will agencies are kept fully informed. ensure that all
Provide advice and recommendations to the SSG and the t
The TIWG will coordinate and transmit r ecozrmmendati on an=co- arses
of action to the SSG and, if so directed, to the President, The
TIWG will direct the preparation of specific options which
include all.instruments at the disposal of the President . The
TIWG will collate, coordinate, and analyze alternative courses
of action, will take decisions when appropriate, and will
forward options to the SSG when necessary.
To ensure that these functions can be carried will develop and constantly update a set fed oce, the
to be followed in the event. of a major terrorism incident.
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"Membership: The TIWG will be composed depending on the nature of
the incident.
-- For pre-crisis planning, the TIWG will consist of
representation from the Office of the Vice President; the
Departments of State, Treasury, Justice, Transportation, Defen;
and Energy; the DCI, the JCS, the FBI, and FENA,
For actual incidents, the TIWG will consist of subsets of
the pre-crisis TIWG, according to the nature of the
incident. Should the nature of the incident change,
additional personnel, may be included in the TIWG.
Under both conditions, the TIWG will be chaired by the
National Security Council staff.
It is important that each agency identify one individual an alternate to be available for service with the TIWG. and
IV. Duration:
-- During a major incident: The TIWG will be convened by th.
Assistant to =e Precid
-
e
-- Pre-crisis: The TIWG will meet periodically at o
the chairman to review procedures and other relevant issuesf
in order to ensure maximum effectiveness in time of crisis,
nu for Ntl "
aiona Security when appropriate and will not be dissolved for thefduration
of the incident. It is up to the TIWG chairman, in
coordination with the SSG, to determine when and how often
the TIWG will meet during an incident.
V. Location: The TIWG will meet in the White House complex, Lo isti.
support for the TIWG will be the responsibility of the National c
Security Council staff.
Relationships:
TIWG - IG/T. The Interdepartmental Group on Terrorism
_
is responsible for the development of overall us (In
terrorism. Its functions are primarily executed ipoi
niaCY on
non-crisis environment. The TIWG, on the other hand, is
focused primarily upon,crisis situations. The TIWG will
provide input to the IG/T on policy issues affecting
incident management. The IG/T will keep the TIWG informed
on policy decisions, regulations, and exercises which affect
the management of terrorism incidents. L
and desirable that designated members of Ithe sTI WGhma p
y sobi e
sit on the IG/T. The chairman of the T
de
liaison between the White House and thelIG/TIl provide
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-- - _ --~----1 .. ~..>..74 ..~.,.,..._~ ua. .cttt.,.y_l~Ail incidents
will not.require the activation of the SSG or the TIWG.
These incidents will be managed by the Lead Agency. The Lead
Agency will keep the chairman of the TIWG fully informed so
that if the incident escalates and the TIWG is activated,
there will be no loss of continuity.
In those incidents in which the SSG and TIWG are activated,
the Lead Agency will be subordinate to the SSG through the
TIWG. The Lead Agency will be responsible for developing
options, for determining requirements, and for the
operational management of the terrorism incident. For
those decisions requiring interagency coordination or SSG
consideration, the Lead Agency will provide recommendations
and options to the TIWG.
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INTERNATIONAL
SECURITY AFFAIRS
WASHINGTON. D.C. 20301
1
.18 May 1982
Ambassador Robert Sayre
M/CT, Room 2238
Department of State
Wash.4-gton, DC 20520
Dear Bob,
(S) I know your comment Wednesday last about Defense coveting the
Lead Agency role in counter-terrorism was made in jest, but there
are sufficient differences of opinion on the matter of the Lead
Agency that I thought it would be useful to clarify our position.
Further to the point, I know neither of us want differences of
opinion, sometimes expressed heatedly, to affect personal relation-
ships.
(S) DoD's concern is not which should be the Lead Agency, but rather
with the Lead Agency concept itself. Parenthetically I want to say
that I do not concede that having the concept codified in an NSDD
validates it, or makes it irrevocable. NSDD 30 is a flawed document
codifying a very dangerous arrangement. It was prepared with insuffi-
cient consultation, and utter indifference to the profound disagree-
ments surfaced by such consultation as did occur.
(S) The over-riding problem with the Lead Agency concept is that it
"floats" responsibility rather than fixing it. The concomitant is
that authority floats as well, and uncertainty as to the situs of
tasking authority results in critical elements falling out of the
command and control matrix at crucial times with, between times,
issues that need to be resolved hanging fire:, and work that needs
to be done going undone.
(S) One of the curiosities I have found in reviewing field exercises
is the extent to which "lessons learned" are ignored, the neat com-
piling and filing of a report constituting acquittal of all attendant
obligations. We're seeing much the same thing now wherein our functior
ing both in actual events and in exercises has revealed serious command
and contra l failings consistently related to the Lead Agency concept.
An exercise should help to debug procedures and facilitate smooth
working relationships between people implementing those procedures.
But an exercise, particularly of still-embryonic capabilities, may
.reveal organic shortcomings which no amount of practice will correct.
I think this is what we are learning about the Lead Agency concept
from the Dozier incident, the Honduran incident, and Rising Star.
Classified by PDASD/ISA-
Review on 18 May 1988
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(S) Both law and logic militate agaihst DoD having Lead Agency
responsibility for counter-terrorism. That has never been a con-
sideration here, much less an ambition. What does concern me deeply.
however is the possibility of DoD personnel, and terrorist targets,,
g jeopardized in an incident as a consequence of disorganization,
intelligence breakdown or decision delay all of which have been
demonstrated and which are endemic in the present command and control
arrangements.
(S) I come back again to the conviction that we need a cell within
the NSC exclusively dedicated to the terrorist problem. This would
in no fashion contravene State's authority within its clearly under-
stood areas of competence... It would sensibly fix on-going authority
at a level from which all relevant components in our counter-terrorism
efforts can be tasked, and from which their ultimate employment
internationally must be determined upon. It would also be consistent
with expressions of the most serious intent on terrorism both from
the President and the Secretary of State.
(S) I do not see the Terrorist Incident Working Group or the Special
Situation Group as useful models for the unit that should be estab-
lished. Further, I am fully cognizant of the problems of White House
Visibility and recall that I was the first to urge the extreme
necessity for suppressing public escalation of an event to the Vbce-
Presidential level and thereby gratifying a major terrorist ambition.
Notwithstanding, the creation of an over-arching authority and the
control of public escalation are not mutually exclusive goals beyond
our wit to achieve.
(U) I propose that we address these concerns in the IG, and that we
present our findings to a SIG for resolution and implementation.
Whatever the outcome, you may be certain of our continued full and
good-faith cooperation in confronting the problem of terrorism.
Warm regards,
kl_
Noel C. Koch
Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary
International Security Affairs
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