AFGHANISTAN

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP96R01136R002605290031-2
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 2
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: October 20, 2010
• Sequence Number: 31
• Publication Date: July 11, 1980
• Content Type: REPORT

Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/10/20: CIA-RDP96RO1136R002605290031-2
INSURGENCY
SITUATION (4 JUL)
1. The USSR's President
Brezhnev, in announcing the limited
withdrawal of Soviet troops from
Afghanistan, stated that 'Afghanistan
was gradually returning to normal with
the route of large gangs of counter-
revolutionaries'. President
Brezhnev's optimistic picture of the
war, however, bears no resemblance
to Western diplomatic and other
reports from Kabul. In contrast, the
insurgency in Afghanistan, which has
gained strength in the past few months,
continues throughout most of the
country.
2. In late May a US press
repor stated that Afghan government
and Soviet forces were in substantial
control of only 8 of the 28 provinces.
In the remaining provinces only the
provincial capitals and one or two
major towns were under government
control, whereas in the country-side
the rebels were dominant. Later
reports have confirmed that insurgency
is widespread; more recent reports
indicate that the increase in urban
unrest and insurgency is a major
problem to the Afghan Government.
The increasing unrest in
the mayor cities has tied down large
numbers of pro-government forces and
has reduced the number available for
deployment elsewhere. This was
illustrated in June by the requirement
to enforce martial law in Kabul, Herat,
Qandahar, and Farah for varying
periods.
4. Also, there are continuing
reports of rebel attacks and ambushes
along the main highways and roads.
Rebels are attacking protected and
unprotected convoys. Many recent
reports indicate that travel in
Afghanistan is being delayed because
of acts of sabotage to the main routes
or because rebel activity had forced
convoys to wait for protection from
pro-government forces. This is
reflected by the statement in a
recent press release that at least
65,000 troops are needed just to
protect the ring of communications
from Termez to Kushka (see Map).
We consider that 65,000 is not an
exaggerated figure.
5. The 80,000 Soviet troops in
Afghanistan are therefore not enough
to carry out the essential security
duties and to seal the borders with
Iran and Pakistan, in addition to
their likely main mission, which is
to destroy the rebels.
6. Estimates of rebel forces 25X1
ran etween 50,000 and 100,000, and
there are many more who just go out on 25X1
raids for a night or so before returning
home. Reports state that up to 95
percent of the people support the
rebels.
7. Rebels are reported to be
receiving military aid from foreign
sources. This aid ranges from small-
arms weapons of British, Chinese,
Egyptian, and US origin to SAM-7 of
unknown origin. This support, and
increasing Afghan resentment to the
Soviet occupation, has provided a
base for the more widespread and
active rebel insurgency of recent
months.
8. In contrast, the Afghan
Army as been reduced from 90,000 in
December 1979 to between 30,000 and
40,000 - about 15,000 of whom are
combat-effective. The rest have
deserted and either joined the rebels
or handed their weapons over to them.
Although the desertions of large units
early this year have generally ceased,
in late May a brigade of Afghan
Government troops mutinied in the
provincial capital of Bamian. It is 25X1
not clear whether the action was
successful, but it illustrates the
problem the Afghan Government is
having regarding morale in its
depleted armed forces. Soviet troops
accompany Afghan government forces
whenever they deploy on operations.
It will probably be a long time before
the Afghan Army can be given any
important responsibility and can be
expected to effectively counter the
rebel threat.
9. The insurgency within 25X1
Afghanistan has increased in recent
months and, in contrast to President
Brezhnev's statement, it will be a
long time before the Soviet Government
will be able to withdraw its troops
leaving a friendly government and
people on the border.
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/10/20: CIA-RDP96RO1136R002605290031-2
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/10/20: CIA-RDP96RO1136R002605290031-2
64'
TURKESTAN
MILITARY
Mary DISTRICT
IRAN / r2K PASS
PASS
Peshawar
AFGHANISTAN
Airfields
Major Roads
0 50 100 150 200 250Kdometres
0 50 1 150stawte Miles
M/NTA
PASS
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/10/20: CIA-RDP96RO1136R002605290031-2