AFGHANISTAN SITUATION REPORT

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP96R01136R001302330006-2
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 14
• Document Creation Date: December 27, 2016
• Document Release Date: September 24, 2013
• Sequence Number: 6
• Publication Date: November 9, 1982
• Content Type: REPORT

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Intelligence
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Afghanistan Situation Report
9 November 1982
Top Secret
NESA-M 82-10592CX
cm/4-A R2-11)17KCY
9 November 1982
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AFGHANISTAN SITUATION REPORT
CONTENTS
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BORDER INFILTRATION CONTINUES UNHINDERED
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The Soviets appear to be making no effort to seal the border near Jalala-
bad. 25X1
SOVIETS IMPROVING AFGHAN AIR FORCE
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The Soviets are advising the Afghan Air Force to establish six "command
zones" to coordinate air support for Afghan ground forces.
IN BRIEF
PERSPECTIVE
THE INSURGENCY IN KABUL
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The Afghan Government is in no danger of losing control of Kabul, but
recent attacks by the insurgents in and around the city underscore their
ability to inflict embarrassing losses on the regime. 25X1
This document is prepared weekly by the Office of Near East/South Asia and tho
Office of Soviet Analysis.
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-BORDER INFILTRATION CONTINUES UNHINDERED
resistance caravans and personnel move
freely across the Pakistani border about 30 miles east of Jalalabad, and
insurgents believe the Soviets have given up trying to seal the border.
The insurgents encountered no "butterfly" anti-personnel mines on trails
and said they had not seen or heard of any Soviet helicopter minelaying
operations along the border in 1982. Some local tribesmen reportedly
have detained Westerners or informed Kabul of their crossing the border,
but the tribes do not hinder insurgent passage.
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Comment: Sealing the border with Pakistan is probably impossible, and
past Soviet attempts to reduce infiltration apparently failed because of
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the large number of routes available and the mountainous terrain. By the
Soviets' own estimate, it would take nine divisions to garrison the Paki-
stan border alone. Moreover, any Soviet or Afghan units stationed on the
border could easily become isolated from reinforcements and come under
attack from insurgent groups.
SOVIETS IMPROVING AFGHAN AIR FORCE
the senior Soviet adviser to
the Afghan Air Force directed that it establish six "command zones" to
coordinate air support for Afghan ground units. The command zones are to
be located in the west at Herat, in the southeast at Qandahar, in the
east at Gardez and Kabul, and in the north at Baghlan and Mazar-i-Sharif.
Each zone will be commanded by an experienced Afghan pilot.
a new Afghan squadron of 20 MI-8 Hip trans-
port helicopters was recently activated at Qandahar Airbase. A second
new squadron of Hips will be formed at Shindand in January.
Comment: Tactical coordination between Afghan air and ground forces
has been poor, and Afghan units have often suffered losses because of
inadequate or unresponsive air support. The new command zones are
intended to improve cooperation by establishing formal liaison and commu-
nication channels for defined operational areas.
Acquisition of two new
Hip squadrons would improve the logistic support and air mobility of the,
Afghan forces.
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IN BRIEF
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--According to relief officials, the influx of Afghan refugees to Paki-
stan is increasing, the result of widespread food shortages. The number
may be as high as the 10,000 a month that immediately followed the 1979
Soviet invasion. (Press 25X1
--Two Ariana pilots claim that Afghanistan has obtained landing rights in
Luxembourg, but the Luxembourgers told the British that they were non-
committal toward the Afghan request.
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Kabul
International
Airport
Srberpur
Area
British
Embassy
Wazir Akbar
Khan Area
US Embassy
FRG Embassy ?
Radio Afghanistan
In;
ffice
Hou
Park Hotel.
Spinzar H
Ka
Hotel
inistry o
Justice
?
shtunistan
Square
Mosque?
Char Chatta
Bazar
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Sangi
rea
?Jangalak
Industries
2 Kilometers
632957 11-82
2 Miles
Kabul
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PERSPECTIVE
The Insurgency in Kabul
The Afghan Government is in no danger of losing control of Kabul, but recent
attacks by the insurgents in and around the city underscore their ability to
inflict embarrassing losses on the regime. Since the Soviet invasion, the level
of insurgent activity in Kabul has waxed and waned, and its impact has been lim-
ited by a lack of weaponry and expertise, fear of Soviet reprisals, and the tra-
ditibnally greater docility of an urban population. Despite these problems,
insurgent operations late this summer demonstrate that the guerrilla'. can tie
down Soviet and Afghan Government forces in the city's defense.
Insurgent Activities
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Insurgent activities in Kabul predate the Soviet invasion and have included
assassinations, hit-and-run attacks on Soviet and Afghan government installa-
tions,nle and mass demonstrations. 25X1
assassination campaign has had the greatest impact. The insurgents have been
killing about 10 to 15 Afghan Communist officials, and occasionally their family
members, per month during the last several years. Afghan officials have been
killed on the street, in cars and doorways, and at windows. The insurgents usu-
ally use pistols, sometimes with silencers, but occasionally strike with rifles
and small explosives. The assassination campaign has forced many officials to
send their families to the USSR. 25X1
The insurgents have also conducted an extensive hit-and-run campaign against
Soviet and Afghan government installations. 25X1
the mujahideen set off a number of bombs in buildings that included the Minis-
tries of Education and Interior, Kabul University, and an Afghan Communist Party
district headquarters during 1981. They also fired rockets at the Soviet
Embassy at least once and at an apartment complex used by Communist personnel at
least twice. 25X1
During the second half of 1982,
stepped up their campaign.
the insurgentE25x1
--In July, they sprayed government buildings several times with bullets
and hit an important military compound with rockets.
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--In August, they again brought the Soviet Embassy under fire with
rockets and fired on vehicles near Kabul Airport.
--In September, they attacked the Soviet Embassy, Radio Afghanistan, the
Soviet 40th Army Command Post, a hydroelectric station supplying Kabul
with power, and several police stations.
--In October, they damaged several stories of Kabul's tallest building.
Soviet and regime forces reacted with largely unsuccessful sweeps around
and through Kabul.
Most of the insurgents operate out of lases around Kabul, such as
Paghman. Security checks and conscription drives discourage permanent
bases inside the city. Most assassination attempts take place at dusk
because the obscurity and street traffic makes escape easier most of the
hit-and-run raids take place at night.
Insurgent Limitations
The insurgents have failed to mount a challenge that directly threat-
ens the Afghan Government's hold on Kabul. The Communists' extensive
daytime security forces have discouraged insurgent activity and insured
the normal functioning of the government. Kabul, in fact, is one of few
Afghan cities where the insurgents cannot circulate openly during the
day. The authorities can even organize major political gatherings. In
March 1982, for example, the government held a Party conference, and the
following month, the government organized a parade that lasted for 3 1/2
hours and had many participants. In both cases, heavy security prevented
the insurgents from creating any major incidents.
The mujahideen, moreover, have failed to create a mass opposition
movement. Ruthless Soviet and Afghan Government tactics, which included
firing into crowds, contained major demonstrations in February 1980.
There have been no demonstrations of this magnitude since. When storek-
eepers tried to close their stores in protest in February 1981 and 1982,
security forces forced them to stay open. The guerrillas also usually
avoid firing persistently from any neighborhood, because Communist air
and artillery retaliation would wreak havoc on civilians.
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The regime has balanced repressive measures with offers of good food
supplies in Kabul. Several foreign observers, who have visited Kabul
since the invasion, have noted diminishing hostility toward Soviet per-
sonnel, presumably because of growing resignation. Thus, time and the
traditionally more compliant attitude of an urban population toward the
authorities' appear to be working against the insurgents in Kabul.
Limited weaponry and training have also hampered the insurgents.
Rounds from RPG-7s and machine guns pass through walls without knocking
them down. Their most common longer-range weapon, the 81mm mortar, has a
range of only three kilometers, thereby discouraging attacks on targets
surrounded by flat, open terrain. Most insurgents also have little
knowledge of explosives. This inhibits what could be two very effective
tactics--blowing up vehicles packed with explosives and destroying elec-
tric power pylons.
Insurgent Strengths
Several important factors, however, are working in favor of the insur-
gents in Kabul. They benefit from an extensive intelligence network.
Informants in the Afghan Army and security services and civilians warn of
impending military operations, pass on information about planned arrests,
and provide details about the daily schedules of assassination targets.
The insurgents also profit from their movement's decentralization.
All six major groups in Peshawar are active in the city, and scores of
other bands, representing all ethnic groups, also take part. Moreover,
all bands tend to operate in small units, which are highly compartmental-
ized. Accordingly, the capture of one insurgent will not usually lead to
many other arrests. Similarly, even if an important insurgent leader is
captured and his band destroyed, other bands will continue their indepen-
dent operations.
Kabul's urban layout also helps the insurgents. There are few high-
rise housing complexes along broad avenues--the easiest type of neighbor-
hood to police--even in the newer areas. The insurgents can also find
shelter in the densely populated "old city" and in the poorer suburbs,
which have grown considerably since the Soviet invasion.
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Finally, the insurgents benefit from the lackluster performance of
Soviet and Afghan units, particularly at night. While the understaffed
Afghan Army does maintain security in Kabul during the day, many of its
units stay in the comparative safety of their posts at night. Similarly,
while the Soviets conduct aggressive sweeps in and around Kabul during
the day, they usually do not respond energetically to insurgent attacks
at night, when their heavy military equipment is less useful.
Prospects
Fear of Communist reprisals and the traditionally greater dependence
of an urban population on the authorities will continue to hamper the
insurgency. Better and more plentiful weapons and improved training
would be helpful, however. In particular, the insurgents need more
explosives, silencers, time-bombs, easily concealed submachineguns such
as the 9-millimeter Sten gun, and better training in the use of explo-
sives.
Despite important limitations, the insurgents probably will continue
to score some successes in Kabul, which will help focus world attention
on Afghanistan. The views of foreign diplomats who are based in Kabul
are strongly influenced by the level of fighting in the capital. Equally
important, insurgent activity in Kabul will continue to pin down Soviet
and Afghan forces that are needed elsewhere.
Overall, the future of the insurgency in Kabul will ?depend largely on
its success in the rest of the country. If the guerrilla movement in
rural areas declined, Kabul's insurgents probably would become demoral-
ized. But as long as the rural insurgency is going well, the urban guer-
rillas will remain active.
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KABUL CITY
Kabul has a population of more than one million. The Tajiks are the
largest ethnic group. Pushtuns and Hazaras form large minorities, and
all other groups are represented. These ethnic groups tend to congregate
together but do not live in homogeneous neighborhoods. 25X1
Residential area of small houses on the outskirts of Kabul.
The city is surrounded by barren, treeless mountains on the west,
south and east. There is a low ridge of hills north of Kabul. The Kabul
river and a rocky ridge run through the city's center. The "old city"
covers a relatively small area on the south bank, but has a large popula-
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tion; it consists of maze-like 1 and 2 story buildings with flat roofs.
The modern, commercial center of Kabul is on the north bank; most of its
buildings are made of concrete or stone and are 1 to 3 stories. The
wealthy residential areas of Share-Naw, Sherpur, and Wazir Akbar Khan are
north and west of downtown Kabul. Many foreigners, including Soviets and
Afghan Communist officials, live in this well-policed area, which has
The periphery of Kabul consists of middle and
broad, paved streets.
lower class housing.
Apartment development near Kabul airport,
Communists live.
where many Soviets and Afghan
Kabul is the most industrialized area in Afghanistan; it has about
two-thirds of the country's industrial establishments. These are scat,-
tered throughout the city. Kabul gets most of its electricity from the
Naghlu hydroelectric complex, almost 50 km. east of the city, from the
Kabul River, and from local diesel units.
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