AFGHANISTAN SITUATION REPORT

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP96R01136R001302330005-3
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 10
• Document Creation Date: December 27, 2016
• Document Release Date: September 24, 2013
• Sequence Number: 5
• Publication Date: November 8, 1983
• Content Type: REPORT

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Afghanistan Situation Report
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AFGHANISTAN SITUATION REPORT
CONTENTS
IN BRIEF
PERSPECTIVE
AFGHANISTAN: DEFECTIONS FROM THE RESISTANCE
Government efforts to incite defections have not appreciably
reduced the effectiveness or manpower of the resistance. The
government could be more successful if it exploited insurgent
infighting and destroyed food supplies in rural areas.
This document is prepared weekly by the Office of Near Eastern and South
Asian Analysis and the Office of Soviet Analysis.
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PERSPECTIVE
AFGHANISTAN: DEFECTIONS FROM THE RESISTANCE
NESA
Soviet and Afghan Government efforts to incite insurgent defections
over the last year have not appreciably reduced resistance military
effectiveness or manpower and have been considerably undermined by a
large number of redefections. Regime officials have attempted to bribe
insurgents, tribes, and religious leaders to join the government, but
most insurgent defections have resulted from military pressure, economic
hardship, or infighting with other insurgent groups. Resistance
organizations have been countering government efforts by assassinating
defectors and destroying defecting groups. We believe Kabul's efforts
will remain ineffective over the short?term, but over the long run
cumulative military pressure and government efforts to exploit insurgent
infighting could increase guerrilla defections.
Government Efforts and Successes
Government efforts to encourage insurgent defeLtions appear? to have
had only modest success over the last year and, in our view, have not
hurt resistance effectiveness so far. at
least 3,600 insurgents from 10 provinces defected to the regime between
September 1982 and September 1983. During a press interview in Moscow
last May, the Deputy Chief of Staff of the Afghan Army claimed that 22
insurgent groups defected in the first five months of 1983. We estimate
that about 10,000 full or part?time insurgents--or 10 percent of
estimated total resistance forces--defected at least temporarily in the
year ending in September 1983.
The Kabul regime has used a combination of methods to encourage
individual insurgents or guerrilla groups to defect.
the most common tactic has been to otter bribes to
insurgents or to insurgent commanders so the latter will bring their
entire group over to the government side. Afghan officials also have
promised that defectors will not be harmed or imprisoned and that the
regime will not interfere with culture and religion in the insurgents'
local areas. propaganda teams sometimes 25X1
have included former guerrillas who tell villagers of good treatment by
the regime and encourage other insurgents to defect. 25X1
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We believe that Kabul has made considerable efforts to use defectors
to improve the government's counterinsurgency capability. 25X1
defecting insurgent groups V 25X1
have been sent to aid police units around Kabul. In early 1983 25X1
defectors were being formed into units 25X1
under elite Afghan Army commando brigades. US Embassy sources indicate 3
that during Soviet and Afghan operations around Herat City in the spring
of 1983, a former insurgent commander identified for government
authorities guerrillas and resistance supporters among captured
civilians. I I in mid? 1983 defectors were 25X1
being used to teach Soviet and Afghan officers guerrilla po
tactics--knowledge that has proven valuable to regime forces during
counterinsurgency operations. 25X1
In addition to encouraging insurgents to defect, Afghan officials
also have tried to bribe tribal and religious leaders to cease their
support of the resistance and back the Babrak regime. The government,
has concentrated these efforts among the 25X1
Pushtun tribes along the border with Pakistan to try to reduce insurgent
infiltration. Afghan officials 25X1
have offered to rebuild mosques and pay mullahs to reduce the religious
leaders' support for the insurgency. 25X1
Insurgent Motives to Defect
We believe that many individual insurgents and some smaller groups
have defected primarily because of a combination of military pressure
and lack of food or the money to buy it.
I insurgent
desertions in the area increased following prolonged large?scale enemy
attacks in early 1983.insurgent
defections have increased during winter because -o-f food and shelter
shortages. Resistance leaders in Peshawar, Pakistan, warned in early
1983 that government efforts to promote cease?fires and defections were
becoming more effective in economically depressed areas. We believe that
the destruction of crops and farms, and emigration of farmers because of
military operations probably have increased food shortages, resulting in
more insurgent defections in certain areas.
Infighting among rival insurgent bands, in our view, also has been a
major cause of defections.
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defections of Hizbi Islami insurgent bands, of 100 or more men,
increased in northeastern Afghanistan in early 1983. We believe that
many of these groups have defected because Jamiat Islami insurgent
forces have been consolidating their control in the northeast by
attacking and driving out rival Hizbi bands.
a major insurgent leader and his band defected
because of a personal nuarrel with other bands around Herat City in
1982.
Redefections and Insurgent Countermeasures
In our view, Kabul's success at fostering insurgent defections has
been undermined considerably by the large numbers of guerrillas and
insurgent group defectors who return to the insurgency. We estimate
that about half of the insurgents who defected over the last year have
redefected to the resistance. In July 1983 defectors attacked Afghan
Army forces in Badakshan Province and
killed 31 party members before rejoining nearby resistance
groups. three government units
formed from defectors in early 1983 returned to the resistance in
midsummer. We believe that the redefection of former guerrillas
attached to Afghan commando units contributed to the defeat of the
Afghan 38th Brigade in Paktia Province in May 1983.
We believe that many insurgents deliberately defect to gain weapons,
intelligence, or foment dissension among regime forces and then redefect
to the resistance..one
Afghan of ficial was extremely worried in June 1983 because 3,000
insurgent defectors had recently rejoined the resistance after the
government gave them 1,000 AK-47 rifles.
in August 1983 two "defectors" recruited three Afghan Army officers into
the resistance, penetrated, the local Afghan secret police unit, and
later redefected to the insurgency.
resistance leaders have
developed tactics they believe will gradually undermine government
defection programs and will allow insurgents to keep the regime's bribes
while remaining active in the war. The leaders have told guerrilla
commanders to "accept" surrender offers, set up meetings with government
delegations, take their money, and then kill the regime officials.
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in late September 1982
insurgents in Nangarhar Province killed 200 members of a regime
negotiating team after taking a defection bribe of 10 million afghanis.
tccording to reports from the US Embassy, a Soviet and Afghan group sent
) negotiate the surrender of insurgent bands north of Kabul in
eptember '1983 met the same fate.
To discourage defections and limit the damage caused by defectors,
sistance groups have assassinated some former insurgent leaders and
ye destroyed a few defecting guerrilla bands. US Embassy sources
.ort that in March 1983 insurgents killed a defector who had appeared
on Kabul television, and that villagers burned his house and killed some
of his relatives. Other Embassy reports indicate that two months later
an insurgent bomb killed a guerrilla leader who had defected in early
spring, the resistance has been
assassinating mullahs who have defected. In early July 1983, insurgents
destroyed a band of 40 former insurgents near Kabul
Prospects
We believe that Kabul's efforts over the next year will not
appreciably increase the rate of insurgent defections and that geurrilla
groups will be able to recruit new members to make up for desertions and
casualties, and to provide for some increase in manpower.
in October 1983 guerrilla groups throughout
Afghanistan have had large numbers of volunteers to replace casualties.
however, guerrilla bands have had difficulties
replacing weapons lost in battle. We judge that the loss of weapons
caused by defections is more likely to hurt the resistance than manpower
shortages.
Although insurgent defections will provide the government with
intelligence on guerrilla activities and the desertion of groups will
temporarily reduce resistance activity in some areas, a continuing small
number of defections will not reduce overall resistance military
effectiveness. In our view, many insurgents will continue to follow the
traditional pattern of taking advantage of government defection offers
and then redefecting. Moreover, we believe that government attempts to
integrate defectors into Afghan security forces and the redefection of
some of these men will undermine regime control in many areas and could
lead to significant military defeats.
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Over the long term, however, we believe government efforts could
become more effective by exploiting infighting among resistance groups
and the logistical weaknesses of many guerrilla bands. Continuing
infighting among resistance groups and the loss of territory by one
group, such as the Hizbi Islam', will provide the government with the
opportunity to encourage the defection of large numbers of well armed
insurgents who can be used to fight other guerrilla groups. Deliberate
destruction of food supplies and farms in the fall and winter combined
with offers of food or money would also increase defections. Although
many deserters would redefect the following spring, continuing strong
government military pressure and material incentives eventually would
reduce the number of defectors willing to return to the war.
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