AFGHANISTAN SITUATION REPORT

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP96R01136R001302320012-6
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 13
• Document Creation Date: December 27, 2016
• Document Release Date: September 25, 2013
• Sequence Number: 12
• Publication Date: October 29, 1984
• Content Type: REPORT

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Directorate of 1 op meFeL,
Intelligence
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Afghanistan Situation Report
29 October 1984
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29 October 1984
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AFGHANISTAN SITUATION REPORT
CONTENTS
PAKISTAN?USSR: ISLAMABAD'S CONCERN GROWING
President Zia is concerned with increasing Soviet military and
diplomatic pressure designed to reduce Pakistan's support to the
Afghan resistance.
IRANIAN VIEWS OF SUPPORT TO THE AFGHAN RESISTANCE
Iranian officials fear a Soviet invasion and will aid Afghan
insurgents to maintain military pressure in Afghanistan.
IN BRIEF
PERSPECTIVE
SOVIET MILITARY STRATEGY IN AFGHANISTAN
The Soviets have been fighting a war in Afghanistan not envisaged
by their military doctrine and one for which they were poorly
prepared in terms ?of military strategy and organization. After
five years, the Soviets still have not developed an effective
counterinsurgency strategy. Because alternatives of a withdrawal
or massive troop increases are so unacceptable, the Soviets are
likely to sustain protracted military and political efforts.
This document is prepared weekly by the Office of Near Eastern and South
Asian Analysis and the Office of Soviet Analysis.
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PAKISTAN?USSR: ISLAMABAD'S CONCERN GROWING
President Zia told visiting US Assistant Secretary of State
Murphy last week the Soviets are increasing military and
diplomatic pressure on Pakistan to force it to end aid to the
Afghan resistance. Zia said cross?border violations have tripled
since last year, and he expects a further increase when the UN
General Assembly debates the Afghanistan issue in November.
Neither Zia nor Foreign Minister Yaqub expressed concern that the
Soviets are planning to invade, however, Yaqub noting that Moscow
wants accommodation, not disintegration. Moscow has also refused (
to finance three aid projects, citina "credit requirements
elsewhere."
Comment
Soviet activities since July indicate that
local Afghan and Soviet commanders have been given greater leeway
to call for air strikes in support of operations being conducted
along the Pakistan?Afghanistan border. Zia's resolve to resist
apparently remains as strong as ever. It is unlikely the Soviets
would have financed two of the three economic aid projects even
if the Soviet?Pakistani relations were good; one is a nuclear
Power proiect and the other is a multibillion?dollar dam project.
IRANIAN VIEWS OF SUPPORT TO THE AFGHAN RESISTANCE (C)
Iranian Foreign Minister Velayati views the Soviet invasion of
Afghanistan as preliminary to a Soviet invasion of Iran- and
Pakistan,
Velayati believes the Afghan
insurgents will need outside aid to maintain military pressure
against the Soviet threat. In Moscow, Soviet Foreign Ministry
officials expressed concern about increased Iranian support to
the Afghan resistance during September, according to Western
diplomats.
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Comment:
Velayati and other senior Iranian leaders have long been
concerned about the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, but the
regime probably will not increase the supply of arms, ammunition,
and basic necessities, which is important to insurgents in the
western provinces and the Hazarajat. Iran also will continue to
support the Afghan resistance diplomatically. Teheran likely
judges that such support will not provoke the Soviets into actin
against Iran but will cause them to focus on Afghanistan.
IN BRIEF
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-- Pakistani police have arrested three suspected KHAD agents
after a 24 October bomb explosion in a Peshawar cinema killed
five arid injured 22, according to press reports. Some Pakistani
officials believe the Peshawar blast is related to recent
explosions in Islamabad and Parachinar.
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PERSPECTIVE
SOVIET MILITARY STRATEGY IN AFGHANISTAN
The Soviets have been fighting a war in Afghanistan not envisaged by
their military doctrine and one for which they were poorly prepared in
terms of military strategy and organization. Despite almost five years
in Afghanistan, the Soviets still have not come to grips with the war
either conceptually or operationally. They appear not to have
recognized the fundamental nature of the Afghan insurgency and have
failed to develop any significant new insights into the conduct of
counterinsurgency warfare. Approaches which the Soviets have tried and
problems they have encountered mirror some of those experienced by other
nations , in attempting to combat insurgencies. Nonetheless, because the
alternatives are unacceptable, the Soviets appear likely to sustain
their effort over the protracted period required to reduce the
insurgency and create reliable and effective Afghan political and
military organizations.
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Conceptual Problems
A major difficulty for Soviet ideologists and strategists lies in
attempting to reconcile the insurgency in Afghanistan with their
conceptions of the nature of local wars and wars of national liberation.
Basic Soviet theory holds that local wars and military conflicts in the
Third World are an outgrowth of imperialism and its reactionary policy.
Communist ideologists have long viewed the "national liberation process"
as a positive and historically?ordained trend and one in which the
Soviet role is to champion peoples oppressed by colonial or foreign?
dominated regimes. Over the years, the Soviets have gained much
expertise in, trained thousands of foreign students for, and provided
significant materiel, advisory, and political assistance to insur ent?
liberation movements in Africa, Asia, and Latin America. 25X1
On the other hand, the Soviets have had relatively little experience
in supporting friendly Marxist governments threatened by insurgencies.
The Soviets do not appear to have developed either a clear?headed
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analysis of the vulnerabilities of their Marxist client states like
Angola, Ethiopia, Nicaragua, and Afghanistan to an insurgency or an
significant new approaches to dealing with such insurgencies.
In Afghanistan, the Soviets allege the fighting is being conducted by
"counterrevolutionary elements" supported by mercenaries of
"international imperialism and Chinese hegemonism." Soviet propaganda
to their own troops emphasizing that they will be fighting US, Chinese,
and other foreign forces in Afghanistan does not pass the test of
reality, and in failing to do so, contributes to morale problems for
Soviet forces there. Nevertheless, the Soviets seem to be both
psychologically and ideologically incapable of confronting the fact that
they are dealing with a broad?based, spontaneous popular movement
opposed to the imposition of Communist rule. This attitude probably
impacts adversely on their military planning for the war which tends to
portray combat operations in the Afghan environment as not significantly
different from operations in any other mountainous?desert region against
a more conventional foe.
Soviet Strategy
Moscow's major military?strategic decision to date has been the
introduction of Soviet combat forces in December 1979 followed by their
commitment early in 1980 to counterinsurgency operations. The Soviets
also recognized at the outset that reliable Afghan armed forces would be
required for long?term pacification of the country. To this end, the
Soviets have adopted a strategic approach emphasizing the participation
of Afghan military forces in combat against the insurgents and the
development of Afghan military capabilities through training and
provision of modern military materiel.
At the same time, Soviet strategy has called for only a modest level
of Soviet forces despite growing recognition by Moscow that the war
cannot be won quickly or easily. For a combination of reasons, the
Soviets have decided to fight in Afghanistan using an economy?of?force
approach. Soviet expectations that the Afghan Army could assume an
increasing burden of the war have proven unfounded, but we still see no
good evidence that Moscow will resort to much greater force levels.
The military component of the overall Soviet strategy has been a
mixture of approaches employed in other counterinsurgencies, to include
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"enclave," "attrition," and "consolidation" aspects. "Enclaves" have
been a significant feature of Soviet military strategy since the
intervention, as Soviet forces have sought to secure government control
in Kabul and other major cities and along the main lines of
communication. Soviet forces were initially deployed to Kabul and (at
least until recently) have played a major role in providing security for
the capital; Soviet forces in other major urban areas such as Ghazni,
Qandahar, Jalalabad, and Herat have played for the most part a
secondary, though important, role. Soviet units also garrison the major
air bases such as Bagram and Shindand, and provide both fixed and mobile
security along the main lines of communication.
Soviet strategy has been focused on reducing the insurgency through
attrition in combat, in addition -to securing these important centers and
routes. Joint and combined operations have been conducted regularly to
search out and destroy insurgent groups, to disrupt insurgent base
areas, and to hinder resupply of insurgent forces. Various tactical
approaches have been employed in pursuit of these objectives, but the
strategy has not wavered.
Finally, the Soviets have made efforts toward expanding and
consolidating Afghan Government control in the countryside, but these
have been constrained by the limited number of Soviet troops available
and the unreliability of Afghan forces. Much of this effort has been in
the nonmilitary aspects of overall Soviet strategy. Soviet strategy in
Afghanistan in practice has been multifaceted and includes economic,
political, educational, and propagandistic as well as military elements
that draw on Soviet domestic experience and the record of Western
involvement in various counterinsurgencies. Military units have been
used to provide small security garrisons in isolated areas and conduct
propaganda and public works activities.
The most extensive consolidation efforts to date have been developed
in the Panjsher Valley subsequent to the spring offensive there this
year. This has involved maintaining an expanded Soviet and Afghan
military presence in the Panjsher, extensive propaganda and intelligence
activity, and the forcible resettlement of refugees in the valley.
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Problems
In their analyses of previous counterinsurgency efforts--notably the
US experience in Vietnam--Soviet authors gleefully pointed out the
problems inherent in such an undertaking. Still, the Soviets have been
unable to avoid many of the same difficulties in devising their own
strategy in Afghanistan.
4 -- Insurgent forces better adapted to local conditions, fight on
their own soil, and have the support of the local population.
-- Unfavorable terrain precluding the utilization of the full
military capabilities of counterinsurgent forces.
-- Inadequate intelligence and counterintelligence resources and
performance.
-- Dependence on unreliable local government forces to secure
"pacified" areas.
-- A military force unprepared for counterinsurgency in organization,
training, or equipment.
-- The necessity to conduct recurrent combat operations in populated
areas with resultant political problems for the government.
-- The vulnerability of lines of communication, military
installations, and important political?administrative centers to
harassing attacks by insurgent forces.
-- The inability of airpower to break insurgent morale and the
difficulty of employing airpower effectively.
-- Logistic problems which are compounded by difficult terrain,
insurgent attacks, and limited infrastructure--including the lack of
railroads.
-- The protracted nature of counterinsurgency campaigns during which
morale becomes an especially significant factor.
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-- The problems of deploying limited forces to attain maximum control
without sacrificing operational capability, flexibility, and the
strategic initiative.
Outlook
Despite its failure to achieve a victory thus far, we see little
prospect for a major change in Soviet strategy in Afghanistan. Though
Moscow has not yet succeeded in resolving many of the intractable
problems associated with a counterinsurgency campaign, the Soviets'
long?term perspective should enable them to endure while rationalizing
away tactical defeats and strategic shortcomings. Moscow probably views
its current economy?of?force strategy, incorporating variations in
tactics and modest efforts to increase the combat power and
effectiveness of Soviet forces, as preferable to higher cost policy
alternatives such as withdrawal or a major troop buildup. Finally, the
Soviet determination to prevail is an influential factor in the
implementation of its Afghan strategy. Russian and Soviet history and
the tenets of Marxism?Leninism serve to encourage the Soviets' belief
that they can prevail in Afghanistan if they remain patient and simply
do not accept defeat.
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