AFGHANISTAN SITUATION REPORT

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP96R01136R001302260010-5
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 17
• Document Creation Date: December 27, 2016
• Document Release Date: December 17, 2013
• Sequence Number: 10
• Publication Date: May 19, 1987
• Content Type: REPORT

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Directorate of
Intelligence
-ro-se4re
aCP
Afghanistan Situation Report
8
19 May 1987
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AFGHANISTAN SITUATION REPORT
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CONTENTS
"') ?
SOVIE
HAN REGIME TROOPS ACTIVE IN EAST AND 2
WEST
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A Soviet
combat operation began in the Jalalabad area
last week, while Soviet-Afghan sweeps were under way in
Herat and Farah Rud. Insurgent activity inside Kabul
dropped, but resistance forces harassed outposts in the
city's suburbs and
interrupted traffic on
the Salang
Tunnel highway.
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IRANIAN SUPPORT FOR INSURGENTS
INCREASING
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Tehran is now allowing Jamiat-i-Islami
insurgents
operating in Herat Province to take refuge and maintain
logistic bases in Iran and occasionally to send supply
convoys across Iranian territory, but Iran's war with
Iraq almost certainly will prevent augmentation
of
Iranian financial aid to the resistance.
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KABUL, KUWAIT, AND THE OIC
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As a gesture to Moscow,
Kuwaiti officials
are planning
to try to persuade Pakistan to be more flexible
regarding the terms it sets for a Soviet withdrawal
from Afghanistan. Islamabad
almost certainly will take
steps to defuse the proposal.
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IN BRIEF
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LOYA JIRGA: KEY TO POWER IN POST
AFGHANISTAN?
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The Loya Jirga--a "Great Council"
of tribal, religious,
and civic leaders--has been described by both the
Afghan resistance and Kabul regime as the key to power
in Afghanistan. A jirga may be the most likely means
of forming a post-Soviet government, but the thorny
matters of composition ?and power of a 'irga will ?be
difficult to settle.
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This document was prepared by the Office of Near
Eastern and South Asian Analysis and the Office of
Soviet Analysis.
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SOVIET AND AFGHAN REGIME TROOPS ACTIVE IN EAST AND WEST
According to the US Embassy in Kabul, insurgent rocket
attacks and bombings in the city ebbed during the past
week. Heavy fighting was reported, however, in Kabul's
northern and western suburbs, where numerous Soviet and
Afghan Army outposts were shelled. The Embassy
reported that several large Afghan Army convoys left
the city on 14 May, probably to relieve insurgent
pressure on the Salang Tunnel highway that was closed
for two days by heavy fighting.
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IRANIAN SUPPORT FOR AFGHAN INSURGENTS INCREASING
Tehran reportedly now allows Jamiat-i-Islami insurgents
operating in Herat Province to take refuge and maintain
logistic bases in Iran and occasionally permits
insurgent supply caravans from Pakistan to cross
Iranian territory. In recent months, Iran also has
increased media coverage of Afghanistan and has
sharpened its rhetoric against Soviet involvement
there.
COMMENT: Tehran's willingness to allow insurgent
supplies to move through Iran will reduce the time and
cost of transporting them from Pakistan to western
Afghanistan. Although the more active Iranian role
probably will include greater diplomatic support for
the insurgents, Tehran is unlikely to augment its
limited financial assistance significantly, given the
expense of its own conflict with Iraq.
Criticism of Iran in the Soviet press and the recent
moves toward expanding Afghanistan's ties to Iraq--
Afghan Prime Minister Keshtmand may visit Baghdad this
summer--probably are intended in part to signal
Moscow's distress over Iran's growing involvement in
the Afghan conflict. We believe that Moscow is
concerned about improvements in guerrilla
effectiveness, the impact Iranian support may have on
radicalizing" the _Islamic nature of the insurgency,
and the repercussic USSR's
Muslim population.
KABUL, KUWAIT, AND THE OIC
Kuwaiti officials recently told their US counterparts
that they intended to use their current three-year OIC
chairmanship to persuade Pakistan to be more flexible
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regarding a Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan. The
Kuwaitis apparently envision direct talks between Kabul
and Islamabad under OIC auspices and perhaps including
UN Special Envoy Cordovez and OIC Secretary General
Pirzada. The Kuwaitis intend to broach the idea with
the Pakistanis in June. 25X1
COMMENT: Kuwait probably is undertaking the initiative
as a gesture to Moscow. The Pakistanis almost
certainly will reject the Kuwaiti plan and will enlist
Saudi assistance to abort the scheme. Although US
officials report that Kabul is not currently
petitioning the OIC secretariat to regain its Afghan
seat in the OIC, Najib's regime has been negotiating
with the Kuwaitis to reopen air links with Afghanistan
and probably will ask Kuwait to sponsor its
readmission.
IN BRIEF
Press reports and Pakistani officials
indicate that UN Special Envoy for
Afghanistan Cordovez will visit Kabul and
Islamabad in June in preparation for the next
round of Geneva talks. Islamabad, according
to the US Embassy, expects Cordovez to push
for Pakistani cooperation in forming an
Afghan government of national reconciliation.
The Pakistanis, however, will try to keep
discussions focused on the need for a short
Soviet withdrawal timetable.
Afghan Foreign Minister Wakil arrived in
Prague on 17 May to discuss expanding
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economic relations between Afghanistan and
Czechoslovakia. According to Czechoslovakian
press reports, total trade between the two
countries amounted to nearly $87 million in
1986. Although Prague now ranks as one of
Afghanistan's leading trade partners, its
trade links with Kabul are substantially
overshadowed by those of the USSR, which
account for nearly 70 percent of all Afghan
exports and imports.
Moscow's Afghanistan correspondent Savodyan,
in an interview broadcast last week on the
Soviet radio program "Panorama," gave a
markedly negative appraisal of national
reconciliation's progress in rural areas.
Also last week, Afghan Foreign Minister Wakil
said the reconciliation program's pace is
being slowed by the insurgents' attacks and
acquisition of new US weaponry. Such
statements suggest that Moscow and Kabul
probably are preparing to abandon their
unilateral six-month cease-fire on 15 July
and shift the blame for the failure of
national rpconniliation to the resistance.
Mohammedullah Safi Subhani, Afghan Ambassador
to the People's Democratic Republic of Yemen,
was recently recalled to Kabul. Subhani, a
Khalqi and alternate member of the PDPA
Central Committee, served three years in the
Afghan Embassy in Moscow before going to Aden
in January 1986. In light of the recent
growth in Khalqi assertiveness and political
influence, the Soviets may have arranged for
Subhani's recall in order to give them
another prominent pro-Moscow Khalr on the
scene in Kabul.
Kabul in late April authorized pay increases
for Army and police personnel, according to
the Kabul New Times. The largest raises are
for combat troops who have completed over a
year of service. The regime also announced
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the sale of discounted goods to military
personnel. These measures will do little to
boost morale or dissuade experienced
personnel from deserting.
Two Soviet TU-154 tranport aircraft,
delivered to Afghanistan's Bakhtar Airline in
April, are in service.
these aircraft are costly additions
to the airline's fleet. They are
substantially more expensive to operate than
Bakhtar's B-727s and cannot carry cargo
loads. In addition, the Afghans have had to
hire some Soviet aircrews because of a
shortage of trained pilots.
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PERSPECTIVE
THE LOYA JIRGA: KEY TO POWER IN POST-SOVIET AFGHANISTAN?
The Loya Jirga--a "Great Council" of tribal; religious
and civic leaders--has been described by both the
Afghan resistance and the Kabul regime as the key to
power in Afghanistan.. Loya Jirgas have been called
only a few times in recent Afghan history, usually to
recognize a new king or approve a ruler's new policy
direction, but have served as the model for most Afghan
legislatures and advisory councils. Local government
has been traditionally carried out by smaller, more
frequent meetings among village or tribal leaders known
as jirgas, while tribal jirgas have been used for
centuries to settle disputes or decide tribal policy.
The Kabul regime has made several attempts to use all
three forms of jirga to enhance its own legitimacy.
The Fundamental Principles of the Democratic Republic
of Afghanistan, which was drafted in 1980. and has .
served as an interim constitution, describes the Loya
Jirga as the eventual "highest organ of state power of
the Government of Afghanistan"--but one that could not
be instituted until "conditions are ripe." The
Revolutionary Council--Kabul's current legislative.
body--supposedly governs Afghanistan only until these
conditions are met." The regime has, however,
attempted to use tribal jirgas as the basis of a mass
mobilization campaign,
Some resistance leaders have also called for a Loya
Jirga, probably in the hope of unifying the resistance,
creating a true government-in-exile, and further
highlighting the Kabul regime's lack of legitimacy.
Arguments over who would be eligible to participate
have, however, prevented a resistance-dominated jirga
from meeting.
Attempts by traditionalist resistance leader Ahmad
Gailani to form Loya Jirgas in 1980 and 1984 to
function as a government-in-exile under former King
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Zahir Shah fell through after boycott threats from
fundamentalist resistance leaders. A proposal in May
1987 by fundamentalist leader Gulbuddin for elections
for a representative assembly in refugee camps in Iran
and Pakistan and in "liberated areas" of Afghanistan
seems to be closely lmodeled on a jirga_ Tribal and
community representatives in the refugee camps have
also made extensive use Of smaller jirgas--in some
cases of as few as five tribal representatives--to
solve camp disputes or decide camp policies.
A Loya Jirga designed as part of awithdrawal
arrangement may prove the most likely means of forming
a post-Soviet government. Pakistani President Zia has
often suggested a Loya Jirga of delegates from Afghan
resistance parties, refugee camps, and perhaps the
People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan (PDPA) that
would draw up a new Afghan constitution and allocate
government positions. While moderate resistance
leaders Ahmad_ Gailani and Sibghatullah Mojadedi are
willing to join such a jirga, fundamentalist leaders
Bekmatyar Gulbuddin and Abdul Rasul.Sayyaf have,
proclaimed they will never meet with Communist leaders.
Resolving the questions of who is to participate in a
jirga and what powers the assembly is to have may prove
a roadblock to peace second only to that of the Soviet
presence, but we believe it is essential in order for
Afghanistan, to have a chance of a stable post-Soviet
government.
Political Power and the Loya Jirga
There are three traditional sources of law in Afghan
society: Islam, tribal codes, and the decisions
reached by jirgas. Obedience and respect in
traditional Afghan society are based less upon a
leader's lineage than upon how well that leader
fulfills his duty according to the dictates of Islam
and the tribal codes. Afghan kings have ruled by
divine sanction rather than by divine right, and a
ruler who disregarded Islamic and tribal codes was by
definition a usurper. A Western academic who lived in
Afghanistan claimed that the jirga--as much as the
difficulties of communication and transportation--
limited the power of Afghan central governments.
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Because the jirga vote is the basis of a leader's
legitimacy--and a second vote could revoke that
confirmation--the result has often been an unstable
government occupied with keeping the tribes happy.
However, the institution also gave traditional Afghan
governments a broad institutional base and a degree of
popular legitimacy, rare among traditional societies.
The first recorded Loya Jirga elected Ahmad Shah Abdali
in 1747 as paramount chief and the first King of
Afghanistan. Subsequent jirgas were called to
strengthen a ruler's claim to the throne or to approve
controversial programs. The most blatant pre-Soviet
attempt to engineer a Loya Jirga's decision was made by
King Amanullah in 1928. After a Loya Jirga of about
1,000 of Afghanistan's most influential tribal, ethnic
and religious leaders rejected the King's reforms--
which included calls for separation of mosque and
state, the unveiling and emancipation of women,
enforced monogamy and compulsory education--the King
disbanded it and convened a smaller jirga of about 100
government employees and supporters who promptly passed
his program. However, the first gathering was widely
perceived as the true Loya Jirga, and King Amanullah--
who by defying its ruling had proven himself un-
Islamic--was deposed. After a year's turmoil and a
nine-month reign by Habibullah, the "bandit king," the
new King Nadir Khan assembled yet another Loya Jirga to
confirm his authority and revoke Amanullah's hated
reform program.
Jirga and Democracy
All adult men were traditionally eligible to be
delegates to a Loya Jirga, and all delegates had an
equal right to speak. Decisions were made either by
consensus or a show of hands. The decision of a Loya
Jirga was binding on all participants, and anyone who
disregarded the ruling was severely punished. Despite
the similarity with the New England-style "town-hall
democracy," where all members of a community have their
say, the Jirga was not entirely democratic. Jirga
representatives were usually the tribal and religious
elite and often appointed to the jirga by the very king
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whose policies they were to judge. The Loya Jirga
reinforced this elite's control over the population
because they served through the jirga as many villages'
only link with the central government. In return for
their support, tribal leaders lobbied the crown for
gifts and arms which they then use?to cement their
own position.
Use of Jirgas by the PDPA and the Soviet's
The PDPA has repeatedly staged jirgas in an attempt to
gain a popular mandate and bolster its claims to
legitimacy. In addition to arranging several tribal
jirgas, the Ministry of State Security (KHAD) brought
about 2,000 tribesmen to Kabul in April 1985 to convene
a People's Loya Jirga. According to the US Embassy in
Kabul, delegates were forced to sign a unanimous
statement praising the Soviet presence in Afghanistan.
Attendees who questioned the document or procedure were
imprisoned for "pro-rebel sympathies."
The regime also held jirgas in 1985 to elect members of
local councils in Kabul, Feyzabad, and Saranj.
According to the US Embassy in Kabul, a single slate of
candidates was presented to the delegates minutes prior
to the voting. Regime officials reportedly stood by
with cameras to discourage "no" votes. Small children
were counted among the voters, and according to a
Western journalist, one woman's "election" consisted of
?a summons from the local party headquarters, where she
was given a plane ticket to Kabul and a prepared speech
to deliver upon her arrival. Few Afghans took these
staged jirgas seriously, according to Embassy
reporting, and many Kabul residents reportedly joked
that members of a tribal jirga convoked in September
1985 probably were resistance fighters taking advantage
of regime bribes and a free trip to Kabul.
Resistance Attempts at a Jirga
Resistance attempts to convene all seven Peshawar-based
parties have been derailed by feuding among the groups,
but smaller jirgas within Afghanistan have inr-rgInqPri
cooperation among some resistance groups.
Panjsher Valley commander Masood has
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used "central groups"--modeled after the tribal jirga--
of approximately 100 members as a means to develop a
unified political structure in northern Afghanistan not
based on tribal loyalties or party affiliation. These
groups serve as a quasi-government and coordinate
combat with other guerrilla units.
The resistance has also used jirgas to adjudicate
differences with Pakistani tribes and to win over
pro-Kabul tribes.
Waziri tribesmen who had attended Kabul's
tribal jirga in September 1985 and received weapons and
10,000 afghanis (US $75) each, were convinced by a
-subsequent insurgent-arrahged jirga--and an additional
$350--to reaffirm their loyalties to the resistance
parties. The Pakistani Government has,
encouraged the use of jirgas
among representatives of resistance and refugee groups
to settle conflicts in camps.
In our view, the greatest roadblock to a resistance
Loya Jirga is the question of the council's
composition. Fundamentalist leaders, such as Gulbuddin
Hekmatyar, oppose the participation of Afghans who have
not taken direct part in the resistance struggle. A
younger generation of battle-tested commanders.is also
likely to contest the chiefs and mullahs who previously
made up many jirgas' membership. We also believe that
traditionalist groups such as Ahmed Gailani's National
Islamic Front of Afghanistan (NIFA) are likelyto
contest the legality of any Loya Jirga not formed along
traditional lines, and might succeed in blocking any
council not to their liking.
Prospects
We believe the Loya Jirga would be most useful in
setting up an interim government with wide
representation and an aura of legitimacy. It would
also allow resistance and regime figures, including
members of various ethnic, regional and interest
groups, to work together without losing face. They
could meet to draw up a new Afghan constitution and a
slate of candidates for government positions and agree
on an interim leader to head the government until
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elections could be held.
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A successful Loya Jirga also could help contain the
factional violence that we believe will follow the
Soviet withdrawal by giving members of all groups a
stake in the new regime. Although it will take more
than a "Grand Assembly" to heal the hatreds and
divisions spawned by the war, it holds some hope of a
solution by bringing members of factions together and
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In our view, King Zahir Shah's Loya Jirga of 1964 could
serve as the closest model for an interim or post-
Soviet Jirga. Unlike most previous Loya Jirgas which
were stacked with the king's men, this one featured
delegates who were appointed and elected from
throughout Afghanistan (including, for the first time,
six women). Debates were broadcast daily and, in
another first, dissenters were permitted to print their
arguments for circulation throughout Kabul. The
candidates selected by the jirga were later nominated
for election to the new national legislature, itself
modeled after the jirga.
We believe that a Loya Jirga which is widely recognized
as a true national assembly could serve as a basis for
mutual agreement among warring Afghan factions, but one
without common ground for decision-making or a
perception of legitimacy could promote continued
warfare and serve as a pretext for further Soviet
involvement in Afghanistan.
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