AFGHANISTAN SITUATION REPORT

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP96R01136R001302260008-8
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 16
• Document Creation Date: December 27, 2016
• Document Release Date: December 17, 2013
• Sequence Number: 8
• Publication Date: May 13, 1986
• Content Type: REPORT

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Directorate 01
Intelligence
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66 C/TWA/ASIA/SOVA .
Afghanistan Situation Report
13 May 1986
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NESA M 86-20070JX
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insurgents in Paktia Province, but Soviet and Afghan forces made
less headway against the insurgency in Qandahar. When
circumstances permit, the Soviets will continue to shift more
combat responsibilities to the Afghan's military.
A.TA*k, 1986
NESAL:20070AI
SOVA M 86-20045
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AFGHANISTAN SITUATION REPORT
CONTENTS
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FIVE-YEAR
PLAN: UNREALISTIC EXPECTATIONS
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The Afghan Government's first five-year
plan is
overly optimistic, probably to
help win support
for the program's objectives.
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THE SOVIETS' MAN IN KABUL
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IN BRIEF
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PERSPECTIVE
AFGHANISTAN IN APRIL
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The Afghan Army conducted
a successful
operation against the
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This document is prepared weekly by the Office of
Near Eastern and South Asian Analysis and the
Office of Soviet Analysis.
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13 May 1986
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FIVE-YEAR PLAN: UNREALISTIC EXPECTATIONS
The Afghan Government's Socio-Economic Development Plan
for 1986-91--the regime's first five-year plan--calls
for national income to increase by 25 percent,
industrial production by 38 percent, and gross
agricultural' putput by 14 to 16 percent.,With Soviet
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assistance, the regime plans over 130 projects in
various sectors of the economy. The government has
identified land reform and the rebuilding of irrigation
systems as key objectives. The plan calls for new
housing construction and increased,salaries for state
employees.
COMMENT: The regime's plans for economic development
are overly optimistic, given past performance. Even
official government statistics--which probably are
inflated--show that from 1978 to 1985, national income
increased by only 4.9 percent, industrial output by 5
percent, and gross agricultural output by 7.3
percent. The counterinsurgency will continue to limit
economic growth, and Soviet aid is unlikely to increase
substantially over 1985 levels because of the USSR's
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THE SOVIETS'
domestic budgetary constraints.
objectives highlighted
win support for the regime
international image.
MAN IN KABUL
The rosy forecast
probably are intended
and to improve its
and
to help
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Najibullah
has publicly stated that he will
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maintain close ties with
the Soviet Union, and he
pledged to defeat the
guerrillas and implement
social
and economic reforms.
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some factional 25X1
fighting and arrests of both pro-Karmal demonstrators
and members of the rival Khalqi faction, the new party
chief has attempted to demonstrate unity within the
regime,...: All members of the Politburo--including
Khalgis-appeared together at a public ceremony last
week. Moreover, Najibullah has conferredwith.Sayyed
Mohammed Gulabzoi, Minister of the Interior and head of
the Khalqi faction,.and with officials from the
National Defense. Najibullah also met with elders of
the minority Hazara tribe--Prime Minister Soltan Ali
KestmanCs ethnic group.
COMMENT: Najibullah's pro-Soviet attitude, his
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? 13 may 1986
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background in intelligence, and his Pashtun ethnicity
probably made him an attractive leader in Moscow's
eyes. His appointment, just as the peace talks in
Geneva were about to begin, also may have been meant to
give the impression of Soviet willingness to consider
other leadership adjustments in Kabul. Although- '
Najibullah will give priority to coopting the Pashtun
tribes--the backbone of the resistance-;-and'imprq4in
the government's security forces, his anti-Khalqi
tendencies, if unchecked, could be counterproductive:
IN BRIEF
Most residents of Uzbekistan and Kirgizia suppOrtv:'
the Soviet policy in Afghanistan despite mistrust
of Soviet press coverage of the war and critical ,
reports from returning veterans, according,to the
US Embassy in Moscow. Even the young-and well=.,
educated--whose suspicion of the Soviet press is
strongest--feel that Soviet national security
interests are at stake in Afghanistan.'
-- Two Sciviet diplomats in Kabul'were executedlir'!
f early 1986 for smuggling gold for the'Afghan
resistance, according to the US Embassy in Moscow
and a Soviet dissident publication. f'The illegal:
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operation evidently was uncovered during a customs
inspection in Moscow. One of the officials was a
former Minister of Justice in the Tadzhik Republic,
and his alleged execution suggests the government
intends to crack down on corruption among Soviet
officials in Afghanistan.
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PERSPECTIVE
AFGHANISTAN TN APRTI
During a three-week offensive in April, the Afghan Army
overran two insurgent camps in Paktia Province and
Pakistani
Afghan Army Success in Paktia
The Afghan Army's performance in the battles in Paktia
suggests that it is making some progress. Although
Soviet air and artillery support were critical to the
outcome of the operations, Afghan Army troops sustained
the offensive and evidently suffered few defections.
The regime has heavily publicized its success in
Paktia. It claimed destruction of vast amounts of arms
and equipment cached in the hill complex at Zhawar and
exaggerated insurgent casualties--Kabul said it killed
3,000 guerrillas and wounded another 4,000. The loss
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of the guerrillas' complex--with communications and
administrative facilities, workshops, and stockpiles--
was a clear set back for the guerrillas.
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The fighting in Qandahar evidently was stepped up by
the guerrillas in response to Afghan regime and Soviet
attacks this winter on base camps in Oandahar
Province.
pthe insurgents destroyed offices of the
Atighan inte1ligence service in Qandahar on 2 April, and
media accounts termed fighting in the city as intense
during the month.
The Soviets and the Afghan Government continued to
prevent any major imsurgent actions in Kabul, according
to the-US Embassy. Although the guerrillas almost
certainly assigned high priority to disrupting the
eighth anniversary celebrations of the Communist coup
on 27 April, the defensive measures instituted by the
regime in the capital apparently checked ?the
insurgents' capabilities for sizable attacks.
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OUTLOOK
probably was the prelude to
this spring. The formula of Soviet
support for Afghan infantry seems to
and the Soviets probably will use
however, that the Army will have
more successful operations to
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The Paktia offensive
heavier fighting
air and artillery
have worked recently,
it again. We believe,
to conduct several
demonstrate that
it is more than a weak
extension of
the Soviet Army.
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The Afghan Army's
successful offensive
in Paktia may
discourage the insurgents from establishing additional
large support complexes and from forming more
conventional-style combat units, in our view. But
reliance on small and highly mobile units will limit
the damage that the insurgents will be
able to inflict
in engagements.
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