AFGHANISTAN STUATION REPORT

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP96R01136R001302260004-2
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 14
• Document Creation Date: December 27, 2016
• Document Release Date: December 17, 2013
• Sequence Number: 4
• Publication Date: May 6, 1986
• Content Type: REPORT

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inrectorate or rup-M.LIC-reL__
Intelligence
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Afghanistan Situation Report
6 May 1986
94 SOVA/TWMASIA.
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NESA M 86-20067JX
SOVA M 86-20044 JX
6 May 1986
CODV 094
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AFGHANISTAN SITUATION REPORT
CONTENTS
COMBAT ACTIVITY WINDS DOWN
Fighting was at a reduced level in Afghanistan
last week, probably in part because Afghan
units were restina and refittina after heavy
spring fighting.
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AFGHAN
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REFUGEES IN IRAN
The Iranian Government
request international
million Afghan refugees
oil prices and the
has been forced recently to
aid to support the some 1.8
in Iran because of falling
cost of the war with Iraq.
PRAISE
AND PROMOTIONS FOR
The Afghan and soviet
THE AFGHAN ARMY
media are giving
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public
praise to the Afghan
Army for its recent successes
in Paktia Province.
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IN BRIEF
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PERSPECTIVE
NEW PARTY CHIEF IN AFGHANISTAN
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Former intelligence chief
appointed to replace Babrak
Najibullah has been
Karmal as head of the
People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan. His new
role probably will not enhance the regime's public
image or improve Kabul's
ability to prosecute the
war.
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NE?A44-857204674X
SOVAM6'4367-20044Ji
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This document is prepared weekly by the Office of Near Eastern
and South Asian Analysis and the Office of Soviet Analysis.
6- May 1986 ,
NESA M 86-20067JX
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COMBAT ACTIVITY WINDS DOWN
Combat activity throughout Afghanistan was at a reduced
level last week, primarily because of the eighth
anniversary celebrations of the Communist coup and
units resting and refitting after intense early spring
fighting.
AFGHAN REFUGEES IN IRAN
Over 1.8 million Afghan refugees--1.1 million since the
1979 Soviet invasion--have settled in Iran, according
to recent official Iranian estimates. Nbout 10 percent
of the refugees are received in centers, while the
majority have a more uncertain position as illegal
aliens. The Iranian Government--which had previously
refused international aid for the refugees--will
receive $11 million this year from the United Nations
High Commissioner for Refugees (muun0 and has also
sought aid from the World Food Program (WFP).
COMMENT: Deteriorating economic conditions in Iran--
caused by falling oil prices and the cost of the Iran-
Iraq war--have forced Tehran to overlook its fear of
outside interference and seek international aid for the
Afghan refugees. The refugees' position in Iran
probably will become more difficult because of high
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6 May 1986
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unemployment and growing shortages of consumer goods.
Tehran probably wants to stop the flow of refu ees into
Iran but,2cannot, given the long open. border.
PRAISE AND: PROMOTIONS FOR THE AFGHAN ARMY
' The Nfghan and Soviet media are playing up recent Army
successes in Paktia Province. In a speech given in
Khowst, Defense Minister Major-General Nazar Muhammand
praisedthe army for its destruction of the nearby
insurgent camp in Zhawar Killi. Kabul-based soldiers
who participated in the attack were greeted on their
, return by government officials including Prime Minister
Keshtmand - The Soviets reported in Krasnaya Zvezda how
Afghan Army units cleared the insurgents' supply
base. In a related move, the Central Committee of the
People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan recommended
expediting promotions for eligible personnel in certain
military specialties and for some who have participated
in combat- over the past year.
COMMENT: The extensive publicity and unusual
promotions come at a time when the Soviet Union is
pressing the Afghan Army to assume more combat
responsibilities and are probably intended to boost
army morale:
IN BRIEF
Soviet and Afghan forces are
destroying houses, farms, and orchards to create a security
belt around Qandahar. When completed, the belt will have
some 37 squad-size outposts linked together with
minefields. The belt will hamper insurgent attacks in
Qandahar and make it more difficult for insurgents to enter
and exit the city.
-- The Afro-Asian People's Solidarity Organization (AAPSO),
which will meet in Moscow in mid-May, has planned an "Afghan
solidarity day". the
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delegation from Mali has been instructed by the Malian
Government not to participate in those activities because of
Malian neutrality on the Afghan issue.
Iranian media, in a commentary on Najibullah's recent
appointment as General-Secretary of the People's Democratic
Party of Afghanistan, labeled the new leader a "KGB pawn."
The Iranians charged that Moscow's decision to remove his
predecessor Babrak Karmal is an indication of a "fundamental
instability" in the Soviet policy toward Afghanistan.
Polish activists in Warsaw chanted "hands off Afghanistan"
during pro-Solidarity Front demonstrations on I May. The
protest was broken up by Polish security forces, and two
British journalists were arrested.
According to an Indian official in Addis Ababa, Ethiopian
leader Mengistu last week expressed concern about the Soviet
role in possibly ousting Babrak Karmal. The replacement of
Karmal as Afghan Communist Party chief on 4 May probably will
increase Mengistu's disquietude over Soviet intentions toward
him.
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PERSPECTIVE
NEW PARTY CHIEF IN AFGHANISTAN
Former intelligence chief Najibullah's appointment as
head of the People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan
(PUPA) to replace Babrak Karmal will not improve the
regime's ability to prosecute the war and could
aggravate factionalism. For now, Karmal remains as
chairman of the Revolutionary Council--the regime's
executive branch--and as a member of the PDPA
Politburo. Najibullah's good relations with the
Soviets while head of the intelligence service suggest
he will be a compliant partner, although his background
probably will reinforce the regime's image as a Soviet-
controlled and narrowly based police state.
Unusual Activity in Kabul
Najibullah's appointment--publicly praised by Soviet
leader Gorbachev--followed two days of substantially
increased security measures and unusual military
activity in Kabul. According to the US Embassy, Afghan
troops--mostly unarmed--blocked off a large section of
the capital around the presidential palace and key
government buildings on 2 May. Soviet combat forces
were observed at several points throughout the city on
3 May. Kabul airport was closed to civilians, and air
activity over the city was unusually light.
Moscow probably had decided before Karmal 's return to
Kabul on I May that he should be replaced, but we do
not know whether the Soviets intended this to occur
immediately or whether events forced their hand.
Moscow probably would have preferred to have avoided
the public display of military power in Kabul
associated with the changeover--and the appearance of
instability in the regime that it conveyed--but may
have felt compelled to make the switch because of a
deterioration in Karmal's health, internal Afghan
plotting, or a desire to have a leader more capable
than Karmal of forcing unpopular policy choices upon a
recalcitrant government and military establishment.
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Up the Ladder
Najibullah's appointment in November 1985 as a
Secretary of the People's Democratic Party of
Afghanistan (PDPA) Central Committee gave him a much
broader role in the regime and expanded his already
considerable power. By overseeing the Ministries of
Defense and Interior, as well as the Afghan
intelligence service (KHAD), he was able to consolidate
his control of all of the re ime's security
forces.
In addition, Najibullah's new position helped to give
him broader experience in party affairs and increase
his public visibility, already considerable for a
secret police head. Moscow may have seen such expanded
horizons as essential preparation for assuming the top
post in the regime. Last year a Soviet diplomat in
Kabul acknowledged the similarity between Najibullah's
rise and Yuri Andropov's movement from KGB chief to
party secretary to General Secretary.
The Man from KHAD
The new Secretary brings numerous professional, party,
and personal assets to his position. As leader of KHAD
since the Soviet invasion, Najibullah presided over the
growth of the secret police into a powerful and feared
organization, which has at times overshadowed the party
itself. He also built a personal reputation for
ruthlessness and relative competence.
Najibullah met daily with
all of his major subordinates in order to maintain
control. He worked to move trusted members of his
Parchami wing of the PDPA into key positions and, when
necessary, ignored the formal chain of command in order
to bypass members of the rival Khalqi faction.
Najibullah adroitly balanced his own bid, fon domestic
power with total acauiescence to Soviet control- of his
organization.
Najibullah has traveled frequently to the USSR for
consultations. A fervent Communist, he has impreSsed
those around him as fanatically pro-Spviet?in.
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outlook.
Parchamis and Other Strangers
Links to others in the PDPA hierarchy may have eased
Najibullah's rise to power. As an early party
activist--he was a student organizer for Karmal in the
late 1960s--Najibullah has longstanding ties to most
high-ranking members of the Parchami faction. His
relations with Karmal, although not always smooth, were
close. Najibullah
over the years as a friend,-as well as a loyal
political ally, of Karmal.
Najibullah's links to other Parchami luminaries also go
well back in the PDPA's turbulent history. Along with
Nur Ahmad Nur, Anahita Ratebzad, Mahmud Baryalai, and
Babrak Karmal, Najibullah was sent into ambassadorial
exile by the Khalqis in 1978. He later traveled with
Nur and Baryalai in Western Europe, recruiting
supporters and plotting the overthrow of the Khalqis,
As
the regime's chief emissary to Pashtun tribal leaders,
Najibullah also worked closely with Solayman Laeq, the
Minister of Nationalities and Tribal Affairs.
His impressive personality should assist Najibullah in
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determined, forceful, self-assured, and an excellent 25X1
speaker. Najibullah is a hard worker who often sleeps
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also has displayed a flair for the dramatic: ?at a mass
meeting of Defense Ministry employees in 1982, he read
what he claimed was a letter from Gulbuddin Hekmatyar
thanking dissident Khalqis for their assistance,
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Problems Ahead?
Despite his many assets, Najibullah will have to
overcome his reputation as violently anti-Khalqi to
become the, successful, effective leader the Soviets
apparently want. as
of 1983, Najibullah became angry even at the mention of
the Khalqi faction and refused to greet Khalqis at
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Politburo meetings. He and Khalqi leader Sayed
Mohammad Gulabzoi pulled pistols on each other during a
Revolutionary Council meeting in January 1983, and at a
meeting of the same body in May 1984 he and
Communications Minister Mohammad Aslam Watanjar,
another Khalqi, came to blows,
In his efforts to mold the PDPA into a more effective
governing body, Najibullah may also encounter
resistance from the party's old guard. While the PDPA
Politburo is hardly a Kremlin-style gerontocracy, seven
of the 12 full and candidate members are a full decade
older than the new Secretary and may resent his rapid
advancement.
Outlook
The Soviets probably deemed Najibullah most capable of
molding Afghan security forces and the PDP 4 into a more
effective, cohesive unit. The Soviets probably hope
such a new, improved regime would prove capable of
shouldering a greater share of what they expect to be a
long, grinding struggle--permitting, in effect, an
"Afghanization" of the war.
The elevation of a former secret police head, in our
view, will reinforce the regime's image as a Soviet-
controlled and narrowly based police state, however.
Najibullah's appointment is unlikely to draw back many
of the Afghans who have fled the country over the past
six years, and the Afghan resistance almost certainly
views his accession to power as offering no improvement
over Karmal.
Najibullah's accession will almost certainly complicate
Afghanistan's relations with Pakistan and will not
advance diplomatic efforts to reach a compromise
solution to the war. Efforts to destabilize Pakistan
can also be expected to continue with Najibullah's rise
to power.
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