AFGHANISTAN SITUATION REPORT

Document Type: 
Collection: 
Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 
CIA-RDP96R01136R001302260001-5
Release Decision: 
RIPPUB
Original Classification: 
T
Document Page Count: 
14
Document Creation Date: 
December 27, 2016
Document Release Date: 
December 17, 2013
Sequence Number: 
1
Case Number: 
Publication Date: 
May 1, 1984
Content Type: 
REPORT
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PDF icon CIA-RDP96R01136R001302260001-5.pdf485.87 KB
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25X1 Declassified in Part-Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2014/03/12 : CIA-RDP96R01136R001302260001-5 0,.daop?Cegr-el? virectorate cot Intelligence 25X1 0 25X1 a Afghanistan Situation Report ti 1 May 1984 0 0 Scret NESA M 84-10178CX SOVA M R4-10061CX 1 May 1984 25X1 Copy A -7 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2014/03/12 : CIA-RDP96R01136R001302260001-5 25X1 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2014/03/12 : CIA-RDP96R01136R001302260001-5 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2014/03/12 : CIA-RDP96R01136R001302260001-5 25X1 ')9(1 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2014/03/12 : CIA-RDP96R01136R001302260001-5 TOP SECRET AFGHANISTAN SITUATION REPORT CONTENTS 25X1 IMPORTANCE OF THE PANJSHER VALLEY The Panjsher has been a key insurgent stronghold since the Soviet invasion, and international media coverage has helped Masood 2 become a key resistance leader. 25X1 STATUS OF GENEVA TALKS 3 UN negotiator Cordovez is looking for additional trivial concessions to justify another round of Geneva talks. 25X1 IN BRIEF 3 PERSPECTIVE THE BATTLE FOR AFGHAN HIGHWAYS 7 Afghanistan's roads are vital to the Soviets and Afghan regime and highly vulnerable to insurgent interdiction and ambush. 25X1 25X1 This document is prepared weekly by the Office of Near Eastern and South Asian Analysis and the Office of Soviet Analysis. 1 May 1984 NESA M 84-10178CX SOVA M 84-10066CX Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2014/03/12 : CIA-RDP96R01136R001302260001-5 25X1 25X1 25X1 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2014/03/12 : CIA-RDP96R01136R001302260001-5 TUF SELKET ? 1 1 20 Kilorneieis 20 Khenj. Molakhel Jabal os Saraj Golbahar Charikar -Dakow-ye Payan 0) Kandla' Kabul International Airport I ?a, KABUL ! * ? Afghani tan . Shindand Ghazni.Gardey;\IS _ MABAD Bagrami Pak 633911 3-83 Kilon? 300 Boundary representation es not necessarely authoreatrre 1 May 1984 NESA M 84? 10178CX SOVA M 84-10066CX II Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2014/03/12 : CIA-RDP96R01136R001302260001-5 25X1 25X1 25X1 25X1 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2014/03/12 : CIA-RDP96R01136R001302260001-5 25X1 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2014/03/12 : CIA-RDP96R01136R001302260001-5 25X1 25X1 25X1 25X1 25X1 25X1 25X1 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2014/03/12 : CIA-RDP96R01136R001302260001-5 IMPORTANCE OF THE PANJSHER VALLEY The Panjsher Valley has been a key insurgent stronghold since the Soviet invasion in December 1979, and international media coverage has helped Panjsher insurgent commander Masood become a key resistance leader. The valley's importance derives from its strategic location and from the effectiveness of the insurgents who have controlled it despite six major Soviet and Afghan - of fensives since spring 1980. The valley's location has been a great advantage to the insurgents. Situated just south of the Hindu Kush range, the high valley overlooks the main highway between the USSR and Kabul. The location has permitted the insurgents to ambush Soviet and Afghan convoys delivering vital supplies of food, fuel, and materiel to the capital and to major Afghan and Soviet garrisons in the Kabul area Panjsher guerrillas have repeatedly attacked the Soviet fuel iDeine that runs from Termez to Bagram. nsurgents use the valley as a major infiltration route for supplies from Pakistan to northern Afghanistan. 25X1 25X1 25X1 25X1, 25X1 25X1 25X1 25X1 The continued existence of a strong Panjsher insurgent organization poses a long?term threat to Soviet control of the area. Masood has used the year?long cease?fire with the Soviets to fortify his position within the valley and to expand his influence through development of additional strongholds and alliances with other commanders in northern northeastern, and central Afghanistan. 25X1 1 May 1984 NESA M 84-10178CX SOYA M 84-10066CX 2 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2014/03/12 : CIA-RDP96R01136R001302260001-5 25X1 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2014/03/12 : CIA-RDP96R01136R001302260001-5 STATUS OF GENEVA TALKS UN Special Representative Cordovez expects the Babrak government to reply this week to proposals he made during his recent trip to the region. Cordovez left Kabul abruptly after waiting three days for Afghan Foreign Minister Dost to get a reply from "them," presumably the Soviets, about whether a Soviet ? troop withdrawal could be included in UN negotiations, If Kabul's reply is satisfactory and if the UN Secretary General obtains some favorable sign during his upcoming trip to Moscow, the UN will call for another round of talks at Geneva. IN BRIEF Comment None of the parties appears to expect any progress at Geneva, but all--probably including Cordovez?believe that talks will help their images. Cordovez' only accomplishment during the trip that ended 14 April was to secure Pakistani agreement to hold indirect talks in separate rooms of the same building instead of in separate buildings. He is likely to regard an equally trivial concession from Moscow or Kabul as sufficient to justif another round of talks in Geneva. 3 1 May 1984 NESA M 84-10178CX SOVA M 84-10066CX 25X1 25X1 25X1 25X1 25X1 25X1 25X1 25X1 25X1 25X1 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2014/03/12 : CIA-RDP96R01136R001302260001-5 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2014/03/12 : CIA-RDP96R01136R001302260001-5 - TASS on 25 April said Pakistan is strengthening forces opposite Afghanistan and is cooperating with the US in coordinating Afghan insurgent activities. The statement is probably intended to intimidate Islamabad or to justify future cross?border incidents. It is unlikely to affect Pakistani policy. - Harakat representatives have in custody. a low?ranking Soviet soldier whom they would like to send to the West, according to the US Consulate in Peshawar. --Because of heavy airstrikes around Qandahar, as many as 4,000 refugees have crossed into Pakistan, according to Afghan resistance sources. 1 May 1984 NESA M 84-10178CX SOVA M 84-10066CX 4 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2014/03/12: CIA-RDP96R01136R001302260001-5 25X1 25X1 25X1 25X1 25X1 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2014/03/12 : CIA-RDP96R01136R001302260001-5 60 \\V,Urgench 40- N. ;- Mashhad - 36 ?P?fr, jayyebat IRAN ? '64 Bukhara,. Chardzhen Sami7cand , Q V I VT \ Karshi. owraghonf BAasH 0 ' Ke left Jeyre On L; Nizhniy Pyandthl ads (.:3 I S heberg ' ha JOWZJANlBALKH fhari 0,'-...J- \ N ? j Inman(*) ? thIlaym.ar7 1,1, SAM, ANGrN I r.' ,IFikiTijr13 . ? , `,,,7,p, Oareh-ye N ow a? 4f I Chao hclia in f ? Jo' Mahn ?-1- ? 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