AFGHANISTAN SITUATION REPORT
Document Type:
Collection:
Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST):
CIA-RDP96R01136R001302260001-5
Release Decision:
RIPPUB
Original Classification:
T
Document Page Count:
14
Document Creation Date:
December 27, 2016
Document Release Date:
December 17, 2013
Sequence Number:
1
Case Number:
Publication Date:
May 1, 1984
Content Type:
REPORT
File:
Attachment | Size |
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CIA-RDP96R01136R001302260001-5.pdf | 485.87 KB |
Body:
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Afghanistan Situation Report
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1 May 1984
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1 May 1984
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TOP SECRET
AFGHANISTAN SITUATION REPORT
CONTENTS
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IMPORTANCE OF THE PANJSHER VALLEY
The Panjsher has been a key insurgent stronghold since the Soviet
invasion, and international media coverage has helped Masood
2
become a key resistance leader.
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STATUS OF GENEVA TALKS
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UN negotiator Cordovez is looking for additional trivial
concessions to justify another round of Geneva talks.
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IN BRIEF
3
PERSPECTIVE
THE BATTLE FOR AFGHAN HIGHWAYS
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Afghanistan's roads are vital to the Soviets and Afghan
regime
and highly vulnerable to insurgent interdiction and ambush.
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This document is prepared weekly by the Office of Near Eastern and South
Asian Analysis and the Office of Soviet Analysis.
1 May 1984
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TUF SELKET
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Boundary representation es
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IMPORTANCE OF THE PANJSHER VALLEY
The Panjsher Valley has been a key insurgent stronghold since
the Soviet invasion in December 1979, and international media
coverage has helped Panjsher insurgent commander Masood become a
key resistance leader. The valley's importance derives from its
strategic location and from the effectiveness of the insurgents
who have controlled it despite six major Soviet and Afghan -
of fensives since spring 1980.
The valley's location has been a great advantage to the
insurgents. Situated just south of the Hindu Kush range, the
high valley overlooks the main highway between the USSR and
Kabul. The location has permitted the insurgents to ambush
Soviet and Afghan convoys delivering vital supplies of food,
fuel, and materiel to the capital and to major Afghan and Soviet
garrisons in the Kabul area
Panjsher guerrillas have repeatedly attacked the Soviet fuel
iDeine that runs from Termez to Bagram.
nsurgents use the valley as a major infiltration route for
supplies from Pakistan to northern Afghanistan.
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The continued existence of a strong Panjsher insurgent
organization poses a long?term threat to Soviet control of the
area. Masood has used the year?long cease?fire with the Soviets
to fortify his position within the valley and to expand his
influence through development of additional strongholds and
alliances with other commanders in northern northeastern, and
central Afghanistan. 25X1
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STATUS OF GENEVA TALKS
UN Special Representative Cordovez expects the Babrak
government to reply this week to proposals he made during his
recent trip to the region. Cordovez left Kabul abruptly after
waiting three days for Afghan Foreign Minister Dost to get a
reply from "them," presumably the Soviets, about whether a Soviet
?
troop withdrawal could be included in UN negotiations,
If Kabul's reply is satisfactory and if
the UN Secretary General obtains some favorable sign during his
upcoming trip to Moscow, the UN will call for another round of
talks at Geneva.
IN BRIEF
Comment
None of the parties appears to expect any progress at Geneva,
but all--probably including Cordovez?believe that talks will
help their images. Cordovez' only accomplishment during the trip
that ended 14 April was to secure Pakistani agreement to hold
indirect talks in separate rooms of the same building instead of
in separate buildings. He is likely to regard an equally trivial
concession from Moscow or Kabul as sufficient to justif another
round of talks in Geneva.
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- TASS on 25 April said Pakistan is strengthening forces
opposite Afghanistan and is cooperating with the US in
coordinating Afghan insurgent activities. The statement is
probably intended to intimidate Islamabad or to justify future
cross?border incidents. It is unlikely to affect Pakistani
policy.
- Harakat representatives have in custody. a low?ranking Soviet
soldier whom they would like to send to the West, according to
the US Consulate in Peshawar.
--Because of heavy airstrikes around Qandahar, as many as 4,000
refugees have crossed into Pakistan, according to Afghan
resistance sources.
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