COMMUNITY-WIDE ADHERENCE TO DCID 1/14 (U)

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP96M01138R000600030050-6
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: C
• Document Page Count: 3
• Document Creation Date: December 20, 2016
• Document Release Date: November 1, 2006
• Sequence Number: 50
• Publication Date: July 29, 1977
• Content Type: MF

DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
OFFICE OF THE ASSISTANT CHIEF OF STAFF FOR INTELLIGENCE
WASHINGTON. D.C. 20310
2 9 JUL 1977
MEMORANDUM FOR: MR. G. MARVIN GENTILE, CHAIRMAN, DCI SECURITY
COMMITTEE
SUBJECT: Community-Wide Adherence to DCID 1/14 (U)
1. (U) Reference is made to Memorandum, SECOM, Executive Secretary,
12 July 1977, subject as above.
2. (C) The following comments are keyed to the questions posed in
para 2, referenced memorandum:
a. Special Background Investigations (SBI's) are conducted for
Department of the Army by the Defense Investigative Service (DIS),
and usually meet DCID 1/14 standards. In those few instances where
cases are closed which reflect that the proper scope has not been
met or a significant lead has not been exploited, the case is returned
to DIS for completion prior to making a final determination. As
provided for in paragraph 15, DCID 1/14, existence of a minor inves-
tigative deficiency will not cause a case to be reopened.
b. Minimum standards expressed in DCID 1/14 would appear to
ensure comparability among all agencies except NSA and CIA. The
latter two agencies have the added feature of a polygraph examination,
which other agencies do not utilize. Accordingly, screening accomplished
by CIA and NSA should be acceptable to other agencies, but screening
accomplished by other agencies would probably not be acceptable to
NSA and CIA until the polygraph examination could be completed. From
the DA viewpoint, current DCID 1/14 standards are adequate and do not
require change.
c. Department of the Army has established a computer based system
to identify personnel having access to SCI. This roster includes
investigation dates, and is the medium which triggers servicing Special
Security Offices (SSO's) to initiate bring-up investigations. A review
of closed SBI-BU's referred to the US Army Intelligence Agency.for
review and adjudication reflects close adherence to the five-year
bring-up requirement.
d. Mutually supporting procedures, constituting DA's continuing
security program, consist essentially of three areas:
ARMY review(s) completed.
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DAMI-DOS
SUBJECT: Community-Wide Adherence to DCID 1/14 (U)
(1) Personnel being granted access to SCI for the first time
receive required indoctrination. Six months following the initial
indoctrination, a reindoctrination is presented to ensure full under-
standing of the program. Reindoctrination is given to all persons
having access to SCI two years after the date of last indoctrination..
Personnel who change duty stations are debriefed upon their departure
and reindoctrinated at their new location (if under Army cognizance),
thereby ensuring familiarity with access procedures in the new
environment while reinforcing their knowledge of safeguards and
procedures previously learned.
(2) Servicing SSO's are required by regulation to sustain close
and continuing relations with supported commanders to monitor the
activities and conduct of persons having access to SCI; through this
coordination, instances of mental instability, excessive drinking
habits, indebtedness, unexplained affluence and other-unusual conduct
or attitude which may bear on continued eligibility for access to SCI
surfaced and reported to adjudicative authority for review and/or
reinvestigation. Further, the Army's adjudication element advises
an SSO/local command of possible problem areas concerning an individual
at the time indoctrination authority is forwarded, and the SSO is
instructed to caution an individual about his conduct and to monitor
the individual's behavior through his. supervisor.
(3) By regulation, Army commanders are required to sustain close
supervision and observation of activities and behavior of personnel
having access to classified information (collateral as well as SCI)..
They are also required to establish security training programs within
their respective commands to ensure personnel knowledge of appropriate
security regulations and procedures and awareness of hostile element
operating techniques. This training takes the form of classic,"security
lectures," briefings to small groups on the hostile threat, incorpora-
tion into other areas of required military training, publicity in the
forms ofbrochures/pamphlets/entries in unit bulletins, desk-side
trouble shooting, and frequent unannounced inspections and spot checks.
A majority of commands require at least an annual attendance of a
formal security education program.
The measures noted in paragraph (1), above, apply to all persons having
access to SCI. As of 15 June 1977, approximately 24,500 persons were
identified as having such access, thus it follows that approximately
one-half of this number is involved annually in the reindoctrination
program. The measures in paragraph (3), above, apply across the board
to all members and employees of the Army, but exact annual numbers have
not been developed.
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DAMI-DOS
SUBJECT: Community-Wide Adherence to DCID 1/14 (U)
e. Within DA, when an individual nominated for SCI is denied
access, a memorandum summarizing the adverse information is prepared.
This item with supportive material is filed in the Army's Investigative
Records Repository (IRR), and this dossier number is recorded in the
Defense Central Investigative Index (DCII). A subsequent check of the
DCII by another Federal agency will disclose the existence of the IRR
dossier, and this item will be released to the agency upon request.
Feasibility of all DOD components and NSA using this procedure is
suggested. The "Third Agency Rule" would apply, but no significant
hurdles are foreseen. This centralization within DOD would constitute
a primary, single source reference point for all agencies to query
DOD. It is suggested that reciprocal exchange procedures among all
agencies may best be established by DCI Directive on the subject..
Such reciprocal procedures should include the voluntary notification
of one agency to another when adverse information is developed which
concerns a member of the second agency.
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