SCI DENIALS WORKING GROUP - COMMENTS CONCERNING TASKING TO PREPARE SCI APPEALS PROCEDURES.

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP96M01138R000600030039-9
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 7
• Document Creation Date: December 20, 2016
• Document Release Date: September 11, 2006
• Sequence Number: 39
• Publication Date: September 6, 1978
• Content Type: MEMO

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MEMORANDUM TO:
FROM:
SUBJECT:
OGC
6 September 1978
Security Committee Staff
SCI Denials Working Group - Comments
Concerning Tasking to Prepare SCI
Appeals Procedures.
1. Reference our conversation concerning the SCI Denials
Working Group, attached find copies of a DIA memorandum dated
15 August 1978 and my memorandum for the record dated 4 August
1978 which has been revised by Mr. Maynard Anderson of DoD.
(See underlining in paragraph 4 - the underlined portions
were substituted for language in my original memorandum of
that date by who felt that my comments did not
accurately reflect the DoD position on the matter).
2. It is my understanding that there still has been no
resolution of the DoD position in this matter. However, it
appears that the DIA recommendation (concurred in by
1 will prevail and that no SCI appeals proce-
dure will be included in the DoD Personnel Security Program
Regulation.
3. As you will recall, it has been agreed that the SCI
Denials Working Group will not submit an alternate proposal
until the aforementioned Dop?Fecommendation, as set forth in
the DIA memorandum of 15 August 1978, is acted upon. This
may take some time. I personally feel that this decision is
unfortunate and submit at this time it would be difficult,
if not impossible, to overturn.
4. Please contact me after you have reviewed the attach-
ments. I welcome any views that you may have on this matter
and look forward to your participation with the group.
On file OSD release instructions apply.
Attachments
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etaied-COMMenis On Proposed DoD'PeriOnnoilecuritY' Program ,Re?iai?n
:
,,..0aragraph 1 -302b.
'
ecommendation: Delete reference to SCI access;
'Rationale: Policy affecting the SCI access program can only be enad
authority of the DCI.,,,,,,,...,..,.,. ....; ,....? :,:',"?.? - ?,' . .,
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.. ?,? . . . , f" , Paragraph 1-401
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,?,..Recommendation : Add to the end of, the paragraph: '. "Knowledge':".0,..at',,,..'A,
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...,possessiOn...of,'Or access to classified defense information shalltribt.'''be,..0,'
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afforded to any individual ::: by v:: virtue . of; his.....offiCe, ? position';'. 'Qr. i''S,ecUrity.?:''.
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.....61earance.'" ,, .. ,. ....,..,?..,' , ':,???? :....;.,' ;:-...y.? ??....? ., 'L.."' ''',...1'.?- ?-???::......... ...4,;,..,'A,;,,...?,..,...,?:',..,'...,.:;;',,..,...'..
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..;, Rationale: The importanee, of restricting dissemination ocr:clasS'ifieit;
l, information on the "need-to-know"' principle should be emphasize4,in,an''''''',
policy document
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,
Paragraph 2-703 '.' f .. , ' 'H ?'
Recommendation: Add the following parenthetical comment to lin' ?':6.afte
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' ,..nominee is assigned." .,',,- ("clerical Oersonnel are not authorize to.Y?...',
.
conduct pre-SBI screening interviews :1
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, Rationale: Experience since May 197Phas shown that some requesting
" agencies have applied an overly liberal interpretation to the Ellsworth
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? Memorandum provisions governing personnel authorized to conduct pre-SBI; ,
interviews. Clerical (to include typing) personnel have frequently been
, utilized to conduct such interviews. The use of Untrained personnel ,to
conduct this vital segment of security investigations only serves to lessen,
rather than improve, the value of the pre-SBI screening procedure. '
4.; .Paragraph 4-102
,
;
.a
Recommendation: Delete parenthetical comment in line 2 of sUbpaii4a?rapii a',
and b. - "(including (SCI)' )." ,
,
Rationale: Paragraph 1-601 (i) of E0 12036 states that the DCI shall"
"....ensure the establishment by the Intelligence Community of common , p
systems, information and products." Further, paragraph 1-710 of the saMe?E0'.
security and access standards for managing and handling foreign intelligence c
,
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..., ,' tasks senior officials of the Intelligence Community to "protect inte1ligence,$0A
and intelligence sources and methods consistent with guidance from
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the DCI and National Security Council." Current SCI policy does not make
, provisions for mutual acceptance of previously certified SCI access. An SCI
certifying authority cannot properly carry out his responsibility to ,protect
sensitive sources and methods foreign intelligence information if he is unabl
? to assess the impact the assignment of an individual who has previously been
granted an exception to Director of Central Intelligence Directive (DCID 1/14
standards will have on an SCI position under his security cognizance. Each, ,
gaining SIO must review all available information relating to an individual's
SCI eligibility in order to conform to the provisions of the cited DCID.
Paragraph 6-100
Recommendation: Delete lines 8 through 14 of paragraph 6-100
Rationale: It would seem inappropriate to specify estima?ed investigative
lead completion times in a DoD policy document. It could be argued that '
completion times will increase/decrease in the future.
6. Paragraph 6-104
Recommendation: Add the following parenthetical qualification to the end' o
the footnote to subparagraph 6-104 b:, "(except for SCI access nominations, in
which cases the requester will determine the number of additional resubmission)f
Rationale: DCID 1/14 requires submisslon of fingerprint charts to the
Tor a search of the criminal files of that agency. No limitation is specified,
for unclassifiable fingerprint card resubmissions. We have been advised that
an ODASD(A) check with Hq FBI confirmed that, unless a fingerprint check is
made, no assurance can be given of even a positive identification of the ,applican
concerned.
7. Paragraph 7-201
Recommendation: Delete paragraph.
Rationale: Inclusion of DIS operational procedures is inappropriate to' 6i
document. Except for DIS, these procedures are of little interest to the
personnel who will be referring to this Regulation.
? 8.. Paragraph 8-103
Recommendation: Delete sentence 1 of paragraph 8-103.
, Rationale: Specification of evaluative factors is already contillled in
preceding paragraph. Restatement is repetitious.
,
For ese 20:0v:00ai5;
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aragraph 8-103
Recommendation: Add the following qualification to the end of the,,
final sentence of paragraph 8-103 "(excluding adjudication for eligibill
. to Sensitive Compartmented Information)."
Rationale: As specified in paragraph 4 above, EO 12036 sets forth',
.the authority of the DCI and, at his delegation, that of the Intelligenc
Community SIO's, to establish security and access standards for managing
SCI material. This includes adjudications policy. It should be noted ,
that the DCI's Security Committee (SECOM) is currently drafting guidelitiels,
for adjudication of personnel security cases involving access to Sc!
, 10. Chapter VIII Section 2
, Recommendation: Delete entire Section (paragraph 8-200, -204 a
.-202) along with Appendix F.
Rationale: The policy enunciated in this section authorizes DIS
adjudicate personnel security cases Conducted by that agency and sctegn
out "minor unfavorable information." DIS is an investigative, not an,.
adjudicative agency. The authority to investigate and adjudicate raise
the question of potential conflict of interest. Any determination of an '
individual's loyalty and trustworthiness must be made by the certifying
command, not an investigative agency. Such a determination is based on v
affirmative factors and not just the existence or non-existence of
'? major/minor derogatory information in an individual's background.
11. Paragraph 10-100
, Recommendation: Delete parenthetical qualification in line 4:
?..."(including....access to Sensitive Compartmented Information)."
Rationale: Pertains to SCI Program over which the DCI exercises,
' jurisdiction. See rationale cited in paragraph 4. above.
12. Paragraph 15-104
Recommendation: Delete subparagraph 15-104a.
Rationale: SIO's authorized to render SCI suitability determinations are
required under paragraph 17c. of DCID 1/14 to keep security and relateci'filel:'
- Under continuing review. This continuing review program requires immediate
availability of all pertinent security information concerning an indiyiduai,!,
background. Retention of investigative files by authorized requesters does
, violate any statutory prohibitions. Additionally, paragraph 13-100 of this
Regulation requires the organizational commander or manager to Maintaingra
.designed to evaluate on a continuing basis, the status of personnel Yqer hisd
Njoefsdiction Oth respect to security eligibility. This cannot properly be
?accomplished unless the activity concerned has all available information:
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Recommendation: Add the following qualification to the end of
. .
:-1 of subparagraph 1.c.: "...or where previous investigative material hat.,p
;been reviewed by the requesting organization."
Rationale: A Periodic Investigation cannot be properly evaluated ih',the
context of an individual's overall background if the requester has not
previously reviewed all available investigative material.
; 14. Appendix D.
1
?
Recommendation: Delete entire appendix.
?
Rationale: The evaluation of any personnel security cast for the purpos
of authorizing access to classified information must, in the finalanalysis; ;
' be the result of a common sense determination based on review of all available'
information pertaining to that case. Beyond this, additional specification of ,
rigid guidelines may result in an inflexible attitude by individual adjudicator4
and slavish dependence on written guidance. Such a situation would not be vindUcf4
to fair and impartial determinations. The general adjudications guidance provideds4
In Chapter VIII of the PSPR is considered sufficient in this respect.
15. Appendix G. Part 2
?. Recommendation: The DO rorm 398C as proposed in this Appendix does notprovide all information necessary for an SCI eligibility determination under
paragraph 5 of DCID 1/14. The following changes are required so that the docume'e
'ca6 be used by the Defense Investigative Service for conducting SBI's for SC',
access eligibility:
, 1. Section 8 should contain a listing of all immediate family members
g "qi
1 to include those specified under Section 10 of the current SPH.
2. Sections 13 and 14 should be combined under the heading, "Other- "
, . Relatives and Alien Friends Residing Abroad" (with no reference to specific
, ?
foreign countries).
3. Section 15 should require listing of schools attended during the j0
' 15 (instead of 5) years.
4 Additionally, Question 2 of Section 20 should be deleted question regarding effects of alcohol use as posed, is too subjective ' . The
' individual completing the DD398 to accurately answer. This type of informatia'
can more properly be elicited by a trained interviewer. ,
Rationale: DCID 1/14 is the governing national document insofar as acces
to SCI is concerned.
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,16. Appendix H
Recommendation: Change paragraph 3 to read:
"Officials (SCI):
Director; NSA - for NSA
Director, DIA - for Major DoD Components
SIO's of the Army, Navy, Air Force - for their respective Military
Departments
Rationale: Section III of DoD Directive S-5200.17 and Chapter XI.o
the implementing DoD Directive S-5200.17 (M-2) designate the Director, ,
DIA as the authority responsible for establishing and administering the"
COMINT security program for the Major Defense Agencies. As part of this
authority, he is required to make final evaluations for SI access for those
individuals under his security cognizance. In the TK area, Sections I and
III of DoD Directive S-5001.2 and Chapter 3 of DoD Directive TS-50012 (M-1)
establish the authority of the Director, DIA, and charge him with respOn
'sibility, as the DoD SIO, for approval of the "must know" determination
for access to that category of sensitive intelligence material. These
directives, in turn, derive from national directives concerning the SCI
program authority of the DCI.
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