PERSONNEL SECURITY STANDARDS FOR ACCESS TO INTELLIGENCE

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP96M01138R000600020003-9
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 2
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: December 10, 2008
• Sequence Number: 3
• Publication Date: March 11, 1981
• Content Type: MF

Declassified and Approved For Release 2012/01/23: CIA-RDP96M01138R000600020003-9
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DEPARTMENT OF THE TREASURY
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20220
1 1981
MEMORANDUM FOR: Ward Green
Chairman, Investigative Standards Working Group
FROM: Vaughn V. Holcanbe, Jr., Assistant Director of
Personnel (Personnel Security) - Treasury Menber
SUBJECT: Personnel Security Standards for Access to Intelligence
After reviewing your draft paper on Personnel Security Standards
for Access to Intelligence, I would like to take this opportunity to
point out some facts about the personnel security program in this De-
partment.
We have five bureaus with investigative staffs: IRS, Customs,
Secret Service, ATF and Engraving and Printing. Investigative services
are provided by each of these bureaus for their own personnel. In
addition, IRS provides investigative services for those Treasury bureaus
without investigative staffs with the exception of the Office of the
Secretary (OS). The Secret Service conducts investigations for OS
personnel.
The personnel security program in Treasury is decentralized. Each
bureau has a personnel security officer. My office has oversight re-
sponsibility for the program and we also promulgate Departmental regulations
and other instructional and policy issuances. I am attaching the dele-
gation order so you can see the extent of the decentralization. Also,
attached are our manual chapters regarding the conduct of personnel security
investigations (736) and on the overall personnel security program (732).
Generally, we follow the standards set by the Office of Personnel
Management in conducting background investigations on applicants for and
occupants of critical-sensitive positions which is basically five-year
coverage with certain exceptions. The Secret Service routinely do a
fifteen year period of coverage on all their people. The Customs Service
do background investigations on applicants for certain public contact
positions, such as Customs Inspectors, regardless of the sensitivity of
the positions. Different bureaus emphasize different aspects of an investi-
gation due to the various missions. I'm sure you can appreciate why the
Engraving and Printing people are so concerned with honesty and they very
carefully conduct police checks in areas where the applicant has worked,
resided, etc.
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Many Treasury employees who have had background investigations never
have a security clearance because there is no "need-to-know". Security
clearances are issued pursuant to Executive order 12065 and waivers are
kept to an absolute minimum.
In SCI cases, to my knowledge, a waiver of investigative coverage
has never been granted by the SIO. Of course, we have a relatively small
number of employees with SCI access. We have the authority to use the
polygraph in cases involving SCI access on a very limited scale as you
can see in Chapter 736, Subchapter VII. We were the first agency with
primarily competitive service employees to receive OPM's concurrence to
use the polygraph in personnel security cases. The Treasury SECOM rep-
rensentative voted for the use of the polygraph in SCI screening and we
received the unofficial concurrence of the Deputy Secretary prior to that
vote.
I'm looking forward to participating in the work of the Personnel
Security Subcanmittee. Thanks for this opportunity to let you know a
little of what we are doing at Treasury in the personnel security area.
Declassified and Approved For Release 2012/01/23: CIA-RDP96M01138R000600020003-9