INTERAGENCY GROUP/COUNTERMEASURES - TASKING ON OPERATIONS SECURITY (U)

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP96B01172R000600020012-2
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: C
• Document Page Count: 2
• Document Creation Date: December 19, 2016
• Document Release Date: September 14, 2005
• Sequence Number: 12
• Publication Date: March 9, 1983
• Content Type: MF

~ ~ _
Approved For R 'e se 2005/12/01 : ?CIA-RDP96B01.172R 00 00020012-2
- C~3"RA,.L.. I1~ITELL.IGENCE AGE - -
? WASHINGTON. 17. C. 205Q5
~~IAR 193
MEMOR~i.NDUM FOR: _ Mr. L. Britt Snider - . ~ -
Director for Counterintelligezice and Security Policy
Office of the Secretary of Defense
SUBJECT: Interagency Group/Countermeasures -Tasking
on Operations Security (U)
ItEFE12ENCF;. Memorandum for the. Executive Secretary, IG/CM,~
Subject: IGjCM Initiatives, dated S Jan. 1983
1_. At the third meeting of , the Interagency Group/- _-
Counterneasures, on 18 February 1983, the Chairman, IG/CM ~--
requested that the membership review a draft proposed National _ _
Security Council policy on Operations Security which was one of
the subjects mentioned in Reference. This draft policy has been
reviewed and the following comments are offered. (U)
2. Operations Security (OPSEC) is defined in the Nationah -
Sec~::~,?ity-Study Directive 2-82 (NSSD-2) report, "Capabilities,- -
Agair?st the Hostile Intelligence Threat 1983-1988, as `.`. - .
the syste;natic evaluatio~t of military operations (emphasis added) -
to find activities or weaknesses that could be exploited ~~~~ the-
en_emy for intelligence purposes." The .report continues tYlat~ ~ -
". By extension, the technique can be applied to any activity~-
or program .and. represents the process of comparing friendly .
vulnerability with hostile capability and intent?to arrive~at
counterm?~asure j~.xdgments." (C)_ ~_ .
.3. The National Security Council. OPSEC policy .draft,".in its
first paragraph, addresses what OPSEC policy perhaps should be,-
but doe: not anywhere in the document, define Operations Security
itself. If, as the NSSD~2 study suggests,.OPSEC applies to -~ -
evaluatian of military operations and by extension (emphas~_..
added) to other programs and activities, ? it is essential tk~x:~;~ a
defi.n3_tion of OPSEC be provided to reflect,. to just what eaten t
evaluation of "any activity or progran" is required. This Agency
does review its programs and activities, particularly Chase of an
operational nature, to ensure that common sense and practical.
security measures are utilized ~.n the protection of intelligence
assets. The approach is multi-disciplinary, and, because of the
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diverse nature of intelligence operations, is tailored to neet
specific operational requirements. Zt is not as "limited" as the
use of that word in the NSSD-2 Study might sug;est. The Agency
is constantly concerned about the hostile threat to operations,
personnel and facilities. There are active prograc~s which
include on--site inspections/surveys, polygraph programs both
within the Agency and in industry, an expanding reinvestigations
program, and extensive security awareness rebriefings,~ These are
constants within the operating environment. (C)
4. This Agency's normal operational planning includes
detailed attention to intelligence-~related OPSEC matterso~. The
operational climate, threats and vulnerabilities, and~how tca
Gaunter them are all taken very carefully into account in the
regular planning process. (C) ~ ?
5. The operational activities of the Central? Intelligence
Agency are conducted in accordance with Executive~Order 12333,
dated ~r? December 1 981-, "United .States Intelligence Activitz.es,"
as amplified by the Director of Central Intelligence in specific
procedures which were approved by the Attorney General on 3 June
1982.? Agency operations are already under the oversight of the
National Security Council, the Senate Select Committee on
Intelligence, and the House Permanent Select Committee on
Intelligence. The Agency operates also, in accordance with
Executive Order 1356, dated 6 April 1982, "National Security
Information," which authorizes the Director of Central Intelli-
gence ~:staUlish Special Access Programs and which directs that he
exercise this function far such programs "pertaining to intelli-
gence activities {including special activities but not including
military aperation~l, strategic and tactical programs),. or Intel-
ligence sources or methods ." A clear distinction is .thus
stated between military operations and intelligence activities.
(U). - -
6. This Agency does not object to Lhe-formation of a
permanent IGjC~'t Subcommittee which would oversee the implementa-
tion of military OPSEC taithin the Department of Defense. This
Agency would, however, oppose oversight of~CIA operations by such
a group. It?is believed that sufficient oversight of CIA opera-
tional. activities already exists through Executive Orders, the
Natio~~al Security Council, Senate and House Committees, and
Agency internal control mechanises. To add still another over-
sight entity covering intelligence (as opposed to military) OPSEC~
matters would add unnecessary complications and would endanger`
the compartmentatzon_fundamental to the success of sensitive
intelligence operations. (U)
Di.stx~ibutaon:
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