U.S. INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY PHYSICAL SECURITY STANDARDS FOR SENSITIVE COMPARTMENTED INFORMATION FACILITIES

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP96B01172R000300070001-2
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 32
• Document Creation Date: December 19, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 31, 2005
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: April 23, 1981
• Content Type: REQ

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NFIB/NFIC-9.1/47
DIRECTOR
OF
CENTRAL
INTELLIGENCE
U.S. Intelligence Community
Physical Security Standards for
Sensitive Compartmented
Information Facilities
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U.S. INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY POLICY STATEMENT
ESTABLISHING
PHYSICAL SECURITY STANDARDS FOR SENSITIVE
COMPARTMENTED INFORMATION FACILITIES (SCIFs) '
(Effective 23 April 1981)
Physical security standards are hereby established governing the construction and protec-
tion of facilities for storing and processing Sensitive Compartmented Information (SCI) 2
which requires extraordinary security safeguards as prescribed in pertinent national
directives. These regulations also cover electric or electronic equipment located in SCIFs.
Compliance with these standards is mandatory for all facilities established after the effective
date above, including any renovation of existing facilities insofar as the renovation will permit
reasonable and practical upgrading. It is not intended that existing, previously approved facili-
ties be modified to conform to these standards. Facilities which meet these standards are
satisfactory for the storage of all SCI.
It is recognized that there may be instances in which circumstances constitute a threat of
such proportion that it can only be offset by the most stringent security arrangements. Con-
versely, there may arise those instances in which time, location, condition of use of the ma-
terial, or other unforeseen factors may render full compliance with these standards unreason-
able or impossible. Situations such as the foregoing are to be referred to the accreditation
authority as far in advance as possible in order that full and timely consideration may be given
to a request for deviation from the standards. When these standards are waived for an SCIF,
the accreditation authority who waives them will inform the SCIF Manager of the areas of
the SCIF that do not meet standards and what changes are necessary before the SCIF will
meet them. For contractor operated SCIFs, waivers are valid no longer than the term of the
contract. The fact of a waiver condition will be made known by the cognizant element to other
components desiring to share the facility.
All facilities must be accredited before SCI may be stored in them. The procedures
for establishment and accreditation of SCIFs are prescribed in applicable national
directives.
' This supersedes USIB-D-9.1/20 dated 30 April 1973, "Policy Statement-USIB Physical Security Standards
for Compartmented Information Facilities"
' "Sensitive Compartmented Information" (SCI) as used in this policy statement means all classified informa-
tion and materials bearing Intelligence Community special access controls formally limiting access and dissemination.
This term does not include Restricted Data as defined in Section 11, Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended.
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PHYSICAL SECURITY STANDARDS FOR SENSITIVE
COMPARTMENTED INFORMATION FACILITIES (SCIFs)
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Pages
Policy Statement .................................................................................. i
Section I
Definitions ............................................................................................
1
Section 11
Perimeter Construction Criteria ........................................................
4
Section III
Security Alarm Systems ......................................................................
8
Section IV
Telephone and Intercommunications Equipment ..............................
11
Section V
Miscellaneous Physical Security Requirements ................................
14
Section VI
Tactical or Combat Operations ..........................................................
15
ANNEX A
Vault Specifications ............................................................................
16
ANNEX B
Secure Area Specifications ................................................................
18
ANNEX C
Sound Attenuation Classifications ......................................................
20
ANNEX D
Specifications for Barring Windows ..................................................
22
ANNEX E
Specifications for Locally Fabricated Doors ......................................
25
ANNEX F
Technical Security ..............................................................................
29
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1. Access Control System, Unattended-An electronic, electromechanical or mechanical sys-
tem designed to identify and/or admit personnel with properly authorized access to the
secure area. Identification may be based on any number of factors such as a sequencing of
a combination, special key, badge, fingerprints, signature, voice, etc. These systems are
for personnel access control only and are not to be used for the protection of stored
materials.
2. Acoustic Security-Those security measures designed and used to deny aural access to
classified information.
3. Administrative/Service Areas-Those identified areas within an accredited SCIF where
no storage, handling, discussion and/or processing of SCI is allowed.
4. Alarm Door Switch-A balanced magnetic switch so designed and installed that opening
the door or introducing an outside magnetic force will cause an alarm to be generated.
5. Alert Security System-A security system which has a local signalling device to alert
persons inside a facility that someone has come in through an entrance.
6. Authorized Personnel-Any person who is fully cleared and briefed for SCI and has been
granted access to the SCIF.
7. Class A Electronic Line Supervision-A system which transmits over wire a pseudo-
random generated tone or tones or digital type modulation. (This system exceeds the
previous "High Line Security" system requirement.)
8. Class B Electronic Line Supervision-A system which transmits over wire a digital or tone
type modulation. (This system is equivalent to the previous "High Line Security" system
requirement.)
9. Class C Electronic Line Supervision-A system, AC or DC, which is wire transmitted.
(This system is equivalent to the previous "Standard Line Security" system requirement.)
10. Closed Storage-The storage of SCI in properly secured GSA approved security contain-
ers within an accredited SCIF while such facility is not occupied by authorized personnel.
11. Continuous Operations-This condition exists when a facility is manned 24 hours every
day by not fewer than two appropriately cleared personnel who have the continuous
capability of detecting unauthorized entry into the SCIF. Positive identification and ac-
cess control must be maintained at all entrance points not fully secured.
12. Continuous Personnel Access Control-An access control system where access to the
building is continuously controlled by a cleared individual.
13. Controlled Area-Any area to which entry is subject to restrictions or control for security
reasons.
14. Document-Any recorded information regardless of its physical form or characteristics,
including, without limitation, written or printed matter, data processing cards and tapes,
maps, charts, paintings, drawings, photos, engravings, sketches, working notes and papers,
reproductions of such things by any means or process, and sound, voice, magnetic or
electronic recordings in any form.
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15. Forced Entry-Unauthorized entry into an SCIF or security container in a manner in
which evidence of such entry is easily discernible.
16. Guard-A properly trained and equipped individual whose duties include the protection of
an SCIF. Guards whose duties require direct access to an SCIF, or patrol within an
SCIF, must meet the clearance criteria in Director of Central Intelligence Directive No.
1 / 14, but need not be indoctrinated for access to SCI.
17. High Line Supervision-See Class A and Class B Electronic Line Supervision.
18. Intrusion Detection System-A security alarm system consisting of various types of
alarms (vibration, capacitance, volumetric, etc.) to detect the unauthorized intrusion into
a facility.
19. Non-Discussion Area-A clearly defined area within an SCIF where classified discus-
sions are not authorized. All such areas shall be clearly marked.
20. Open Storage-The storage of SCI in other than GSA approved security containers
within an SCIF when it is not occupied by authorized personnel.
21. Optical Security-Those security measures designed and used to deny visual access to
classified objects, documents, rooms, etc.
22. SCI Facility (SCIF)-An accredited area, room, group of rooms, or installations where
SCI may be stored, used, discussed and/or electronically processed.
23. SCI Security Control System-A system which provides for the security control of special
access program information within the category of National Security Information (NSI)
called National Foreign Intelligence (NFI).
24. Secure Area-An accredited facility which is used for storing, handling, discussing,
and/or processing of SCI.
25. Secure Working Area-An accredited facility which is used for handling, discussing
and/or processing of SCI but where SCI shall not be stored.
26. Senior Intelligence Officer (SIO)-Those senior principals and observers on the National
Foreign Intelligence Board who head intelligence organizations or intelligence producing
agencies within the Intelligence Community.
27. Sound Groups-Sound transmission attenuation groups (ratings measured in decibels-db)
established to satisfy the acoustical security requirements of SCIFs.
28. Sound Transmission Class (STC)-The rating used in architectural considerations of
sound transmission loss such as those involving walls, ceilings, and/or floors.
29. Standard Line Supervision-See Class C Electronic Line Supervision.
30. Surreptitious Entry-The unauthorized entry into an SCIF or security container in a
manner in which evidence of such entry is not readily discernible.
31. Tactical or Combat Operations-Operations which are conducted under combat or simu-
lated combat conditions and which must provide for a mobile or semi-permanent
environment.
32. Technical Surveillance Countermeasures (TSCM) Surveys and Inspections-A thorough
physical, electronic, and visual examination to detect technical surveillance devices, tech-
nical security hazards, and related physical security weaknesses.
33. Temporary Secure Area (TSA)-A temporarily accredited facility which is used for stor-
ing, handling, discussing, and/or processing of SCI.
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34. Temporary Secure Working Area (TSWA)-A temporarily accredited facility which is
used for handling, discussing, and/or processing of SCI, but where SCI shall not be
stored.
35. Two-Person Rule-As a matter of policy, SCI Control Facilities (SCIFs) should be
staffed with sufficient people to deter unauthorized copying or illegal removal of SCI.
SCIF designated communication centers, document control centers (registries), and like
facilities that handle or store quantities of SCI must be manned while in operation by at
least two appropriately indoctrinated persons in such proximity to one another as to
provide mutual support in maintaining the integrity of the facility and the material stored
.therein. The granting by an SIO of exceptions to this policy will be made a matter of
record and should involve consideration of the proven reliability and maturity of the
persons involved; the volume, variety and sensitivity of the holdings in the facility; and
whether or not the persons involved are subject to periodic polygraph examinations as a
condition of access. Exceptions for communications centers, document control centers,
and the like, should be granted in only extraordinary circumstances. Routine work by a
lone individual in any SCIF is to be avoided. Contractors will provide two person occu-
pancy in all SCIFs not specifically exempted by the SIO of the Government sponsor.
36. Vault-A maximum protection accredited facility which is used for storing, handling,
discussing, and/or processing of SCI.
37. Volumetric Detection System-An alarm system which detects movement or human
presence within a protected area.
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PERIMETER CONSTRUCTION CRITERIA FOR
SCI FACILITIES
1. GENERAL-The construction of and the physical security protection for an SCI Facility
(SCIF) must prevent the visual, acoustic, technical and physical access to or compromise
of classified information. It must also permit detection of forced or surreptitious entry of
the facility. The criteria for the construction of perimeters are governed by whether the
facility is in the United States or not, and whether it is located at, above or below ground
level according to the following situations: Open Storage, Closed Storage, Continuous
Operations, Secure Working Areas, and Non-Discussion Areas.
2. COMMON CRITERIA-Certain criteria, however, are common to every facility and ap-
ply to all locations and situations. These are set forth as follows:
A. AIR VENTS AND DUCTS-All air vents, ducts, and similar openings that pass
through a facility's perimeter will be protected and equipped as prescribed below:
(1) Sound protection-All openings will be sound baffled where appropriate to meet the
requirements of Sound Transmission Class (STC) 45 or better (not required for
Non-Discussion Areas).
(2) Nonconductive Section-All ducts must have a nonconductive section installed at
the perimeter of the SCIF.
(3) Physical protection-All openings larger than 90 square inches will be protected at
the perimeter with the following installed in the order listed, progressing inward
from the outer face of the perimeter:
(a) Hardened steel bars one-half inch in diameter, mounted five inches on center
vertically and horizontally and welded at all the intersections.
(b) An alarm device (not required for Non-Discussion Areas).
(c) Access ports to facilitate the inspection of any installed security devices and to
permit examination of the interior of the vent and duct runs for the presence of
unauthorized objects. These access ports will be within the secure perimeter of
the SCIF.
B. SOUND ATTENUATION-Except for Non-Discussion Areas, all SCIFs, regardless of
location or situation, must meet the specifications for sound attenuation as set forth in
Annex C.
C. ALARM REQUIREMENTS-All SCIFs, as defined in Section I, must meet the
requirements for security alarms as set forth in Section III.
D. DOORS
(1) Normally there will be a single controlled entrance to an SCIF. When safety or
other considerations require more than one door, only one of the doors will be used
as the entrance access control point. The other door(s) will be secondary and se-
cured from the inside with either bars and brackets, or sliding dead bolts, and/or
dead bolt panic hardware.
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(2) Door requirements for Vaults and Secure Areas will be as stated in Annex A and
Annex B, respectively.
(3) The entrance door will be equipped with a permanently mounted approved Group I
combination lock and have an inside escape mechanism. The access door will also
be equipped with a door closer and may be equipped with an access control device
for use as a convenience during working hours. Secondary exit door(s), if required,
will be of equal construction as the entrance door and locked as described in D(l)
above. Door hinges located on the door exterior will be the nonremovable type with
hinge pins peened or otherwise secured to preclude removal.
E. WINDOWS-Windows should be permanently sealed. All windows in an SCIF which
might reasonably afford optical surveillance of personnel, documents, materials, hard-
ware or activities within the SCIF shall be made opaque or equipped with blinds,
drapes, or other suitable coverings which will preclude such surveillance.
3. SCI FACILITIES IN THE UNITED STATES AT GROUND LEVEL-SCIFs at ground
level must meet the construction criteria set forth herein as they apply to the following
situations:
A. OPEN STORAGE-Open storage of SCI shall be avoided if possible. When open
storage is required, the SCIF must meet either the specifications for vaults set forth in
Annex A, or be located in a building that has:
(1) Continuous personnel access control;
(2) A 24-hour guard force capable of responding to an alarm within five minutes or
less;
(3) A reserve guard force available to assist the responding guard in an emergency,
and
The area is alarmed in accordance with Section III, and the SCIF is constructed as
a secure area according to Annex B, paragraph IA.
B. CLOSED STORAGE
(1) The SCIF must meet the specifications of a Secure Area specified in Annex B.
(2) SCI must be stored in GSA approved security containers having a resistance to
surreptitious entry equal to or exceeding that of a Class 6 container.
C. CONTINUOUS OPERATIONS
(1) The floors, walls, and ceilings in such part of the facility must be constructed of
substantial material that provides protection against forced entry.
(2) An adequate security force must be available to respond to the SCIF within five
minutes in an emergency.
(3) In an emergency, all SCI must be stored in lockable containers. If the bulk of the
material precludes this, then there must be an adequate, tested plan to protect,
evacuate, or destroy the material.
D. SECURE WORKING AREAS-Perimeter walls, floors, and ceilings may be con-
structed without regard to the thickness or type of material so long as they will show
evidence of attempted forced or surreptitious entry.
4. SCI FACILITIES IN THE UNITED STATES ABOVE OR COMPLETELY BELOW
GROUND LEVEL-Facilities above or completely below ground level with no ready ac-
cess to exterior openings must meet the construction specifications set forth herein as they
apply to the following situations:
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A. OPEN STORAGE-Open storage of SCI shall be avoided if possible. When open
storage is required, the SCIF must meet either the specifications for secure areas set
forth in Annex B, paragraph I B, or be located in a building that has:
(1) Continuous personnel access control;
(2) A 24-hour guard force capable of responding to an alarm within five minutes or
less;
(3) A reserve guard force available to assist the responding guard in an emergency,
The area is alarmed in accordance with Section III, and the SCIF meets construction
specifications in Annex B, paragraph IA.
B. CLOSED STORAGE
(1) SCI must be stored in GSA approved security containers having a resistance to
surreptitious entry equal to or exceeding that of a Class 6 container.
(2) The floors, walls, and ceilings must be constructed of substantial, permanent ma-
terial which provides protection against forced or surreptitious entry and which will
offer visual evidence of surreptitious entry. Walls will be attached to floors and true
ceilings solidly and permanently.
C. CONTINUOUS OPERATION
(1) No alarm or special construction is required other than to meet sound attenuation
requirements set forth in Annex C. If there is the possibility of surreptitious entry,
however, then alarms and/or barriers as discussed in Section 11, paragraph 2, must
be used to guard against such penetration.
(2) In an emergency, all SCI must be stored in lockable containers. If the bulk of the
material precludes this, then there must be an adequate, tested plan to protect,
evacuate or destroy the material.
D. SECURE WORKING AREAS-The construction of, and the physical security protec-
tion for, a secure working area must provide for the detection of both forced or sur-
reptitious entry of the SCIF, including those areas above false ceilings or below false
floors. Perimeter walls, floors, and ceilings may be constructed without regard to the
thickness or type of material so long as they will show evidence of attempted forced
entry.
5. SCI FACILITIES LOCATED OUTSIDE THE UNITED STATES-The criteria for
SCIFs outside the United States are the same as those for SCIFs within the United States
except as follows:
A. OPEN STORAGE
(1) No waiver shall be granted for the vault construction of an SCIF approved for open
storage.
(2) No waiver shall be granted for the secure area construction requirement of an
SCIF approved for open storage.
(3) Open storage of SCI will be permitted only for material which is of a size or
configuration that precludes its being stored in the largest GSA approved security
container available. All other SCI must be stored in GSA approved security
containers having a rating for both forced and surreptitious entry equal to or
exceeding that afforded by Class 5 containers.
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(1) The SCI F must meet secure area construction specifications as listed in Annex B,
paragraph 113.
(2) All SCI controlled material shall be stored in GSA approved security containers
having a rating for both forced and surreptitious entry equal to or exceeding that
afforded by Class 5 containers.
(I) The SCI F must meet secure area construction specifications as listed in Annex B,
paragraph 113.
(2) In an emergency, all SCI must be stored in GSA approved security containers, or
the SCIF must have an adequate, tested plan to protect, evacuate or destroy the
information.
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SECTION III
SECURITY ALARM SYSTEMS
1. PURPOSE-The purpose of an alarm system is to detect an intrusion or attempted intru-
sion into an SCIF and to notify appropriate personnel. Whenever these requirements state
a class of alarm system, they are referring to the method of transmitting an alarm signal.
2. CLASSES OF ELECTRONIC LINE SUPERVISION
A. CLASS A-Pseudo-random digital and tone-wire transmitted preferred. (Exceeds pre-
vious "High Line Security" requirement.)
(1) These systems will transmit over wire a pseudo-random generated tone or tones or
digital type modulation. These systems will use either an interrogation and reply
scheme or a synchronization scheme. The signal between the protected premises
and the monitor location shall not repeat itself within a six month period. A line
supervision alarm signal shall cause a lock-in condition which shall be transmitted
to the monitor location in not more than 30 seconds. If the above conditions cannot
be met, then a UL approved system with commercial Grade A service and Grade
AA transmission will be acceptable.
(2) It shall not be possible to compromise Class A systems by the use of resistance,
voltage or current substitution techniques.
B. CLASS B-Digital and tone-wire transmitted preferred. (Formerly described as High
Line Security.)
(1) The systems using digital or tone type modulation over transmission lines shall use
an interrogation and reply scheme. The signal technique used for the interrogation
shall be different than that of the reply. Each line supervision alarm signal shall
cause a lock-in condition which shall be transmitted to the annunciator in not more
than 90 seconds. If the above conditions cannot be met, then a UL approved system
with Grade B commercial service and Grade A transmission will be acceptable.
(2) It shall not be possible to compromise Class B system by the use of resistance,
voltage, or current substitution techniques. The circuits and methods employed
shall be highly immune to transmission line noise, such as crosstalk, hum,
transients, and the like.
C. CLASS C-AC and DC-Wire Transmitted. (Standard Line Security.) The Class C.
circuit supervisor units shall provide an alarm response in the annunciator in not more
than one second as a result of the following changes in normal transmission line
current:
(1) Five percent or more in normal line signal when it consists of direct current from
0.5 milliamperes through 30 milliamperes.
(2) Ten percent or more in normal line signal when it consists of direct current from 10
microamperes to 0.5 milliamperes.
(3) Five percent or more of any component or components in a complex signal upon
which the security integrity of the system is dependent. This tolerance will be
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applied for frequencies up to 100Hz. Component as used in this specification
means AC or DC voltage or current, AC phase, or frequency duration.
(4) Fifteen percent or more of any component or components in a complex signal upon
which the security integrity of the system is dependent. This tolerance will be
applicable for all frequencies above 100Hz. Component as used in this specifica-
tion means an AC or DC voltage or current, AC phase, or frequency duration.
3. FACTORS-The factors that determine whether or not an SCIF shall have an alarm or
alert system are:
A. LOCATION
(1) Within the United States.
(2) Outside the United States.
B. TYPE OF OPERATION
(1) Continuous.
(2) Noncontinuous.
4. ALARM REQUIREMENTS
A. SCIFs located within the United States
(1) Continuous Operation SCIFs are not required to have an alarm system unless there
exists a possibility of surreptitious entry. This determination shall be made by the
SIO.
(2) Noncontinuous Operation SCIFs shall be alarmed and have a Class A line super-
vision system if the transmission signal leaves the SCIF and traverses an un-
controlled area.
(3) Noncontinuous Operation SCIFs shall be alarmed and have a Class A or Class B
line supervision system if the transmission signal does not leave the controlled area
containing the SCIF.
(4) If an SCIF cannot meet the requirements of (1), (2), or (3) above due to un-
availability of transmission and/or monitoring facilities, then the SCIF must be
protected by an alarm system utilizing a Class C line supervision system and which
has an external UL approved bank vault type bell. Approval for the substitution of
a Class A or Class B line supervision system by the above mentioned Class C line
supervision system can only be granted by the SIO.
B. SCIFs located outside the United States-All SCIFs located outside the United States,
regardless of the type of operation, shall have an alarm system or alert system. Either
system must be monitored by U.S. citizens.
(1) Continuous Operation SCIFs shall have, as a minimum, an alert system. If there
exists a possibility of surreptitious entry, appropriate alarms will be installed. This
determination will be made by the SIO.
(2) Noncontinuous Operation SCIFs shall be alarmed and have a Class A line super-
vision system.
(3) SC1Fs for which the two-person rule has been waived should have, in addition to an
alarm or alert system, a panic system for emergency notification to an outside
cognizant individual or other facility to provide immediate response.
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5. ALARM SYSTEM
A. Equipment shall be UL approved (or equivalent).
B. Areas of the SCIF between the floor and ceiling shall be protected by volumetric
C. If an SCIF has a false ceiling or floor which provides a means for surreptitious entry,
then one of the below listed methods must be used to protect that area:
(1) A separate alarm system covering the area between the false and true ceiling or
false and true floor.
(2) Expanded metal (9-11 gauge).
D. Perimeter doors will be protected by balanced magnetic switches.
E. All windows will be protected by an alarm system.
F. Emergency exits and secondary doors shall be on a separate zone from the volumetric
and main entrance sensors within the same SCIF.
G. Every SCIF shall be on a separate zone.
H. If an SCIF consists of more than 6 rooms, or more than 5,000 square feet, then it shall
be protected by two or more alarm zones as determined by the cognizant security
authority.
1. All control units will be located within the protected area.
J. All alarm systems will be tested monthly, i.e., doors opened and volumetric sensors walk
tested. Detailed test procedures will be prepared which outline the required tests by the
SCIF Manager.
K. All components shall be installed in a manner to prevent access or removal from a
location external to the protected zone.
L. All alarm systems shall be capable of operating from commercial AC power. In the
event of commercial power failure, provisions will be made for automatic switchover to
emergency power, and back to commercial power without causing an alarm. A signal
will be presented to the monitor location indicating when the system has lost all power.
When batteries are used for emergency power, they will be maintained at full charge by
automatic charging circuits. Emergency power must be capable of operating the system
for a minimum of four hours.
M. Volumetric sensors employed in the alarm system must be placed so that the most likely
intruder motions are detected.
N. All perimeter sensors and control units will be equipped with tamper detection.
6. ALERT SYSTEM-An alert system shall consist of balanced magnetic switches or other
appropriate sensors on all entrances. These sensors shall be connected to a signaling device
through a closed loop to a latching relay. Neither the signaling device, relay or wire
connecting the switches shall leave the SCIF.
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SECTION IV
TELEPHONE AND INTERCOMMUNICATIONS EQUIPMENT
1. CONCEPT-Unsecure telephones installed in areas where SCI is discussed and/or pro-
cessed, present an unacceptable threat unless particular attention is paid to applying effec-
tive countermeasures. The most effective countermeasure is the exclusion of telephones and
associated wire runs and equipment from SCIFs. Telephones and associated wire runs and
equipment are therefore prohibited in SCIFs except where operationally justified.
2. PROTECTIVE MEASURES-If telephones are permitted within an SCIF, the protective
measures outlined below must be applied:
A. Cable/wire control.
(1) All telephone wires must enter the SCIF through one opening. Each conductor will
be accurately accounted for from the point of entry. The accountability will iden-
tify, through labeling or log/journal entries, the current precise use of every
conductor. This accountability applies to excess conductors which must also be
terminated at the point of entry and connected to appropriate connector blocks and
grounded.
(2) When SCIFs employ dedicated key telephone or computerized systems, the system
shall be installed within the secure perimeter of the SCIF and restricted to such
use.
B. Isolation. The telephone instrument must be effectively isolated from all incoming lines
when the telephone is not in use, i.e., in the "on-hook" condition. The two approved
methods of achieving isolation are listed below:
(1) Manual disconnect. Each instrument must be fitted with a plug and jack arrange-
ment so that the telephone can be manually disconnected at all times when not in
use. This method requires the incorporation of an audible alarm in the "on-hook"
condition to warn users to remove the plug upon completion of calls. (Attachment
1, Section IV, is a diagram of an approved installation method.)
(2) Automatic disconnect,. Any Telephone Security Panel (TSP) approved automatic
disconnect system may be used.
C. Handsets. All telephones will be equipped with a TSP approved handset.
D. Ringers. Signalling of incoming calls will be accomplished by one of the following
procedures:
(1) In SCIFs where the Key Service Unit (KSU) is installed, no special signalling
apparatus is required if the KSU includes a local ring generator and is wired for
common audible signalling. Any ringer or buzzer may be used.
(2) In SCIFs where KSU is not used, a TSP approved signalling device will be used.
3. SPECIALIZED EQUIPMENT-The installation of specialized telephone equipment, such
as telephone answering devices or speaker phones, within an SCIF is prohibited.
11
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For Official Use Only
4. INTERCOMMUNICATIONS EQUIPMENT-The installation of intercommunications
systems within SCIFs is prohibited except where operationally justified and installed
according to the guidance below:
A. If a dial-type intercommunications system capability is engineered into the approved
telephone system, no further action is required provided that the system is installed
according to paragraphs one through three above.
B. If a separate telephone, dial type system is installed, no station or wiring will be located
outside the SCIF and all wiring will be installed in a manner that permits visual
observation of the complete wire run, or installed within electromagnetic tubing
(EMT).
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For Official Use Only
RING-1
RING-2
2.7M
RING-3
RING-4,
2.7M
2.7M
2.7M
2.7M
2.7M
2.7M
470K
RING-IC
(INTERCOM RING, -24VDC)
0-
L-2