DRAFT SUMMARY REPORT. STAR GATE OPERATIONAL TASKING EVALUATION
Document Type:
Collection:
Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST):
CIA-RDP96-00791R000200300003-1
Release Decision:
RIPPUB
Original Classification:
K
Document Page Count:
16
Document Creation Date:
November 4, 2016
Document Release Date:
April 13, 2000
Sequence Number:
3
Case Number:
Content Type:
SUMMARY
File:
Attachment | Size |
---|---|
CIA-RDP96-00791R000200300003-1.pdf | 1.08 MB |
Body:
Approved For Release 2000/08/10 : CIA-RDP96-00791 R000200300003-1
DRAFT
UNCLASSIFIED
SUMMARY REPORT
STAR GATE OPERATIONAL TASKING AND EVALUATION
1.0 EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
From 1986 to the first quarter of FY 1995, the Star Gate program received more than
200 tasks from operational military organizations requesting that the program staff
apply a paranormal psychological technique know as "remote viewing" (RV) to attain
information unavailable from other sources. The operational tasking comprised
"targets" identified with as little specificity as possible to avoid "telegraphing" the
desired response.
In 1994, the program office created a methodology for obtaining numerical evaluations
from the tasking organizations of the accuracy and value of the information provided
by the Star Gate program. By May 1, 1995, 40 tasks from five operational
organizations had been evaluated under this process by one or more of the three
Program Office remote viewers.
Ninety-nine accuracy scores and 100 value scores resulted from these evaluations.
On a 6-point basis where "1" is the most accurate, accuracy scores cluster around "2's"
and "3's" (55 of the entries) with 13 scores of 1". Value scores, on a 5-point basis with
"1" the highest, cluster around "3's" and "4's" (80 of the entries); there are no "1's" and
11 scores of "2".
The conclusion that can be drawn from an evaluation of these results of the 40
operational tasks is that the value and utility to the Intelligence Community of the
information provided by this process cannot be readily discerned. The ambiguous and
subjective nature of the process actually creates a need for additional efforts of
questionable operational return on the part of the intelligence analyst. Assuming that
the subjective nature of the psychic process cannot be eliminated, one must determine
whether the information provided justifies the required resource investment.
2.0 GENERIC DESCRIPTION OF OPERATIONAL TASKING
Over the period from 1986 to first quarter of FY 1995, the Star Gate program received
more than 200 tasks from operational military organizations. These tasks requested
that the program staff apply their paranormal psychological technique know as "remote
viewing" (RV) in the hope of attaining information unavailable from other sources. The
operational tasking comprised "targets" which were "identified" in some manner,
normally with as little specificity as possible (see discussion below) to avoid
excessively "telegraphing" the desired response. However, until 1994, the results
UNCLASSIFIED
DRAFT
Approved For Release 2000/08/10 : CIA-RDP96-00791 R000200300003-1
Approved For Release 2000/08/10 : CIA-RDP96-00791 R000200300003-1
DRAFT
UNCLASSIFIED
from this tasking were not evaluated by the tasking organizations by any numerical
method that would identify the accuracy and value of the provided information (in a
few cases narrative comments were provided by some organizations in prior years).
In 1994, this situation changed when the Program Office developed a methodology for
obtaining numerical evaluations from the tasking organizations of the Star Gate inputs;
this methodology is described briefly in Section 3.0. By May 1, 1995, 40 tasks
assigned by five operational organizations had been evaluated under this process.'
Section 4.0 describes the numerical evaluations performed by evaluators from the
tasking organizations. The descriptions presented below regarding the tasking and
the related targets refer principally to the operational tasks that were numerically
evaluated.
The process for a typical tasking, RV response and subsequent evaluation is as
follows:
- The tasking organization provides information to the Star Gate Program
Manager (PM) describing the problem to be addressed.
- The PM provides a Tasking Form delineating only the most rudimentary
information to one or more of the three Star Gate RV's for their use during the
RV session (a typical Tasking Form is presented in Figure 2-1). In addition, the
RV's are appraised of the identity of the tasking organization.
- Subsequently the RV's hold individual "viewing" sessions recording their
comments, observations, feelings, etc. and including line drawings or sketches
of things, places, or other items "observed" during the session.
- The individual RV inputs are collected and provided to the tasking
organization for their review with a request for completing a numerical
evaluation of the individual RV inputs for accuracy and for value.
- Finally, for those organization who comply with the request, the evaluation
scores are returned to the Star Gate Program Office.
Twenty-six (26) of the 40 operational tasks originated from two counterdrug Task
Forces, JTF-4 and JTF-5, (see Section 4.0). Typical tasking targets from these
organizations comprised the name of a person or thing (e.g., vessel) with a generic
request to describe the target, his/her/its activities, location, associations, etc. as
1 Evaluation of additional 1994-95 tasks is still proceeding. Three (3) evaluated since 5/1/95 were
reviewed and cause only marginal changes to the statistical information provided in Table 4-1 and do not
alter any of the Conclusions and Recommendations in Section 6.0
UNCLASSIFIED
DRAFT
Approved For Release 2000/08/10 : CIA-RDP96-00791 R000200300003-1
Approved For Release 2000/08/10 : CIARR-RDPJ6-00791 R000200300003-1
FIGURE 2-1
TASKING SHEET
DATE: 18 Jul 94
SUSPENSE: 18 Jul 94
1600 Hrs
2. METHOD/TECHNIQUE: Method of Choice
4. ESSENTIAL ELEMENTS OF INFORMATION:
Access and describe target.
Approved For Release 2000/08/10 : CIA-RDP96-00791 RD00200300003-1
Approved For Release 2000/08/10 : CIA-RDP96-00791 R000200300003-1
SG1 B
DRAFT
UNCLASSIFIED
appropriate. No specific information (e.g., what is the height/weight/age of the target?)
was requested in the tasking. As noted above, the identity of the tasking organization
also was provided. For the JTF tasks that identification implies an interest in the drug
culture and drug operations. Thus, any drug related information provided by the RV's
in response to the tasking "could be" relevant; and, therefore, could be interpreted by
the evaluators as having some level of "accuracy' and "value" depending upon the
information described and the evaluator's interests and beliefs.
The tasking provided by the organization denoted as Org. S (see Section 4.0)
comprised targets that were "places" visited by "beacons" (i.e., an individual from Org.
S who visited and "viewed" the site of interest) to assist the RV in "visualizing" and
describing the site. Targets could be a general vista in or around a particular location,
a particular facility at a selected location or, perhaps, a particular item at,a location (in
the one case where this type of target was used, the item was a particular kind of boat).
No specifics regarding the type of target or its location was provided.
Tasking by elements of the DIA comprised two generic types of targets that related to
military interests/concerns current at the time of the tasking, e.g., North Korean (NK)
capabilities and leadership. The first type of target focused upon then-current military
concerns while the second type required "precognitive" (predictive) capabilities since it
required a prognoses of future intentions and actions.2
The tasking from the USA FCI Activity was similar in scope, albeit quite different in
context, from that of the JTF's noted earlier, i.e., describe a person, his activities,
location, etc..
3.0 EVALUATION MEASURES
The numerical evaluation measures that were given to the evaluators of the tasking
organizations to score the accuracy and value of the Star Gate inputs were extracted
2 Some operational tasks from the period Oct. 1990 to Jan 1991 regarding Middle East issues were of a
similar types, albeit these were not numerically evaluated. They would provide some data for an after-the-
fact check of the accuracy of the RV predictions - see Section 6.0 for a discussion of this possibility.
UNCLASSIFIED
DRAFT
Approved For Release 2000/08/10 : CIA-RDP96-00791 R000200300003-1
Approved For Release 2000/08/10 : CIA-RDP96-00791 R000200300003-1
DRAFT
UNCLASSIFIED
from the Defense Intelligence Agency Manual (DIAM) 58-13. These measures are
shown in Table 3-1. Most of the stipulated measures include modifiers such as "may",
"possibly", "high", "low", etc. which are subjective and open to individual interpretation
by each evaluator. The DIAM 58-13 definitions for the ratings under "Value" are
presented in Table 3-2; whether the individual evaluators reviewed these definitions
prior to their scoring is unknown. There was no clarification of what was intended by
the generic headings of "Accuracy" and "Value", e.g., in the evaluator's estimation how
much of the RV's response to the tasking had to qualify for a particular measure, 1%,
10%, 90%, to be granted the related score?
Table 3-1 Numerical Evaluation Measures Category Score Accuracy - Is the information accurate? I Yes (true) 1
I May be true 2
I Possibly true 3
No 4
I Possibly not true3 5
Unsure 6 I Value - what is the value of the sources' information?
I Major significance 1
I High value 2
Of value 3
Low value 4
No value 5
As noted in Section 2.0, one series of tasks were evaluated by a narrative discussion
only. While much of the final narrative evaluation for this series was complimentary, it
lacked any real specifics regarding the usefulness or relevance of the Star Gate inputs
and much of the narrative was replete with modifiers and other hedges. A sanitized
extract from the final evaluation report for these tasks is presented in Appendix A
illustrating the subjective, "uncertain" nature of the comments.
3 Note that Accuracy scores 5 and 6 actually rank "higher" than 4 since both imply that there may be
something accurate in the information. Changing the scoring order to accommodate this observation
causes only marginal changes to both the averages and the standard deviations shown on Table 4-1.
UNCLASSIFIED
DRAFT
Approved For Release 2000/08/10 : CIA-RDP96-00791 R000200300003-1
Approved For Release 2000/08/10 : CIA-RDP96-00791 R000200300003-1
DRAFT
UNCLASSIFIED
Table 3-2 - Value Rating Definitions from DIAM 58-13
MAJOR SIGNIFICANCE - Intelligence Information Report (IIR) provided information which
will alter or significantly influence national policy, perceptions, or analysis; or provided
unique or timely indications and warning of impending significant foreign military or
political actions having a national impact.
HIGH VALUE - IIR(s) was best report to date or first report on this important topic, but
did not significantly influence policy or change analyses.
OF VALUE - IIR(s) provided information which supplements, updates, confirms, or aids
in the interpretation of information in data bases, intelligence production, policy research
and analysis, or military operations and plans; most DoD HUM INT System reporting falls
into this category.
LOW VALUE - IIR was not a good report because the information was not reported in a
timely manner, or was of poor quality/of little substance. Nevertheless, it satisfied some
of the consumer's informational needs.
NO VALUE - IIR provided no worthwhile information to support data base maintenance,
intelligence production, policy research and analysis, or military operations and planning;
or its information had no utility, was erroneous, or misleading.
4.0 EVALUATION SUMMARY AND COMMENTS
Thirty-nine (39) of the 40 numerically evaluated, operational tasks were performed in
1994 and one in 1995. The information provided by the Star Gate RV's for each task
was evaluated by staff of the tasking organization. The complete compilation of
evaluated scores is presented in Table 4-1 which includes an identification of the
tasking organization and, where known, the name of the evaluator from that
organization. Also presented are the individual and collective scores for Accuracy and
Value for each of the three RV's and the related average and standard deviations for
the compiled scores. (Note that the total number of scoring entries for either Accuracy
or Value is not equal to the maximum of 120, i.e., 3x40, since all three RV's did not
participated in all tasks). Table 4-2 presents the same scoring data by tasking
organization.
Histograms of the scores from Table 4-1 are shown below. Note that "Accuracy'
scores tend to cluster around 2's and 3's (55 of the 99 entries) while "Value" scores
cluster around 3's and 4's (80 of the 100 entries). This is not too surprising as the
nonspecific, nebulous nature of the individual task/target requests permits the RV to
"free associate" and permits the evaluator to pick and choose from the RV commentary
anything that he thinks "may" or "possibly" is related to his problem (and score
accordingly) regardless of how much of the RV commentary may satisfy the particular
UNCLASSIFIED
DRAFT
Approved For Release 2000/08/10 : CIA-RDP96-00791 R000200300003-1
A
B
C
D
E
F
G
H
I
J
K
L
1
Doc.
Date
Tasker
Evaluator
Remote Viewer & Scores
Totals
2
1A
1V
2A
2V
3A
3V
3
250
7/13/94
-.W
yW
0 r9
: -S
..._......
3:0...
..
3.0
.
2.0
3.0
4.0
5.0.
.,. ,...
4
264
9/6/94
Or . S
2.0
3.0
5.0
4.0
5
270
1 1 /3/94
JTF-4
5.0
4.0
5.0
4.0
6
271
1 1 /3/94
JTF-4
3.0
4.0
::::_
::
5.0
4.0
7
273
1 1 /3/94
JTF-4
....................... ........-..-.
............
4.0
.,...........
5.0
................_
5.0
4.0
..................
4.0
...v ....
5.0
-........ ,...
................
...........
8
267
1 1/3/94
JTF-4
3.0
4.0
3.0
4.0
9
268
1 1 /3/94
_ . W W w w,..
JTF-4
._.. ..,- ,.,..,,.,_,...,,,...,v
............
3.0
4.0
4.0
3.0
.................
5.0
........
.w.......
4.0
......,...
W....
................
..............,.
10
269
1 1 /3/94
JTF-4
3.0
3.0
5.0
5.0
1 1
272
1 1 /3/94
.......
.......... ..
JTF-4
.............................-..-.,._W
...._....,.
.....,
......
.... -. ,. -.
....... ....,......
3.0
....... ...........
..W....-_.
.................
12
258
8/3/94
JTF-5
.
1.0
3.0
2.0
3.0
1 3
257
8/ 1 /94
v.~.,..~.... .-w
JTF-5
W w_
3.0
...... -....,
5.0
.......... .........
3.0
..._.......w.
5.0
.................
....w._ ,..
....,..........
14
256
7/28/94
JTF-5
2.0
3.0
5.0
4.0
1 5
249
...
7/1 1 /94
.... .. .............. ......._......,. _....
DIA/PAN-3E
,..... .. . .. ......... ..... .............. ...
,. .........
1.0...
.....4 0....
....2.0....
...,2.0....
....2.0 ...
....4:0 .....
..............
................
16
248
7/6/94
DIA/PAN-3E
3.0
3.0
2.0
2.0
1.0
4.0
17
245
6/24/94
........... ._....,............- ....
DIA/PAN-3E
..,...............,... W. W..
w.... _
3.0
....,., ......
-3.0
..._.....
.,,.._........u._.
...................
1.0
.........-....
4.0
... ..,.
............
._....w,,...,.
18
252
7/18/94
JTF-5
4.0
4.0
2.0
3.0
19
251
7/15/94
..
JTF-5
........................ ........... v...
...........
2.0
3.0
1.0
,,,,....,,..,.....
3.0
... ...........
2.0
.... - ..
3.0
...........
.,.,.,.........
..-..........
2 0
243
5/31 /94
JTF-5
3.0
3.0
5.0
4.0
1.0
4.0
21
242
5/25/94
JTF-5
1.: 5
3.0
x,.5.....
....3: Q ....
................
...............
22
244
6/6/94
---Or l S
4.0
5.0
2.0
3.0
1.0
2.0
2 3
239
6/ 12/94
Or ._S
w
20
2.0
1.0
2.0 ?
2.0
2.0
2 4
230
4/ 1 /94
Or l S
2.0
2.0
2.0
2.0
1.0
2.0
2 5
------- ------- --- -
240
------- --- --
5/17/94
......................
JTF-5
.................. ... ........- _.....-
_..... .....
220
...,............
3.0
......,_,...
.........w...W
..,, ............
3.0
.....,............
4.0
.......,....,.
..._...........
..........
26
235
4/18/94
JTF-5
3.0
4.0
3.0
3.0
3.0
4.0
27
234
4/14/94
........................................
JTF-5
..,.._................. -........
2.0
3.0..
5.0
......._..-..
3.0
........v........
6.0
w W ..
5.0
.............
...............
...............
28
233
4/1 1 /94
JTF-5
3.0
3.0
3.0
3.0
3.0
3.0
29
229
3/29/94
v. W . ... ............_
JTF-5
.uw.....-..,.,........,.....,.....,..,.
,.,.,-,...
2.0
4.0
..... .... w. .
2.0
......., ,._...
4...........
......
4.0
30
228
3/28/94
JTF-5
1.0
2.0
3.0
4.0
3.0
3.0
31
227
3/24/94
W_ ...W..W.
JTF-5
.,, ,. .......... -- .
-..-...., ......
3.0
............_..
3.0
.....,.,........
4.0
ww .....
5.0
.,,,.............
3.0
.......,.....,...
3.0
..v............
....,_.......
., ,-.........
32
226
3/22/94
JTF-5
5.0
4.0
5.0
4.0
2.0
3.0
33
225
3/21 /94
...,- -.
JTF-5
- ..............-w-._
v..,,._
2.0
..-........ _
3.0
W.
3.0
.-,......., ,,
3.0
................ ,
2.0
.......W_.
3.0
......
......,..
.....
34
232
4/ 1 1 /94
USA FCI Act.
2.0
4.0
5.0
4.0
5.0
4.0
35
236
4/26/94
USA FCI Act.
6.0
4,0
6,0
2.0
36
237
4/26/94
USA FCI Act.
5.0
4.0
5.0
4.0
37
241
4/27/94
w - .
USA FC1 Act.
- ~,,,,., -....
.. ,......
3.0
W,.
4.0
_-......
...w
.. ................
2.0
...
4.0
38
247
6/29/94
DIA/PAG-1 A
1.0
3.0
3.0
3.0
3.0
3.0
39
265_W
7/6/94
DIA/PAG-1A
..
3.0
2.0
...
3.0
..................
2.0
..............
4.0
W........,....
...............
. ..._...........
40
259
7/15/94
JTF-5
5.0
4.0
2.0
2.0
41
262
8/23/94
JTF-5
.............................-
.,......
6.0
4.0
....... ..... _...
. .v.........v....
...................
4.0
...W.-..-
5.0
.._.....-..-...
...... .........
...............
42
287
4/3/95
JTF-5
2.0
4.0
1.0
4.0
4 3
...
.
.
................... ....................
.........
106.5
..............
130
76.0
,v..
83.0
..............
113.5
135.0
296
348
44
._....W_....
._ -
-
Num
ber of entries =
37
37
25
26
37
37
99
100
45
Avg score =
2.9
3.5
2.9
,......, , ......
3.2
......._.........
3.1
..... . w
3.6
W......
3.0
.........., .
3.5
W .,,......
46
,
I
Std.Deviation =
1.4
0.8
1.3
0.7
1.6
0.9
1.4
0.8
Approvjjft fi" /E8/j0A?K4 Or9ff .0300003-1
NUMERICAL EVALUATIONS
Approved For Rele% 12OO ABI;EIA4RVP96-00791 R000200300003-1
Approved EacBelease.2000108110A~A,~29S.OpZ91R000200300003-1
Vf'CtiA11VIVAL 1 ft If1AI f1AVt
NUMERICAL EVALUATIONS
A
B
C
D
E
F
G
H
I
J
K
L
1
Doc.
Date
Tasker
Evaluator
Remote Viewer
& Scores
Totals
2
1A
1V
2A
2V
3A
3V
A V
3
By
_~ . _
Tasking Agency,
-..._m. -..-aw .................................._.- .
~
.......... ..
.......,........
................
.......r........,,
4
5
_
6
258
8/3/94
JTF-5
1.0
3.0
2.0
3.0
7
257
8/1/94
JTF-5
3.0
5.0
3.0
5.0
8
256
7/28/94
JTF-5
2.0
3.0
5.0
4.0
9
252
m ....... .......
7/18/94
................................ ........
JTF-5
........... ...,.,.............-..~
.......... ...
4.0
.
..
.
.-.
.
...
4.0
.
.
..
.
2.0
3.0
10
, 251
7/15/94
JTF-5
.
.-
.
.
..
2.0
.... .
.
.
...
.
3.0
............
1.0
3.0
2.0
3.0
1 1
243
5/31 /94
.............. ......................M...
JTF-5
......., w........ ............... ..
...........
3.0
.
3.0
.
.
..
.
5.0
4.0
1.0
4.0
12
242
5/25/94
JTF-5
........--....
...
1.5
.....
-.
...
..
3.0
.-.............
................
.-_.....-....
1.5
3.0
13
240
_ ..................
5/17/94
..........................................
JTF-5
.
..... .-.
2.0
............. --.
3.0
............,.....
..-
.
3:0
4.0
14
235
4/18/94
JTF-5
3.0
4.0
..
.
..........
3.0
........... ...
3.0
....-..... .......
3.0
._...-...........
4.0
._............. .... -.........
15
234
4/14/94
JTF-5
2.0
3.0
5.0
3.0
6.0
5.0
16
233
4/11/94
JTF-5
3.0
3.0
3.0
3.0
3.0
3.0
17
229
m..-.
3/29/94
......-- ..... ............-..-
JTF-5
......-. ............. ...................
.......... ....
2.0
..
m.
._...
4.0
2.0
4.0
5.0
4.0
18
228
3/28/94
JTF-5
.
.
1.0
2.0
....
3.0
.............. ..
4.0
............. _
3.0
........
3.0
................................
19
227
3/24/94
JTF-5
3.0
3.0
4.0
5.0
3.0
3.0
20
226
3/22/94
JTF-5
-
..................
5.0
..................
4.0
..... -....
5.0
.~._.........
4.0
m ...
2.0
--...-.-.........
3.0
..... ...........................
21
225
3/21/94 ........
.......... . ... JTF-5
...
2.0
.
.
-
..- ...
3.0
.
.
..
..
.
3.0
3.0
2.0
3.0
22
259
7/15/94
JTF-5
.
.
.....
.
5.0
...
.
.-
.
.
4.0
.-.............
,...............
.............m
2.0
..m.n..n......
2.0
................ ................
23
262
8/23/94
JTF-5
6.0
4.0
w0
5.0
24
287
4/3/95
JTF-5
2.0
4.0
.....
.............
-- .
..,.
1.0
...
....
4.0
.....-.........w...-.........
25
..................... ......
-
................. _...... .................
S
.....
52.5
65.0
36.0
39.0
51.5
65.0
140 169
26
No.
19
19
11
1 1
18
18
48 48
27
A
2.8
3.4
3.3
3.5
2.9
3.6
2.9 3.5
28
.
..... ..................................
.... .-.....w........- ..-.......
..........
..................
....... .........
...............
........,..,......
......,
29
270
m -.._ -~ ..
1 1 /3/94
...M... .. .................... -,
JTF-4
...m..- m...m.._...................
. .........
.
5.0
.
.
..
.
..
4.0
....,-.
.
.
5.0
4.0
30
271
1 1 /3/94
JTF-4
.
..
..
....
.
.
..
3.0
.
... .
...
4.0
..... -.m.....
...........--...
..
5.0
w.........
4.0
................. ....... .......
31
273
1 1 /3/94
........... -
JTF-4
4.0
5.0
.
5.0
4.0
4.0
5.0
32
267
1 1 /3/94
JTF-4
3.0
4.0
..........
3.0
..........
4.0
.............. , ..........
33
268
..- ......
1 1 /3/94
----- m................. ..... ----------
JTF-4
...._......n............... -.
-....._...
3.0
... ..
.
.
4.0
.
.
4.0
3.0
5.0
4.0
34
269
1 1 /3/94
JTF-4
.
..
.
.
.......... ..-.
.
......... ..._..
3.0
...............
3.0
....... .....-.,..
5.0
......... .........
5.0
................
35
272
- m - .
1 1 /3/94
- .....................
JTF-4
n....... _
3.0
36
Sc =
..................
18.0
...............
21.0
............
12.0
................
13.0
............_._
27.0
_ ............
26.0
.....,............... ,....
57 60
37
..... ..n ........
............_.............. .....
. m.. ...............
No. of entries=
_ w _., m..._.m.
5
................_..
5
..-.......
....
3
.
..
..
4
6
6
14 15
3 8
Av score=
3.6
.
.
4.2
. .
....
...
4.0
............... .
3.2
................
4.5
...............
4.3
.... ........... .... .....n --
4.1 4.0
39
40
41
42
43
4
.........................
......._.............................
....... ....................... .......__._
.......
... ...... .
...... ...........
.-.............................
45
Approved For Release 20004PAO A-4DP96-00791 R000200300003-1
A
B
C
D
E
F
G
H I
J
K
L
46
47
Doc.
Date
Tasker
Evaluator
Remote Viewer & Scores
Totals
48
1 A
1V
2A
2V
3A
3v
A
V
49
By
Tasking Agency
51
DTA
5 2
249
M........._ ................ -.-...............................
7/ 1 1 /94 DIA/PAN-3E
.......
..........
1.0
... .- ...
4.0
w..m
2.0
................
2.0
..........,n.
2.0
_.._..
4.0
................,
................
5 3
248
7/6/94 DIA/PAN-3E
m
3.0
3.0
2.0
2.0
1.0
4.0
54
245
6/24/94
DIA/PAN-3E
3.0
3.0
'
1 0
4.0_
55
247
6/29/94 61A/PAG-1 A
1.0
3.0
3.0
3.0
3.0
3.0
56
1 265
7/6/94 DIA/PAG-1A
1.0
3.0
2.0
3.0
2.0
4.0
57
....-............M.
....
m .mm.~ mrr.
9.0
...
16.0
.
.
9.0
10.0
9.0
19.0
27
45
58
N
......
...
5
.
..
.._.......
5
4
....... .......
4
.................
.... ......... _
5
._.__ . m.
5
..............
14
..............
14
59
.....-...........-........._.
..--------------* .................
1.8
3.2
2.2
2.5
8
3.8
1,9
3.2
6 0
61
rg?
~.~
62
102
7/13/94
Or . S
3.0
3.0 t
22. 0
3.0
4.0
5.0
...... .....
................
6 3
101
9/6/94
Ord. S
2.0
3.0
5.0
4.0
64
82
....,.................... .....
6/6/94
........-.........
Or . S
4.0
5.0
2.0
3.0
1.0
2.0
65
81
6/12/94?
m.-. Ord S
..
2.0
2.0
1,0
2.0
2.0
2.0
66
79
4/ 1 / 94
Or . S
2.0
2.0
2.0
2.0
1.0
2.0
67
S
11.0
12.0
9.0
13.0
13.0
15.0
33
40
68
N
4
4
5
5
5
5
14
................
14
6 9
.....................
....
2.8
3.0
1.8
2.6
2.6
3.0
2.4
2.9
70
71
USA-
ct.
.............. -
7 2
232
4/ 1 1 /94
USA FCI Act.
2.0
4.0
5.0
4.0
5.0
4.0
73
236
4/26/94
USA FCI Act.
...-....,............................. ..
.........
6.0
..
.
.
.
.
4.0
6.0
2.0
74
237
4/26/94
USA FCI Act.
.
.
..
.....
.
.
5.0
..........._.._.
4.0
-......... .....
5.0
.................
4.0
..m-...........
........
.....-.........
..........,.....
75
241
4/27/94
USA FCI Act.
3.0
4.0
_
2.0
4.0
76
S
16.0
16.0
10.0
8.0
13.0
10.0
39
34
77
--
~ .............._-
_ ......._........ ...... ......
N
........
4
.
.
.
4
2
2
-
3
3
9
9
78
..........
.
....
4.0
...............
4.0
.............
5.0
...
..........
4.0
..............
4.3
..................
3.3
........... .....
4.3
......... .......
3.8
9
7 9
8 0
-
_- ....m...-..
.
_ ......................-......
- .mm .
.... -
.... -..........
...............
81
82
tom ariso
n - - -A-lv a
a -c
ores
" ~`r
C~~
aniza
tion
83
Organization
A
vera
a Sco
res
841
JTF-5
2.8
3.4
3.3
5
------
2.9
------------------
3.6
85
_.....n ..............
....m_ ..._.........-..n........
JTF-4
........_.............._..-,..r.
...
3.6
......
.....
4.2
4.0
_
r3.
2~
4.5
4.3
""-
8 6
.
DIA
.
.....
1.8
3.2
.......-m
2.2
.......
5
1.8
..
3.8
...........
87
.......... ..............~-.m..ry
-.rv........ m------ ...--......
Or?wS
...
.
2.8
3.0
18
.
~
2.6
.
?6
3.0
I
88
.
. ..-
USA FCI Act
....... ........... .
4.0
....-- .
....... -1---.
4.0
.>...
-,-
~-
5.0
4.0
.
............
4.3
..._.............
3.3
..............
........_.._..
ApproveaEgr 1ele 1bW,4 TA k9'% 9W,?,Q0300003-1
F~tNUMERICAL EVALUATIONS
Approved For Release 2000TA P d4&DP96-00791 R000200300003-1
Approved For Release 2000/08/10 : CIA-RDP96-00791 R000200300003-1
DRAFT
UNCLASSIFIED
measure. If the Accuracy of the information is somewhat uncertain, its Value must be
vaguer still, i.e., scored lower. This presumption is supported by review of the scored
"pairs for all cases, e.g., 1 A and 1 V; only rarely does the "V" score equal or exceed the
"A" score for a specific RV and target. Note further that of the 100 "V" scores shown on
Table 4-1, there are no "1" scores4 while the 99 "A" scores include 13 "1's".
Regarding the latter, a detailed review of the evaluator comments and/or the tasking
suggests that the importance of these 1's is less than the score would imply in all but 4
cases since:
- the evaluator of Document 243 stated that the RV 3A score "...though vague, is
probably correct."
- the tasking and targets for Documents 245,247, 248, 249 and 2655 concern
topics widely publicized in the open media during the same period, hence the
"source" of the RV 1 A and 3A comments, intended or not, is suspect,
and - for Documents 2$0, 239 and 244, the evaluator's supporting narrative6 is
inconsistent with the "1" score (and Org. S evaluators score higher - see
comments later in this section).
Another comparison between the Accuracy and Value scores can be made by
considering the standard deviations for each. In all cases, the normal distribution for
Value scores has a much sharper peak than for the Accuracy scores, i.e., the 1 a values
are substantially smaller. This implies a better, albeit independent, understanding or
agreement across all of the evaluators for the scoring of Value.
4 The significance of this omission is further enhanced if one assumes that the evaluators were familiar
with the definitions in Table 3-2 since even those 11 instances scored as #2 ("High value") merely require
that the input be the "best report to date or first report on this important topic, but [it] did not significantly
influence policy or change analyses."
5 The evaluation of Document 265 is actually a second evaluation of the same RV inputs provided for
Document 248 but done by a different evaluator and many months after the first evaluation.
6 The following were the comments from RV 3 regarding Document 244:
"- The site seemed to be crowded. There were people walking down a narrow `ramp' and they were
dressed casually and looked serious. These people were outside and it was warm.
- There were lots of animals at the site. The animals were outside sitting.
- There was one area that was isolated and this area has low rolling green hills with several small
structures spread apart sitting on the land."
The evaluators comments regarding this input and for which an Accuracy value of 1 was granted were:
"Site is crowded. Prison is full of prisoners moving back and forth between buildings. Casually dressed
is true of prison dress and a prisoner does look serious and it was a warm day. One prisoner was feeding
a cat outside by the fence. It must be noted that there was not a lot of animals in this area. This area is
isolated and does have low rolling green hills with several small structures spread apart sitting in different
types of confinement locations thru-out the prison complex."
UNCLASSIFIED
DRAFT
Approved For Release 2000/08/10 : CIA-RDP96-00791 R000200300003-1
Approved For Release 2000/08/10 : CIA-RDP96-00791 R000200300003-1
DRAFT
UNCLASSIFIED
Histograms of Evaluator Scoring
A review of the data is Table 4-2 provides several other observations:
-The average scores from the JTF-4 evaluators averaged 0.7 to 1.5 marks lower
than those of the JTF-5 evaluators in all but one case (i.e., scores for 2V) even though
the targets were similar, albeit in different hemispheres. Since the tasking was very
similar, this discrepancy raises the suspicion that the difference is due to different
evaluators views of data provided from the Star Gate source and/or different
interpretations of the scoring criteria, i.e., the subjective nature of the whole process
makes accountability and evaluation difficult (see Section 5.0).
- Conversely, the two principal JTF-5 reviewers were quite consistent in their
average scoring considering the general uncertainty in the whole process. It would be
interesting to know whether these evaluators were provided common guidance
regarding how to interpret the measures; it is unfortunate that they never scored the
same information.
- The highest scores for Accuracy occurred for the DIA tasking (these tasks
received 5 of the 13 "1's" for Accuracy), but as noted above, this tasking was directly
relevant to information readily available in the open media during the same period
which may have, knowingly or unknowingly, biased the RV derived information.
- The marginally higher average scores for Org. S may result from either (or
both) of two possible causes: 1) the use of "beacons" to support the RV efforts or 2) the
differences in the evaluator interpretations of the scoring measures (two of the Org. S
evaluators - "We" and "Kn" - score Accuracy and Value from 1 to 3 levels higher than
UNCLASSIFIED
DRAFT
Approved For Release 2000/08/10 : CIA-RDP96-00791 R000200300003-1
Approved For Release 2000/08/10 : CIA-RDP96-00791 R000200300003-1
DRAFT
UNCLASSIFIED
any other evaluator from any organization) or other subjective causes.
- The cause of the exceptionally low scores given by the USA FCI Activity
evaluator is unknown but may be due to an honest appraisal of the data or a personal
bias against the source by the single evaluator (among other possibilities).
5.0 GENERAL COMMENTS ON THE PROCESS
Several general observations were derived by the author from the review of the
operational tasking folders, each of which included the information derived by the RV's
as well as the subsequent evaluator scoring and comment sheets.
As noted earlier, most tasking was nonspecific in terms of the information desired.
Most task targets were generic, e.g., a name and nothing else. Knowledge of the
identity of the tasking organization may have telegraphed the type of information of
interest. The result of this approach, in general, was that much of the RV-provided
information was an unstructured discourse on a variety of topics. It frequently had the
characteristic that I would associate with "free association or stream of consciousness".
The combination of the broad, unspecified nature of the tasking in conjunction with the
resulting unstructured information from the RV makes evaluation difficult if not
impossible. The evaluation process is subjective and, thereby, influenced by the
beliefs, interests, whims, and fancies of each evaluator. Conversely, any
"telegraphed" information acquired by the RV7, whether by accident, inference or
intention, makes Accuracy scoring suspect since some "accurate" information can be
provided based upon that knowledge8 , e.g.," the target is involved in the drug culture"
is almost certainly true of any targets specified by the JTF's.
Correspondence between portions of the RV-derived information and the interests of
the evaluator can be completely illusionary since the communication channels
between the RV(s) and the evaluator:
- has a very narrow information bandwidth, i.e., the RV-derived information
cannot be embellished by a dialogue with the evaluator without substantially
telegraphing the evaluator's needs and interests, thereby biasing any
RV information subsequently derived ,
and - is extremely "noisy" as a result of the unidentifiable beliefs, intentions,
7 Telegraphed by knowledge of the tasking organization and its interests and concerns or by tasking that
relates to highly publicized media information during the same time period.
8 In addition, "Accuracy" is a necessary but not a sufficient condition for determining the utility of the
information since "accurate information " may already been know by the tasker or, even though accurate,
may not have any utility for the tasker's problem.
UNCLASSIFIED
DRAFT
Approved For Release 2000/08/10 : CIA-RDP96-00791 R000200300003-1
Approved For Release 2000/08/10 : CIA-RDP96-00791 R000200300003-1
DRAFT
UNCLASSIFIED
knowledge, biases, etc. that reside in the subjective consciousness of the
RV(s) and the evaluator .
As a result, the potential for self-deception on the part of the evaluator exists, i.e,
he/she "reads" into the RV information a degree of validity that in truth is based upon
fragmentary, generalized information and which may have little real applicability to
his/her problem. The relevant question in the overall evaluation process is who and
what is being evaluated, i.e., is the score a measure of the RV's paranormal
capabilities or of the evaluators views, beliefs and concepts?
One of the RV's expressed a concern to the author that the protocols that were
followed in conducting the RV process in response to the operational tasking were not
consistent with those that are generally specified for the study of paranormal
phenomena. Whether the claimed discrepancy was detrimental to the information
derived by the RV's,or to its subsequent evaluation or use is not derivable from the
available data.
The operational tasking noted earlier concerning activities in North Korea which
required precognitive abilities on the part of the RV's provides an opportunity for a
post-analysis by comparing the RV predictions against subsequent realities.
Additional comparative data of this type is available from operational tasking during
the period 11/90 through 1/91 regarding the Middle East situation (this tasking was not
numerically evaluated).
6.0 CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
6.1 Conclusions
The single conclusion that can be drawn from an evaluation of the 40 operational
tasks is that the value and utility to the Intelligence Community of the information
provided by the process cannot be readily discerned. While, if one believes the
validity of parapsychological phenomena, the potential for value exists in principal,
there is, none-the-less, an alternative view of the phenomenology that would disavow
any such value and, in fact, could claim that the ambiguous and subjective nature of
the process actually creates a need for additional efforts with questionable operational
return on the part of the intelligence analyst.
Normally, much of the data provided by the RV(s) is either wrong or irrelevant although
one cannot always tell which is which without further investigation. Whether this reality
reduces or eliminates the overall value of the totality of the information can only be
assessed by the intelligence analyst. It clearly complicates his/her problem in two
ways: 1) it adds to the overburden of unrelated data which every analyst already
UNCLASSIFIED
DRAFT
Approved For Release 2000/08/10 : CIA-RDP96-00791 R000200300003-1
Approved For Release 2000/08/10 : CIA-RDP96-00791 R000200300003-1
DRAFT
UNCLASSIFIED
receives on a daily basis, i.e., the receipt of information of dubious authenticity and
accuracy is not an uncommon occurrence for intelligence analysts, and 2) since the
analyst does not normally know which information is wrong or irrelevant, some of it is
actually "disinformation" and can result in wasted effort as the analyst attempts to verify
or discount those data from other sources.
The review of the operational tasking and its subsequent evaluation does not provide
any succinct conclusions regarding the validity of the process (or the. information
provided by it). First and foremost, as discussed in Section 5.0, the entire process,
from beginning to end, is highly subjective. Further, as noted in Section 3.0, the
degree of consistency in applying the scoring measures, any guidance or training
provided to the evaluators by any of the tasking organizations and/or the motivation or
interest of the evaluators are all unknown. The lack of information regarding these
items could account for some of the variability in the scores across organizations noted
in Figure 4-2, but this cannot be certified and is, at most, a suspicion.
Whether the information provided by the Star Gate source is of sufficient value to
overcome the obvious detriment of accommodating the irrelevant information included
therein is an open question? More precisely, whether the Star Gate information is of
sufficient value to continue this program - vis-a-vis other sources of information and
other uses of resources - is an important question for the Intelligence Community to
address, irrespective of one's personal views and/or beliefs regarding this field of
endeavor, i.e., does the information provided justify the required resource investment?
One method that might assist this evaluation is to develop a means for scoring the
complete input from the RV process, i.e., evaluate all information and determine how
much is truly relevant, how much is of undeterminable value and how much is
completely irrelevant. One could then analyze how much information is being handled
to achieve the relevant information (along with some measure of the relevancy) and
make judgments on its value vis-a-vis the investment in time and money. Other, less
technical methods, for adjudicating this issue also exist.
6.2 Recommendations
Considering the statements above, the only sensible recommendation in this author's
mind is to bring some "scientific method" into this process (if it is continued). As
evidenced by more than 20 years of research into paranormal psychology, much of it
done by institutions of higher education or others with excellent credentials in related
fields, validation of parapsychological phenomena may never be accredited in the
sense that is understood in other scientific and technical fields of endeavor . Control in
any rigorous scientific sense of the multitude of human and physical variables which
could, and probably do, influence this process is difficult - perhaps impossible - for any
UNCLASSIFIED
DRAFT
Approved For Release 2000/08/10 : CIA-RDP96-00791 R000200300003-1
Approved For Release 2000/08/10 : CIA-RDP96-00791 R000200300003-1
DRAFT
UNCLASSIFIED
illusionary, interpretation regarding both accuracy and value. If some specificity
regarding the target could be defined such that the relevance and accuracy of the RV-
derived data could be evaluated more readily, some of the uncertainties might be
eliminated. In this context, note that the cases where targets were more specific, e.g.,
the NK targets , the resulting scores were generally higher.
Finally, it was noted in Section 5.0 that some of the RV information obtained from
operational tasks regarding North Korea (and others concerning the Middle East)
depended upon the precognitive ability of the RV's in predicting events yet to occur.
These data provide an opportunity for a post-analysis of the accuracy of these
predictions by making a comparison with subsequent information regarding actual
events (some data for this comparison might require access to classified information
from other sources). Such a post-analysis would provide data for evaluating the ability
of the RV's to perform precognitive tasks and of the related operational value of the
predictions. Performance of this post-analysis lies beyond the scope of this paper, but
is a topic for a subsequent study if any sponsor is interested.
UNCLASSIFIED
DRAFT
Approved For Release 2000/08/10 : CIA-RDP96-00791 R000200300003-1
SG1 B
Approved For Release 2000/08/10 : CIA-RDP96-00791 R000200300003-1
Next 1 Page(s) In Document Exempt
Approved For Release 2000/08/10 : CIA-RDP96-00791 R000200300003-1