GOVERNMENT SPONSORED RESEARCH IN PSYCHOENERGETICS

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: STARGATE
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP96-00789R002200440001-9
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 68
• Document Creation Date: November 4, 2016
• Document Release Date: December 4, 1998
• Sequence Number: 1
• Content Type: REPORT

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GOVERNMENT-SPONSORED RESEARCH
IN PSYCHOENERGETICS (S)
Prepared By:
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SUMMARY (U)
(S/NF) Since 1972, the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) and various
elements of the Department of Defense (DoD) have participated in
psychoenergetics research. During this time almost 11 million dollars
were spent. This is an average of nearly 600,000 per year. While this
points out the magnitude of the research effort, it is also important to
note that this was not a single sponsor program, rather, there were
several programs, funded by a variety of funders, some lasting only a few
months. Although it was noted in the early seventies, a basic dichotomy
of effort plagued the program for many years. It was apparent that much
basic research was needed before applications of the phenomena would be
possible. However, the sponsors had no charter to do basic research and
hence pursued the application aspects of the program.
(S/NF) During their short participation the CIA attempted to utilize
remote viewing (RV) to collect operational level intelligence. The
Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) also pursued that goal, but additionally
looked at countermeasures and some aspects of psychokinesis. The Foreign
Technology Division (FTD) initiated research that would assist them with
providing a threat assessment of foreign psychoenergetics research. The
Navy had a short participation early in the program also, but looked only
for physiological markers during psychoenergetic functioning. Several Army
elements were involved in the research. Again, applications were stressed
until 1986 when Army provided funds for some basic R&D.
(S/NF) The psychoenergetics research sponsored by the CIA and DoD
elements was conducted almost exclusively at SRI International. The
reasons for this were twofold. First, when funding averages just about
600,000 per year it is difficult to parcel it out to several different
laboratories. Additionally, there are only a few labs doing
state-of-the-art research. Late in the program an attempt was made to
sub-contract some of the work, but was not very successful.
(S/NF) As one looks over the research experiments done since 1972 it
is apparent the emphasis was placed on making RV an operationally useful
tool. Projects aimed at various aspects of this goal were carried out.
Much effort was placed on screening and selection to find people with
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natural talent for RV, Training people to improve their ability was
tried. Ways to increase the signal and decrease the noise were looked at.
Support activities were also researched, these included such things as
evaluating results, the role of feedback and ways to direct the viewer to
the target.
(S/NF) As the project draws to a conclusion some overall evaluation
of all the research should be made. To that end, the staff at SRI
International is preparing a meta-analysis of each research topic. In
general, it can be said that the researchers worked hard, were honest and
always gave their best effort. The quality of the work, however, varied
from excellent to poor. This should not be surprising as in any new field
of scientific research many mistakes are made. So, rather than looking
back we should look at the quality of the research going on now. It is
creditable and the SRI research greatly exceeds the work on
psychoenergetics being done at other laboratories.
(S/NF) Perhaps the most important aspect that needs to be looked at
is, "where are we now?" It is immediately apparent that we are now much
further along than we were 15 years ago. The crux is that, currently we
are not at a point where complete and accurate descriptions of any and
every operational target is possible. It appears we are many years away
from being able to do that. Target descriptions by remote viewers still
contain a considerable amount of incorrect data and some good data. Over
the years the research has made inroads toward increasing the proportion
of good data. Does this mean that we should abandon the research or the
goal of making it an intelligence collection tool? I think not.
(S/NF) So, where do we go from here? Two things must be done. The
first is that we need to curtail applications research and increase basic
research to gain a better understanding of phenomena and of the variables
that affect it. Then it must be honed to a fine edge and applied to those
areas of intelligence that are particularly susceptible to the application
of RV. In addition, we need to stop thinking of RV as a methodology for
complete descriptions of everything. In any RV it is conceivable that
most of the data may be wrong, but if one tangible facet is correct and
this propels the analyst into a better understanding of whatever he is
seeking, then it must be labeled a successful effort. There has already
been at least one such occurrence.
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(S/NF)
Based on that
in ormation the analysts explored that possibility and found that, that
was exactly what happened. Again, all the other data in the viewer's
description could have been incorrect, but the session would have to be
rated as extremely successful.
SG1A
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TABLE OF CONTENTS (U)
SUMMARY (U) ..............................................................ii
LIST OF FIGURES (U) ...................................................... vii
LIST OF TABLES (U) ...................................................... viii
PREFACE (U) ............................................................. viiii
I SECTION 1. THE EARLY YEARS--CIA (U) ........................... 1
II SECTION 2. THE SERVICE YEARS--ARMY, NAVY, AIR FORCE (S/NF) . 7
A. Navy (S/NF) .................................................. 7
B. Air Force (S/NF) .............................................. 9
C. Army (S/NF) ................................................. 25
III SECTION 3. EARLY DIA SUPPORT (S/NF) .......................... 33
IV SECTION 4. THE JOINT SERVICE PROGRAM (U) ................... 36
A. FY 1981 (U) ................................................. 36
B. FY 1982 (U) ................................................. 43
C. FY 1983 (U) ................................................. 45
V SECTION 5. THE GRILL FLAME EVALUATION (S/NF) .............. 48
A. Training (U) .................................................. 50
B. Remote Viewing Enhancement (U) ............................... SO
C. Search (U) ................................................... 50
D. Evaluation (U) ................................................ 50
E. Data Base Management (U) ..................................... 50
F. Countermeasures (U) .......................................... 50
G. Foreign Psychoenergetics Research (U) ............................ 51
VI THE FOLLOW-ON PROGRAM (U) ................................. 52
A. FY 1984 (U) ................................................. 52
B. FY 1985 (U) .................................................53
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TABLE OF CONTENTS (U) - (Continued)
VII THE FIVE YEAR PROGRAM (U) ................................... 54
A. The First Year--FY 1986 (U) ................................... 54
B. The Second Year--FY 1987 (U) ................................ 56
C. The Third Year--FY 1988 (U) .................................. 58
VIII THE DIA PROGRAM--FY 1989 (U) ................................. 59
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LIST OF FIGURES (U)
1. Comparison of Target Site and Drawing by Remote Viewer (S/NF) ............... 3
2. Remote Sensing EEG Experiment (S/NF) .................................... 8
3. Penetration Strategies (U) ................................................ 11
4. Local Target in Palo Alto (U) ............................................ 12
5. Long Distance Target, The Louisiana Super Dome (U) ........................ 13
6. Coordinate Remote Viewing, Air Supported Building at Sylvania Near Palo Alto (U) 14
7. Rocket Test Site (U) .................................................... 16
8. Remote Viewing, A Soviet Airport (U) ..................................... 18
9. Target Objects in Metal Containers (U) ..................................... 19
10. "Pyrophoric" Explosion of Nuclear Material (S/NF) .......................... 24
11. Stanford Art Museum Target (U) .......................................... 28
12. Stanford Shopping Center Target and Response (U) .......................... 30
13. Target Slide, and Viewer (U) ............................................. 31
14. Schematic Representation of Remote Viewer Response to CRV Situation (U) ...... 35
15. Grill Flame Funding Plan (S/NF) .......................................... 37
16. Grill Flame Funding Actual (S/NF) ....................................... 38
17. Data Flow Plan (S/NF) .................................................. 39
18. Data Flow Actual (S/NF) ................................................ 40
19. Contract Monitor--Proposed (S/NF) ....................................... 41
20. Contract Monitor--Actual (S/NF) ......................................... 42
21. The DIA Missions and Program Development (C) ............................ 46
22. The Army Mission and Program (C) ....................................... 47
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LIST OF TABLES (U)
1. Laboratories with Remote Viewing Research (U) ............................. 10
2. Known Elements in Remote Viewing (S/NF) .............................. 20-21
3. Rewarding RV Applications (U) ........................................... 23
4. CRV Stages of Target Acquisitions (U) ..................................... 34
5. FY 1981 Research Areas (U) ............................................. 43
6. FY 1983 Tasks (U) ..................................................... 45
7. Grill Flame Intelligence Publications (S/NF) ................................. 51
8. FY 1984 Tasks and Spending (S/NF) ...................................... 53
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PREFACE
(C) This report reviews government sponsored research in the field
of psychoenergetics from 1972 through 1988. The work was supported by CIA
and the Department of Defense (DoD). Most of the DoD program was paid for
by various intelligence organizations. The research currently under way
(January 89) will be written up and published as an addendum to this
report as will subsequent research.
(C) Most of the research was conducted at SRI International in
Menlo Park, California and the author is indebted both to the professional
and clerical staffs for their assistance in compiling the data and making
it ready for publication.
(C) This document, while large in size, attempts to cover a set of
reports that would occupy at least two complete file drawers. So, if a
reader is sufficiently interested in a particular topic, there are
probably several individual reports on that topic.
(C) This report is a summary of psychoenergetic research that has
taken place over the past 16 years. The aspects included are: funding
source and amount, topics covered, research results, applications for
intelligence and difficulties encountered. In addition foreign research
and countermeasures are reviewed. Considering the funding level, time and
the many difficulties encountered, the project should be considered a
success. To realize this one need only look at what we knew in 1972 about
psychoenergetic and what we now know. The growth has been phenomenal. It
must be added, however, that much remains to be solved by future research,
should sponsors be found.
(U) The author of the report is Defense Intelligence Agency, DT-5A
Washington D.C. 20340-6053
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SECTION 1. THE EARLY YEARS--CIA (U)
(S/NF) The Central Intelligence Agency was the first government
organization to investigate parapsychology as it pertains to intelligence
collection. Their work was initiated in 1961 when the Office of Technical
Service OTS (then the Technical Services Division) became interested in
ESP claims. Under the auspices of Project ULTRA, Stephen I. Abrams,
Director of the Parapsychological Laboratory, Oxford University, England,
reviewed parapsychological research and prepared an article stating that,
at most, ESP had been demonstrated but was neither understood or
controllable. After that effort, the field lay dormant at CIA for 10
years.
(S/NF) In 1972 Russell Targ, then a SRI, conducted the CIA to discuss
paranormal abilities. He proposed a demonstration of psychokinetic
abilities at SRI. For the demonstration, a subject with psychokinetic
abilities was taken to a super conducting shielded magnetometer and was
able to visibly disturb the output signal by placing his attention on the
interior of the magnetometer. This was followed by an additional few days
of work in August, 1972, where further demonstrations of psychic ability
were presented. The cost for this effort was $874.00. Another work order
for $2,500 was then issued to develop a complete research plan. The
result was a $50,000 contract for an expanded effort in parapsychology.
It was at this time that the work caught the interest of the office of
Research and Development (ORD) at the CIA.
(S/NF) As part of the expanded effort, a remote viewing (RV)
experiment was conducted in the summer of 1973 that further stimulated CIA
sponsored investigations of parapsychology. Geographic coordinates of a
vacation property were given to an SRI subject. Having no more
information than the coordinates, he described the site as being a
military-like facility. As the coordinates were for a vacation cottage,
the response was believed to be incorrect. However, the CIA went to the
site several months later to investigate it more thoroughly and discovered
a sensitive government installation a few miles from the vacation
property. The subject was then asked to view the interior of the
installation. When all the data were reviewed the quality of the
experimental results was judged to be mixed.
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(S/NF) The mix of good and bad results from RV experiments continued
throughout the next 10 years. Only in the last few years have we begun to
understand some of the causes of wrong data. When CIA reviewed the
experiments conducted, they thought the results impressive enough to
warrant a jointly funded program (ORD and OTS) to begin in February, 1974.
In this program, the ORD funds were to be used for basic scientific
studies, such as the identification of measurable physiological or
psychological characteristics of psychic individuals, and to develop
experimental protocols for validating paranormal abilities. The ORD
project did demonstrate psychic functioning, but critics found fault with
the equipment, the experimental designs, and the analysis of data (such
fault-finding is a recurrent problem in parapsychological research). In
addition, ORD's new director was admittedly skeptical of parapsychology
and his skepticism began to affect others, including some in OTS.
(S/NF) Despite these pressures, SRI attempted the first intelligence
collection operation using parapsychology. The target was Unidentified
Research and Development Facility-3 at Semipalatinsk in the Soviet Union.
The results were again mixed. While most of the data were either wrong or
could not be evaluated, the subject did produce some amazing and accurate
descriptions of a crane, shown in Figure 1. In addition, buildings under
construction and some spherical tank sections were described accurately.
However, the ORD officers concluded that the lack of control experiments
with which to compare the data reduced their legitimacy to the status of
"lucky guesses."
(S/NF) At this point the contractors were claiming the experiments a
success while the CIA officers were saying that the experiments were not
meaningful because of poor experimental design. To resolve this
dissonance, a critique of the investigations by a disinterested consultant
was requested. After reviewing the parapsychology file and looking at the
CIA data, he concluded that there is "a large body of reliable
experimental evidence that points to the inescapable conclusion that extra
sensory perception does exist as a real phenomenon albeit characterized by
rarity and lack of reliability." This judgment gave impetus to continued
investigations into parapsychology. Since then, considerable research has
been devoted to improving the quality and reliability of data obtained by
psychic means.
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FIGURE 1 (S/NF) COMPARISON OF TARGET SITE AND DRAWING BY REMOTE
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(S/NF) As OTS was then sponsoring psychic research, although they
were "not in the research business," they asked that something of genuine
operational significance be done. To meet this challenge, Pat Price, a
person with purported psychic abilities, was tasked to locate code rooms
in two foreign embassies. He located both correctly. He also provided a
lot of additional information, much of which was vague or incorrect. The
operations officer stated, "It is my considered opinion that this
technique--whatever it is--offers definite operational possibilities."
However, the ORD project officers concluded that the research was not
productive or even competent and that research support to SRI should be
dropped. In OTS, the feeling was that their charter would not allow them
to fund basic research. Therefore, all agency funding in paranormal
research was stopped. As the operational utility was still conceivable,
it was decided that Price would work for CIA under a personal service
contract.
(S/NF) Price was then given a set of geographic coordinates in Libya.
He described a guerrilla training site and an underwater sabotage training
facility several hundred kilometers away on the sea coast. The new
information produced by Price was later verified by reconnaissance and the
undersea facility was similar to the description given by a collateral
agent. The Libyan desk officer quickly asked for more data and these
requests were given to Price. Two days later, however, Price died of a
heart attack and the CIA-sponsored intelligence collection tests were
ended.
(S/NF) At this point the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) became
interested in the field. The DIA interest resulted from an intelligence
production request. This request resulted in the publication of a 1972
study entitled, "Controlled Offensive Behavior--USSR." A great deal of
interest was shown in this study, particularly the sections on
parapsychology. Several members of DIA met with CIA action officers to
review the results of CIA parapsychology experiments. The DIA did not,
however, fund any research until 1978. Between the point in 1975 when the
CIA left the field and DIA's entry in 1978, various research projects at
SRI were sponsored by the Army, Navy and Air Force. Each of these will be
discussed later.
(S/NF) In his 1977 summary article on the CIA's involvement with
parapsychology ("Parapsychology in Intelligence: A Personal Review and
S G11 Conclusions,") makes a number of interesting points that should
be examined in light of current information. He says, "It is my opinion
that, as it relates to intelligence, sufficient understanding and
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assessment of parapsychology has not been achieved." He then alludes to
observations and experiments that defy explanation by other means.
believes that the principal problem is that the research has been funded
by military and intelligence organizations. These agencies all wanted
quick and relevant results with no attention to fundamental mechanisms or
experimental variables. He further concludes, "Unless there is a major
breakthrough in understanding, the situation is not likely to change."
Unfortunately, remarks went unheeded for nearly ten years. During
that time, the sponsoring agencies insisted on applications research,
while the elements needed for a fundamental understanding of the phenomena
were given scant attention. Recognizing the points made by _ and S G11
noting the participation of various DoD elements in funding parapsychology
experiments, the DIA initiated a joint service research program in 1980.
The goals of this program were to continue the applications-oriented work,
but also to fund basic scientific experiments. It was also hoped that a
joint contract would result in better utilization of funds. This program,
called "Grill Flame," was moderately successful as will be discussed in
detail in a later section. It was not until 1985, however, that an R&D
organization financed a program to look for fundamental mechanisms, and
basic science investigation began. (This, too, is covered in a later
section.)
(S/NF) In summary, the CIA spent $195,000 from 1971 to 1975 on
parapsychology research. Various experiments were conducted and the
experimental data gathered were very frustrating. A large portion was
completely wrong, another portion was questionable, but there were almost
always a few gems (e.g., the Price crane) that defied explanation and
whetted the appetite for more. Other problems experienced by CIA projects
were inconsistency and lack of reproducibility of experimental results.
There were also problems with experimental design. Such problems will
accompany this kind of research for many years, until we understand their
causes and how to prevent them. Lack of adequate funding is also a
persistent problem. Ultimately though, it appears that the CIA abandoned
the research field, more because of internal political problems, than any
scientific consideration.
(S/NF) The CIA-funded research, did establish that remote viewing of
geographical and technical features is possible, "i.e.,results cannot be
assigned to any other known cause," and that descriptive aspects are
better described than analytical concepts. Most important, the projects
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showed that obtaining operationally useful data is possible. This was, to
DoD funding agencies, the most critical finding as the operational
potential was the element that made funds available. Additionally, the
CIA work showed that a target can be accessed by geographical coordinates
as well as by means of a person at the target site. while few data were
acquired, it was postulated that standard medical/psychological screening
is of little use.
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SECTION 2. THE SERVICE YEARS (U)
(S/NF) Service funding for parapsychology from 1975 to 1979 was as
follows:
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DATES ORGANIZATION BUDGET ($K)
1975-1976 NAVALEX $ 74
1976-1979 FTD $300
1977-1980 MIA $281
1978-1980 AMSAA $230
(S/NF) In addition, during these years, the DIA provided $228,000
from 1978 to 1980. In all, about $1,293,000 was spent over five years or
an average of $258,600 per year. The annual funds could support only a
very few researchers, so that the chances for significant progress were
correspondingly limited. Note that the $1,293,000 was not for a single
program over five years, but rather seven different programs each with its
own goals and objectives. These programs are discussed below.
(S/NF) In the NAVALEX program, the ability of individuals to perceive
remote faint stimuli at a noncognitive level of awareness was
investigated. To do this, changes in a subject's brainwave (EEG)
production were monitored while light flashes were generated on a random
schedule in a remote laboratory. A diagram of the experimental apparatus
is shown in Figure 2. A statistical correlation was observed, but it was
very weak and would require additional research.
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B. (U) AIR FORCE
1. (U) FTD
(S/NF) The Foreign Technology Division (FTD) USAF was tasked by
DIA to follow and report on foreign research in psychoenergetics. FTD
funded research at SRI to provide the needed basis for assessing the
psychoenergetic process as an advanced threat technology. FTD sought to
determine the state of the art in psychoenergetics and, more important,
its applications feasibility. RV could be shown to be a real and robust
phenomenon but not of use to the intelligence community.
(S/NF) The field holding the greatest potential for
intelligence applications, however, is clearly RV. In this perceptual
process, certain individuals access and describe information blocked from
ordinary perception by distance or shielding (see Figure 3). To
immediately begin testing its operational possibilities, a number of
Soviet sites of intelligence interest were exploited using RV. The
accuracy and value of the RV results were then assessed and found to
contain a considerable amount of correct information. This, of course,
presents the possibility that the Soviets may be remote viewing U.S.
sites. In general, the questions posed to SRI by FTD were:
? Is remote viewing possible?
? is distance a factor?
? Can coordinates be used to target a viewer?
? Can real time events be remotely viewed?
? Can shielding be used to block remote viewing?
(S/NF) These are discussed in turn below.
IS REMOTE VIEWING POSSIBLE? (U)
(C) After reviewing their own and other research data, the SRI
investigators conclude that RV is indeed a human perceptual ability. In
support of their conclusion, they cited a number of other studies in which
other labs and investigators had replicated the RV research at SRI. Based
on this evidence, the FTD believed that there was good reason to pursue
the field but with moderate funding. Since that time there have been a
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number of labs where successful RV research has been performed.
these are shown in Table 1.
Table 1
(U) LABORATORIES WITH REMOTE VIEWING RESEARCH
? Princeton University
? University of Chicago
? Mundelein College
? University of California, Davis
? Lawrence Berkeley Consciousness Research Group
? Institute for the Future
? Midwest Parapsychology Research Institute
? Mind Science Research Laboratory
IS DISTANCE A FACTOR? (U)
(S/NF) To determine this, SRI conducted a series of remote viewing
experiments with targets several thousand miles away in such places as New
York, Dayton, the Artic, and the Soviet Union. One of the local targets
is shown in Figure 4, and one of the distant targets in Figure 5. After
comparing a number of such experiments, it was concluded that there is no
degradation in accuracy or resolution as a function of distances of up to
5000 km.
CAN MAP COORDINATES BE USED TO TARGET A VIEWER? (U)
(S/NF) Using a beacon person (someone at the site) had already been
tried and was successful. To investigate the use of coordinates, the SRI
investigators did a series of experiments where the viewer was given only
the coordinates of a target. A successful trial is shown in Figure 6.
From this and a number of other attempts, the researchers concluded that
targeting by coordinates yields results comparable to beacon targeting.
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FIGURE 3 (U) PENETRATION STRATEGIES
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CPYRGHT UNCLASSIFIED
FIGURE 4 (U) LOCAL TARGET IN PALO ALTO
1'A' e122 S
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UNCLASSIFIED
CPYRGHT
FIGURE 5 (U) LONG DISTANCE TARGET, THE LOUISIANA SUPER DOME
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(S/NF) it is well known in the
choice selection (the target is a n
difficult than describing a remote
infinite, The problem with a force
distracted by mental images from hi
noise in the RV channel. Later, it
field of psychoenergetics that forced
mber between one and ten) is more
ocation where the target pool is
choice is that the viewer can be
memory; this is a major source of
was discovered that coordinates can
also constitute a source of noise for
sing several subjects in a series of
u
the same reason. SRI did a study
trials where the target was to name
letters of the alphabet being displayed at a remote location. Their
conclusion was that alphabet letters displayed at a remote location could
be identified to a statistically significant degree. The level was not,
however, high enough to even approach operational utility. After these
studies, some changes in protocol were made. First, a person who claimed
she read things in her dreams was used as the subject. Then the subject
was asked to describe the target as if it were an RV exercise rather than
naming the letter. With these modifications, increased accuracy was
achieved. This work further suggests that, to increase resolution, the
perception of the target must be separated from the analysis.
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CAN REAL TIME EVENTS BE REMOTELY VIEWED? (U)
CAN SHIELDING BE USED TO BLOCK REMOTE VIEWING? (U)
(U) With regard to shielding, only electrical shielding was tested and it was shown not to
be effective. The shielding problem will be looked at in greater detail over the next several years.
Should RV develop into an operationally useful phenomenon, a program must be available to
develop countermeasures.
(C) At this point, it should be noted that not all RVs are
successful. In fact, a good many are not. This mix of good and bad will
continue over many years while researchers attempt to resolve the nature
of the psychoenergetic signal and dampen the noise. This and other
ongoing efforts to examine the many variables encountered in RV has
improved the signal-to-noise ratio, but much remains to be done. For
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example, at this time no definitive method to evaluate RV results has been
developed, there are still questions about how to target a viewer, and the
role of feedback has not been completely settled.
(C) Also, in the 1978-79 time frame, the sponsoring agencies gave
some consideration to investigating the relevant physical principles and
laws governing paranormal functioning. This effort will continue for many
years: the proof of principle is very elusive and delimiting its
characteristics is a giant undertaking; also, such basic work is difficult
to do when sponsors are, as they must be, applications oriented.
(S/NF) Once SRI had answered many of the questions posed by FTD, FTD
proposed some new areas for the next year and asked that several of the
previous year's topics be further explored. The next questions were:
? Can RV be used as a form of communication?
? What is the spatial resolution of RV?
? What is the role of feedback in RV?
? Can audio signals be remotely sensed?
(C) Psychokinesis (PK) was also included as a topic for study.
Psychokinesis is the production of physical effects, such as perturbation
of equipment or instrumentation that appears to be well shielded against
human influence or otherwise inaccessible. During this contract period,
SRI developed equipment to detect and measure PK.
(C) After it was determined that RV is indeed possible and can be
done over long distances, the resolution capability was examined. To do
this, SRI concealed small objects in light-tight metal cans (35-mm film
cans) and asked a subject to describe the objects. The results are shown
in Figure 9. These data indicate that the psychoenergetic functions have
a spatial resolution down to at least one millimeter. At this point it
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U
"IT'S DEFINITELY SOMETHING THIN AND
LONG... WITH A NAIL HEAD AT THE
END . . . SILVERED COLORED."
"LIKE A MINIATURE TOWER . . . SCALLOPED
BOTTOM . . . LIGHT BEIGE."
"LIKE A PENGUIN . . . GREY AND BLACK AND
WHITE ... POINTED OR SLIGHTLY ROUNDED
OFF AT THE TOP ... OPEN OR POINTED AT
GREY AND WHITE QUILL I THE BOTTOM."
FIGURE 9 (U) TARGET OBJECTS IN METAL CONTAINERS
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(C)
may be useful to summarize what has been learned thus far about RV (see
Table 2).
(C) To expand the applications of remote viewing and further
explore its parameters a communication experiment was attempted. The
experiment involved placing remote viewers in a submersible in 500 feet of
sea water and approximately 500 miles from the target sight. A series of
six targets were associated with six possible communications, and at an
arranged time an experimenter went to a target and a remote viewer in the
submersible prepared a description of a target. The description was then
compared with the list of potential targets and a choice was made as to
which one most nearly resembled the viewer's description. Correct
identification of this target, which was coupled with a particular
message, constituted delivering the message. Because of various technical
problems, only two trials were completed and the correct message was
transmitted in both. As the experiment was shielded by sea water, it was
further concluded that ELF transmission was not a possible mechanism for
remote viewing. The stress induced on the viewer by being underwater did
not appear to degrade the quality of their remote viewing.
(S/NF) The FTD, as part of their threat assessment responsibility,
asked SRI to replicate a Soviet experiment where the transmission of 105
out of 135 digits was accomplished. SRI did the experiment and obtained
results that were not significantly greater than chance. There are a
number of possible explanations for the failure. The author's choice is
that the state of the art was being exceeded. At that time, reasonable
descriptions of macro targets were being confirmed. To give very refined
descriptions of much smaller objects, letters and numbers in particular,
has had a history of failure (or a very low level of success). If this
ability is ever used in an intelligence mode, there are more rewarding
areas where it may be better applied. Some of these are shown in Table 3.
(C) Remote viewing, as the name implies, is a visual task. There
have been, however, several instances where signals from other sensory
modalities were reported. SRI developed an experiment with an audio
target and initial results suggest that remote audio perception is
possible but additional experiments would be needed to confirm its
strength and reliability. In some cases data reported from other sensory
modalities at times have been better than visual data.
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(S/NF) KNOWN ELEMENTS IN REMOTE VIEWING
? Target acquisition--Subjects can acquire target site on the
basis of the presence of a known person at the site;
targeting by geographical coordinates without the presence
of a known person at the site yields results comparable to
those obtained in experiments in which a person known to the
subject is used as a beacon. This observation offers
evidence for goal-oriented as opposed to means-oriented
interpretation of the "laws" that appear to govern
psychoenergetic functioning.
? Target attributes sensed--Descriptive aspects (shape, form,
color, material) are described better than analytical
concepts (function, name), although at times the latter come
through excellently. Written target material is correct
only occasionally. Alphabet targets are successful only
statistically. In addition to visually observable detail,
subjects sometimes report sounds, smells, electromagnetic
fields, and other phenomena that can be verified as existing
at target locations.
? Target attributes sensed--Descriptive aspects (shape, form,
color, material) are described better than analytical
concepts
? Spatial and temporal resolution--The channel functions with
spatial resolution down to at least one millimeter.
Real-time activities at the target site are often perceived.
? Distance effects--Accuracy and resolution are not sensitive
functions of subject-target distance over intercontinental
distances.
? Shielding--Faraday cage or sea water electrical shielding
are not effective shields.
? Factors that appear to inhibit success in remote
viewing--These are a priori subject knowledge of target
possibilities, absence of feedback, application of the
ability to trivial tasks (testing for the sake of testing),
and use of repetitive target sequences.
? Factors that appear to enhance success in remote
viewing--These are interest factors for the subject, a
priori necessity for obtaining information and relevance
(i.e., seriousness of purpose), the presence of a
facilitating monitor to ask questions and direct the
subject's attention, and practice with feedback.
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R
Table 2, Continued
(S/NF) KNOWN ELEMENTS IN REMOTE VIEWING
? Accuracy and reliability--Analysis of remote viewing
transcripts generated by experienced subjects indicates that
on a given target site roughly two-thirds of the subject's
generated material constitutes an accurate description of
the site while about one-third is ambiguous, general, or
incorrect.
? Repeatability of phenomena--Continuing demonstrations in
this program, and replications in other laboratories,
indicate that the capability known as "remote viewing" is a
repeatable human perceptual ability.
? Distribution of psychoenergetic capacity in the
population--Abilities appear widespread although latent;
volunteers with no previous history of psychoenergetic
functioning exhibit ability in screening experiments,
indicating that reliance on the availability of special
subjects may not be necessary. Unknown, however, are the
percentage of population trainable or with natural talent,
the optimum screening procedures, and the medical or
psychological profiles of good subjects.
? Threat potential--Remote viewing, through the use of
geographical coordinates as designators, has in many cases
provided meaningful descriptions of East-Bloc military
facilities designated as targets by the sponsor. Evaluation
by appropriate intelligence community specialists indicates
that a subject is able by this process to generate useful
data corroborated by other intelligence data. As is
generally true with human sources, the information is
fragmentary and imperfect, and is therefore best utilized in
conjunction with these other resources; nonetheless, the
data generated by this process appear to exceed any
reasonable bounds of chance correlation or acquisition by
ordinary means, and therefore constitute a potentially
exploitable information source.
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(C) As a beginning to researching the many variables that could
affect the quality of data obtained by remote viewing, the role of
feedback was examined. Its role in a learning task is well known, so it
is a natural element to test. There is an added complication,
however,when the role of feedback in remote viewing is examined. That is,
some researchers claim that a remote viewing subject obtains all his
information precognitively from the feedback.
Table 3
(U) REWARDING RV APPLICATIONS
? Finding lost objects
? Tracking
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REMOTE VIEWING
? Description of geographical feature
? Access to targets obscured to other intelligence collection techniques
? Descriptions of buildings, weapons, etc.
? Descriptions of the inside of buildings, laboratories, weapons storage, or housing
? Information that indicates the function of a site
(C) In these feedback experiments two subjects were initially
tested in 13 trials. All those with feedback were successful and those
where no feedback was provided were not successful. To eliminate the
psychological difficulties of the "no feedback mode" a series of
experiments were performed where feedback was provided on a random basis.
From the results of these experiments, the SRI researchers conclude that,
"while it appears that feedback may be an extremely important
psychological factor and may have some substantive role, it is not
absolutely essential for successful remote viewing."
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(S/NF) Prior to the formation of a joint service DoD contract, three
Army units were sponsoring research efforts at SRI.
1. (U) Missile Intelligence Agency (MIA)
(S/NF) The objective of the MIA program was to determine the
degree to which selected personnel are able to interact with and
influence, by mental means only, sensitive electronic equipment and to
ascertain how this phenomenon might be exploited for Army-designated
applications. While there have been a number of studies in psychokinesis,
many of those studies were considered to be incomplete in some of the more
significant details. Many had no controls or afforded insufficient
details about experimental apparatus. A proper experiment on mental means
of influencing electronic equipment needs two things besides an individual
who will attempt, by mental means alone, to change the random source's
output: a source of true random electronic output and an accepted
statistical technique.
(S/NF) The MIA program had two phases. In Phase I a
computer-based binary random number generator (RNG) was constructed. The
system was tested by a series of standard, fixed-length statistical tests
and found to meet all criteria for randomness. In Phase II, subjects were
selected and trials begun. When all were completed, the SRI investigators
concluded that there was an anomalous, unexplained effect on the
electronic system which could not be accounted for by engineering
considerations only. Two possible mechanisms could be responsible for the
results: The first is that the subject, without physical intervention,
produced a physical change in the electronic system. A second possibility
is that the subject scanned the unperturbed binary sequence ahead in time
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and selected the proper time to initiate the trial. The military
implications of the remote perturbation would depend on which of the two
mechanisms is correct. The data from these experiments were inconclusive.
2. (U) Army Material Systems Analysis Activity (AMSAA)
(S/NF) Another Army Unit,AMSAA, contracted SRI to remote view
daily field tests being conducted at Hunter-Liggett Military Reservation.
These tests were generally unsuccessful. The SRI conclusion was that
repetitive targeting on familiar sites is more difficult than viewing
strategic targets. When the tests were successful, the site descriptions
were of a higher quality than the tracking data. Since no final reports
were produced on this work, it is difficult to evaluate its contribution
to the field. This, however, may be an example of the penalty for
attempting to acquire operational level data without having done enough
ar S G1I basic research. We were warned of this source of error as early as
mid-1970 at CIA. Even now, research has not yet established how
to search for or how to track a target.
3. (U) Intelligence And Security Command (INSCOM)
(S/NF) A third Army unit, INSCOM, provided $75,000 for research
at SRI in 1979-1980. INSCOM and DIA would later form a joint service
program (described in detail in section 5). Only their work prior to the
joint program will be discussed here. It was also INSCOM that
compartmentalized the area of psychoenergetics under the code name Grill
Flame.,
(S/NF) In 1978, INSCOM was tasked by the Army to determine if
parapsychology could in any way be used to collect intelligence.
Specifically, INSCOM was tasked to determine if remote viewing can be used
as a collection modality to gain operationally useful data. They chose to
test the issue empirically. A unit was assembled and organized in 1979.
The initial training phase was conducted at SRI during that summer. This
was followed by an INSCOM in-house training program. The first
operational sessions at INSCOM were conducted in September 1979. In
December, the in-house remote viewing unit was declared an operational
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unit having the capability to remote view targets of intelligence interest
and provide accurate and useful data. INSCOM accepted tasks from a variety
of DoD and other government organizations. Since no comprehensive
analysis of their data was made, their success must remain a mystery. it
again appears that applications were demanded too early in the program.
(S/NF) INSCOM's greatest contribution was that their operational
nature provided a proving ground for the ongoing research. They were also
able to pose questions and identify problems they encountered in their
operational sessions that could then guide research that could aid
applications efforts.
(S/NF) To screen a large number of individuals and select those
most likely to be good remote viewers is a difficult task. In
establishing the INSCOM unit, attempts were made to establish
physiological and/or psychological parameters that would differentiate
high performers from low performers. After a large number of tests were
administered, no clear profile parameters emerged on which an a priori
screening procedure could be based. SRI did, however, postulate that
individuals who do successful remote viewing would be confident, outgoing,
adventurous, broadly successful, and have an artistic bent. In 1988, the
problem of identifying potentially good remote viewers was re-examined and
a major research effort is now under way .
(S/NF) Because SRI had been doing research in remote viewing for
seven years, INSCOM sent six individuals to SRI to be trained to do remote
viewing. The goals were to familiarize the individuals with SRI remote
viewing protocols and attempt to achieve enhanced levels of functioning.
Four of the six participants produced results that departed significantly
from chance expectations. An example of a successful viewing is shown in
Figure 11. This work was instrumental in establishing that remote viewing
is a transferable technology. As the DoD becomes more involved in this
particular technology, transferability is an important point. In the
second phase of the INSCOM orientation training program, five of the six
original participants returned to SRI for an additional two weeks of
instruction.
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FIGURE 11 (U) STANFORD ART MUSEUM TARGET
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(S/NF) In addition to the training, SRI investigated several
other research topics for INSCOM. In one experiment, the viewers were
targeted on 35-mm slides of Bay Area locations. SRI was attempting to
determine if the viewer would describe the slide with the same accuracy as
an actual target site. The slide was thought to represent a finer
resolution task and a more ephemeral target. Evaluation of the data led
SRI to conclude that viewers can describe target slides and that the
content of the transcripts indicates that the target slides were viewed,
not the actual target locations.
(S/NF) A second area, precognition, was also investigated using
35-mm slides as the targets. In this experiment the viewer was asked to
describe a slide that would be shown to him at a later time, although the
slide was not chosen until after the viewing was completed. This ability
is significant, because many of the things clients would be interested in
would involve knowing about a future event. SRI staff concluded that
results from future remote viewings are comparable to the results obtained
with real-time targets. Examples are shown in Figures 12 and 13.
(U) At the suggestion of one of the viewers, SRI conducted some experiments on
spontaneous extended remote viewing (ERV) which are associated with rest or sleep and take an
hour or more to do. The results showed that ERVs are also comparable to other forms of remote
viewing. In another experiment, a viewer was targeted on alphabet letters. The results were
encouraging, but not definitive.
(S/NF) Finally during this time period, SRI renewed their
investigation of the use of geographic coordinates to target viewers. At
this time it is not known how or why a viewer can describe an area when he
is given only its geographic coordinates. However, the same results are
achieved even when an arbitrarily constructed coordinate system is used.
It is known that it works, but not why. The coordinates may be only a
permission-granting device or the information may come from future
feedback and the targeting technique may be immaterial. This would,
however, support the notion that the psychoenergetic process is a goal-
oriented phenomenon.
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FIGURE 12 (U) STANFORD SHOPPING CENTER TARGET, AND RESPONSE
C
z
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UNCLASSIFIED
FIGURE 13 (U) TARGET SLIDE, AND VIEWER
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(S/NF) Later research shows that not even coordinates are needed
to get the viewer to the target; the need for the information is what must
be present. This could explain why operational trials where the data are
needed by the intelligence community often produces information of a
higher quality than laboratory or experimental trials. Formerly, it was
believed that it was the monotony and repetitiveness of a lab drill that
dampened the results. An equally plausible explanation is that the
information is not really "needed."
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SECTION 3. EARLY DIA SUPPORT (S/NF)
(S/NF) The military services provided most of the money to support
psychoenergetics research at SRI from 1975 to 1980. During this time,
however, $228,000 were provided to SRI by the Defense Intelligence Agency
(DIA) .
(S/NF) The DIA sought to investigate remote viewing as an aid in
assessing the Soviet RV research. As the phenomenon has intelligence-
collection potential, countermeasures and other factors that inhibit
remote viewing were also of interest. The DIA program did not seek proof
of principle but restricted its efforts to applications research and to
actual attempts to collect intelligence. Thus, the research was confined
to delineating factors that appear to affect the reliability and accuracy
of RV and to develop a methodology to minimize the deleterious effects and
then incorporate the findings into an RV training methodology.
(S/NF) Since SRI, by now, had considerable experience with coordinate
remote viewing (CRV), the factors that affect it were chosen for
investigation. To improve the signal to noise ratio, it is necessary
either to increase the signal or reduce the noise. Many attempts, mostly
unsuccessful, had been made to increase the signal; therefore, it was
decided to look at that causes of the noise and try to dampen them. Four
major sources of noise were identified:
1. Analytical Overlay--Extrapolations to fill gaps in the data.
2. Associational Overlay--The stimulation of existing mental
formations that are associationally related to the target.
3. Monitor Overlay--The encroachment of the monitor into the
viewer's awareness
4. Environmental Overlay--The intrusions of environmental
objects into the viewer's awareness.
(S/NF) At this point, a model of how RV works (Figure 14) was
developed. Upon presentation of the stimulus (a coordinate), a burst of
data appears which then fades away. The stimulus is again presented and
there is another burst of data. It is in the time gap between
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presentations of the stimulus that the viewer fills in his own
interpretations and analysis of the data.
(S/NF) These are not psychically derived, and they are usually not
accurate. To avoid this noise, a procedure where the stimulus is
repeatedly provided and where the viewer responds with quick-reaction data
bytes was developed. This procedure, the use of a featureless room with
homogeneous coloring, and limiting the monitor's behavior are the
solutions offered to reduce the noise.
(C) To improve the signal, a progressive multistage target
acquisition process was postulated where increasing contact is made with
the target through a series of steps (Table 4). It was hoped that
training viewers to know these stages and report their data within that
format would increase the amount of correct data. Initial training
results seemed to confirm that the amount of inaccurate data dropped.
Table 4
(U) STAGES OF TARGET ACQUISITION
1. Recognition and decoding of Gestalts
2. Achieving sensory contact with target
3. Experiencing motion and mobility within target
4. Recognizing and decoding minor signals
5. Decoding special characteristics of target
6. Analytical recognition and decoding of significant aspects of the target
(C) To determine the applications possible, SRI chose and explored
a series of targets using CRV. The results were encouraging and provided
some hope that using RV for collecting intelligence may be possible, and
that the training mechanisms seem to improve the signal-to-noise ratio.
(C) The training program was directed at training participants to
bring their remote viewing ability under more conscious control, and to
recognize and overcome factors that limit RV reliability. One of the
larger limiting factors was the viewer mixing data from his memory and
imagination with the psychic data. This could account for the final set
of data having accurate and inaccurate information intermixed.
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uNC1.ASS
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SECTION 4. THE JOINT SERVICE PROGRAM (U)
(S/NF) By 1980, a number of DoD elements were contracting for a
variety of psychoenergetics tasks at SRI. As a result, a briefing was
given in April 1980 to launch a joint service program. High ranking
officers and civilians in Army, Navy, and Air Force Intelligence were
present along with representatives of DIA and other DoD offices. It was
hoped that a joint service program would redress the problems of not
enough funds, no central management, and no termination point. The
details on the structure and function of this program are available in the
DoD Grill Flame Progress Report (Mid-Year FY 1981), Appendix I. In brief,
the program established a working group to deal with policy matters and to
establish broad general guidance for the psychoenergetics external
assistance contract. Provisions were also made for a primary contract
monitor who would attend to the day-to-day research progress,
(S/NF) With regard to funds for the program, the budget for FY 1981
was $456,000. Funding at that level did keep the program alive but, it
was estimated that a minimum of $600,000 to $1,000,000 per year would be
needed to fund the research program properly. A three-year contract was
proposed but only a one-year effort was contracted. At the end of three
years a decision would be made whether or not the program would be
continued.
A. (U) FY 1981
(S/NF) The joint service proposal was accepted and work began in
September 1981. Almost immediately a great number of problems were
encountered. The sparse funding for the first year has already been
mentioned. DoD Grill Flame Progress Report, Mid-Year FY 1981 gives the
details of a number of other problems. The most serious difficulty was
that the sponsoring group would include only the DIA and Army INSCOM. For
various reasons all the other potential members chose not to participate.
There were also some significant administrative differences between the
DIA and INSCOM. In short, where a union had been envisioned a confederacy
developed. That is, each participant maintained its separate funding, and
requirements, and both engaged in managing and monitoring the research.
As a result, the Grill Flame Program was only an overlay on what already
existed. Figures 15 through 20 point out how the program was conceived
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REQUIREMENTS
POOL
GRILL FLAME PROGRAM
SRI
CONTRACT
OTHER
CONTRACTS
FIGURE 15 (S/NF) GRILL FLAME FUNDING PLAN
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REQUIREMENTS
$ POOL
ARMY I DIA
GRILL FLAME PROGRAM
TASK POOL
OTHER
CONTRACTORS
FIGURE 16 (S/NF) GRILL FLAME FUNDING ACTUAL
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REQUIREMENTS
ARMY
L DoD GRILL FLAME PROGRAM
L CONTRACTOR RESEARCH
FIGURE 17 (S/NF) DATA FLOW PLAN
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FIGURE 18 (S/NF) DATA FLOW ACTUAL
40
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GRILL FLAME
ARMY
REQUIREMENTS
DIA
PROGRAM
DIA
S.O.W.
ARMY [DIA]
CONTRACT CONTRACT
MONITOR MONITOR
CONTRACTED RESEARCH
ARMY
DIA
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REPORT TO
? REQUIREMENTS
? EXPERIMENTS
? OPERATIONAL TARGETS
REPORT
RESEARCH
RESULTS
GRILL
FLAME
SPONSORS
REPORT
PROGRAM
INTERPRETED
L-1SRI : I
REPORT TO
FIGURE 19 (S/NF) CONTRACT MONITOR--PROPOSED
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OP TARGETS
R IMENTS
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and how it actually functioned. The areas pursued in FY 1981 are listed
on Table 5. Details on the accomplishments for FY 1981 can be found in FY
1981 DoD Grill Flame Report, November 1981. In brief, however, SRI
developed an RV training procedure and transferred it to three experienced
viewers. An intelligence study on Soviet psychoenergetics was written and
one on China was begun. Initial steps were taken toward the development
of an RV data base management system and a list of possible
countermeasures was compiled. In audio analysis, a target-independent
audio/linguistic measure was correlated with RV accuracy. Some progress
was made on the targeting issue, but as it was seen to be a very difficult
problem, it was reported that it would require several more years of
research before a result could be expected. In addition to the above
tasks, approximately 16 operational remote viewings were completed at SRI.
Table 5
(U) FY 1981 RESEARCH AREAS
? Reliability of RV/OP Targets
? Intelligence Assessment
? Feasibility of data base management for RV data
? RV Countermeasures
(S/NF) Before the FY 1982 Program is discussed, several points should
be made with regard to the participants in the joint program. The overall
goal for both was to develop the capability to do high-quality, high-
resolution remote viewing of operational targets of intelligence interest.
When one examines the tasks pursued over the three years, the common
thread that runs throughout the research would have led to the development
of this capability. Initially, however, the DIA and INSCOM efforts appear
to have diverged. INSCOM had only one mission, to explore those factors
that would improve the functioning of their existing in-house operational
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RV group. Targeting, audio analysis, and training members of their
in-house group, all fit well within their mission. The DIA, however, had
three missions:
? Prepare for developing an in-house capability
? Identify countermeasures to psychoenergetic phenomena
? Evaluate and report psychoenergetics research in foreign
countries.
(C) Figures 21a and 22 depict these missions and the program's
development over the entire three years.
(U) Funding problems again reduced the amount of work that was done. The amount
of money was not the only problem, it was the late date at which it arrived. The DIA FY
1982 money arrived on 10 February 1982, and the Army funds on 6 August 1982. This
meant that for nearly five months the project was paid for on SRI overhead. The point
should not be belabored, but its effect on the amount (and sometimes the quality) of the
work should be noted.
(S/NF) The FY 1982 research projects were, for the most part,
follow-on efforts to the FY 1981 research. In the RV enhancement program,
research on training procedures was continued and the task of transferring
the technology was begun. Instead of training experienced remote viewers,
as in FY 1981, SRI trained novice viewers. Several of them were Army
personnel who were to be members of the INSCOM in-house RV team,
(C) During FY 1982, one of the most difficult problems in the
field of psychoenergetics was probed: how do you evaluate the results of
a remote viewing session? Nothing else can proceed in a normal way until
researchers can measure their results. Only then can they detect the
effect of altering the variables. In FY 1982, a procedure having three
distinct phases was developed:
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? Reduction of remote viewing response data.
? Target/task related assessment.
? Analysis procedure. Instructions for using the evaluation
system can be found in Remote Viewing Evaluation Techniques,
December 1986.
C. (U) FY 1983
(S/NF) While the funding picture for FY 1981 and FY 1982 was bleak,
it became much worse in FY 1983, when Congres removed all the Army INSCOM
funds for psychoenergetics research from the FY 1983 budget. As INSCOM
funds were being counted upon to support half of the research for that
year, this action threatened the existence of the project. However, other
funding was found and the work continued. The Grill Flame program was to
last only three years and, at the close of FY 1983 it was ended by
Congressional dictate. Congress further specified that no NFIB funds were
to be spent for psychoenergetics research in FY 1984 or beyond. Thus,
funding outside the NFIB had to be found to continue the research.
(S/NF) Also in FY 1983, the Grill Flame Project was reviewed by a
panel of distinguished scientists. Over a period of several days, they
took a hard look at the scientific aspects of the program, including
experimental design and analysis of data. In general, they were impressed
by the work and found no major flaws in it. A summary and discussion of
their report can be found in Psychoenergetic Research, 7 August 1984.
(S/NF) The tasks pursued in FY 1983 are shown in Table 6. All except
one, search methodology, are follow-on efforts to work begun in or before
FY 1982. This search methodology task is essentially the inverse of the
kind of remote viewing that had received the greatest amount of attention
at SRI. Whereas, SRI had always asked "tell me what is at location X,"
now the question was "where is what I want, where can I find it?" Over
the next several years this task was to receive a great amount of
attention. For DoD applications, searching has the potential for being
the most valuable form of remote viewing.
Table 6
(U) FY 1983 TASKS
RV Enhancement Data Base Management
Intelligence Assessment Operational Sites
Search Methodology
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IMPROVE EXISTING CAPABILITY
TARGETING IIFY'811
AUDIO ANALYSIS (FY'81)
TRAINING (FY'81)--DIA
(FY'82)
FIGURE 22 (C) THE ARMY MISSION AND PROGRAM
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SECTION 5. THE GRILL FLAME EVALUATION (S/NF)
(S/NF) The goal of Grill Flame had been to devise a joint service
program that would place an adequate amount of money into psychoenergetics
research, on a timely basis, for a period of three years. Not one of
these objectives was met. The program had only two participants, both of
whom operated unilaterally, and there was never enough money. For the
three years, funding averaged only $429,000 per year. In addition, the
funds were always much delayed. The 1982 funding was not received at SRI
until the fiscal year was over. The three-year contract never
materialized, only three one-year contracts.
(S/NF) To make conditions worse, the two participants, DIA and
INSCOM, had different agendas. DIA sought to determine if any form of
psychoenergetics processes could be applied to intelligence problems.
This translates into, "can remote viewing be used to collect
intelligence." INSCOM decided, however, that remote viewing had already
achieved a level where it could be put to operational use. They then
proceeded to conduct a large number of operational RV sessions for a
variety of clients. Their attempt to push the RV process into operational
status resulted in their pursuing goals that were scientifically
inappropriate. Rather than waiting for training research to be completed,
they immediately wanted "their people" trained. They selected project
personnel for training long before any valid selection and screening
techniques were available. Other areas that lacked operational readiness
were evaluation methodology, tracking and searching techniques, RV
operational protocols, data base management techniques, and research on
the many variables that can affect RV performance.
(S/NF) Despite all of this, the April 1980 briefing specified that at
the end of three years one of the following recommendations would be made:
(1) All funding should be terminated because it does not appear
that psychoenergetics can be applied to the intelligence
process.
(2) Psychoenergetics can assist in gathering intelligence and we
should either work with contractors in building an
applications group or set up a DoD in-house unit.
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(S/NF) The three-year program report recommended Alternative 2. The
basis for this choice is found in the performance of the primary SRI
viewer and several of the INSCOM viewers. Each did considerably better
than chance over a series of operational remote viewings. This
statistically significant series should not be taken to mean that an
operational capability exists; it means only that there is a potential
that might be developed into a useful intelligence collection tool. For
instance, the configural and analytical content of RV sessions must be
improved. Even today, SRI does not claim to be able to train and develop
a cadre of remote viewers who can consistently produce operational-quality
intelligence. Someday, hopefully soon, this will be possible.
(S/NF) A complete assessment of the Grill Flame project can be found
in "The Three-Year Grill Flame Program," dated 22 August 1983. The key
findings are as follows:
? Remote viewing is a real phenomenon and is not degraded by
distance.
? Remote viewing can be improved by appropriate training
procedures.
? Remote viewing also has potential for U.S. intelligence
applications and a potential threat to national security
exists from foreign achievements in psychoenergetics.
(S/NF) It should again be noted that there was a wide gap between
Army INSCOM, and DIA's understanding as to what the current state of the
art is in psychoenergetics research. To give the Three Year Program some
semblance of order and direction, eight major areas of interest were
identified. Each bears directly on the applications orientation of the
two sponsors.
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A. (U) Training
(S/NF) The effort was divided into research and development, and
training personnel from client organizations. At the end of the program,
the assumption was that improved remote viewing can be achieved through
training. While almost all of the effort during the Three-Year Program
was placed on only one methodology, research was begun on another training
program when the Three-Year Program was concluded. Additional training
methodologies that should yield more and better training programs are
continually reviewed at SRI.
B. (U) RV Enhancement
(C) To this point, most of the targeting has been using
coordinates. Other targeting strategies were investigated and they show
promise. In addition an attempt to identify and separate good from bad
data during sessions was made. Calibration trials and audio linguistic
analysis were both looked at but did not hold enough promise to warrant
their continuance.
C. (U) Search
(C) Search is looking for an object or person that is lost. Some
progress was made, however, this problem still baffles the researchers.
D. (U) Evaluation
(C) A number of evaluation methods have been developed over the
years, yet no standard procedure exists. Very little was accomplished on
this subject during the Three Year Program, but the research on this
important area continues.
E. (U) Data Base Management
(C) During the program a system was developed to store and sort
both RV data and intelligence information,
F. (U) Countermeasures
(C) Research on this area still largely resides on gaining an
improved understanding of the RV phenomena. Direct searches for
countermeasure techniques cannot take place without having some basic
understanding of the phenomena.
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(U) Evaluation Recommendations
(C) The final section of the Three-Year Grill Flame Program Report
made two recommendations. It is interesting both
The recommendations were:
have been followed.
?
Applied
should
funding
intelligence-oriented research in remote
be continued. (It has, although through
source.)
viewing
another
?
Basic research on RV and PK should be initiated.
also through another source.)
(It has,
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SECTION 6. THE FOLLOW-ON PROGRAM (U)
(S/NF) In FY 1984, the U.S. Congress imposed a prohibition on
spending NFIB money for psychoenergetics research. At this point, the
Three-Year Grill Flame Program had ended and an assessment of the research
was made. The recommendation was that the work showed very promising
potential, especially the use of RV to gather intelligence. Fortunately
both Army and DIA were able to secure R&D funds to continue financing the
research at SRI.
(S/NF) In FY 1984, as before, the Army portion of the program was
dedicated to topics that would assist INSCOM in improving the performance
of their in-house RV group. The DIA funds were used to continue lines of
research that began in the Grill Flame era. A complete list of areas
investigated and the FY 1984 budget are shown in Table 8. Prior to FY
1984, only one training methodology had been investigated and it was used
to train a number of individuals to do RV, During FY 1984, research on an
alternative program was begun and good initial results were obtained using
that technique.
(S/NF) Also in FY 1984, a major emphasis was placed on methods to
evaluate data derived from RV. Until then, RV research had concentrated
on training people to do RV, improving the quality of RV data, and looking
at variables that affect RV. A very vital area, evaluation, had received
some attention but no concentrated effort. Evaluation is, of course,
critical to any research effort and evaluating RV data has been an
especially difficult task and one that is surrounded by much controversy.
Complete and detailed reports are available on each of the tasks
investigated in FY 1984.
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Table 8
(S/NF) FY 1984 TASKS AND SPENDING
$ 85K
RV Enhancement
$ 85K
Alternative Training
$ 25K
Targeting
$150K
psychokinesis
Data Base Management
$ 25K
$ 50K
RV Evaluation Methodology
$ 10K
Operational RV
$126K
Training (Advanced)
$115K
Selection and Screening
$ 65K
ELF
$165K
Search RV
B. (U) FY 1985
(S/NF) During FY 1985, research on tasks initiated in FY 1984 was
continued and many of the final FY 1984 reports were completed. The major
item for FY 1985 was to develop a contract and statement of work for a
major and well-financed five-year program to begin in FY 1986. The
funding is from the R&D community and, therefore not restricted by the
U.S. Congress prohibition on NFIB funds. The level of funding and the
multi-year commitment has the potential to accomplish what previous under
funded one-year efforts could not. One important facet of the program
begun in FY 1985 was that some of the fundamental aspects of the RV and PK
phenomena could be investigated without regard to a specific application.
However, the sponsor also assured the intelligence community that those
aspects of the phenomena that are important to the intelligence
applications would continue, as would elements begun earlier but not
completed. So, for the first time since 1972 it appeared that a program
had been developed that was secure and would produce major advances in
psychoenergetics research.
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SECTION 7. THE FIVE YEAR PROGRAM (U)
(S/NF) In FY 1986, a five-year psychoenergetics research program was
launched at SRI using Army Medical Department R&D funds. Although the
Army currently provides all the funds, the effort, from the outset,
included the needs of the intelligence community. In addition, research
and development on medical and biological aspects of psychoenergetics was
initiated. The Five-Year Program has three major objectives:
Document that psychoenergetic phenomena are real and
reproducible.
? Determine the mechanism underlying psychoenergetic
phenomena.
? Bring psychoenergetics into the mainstream of human
performance research.
(U) The categories of research interest form a hierarchy ranging from basic research on
fundamental mechanisms to methodologies for applications. These include:
? Identify explanatory mechanisms (e.g., electromagnetic effects,
neurophysiological mechanisms).
? Specify phenomenological properties (e.g., effects of distance and shielding).
? Determining physical, physiological and psychological correlates (e.g.,
geophysical environment, EEG and GSE measures).
? Develop optimal strategies for use in applications (e.g., statistical averaging).
A. (U) The First Year--FY 1986
(S/NF) Technical reports for each of the research areas investigated
are available. Advances in several technical areas were made during this
fiscal year. Much of the work was follow-on efforts to research begun in
past fiscal years. In addition some new topics were also investigated.
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1. (U) Remote Viewing Enhancement - Advanced Training
(S/NF) Two of the most experienced remote viewers who have been
responsible for helping to formulate advanced training directions were
formally calibrated during FY 1986. Both demonstrated strong
statistically significant evidence of functioning. They also brought
their attention to developing an advanced training manual. One of the
experienced viewers also continued to train some of the advanced students
and some progress was noted. Both demonstrated strong statistically
significant evidence of functioning. They also brought their attention to
developing an advanced training manual. One of the experienced viewers
also continued to train some of the advanced students and some progress
was noted.
2. (U) Novice Training
(C) Nine students were chosen on the basis of personality
screening criteria to participate in a novice RV training program. Four
of the nine showed promise.
3. (U) Remote Viewing Evaluation
(S/NF) The primary evaluation procedure, figure of merit
analysis, was brought to the point where it was well understood and
stable. In addition to its capacity to provide an assessment of RV-
derived data, it is also useful in assessing the ability of RV evaluators
(i.e., analysts). Other technologies to evaluate RV data have been
identified for preliminary research. They will be discussed in future
studies.
4. (U) Screening And Selection
(C) The greatest amount of research on selecting potentially
good remote viewers was on examining the Personality Assessment System.
During 1986 that system accurately predicted the best and worst remote
viewers among ten novice trainees.
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5. (U) Search
(C) Thirty-six participants were tested on both a spatial
search and a temporal search problem. Two participants contributed
significant results in spatial search and six were significant in temporal
search. Subjects tended to do much better on one or the other, but not on
both of these search tasks.
6. (U) Photon Production Experiment
(C) This experiment attempted to replicate a Chinese
experiment where signals from a photomultiplier tube were noted when
"exceptional" remote viewings occurred. No statistically significant
correlations were observed in the SRI experiments, despite the fact that
the quality of the remote viewing was excellent.
7. (U) Piezoelectric Strain Gauge Experiment
(U) In these experiments the object was to determine if RA could be used to
induce effects on a piezoelectric strain gauge. Only one of the five subjects was able to
consistently produce above-threshold effects. He produced at least two statistically significant
events at SRI which led to a follow-on effort in FY 1987.
B. (U) The Second Year--FY 1987
(U) Technical reports for each of the research areas investigated are available. The
categories of research interest range from basic research on fundamental mechanisms to
methodologies for applications.
(U) Selected tasks are summarized below. A more complete description of the
work and a complete task list may be found in the Enhanced Human Performance (December
1987).
1. (U) Fuzzy Set Applications in Remote Viewing Analysis
(U) In FY 1987, fuzzy set mathematics was applied to the problem of RV analysis.
Two analytical methods were developed; the first was designed to analyze the verbal content of
the RV response, and the second to analyze the visual and spatial arrangements of response
elements.
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2. (U) An Expert System Approach to Remote Viewing Analysis
(U) The effort here was to make RV judging techniques more transferable, if not
uniform. The result was an expert system to assist the analyst. Unfortunately, the series of RVs
to test the system did not show a significant RV effect.
3. (U) Gross Physiological Correlates to RV
(U) A persistent problem in using RV in an operational environment is the lack of a
method for assessing the quality of a particular RV session. SRI attempted to determine whether
external physiological cues could be used to discriminate accurate from inaccurate sessions.
Unfortunately, no RV functioning was apparent; thus, no conclusions could be drawn.
4. (U) PAS Review
(U) The PAS was reviewed to gauge its continued usefulness as a screening and
selection technique. SRI concluded that it is not useful.
5. (U) Video Disk Training
(U) The FY 1987 effort was aimed at developing a technology for enhancing the
acquisition of RV skills. The conclusions were that persons trained using video disc format
developed significantly improved RV skills.
6. (U) RV Stimulus-Response Times
(U) The hypotheses tested were (1) shorter response latencies produce relatively
better RV responses and (2) better responses are produced when less time is spent processing
them. Both were confirmed.
7. (U) Hypnosis as an RV Debriefing Tool
(U) In this experiment, hypnosis was used in an attempt to enhance an RV session.
The results confirmed previous findings that hypnosis can facilitate the acquisition of information
not available to other sensory processes.
8. (U) Neuropsychological Assessment
(U) This was an exploratory attempt to determine if there are neuropsychological
correlates of psychoenergetic functioning. Analysis of the results did show that productive
ideation was partially related to measures of psychoenergetic functioning.
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C. (U) The Third Year--FY 1988
(S/NF) For FY 1988 the Army funding was reduced from the expected
$2.3 million to $1.15 million, and the Army Medical R&D Command expressed
its intent of providing no additional funds for psychoenergetics research.
The DIA, however, is holding $1 million to continue the research in FY
1989. The following tasks were completed in FY 1988:
a. Identify New and Excellent Remote Viewers.
To accomplish this task 196 individuals were screened using
the video disk technology and protocol that were developed
during FY 1987. Of the 196, 16 were selected for
second-stage screening and two produced excellent results
and have been invited to join the research effort as
part-time viewers.
b. Determine Physiological Indicators of RV:
SG1A
a second experiment, the attempt was to determine ii Lnere
was significant alpha blocking as a result of a remote
visual stimulus. The three participants all demonstrated
significant changes in Alpha power across the remote
stimulus boundary, of the six participants in the first
experiment some did exhibit a response to a remote stimulus.
c. Effects of Robust Feedback on RV Quality
Of the targets looked at, the ones from the natural category
elicited better remote viewing
d. Effects of Hypnosis on RV Quality
To test this, the remote viewing sessions were conducted
while the viewers were in a hypnotic trance. The results
were not statistically significant.
e. Mental Noise in Binary Psychoenergetic Task
The statistical data suggest that some sources of mental
noise was detected by the experiment.
f. Fuzzy Set RV Analysis
This methodology shows much promise for judging the amount
of correct information in a remote viewing session.
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SECTION 8. THE DIA PROGRAM--FY 1989 (U)
(S/NF) DIA will investigate the following topics in FY 1989.
? Meta-analysis of all experimental results since 1973
? Magnetic visual evoked potentials correlation with a remote
stimulus
? Evaluation of operational RV results
? Conduct operational RV sessions
? Selection and screening for remote viewers
? Further research on using hypnosis in the RV process
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