ERV SESSION PROCEDURES REPORT. CONTROL NUMBER: SPR-002-86. SESSION NUMBER: 04, 05, 06. SOURCE: RV-101

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: STARGATE
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP96-00789R002000130001-5
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 5
• Document Creation Date: November 4, 2016
• Document Release Date: July 13, 1998
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: September 25, 1986
• Content Type: REPORT

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SECRET/NOFORM - SKEET CHANNELS ONLY
PROJECT SUN STREAK (U)
ERV SESSION PROCEDURES REPORT
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CONTROL NUMBER: SPR- 002- N, NICKNAME: OTHER "H"
DATE OF SESSION: 25, 30 Sep and 2 Oct 86 TARGET COUNTRY:
REFERENCES: SPR-001s-86, dtd 25 Sep 86, SAB SESSION NUMBER: 04, 05, 06
MISSION STATUS: CONTINUING ;-,A 9'
TECHNIQUE UTILIZED: ERV SOURCE IDENTIFIER:
1. ( ) TASKING:
a-. The Interviewx^',in a departure from previous practices, was fully briefed
on this mission (see SPR-001-86 referenced above). In light of this factithe
Interviewer, prior to each session would "brief back" major gestalts to the
Source from those items, and only those items actually provided by the Source in
previous sessions. Prior to session 04, as an example, Source was told that a
previously prepared "time line" (see references above) now had -two days
partitioned'off reflecting the fact that both of those days had already been
covered. Future sessions, therefore would concentrate on the day to day events
which occur on the target road from those days forward. Prior to session 05,
Source was again shown the time line in which one more day had been partitioned
off again reflecting no further interest in tkht period. Source was further told
that he would no longer be given the two previouly recorded coordinates since
these areas were only.guide post and did not reflect the primary areas of
interest. Instead during the actual session.targettingghe would be told simply
to describe the events on the "target" road during the stted periods of time.
b. ( ) This procedure, once it was briefed and mutually agreed
upon proved to be as successful as coordinate tasking and far less time
consuming. This procedure was replicated during the pre-session "brief back"
prior to session 06. Other than the above cited information, no other cueing
or descriptive 'data was provided to Source prior to any of the session included
in this report.
2. ( ) SESSION: There were no unusual occurrences or reportable
oddities in any of the session referenced in this report.
SG1A
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a. ( ) Following each of the three sessions described in this
report, Source prepared a post-session written summary of his impreslions. Due
to the unique nature of the targetting procedures, much of the information in
these post-session summaries was redundant or not relevant to the ultimate target.
To facilitate analysis of Source's perceptions as described during and in post-
session interivews, the major gestalts have been summarized below with Interviewer
notes when appropriate.
(1) ( ) On day 3-(9March 1984), a military convoy moved
down the road between the two beacon cities. Some of these vehicles were small
lightly armored wheeled personnel carriers while.others were larger freight/personnel
hauling trucks. In one vehicle, a-lead vehicle which traveled well in
advance of the main column, there was an array of electronic devices in a
compartment carrying four soldiers. These machines were being used to monitor
and communicate with another element. The vehicle had large overinflated tires.
The vehicle had exaggerated sloping lines with the drivers compartment possibly
uncovered. The rear passenger/equipment compartment was definitely
covered. Overhead, helicopters were flying as though providing escort or
security cover and it was possible that the sloping lead vehicle was in commun-
ication.with these helicopters. AT a distance back from the lead vehicle the
main body of the convoy consisted of trucks and vehicles similar to the lead
vehicle. The troops with this convoy were intelligent , alert, highly qualified
and dedicated. There was a deep feeling of comrad=eshi1between these soldiers.
In one of the trucks the soldiers are dressed in very bulky and stiff fitting
suits with a hard plastic or rubbery texture. It is very difficult for the men
to bend or move around in these suits. Their entire bodies are covered including
their heads. The head covering makes the soldiers appear bug-eyed, perhaps from
the largelenses. The overall impression is that these suits are some sort of
chemical/biological/nuclear (CBR) protective garments. It is very warm and stuffy
inside these suits. Not'all of the soldiers in the convoy wear these suits, just
the men around some of the trucks. These particular trucks are carrying large,
,dark colored cylindrical objects containing a foul smelling liquid. The smell
is described as sweet to the point of'almost being putrid. It is likened to
orchids and lilacs lying on top of rotting garbage. To smell it causes your
eyes to water and the inside of your nose to burn. Theliquid has an acid quality
and may require a catalyst to mix before using.This liquid is dispersed in clouds
from the ground or from the air and leaves a very light, grayish, dusty, chalky
residue.When used against humans it causes a tightening of the skin (perhaps
bloating or swelling), extreme nausea, dibilitating vomiting, tearing in the
eyes, a runny nose, extreme stomach cramping, breathing difficulties, burning of
lung tissue and blood damage.
(2) (. ) On day 3, the above referenced convoy received
several rounds,of small mortar or artillery from men hiding in the hills. These
men are wearing beards, long hair covered by a cloth hat or turban and. similar
or identical colored striped robes. The hostile firing consists of several rounds
impacting on the road-in front of the lead vehicle causing the convoy to
immediately turn back. Several more rounds, perhaps white phospherous, land
to the rear of the convoy forcing the convoy to seek shelter in a mountain tunnel
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between the two impact areas. The convoy eventually retreats back in the
direction from which it came without any significant damage.
(3) ( ) On this day there is a separate impression of a
large group of people, perhaps uniformed soldiers, armed and waiting within an
underground structure, perhaps a tunnel. There was no impression of their
purpose or reason for waiting except that their presence was more like a
marshalling of troops rather than troops seeking shelter.
(4) ( ) On day four, (10 March 1984), there is continued
heavy convoy activity. The vehicles consist of troop transport vehicles and
smaller escort vehicles some of which appear to have a medium caliber turret or
swivel mounted weapon on the roof. The troops are armed with individual weapons.
These troops are not the same type of troops as the previous day. Instead ,these
troops are less intelligent=, poorly trained and are wearing different uniforms.
In the hills, the robed men continue to observe the convoy activity, at times
appearing to sketch the movements and profiles of specific vehcles. At one
point some of the trucks appeared to be hauling long poles, possibly wooden
indicating that the convoy may have been made up of engineer type troops. Overall,
however, the traffic on this day,(day four), was routine and uneventful:..
(5) ( ) On day five (11 March 1984),::the dusk begins with
robed men in the hills firing one mortar round at an empty point on the road,
(perhaps to assist in establishing a baseline for fire adjustment}.. The round
is fired before any traffic appears on the road and therefore goes unnoticed
by the military convoys that normally travel the road during the day. At this
point there is an image of an older man in his fifties who is associated with
the traffic.patterns on this road. Although not located at either site I or
Site II, this individual is directly responsible for the vehicular traffic on
the road and is preparing to make decisions that mill have an affect on the
future use of this road.. Described as in his fifties, this man is seen in an
olive brown uniform and is somewhat heavyset. The actual nature of his
involvement- and/or future policies on the road could not be discerned. On this
day the traffic-is a mix of both-military-and groupings of heavily ladened
civilian vehicles with even a smattering of animal drawn. carts. The military
may be providing escort duty for commercial vahicles travelling between Site I
and Site II. By evening all traffic on the road has ceased as the robed men
in the hills move down from the hills to points closer to, but never directy
on the road. This day has been relatively quiet and uneventful:: These is an
almost holiday or weekend feel about the traffic. It is far less than other days
with far fewer military vehicles.
(6) ( ) Traffic patterns on day six (12 March.1984),
have returned to normal with heavy military. convoy activity. One convoy is
escorted by large flying objects capable of hovering, probably hel:iq??pters. The
troops on this convoy speak a very harsh and gutteral foreign language and there
is a lot of loud yelling like angry sergeants screaming orders to incompetent
privates. The traffic is stop and go and there is an impression that'many of the
vehicles aren't equipped with springs or working suspension since their ride is
very rough and pounding to the soldiers inside. There is a strong impression that
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those soldiers constitute a military expeditionary force and are actually foreigners
to this area. Later in the day an unusual occurrence is noted at the military
compound at Site I. Several reounds of small artillery or mortar is fired by
the robed men into the military compound at Site I. This causes some momentary
confusion and panic but very little actual damage. This incident is unusual
not because the robed men would fire on the military forces but the fact that
they did so in bright day light. This event caused some convoys preparing to
begin their journey on the road to cancel their trip but this was not considered
by the military to be a crucial or serious delay. Other than this incident there
is little other activity of interest on the road.
(7) ( ) On day 7, (13 March 1984), traffic is not as
heavy as previous days however, in the hills around the road their appear to be
growing numbers of robed men. The colors of the stripes in the robes of some of
these men are different now, perhaps because they come from other areas of this
country. Most of the traffic on this day is heavier types of military convoys,
not tanks, but some armored type vehicles and heavier type trucks. The road con-
tinues to be observed by the men in the hills. On the military side, helicopters
and escort jet aircraft continue to appear sporadically, flying low along the
road. There is an increasing feeling of anxiety on the part of the military who
travel this road. .It has been relatively quiet but the men still continue to
look searchingly into the hills expecting some sort of danger at any moment,
presumably from the robed men whose numbers continue to increase.-.
(8) ( ) On day eight, (14 March 1984), there is very little
reportable activity along the road except for one area being accupied by the
military. These men have moved their van type vehicles into a circle and have
built dirt and stone revettments around the outside perimeter of the trucks.
Other soldiers have begun short range foot patrols around this site. The
protective-barriers are being dug by hand and the soldiers have stripped to the
waist even though the weather continues to.be very cold. It is apparent by the
nature of their activity that these soldiers are digging in for a lengthy stay.
On top of the.:-vans there are concave devices, oblong in shape and moveable.
They resemble square antennae but their actual purpose is unknown. In the center
of this circular array of vans there is a long pole mount in the ground with
supporting guide wires.At the top of the pole there is a cross-member. Again
the impression is that this device is some sort of antenna. Throughout the day
the soldiers continue to dig barriers, individual shelters and common facilities
but there is no other activity ,reported on this site. Near the site other
soldiers are seen looking through something resembling binoculars mounted on a
tripod. The impression is that these men are some sort of surveying crew.
Source reported, almost as a sidelight, that in this session as well as one
or two other sessions he has perceived a Village in the hills overlooking this
road. The, majority-of this village has been destroyed by the weapons of the
soldier and most of the inhabitants have deserted the remains. The previously
mentioned "robed men" continue to use some of the remaining structures for
lining quarters-and operational facilities. The general arhetecture of the
buildings resembles the village-and homes pictured in a ""lintstone" cartoon
show. They are low, flat roofed homes made of natural stone and bonding agent,
probably mud. They are arranged in no special order with an overall impression
of a quiet, dusty, hot southwestern or Mexican adobe village.
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b. ( ) The actual written post-session. summaries prepared by Source
are maintained in the mission field dossier at this lecation along with any other
material produced during this session, e.g., sketches, Interviewer's notes, etc.
4. ( ) COMMENTS: The quality and clarity of Source's information
continues to be superb. The fact that the actual Intelligence question has not
been answered is undoubtedly due to the fact that it has not been 'reached" yet
in Source's time-line. As reinforcement.feedbackkSource has been told that he
continues to provide high quality and apparently factual information and that he
should continue the same"mindset" to continue to replicate this outstanding
performance. Source has been given a regularly scheduled six day break from
Remote Viewing duties to prevent session burn-out. It is expected that following
this pause Source will continue to provide additonal supporting data as the
date of the incident is approached and eventually ajt-ained.
Special. Activities Officer
SG1J
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