ERV SESSION PROCEDURES REPORT CONTROL NUMBER: 8709, SESSION NUMBER: 05, SOURCE IDENTIFIER: 079

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: STARGATE
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP96-00789R000300630001-9
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 12
• Document Creation Date: November 4, 2016
• Document Release Date: June 23, 1998
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: August 27, 1987
• Content Type: REPORT

s'ioR97?cq .*as-
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SECRET/NOFORN - SKEET CHANNELS ONLY
PROjECT SUN STREAK (U)
ERV SESSION PROCEDURES REPORT
WARNING NOTICE: INTELLIGENCE SOURCES AND METHODS INVOLVED
CONTROL NUMBER: 8709 NICKNAME:
DATE OF SESSION: 27 Aug 87 TARGET COUNTRY: UR
wHETdDsoaa3 L. None SESSI(Mq NUMBER: 0 f.r
DATE OF -REPORT: 1 Sep 87 MISSION STATUS: Continuing
TECHNIQUE UTILIZED: ERV SOURCE IDENTIFIER: 079
1. (S/NF/SK) INTERVIEWER T(.SKING: Tasking as listed in the
previous sessions conducted with this Source on this project has not
been changed or re directed.
(S/NF/SK) SOURCE TASKING: Source was told this was a
continuation of the last session and that Sie would be receiving new
tasking during the session. In addition, Source was provided the
same encrypted coordinates as the previous sessions, 137500/112794,
as per Extended Remote Viewing (ERV) protocols.
INCLEMENCIES: There were no reportable incidents or
anomalies which may have influenced the data obtained in this
session.
4. (S/NF/SK) SUMMARY: Source furnished the at. summary which
was prepared following the session and submitted to the Interviewer
within 24 hours after the session. The completeness of the
typewritten summary has been compared to the Interviewer's notes and
all omissions, changes, and/or corrections have been verified as
acceptable by the Interviewer. In addition to the information
provided in the summary, Source provided additional information
during the actual session which was inadvertently omitted from Her
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SG1A
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summary and which may impact on the final analysis of the data
provided. That additional data is provided below in raw unevaluated
form:
a. ((:3/NF/SK) In Source's initial descriptions of the Soviet
prototype, "Plane #2", she perceived that this aircraft had two
enTines described as "powerful rotors", which are place to the side
'75774trilT-77rrcraft "separated" (one to a side?) and that it requires
both of these engines to fly this aircraft. This may indicate a
fairly heavy aircraft or less powerful engines. In either case,
Source perceived the existence of two engines probably located on
each side of the fuselage and possibly "buried" deep within the
airframe since the Source could "feel" but not "see" the engines.
Internally, the Soviet model was perceived as having several crew
members but possibly only one pilot who actually flies the aircraft.
Separate areas within the aircraft are isolated from one another
according to the specific mission of each crew member.
b. (S/NF/SK) Source was tasked to per.g.4.ve_the "possibility"
.that data pertaining to "Plane #1" (tri-6FUTTStealth Bomber) was in
some way_provided to-tbe.PeoP le who are involved...KOJI "Plane In '1,P4M4t
SoUr-Ce-s "opinion" this fact is a distinct. possibility_and may have
involved the passage of actual coMponents of the-B-fealth Bomber to
Soviet agents. In a rather confusing scenario, it would appear that
these components fell into the hands of an individual involved with
Stealth through an accident. The actual nature of the accident was
unclear but_ma e_involved_the actual crash of a Stealth prototype
in which-TkeTheco Ory of the components provided the opportunity for
this individual to steal the items without detection. The actual
crash. may .have only been. a runway incident or some similar event in
which actual Stealth components were damaged and recovered. Again,
the scenario appears to be confusing, but a breakdown in control of
these items, possibly the crash recovery items, max_have, enable the
transfer of thm-EaffPenents to a Soviet agent who may have also not
actually been prepared to receive the items. In fact, according to
Source's scenario, this Soviet agent may not haye actually been
aI tempting to acquire Stealth technology and may have_bepn approached
unsolicited by the other individual who made him the offer of Stealth
technology. In an case, the components andier information concerning
US Stealth tech-rib-logy was flown to the location of "Plane #2".
c. (S/NF/SK) The type of data that was delivered to the Soviets
was unclear, however, it would appear that the Soviet engineers
invold-with their own counterpart looked at the data with Less than
expected excitement. Although-lit Would appear that they_.,i-rit to
incorporate the informaticv/Compenents, they considered the
I nformation to be more of a "link" J-ather that the final answeH.
(S/NF/SK) COMMENTSIL Sourcevtxmtinues to provide very
Approvect?Farammitaiaomwas :trAtesoDFLarwrgat89806)00630001-9
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interesting data on this rather unusual aspect of the tasking
package. It should be noted that the questions concerning the
possibility of US Stealth technology being passed to the Soviets was
couched in very_ambiguous_praseology_in an. attempt to avoid
"forcing" th& concept on Source's consciousness and yet preparing Her /
for the tasking in a manner that the concept of espionage involving
Stealth was the actual tasking. It cannot be assumed that even
'though the question was couched in "polibilj.tic, "potentials"
etc., that, the Source, nevertheless, perceived the true meaning of
the tasking and with this "conscimm" knowledge delivered up
' information that may have been tainted by this "left brain" analytic
concept. The fact that She did provide some definitive data, e.g., a
man with an in hand perhaps even in a cast, and data
pertaining the to acquisition of the information, may provide the
.opportunity to confirm and/or refute portions of .this report sO
r..outine counterintelligence investigative procedures._
SG1J
Interviewer
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rzeirozyt
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(When filled in)
Page 1
Project: Start: i?60
Sanctuary: t6eY5
Date -
Session: tac-'
Source: 079
Co rdinate:
Frontload:
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Notes:
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(when filled in) Draft
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27 ,AUG 87
SOURCE 079
I: FIRST FELT THAT I WAS IN AN OPEN, CIRCULAR AREA WITH THE
SECOND AIRCRAFT AND I COULD SEE MEN AROUND THE OBJECT. THEY WERE
LOOKING DOWN INSIDE THE AIRCRAFT, CLOSING IT, AND SHUTTING IT, I
FELT AS THOUGH THEY ."ZIPPED" IT UP,
AS I MOVE INSIDE THE AIRCRAFT, I COULD SEE MEN WALKING
AROUND THE AIRCRAFT AND I COULD SEE THE CONTROLLER DRIVING THE
AIRCRAFT. I COULD SEE MEN TALKING AND MAKING DECISIONS ONCE
INSIDE THE AIRCRAFT. THE AIRCRAFT HAD MANY COMPARTMENTS AND I
COULD NOT SEE INSIDE ALL OF THEM.
THEN I COULD SEE THAT SOMETHING HAD FALLEN FROM A SMALL
STORAGE ROOM AND ALTHOUGH THERE WAS NOT MUCH DAMAGE, IT WAS
DECIDED BY A MAN OR A SMALL GROUP OF MEN THAT THIS WAS A GOOD
OPPORTUNITY TO DO AN EXCHANGE OF SOME HARDWARE PARTS.
THIS DECISION WAS MADE ON.THE_ SPOT AND IT WAS NOT PLANNED
OUT. THERE WAS AN EXCHANGE THAT TOOK PLACE BETWEEN MILITARY MEN
AT A LOCATION THAT IS KNOWN TO ALWAYS DE BUSY BUT DURING THE
EXCHANGE THE LOCATION WAS NOT BUSY. / THE MAIN FRAME OF THE
AIRCRAFT WAS IN BOXES AND WAS PICKED UP BY THESE MEN AND WAS USED
TO BUILD THE FIRST AIRCRAFT.
AT THE END OF THIS SESSION, I FELT THAT A MAN WAS PHYSICALLY /0---
HURT BY ANOTHER MAN. /
/7-
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