FERMENT SEEN IN SOVIET POLICY

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Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 
CIA-RDP96-00789R000100160006-8
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RIFPUB
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K
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1
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November 4, 2016
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December 7, 1998
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6
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Publication Date: 
June 21, 1984
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NSPR
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Approved For Release 2000/08/08 : CIA-RDP96-00789R000100160006-8 p THE WALL STREET JOURNAL 30 Thursday, June 21, 1984 Ferment Seen in Soviet Policy By DAVID IGNATIUS Staff Reporter of TilF: WALL STRE FIT JUU RNAL WASHINGTON-If Soviet policy seems confused to Western observers these days, there may be a simple reason: it is con- fused. Senior Reagan administration officials believe the Soviet leadership is in the midst of an unusual internal debate over foreign and domestic policies, in which some Soviet officials are privately criticiz- ing their hard-line superiors. In the Ameri- can view, tlnS-Soviet debate offers new op- portunities and riskrfor the U.S. in a pe- riod of frosty superpower relations. The latest example of Soviet uncer- tainty, U.S. officials argue, is the Krem- lin's treatment of President Reagan's re- cent remarks about a summit meeting with Soviet leader Konstantin Chernenko. Moscow finally got around this week to re- porting in the Soviet news media about Mr. Reagan's offer last Thursday of a summit, characterizing it as election-year rhetoric. But administration officials say the Krem- lin still hasn't taken a clear position on whether it favors a summit and what should be discussed. "There seems to be a fascinating uncer- tainty in the Soviet elite right now," says a administration official who deals with Soviet affairs. He believes that, on the summit issue, the Soviets "don't want to close off any option" and are "wary of denouncing" a meeting and thus adding to their current international Isola lion . high-ranking But as administration officials read the ev- U.S. intelligence about what goes on in side the Kremlin is always murky at best. idence, the current debate pits the hard- line views of Soviet Foreign Minister An dreg Gromyko against more pragmatic ar- guments advanced by officials who deal primarily with economic policy , such as Politburo members Mikhail Gorbachev and Nikolay Tikhanov. The Gromyko group seems to be argu- that the Reagan administration is fun ing anti-Soviet and can't be trusted damentally under any The other fac- to be taking a more cautious line, arguing that the Soviet Union needs Western technology and modern manage meat for its economy, and that it makes tion appears to a propagandistic Ra^agan adminis- sense to keep channels open to the U.S.- even tration. There is a sharper d to o over eco nomic policy. Some senit ynviet econo mists, perhaps with suppo :rom Mr. Gor- cials, symbolized these days by Politburo member Grigoriy Romanov, insist that re- form will weaken the Communist Party's political power and argue that the best eco- nomic medicine is to crack the whip and maintain discipline. Presiding over this contentious collec- tive leadership is Mr. Chernenko. U.S. offi- cials describe him as a weak leader, a "staff man" and "appointments secre- tary," who succeeded Yuri Andropov this year on the condiljon that he would allow unusual autonomy to'his"fellow politburo members, such as Mr. Gromyko and Mr. Gorbachev, in their areas of expertise. The Reagan administration may be overestimating the degree of friction in the the U.S.S.R. is run by a gaggle, rather than a tightly knit body." was telling American officials early this year that the Soviets would come to the Olympics; suddenly, the policy switched. Administration officials also note that the Soviets seemed eager to discuss dead- locked arms-control issues with former na- tional security adviser Brent Scowcroft and former Chairman of the Joint Chiefs David Jones, but when they arrived in Moscow last March for confidential discus- sions, they were rebuffed by top Soviet of- ficials. -Politburo portfolios. Two younger Po- litburo members who appear to be rivals to succeed Mr. Chernenko, 53-year-old Mr. Gorbachev and 61-year-old Mr. Romanov, recently have gained added responsibility. U.S. officials believe that Mr. Gorbachev, as the senior member of the party secre- tariat on the Politburo after Mr. Cher- nenko, is now the No. 2 party leader, with . Kremlin and the extent of Moscow's for intriguing, U.S. officials say, is that no sin eign and domestic problems. U.S. officials gle member of the Politburo appears t 'may also be mistaken if they assume the have taken control of the most importan Soviets will agree soon to real improve portfolio of all-the responsibility for run ments in superpower relations, such as a ning the party's "organizational work," summit meeting. which confers enormous patronag One Soviet expert at the State Depart- power. ment argues, for example, that the roots of -Military. U.S. officials are studyin the current hard-line policy go back to No an interview by Soviet Chief of Staff Niko vember 1982, when Leonid Brezhnev was lai Ogarkov that appears last month in th still the Soviet leader; the Kremlin isn't military newspaper Red Star. ~ViarshalI likely to reverse this policy quickly, he e surprising comments, maintains. This official also contends that Including a sta policy conflict in the Kremlin is the rule, n` jurthei clear forces rather than the exception. sense becoming e&S; a call for But there are some intriguing signs of re uncertainty and friction in the kremlin ` deep strike'` non aide weao ns U.S. these days. Administration officials cite officials believe he was suggesting the the following examples: need for reform in Soviet military doctrine -Sniping and rumor-mongering. In re and lobbying for more spending on high- cent conversations with Westerners, So tech weaponry. viets have criticized Mr. Gromyko and Mr. Analysts in and out of the Reagan ad - Chernenko. Some of these comments seem ministration disagree about how to read to reflect rumor-mongering by the KGB, these tea leaves, and about whether they the Soviet security and intelligence force, imply a gradual softening of Soviet policy .S. But most Soviet experts but U.S. officials believe they may signal a toward the U.S. real debate within the Soviet leadership. seem convinced that the Kremlin-after "Russians all over the place-official and months of strident bluster toward the semiofficial-are now talking about politics U.S.-is now on what one analyst calls "a in the Kremlin more openly than they have sticky wicket." in years," says one senior administration "You have a situation emerging where official. He notes, for example, that some the U.S.S.R. is run by a gaggle, rather officials of the Soviet Foreign Ministry than a tightly-knit body, and what you're have suggested that Mr. Gromyko may be getting is a more dissonant information excessively hard-line. flow flow," says one State Department offi- -The March Switch. Many U.S. officials cial. believe something happened in March that Adds a top Soviet expert for several re- bachev, contend that the viet economy led to a hardenin of S t cent U.S. ad s r t'o "Soviet policy is b di>> 4aR -e#ige- 0O$O8 eyGl thRMU RA?ct}Otl~ i in re seeing now is ages geater authority. Bi hard-line offi- head of the Soviet Olympic Committee, the tip of the iceberg." growing involvement in foreign affairs; Mr. Romanov, meanwhile, appears to have taken control of "administrative organs"- such as tho KGB, the police and the courts-as well as defense industry What's - o t - e g - e