INTERFACE OF IGFP PERSONNEL AND OUTSIDE ANALYSTS

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: STARGATE
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP96-00788R002000250028-4
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 2
• Document Creation Date: November 4, 2016
• Document Release Date: May 12, 2000
• Sequence Number: 28
• Publication Date: March 24, 1980
• Content Type: MF

Approved For Release 2001/04/ 8ROO2000250028-4
IAFM-OPS-HU-SA 24 March 1980
MEMORANDUM FOR: MURRAY B. WATT, LTC, MI, Chief, Special Activities Brat,
ADCSOPS-HUMINT, INSCOM
SUBJECT: Interface of IGFP Personnel and Outside Analysts(U)
1. (S) If remote viewing is to ever become a viable asset to the intelligence
collection effort, certain obstacles, which are not a direct component of the
controversal viewing phenomenon will have to be reduced or eliminated completely.
a. One of the greatest obstacles will be the interface of the remote
viewing collection effort with the taskers and users in the intelligence
community. Even if the outside POC is Grill Flame cleared the interface will
still be more difficult than between other intelligence disciplines. Because of
~./ the nature of the subject few cleared POCs or analysts will be neutral on the
subject.
0
b. Our experience indicates there will be the true believer who probably
doesn't understand the phenomenon but is overly excited about the potential,
and his own involvement in the project. This type of individual will probably
believe almost everything that is provided by the RV net. The undisciplined
statement# made by this type of individual will result in a reduction in credibility
of the IGFP.
c. The other extreme is the type of individual who states he wouldn't
believe it even if it was proven to him. This type will neglect to perform the
necessary follow-up research required to exploit RV data.
6 2. (S) The POC analyst must be properly indoctrinated in the special require-
ments necessary to efficiently task and utilize this bizarre approach to
intelligence collection. It should be noted, however, that the prevelent
problem encountered with POC/analyst thus far have not been primarily due to
lack of RV indoctrination.
a. For example, one analyst is reluctant to provide another POC. This
would not present a problem if the analyst were readily available in person or
by phone. However, his many commitments makes it extremely difficult to locate
him at one of the many places he visits regularly. Call-back messages are apparently
not passed on to this individual because calls are seldom returned. Some
analysts fail to attend scheduled meetings to evaluate recently collected raw
data and develop targeting data for the next RV session. At least two analysts
GRILL FLAME
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are usually so busy that they forget to call and cancel or delay the meeting.
This leaves the RV coordinating analyst (CA) with viewers scheduled to work
a target area without a valid EEI.
b. There is some indication that the quality and accuracy of a viewer's
impressions is highly vulnerable during the last few hours prior to a scheduled
session. The viewers are highly sensitive to subtle indications that all is
not well with their specific session or that it is being managed in an un-
professional manner. Lack of timeliness on the part of some outside analyst,
in particular INSCOM analyst, has caused considerable extra work for the IGFP
analyst.
c. Target research for mission planning, data analysis, and data feedback
to the coordinating analyst should be provided by the POC. Coordinating analyst
should not be expected to become an expert in all areas that we might be required
to support. If CA's are required to do this it could reduce IGFP's credibility
during the initial learning training phase of the project.
3. c: ih
(S) Outside analyst must be required to restrict this tasking to the type of
targets that cannot be easily targeted by other techniques. Some analysts have
provided an ICR on a particular country and then seemed reluctant to provide
specific tasking that was planned relative to the unique abilities of the source.
----- Tasking must be designed to provide the viewer with enough data to
00
access the particular requirement witI
roviding information that would color
the response.
4. (S) I suggest that a well thought out SOP be developed for the interface of
IGFP project officer with those in the intelligence community.
~ ol
HARTLEIGH RENT
GS-l2
Senior IGFP Analyst
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